ML20202B848

Rev 1 to Colr,Cycle 9 for Songs,Unit 2

ML20202B848
Person / Time
Site:	San Onofre
Issue date:	12/15/1997
From:	SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA EDISON CO.
To:
Shared Package
ML20202B837	List: ML20202B831 ML20202B848 ML20202B862
References
NUDOCS 9802120110
Download: ML20202B848 (32)

Text

_ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _

Enclosure Core Operating Limits Report Cycle 9 San Jnofre Nuclear Generating Station S0his Unit 2 4

9902120110 980206 PDR ADOCK 05000361 P PDR

COLR MTC core op.r.: inn u .it a. port LCS 3.1.100 L 3.1 REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS LCS 3.1.100 Moderator Temperature Coefficient (MTC)

The MTC shall be > [more positive than) -3.7 E-4 Ak/k/*F at RTP.

AND The steady state MTC shall be no more positive than the upper MTC limit shown in Figure 3.1.100-1.

VALIDITY STATEMENT: Effective upon start of Cycle 9.

APPLICABILITY: MODES I and 2 with K.,, 2 1.0 ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME Refer to LCO 3.1.4 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY Refer to LCO 3.1.4 L

SAN ON0FRE--UNIT 2 3.1-100-1 Rev. I 1/15/97

COLR MTC cor. %.e. tina u.iti s.wm LCS 3.1.100 NOTE: Predicted MTC values shall be adjusted based on Mode 2 measuremerits to permit direct comparison with Figu- 3.1.100 1.

Figure 3.1.100-1 MOST POSITIVE MTC VS. POWER 0.6 l~ 0.5 0./. N O.3 N

" 0.2 N N

3 0.1 x

- 0.0 N -

h-0.1 --

N

-0.2 Most Positive MTC Limit urecea ex,x,p3. o.s.co.oo. x % aie>

\,

-0.3 q *--

-0.4 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90-100 POWER LEVEL (% RTP)

SAN ONOFRE--UNIT 2 3.1-100-2 Rev. 2 May 13, 1997

_ __ _ _j

COLR MTC core o r. tine u.it n rt LCS 3.1.100

. LCS 3.1.100 Moderator Temperature Coefficient (MTC)

BASES The limitations on MTC are provided to ensure that the assumptions used in the the accident and transient analysis remain valid throughout each fuel cycle.

The limiting events with respect-to_the MTC-limits are: a CEA ejection at the beginning of core life and a main steam line break at the end of core life.

The Surveillance Requirements for measurement of the MTC during each fuel cycle are adequate to confirm the MTC value since this coefficient changes '

slowly due principally to the reduction in RCS boron concentration associated with fuel burnup. The_ confirmation that the measured MTC value is within its limit provides assurance that the coefficient will be maintained within acceptable values throughout each fuel cycle, P

SAN ONOFRE--UNIT 2 3.1-100-3 Rev. 2 May 13, 1997 1

COLR Regulating CEA cor, one. tina unit nort Insertion Limits LCS 3.1.102 3.1 REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS LCS 3.1.102 Regulating CEA Insertion Limits The regulating CEA groups shall be limited to the withdrawal sequence, and insertion limits specified in Figure 3.1.102-1.

VALIDITY STATEMENT: Effective upon TSIP Implementation.

APPLICABILITY: MODE I and 2

\

ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME Refer to LC0 3.1.7 <

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY Refer to LCO 3.1.7 SAN ON0FRE--UNIT 2 3.1-102-1 Rev. O April 24, 1996

?.-['

s: 4 x

l

!! REGULA11NG CEA WITHDRAWAL VS THERMAL POWER a

r",

c i'i

~

108" GP. 6  ;

1

$ /

ro 1.0 N 8:

s O E E 0.9 - 3 -

es 0.8 -

E w

-i Cg i

"  ?

8 0.7 -

e 8

• 2 3 h Ti ' Transient w ,E y 0.6

- gs .

{2 inseition Limit -

f=n

- . 3 D w *8

$ 0.5 see &

@ c o

ro .~ E ", o rm E E - 0.4 - E E - I

1. s':

~

. 0 C 0.3 -

E!

) 5! /

50" GP.4 F

,o 3 _ _ _ _ _ __.______________ _ _di _______________ . _, ,,.

U 0.2 -

\ \ \ ',

s gp,3 -

0 120* GP. 6 60* GP. 6 70" GP. 5 x 5 0.1 - 's -

,4

- 4' o 0.0 3 GP. 6 G8. 4 S, e i i i i i I I i i I I ee 5 150 120 90 60 30 0 150 120. 90 60 30 0 g d c:_,

,o GP. 5 GP. 3 *8 w

? I i i i i l l I I ,ry

- 150 120 90 60 30 0 150 120 90 **7*

8 532

• CEA Withdrawal-Inches E - _ _ -- . - - - - - - - - - . . _ . . . .

COLR . Regulating CEA core o..r.etas ti.it a ort Insertion Limits LCS 3.1.102 LCS 3.1.102 Regulating CEA Insertion Limits Bases The Core Operating Limits Report (COLR) Licensee Controlled Specification (LCS) for Regulating Control Element Assembly (CEA) Insertion Limits provides CEA withdrawal sequence and insertion limits while operating in Modes 1 and 2.

The long term and short term steady state insertion limits and transient insertion limits- for each regulating CEA group are specified graphically as a function of the fraction of rated Thermal Power. These limits ensure that an acceptable power distribution and the minimum shutdown margin is maintained, and the potential effects of CEA misalignment are limited to an acceptable level. Limited deviations from the nominal requirements are permitted with Technical Specification (TS) ACTION statements providing additional compensatory restrictions and time limits. TS Surveillance Requirements provide assurance that necessary system components are OPERABLE and CEA group  ;

. posittens that may approach or exceed acceptable limi.s are detected, with adequate time for an Operator to take any required Action. 3 l

l SAN ON0FRE--UNIT 2 3.1-10?-3 Rev. O April 24, 1996

COLR Part-Length CEA cor w.r. tina u.it a.mt Insertion Limits LCS 3.1.103 3.1 REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS LCS 3.1.103 Part-Length CEA Insertion Limits The Part-Length CEA groups shall be limited to the insertion limits specified in Figure 3.1.103-1.

VAllDITY STATEMENT: Effective upon TSIP Implementation.

APPLICABILITY: MODE 1 > 20% RTP ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME Refer to LC0 3.1.8 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY Refer to LC0 3.1.8 s

SAN ONCFRE--UNIT 2 3.1-103-1 Rev. O April 24, 1996

Y ..

l z

!= PART LENGTH CEA INSERTION UMIT VS THERMAL POWER C

[ b

• 8 1*00 m I I I I I I I I 1

) I I I I 6 0.90 -

D 0.80

< 112.5" (75%) p m 8 0 .70 -

2 w

A fi h e

e g 0.60 En L w g aO o  ; &

" E ;O 0 0.50 -

', \ Transient N 5 m 5 I U*" 5

- 0.40 2 O l g 0.30 1.ong Term steady State

l / Insertion Umit i

= 0 0.20 2 0 22.5' (15%)

it o 0.10 -

i 0 i I I I i i i I i I ' I I I 5 0 150 140 130 120 110 100 90 80 70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0 $

Port length CEA Position, Inches Withdrawn -bh L" n 8 809 L__--------_

(T)lR- Part-Length CEA c.r. o r. tine u.it a rt insertion Limits LCS 3.1.103 LCS 3.1.103 Par

• Length CEA Insertion Limits Bases The Core Operating Limits Report (COLR) Licensee Controlled Specification (LCS) for Part length Control Element Assembly (CEA) Insertion Limits provide the part length CEA insertion limits while operating in Mode 1 and-reactor power > 20% of RTP. The transient and steady state ) art length CEA insertion limits are specified graphically as a function of tie fraction of rated Thermal Power. The part length CEA limits ensure that safety analysis assumptions for ejected CEA worth and power distribution peaking factors are preserved. Limited deviations frota the nominal requirements are permitted with Technical Specification (TS) ACTION statements p oviding additional compensatory restrictions and time limits. TS Surve.11ance Requirements provide assurance that necessary' system components a*e OPERABLE and that CEA positions that may approach or exceed acceptable limits are detected, with adequate time for an Operator to take any required Action.

SAN ONOFRE--UNIT 2 3.1-103-3 Rev. O April 24, 1996 m

CT2[R CEA Misalignment core o r. tina u.iti enert Power Reduction t

LCS 3.1.105 l 3.1 REnCTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS LCS 3.1.105 Control Element Assembly (CEA) Misalignment Power Reduction All full length CEAs shall be OPERABLE and all full and part length CEAs shall be aligned to within 7 inches of all other CEAs in its group.

VAllDITY STATEMENT: Effective upon TSIP Implementation APPLICABILITY: MODES 1 and 2.

ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPl.ETION TIME

?

A. One non-group 6 full A.1 Initiate THERMAL POWER In accordance length CEA trippable reduction in accordance with Figure ar; misaligned from with Figure 3.1.105-1 3.1.105-1.

its group by requirements.

> 7 inches.

B. One group 6 CEA B.1 Initiate THERMAL POWER in accordance {

trippable and reduction in accordance with Figure '

misaligned from its with Figure 3.1.105-2 3.1.105-2.

group by > 7 inches, requirements.

C. One part length CEA C.1 Initiate THERMAL POWER In accordance initially 2 112.5" reduction in accordance with Figure misaligned from its with Figure 3.1.105-3 3.1.105-3.

group by > 7 inches, requirements.

D. One part length CEA D.1 Initiate THERMAL PUWER In accordance initially < 112.5" reduction in accordance with Figure misaligned from its with Figure 3.1.105-4 3.1.105-4.

group by > 7 inches. requirements.

(continued)

SAN ON0FRE--UNIT 2 3.1-105-1 Rev. 0 July 29,1996

COLR CEA Misalignment i

cor. o .u u.ii. n es Power Reduction 1 LCS 3.1.105 I ACTIONS (continued)

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME E. Required Action and E.1 Refer to TS 3.1.5. In accordance associated Completion with TS 3.1.5.

Time of Condition A, B, C, or D not met.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY Refer to LC0 3.1.5 f

SAN ONOFRE--UNIT 2 3.1-105-2 Rev. O July 29, 1996 I

c. .. . .

, COlR CEA Hisalignment cor, on.r. tina u.ite a.=n Power Reduction

LCS 3.1.105 REQUIRED POWER REDUCTION AFTER SINGLE NON-GROUP 6 FULL LENGTH CEA DEVIATION

• 20 -

- REGION OF ACCEPTABLE (120 Minutes,15%)

I 33 '

(

O OPERATION F (60 Minutes,10%)

0 10 -

8 e

5- REGION OF UNACCEPTABLE (15 Minutes,0%) OPERATION 0 :: -, , , , ,

0 20 40 60 80 100 120 TIME AFTER DEVIATION (MINUTES)

FIGURE 3.1.105-1 When core power is reduced to 50% of rated power per this limit curve, further reduction is not required by this specification.

SAN ONOFRE--UNIT 2 3.1-105-3 Rev. 1 02/19/97

~ _ u

COLR CEA Misalignment core o r. tie,a u.it. n. ort Power Reduction LCS 3.1.105 REQUIRED POWER REDUCTION AFTER SINGLE GROUP 6 FULL LENGTH CEA DEVIATION

• S

[ 20 g REGION OF a: 15 - ACCEPTABLE E

z OPERATION o

P (120 Minutes,10%)

0 10 -

i 8

e E

(60 Minutes,5%) '

5-REGION OF

a. UNACCEPTABLE (15 Minutes,0%)

0= . . . . .

0 20 40 60 80 100 120 TIME AFTER DEVIATION (MINUTES)

FIGURE 3.1.105-2 When core power is reduced to 50% of rated power per this limit curve, further reduction is not required by this specification.

SAN ON0FRE--UNIT 2 3.1-105-4 Rev. 1 02/19/97 4

'^

COLR CEA Misalignment en, con. tina u.it. eart Power Reduction LCS 3.1.105 REQUIRED POWER a50VCTION AFTER SINGLE PART LEN6id CEA DEVIATION (CEA INITIALLY 2 112.5 INCHES WITHDRAWN) 20 E

e ts -

NO 6

POWER S

U 10 -

$ REDUCTION

, E 5 REQUIRED 0 ::  : , .  ; . .  ::

0 20 40 60 80 100 120 TIME AFTER DEVIATION (MINUTES)

FIGURE 3.1.105-3 SAN ONOFRE--UNIT 2 3.1-105-5 Rev. 2 02/19/97 j

COLR CEA Hisalignment core om.ti,.a u.it sert Power Reduction LCS 3.1.105 REQUIRED POWER REDUCTION AFTER SINGLE PART LENGTH CEA DEVIATION *

(CEA INITIALLY < 112.5 INCHES WITHDRAWN)

~3 20 REGION OF 6

e 15 - ACCEPTABLE E OPERATION 5

A U 10 -

8 e

(120 Minutes,5%)

E (60 Minutes,2%)

REGION OF (15 Minutes,0%) M 2 0=  ; , , , , .

0 20 40 60 80 100 120 TIME AFTER DEVIATION (MINUTES)

FIGURE 3.1.105-4 When core power is reduced to 50% of rated power per this limit curve, further reduction is not required by this specification.

6 SAN ONOFRE--UNIT 2 3.1-105-6 Rev. 1 02/19/97

l- COLR CEA Misalignment core o retina u.it n rt Power Reduction LCS 3.1.105 LCS 3.1.105 CEA Misalignment Power Reduction Bases l LCS 3.1.105 l

The Core Operating Limits Report- (COLR) Licensee Controlled Specification (LCS) for Control Element Assembly (CEA) Misalignment Power Reduction provides the power reduction required following a single CEA becoming misaligned from its group by greater than 7 inches while operating in Modes 1 and 2. There are 4 separate power reduction figures provided, with application being dependent on the type of CEA, either " full-length" or "part-length", and the initial position of the "part-length" CEA. For " full-length" CEAs, there are two "sub types" identified: "non Group 6" and " Group 6". For "part-length" CEAs, there are two initial conditions identified: " initially a 112.5 inches withdrawn" or " initially < 112.5 inches withdrawn".

The reason for establishing four separate power reduction figures is that full-length group 6 CEAs and/or part-length CEAs are typically used during normal operation. Therefore, a misalignment would most likely involve a CEA in one of these CEA groups. Furthermore, due to the design of the part-length CEAs and their associated insertion limits, it is possible for an inward misalignment to add oositive reactivity to the core. Thus, the initial-position of a single misaligned part-length CEA must be considered.

The required powet reductions are specified graphically as a function of time following the CEA deviation event. For the first 15 minutes, no power reduction is necessary since there is sufficient thermal irargin-already reserved in the Core Operating Limits Supervisory Systerr (COLSS) or, if COLSS

-is out-of-service, the amount of thermal margin administratively established i

by LCS 3.2.101, Departure from Nucleate Boiling Ratio (DNBR). After 15 minutes, a power reduction may be required to increase the thermal margin to offset the build-in of Xenon and its detrimental affect on the radial core power distribution (called " distortion").

Reactor power is required to be4 reduced to compensate for the increased radial power peaking that occurs following a CEA misalignment. At lower power levels, the potentially adverse consequences of increased radial power peaking can be eliminated.

The magnitudes of the required power reductions differ because of the mechanical design differences between full-length and part length CEAs and the core physics characteristics due to the fuel load pattern. There are two (continued)

SAN ON0FRE--UNIT 2 3.1-105-7 Rev. O July 29, 1996 l

COLR CEA Misalignment c.c. oc.r. tin u.its n rt Power Reduction LCS 3.1.105 LCS'3.1.105 CEA Alignment Power Reduction l Bases-major mechanical differences between full-length and part-length CEAs: the lengths and type: of neutron absorbers. In a part-length CEA, the neutron absorber is Inconel and is positioned entirely in the lower half of the CEA.

In a-full length CEA, there are two types of neutron absorbers: silver-indium-cadmium, located in the bottom 12.5 inches of the CEA, and 136 inches of boron carbide, located above the silver-indium cadmium.

Since inconel is neutronically less reactive than boron carbide and silver--

indium-cadmium, there will be less of a distortion of the core power distribution as a results of a misalignment of a single part-length CEA initially a 112.5 inches withdrawn.- Therefore, the magnitude of the power reduction for a part-length CEA initially a 112.5 inches withdrawn is less than that for a full-length CEA. However. the positive reactivity added by the misalignment of a single part-length CEA initially < 112.5 inches withdrawn and the res,ulting power increase is more significant than the difference in the absorbers and a power reduction is required to return power to s 50% RTP where there is sufficient margin already reserved.

One of the core physics characteristics established by-the fuel load pattern

-is CEA reactivity. CEA reactivity depends _on the power being produced i' the j

fuel assembly into which the CEA is-inserted. Analysis of a single group 6 '

CEA ni; alignment need only be considered with the power being produced in the fuel assemblies into which a group 6 CEA could be inserted. For-all other .

full-length CEAs, the most adverse conditions must be considered. Due to the physical location of group 6. it is unlikaly that misalignment of.a single group 6 CEA will be most-limiting; and typically it is not. Therefore, the-magnitude of the power reduction for a group 6 CEA is less than that for the limiting full-length non-group 6 CEA.

A maximum of 120 minutes is allotted to concurrently reduce power and/or eliminate the misalignment. The 120 minute limit is based solely on the duration evaluated in the applicable analyses. 'Since there is no safety analysis basis provided beyond the 120 minute limit, Technical Specification 3.1.5 requires that the plant be placed in Mode 3 within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> after reaching the 120 minute limit. However, during the power reduction to achieve Mode 3 conditions, continued efforts to re-align the affected CEA are acceptable and recommended.

At all times throughout a required power reduction, THERMAL POWER shall be reduced by greater than or equal to the amount specified by the appropriate figure for the given time-following the CEA deviation.

(continued)

SAN ONOFRE -UNIT 2 3.1-105-8 Rev. 0 July 29, 1996 J

COLR CEA Misalignment cor. op.r.it u.it n mo Power Reduction LCS 3.1.105 LCS 3.1.105 CEA Hisalignment Power Reduction Bases The analysis performed to determine the figures contains the following basic assumptions:

1. Only one CEA is misaligned;

2. The magnitude of the required power reduction is determined from the increase in the integrated radial peaking factor (F,), represented by static and dynamic distortion factors, the Power Operating Limit (POL)-to-F, ratio and the thermal margin reserved in COLSS as a function of power level;

3. The increase in F, is evaluated for only 120 minutes;

4. The thermal mare,in increase accompanying the decrease in core inlet temperature is used to compensate for the thermal margin decrease accompanying the decrease in RCS pressure;

5. The chanto in the axial power distribution due to the misalignment of a single C'A i has been considered, when applicable, in the power reduction curves;

6. Coro power is assumed to remain at its initial value for the full-length CEA and the part-length CEA initially 2112.5 inches withdrawn analyses.

No credit is taken for the decrease in the power level due to the negative reactivity added as a result of an inward deviation; and

7. The increase in core power for the part-length CEA initially < 112.5 inches withdrawn analysis is explicitly considered.

SAN ONOFRE--UNIT 2 3.1-105-9 Rev. 1 December 2, 1996 l

COLR LHR c.c. e m etins ti.iti asee n LCS 3.2.100 i-

=3.2 POWER DISTRIBUTION !!!IITS LCS 3.2.100 Linear Heat Rate (LHR)

LHR shall notiexceed 13.0 kW/ft.

VALIDITY STATEMENT: Effective upon TSIP implementation.

APPLICABILITY:- MODE 1 with THERMAL POWER > 20% RTP.-

ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME-Refer to LC0 3.2.1

,; SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE -FREQUENCY Refer to LC0 3.2.1 i r

SAN ON0FRE--UNIT 2 3.2-100-1 Rev. O April 24, 1996

COLR LHR cor. om.two u.its awt LCS 3.2.100 LCS 3.2.100 Linear Heat Rate (LHR)

BASES The COLR limitation on LHR ensures that in the event of a LOCA, the peak temperature of the fuel cladding will not exceed 2200*F. Actions and Surveillance Requirements are provided by the Technical Specifications (TS).

Either of the two core power distribution monitoring systems, the Core Operating Limit Supervisory system (COLSS) or the Local Power Density channels in the Core Protection Calculators (CPCs), provide adequate monitoring of the r core power distribution and are capable of verifying that the LHR does not exceed its limits. The COLSS performs this function by continuously monitoring the core power distribution and calculating a core power cperating limit corresponding to the allowable peak linear heat rate. With the reactor operating at or below this calculated power level the LHR limit is not exceeded.

The COLSS calculated core power and the COLSS calculated core power operating limits based on LHR are continuously monitored and displayed to the operator.

A COLSS alarm is annunciated in the event that the core power exceeds the core power operating limit. This provides adequate margin to the LHR operating limit for normal steady state operation. Normal reactor power transients or equipment failures which do not require a reactor trip may result in this core power operating limit being exceeded. In the event this occurs, COLSS alarms will be annunciated. If the event which causes the COLSS limit to be exceeded results in conditions which approach the core safety limits, a reactor trip will be initiated by the Reactor Protective Instrumentation. The COLSS calculation of the LHR includes appropriate penalty factors which provide, with a 95/95 probability / confidence level, that the maximum LHR calculated by COLSS is conservative with respect to the actual maximum LHR existing in the core. These penalty factors are determined from the uncertainties associated with planar radial peaking measurement, mgineering design factors, axial densification, software algorithm modelling, computer processing, rod bow and core power measurement.

The core power distribution and a corresponding power operating limit based on LHR are more accurately determined by the COLSS using the incore detector system. The CPCs determine LHR less accurately with the excore detectors.

Therefore, when COLSS is not available the TS LCOs are more restrictive due to the uncertainty of the CPCs. However, when COLSS initially becomes inoperable, the added margin associated with CPC uncertainty is not immediately required and a 4 hour4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> Act;on is provided for appropriate corrective action.

Parameters required to maintain the operating limit power level based on LHR, margin to DNB and total core power are also monitored by the CPCs assuming minimum core power of 20% RATED THERMAL POWER. The 20% Rated Thermal Power (continued)

{

SAN ON0FRE--UNIT 2 3.2-100-2 Rev. O April 24, 1996

_ ._ _j

COLR LHR c.c. o .. tine u.it. n et LCS 3.2.100 BASES (continued) threshold is due to the neutron flux detector system being inaccurate below 20% core power. Core noise level at low power is too large to obtain usable detector readings. --Therefore, in the event that the COLSS is not being used, operation within the DNBR limits with COLSS out of servict. can be maintained by utilizing a predetermined local pcder density margin and a total core power-limit in the CPC !. rip channels. The above listed uncertainty penalty factors plus those associ ted with startup test acceptance criteria are also included in the CPCs.

While operating with the COLSS out of service, t5e CPC calculated LHR is monitored every 15 minutes to-identify any adverse trend in thermal margin.

The increased monitoring of LHR during the 4 hour4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> action period ensures that adequate safety margin is maintained for anticipated operational occurrences and no postulated accident results in consequences more severe than those described in Chapter 15 of the UFSAR.

i SAN 0N0FRE--UNIT 2 3.2-100-3 Rev. O April 24, 1996

COLR ONBR con o ntin u.its h rt LCS 3.2.101 3.2 POWER DISTRIBUTION _ LIMITS LCS 3.2.101 The Departure from Nucleate Boiling Ratio (DNBR) shall be -

maint.<,ined by one of the following methods:

a. Maintaining Core Operating Limit Supervisory System (COLSS) calculated core power less than or equal to COLSS calculated core power operating limit based on DNBR (when COLSS is in service,_ and either one or both control element assembly calculators (CEACs) are OPERABLE);

[ b. Maintaining COLSS calculated core power less than or ecual .to -

COLSS calculated core power operating limit based on DhBR decreased by 13.0% RTP (when COLSS is in service and neither CEAC is OPERABLE);

c. Operating within limits as specified in Figure 3.2.101-1A for initial power a 90% RTP or Figure 3.2.101-1B for initial power < 90% RTP using any 0PERABLE core protection calculator (CPC both)CEACs are OPERABLE); orchannel (when COLSS is out of service and N

N d. Operating within limits as specified in Figure 3.2.101-2 using any OPERABLE CPC channel (when COLSS is out of service and neither CEAC is OPERABLE).

-VALIDITY STATEMENT: Effective upon TSIP implementation.

APPLICABILIlY: MODE 1 with THERMAL POWER > 20% RTP.

ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME Refer to LC0 3.2.4 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY Refer to Lc0 3.2.4 SAN ONOFRE--UNIT 2 3.2-101-1 Rev. 1 02/19/97

\

COLR onBR c e, one.iion u.it, amrt LCS 3.2.101 E

COLSS OUT OF SERVICE (>=90% RTP)

ONE OR BOTH CEACS OPERABLE 2.5

] 2.4 - REGION OF g ACCEPTABLE to 2.3 - OPERATION 5:.2-2 1-0 d

< 2-g ~

-0.23 <= ASI <= 0.1

.3 1 DNBR >= 0.3

• ASI + 2.0 E ,9 0.1 < ASI <= 0.23 1.8 - DNBR >= 2.03 2

0 17- REGION OF UNACCEPTABLE 1.6 - OPERATION 1.5 , . , ,

-0.3 0.2 -0.1 0 0.1 0.2 0.3 CPC AXlAL SHAPE INDEX (ASI)

Figure 3.2.101-1A DNBR OPERATING LIMIT BASED ON CORE PROTECTION CALCULATORS

- COLSS OUT OF SERVICE

- ONE OR BOTH CEACS OPERABLE SAN ONOFRE--UNIT 2 3.2-101-2 Rev. 1 02/19/97

C0!.R DNBR core op rettu u.it n.mt LCS 3.2.101 COLSS OUT OF SERVICE (<90% RTP) 4 ONE OR BOTH CEACS OPERABLE

! 2.8 2.7 - REGION OF ACCEPTABLE g2.6- OPERATION E 2.5 -

l 2.4 -

J #

J

< 2.3 -

-0.2 <= ASI <= 0.05 DNBR >= 0.6

• ASI + 2.35 l2.2-3 0.05 < ASI <= 0.2 E DNBR >= 2.38 52.1-2- REGION OF UNACCEPTABLE 3,9 OPERATION 1.8 . .

0.3 0.2 -0.1 0 0.1 0.2 0.3 CPC AXlAL SHAPE INDEX (ASI)

Figure 3.2.101-1B DNBR OPERATING LIMIT BASii)

ON CORE PROTECTION CALCULATOR

- COLSS OUT OF SERVICE

- BOTH CEACS INOPERABLE SAN ON0FRE--UNIT 2 3.2-101-3 Rev. 1 02/19/97

_ ___~

COLR ONBR core m,,r. tina u.it n ort LCS 3.2.101 COLSS OUT OF SERVICE BOTH CEACS INOPERABLE 3.5 34-REGION OF g3.3_ ACCEPTABLE E OPERATION o 3.2 -

3.1 -

J

-0.2 <= ASI <= 0.0 M 3-DNBR >= 1.0

• ASI + 3.1 5 0.0 < ASI <= 0.2 2 9-5 DNBR >= 3.1 2

• 2.8 -

REGION OF

{2.7- UNACCEPTABLE 2.s . OPERATION 2.5 ,

-0.3 -0.2 0.1 0 0.1 0.2 0.3 CPC AXIAL SHAPE INDEX (ASI)

Figure 3.2.101-2 DNBR OPERATING LIMIT BASED ON CORE PROTECTION CALCULATOR

- COLSS OUT OF SERVICE

- BOTH CEACS INOPERABLE SAN ON0FRE--UNIT 2 3.2-101-4 Rev. 1 02/19/97

6 COLR DNBR weom un u.iteumt LCS 3.2.101 LCS 3.2.101 DNBR BASES The COLR limitation on DNBR as a function of Axial Shape Inuex (ASI) represents a conservative envelope of opercting conditions consistent with the safety analysis assumptions and which have been analytically demonstrated adequate to maintain an acceptable minimum DNBR throughout all anticipated 4 operational occurrences, of which the loss cf flow transient is the most limiting. Operation of the core with a DNBP. at or above this limit provides assurance that an acceptable minimum DNBR will be maintained in the event of a loss of flow transient. The TS provides the required Actions and Surveillance Requirements to ensure that the minimum DNBR is maintained.

Either of the two core power distribution monitoring systems, the Core Operating Limit Supervisory System (COLSS) or the DNBR channels in the Core Protection Calculators (CPCs), provide t? equate monitoring of the core power distribution and are capable of verifying that the DNBR does not violate COLR s)ecified limits. The COLSS performs this function by continuously monitoring tie core power distribution and calculating a core operating power limit corresponding to the allowable minimum DNBR. The COLSS calculation of core power operating limit based on the minimum DNBR limit includes appropriate penalty factors which provide, with a 95/95 probability /confidenco level, that the core power limit calculated by COLSS (based on the minimum DNBR limit) is conservative with res;" to the actual core power limit. These penalty 4 factors are determined from the uncertainties at3ociated with planar radial peaking measurement, engineering design factors, state paraneter measurement, software algorithm modeling, computer processing, red bow and core power maasurement.

} Parameters requ' red to maintain the marpln to DNB and total core power are also monitored by the CPCs. In the event that the COLSS is not being used, tnu DNBR margin can be maintained by monitoring with any OPERABLE CPC channel so that the DNBR remains above the predetermined limit as a function of Axial Shape Index. The above listed uncertainty penalty factors are also included in the CPCs, which assume a minimum of 20% of RATED THERMAL POWER. For the condition in which one or both CEACs are operable, the thermal margin requirements are given as a function of power level. One requirement applies to a 90 % R1P and the other applies to < 90% 5JP. The 20% RATED THERMAL POWER threshold is due to the excore neutron flux detector system being less accurate below 20% core power. Core noise level at low power is too large to obtain usable detector readings. The additional CPC uncertainty terms for transient protection are removed from the COLR figures since the curves are intended to monitor the LCO only during steady state operation.

The. core power distribution and a corresponding POL based on DNBR are more accuNtely determined by the COLSS using the incore detector system. The CPCs (continued)

SAN ONOFRE--UNIT 2 3.2-101-5 Rev. 1 02/19/97

COLR DNBR c n o ntin u.it nemt LCS 3.2.101 BASES (continued) determine DNBR less accurately using the excore detectors. When COLSS is not available the TS LCOs are more restrictive due to the uncertainty of the CPCs.

However, when COLSS initially becomes inoperable the added margin associated with CPC uncertainty is not immediately required and a 4 hour4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> ACTION is provided for appropriate corrective action.

A DNBR penalty factor has been included ia the COLSS and CPC DNBR calculation to accommodate the effects of red bow. The amount of rod bow in each assembly i is de3endent bpon the average burnup experienced by that assembly. Fuel assem)1ies that incur hight. average burnup will experience a greater magnitude of rod bow. Conve;sely, lower burnup assemblies will experience less rod bow. In design calculations, the penalty for enh batch required to compensate for rod bow is determined from a batch's maxi'aum average assembly burnup applied to the batch's maximum integrated planar radial power peak. A single net penalty for COLSS and CPC is then determined from the penalties associated with each batch, accounting for the offsetting margins duo to the lower radial power peaks in the higher burnup batches.

While operating with the COLSS out of service, the CP calculated DNBR is

-monitored every 15 minutes to identify any adverse tr and in thermal margin.

The increased monitoring of DNBR during the 4 hour4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> action period ensures that adequate safety margin is maintained for anticipated operational occurrences and no postulated accident results in consequences tore severe thao those described in chapter 15 of the UFSAR. '

j- ~ SAN ONOFRE UNIT 2 3.2-101 6 Rev. 1 02/19/97

COLR ASI c.r. m r.itn u. tis n rt LCS 3.2.102 3.2 POWER DISTRIBUTION LIMITS LCS 3.2.102 Core average Axial Shaps Index (ASI) shall be within the nollowing limits:

a. COLSS OPERABLE -0.27 s ASI s +0.27

b. COLSS OUT OF SERVICE (1) One or Both CEACs 0 parable and a 90% RTP 0.23 s ASI s +0.23 (2) One or Both CEACs Operable and < P <RTP OR Both CEACs Inoperable- 0.20 s ASI s +0.20 VAllDITY STATEMENT: Effective upon TSIP implenentation.

APPLICABILITY: MODE 1 with THERMAL POWER > 20% RTP.

ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME Refer to LC0 3.2.5

$URVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS l

SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY Refer to LCO 3.2.5 SAN ONOFRE--UNIT 2 3.2 102-1 Rev. 1 02/19/97

(

COLR ASI c.r. o r.it u.it. n et LCS 3.2.102 LCS 3.2.102 ASI BASES l The Axial Shape Index (ASI) is a measure of the power generated in the lower half of the core less the power generated in the upper half of the core divided by the sum of these powers. This s)ecification is provided to ensure that the core average ASI is maintained wit 11n the range of values assumed as an initial condition ir the safety analyses.

O The ASI can be determined by utilizing either the Core Operating Limit Supervisory System (COLSS) or any OPERABLE Core Protection Calculator .(CPC) channel. The real time monitoring capability and accuracy of COLSS allows COLSS to monitor power limit margins closely. Consequently, the ASI limit is broader than it would be with the same core without COLSS. Although the uncertainty associated with the ASI calculated by the CPCs-is not dependent on the operability status of the CEACs, a larger uncertainty is applied to the

< 90% RTP case with one or both CEACs operable and to tha case of both CEACs inoperable to provide additional conservatism. The COLSS continuously calculates the ASI and compares the calculated value to the parameter established for the COLSS ASI alarm limit. In addition, there is an uncertainty associated with the COLSS calculated ASIt therefore the COLSS ASI alarm limit includes this uncertainty, if the LCO is exceeded, COLSS alarms are initiated. The ASI limit is selected so that no safety limit will be exceeded as a result of an anticipated operational occurrence, and so that the consequence of a design basis accident will be acceptable.

SAN ONOFRE -UNIT 2 3.2 102 2 Rev. 1 02/19/97 J

COLR Boron Concentration Liott l czer over:stro it sts arport LCS 3.9.100 3.9 REFUELING OPERATIONS LCS 3.9.100 Boron Concentration Limit-With the reactor vessel head closure bolts less than fully tensioned or with the head removed, the boron concentration of all-filled portions of the Reactor Coolant System and the refueling canal shall be maintained uniform and sufficient to ensure that the more restrictive of following reactivity conditions is met.

a. K,,, s 0.95, or

b. Boron concentration a 2600 ppm.

VALIDITY STATEMENT: Rev. I effective 12/1/97, to be implemented within 30 days.

APPLICABILITY: MODE 6.

ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. The more restrictive A.1 Sus',end

, all Immediately of the following not operations involving met:- CORE ALTERATIONS or positive reactivity

, a. K,,, :s 0.95, or changes.

b. Boron MQ concentration a 2600 ppm. A.2 Initiate and continae Immediately -

boration at t 40 gpn of a solution containing adequate boron concentration until K ,, is reduced to50.65.

$Ah ONOFRE -UNIT 2 3.9-100-1 Rev. 1 12/1/97

CT2lk Boron Concentration Limit En omettaa tiaits *=_d LCS 3.9.100 SVRVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.9.100.1 The boron concentratic" of the Reactor 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> Coolant System and ti,e cofueling canal shall be determined by chemical analysis, i

SAN ON0FRE--UNIT 2 3.9-100 2 Rev. O April 24,1996

_ . . . _ . . . - . . _ . _ _ . _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ . _ . . _ . _ . _ . _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ . ~ . _ _ _

i COLR Boron Concentration Linit cere ope netre it: es a m re LCS 3.9.100 ,

LCS 3.9.100 Boron Concentraticn Limit i BASES The limitations on reactivity conditions during_ REFUELING ensure that: 1)  !

the reactor will remain suberitical during CORL ALTERATIONS, and 2) a uniform beron concentration is maintained for reactivity control in the  ;

water volume having direct access to the reactor vessel. These limitations:  !

are consistent with the initial conditions assumed for the boron dilution-incident in the accident analyses. The value of 0.95 or less for_ K,,,  ;

includes a conservative allowance for uncertainties.

l!

i i

SAN ONOFRE--UNIT 2- 3.9 100-3 Rev. I 12/1/97