ML20202B818
| ML20202B818 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Millstone  |
| Issue date: | 11/19/1997 |
| From: | Mckee P NRC (Affiliation Not Assigned) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20202B822 | List: |
| References | |
| GL-91-08, GL-91-8, NUDOCS 9712030187 | |
| Download: ML20202B818 (15) | |
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UNITED STATES p
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON, D.C. 2006HOO1
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NORTHEAST NUCLEAR ENERGY COMPANY THE C0i4NECTICUT LIGHT AND POWER COMPANY AND WESTERN MASSACHUSETTS ELECTRIC COMPANY DOCKET NO. 50-336 MILLSTONE NUCLEAR POWER STATION. UNIT 2 AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE Amendment No. 210 License No. OPR-65 1.
The Nuclear Regulatory Co"nission (the Commission) has found tnat:
A.
The application for amendment filed by Northeast Nuclear Energy Company, et al. (the licensees) dated May 20, 1997, as supplemented on September 23, 1997, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I; B.
The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission; C.
There is reasona'le assurance (i) that the activities authorized o
by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations; D.
The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and E.
The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.
i i
l 9712030187 971119 l
PDR ADOCK 05000336 P
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. 2.
Accordingly, Facility Operating License No. DPR-65 is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment, and paragraph 2.C.(2) of Facility Operating License No. DPR-65 is hereby amended to read as follows:
(2) Technical Soecifications The Technical Specifications contained in Appendix A, as revised through Amendment No. 210, are hereby incorporated in the license. The licensee shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications.
The license is also amended by adding paragraph (5) to read as follows:
(5) Relocated Technical Specifications The licensee shall relocate certain technical specification requirements to licensee-controlled documents as described below. The location of these requirements shall be retained by the licensee.
a.
This licen:;e condition approves the relocation of certain technical specification requirements to licensee-controlled documents (Technical Requirements Manual), as described in the licensee's application dated May 20, 1997, as supplemented on September 23, 1997.
The approval is documented in the staff's safety evaluation dated November 19, 1997 This license condition is effective as of its date of issuance by Amendment No. 210 and shall be implemented 90 days from the date of issuance.
Implementation shall include the relocation of technical specification requirements to the appropriate licensee-controlled document as identified in the l
licensee's application dated May 20, 1997, as supplemented on September 23, 1997.
3.
The license amendment is effective as of its date of issuance to be implemented within 90 days from the date of its issuance.
FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
[
A Philli
. McKee Deputy Director for Licensing Special Projects Office Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Attachments: 1. Page 4a of License
- 2. Changes to Technical Specification Date of Issuance:
November 19, 1997
I
- 4a -
(5)
Relocated Technical Soecifications The licensee shall relocate certain technical specification s
requirements to licensee-controlled documents as described below.
The location of these requirements shall be retained by the licensee.
a.
This license condition approves the relocation of certain technical specification requirements to licensee-controlled documents (Technical Requirements Manual), as described in the licensee's application dated May 20, 1997, as supplemented on September 23, 1997. The approval is documented in the staff's safety evaluation dated November 19 1997. This license condition is effective as of its date o,f issuance by Amendment No. 210 and shall be implemented 90 days from the date of issuance.
Implementation shall include the relocation of technical specification requirements to the appropriate licensee-controlled document as identified in the licensee's application dated May 20, 1997, as supplemented on September 23, 1997.
D.
This amended license is effective as of its date of issuance and shall expire at midnight, July 31, 2015.
FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Original signed by Roger S. Boyd Roger S. Boyd, Acting Director Division of Reactor Licensing Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Enclosures:
1.
Incomplete Preoperational Test Items Which Must be Completed 2.
Change No. 4 to Technical Specifications Contained in Appendix A to DPR-65 Date of Issuance: September 26, 1975 l
Amendment No. 210 l
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ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE :1ENDMENT NO. 210 FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-65 DOCKET NO. 50-336 Replace the following pages of Appendix A, Technical Specifications, with the attached pages. The revised pages are identified by amendment number and contain vertical lines indicating the areas of change.
Remove Insert 1-2 1-2 3/4 6-1 3/4 6-1 3/4 6-15 3/4 6-15 3/4 6-16 3/4 6-16 3/4 6-17 3/4 6-17 3/4 6-18 3/4 6-18 B 3/4 6-3 B 3/4 6-3 B 3/4 6-3a B 3/4 6-3b B 3/4 6-3c B 3/4 6-3d License page 4a License page 4a
DEFINITI00is CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY 1.8 CONTAIMENT INTEGRITY shall exist when:
1.8.1 All penetrations required to be closed during accident conditions are either:
a.
Capable of being closed by an OPERABLE containment automatic isolation valve system, or b.-
Closed by manual valves, blind flanges, or deactivated automatic valves secured in their closed positions, except for valves that are open under administrative control as permitted by Specification 3.6.3.1, 1.8.2 The equipment hatch is closed and sealed, and 1.8.3 The airlock is OPERABLE pursuant to Specification 3.6.1.3.
CHANNEL CALIBRATION 1.9 A CHANNEL CALIBRATION shall be the adjustment, as necessary, of the 4
channel output such that it responds with the necessary range and accuracy to known values of the parameter which the channel monitors. The CHANNEL CALIBRATION shall encompass the entire channel including the sensor and alarm and/or trip functions, and shalt include the CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST. The CHANNEL CALIBRATION may be performed by any series of sequen-tial, overlapping or total channel steps such that the entire channel is calibrated.
CHANNEL CHECK 1.10 A CHANNEL CHECK shall be the qualitative assessment of channel behavior during operation by observation. This determination shall include, where possible, comparison of the channel indication and/or status with other indications and/or status derivt i from independent instrument channels measuring the same parameter.
CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST 1.11 A CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST shall te the injection of a simulated signal into the channel as close to the primary sensor as practicable to verify OPERABILITY including alarm and/or trip functions.
MILLSTONE - UNIT 2 1-2 Amendment No. 210 0294 s
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a 2/.i.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS 3A.5.1.. PRIMARY CONTAINMENT CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.6.1.1 Primary CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY shall be maintained.
L5PLICABILITY:
MODES 1, 2, 3 and 4.
AfJJDN:
Without primary CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY *, restore CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY within one hour or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the next 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />.
$URVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.6.1.1 Primary CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY shall be demonstrated:
a.
At least once per 31 days by verifying that all penetrations ** not l
capable of being closed by OPERABLE containment automatic isola-tion valves and required to be closed during accident conditions are closed by valves, blind flanges, or deactivated automatic valves secured in their positions, except for valves that are open under administrative co'atrol as permitted by Specification 3.6.3.1.
i b.
At least once per 31 days by verifying the equipment hatch is i
closed and sealed.
c.
By verifying the containment air lock is OPERABLE per Specifica-tion 3.6.1.3.
d.
After each closing of a penetration subject to type B testing (except the containment air lock), if opened following a Type A or B test, by leak rate testing in accordance with the Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program.
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- 0peration within the time allowances of the ACTION statements of Specifica-tion 3.6.1.3 does not constitute a loss of CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY.
I
- Except valves, blind flanges, and deactivated automatic valves which are located inside the containment and are lo:ked, sealed, or otherwise secured in the closed position.
These penetrations shall be verified closed prior to j
entering MODE 4 from N0DE 5, if not performed within the previous 92 days.
MILLSTONE - UNIT 2 3/4 6 Amendment No. JJ, JJ, JpJ. 210 0297
CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS
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3/4.6.3 CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES LINITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.6.3.1 Each containment isolation valve shall be OPERABLE.*
l APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3 and 4.
ACTION:
With one or more of the isolation valve (s) inoperable, either:
l a.
Restore the inoperable valve (s) to OPERABLE status within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />, or b.
Isolate the affected penetration (s) within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> by use of a deactivated automatic valve (s) secured in the isolation position (s),or c.
Isolate the affected penetration (s) within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> by use of a closed manual valve (s) or blind flange (s); or d.
Be in COLD SHUTDOWN within the next 36 hours4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br />.
SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.6.3.1.1 Each isolation valve testable during plant operation shall be l demonstrated OPERABLE:
a.
At least once per 92 days by:
1.
Exercising each power operated valve through one complete cycle of full travel and measuring the isolation time, and 2.
Exercising each manual valve, except those that are closed, through one complete cycle of full travel, b.
Immediately prior to returning the valva to service after maintenance, repair or replacement work is performed on the l
- Locked or sealed closed valves may be opened on an intermittent basis under administrative controls.
NILLSTONE - UNIT 2 3/46-15 Amendment No. 5,' 210 can
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CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS 50RVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (Continued) valve or its associated actuator, control or power circuit by performance of the applicable cycling test, above.
4.6.3.1.2 Each isolation valve shall be demonstrated OPERABLE during l the COLD SHUTDOWN or REFUELING MODE at least once per 18 months by:
a.
Verifying that on a containment isolation test signal, each isolation valve actuates to its isolation position, b.
Verifying that on a Containment Radiation-High signal, all containment purge valves actuate to their isolation position, c.
Exercising each ponr operated valve not testable during plant operation, through one complete cycle of full travel and measuring its isolation time, and d.
Exercising each manual valve not locked, sealed or otherwise secured in position through at least one complete cycle of full travel.
i MILLSTONE - UNIT 2 3/4 6-16 Amendment No. ;t), 210 1
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MILLSTONE - UNIT 2 3/4 6-17 Amendment No. 210 cm
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s-NILLSTONE - UNIT 2 3/46-18 ArendmentNo.IS6,210 om
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CONTAINMENT $YSTEMS BASES 3/4.6.2 DEPRESSURIZATION AND COOLING SYSTEMS 3/4.6.2.1 CONTAINMENT SPRAY SYSTEM The OPERABILITY of the containment spray system ensures that contain-ment depressurization and cooling capability will be available in the event of a LOCA. The pressure reduction and resultant lower containment leakage rate are consistent with the assumptions used in the accident analyses. The leak ratt surveillance requirements assure that the leakage assumed for the system outside containment during the recircula-tion phase will not be exceeded.
3/4.6.2.2 CONTAINMENT AIR RECIRCULATION SYSl[B The OPERABILITY of the containment cooling system ensures that
- 1) the containment air temperature will be maintained within limits during norrol operation, and 2) adequate heat removal capacity is available when operated in conjunction with the containment spray systems during post-LOCA conditions.
l 1/4.6.3 CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES i
The Technical Requirements Manual contains the list of containment isolation valves (except the containment air lock and equipment hatch). Any changes to this list will be reviewed under 10CFR50.59 and approved by the Plant Operations Review Committee (PORC).
The OPERABILITY of the containment isolation valves ensures that the containment atmosphere will be isolated from the outside environnent in the event of a release of radioactive material to the containment atmos-phere or pressurization of the containment.
Containment isolation within the time limits specified ensures that the release of radioactive material i
to the environment will be consistent with the assumptions used in the analyses for a LOCA.
The containment isolation valves are used to close all fluid (liquid and gas) penetrations not required for operation of the engineered safety feature systems, to prevent the leakage of radioactive materials to the environnent.
The fluid penetrations which may require isolation after an accident ar?
categorized as Type P, 0, or N.
The penetration types are listed with the containment isolation valves in the Technical Requirements Manual.
Type P penetrations are lines that connect to the reactor coolant pressure boundary (Criterion 55 of 10CFR50, Appendix A). These lines are provided with two containment isolation valves, one inside containment, and one outside containment.
MILLSTONE - UNIT 2 B 3/4 6-3 Amendment No.23,' 61;.21' 0300
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4 C9NTAINMENT SYSTEMS BASES 3/4.6.3 -CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES fcontinued)
Type 0 penetrations are lines that are open to the containment internal atmosphere (Criterion 56 of 10CFR50, Appendix A). These lines are provided with two containment isolation valves, one inside containment, and one outside containment.
Type N penetrations are lines that neither connect to the reactor coolant pressure boundary nor are open to the containment internal atmosphere, but do form a closed system within the containment structure (Criterion 57 of 10CFR50, Appendix A). These lines are provided with single containment isolation valves outside containment. These valves are either remotely l
operated or locked closed manual valves.
Locked or sealed closed-containment isolation valves may be opened on an intermittent basis provided appropriate administrative controls are established. The position of tie NRC concerning acceptable administrative controls is contained in Generic Letter 91-08, " Removal of Component Lists from Technical Specifications," and includes the following considerations:
(1) stationing an operator, who is in constant communication with the control room, at the valve controls, (2) instructing this operator to close these valves in an accident situation, and (3) assuring that environmental conditions will not preclude access to close the valve and that this action will prevent the release of radioactivity outside the containment.
i The appropriate administrative controls, based on the above considerations, to allow locked or sealed closed containment isolation valves to be opened are contained in the procedures that will be used to operate the valves. Entries should be placed in the Shift Manager Log when these valvos are opened and closed. However, it is not necessary to log into any Technical i
Specification Action Statement for these valves, provided the appropriate administrative controls have been established.
i If a locked or sealed closed containment isolation valve is opened while operating in accordance with Abnormal or Emergency Operating Procedures (AOPs and E0Ps), it is not necessary to establish a dedicated operator.
The A0Ps and E0Ps-provide sufficient procedural control over the operation of the containment isolation valves.
-Opening a locked or sealed closed containment isolation valve bypasses a plant design feature that prevente the release of radioactivity outside the containment. Therefore, this should not be done frequently, and the time the valve is opened should be minimized. As a general guideline, a locked or sealed closed containment isolation valve should not be opened-longer than the time allowed to restore the valve to OPERABLE status, as stated in the action statement for LCO 3.6.3.1
- Containment Isolation Valves."
MILLSTONE - UNIT 2 B 3/4 6-3a Amendment No. 210 l one
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CONTAI E NT SYSTEMS BASES 3/4.6.3 CDNTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES fcontinued)
A discussion of the appro contatament isolation valves, priate administrative controls for the that are expected to be opened during operation in MODES 1 through 4, is presented below.
Manual containment isolation valve 2-SI-463, safety injection tank (SIT) recircrlation header stop valve, is opened to fill or drain the SITS and for Shutdown Cooling System (SDC) boron equalization. While 2-51-463 is open, a dedicated operator, in continuous communication with the control room, is required.
When SDC is initiated, SDC suction isolation r wiely operated valves 2-SI-652 and 2-51-651 (inside containment isolation valve) and manual valve 2-SI-709 (outside containment isolation valve) are opened.
2-SI-651 is normally operated from the control room.
It does not receive an automatic containment isolation closure signal, but is interlocked to prevent opening if Reactor Coolant System (RCS) pressure is greater than approximately 275 psia.
When 2-SI-651 is opened from the control room, either one of the two required licensed dedicated (Reactor Operator) control room operators can be credited as the operator required for administrative control. It is not necessary to use a separate dedicated operator.
When valve 2-S1-709 is opened locally, a separate dedicated operator is not required to remain at the valve. 2-51-709 is opened before 2-S1-651.
Therefore, opening 2-51-709 will not establish a connection between the RCS and the SDC System.
Opening 2-SI-651 will connect the RCS and SDC System.
If a problem then develops, 2-S1-651 can be closed from the control room.
The administrative controls for valves 2-51-651 and 2-SI-709 only apply during SDC operation. They are acceptable because RCS pressure and temprature are significantly below normal operating pressure and temperature (the RCS is administrative 1y required to be < 300 Y and < 265 psia before shutdown cooling flow is initiated), the penetration flowpath can be isolated from the control room by closing either 2-SI-6S2 c~.- 2-S1-651, and the manipulation of these valves, during this evolution, is controlled by plant procedures.
The pressurizer auxiliary spray valve, 2-CH-517, can be used as an alternate method to decrease pressurizer pressure, or for boron precipitation control following a loss of coolant accident. When this valve is opened from the control room, either one of the two required licensed (Reactor Operator) control room operators can be credited as the dedicated operator required for administrative control. It is not necessary to use a separate dedicated operator.
MILLSTONE - UNIT 2 33/46-3b.
AmendmentNo.510 l osoo
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CONTAH9 TENT SYSTDt3
- l BASES.
i 3/4.6.3 CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES (continued) t The exception for 2-CH-517 is acceptable because the fluid that passes through this valve will be collected in the Fressurizer (reverse flow from the Pressurizer to the charging system is prevented by check valve 2-CH-431), and the penetration associated with 2-CH-517 is open during accident conditions to allow flow from the charging pumps. Also, this valve is normally operated from the control room, under the supervision of the licensed control room operators, in accordance with plant procedures.
A dedicated operator u not required when opening remotely operated valves associated with Type N fluid penetrations (Criterion 57 of 10CFR50, Appendix A). Operating these valves from the control room is sufficient. The main steam isolation valves (2 MS 64A and 648), atmospheric steam dump valves (2-MS-190A and 1908), and the containment air recirculation t.ooler RBCCW discharge valves (2-RB-28.2A-D)h Type N fluid penetrations.
are examples of remotely operated containment isolation valves associated wit Local operation of the atmospheric steam dump valves (2-MS-190A and 190B), or other remotely operated valves associated with Type N fluid l
penetrations, will require a dedicated operator in constant communication j
with the control room.
Even though these valves can not be classified as locked or sealed closed, the use of a dedicated operator will satisfy administrative control requirements.
Local operation of these valves with a dedicated optrator is equivalent to the operation of other manual (locked or sealed closed) containment isolation valves with a dedicated operator.
The main steam supplies to the turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pump (2-MS-201 and 2-MS-202) are remotely operated valves associated with Type N fluid penetrations. These valves are maintained open during power operation.
2-MS-201 is maintained energized, so it can be closed from the control room, if necessary, for containment isolation. However, 2-MS-202 is deenergized open by removing the valve closing coil to satisfy Appendix R requirements.
Therefore, 2-MS-202 cannot be closed immediately from the control room, if necessary, for containment isolation. The closing coil for 2-MS-202 is stored in the Unit 2 control room, and can be installed to close the valve from the control. room.
It is not necessary to maintain a dedicated operator at 2-MS-202 because this valve is already'in the required accident position.
Also, the steam that passes through this valve should not contain any radioactivity.
The steam generators provide the barrier between the containment and the atmosphere. Therefore, it would take an additional structural failure for radioactivity to be released to the environment through this valve.
Steam generator chemical addition valves, 2-FW-15A and 2-FW-158, are opened to add chemicals to the steam generators using the Auxiliary Feedwater System (AFW). When either 2-FW-15A or 2-FW-158 is opened, a dedicated operator, in continuous communication with the control room, is required.
Operation of these valves is expected dur.ing plant startup and shutdown.
NILLSTONE - LMIT 2 3 3/4 6-3c Amendment No.210 l
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l CONTAINJEE SYSTEMS 4
BASES' 3/4.6.3 CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES teontinued)
The bypasses around the main steam supplies to the turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pump (2-MS-201 and 2-MS-202), 2-MS-458 and 2-MS-459, ara opened to drain water from the steam supply lines. When either 2-MS-458 or 2-MS-459 is o control r-a,pened, a dedicated operator, in continuous communication with the is required. Operation of these valves is expected during plant startup.
The containment station air header isolation, 2-5A-19, is opened to supply station air to containment. When 2-SA-19 is opened, a dedicated operator, in continuous communication with the control room, is required.
Operation of this valve is only expected for maintenance activities inside containment.
The backup air supply master stop, 2-IA-566, is opened to supply backup air to 2-CH-517, 2-CH 518, 2-CH 519, 2-ES-88, and 2-EB-89. When 2-IA-566 is opened, a dedicated operator, in continuous communication with the control room, is required. Operation of this valve is only expected in response to a loss of the normal air supply to the valves listed.
The nitrogen header drain valve, 2-SI-045, is opened to depressurize the l
containment side of the nitrogen supply header stop valve, 2-SI-312. When 2-51-045 is o control room,pened, a dedicated operator, in continuous communication with the is required.
Operation of this valve is only expected after using the high pressure nitrogen system to raise SIT nitrogen pressure.
The containment waste gas header test connection isolation valve, 2-GR-63, is opened to sample the prisaary drain tank for oxygen and nitrogen.
When 2-GR-63 is opened, a dedicated operator, in continuous communication with l
the control room, is required. Operation of this valve is expected during plant startup and shutdown.
The determination of the appropriate administrative controls for these containment isolation valves included an evaluation of the expected environmental conditions. This evaluation has concluded environmental cendttions will not preclude access to close the valve, and this action will prevent the release of radioactivity outside of containment through the-respective penetration.
The containment purge supply and exhaust isolation valves are required to be closed and electrically deactivated during plant operation since these valves have not been demonstrated capable of closing during a LOCA or steam line break accident. Such a demonstration would require justification of the mechanical operability of the purge valves and consideration of the appropriateness of the electrical override circuits. Maintaining these L
valves closed during plant operations ensures that excessive quantities of radioactive materials will not be released via the containment purge system.
gLSTONE-UNIT 2 B3/46-3d Amendment No. 210 l
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