ML20199E866

Forwards Copies of Escalated Enforcement Actions for Reactor Licensees for Fy 1998 (971001-980930) on Regulatory Significance.Encl Matl Has Been Previously Publically Released & Can Be Found in PDR

ML20199E866
Person / Time
Issue date:	11/03/1998
From:	Lieberman J NRC OFFICE OF ENFORCEMENT (OE)
To:	Ginsberg E, Lochbaum D NUCLEAR ENERGY INSTITUTE (FORMERLY NUCLEAR MGMT &, UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS
Shared Package
ML20199E832	List: ML20199E830 ML20199E866
References
NUDOCS 9901210107
Download: ML20199E866 (9)

Text

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4 f tse g NITACFIMENT 2

/ k UNITED STATES l

• ) NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

,  ! WASHINGTON, D.C. ma "1

%Qt?,iw,5 November 3, 1998 1

t

! Ellen C. Ginsberg Assistant General Counsel Nuclear Energy institute 1776 i Street, NW ,

Suite 400 l Washington, DC 20006-3708

\

1 l

SUBJECT:

! REVIEW OF FISCAL YEAR 1998 ESCALATED ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS FOR REACTOR LICENSEES IN CONJUNCTION PUBLIC MEETING ON l REGULATORY SIGNIFICANCE

Dear Ms. Ginsberg:

l The enclosed copies of escalated enforcement actions for reactor licensees for fiscal year 1998 (October 1,1997 September 30,1998) are provided in preparation for an NRC public meeting to discuss the concept of regulatory significance. 'All of the enclosed material has been previously publically released and can be found in the NRC Public Documer.t Room as well as on the NRC's internet web page (www.nrc.cov/OEA.

it is my intent to hold a public meeting in early December with NEl and UCS, to discuss the past and possible future use of regulatory significance in escalated enforcement decision making. l believe it would be useful for each of us to identify which of the enclosed enforcement actions '

involved the concept of regulatory significance, and of those, where was it appropriate or inappropriate to use in the development of the action. I have included a matrix for recording '

your views.

Although it is not necessary (and not the intended focus of the upcoming public meeting), NEl may choose to identify any actions that would have been categorized at a different severity level based on it's proposed enforcement process (i.e., Table A, Table B).

I look forward to continuing our public discussions on the issue of regulatory significance, if you have any questions, please feel free to contact me.

Sincerely, W '

ames Lieberman, Director Office of Enforcement

Enclosures:

As Stated

! cc:

David A. Lochbaum (Union of Concerned Scientists)w/o enclosures 9901210107 981222 PDR REVQP ERONUMRC PDR

so arou

. O y t UNITED STATES j

j f

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION -

WASHINGTON, D.C. ma mi r..e v. ..

November 3, 1998 l

David A. Lochbaum Nuclear Safety Engineer Union of Concerned Scientists 1616 P Street NW '

Suite 310 Washington DC 200361495

SUBJECT:

REVIEW OF FISCAL YEAR 1998 ESCALATED ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS FOR REACTOR LICENSEES IN CONJUNCTION PUBLIC MEETING ON REGULATORY SIGNIFICANCE

Dear Mr..Lochbaum:

The enclosed copies of escalated enforcement actions for reactor licensees for fiscal year 1998 '

(October 1,1997 - September 30,1998) are provided in preparation for an NRC public meeting to discuss the concept of regulatory significance. All of the enclosed material has been i previously publically released and can be found in the NRC Public Document Room as well as on the NRC's Internet web page (www.nre.oov/OEA.

It is my intent to hold a public meeting in early December with NEl and UCS, to discuss the past and possible future use of regulatory significance in escalated enforcement decision making. I believe it would be useful for each of us to identify which of the enclosed enforcement actions involved the concept of regulatory significance, and of those, where was it appropriate or inappropriate to use in the development of the action. I have included a matrix for recording your views.

Although it is not necessary (and not the intended focus of the upcoming public meeting), UCS may choose to identify any actions that it believes should have been categorized at a different severity level based on it's view.

I look forward to continuing our public discussions on the issue of regulatory significance. If you have any questions, please feel free to contact me.

Sincerely, h

ames Lieberman, Director Office of Enforcement

Enclosure:

As Stated cc: Ellen C. Ginsberg (Nuclear Energy Institute)w/o enclosures

ESCALATED ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS FOR REACTOR LICENSEES October 1,1997 - September 30,1998 Licensee Facility EA # Actual Potential Regulatory Regulatory Consequences Consequences Significance Significance Appropriate Inappropriate American D.C. Cook 98-113 Electric Power Arizona Public Palo Verde 98-131 Service Co.

Baltimore Gas & Calvert Cliffs98-106 Electric Baltimore Gas & Calvert Cliffs98-280 Electric Boston Edison Pilgrim 97-482 Company A.

B.

C.

Boston Edison Pilgrim 98-191 Company Carolina Power H.B. Robinson 97-490

& Light Carolina Power Harris98-020

& Light

_1_

Licensee Facility EA # Actual Potential Regulatory Regulatory Consequences Consequences Significance Significance Appropriate inappropriate Centerior Perry 97-047 Service Co. A.96-542 B.97-430 C.

Commonwealth Dresden 96-493 Edison Co.

Commonwealth Braidwood 97-110 Edison C.

Commonwealth Braidwood 97-265 Edison Co.

Commonwealth Byron 97-264 Edison Co.

Commonwealth Byron 97-446 Edison Co.

Commonwealth Quad Cities97-466 I Edison Co.

Commonwealth Quad Cities97-591 Edison Co.

. _ _ _. = . . ._ . - . . . .. . . _ . - _ - _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ . __. . . = - - .

Licensee Facility EA # Actual Potential Regulatory Regulatory Consequences Consequences Significance Significance Appropriate inappropriate Commonwealth Quad Cities98-175 Edison Co.

Commonwealth Zion 97-249 Edison Co. _

Connecticut Haddam Neck 97-366 Yankee Consolidated Indian Point 2 97-575 Edison I.

Il 111.

Consolidated Indian Point 2 97-367 Edison 1.

II.

Consumers Palisades97-567 Power Duke Energy Catawba 98-208 Corp.

Duquesne Light Beaver Valley 97-517 Co.

Entergy Arkansas97-382 Operations, Inc. Nuclear One

Licensee Facility EA # Actual Potential Regulatory Regulatory Consequences Consequences Significance Significance Appropriate inappropriate Entergy River Bend 97-497 Operations, Inc.

Entergy Waterford 97-589 Operations Florida Power & St. Lucie 97-501 Light Co.

Florida Power & St Lucie 98-009 Light Co.

Florida Power & St Lucie 98-064 Light Co.

GPU Nuclear Oyster Creek 97-421 Corp. l.A.

l.B.

I.C.

GPU Nuclear Oyster Creek 97-617 Corp.

GPU Nuclear Oyster Creek 98-220 Corp.

t Licensee Facility EA # Actual Potential Regulatory Regulatory Consequences Consequences Significance Significance Appropriate inappropriate GPU Nuclear Three Mile 97-070 Corp. Island I.

II.

Ill. ~

IV.

GPU NL. clear Three Mile 97-533 Corp. Island Niagra Mohawk Nine Mile Point 97-007 Power Corp.

Niagra Mohawk Nine Mile Point 97-530 Power Corp.

North Atlantic Seabrook 98-073 Energy Service Northeast Millstone 96-034 Nuclear Energy I.

II.

Ill.

IV.

Northeast Millstone 97-562 Nuclear Energy

Licensee Facility EA # Actual Potential Regulatory Regulatory I Consequences Consequences Significance Significance Appropriate Inappropriate Northeast Millstone 98-179 '

Nuclear Energy Northem States Prairie Island 97-290 Power Co.

Omaha public Fort Calhoun 97-432 Power District PECO Nuclear Peach Bottom 98-221 PECO Nuclear Limerick 98-141 Public Service Hope Creek 97-144 Electric & Gas 1.

II.

Public Service Hope Creek 97-160 Electric & Gas Public Service Salem 97-182 Electric & Gas Southern San Onofre 97-585 Califomia Edison Co.

Tennessee Sequoyah 97-409 Valley Authority

- - _ - _ _ - - - - _ _ ~ - _ - - _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ - _ _ _ ._ _ _ _ - - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - -_ . _ _ _ _ . - _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . - _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ -

Licensee Facility EA # Actual Potential Regulatory Regulatory Conseyimnces Consequences Significance Significance Appropriate inappropriate Vermont Vermont 97-531 Yankee Nuclear Yankee Virginia Electric Surry 97-474 Washington Washington 97-573 -

Public Power Nuclear Project-2 UNION OF a nc mEwr 3 CONCERNED -

SCIENTISTS .

November 11,1998 Mr. James Lieberman, Directae Office of Enforcement United States Nuclear Regulatory C==taion Washington, DC 20555-0001

)

SUBJECT:

SOLICITED COMMENTS ON FISCAL YE AR 1998 ESCALATED ENFORCEM ACTIONS FOR REACTOR LICENSEES Deat Mr. Lieberman-In response to the request in your letter dated November 3,1998, I have reviewed the fiscal year 1998 escalate enforcement actions mvolving reactor licensees. My comments are attached. I did not use the matnx! t with your letter because I have an incomplete understanding of what NRC means by " regulatory significa thus would not have been able to fill out the rnatrix. ! trust that the information provided in my attached com acrves the purposes of the matrix. {

His exercise was useful to me. I still cannot see any rhyme or reason to the escalated enforcemej the NRC. I have often stated that the NRC uses s " Wheel of Misfortune" to decide its e i from FY98 does little to dissuade me from that position. De actions are neither eensistent nor repe discernable panem that I can detect seems to be that civil penalties correspond to the NRC's perceived no) 3 iicensees' performance. When the NRC " likes' a licensee, the civil penalties are low or even compfetel When the NRC "dtslikes" a licensee, civil penalties are imposed or even doubled. His process is blata the NRC likes a licensee,it would be more appropriate to exchange Valectine's Day cards or take moonlit str along the ultimate heat sink than to allow that fondness to flavor enforcement action decisions. Likewise,it equally unfair to subject unfavored licensees with the euble jeopardy from heightened enforcement actions.

The NRC's enforcement actions should be an exclusive function of the severity of the offense. Faeters su first identified the offending condition, how rapidly the licensee responded to it, and whether the offenses are entirely immatenal. De NRC's enforcement action process should simply consist of det seventy Icvel of the offense. That severity level alent should then dictate the size of the civil penalty to The civil penaliy should neither be mitigated for " good" licensees nor increased for " bad" licensees.

A factor that must be considered when determining the seventy level of an offense is hs duration condition over 10 years is obviously worse than a comparable offending condition that persisted Not only ws the piant degraded for a longer period of time, but the longer duration implicitly indicstes tha licensee's self assessment processes were less than fully espable.The NRC's eser. lated enfo day basis as provided in the regt lation, but very rarely used by the N  !

offense could be increased by one level ifits duration was longer than some reasonable interval (sa reduced by one level if f ts duration was shorter than some reasonable period (say coe month Another factor that should be considered when determining the severity level of an offcase is its risk. The N ~

escalated enforcement action process should account for the risk associated with an offense. When an offe lirde or no risk, it should not be a level III or higher violation.' Examples of FY98 actions which probab not have been taken are: EA's 97 007,97144,97 249,97 264,97 265. 97 290,97 432,97-466,97 497,97 56

' The exception to this rule being willful violations.

Washington Offica: 1818 P Street NW Sulta 310 e Washington DC 20036-1495 e 202 332 o900 e FAX: 202 332 0005 Cambodge Haacquaners: Two Bran't Square e Ca nbrieDe MA Califamia Ofr.ce: 2397 $$sttuck Avenue Sune 203 e Berkeley CA 02238 9105 e 517 547 2552 FAX: 617 864 94 947041567 e 510 8431872 e FAX: 510843 3785 jpdB . -

H

,e n , . . .-_ _ _._

98 020,98 113, and 9B 191. These offenses needed O be corrected, but civil penalties seem unwarrante involved. Examples cfFY98 actions which probably sh uld have involved civil penalties or received high!

penalties: EA's 96434,97 070,97110,97182,97 366,97 367,97 382,97-421.97 446,97 474.97 482,97 490 -

97 517.97 531.97 533,97 573,97 576,98 073,98106,98131,98179,98 208,98 220,98 268, And 98 336.T i

NRC has a lot of work to do in this area to ensure consistency,in its enforcement actions.

~

A factor that naast be immediately climinated from the NRC's escalated enforcement action process is application of volume discounts." All too often, the NRC groups a number of offenses into a sing!c i grouping is appropriate when a problem is discovered and the licensee undertakes an aggressive exten prograin that reveals severa! more related problems. Issuing aeparate violations in these cases could have the

undesirable etfeet of discourssing such commendable licensee actions. However, the NRC also gr offenses into single violations. For exarnple, EA 97 366 lumped a service water hammer prob diesel generator turning gear prob!cm into a single Level!!! violation. These offenses abould have been individua1 violations with the severity level based on their specirse risk and duration factors.

Iappreciate this opportunity to provide input during the NRC's review ofia enforcement policy.

Sincerely.

l David A.INeb' um j Nuclear Safety Engineer Union ofConcemed Scientists l

l 4

A 4

1 1

i I

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e

1 UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS EA No. Plant Event 96 034 et al Minssone UCS Cornments II(56 violations) HI(4 Civil penalty seems too low Mwd on large violations) & IV(2 violseons) A of NRC. identified longstanding

-just about everything safety deficiencies. Licensee clearly benefried from abe civil penalty volume

($2,100.000) discount progrwn. What happened to the "$55.000 per violonen per day'"In 964R2 et at additmu, EA was too isswed way, way one long (nearly one year) after 4-.

rmdings.

6 7 -

Ill- Flow increase event.

miswired breaker, and USQ for Civil pensity for flow increase event was lhe same os for the USQ problem, ECC surze tanks ($100,000) risk is consaderably less, perhaps even orders of ruegnstude lower.

96483 cm " -_ -

111 - operator 14-ing exam c;,... _4 Lock of civili aa.ity and som..iy level seesu approproote for cirteenstances,97-007 Nine Mile Point 1 Ill-seven Maintenance Rule violations ($50,000) Civil pecelty seems either too high based os risk c,,...,

(J to EA Nos. 96482 and 97490 orrequirement.

verstatory unwarranted based on initial NRC inspechen of a newly innpesed 97 070 Three Mile Island HI, m, m. Hl. IV & IV - failure Civil penalty sa... Iow based on d-.;

to perform safety evaluatmas orieJA For exengle, NRC steced when downgmding equipmcat that deficiency in one teactor buddung c.,~.g.Ay cooling fan was promptly classifications and emergency corrected, but identical deficiencies on the two remaining fans was not corrected response problems ($2I0,000) for 33 more days. The emergency resposisc problems are troubling, especially facility which triggered the upgrading of emes97-110 e.47 resia.,,ps,, " e across the Braidwood IB & IV - six fire protection country. What hapgsd to the"355,000 per violahon per day?"

violations Civil penalty seems warranted based on Istge nornber of NRC-identifbt longstanding safety deficiencies. What hop,,97-144 day?" See also EA 97A46. J to lhe "555,000 per violation pee Hope Cecek 111 & m - rencavity coritrol problem and two Maintenance Civil penelty seems warranted based on 355,000 civil pensity in EA's97-007 and 97-160 I",,,,,. Orck Rule violations (155,000) 97466 for Mairrtenance Rule violations. De reec;...;y i costol dk. bed very low risk and thes did not warrant a civil penalty.

Ill- RIIR shutdown coohng cross-tic piping design Lack of civil pensity seems warranted based on low risk.

problems from 1994 mod 97152 Salens til & IV -transfer to cold leg recintulation problenss sod fire Cml penalty should po_t have he disi..=x4. NRC stated that civil penalty was barrier violations dismissed because a 3600,000 civil pensity had been imposed in Octobe similar engineering design problems. But this peoblern occerted in Mwch 1996-BRtt the licensee should hatt upgraded its design control progrens. T1uss, this97-249 Zion violatmn is a new violation, not dia..,m., ofan old III- four fitness for J, ;1 dk..

Civil peoelty should ngt have been doubledjust because NRC wasJdiscr.C Washington OfWee: 1818 P Street StW Suite 310 e Westiengton DC Camtmdge :L ",, 6... Two BratWe Square e Centsidge MA 20935-1495 e 2974324900

• FAX: 2o2 3324995 .

07238-9105 e 617-547-5552

• FAX: 6tF 864 9405 - -

Catfomia Ofuoe: 239F Shattudt Avenue Sube203 e BedeleyCA 94T041957 e $10443-1872

• FAX: 5to843 3 -

violations (III0.000) with licemee's performance. This EA seems the perfect ensnyle of the NRC I determining severity based on its pre. conceived notions of the beensee rather than on the merits of the marter. UCS strongly doubts that this EA would have been so critical had the enact same sequence of events transpired at one of the NRC's pet plants.97-264 Bym., IU - not ventmg ECCS p...y casings per Tech Specs Civil penalty sterns totally imwarranted based on absolueely zero risk. It's not clear why this problem is even a violation.

(155.000)97-265 Braidwood IH - not wnting Eu.s ;, ...y casings per Tech Specs C,vil penalty seems totally unwarranted besed on absolutely zero risk. It's not clear (S35,000) '

why tius psobicm is even a violation. Good News: His EA is camsistent with EA 97-290 Prairic Island 97-264. Bad News: %ey are both imwarranted.

fu- AFW systern flow problems (150,000) Civil penalty seems totally unwarranted based on absolutely zero risk. It's not clear wby this problem is even a violation. Act,ording to NRC, the AFW sysicci always met its design requuements.97-366 Haddaen Neck lit -SW batamer and EDG turning gene corrective actions Civil penalty seems warranted because the risk from these violations is far greater than risk from EA 98-131 which carried a 350,000 price tag. De EDG was actuall 97-367 daninged due to a repetitive w.ator error.

Indise Point 2 HI,Ill & IV - Lw .-ble overpressure protection system, Civil pensky low based on stated duration of violations: overpressure protection base wrapped around system was inoperable for longer than two days while base impaired piernp for.

i recirculation pump impeller nearly eight (8) years. What happened to the *$55,000 per violation per day? i (3tIO,00C}

97-382 ANOl&2 HI & IV-SG inspections Civil penalty seems warranted because the risk from these violsecas is greater than 97-409 Sep ~,J. risk fror EA 98131 which carr,ul a 550,000i,w tag.

El-;.,vwpuly alQ. .I battery Civil r,ci Ity seems warranted based on actual risk. ~

(155,000)97-421 Cy.;u Creek HI, Hl. Hl. IV, IV & IV -

configwation controlproblems Civil penalty seems warranted based on risk De RWCU violatmn (allowmg valve to be exposed to greater difrerential pressure than it could close against) was longstanding and should have been identified during 89-10 MOV program effort.97-424 C,~yu Risk was far greater than :r.ar.y of the 355,000 civil penalties imposed.

Hi- back!!ow impairing standby gas treatment system Civil penalty seems warranted, but not for basis cited by NRC. Each of the two and blocksge impainng RIIR problene warranted a $55,000 civil penalty. Instead NRC Intryed the problems heat exchanger (1110,000) tcgether and imposed a single $55,000 civil penalty, which was doubled L-_- .97-432 Fort Calhoes HRC was less than enchanted with the licensec's perfm m.a UI - contai. wet spray valve control switches mi ,-L-f .

Civil pensky seems totally unwarranted based on exceedingly low risk. It is far 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> ($110,000) unbelievable that the NRC would impose a $55.000 civil pesahy and then have the

~

audacity to double it.110515 Tile MOSTIMPROPER CIVIL PENALTY I .

HAVE EVER SEEN. THE NRC SHOULD IMMEDIATELY Wfn{ DRAW THE CIVIL PENALTY, REFUND Tile MONTES, AND APOLOGtZE TV THE LICENSEE.

i i o<

m _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ , _ _ _ .. _ .. __ ._ _

97-446 Breidwood Ill - seven fire protection viointions Civil penalty scerns wonanted b. sed on large smmber of NRC-identified longstanding dayr safety See niso EA deficicacies. What happened to the "155,000 per violation pe 97-110.

,i 97-466 Quod Cities '

til- five Mamtensoce Rule Civil penalty seems either too high based on risk coenpered to EA Nos. 96482 and violations (555.0001 97 490 or onwanented based on initial NRC inspection of a newly inyosed regulatory requirenwnt.

97 474 S .y Ill & IV - App R electrical Civil -

rsolation and circuit breaker Fn Ity should n_ot have L. dismissed. Licensee identified isolation problem  ;

coordination problems in 1992, but failed to correct it until 1997. What happened to the ~155,000 per

_ violation per day?"97-482 et al Pilgnan IR & IV - design contml and i engmeenne (5165,000) Civil penalty seerns too low based on large number of NRC-identified L..v_.finr.97-490 HB Robinson 111 - EDG output breaker safety deliciencies. What hapsoed to the "15S,000 per violation per dayr control switch nuspositioned Civil penalty seems too low based ce repetWive event (EA 91-298) sed (555,000) indeterminate pened of vioistion. What happened to the *$35,000 per violation per day?"97-497 River Bend D1-loss of shutdown coolmg  !

and inadvertent enode change Civil pensity seems too lugh based es low risk despite sumerous errors by I operators.

(555,000) j 97-501 St Lucie DI- containment cooler fan rotating in reverse direction at lack of civil penalty seems warrected based os low risk, short dsranon, and self- r identification ofprobiern.

low speed I 97-517 Beaver Valley III- high head safety injection Civil penalty seems woefully low based on longstmoding problem which caused section line gas bending

($55,000) four (4) actual ges binding events - March 1988. June 1993. November 1996 and August 1997-without effective corrective actices. EA 97 562 involved some sire civil penalty for a potential air binding problent it is absved that this civil penalty matched those in EA's97-264 and 97-265 which involved zeto risk. Wiset 97-530 Name Mdc Poird haps..cJ to the "$55,000 per violation s ierday" IH - radioactive sM,_.,a Civil penalty seems warranted based on actual c.+nces of problems (2.8 (155.000) rmernibr vs. 2.0 meern/hr limit and wrong liner causing dose rates 4-tirees greater than expected). Civil peonity also seems warranted a..v d to EA 98-113, wluch 97-53I did not prompt a civil penalty.

Verreont Yankee UI & IV (9 violatums) - A/E team mspection violations Civil grelty seems low besed on longstanding problems. Toros tengerature

($55,000) problem existed since the Tech Spec amendment in 1985. Licensee asted the problein in May 1994, but failed to entreet it. Licensee revisited the problern again in March 1996, and again feded to correct it. What beppened to the "555,000 per I violation per day?"97-533 Three Mile Island Ill. IV & IV -miswired (inop)

PORV for two(2) years, RCS Civil gralty should no! have been dismissal. The PORV could riot have opened, overfill, and hot particle either autornatically or manently, for two (2) years during plant operatiott The RCS contandnation overfill event caused 50 gallons of radioactive water to be spilled. The hot particle event causal a worker to receive a skio exposwe of 14 rem. Ilow can NRC iropose a $55,000 civilin hy for EA's97-264,97-265 and 97-466 bot do nothing in this E

8C

_ . _ . . . _ _ _ _ . _ . ==._ _ . ..- _ _ _ _ _ . . . . _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ ..___.._..m._ _ . _ . _ _ _ _.

case? .:

97 562 Millstone ut - poteneint air beding *i Cavil penelty seems warranted, s'-",". perhaps too high based on EA 97-517 (555,000) involving exactly the some civil penahy for foer(4) sctmal air beding , */ _ =--

over a ten ycee s n,d.

97 567 Polisades lu -removalof allcontroleods from service atpower Civil pensky seems too high based on low risk desyste sumeroes errors by operators and maintenance personnel

($55.000)97-573 WNP-2 111 -RCIC systets ;.. ,.wly downgraded Civil penalty should not have been disriessed based os EA 97 070 in which 97-576 licensee received civil penalty for cas.yavable v;v ; ion.

Indian Post 2 Ill. Hl. Ill. IV. IV & tv.-

falsification of emergency Civil penalty seems too low based on large number oflongstanding safety lighting test remeds, M.:... deficiencies. %e breaker problems afTcceed scarfy 60 safety-related coeposeets breaker problems, and 170 between August 1993 and May 1997.The ;..my lightmg test problents Tech Spec testeg deficiencies cecerred in the last several years.170 Tech Spec teshag dNI What happened to the "$55,000 per violation per dayT' (5110.000)97-585 See Onofre IR & IV - federe to , .,6; sal'egesids informenon Hard to evaluate because safegnerds information was redacted. However, a civil I penalty seems warranted based on EA 98191 which came with a 555,000 price tag for coniparable safereerds ;- * - n.97-589 W.i. tad Ill-posposshosed controller Lack of civil penehy seems warrossed based on low risk, short duremen, and self-en aux component cooling identifscenen ofproblem.

watersystens-Train A OOS for 15 hosts, both trains 005 for7.5 boers97-591 Quad Cities IX- ASMEcode pressere Crvil pesaky should agJ have beca doebiedjust because NRC was desenchanted testes ($330,000) +

with becasee's performance. Civil pensky seems too high based on risk compared to EA Nos. 97 110 med 97 446 getting nothing (or, diese EA's should have else 97-617 C,.i. Cheek had civil = - -L).

Hl. IV. IV & IV- faihat to perform safetyevalesticos Lack of civil pensity seenns warranted besM on $210,000 civil peselty agemst becasee for esme psoblene at1MI-l.

when downgredmg eqmpment classificat ons98-009 St Lecie II-refuelingwatertank and Civil penelty seems warranted based as risk.

containment ses, recirculation actuation signal contigeration control (588.000) 98 020 Huetis

• til & IV- enescorted access Civil penalty seems too high based on risk canyared to risk associated with EA "

problenis (555,000)

Nos.97-490 and 98-13 I which camed coe,perable price tags, la addition, EA No. a 98 064 St Lecie 915-064 :...J ~* similar ,,. ',lem, but comed no civil pemaky.

Ill-seescorsed arrene penblems Lack of civi8pensky seems weeranted based on low risk. Howevee EA No.98-020 involved very simdar 41... but carried a $55.000,.6 tag.

0

. g 0

98-073 Seabrook III- t~,w scid impairing RHR Ctvil peestty A.ld ng have been desnwesed because problems ecsted for moeem pump suction relieIvalve, .

, degraded control building air and years and licensee Isoled numerous times to correct thess in a tunely nimener.

compressors, positive desplacement charging pmmp impeired due to oilIcak 98-105 Peach Benois til- foreign material exclusion Civil penalty seerns wonented based on actual risk.

probierns (555.U00)98-106 Calvert Cliffs III- concetive actions related Civil penalty warranted because the violations reIIect hi J _ conective scaces to spent fuelpooldiving event 98-113 D CCook froen 1997 event which prornpfed a 3176.000 civil penalty.

til-radioactive stupment Severity seems too high for worst-case risk med relative to levellV's at other 98-131 facihties. lack ofcivil penalty sectes w...;ad _,, id to EA 97-530.

Pale Verde 111- Falsification of Civil peosity seems too low for wrong-dong by four licensed coneel voore surveillance don . .a. operatots.

($50.000)98-14I 1.L. M 111 & IV -inadequate Civil pensity seems warranted based om actual risk.

conective actions for HPCI turbine exhaust valve problerns (155.000) .98-173 Quad Cities H-fue .-Mtion(188,000) v Civil penalty seems woefully low based on risk compared to EA Nos.96-482, M-482,97-591, and pl} of the EA's with $50,000/155,000 price tags. This ennt was largely NRC-identified and was mis-handled by the licensee. The severity seems proper - the civil penalty is ludicrous.98-179 Millstone til-PASS con 6guration control Civil penalty should nE have beca dismissed. The PASS had not been fully operational for 10 years. Thus, the licensee had plenty of opportmeiries to identify 98-191 Pi su= the problem. Giving the licensee credit for self-identification in this case is i d.

Ill- ww.ay (355,000)

Hard to evaluate because safeguards infonnation was redacted. Civil penalty seeras too high compared to EA 97-585 which involved a safeguards violation and did not cany a civil penalty. Civil penalty also seems too high menpared to civil penelty given for EA 97482 (or, perhaps the civil penalty for EA 97-482 was too low).

Risk hem this event is by no stretch of the imagnetion one-third that from fic 98-208 violations in EA 97-482.

Catawba Ill & IV- aux building filtered Civil j,4 Ity should not have been dismissedjust because NRC was contest with exhaust system serveillance testegproblems licensee's performance. It appears that these v . i' .-, were identified by the NRC l and not the bccusee. Risk and regulatory significance seem comparahie to EA 97-98-220 567 f.S casi;ed a $55.000 g,..w tag.

C,. Ocek til - three of five electmmatic Civil pensity seems low based on risk from loogstacdeg problent What beppened -

relief valves solenads for ADS to the "$55,000 per violatsoa per day?"

valves inop under certain accident Mtions (355.000) -

i b d

. . R i

95-268 Ooosee .:

II- boresed weser seosage teset  %

eas(geresses seenagement Civil penalty abowld mg have been dismissedjust "A_ NRC was contest with C

• liccesee's performance.%e BWST probleen, whsch existed in te origleet pleet des 6gn, was not idcotified in 1989 when a eeod(sestion mode she penblem nasch worse. He problem could have resulted in air benshag of the HPl. LPl. ood BS pernps in event of a 1.OCA. Risk is et least equel to that of EA 97 591. which corried a $330,000 price Ing. Risk is viruselly idenneel to EA 98-009 which carried 98-280 a 388,000 in 6 tag.

Calvert Clifts Ill-r *.elogicalmetrol NRC seems to be E,. *Ooldilocks"enim vioistions ($55.000) ~.;-lest year's $176.000 CP was too high, this spring

• CP waiver was too low, so now NRC is trying forjust right.98-336 lashen Point 3 Real message - enfeecement is not working, NRC should try no ORDER.

III & IV- modification wiuch dessbled two ofihree EDGs Civil;~ aty seems low because risk is for gecour shes lbst in EA's97-264. 97-(s55.000) 265.97-567, 98-020 and 98-280 which carried $55,000 price tags. le addition, probican was immoduced in oesober 1997-afkr te h =" =emy concied its ma problems.

O 4

e T

e J 1

ATTACHMENT 4 i

NU(llAt ENfRGY IN511TUTI Ellen C. Ginshrg AS$11 TANT G(N(R Ag COUN5tt j December 14,1998 1

Mr. James Lieberman Director, Office of Enforcement ~

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Mail Stop O.7 H5 One White Flint North 11555 Rockville Pike Rockville, MD 20852 2738

SUBJECT:

NRC Office of Enforcement Request for Industry Review of FY 1998 Escalated Enforcement Actions

Dear Mr. Lieberman:

As you requested, on behalf of the nuclear energy industry, NEI's Enforcement Policy Development Task Force has reviewed the escalated enforcement actions -

issued to reactor licensees during fiscal year 1998. (See attached matrix and the latest version of the tables explaining the criteria applied.) We understand that you requested that the industry and other stakeholders, including representatives of the j Union of Concerned Scientists ("UCS"), evaluate these actions in order to facilitate more pointed discussion about " regulatory significance" and escalated enforcement generally, at the December 17,1998 public meeting.

The NRC has proposed reforming the Er forcement Policy and its implementation beginning with violations with little or no safety significance, currently designated as Severity Level IV and below. Previously, in a letter dated October 23,1998, NEI indicated the industry's support for NRC efforts to modify the Enforcement Policy to more effectively address nonsafety significant violations. However, as we also explained in that letter, we remain concerned about certain features of the NRC's proposal that retain considerable subjectivity and impose unnecessary burden on licensees.

The NRC also should move expeditiously to reform the Enforcement Policy's treatment of" escalated" violations. It is essential that these high profile actions, which consume substantiallicensee and NRC resources, be focused on violations l that are seiety significant based on actual consequences or on realistic and i significant potential consequences. To this end, we have presented the basic features of our proposal for enforcement treatment of safety significant violations to l

the NRC and other stakeholders in a number of public meetings. We expect to 1776 4 5ttiIt, NW $UI11 ADO WA$MINGTON. DC ?0006-3708 PHONE 202.739.9000 # An 202.78 5 4 010

r 1

Jim Lieberman  !

December 14,1998 '

Page 2 discuss our approach in considerably greater detail during the December 17 public meeting.

The industry's proposal for treatment of safety significant violations is based on a number of guiding principles. The single most important principle is that enforcement should, through application of risk information, clearly focus on items having actual consequences or realistic and significant potential consequences for the public health and safety. In addition, escalated enforcement action should consider the event as it occurred, and not be a surrogate for performance assessment activities through, for example, the aggregation of a number of j

violations that, individually, are not safety signi6 cant. Finally, enforcement should be based.upon objective criteria, not such elusive terms as " regulatory significance" and " regulatory concern."

(

By reforming the Enforcement Policy in accordance with these basic principles, NRC enforcement action will become readily understandable and predictable. NRC i

enforcement action also will be less susceptible to criticism for being driven by changing staffinterpretations or expanding views of compliance. And, ultimately, these reforms will result in the NRC and licensa expending their resources on those items of greatest safety significance..a primary objective of the NRC's overall regulatory reform effort.

l The industry's proposal provides that each violation will be evaluated to determine ifit meets the criteria for escalated enforcement action, and if so, what severity level should be assigned. The proposal also permits the use ofplant specific risk information. The criteria and severity levels are captured ni three tables:

Table A - Criteria for violations having actual consequences. These include violations that cause an offsite release of radiation, onsite or offsite radiation exposures, accidental criticality, core damage, or radiological emergencies.

Table B - Criteria for violations without actual consequences, but having realistic and significant potential consequences based on risk-informed analyses. These include violations that render high risk or risk signi6 cant systems (as defined for each class of plants by AEOD) fully or partially unable to perform their intended safety functions.

I .

Table C - Criteria for violations that are potentially safety significant but do not have actual consequences and are not susceptible to the risk informed analyses embodied in Table B. These include violations that may affect the assumptions upon which risk assessments are based or undermine the i

Integrity of the regulatory process, such as willful violations, fire protection I

,-- . , - . y .y , w - _4 .-m-- .-,

Jim Lieberman December 14,1998 '

Page 3 violations, licensed operator inattentiveness, employee discrimination, failures to report, and failures to perform 10 CFR 50.59 evaluations.

By applying the industry's proposed tables to the escalated enforcement actions issued to reactor licensees during FY 1998, we were able to test the tables' effectiveness in directing enforcement action to safety significant violations. From this exercise, it became apparent that the industry's overall proposal is workable in practice and will, in fact, focus licensee and NRC resources on safety significant issues.

Under the defined, objective criteria set out in Tables A, B and C, approximately 50 percent of the escalated enforcement actions for FY 1998 would not have been subjected to escalated enforcement. Significantly, UCS's review of the same enforcement actions led it to conclude that approximately 30 percent of the identified enforcement actions should not have been escalated. Several factors account for the difference in the industry's severity level assignment for FY 1998 enforcement actions versus the conclusions reached by the NRC. We describe these below.

First, the industry's proposal does not permit enforcement action to be taken, as is current NRC practice, based upon on aggregation ofindividually insignificant noncompliances that are used to form an inference of" programmatic breakdown" or

" regulatory significance." Aggregatin they relate to the same areas or repetitive,"is are "g noncompliances, whether by claiming that a highly subjective exercise.

Aggregation often results in enforcement action (and consequent NRC and licensee management attention) being directed toward matters having little nexus to afety, and skews the relative priority of these matters in the licensee's corrective action program. In essence, aggregation is a form ofperformance assessment-a process better accomplished through evaluations that are specifically designed for that purpose, are more systematic and are broader in scope.

Second, c.r review identified fewer escalated enforcement actions based on the incorporabon of risk insights through the application of Table B. When the safety impact of the FY 1998 escalated violations was evaluated against the risk. informed criteria captured in Table B, a substantial portion of the violations were determined  ;

not to have any significant impact on core damage frequency, general operability or the ability to safely shut down the reactor. Accordingly, they did not warrant l escalated action. Applying the heavy hand of escalated enforcement to these

)

matters results in a level of NRC and licensee attention and resourcee that is not i justified from a safety perspective. In such cases the licensee should be permitted to place the item into the corrective action program and to address the violation f according to the licensee's assigned priority.

)

l 1

i Jim Lieberman December 14,1998 ' '

Page 4 i

Finally, in a number of cases where the industry's conclusions diverge from the NRC's, the escalated enforcement action involved 50.59 safety evaluations which l

should have been performed, but were not, and involved changes to the facility that were later determined to be technically acceptable. Table C addresses those 50.59 violations that the' industry considers sufficiently important to warrant escalated enforcement. However, Table C draws a clearer connection between such a violation and actual risk than is currently NRC's practice. Application of Table C l

would lead to an escalated 50.59 violat. ion either because the violation led to i degraded equipment (as assessed on Table B) or because the violation led to implementation of a change that, if reviewed by the NRC, would not have been approved. This approach protects the NRC process while focusing escalated enforcement on truly risk significant matters.

' We appreciate the continuing opportunity to discuss with the NRC and other stakeholders how the Enforcement Policy can be improved. We look forward to meeting to again exchange views. We are confident that,if the NRC takes meaningful action to reform the Enforcement Policy, the agency will more effectively carry out its mission to protect public health and safety.

Sincerely, h<

Ellen C. Ginsberg c: David A. Lochbaum Nuclear Safety Engineer

! Union of Concerned Scientists i

l BY COURIER i

}

s

7 -. . .

ESCALATED ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS FOR REACTOR LICENSEES October 1,1997 - September 30,1998 Facility EA NRC NEl I NEl Comments -

D.C. Cook 98-113 Ill NSSI Table C - transportation - single isolated administrative mistake l Palo 98-131 lil til l Table C - willful violation - licensed operator Verde Calvert 98-106 lil NSSI Table A- health physics - no overexposures; program Cliffs deficiencies to be addressed by the assessment process Calvert 98-280 lli NSSI Table A - health physics - no overexposures; program Cliffs deficiencies to be addressed

! by the assessment process Pilgrim 97-482  !

l A. 111 111 Table C - 50.59 '

B. 111 til Table C - 50.59 '

C. 111 NSSI Table C - 50.59 - cover letter implies the NRC would have approved the changes and they were not safety significant; program deficiencies to be addressed by the assessment process.

Pilgrim 98-191 111 111 Table C - security 2 l

H. B.97-490 til lli Table B - 5.a - one train of high risk system not functional Robinson l

Harris98-020 til 111 Table C - security 2 1 Perry 97-047 A. til NSSI Table C - licensed operator matters - no tech spec reactivity ,

violated; program deficiencies to be addressed by the assessment process.

B. 111 NSSI Table B - 5.b - one train of risk significant system not functional under certain circumstances C. til 111 Table C - 50.59 '

Dresden 96-493 lil 111 Table C - willful- assuming action is necessary against i licensee Braidwood 97-110 ll! Ill Table C - Appendix R Braidwood 97-265 lli NSSI Table B - 6.a - system operable, tech spec surveillance not corrected Byron 97-264 Ill NSSI Table B - 6.a - system operable, tech spec surveillance not corrected Byron 97-446 111 111 Table C- Appendix R Quad 97-466 lil NSSI Table B - 6.b - no equipment inoperable *- program Cities deficiencies to be addressed by the assessn;ent process

Quad 97-591 Cities A. 111 til Table C - 50.59 '

B. 111 NSSI Table C - miscellaneous full qualification issues - program Quad deficiencies to be addressed by the assessment process98-175 11 til Cities Table C- Appendix R. Note: 50.59 USO was subsequently Zion approved by the NRC, so not safety significant 97-249 Ill lli Table C- Fitness for Duty Haddam 97-366 til NSSI Neck Table B -6.b- system degraded but functional; program indian deficiencies to be addressed by the assessment process97-576 Point 2 1. 111 NSSI Table C - willful- nonmanagement individual

!!. lit lil Table B - 3.a 111. til 111 Table B - 3.a - assumes failure of breaker causes Inoperability of auxilliary feedwater system Indian 97-367 Point 2 1. ll1 lil Table-B - 2.b

11. lll NSSI Table B - 5.b

, Dalisades97-567 Ill

' NSSI Table B - 6.a - rods trippable; program deficiencies to be addressed by the assessment process Catawba 98-208 111 NSSI Table B - 5.b - program deficiencies to be addressed by the assessment process Oconee 98-268 11 til Table B - 3.a - if plant specific PRA indicates substantial increase (e.g., > 10% annual) in CDF risk, then increase to level 11 Beaver 97-517 111 111 Table B - 5.a Valley Arkansas97-382 Ill NSSI Nuclear Table B - 6.b - steam generator inspection program; One program deficiencies to be addressed by the assessment process River 97-497 Ill ill Bend Table C -licensed operator matters; RCS boiling during shutdown, but no core damage Waterford 97-589 111 NSSI Table B - 5.b St. Lucie 97-501 Ill NSSI Table B - 5.b St. Lucie 98-009 11 Ill Table B - 2.b -if plant specific PRA indicates substantial increase (e.g.,> 10% annual) in CDF risk, then increase to level 11 St. Lucie 98-064 til NSSI Oyster Table C - security - no threat; isolated administrative error "97-421 Creek I.A Ill NSSI Table B - 5.b l.B 111 NSSI Table B - 3.b -

1.C. Ill NSSI Table B - 3.c Oyster 97-617 Ill NSSI Table C-full qualification issue Creek Oyster 98-220 til

" NSSI Creek Table B - 3.b - program deficiencies to be addressed by the assessment rocess

i I

Three Mile 97-070 Island I. 111 til Table B - 3.a

11. 111 l

111 Table C - 50.59 '

111. lil NSSI Table C : miscellaneous full qualification issues - program deficiencies to be addressed by the assessment process IV. lll NSSI Table C- EP-drill failures only V.A. 111 NSSI I Table C - miscellaneous full qualification issue Three Mile 97 533 111 111 i Island Table B - 3.b - however,16% CDF increases level per Table B asterisk C N per 97-424 Ill NSSI Table B - 3.b - corrective action program issues; program l deficiencies to be addressed by the assessment process; l Indian 98-336 lit til Point 3 Table B - 5.a - one EDG was still able to function  !

Nine Mile 97-007 Ill NSSI Point Table B - 6.b - no equipment inoperable *; program deficiencies to be addressed by the assessment process Nine Mile 97-530 lit til Table A- exceeded exposure limits l

Point ,

Seabrook 98-073 Ill NSSI Table B - 6.b -program deficiencies to be addressed by the

' assessment process.

' Millstone 96-034

1. II ill Table C - 50.59', first bullet (Violation I.B.2.)

11. Il ill Table C -50.59', first bullet (Violation I.B.3.)

111. Il 111 IV.

Table B-3.a. (Violation ll.A.11) 111 Ill Table B -5.a; high risk significant, one train does not perform safety function (Violation ll.A.17) til Table C - 50.9 inaccurate information, second bullet (Violation ll.B) 111 Table B - 3.a. under certain circumstances, all trains of high risk system would not have performed safety function (Violation Ill.C) 111 Table B - 3.a. (Violation Ill.E) same as Ill.C.

NSSI all remaining examples i

Millstone 97-562 Ill NSSI Table B - 3.b - program deficiencies to be addressed by the assessment process.

Millstone 98-179 Ill lil Table C- emergency planning; assuming assessment planning standard not met Prairie 97-290 lli NSSI Table C - miscellaneous full qualification issues on IST island Fort 97-432 Ill NSSI Table B - 3.b - however, text states other systems available, Calhoun so reduce to nonsafety significant violation per Table B asterisk Peach 98-105 Ill NSSI Table B - 5.b Bottom Limerick l 98-141 111 til Table B - 5.a

7 o . ~

o t

Hope Creek 97-144

l. til NSSI Table C-licensed operator matters

11. til NSSI Table B - 6.b - no equipment inoperable8- program Hope Creek deficiencies to be addressed by the assessment process97-160 lli lli Table C - 50.59 '

Salem 97-182 111 111 Table C - 50.59 '

San Onofre 97-585 111 Ill Table C - security Sequoyah 97-409 > lli NSSI Table B - 5.b Vermont 97-531 Ill lli Yankee Table B - 3.a - assuming could not perform safety function Surry 97 474 Ill NSSI Table C - Appendix R - single isolated failure Washington 97-573 til lil Table C - 50.59 '

Nuclear Project-2 l

l l

l i

i I  !

The 50.59 assessrnent assurnes that a USQ existed, and that the NRC would gg.t have approved the change. If approved the change, then the item would be nonsafety significant due to limited actual safety / risk significance. I

( 2 'Ihe security inrormation was redacted it is assumed that there was degradation such that there w  !

persotmel who represented a threat to gain access to a vital area or to introduce contraband.

l 4

3 Maintenance Rule violation where no equipment was inoperable; violation appears to have been due to new regulatory requirernents.

l l

l l

l

\

I _ . . . . . _ . ._

l 1 December 15,1998 i TABL'E A ACTUAL CONSEQUENCES Table A applies to enforcement actions related to a violation (or a group of concurrent violations) that are the proximate cause of actual radiological safety consequences or other specified actual safety consequences, as specified below.

1 Offsite Releases Of Radioactive Material or Offsite Radiation Expos'ures (Due to a Reactor Operating Event or an Unauthorized Release Disoosal)

SeverityLevel1:

An annual exposure of a member of the public in excess of 1.0 rem total effective dose equivalent; or A release of radioactive material to an unrestricted area at concentrations in excess of 50 times the limits for members of the public as described in 10 CFR 20.1302(b)(2)(i); or Disposal oflicensed material in quantities or concentrations in excess of 10 times the ,

limits of10 CFR 20.2003.

SeverityLevelIh An annual exposure of a member of the public in excess of 0.5 rem total effective dose equivalent; or I

A release ofradioactive material to an unrestricted area at concentrations in excess of 10 times the limits for members of the public as described in 10 CFR 20.1302(b)(2)(i)

(except when operation up to 0.5 rem a year has been approved by the Commission under Section 20.130(c)); or Disposal or release of licensed material in quantities or concentrations in excess of j five times the limits of 10 CFR 20.2003.

l'

y. _ _ _ _. _ _ . _ _ ._ _ _ __ _ __ _ _ ..-_. _ . . _ _ . _ _

4 SeverityLevelIII:

An annual exposure of a member of the public in excess of 0.1 rem total effective dose equivalent (except when operation up to 0.5 rem a year has been approved by the Commission under Section 20.1301(c)); or A release of radioactive material to an unrestricted area at concentrations in ex two times the effluent concentration limits referenced in 10 CFR 20.1302 (except when operation up to 0.5 rem a year has been approved by the Commission under Section 20.1301(c)); or l

e Disposal or release oflicensed material in excess of 2.5 times the limits of 10 CFR l 20.2003.

[ ~.

Onsite Radiation Exposures mue to Violations of NRC Rea_uirements)

SeverityLevel1:

1 A radiation exposure during any year of a worker in excess of 25 rems total effective

' dose equivalent,75 rems to the lens of the eye, or 250 rads to the skin of the whole body, or to the feet, ankles, hands or forearms, or to any other organ or tissue; or A radiation exposure over the gestation period of the embryo / fetus of a declared pregnant woman in excess of 2.5 rems total effective dose equivalent; or i

e A radiation exposure during any year of a minor in excess of 2.5 rems total effective dose equivalent,7.5 rems to the lens of the eye, or 25 rems to the skin of the whole body, or to the fe" ankles, hands or forearms, or to any other organ or tissue; I

SeverityLevelII:  !

A radiation exposure during any year of a worker in excess of 10 rems total effective dose equivalent,30 rems to the lens of the eye, or 100 rems to the skin of the whole body, or to the feet, ankles, hands or forearms, or to any other organ or tissue; or e

A radiation exposure over the gestation period of the embryo / fetus of a declared l

l pregnant woman in excess of 1.0 rem total effective dose equivalent; A radiation exposure during any year of a minor in excess of 1.0 rem total effective j

dose equivalent; 3.0 rems to the lens of the eye, or 10 remt to the skin of the whole body, or to the feet, ankles, hands or forearms, or to any other organ or tissue.

2 l

l

Severity LevelIII:

A radiation exposure during any year of a worker in excess of 5 rems total effective dose equivalent,15 rems to the lens of th'e eye, or 50 rems to the skin of the whole body or to the feet, ankles, hands or foreanns, or to any other organ or tissue; or A mdiation exposure over the gestation period of the embryo / fetus of a declared pregnant woman in excess of 0.5 rem total effective dose equivalent (except when doses are in accordance with the provisions ofSection 20.1208(d)); or A radiation exposure during any year of a minor in excess of 0.5 rem total effective dose equivalent; 1.5 rems to the lens of the eye, or 5 rems to the skin of the whole i body, or to the feet, ankles, hands or forearms, or to any other organ or tissue.

Other Reactor Events with Actual Consequences fBut Not Involving Offsite Releases in Excess of Technical Specifications or Onsite l Exposures) I l

l Severity LevelII:

A violation or a group of concunent violations leading to an accidental criticality, but not radiological consequences that would constitute a Severity Level I on this Table; or A violation or a group of concurrent violations leading to core damage (other than l fuel failures), but not radiological consequences that would constitute a Severity LevelI on this Table.

Severity LevelIII:

A violation or group of concurrent violations that are the proximate cause of an event that is or should have been classified as a site area emergency or general emergency, but not radiological consequences that would constitute a Severity Level I or II on this Table.

3

=__ ._ _ _ _ __ _ .__ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

4 TABLE B - POTENTIAL CONSEQUENCES I This table applies to reactor operations, maintenance, and design activities (including programs l

apply to those activities) that are found to be in violation of NRC requirements. As referred to in

.

• intended safety function" refers to the function (s) that caused the system to be classed as a " ri 4 *high risk agnificant' system. Inability of all trains to perform safety function refers to cases in w trains could not perform intended safety function pertinent to the event or circumstances at issu a beyond the allowed outage time (A01) that would apply to each train ifother trains were ope systems with redundancy provided by diverse trains or systems, the single train system and the diverse ersin or system should be treated as redundant trains of a single system.

3, 4

CONDrI10N HIGH RISK 4

RISK NON-RISK SIGNIFICANT SSC SIGNIFICAbTSSC SIGNIFICAhTSSC All trains ofsystem fail to I* II* NSSI perfonn intended safety function when actually called upon.

All trains ofsystem cannot II* III* NSSI perfonn intended safety functions.

All trains ofsystem cannot  !

III* NSSI NSSI perfonn intended safety functions under some circumstances.

One train ofmultitrain II* III*

system fails to perform NSSI intended safety function when actually called upon.

Once train ofmultitrain 11I

• NSSI system cannot perform . NSSI i I

intended safety function.

One train ofmultitrain NSSI NSSI NSSI system cannot perfonn intended safety function  !

under some circumstances, or system or systems degraded but capable of performing intended safety.

• If reasonable compensatory capability was available, or compensatory action was taken, low one severity level.

m L32/1226?a t

December 15,1998 TABLE C DEFINED VIOLATIONS IMPORTANT TO SAFETY Table C addresses certain violations related to licensee programs that involve  !

significant and realistic potential safety consequences and that are not susceptible to treatment on Table B. However, use of Table C should not undermine the philosophy that the enforcement program should not assume a " performance assessment" function. 1 With respect to programs and program implementation, Table C would focus on issues l

with realistic potential consequences because there is a failure to achieve a required program element, not on isolated implementation issues.

Repetitive problems, programmatic or performance concems, or management issues are not addressed on ,

Table C; these ntters will be addressed in the performance assessment context, utilizing other regulatory mechanisms (s&, management meetings, confirmatory action letters).

Table C also addresses certain violations where enforcement action is important for deterrence or other reasons important to safety (apart from any remedial purpose).

These include certain violations of 10 C.F.R. Section 50.5 (deliberate misconduct),

Section 50.7 (employee discrimination), and Section 50.9 (complete and accurate information).

The following objectives and guidelines should be employed in applying Table C:

Table C addresses enforcement actions issued to power reactor licensees.

Severity Levels of actions issued directly to individuals (including licensed operators and licensee employees) would be assessed separately in accordance with the guidelines of Section VIII of the Enforcement Policy.

' Table C reflects the philosepliy that licensees are held accountable for the acts of their employees, bu' should not be held accountable for matters outside their control such as random equipment failures or certain examples ofpersonnel wror.gdoing.

l As with all violations, the presumption is made for Table C that the licensee has initiated corrective actions through the Corrective Action Program or otherinitiative.

For issues addressed on Table C (n, fire protection), Tables A or B do not apply unless spee!!ically stated on Table C.

1 1

O Note: Not all potential violations appear on Table C, even though some "NSSIs" appear on the Table. These NSSIs are listed for clarity and guidance. If a specific matter under consideration does not appear on Table C, it should presumptively be treated as an NSSI.

i Condition Guideline Licensed Operator Matters'

e Multiple instances ofinattentiveness l

SLII by licensed operators (sleeping or engaging in a distracting activity) m i control room, evidencing a pattem of abuse e A significant example of an inatteistive SLIII licensed operator (sleeping or engaging in a distracting activity)in control room )

(11, during a significant operational i event or for a significant period of time)

Actions by a licensed operator or operators SL HI in the control room during a risk significant evolution or contributing to a safety significant operational event, that reflect careless disregard for or constituting a pattern of abuse oflicensed

! responsibilities i l

e A significant failure to meet minimum i j SLIII control room staffing requirements (11, during a risk-significant evolution l or event, or for an extended period of time) e Operator errors resulting in Technical Specification SLIII violations related to limiting safety system settings, reactivity, power distribution, or core safety limits, where the violations do not result in actual consequences or potential consequences covered under Tables A or B Severity Levels in this category may be adjusted iflicensee management has taken reasonable corrective actions, including disciplinary action.

1 2

_ . _ = . - . .- , _ - ..

Operator errors resulting in Technical Specification SLIII violations involving Reactor Coolant System boiling during shutdown, where the violations do not result in core uncovery or core damage Inadvertent instances ofinadequate NSSI performance by licensed operators in the control j room (unless otherwise specified on this Table)

Section 50.59 Failure to apply for required NRC approval SLIII due to flawed safety evaluation, or failure to perform a required safety evaluation, where the change involves a USQ and is later determined to be unacceptable on the merits l

Failure to apply for required NRC approval NSSI due to flawed Section 50.59 safety evaluation, where the change involves a USQ, but the change is otherwise determined to be acceptable on the merits with no further modifications Change made without Section 50.59 safety Assess based on evaluation Table B or C Deliberate / Willful Violations' Willful violation by licensee management Assess based on individual (licensed operator, or manager- Table A, B, or C and level and above), with actual or potential safety raise 1 Severity consequences Level e

Willful violation by licensee management SLIII individual (licensed operator, manager-level and above), with minimal potential safety ig consequences Willful violation by low ranking individual, Assesr based on i

with actual or potential safety consequences Table A, B, or C I

)

3 l

. _._ _. _. m. _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ . _ _. . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ . _ _ _ _ . , _ _ _ _ .._

Willful violation by low ranking individual, NSSI with minimal potential safety consequences Employee Discrimination e  !

Use discretion to assign Severity Level, or forego escalated enforcement action, based upon the following factors:

Whether a particular licensee official is detennined culpable, and the level

. of that official.

The safety importance of any particular technical concern involved.

Whether actions have been taken to remediate the claim with the individual (it, reinstatement or settlement).

Whether the circumstances of the violation create the potential for widespread chilling effects.

Whether the potential chilling effects have been addressed by the licensee, either by corrective actions or by pre-existing initiatives.

Incomplete / Inaccurate Information and RfDortInf ISSUE $

=

Submittal ofincomplete or inaccurate information on SLII a matter, or failure to file a required report, where tn' e information or report would have warranted an immediate NRC order required by public health and safetyifcomplete/ accurate / filed Submittal ofincomplete or inaccurate information on SLIII i

a matter, or failure to file a required report, where the information or repon would have resulted in adverse regulatory action other than an immediate order (e.g., enforcement, withholding an approval) ifcomplete/ accurate / filed l

• Deliberately incomplete or inaccurate information, or Raise Severity Level deliberate failure to file a required report, with the based on above knowledge of senior licensee management examples by 1 4

e

l l

l '. .

l Other example ofdeliberately inaccurate or See " Deliberate /

incomplete information or deliberate failure to Willful Violations" l file a required repon above; consider '

individual actions i

taken bylicensee, NRC Other isolated example ofincomplete or inaccurate NSSI l information or failure to file a required report, which would not have resulted in regulatory action if complete / accurate / filed l

Fitness For Duty e Licensed operator at controls makes errors See Table A/B/C; that cause or exacerbate an alen or higher consider raising one level emergency, and later tests positive - SL, but also consider i

with actual or potential safety consequences actions by licensee '

and NRC against individual Licensed operator at controls makes errors, SL III, but consider and later tests positive - with minimal safety actions bylicensee consequences and NRC against individual

• Failure to implement a significant element of SLIII the FFD program as required by NRC regulations

~

e Isolated FFD program implementation NSSI deficiencies Securitv/Safenuards

• Actual act of sabotage in which security SLI i

system did not function as required and, as a result, there was a significant event j such as accidental criticality, theft of

! formula quantity of SNM, or unauthorized production of SNM 1

S

I Security system did not function as required SLII and, as a result, there was an unauthorized entry into vital area by an individual who '

was a threat, or there was a theft of SNM of moderate strategic significance e

l Accen authorization or security system deficiency SLIII that resultsin access being granted to an indisidual who should not have been authorized, and who was subsequently determined to be a threat, i

but who did not enter vital area

e Failure, inability, degradation, or other SLIII deficiency (other than an unauthorized personnel entry)in the established security systems or procedures such that there was a realistic potential for unauthorized personnel who re' presented a threat to gain access to a vital area or to circumvent systems to introduce contraband

• Access authorization deficiency that results NSSI in access being granted to an individual who should not have been authorized, but who was subsequently determined to not be a threat Isolated safeguards failures, including both NSSI system design and procedure implementation deficiencies IE'

• Significant failure to eficctively respond to a general SLI emergency Significant failure to effectively respond to a site

, emergency SLII

• Significant failure to effectively respond to an alert SLIII l

i I

8 l 'Ihese violations are separate from, and in addition to, any other violations that relate to causing an event at a nuclear plant.

I 6

i Significant failure to maintain equipment and/or systems SLIII such that a planning standard involving assessment or notification capability is compromised Failure to meet or implement an emergency NSSI planning standard not directly related to assessment or notification capability Isolated failures to implement emergency NSSI response procedures e

Failure to implement emergency preparedness NSSI procedures during an emergency response drill Fire Protection (Annendir R) .

Actual fire event resulting in damage and Table A

! unintended radiological releases in excess of Technical Specifications Actual fire event that a Fire Protection program SLII element should have prevented or mitigated causing the loss of safety related systems necessary to achieve safe shutdown l

l .

Concurrent multiple failures to implement the Fire SLIII l

Protection program such that, in the event of a fire, the failures could have prevented the plant from achieving safe shutdown

• Isolated failures in the implementation of the NSSI Fire Protection program Miscellaneous Full Oualification Issues (e.e.. ASME Code. EO.

!. Surveillances. OA Deficiencies)

Failure to meet full qualification provision, or a failure Table B to perfonn a surveillance, resulting in indetermhiate equipment status and potential component degradation -

equipment later determined to involve component degradation i

4 7

i

Failure to meet a full qualification provision, or a failure NSSI to perform a surveillance, resulting in indeterminate equipment status and potential component degradation -

equipment functionality subsequently verified Transnortation e

Failure to meet transportation requirements resulting SLI in loss of control of radioactive material with a breach in package integrity such that the material caused a radiation exposure to a member of the public and there was a clear and realistic potential for the public to receive more than 0.1 rem to the whole body e

Failure to meet transportation requirements resulting in SLI surface contamination in excess of 50 times the NRC limit Failure to meet transponation requirements resulting in SLI extemal radiation levels in excess of 10 times the NRC limit e

Failure to meet transponation requirements that resulted SLII i

in loss of control of radioactive material with a breach in package integrity such that there was a clear and realistic potential for the member of the public to receive more than 0.1 rem to the whole body e

Failure to meet transponation requirements that resulted SL II in surface contamination in excess of 10, but not more than 50 times the NRC limit Failure to meet transportation requirements that resulted SLII in extemal radiation levels in excess of five, but not more than 10 times the NRC limit e

Failure to meet transportation requirements that resulted SLIII in surface contamination in excess of five but not more than 10 times the NRC limit e

' Failure to meet transportation requirements that resulted SLIII in extemal radiation in excess of one but not more than five times the NRC limit 8

Any noncompliance with labeling, placarding, shipping SLIII paper, packaging, loading, or other requirements, where there was a realistic potential for the following:

(a) A significant failure to identify the ty;ie, quantity, or form ofmaterial; (b) A significant failure of the carrier or recipient to exercise adequate controls; or (c) A substantial potential for either personnel exposure or contamination above regulatory limits or improper transfer ofmaterial.

9

ATTACHMENT 5 Propo alated

. ntorcement Policy .l Revision l l

1

/ NEI Enforcement Policy i

[ Development Task Force g.

l I

i j

l Industry Concerns Escalated actions are not sufficiently safety based Escalated actions are often inconsistent within and among regions Escalated actions are based on undefined, subjective concepts (e.g., Regulatory Significance)

Escalated actions are not based on actual event i

i l

Guiding Principles for Escalated Enforcement Severity level ~should directly relate to safety significance of actual event

- Evaluation based on actual consequences (Table A)

- Incorporation of risk insights for realistic and significant potential consequences (Table B)

- Definition of other significant violations that are not subject to application of risk insights (Table C)

U Guiding Principles for Escalated Enforcement (cont d>

Escalated enforcement should not be used to address performance issues

- Programmatic" issues are better evaluated and addressed in performance assessment process

- Aggregation does not equate to safety significant

- Maintenance rule violations tend to be

" programmatic"/ based on differing understanding of requirements i

'h 2

. c 1

i Results of Application of  ;

industry Proposal '

• Industry review yielded 30 escalated actions vs. NRC's 56 Industry review yielded 41 escalated violations vs. NRC's 74 Specific cases yielded more individual violations than NRC cited 1.*

Bases for Industry Results Proposal directly applies risk information

- Table B

- opportunity for consideration of plant specific risk infonnation Proposal eliminates consideration of most programmatic issues Proposal treats 10 CFR 50.59 violations according to realistic risk impacts Proposal considers duration through impact of time on realistic risk gfi 3

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