ML20199E619
| ML20199E619 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion Plant |
| Issue date: | 11/17/1997 |
| From: | John Miller UNITED STATES ENRICHMENT CORP. (USEC) |
| To: | Paperiello C NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM), NRC OFFICE OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL SAFETY & SAFEGUARDS (NMSS) |
| References | |
| GDP-97-0197, GDP-97-197, TAC-L32032, NUDOCS 9711210265 | |
| Download: ML20199E619 (26) | |
Text
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United States EnrichmeniCorporation 2 Democracy Center 6903 nockledge Dnve Bethesda, MD 20817 Tel; 1301)564 3200 raic1301)564 3201 JAnsEs H. MiLLen or: (301) 564-3309 VICE PRESIDENT, PRODUCTION Faic (301) $71-8279 November 17,1997 Dr. Carl J. Paperiello SliRIAL: GDP 97 0197 Director, Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards Attention: Document Control Desk (J.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 0001 Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion Plant (PORTS)
Docket No. 70-7002 Transmittal of Revision 14 to Portsmouth Certification Application
Dear Dr. Paperiello:
In accordance with 10 CFR Part 76, the United States linrichment Corporation (IJSliC) hereby submits twenty (20) copics of Revision 14 (November 5.1997) to USEC-02, Application for United States Nuclear Regulatory Commis ion Certincution, Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion Plant.
Revision 14 incorporates changes to the Safety Analysis Report and Technical Safety Requirements.
These changes were previously submitted for your review in accordance with 10 CFR 76.45 and were appmved as Amendment 5 to the CertiGcate of Compliance GDP 2 in your letter dated Octowr 6,1997 (TAC NO.1.32032). Revision bars are provided in the right-hand margin to identify the changes.
. Revision 14 was implemented on November 5,1997.
Should you have any questions or comments on Revision 14, please call me at (301) 564-3309 or Steve Routh at (301) 564 3251. There are no new commitments made in this submittal.
Sincerely, C u c ygL MFwi',
mes 11. Miller
. Vice President, Production b!$lllll$ lklblll C
ome in uvermore.CaWomte Paducah, Kentucky. Portsmouth, Ohio Washmgton, DC
Dr. Carl J. Papaiello November 17,1997 GDP 97-0197 Page 2
Attachment:
USEC 02, Application for United States Nuclear llegulatory Commission Certification, Partsmouth Gaseous Diffusion Plant, llevision 14, Copy Numbers 1 through 20
Enclosure:
Affidavit ec:
NRC Region 111 Office Copy Numbers 21,172 NRC Resident inspector - PODP Copy Number 22 Mr. Joe W. Parks (DOE)
Copy Numbers 24 through 28 l
1 DATil AND AFFillh1ATION 1, James 11. hiiller, swear and aftirm that I am Vice Pnsident, Production, of the (Jnited States linrichment Corporation (lJSliC), that I am authorized by l)S!!C to sign and file with the Nuclear llegulatory Commission this Revision 14 of the tJSI!C Application for United States Nuclear llegulatory Commission Certification, Portsmooth Gaseous DifTusion Plant (USI!C-02), that I cm familiar with the contents thereof, and that the statements made and matters set forth therein are true and correct to the best of my knowledge, infbrmation, and belief.
J: ie
- 1. hiiller On this 17th day of November,1997, the ollicer signing alxwe personally aopeared belbre me, is known by me to be the person whose name is subscribed to within the instrument, and acknowledged that he executed the same ihr the purposes therein contained.
In witness hereofI hereunto set my hand and oflic:al seal,
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.ldfLLjm State of h1aryland, hiontgomery County'/
~
aurie M. Knisley, Notary Public
/
hiy coinmission expires hiarch 17,1998
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SAR PORTS November 5,1997 Rev.14-j The scale pits in ERP, LAW and Tails, are filled to a minimum depth of 6 inches with 1.5 inch l
borosilicate glass Raschig rings containing 4% b9ron. With the exception of the 1.AW Station, these pits l
have neither drains nor sump pumps. In th2.AW Station, avtomatic sump pumps transfer any liquid i
accumulating in the scale pits to a reservoir tank. The scale pits in all three facilities are checked weekly for the presence ofliquid. If more than one inch of water is detected, the pits are pumped. The 1.AW Station reservoir tank is also inspected weekly. If liquid is found in the tank, it is pumped and analyzed before disposal. If the liquid contains rnore than 5 grams of U 235 per liter, the solution is drained into tinch polybottles and stored in approved container holders.
3.2.2.4,7 Hinh Vent Hender Pressure Alarm r
The plant auxiliary feed and vent return headers are normally used to supply UF. and to vent the withdrawal station to its withdrawal point. Most likely, the withdrawal point will be located in the X 330 Building, requiring the use of building tie lines and motor operated valves. High vent ?,eader pressure alarms are provided for each compression loop to warn of high vent header pressure, which could result from inadvertent closing or a misvalving operation in the station's vent return header. This PBS when actuated sounds an alarm when the vent headcr pressure reaches 7.5 psia.
3.2.2.4,8 High Discharne Pressure Protection for First Stage Comoressor At ERP and LAW, the instrumentation which provides for the high pressure venting (HPV) on each contpressor loop is located in the recycle line vf the first stage compressor. It consists of two pressure switches (PSH and PSHH), each with an accuracy of 0.1 %. The PSH is set at 7.5 psia and actNates both audible and visual alaims locally and in the ACR. If the PSHH is allowed to be energized (10 psia), the HPV circuit will become energized, isolating the affected loop and venting it to the cascade. These alarms serve two purposes. The PSH (7.5 psia) provides a warning the operator of the accumulation of light molecular weight matet;al (" lights") in the condensers, accumulators, and product cylinder. Usually
- lights" accumulate slowly causing a gradual increase in the compressor discharge pressure. At 7.5 psia, the compressors are experiencing high discharge pressure and are nearing a critical operating region where surging could begin. When this alarm is actuated, immediate investigation and corrective action by the operator are necessary.
The PSHH is set at 10 psia so chat automatic HPV, isolation and venting will occur if a break in process piping occurs, total seal failure occurs, or a process gas cooler ruptures allowing a large volume of coolant to enter the compression loop. The lighter gases cause a decrease in compressor discharge pressure and an increase in compressor suction pressure resulting in automatic HPV and isolation.
However, this PSHH would not protect the compression loop from overpressurization due to instrument failure or recycle failure. The PSH and PSHH are calibrated annually.
h-
/:
-3.2-33
SAR PORTS September 15,1995 Rev.1 3.2.2.4.9 Coolant System Protection The coolant system has the same high pressure protection as previously described for process cells (Section 3.1.1.2.5). When the compressor motors are tripped due to high coolant pressure, the MOVs automatically close (ERP and LAW only).
The ERP station coolant system is protected against r drop in R-114 pressure by a pressure switch which closes an MOV in the water inlet line if the R ll4 vapor header pressure drops below 70 psia. If the differential pressure between the R.ll4 vapor header and the water side of either condenser drops to approximately 5 psi, the compressors are tripped.
The meletron, described in Section 3.1.1.2.7.2, is set to trip the compressor at 100 psia coolant pressure. (LAW and ERP only) 3.2.2.4.10 Buffer Systems The monitoring and control panels for the buffer systems in the high pressure withdrawal facilities provide a means of identifying failures in comprescor flanges, compressor discharge flanges, valve bonnets and bellows, and double wall expansion joints. An alarm is prov!ded both locally and in the ACR when a component failure occurs. This permits adequate time for timely isolation and replacement of failed or damaged components.
Due to the pressure extremes across a compression / liquefaction loop, two systems are employed to supply the appropriate amount of buffer gas to these components. The high pressure control panel provides buffer gas at 25 psig to all buffered components after the second stage of compression. The low pressure control panel supplies 10 psig buffer gas to all the components operating below atmospheric pressure. See Figure 3.2-12E.
The G-17 valves that are located in the high pressure section of the loop can experience pressures ranging from 0.2 to 40 psia. To prevent the valve bellows differential rating of 32 psia from being exceeded when the systems are evacuated, and yet provide adequate purge pressure during normal operation, instrumentation has been installed to switch the buffer pressure from 25 psig to 10 psig or vice versa when the valve body pressure reaches 20 psia. See Figure 3.212F. A revised, variable pressure, buffer system is scheduled for installation in 1995 and 1996 under CWIP Project 34470.
Dry air is supplied from the 100 psig plant air header through a filter and a pressure reducing valve for each monitoring and control panel. After the pressure reduction, a relief valve is provided to prevent overpressuring of the system. Normally, the buffer gas will pass through an orifice; but if the required flow is greater than the orifice can supply, a needle valve can be opened to supply additional buffer gas.
If a component failure occurs, requiring a much larger amount of buffer gas, a check valve will open to permit the required amount of gas to enter. Another check valve has been installed to relieve excess pressure caused when opening a G 17 valve. When a G 17 valve opens, the valve bellows collapses cataing an increase in pressure in the ime. From the main monitoring and control panels the 3.2 34
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requirements for assay monitoring (laboratory samples or automatic systems), and verification that withdrawals are made into the proper cylinders provide assurances that the probability of the occurrence of a cri:icality at these facilities is extremely law.
The nuclear criticality safety review determined that the reservoir was nuclearly safe for an assay s
of 5% U 235 and that two or more contingencies or failures would be required for the reservoir to be unsafe at 10% assay. Double Contingency is ensured by appropriate mass and moderation controls identified in the NCSA. As described in Section 3.2.2.4.6, the scale pits are filled to a minimum depth of 6* at LAW. Tails, and ERP with 1.5 inch borosilicate glass Raschig rings containing 4% boron.
4.2.2.3 Criticality in X 326 Top Case C 22 Criticality at Product Withdrawals and HASA O
The high-assay UF. withdrawn at the PW, Line Recorder Manifolds, and Interim Surge / Purge is capable of enticality if an unsafe mass is allowed to accumulate. Local Control Center (LCC) withdrawal gaantities are too small to achieve criticality, even at high assay cells. To prevent a criticality at high-assay solid condensation withdrawals, product withdrawals and cylinders are designed with limiting dimensions defined by nuclear safety. To prevent a criticality due to operator error and cylinder mishandling, cylinder handling carts and equipment and administrative contrcls assure compliance with safe handling procedures. However, operator negligence, resulting in an unsafe
(]
configuration of product cylinders and equipment, or process failure resulting in the accumulation of an v
unssie mass can result in criticalities. These incidents ran be modified slightly by introducing a moderator, usually water, which reduces the amount of enriched uranium required to form an unsafe mass.
Operator error is the only credible cause for criticality; the operator would have to totally disregard operating procedures that restrict the placement of 5-inch and 8-Meh UF. cylinders in always-safe spacing. However, the probability of operator errer of gathe e sufficient number of cylinders to form a critical assembly is extremely low. Data from critical experiments performed at Oak Ridge, summarized in Table 4.2 2 shows that twelve air reflected cylinders (3 x 4 array) or four fully reflected (concrete) cylinders (1 x 4 or 2 x 2 arrays) are required for criticality. Smaller cylinder arrays can be made to go critical, but the reflection requirements are even more exotic than those for the 1 x 4 or 2 x 2 arrays. The smallest critical assembly for 8-inch cylinders containing Very High Enriched (VHE) material has been calculated as two cylinders; if the two cylinders are lying side by side on 12 inches of concrete and covered by I foot of water. It is not a credible scenario to have sufficien: vater and two cylinders in con.act in a volume large enoogh to hold the cylinders and water. The probability of creating a larger critical array of cylinders is extremely low because of operator trcining, direct supervision, transport equipment design, and the limited number of cylinders available. The probability of natural phenomena to rearrange the limited number of cylinders into a critical configuratio,n is also extremely low, p
kv 4.2 3 6___
SAR PORTS January 19,1996-hev.2 This brief analysis is sufficient to dismiss criticality in cylinders as a potential accident for high-assay solid condensation withdrawals. However, dismissing these small probabilities and allowing the occurrence of a criticality with 5 x 10" fissions as the expected critical accident, the two operators, required to be present by the admir.istrative buddy system, could be killed by direct radiation and several other persons could receive up to 100 rem. Most of the UF. involved and all of the fission products would be released because the cylinder (s) would rupture. Cylinder rupture resulting in material dispersion should prevent fission rebursts. The consequences would be considered medium and the risk would be extremely low.
4.2.2.4 Criticality in the X.344A SS31 Vault Case C-2} Criticality in X 314A Due to Imnroner Cylinder Handline The occurrence of a nucluar excursion is possible in the X 344A Vault if the always safe space requirements are simultaneously ignored by at least two operators. A more detailed analysis of this criticality is contained in Appendix C. A criticality will actuate the radiation alarm in the vault, resulting in the evacuation of X 142A, X-344A, XO448, X-LOPH, and X-630-1. The estimated acute radiation dotes for personnel in and near the vault are shown in Table 4.13. The locations of the personnel listed in the table are st awn in Figure 4.21.
Because initiation of a critical reaction requires simultaneous multiple errors by at least two persons, the probability of occurrence in the X 344A Vault ts considered extremely low. The consequences are considered medium. The risk is extremely low, 4.2.2.5 Criticality in the X-345 SS3! Storage Facility Cate C 24 Criticality from Accidental Ceometry Change A ruclear accident hav;ng the greatest impact on those exiting through the constrained path occurs in X 345 during the loading and unloading of eight constrained containers which are transported on a cart between the vault and the storage and drum area. The cart has eight cylindrical holders with a metal extension of at least two feet center to center. The containers are set in the holders and are secured with a chain at the top of the holder. Administrative controls limit the number of containers in motion to one, at any one time. During im entory two containers are allowed in motion at one time, one in each half vel. Activities performed in the work and drum storage area are to conform t
to procedures approv.A by Criticality Safety staff. A criticality alarm system ensures that l
operating personnel would be rapidly alerted to a nuclear criticality.
An accident scenario is assumed in which a forklift knocks over the cart which holds a group of containers in the south vault of Building X-345. The containers assemble in an unsafe geometry about two feet from tb: west wall and 25 feet from the south wall. resulting in a critical reaction. This generates a single radiation burst of about 10" fissions. One of the containers ruprures, causing some of the reaction products to become airborne. At the time of the accident, employees are stationed as shown in Figure 4.2 2. Their distances from the reaction and the prompt radiation doses they receive are shown in Table 4.2-4. The radiation triggers the alarm clusters in X-345 and in all the adjacent 4.2 4
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' " " ' ' ' ' ' ' ' " ' ' " * ~ ' ' ' " " * - " ' ' * " ^ * * ~ " ' ' ^ ' ' '
WITHDRAWAL STATIONS i
2.5.4 GENERAL DESIGN FEATURES' i
~
2.5.4.3 UF, Cylinder Pigtails DF: - Newly fabricated pigtails are designed to withstand at least 400 psig SURVEILLANCE:
Frequency Surveillance Prior to initial use SR 2.5.4.3.1 Inspect and perform hydrostatic test at least to 400 psig and ensure inspection tag is
=
l attached to the pigtail BASIS:-
Structural integrity of the pigtail significantly reduces the likelihood of a catastrophic rupture (SAR Section 4.2.3.2].
2.5.4.4 Scale Pit Raschig Rings DF: ERP, LAW and Tails scale pits shall contain Borosilicate glass Raschig rings to a minimum depth of 6 inches.
SURVEILLANCE:
Frequency Surveillance Annually-
.SR 2.5.4.4.1 Verify that the surveillance requirements contained in ANSI Standard 8.5 are satisfied.
BASIS:
' The scale pits contain Raschig Rings to enhance nuclear criticality safety [SAR Section 3.2.2.4.6
&4.2.2.2].
Q.
2.5-24
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