ML20198S927
| ML20198S927 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Fort Calhoun  |
| Issue date: | 12/29/1998 |
| From: | Graves D NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV) |
| To: | Gambhir S OMAHA PUBLIC POWER DISTRICT |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 9901120041 | |
| Download: ML20198S927 (19) | |
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION -
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611 RYAN PLAZA DRIVE SUITE 400 j
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- S.' K. Gambhir, Division Manager
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Omaha Public Power District 4
' Fort Calhoun Station FC-2-4 Adm.
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- P.O. Box 399 '
r Hwy.-75. North of Fort Calhoun j
Fort Calhoun, Nebraska 68023-0399
SUBJECT:
INSPECTION PLANNING REVIEW (IPR)- FORT CALHOUN STATION
Dear Mr. Gambhir:
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' On December 2,1998, the' NRC staff completed a unique inspection Planning Review (IPR) of r
Fort Calhoun Station. The staff normally conducts Semiannual Plant Performance Reviews for.
all operating nuclear power plants to develop an integrated understanding of safety
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performance and adjust inspection resources. However, due to the suspension of the Systematic Assessment of Licensee Performance process, we implemented an abbreviated Inspection Planning Review for plant issues and to develop inspection plans. The IPR for Fort
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Calhoun Station involved the participation of both Reactor Projects and Safety divisions in evaluating inspection results and safety performance trends for the period April 23 to l
October 28,1998.
Based on this review, inspection resources have been prioritized and scheduled, in addition to l
core inspections, two Temporary Instructions have been scheduled to be conducted at your facility. The Temporary Instructions are Ti 2515/138," Evaluation of the Cumulative Effect of 3
Operator Workarounds," and Tl 2515/139, " inspection of Licensee's implementation of Generic i
. Letter 96-01 Testing of Safety-Related Logic Circuits."
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Enclosure'1 contains an historical listing of plant issues, referred to as the Plant issues l Matrix (PIM), that was considered during this IPR process to arrive at an integrated view of
- licensee performance trends. The PIM includes only items from inspection reports and other
- docketed correspondence between the NRC and Omaha Public Power District. The IPR may
, also have considered some predecisional and draft material that does not appear in the 6
attached PIM, including observations from events and inspections that had occurred cince the last NRC inspection report was issued, but had not yet received full review and consideration. is a general description of the PIM table labels. This material will be placed in the 3
NRC Public Document Room.
This letter also advises you of our planned inspection effort resulting from the Fort Calhoun
- Station IPR. It is provided to minirnize the resource impact on your staff and to allow for t scheduling conflicts and personnel availability to be resolved in advance of inspector arrival
' onsite.4 Enclosure 3 details our inspection plan for Fort Calhoun Station over the next 8 months.
- The rationale or' basis fo'r each inspection outside the core inspection program is provided so
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~ that you are aware of the ' reason for emphasis in these program areas. Resident inspections -
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are not listed because of their ongoing and continuous nature. We will inform you of any.
changes.to the inspection plan.
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.lf you have any questions, please contact me at (817) 860-8148.
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Da N. Graves, Acting Chief
-i Project Branch B Division of Reactor Projects 4
Docket No. 50 285 License No. DPR-40
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Enclosures:
- 1. Plant issues Matrix l
- 2. _ General Description of PIM Table Labels f
- 3. Inspection Plan '
cc w/ enclosures:
Mark T. Frans, Manager t
Nuclear Licensing.
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Omaha Public Power District Fort Calhoun Station FC-2-4 Adm.
i P.O.' Box 399 -
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- Hwy. 75 - North of Fort Calhoun Fort Calhoun, Nebraska 68023-0399 l
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James W. Chase, Division Manager _
e Nuclear Assessments i
Fort Calhoun Station l
P.O. Box 399 Fort Calhoun, Nebraska 68023 J. M. Solymossy, Manager - Fort Calhoun Station i
Omaha Public Power District :
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Fort Calhoun Station FC-1-1 Plant
' P.O. Box 399 '
F J Hwy. 75 - North of Fort Calhoun-
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- Perry D. Robinson, Esq.
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L1400 L Street, N.W.'.
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. Chairman
' Washington County Board of Supervisors-Blair, Nebraska 68008 -
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' Cheryl Rogers,'LLRW Program Manager l
Environmental Protection Section.
2 Nebraska Department of Health
,.301 Centennial Mall, South.
P.O. Box 95007
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Omaha Public Power District DEC 291998 E-Mail report to T. Frye (TJF)
E-Mail report to D. Lange (DJL)
E Mail report to NRR Event Tracking System (IPAS) i E-Mail report to Document Control Desk (DOCDESK)
E-Mail report to Richard Correia (RPC)
E-Mail report to Frank Talbot (FXT) bec to DCD (IE01) 1 bec distrib. by RIV:
Regiona! Administrator DRS-PSB DRP Director -
MIS System i
Branc Chief (DRP/B)
RIV File Project Engineer (DRP/B)
Branch Chief (DRP/TSS)
Resident inspector Carol Gordon i
.The Chairman (MS:' 16-G-15)
Records Center, INFO Deputy Regional Administrator -
C. A. Hackney Commissioner Dieus B. Henderson, PAO Commissioner Diaz_
B. Murray, DRS/PSB Commissioner McGaffigan SRIs at all RIV sites Commissionei Merrifield W. D. Travers, EDO (MS:.17 G-21) i Associate Dir. for Projects, NRR Associate Dir, for insp., and Tech. Assmt, NRR SALP Program Manager, NRR/lLPB (2 copies)
W. H. Bateman, NPR Project Director (MS: 13-E-16) i R. Wharton, NRR Project Manager (MS: 13-E-16) a
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E-Mail report to NRR Event Tracking System (IPAS)-
' E-Mail report to Document Control Desk (DOCDESK)
E-Mail report to Richard Correia (RPC)
E Mail report to Frank:Taibot (FXT)-
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bec distrib. by RIV:
Regional Administrator DRS-PSB DRP Director MIS System i '
Branch Chief (DRP/B) -
RIV File
- Project Engineer (DRP/B)
Branch Chief (DRP/TSS).
4 Resident inspector..
Carol Gordon
- The Chairman (MS: 16-G-15)
Records Center, INPO Deputy' Regional Administrator.
C. A. Hackney Commissioner Dieus -
B. Henderson, PAO Commissioner Diaz B. Murray, DRS/PSB Commissioner McGaffigan SRis at all RIV si'as Commissioner Merrifield W. D. Travers, EDO (MS: 17-G-21)
Associate D r, for Projects, NRR Associate Dir. for insp., and Tech. Assmt, NRR SALP Program Manager, NRR/lLPB (2 copies)
W. H. Bateman, NRR Project Director (MS: 13-E-16)
R. Wharton, NRR Project Manager (MS: 13-E-16)
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ENCLOSURE 1 PLANT ISSUES MATRIX FORT CALHOUN STATION DATE TYPE SOURCE ID SFA TEMPLATE ITEM CODE 10/2/98 STR 1R 98-17 NRC OPS 1C 1A 35 The licensee implemented a robust licensed operator requahfication program that appropriately matntained and evaluated hcensed operator proficiency in acccrdance with the requirements of 10 CFR Part 55. A key element in the program was excellent interaction between the training and operations organizations. The inspectors identified improved evaluation processes utilizing operat ons and training statt and frequent communications as good examples of this interaction.
10/2/98 STR 1R 98-17 NRC OPS 1A 3A 3B Facihty management exhibited a strong commitment to improving hcensed operators' human performance skills.
This was evident by the number and nature of initiatives implemented after the August 1997 containment spray operabihty event. The inspectors observed licensed operator performance in the simulator and in the control room that confirmed that licensed operators were performing with increasing consistency to higher management expectations.
09/28/98 NEG 1R 98-21 LIC OPS 1A 3A inadequate training was provided for positioning of the mechanical throttle lever for the diesel-driven auxiliary feedwater pump following the January 1998 event, resulting in an overspeed trip of the pump in September 1998. The inspectcrs determined that the licensee misscd an opportunity following the January event to adequately train operations personnel on how to determine the correct positiori of the mechanical throttle lever.
09/26/98 NCV IR 98-20 LIC OPS 3A The licensee failed to take a reactor coolant flow voltage reading once per shift as required by Technical LER 97-007 Specification 3.1. The cause was inadequate self-checking by the control room operator and inadequate review of the logs by both the shift technical advisor and the shift manager. This nonrepetitive licensee identified and corrected violation is being treated as a noncited violation consistent with Section V11.B.1 of the NRC Enforcement Policy. The event occurred in June 1997.
08/15/98 NCV 1R 98-14 LIC OPS 1A The licensee failed to maintain containment isolation during refueling activities as required by Technical LER 96-11 Specification 2.8. The cause of this noncited violation (50-285/9814-02) was a failure of the outage contro!
center shift supervisor to recognize that valves that fail open which are being used to maintain containment closure need to be manually overridden into the closed position. This nonrepetitive, hcensee-identified and corrected violation is being treated as a noncited violation consistent with Section Vll.B.1 of the NRC Enforcement Pohcy.
08/15/98 POS 1R 98-14 NRC OPS 1A Operations personnel demonstrated excellent command and control of activities by challenging personnel who wanted to enter the control room to ensure only official business was conducted and consistently using three-l way communications to acknowledge alarms and perform equipment manipulations.
October 28,1998 1
Fort Calhoun Station
ENCLOSURE 1 PLANT ISSUES MATRIX FORTCALHOUN STATION DATE TYPE SOURCE ID SFA TEMPLATE ITEM CODE 08/15/98 NCV IR 98-14 LIC OPS 1A The licensee failed to maintain an automatic containment isolation valve operable during refuehng activites as LER 96-10 required by Technical Specification 2.8. The cause of this noncited violaton (50-285/9814-01) was a decision by the outage control center shift supervisor to release Steam Generator RC-2A blowdown isolaton valve for maintenance without ensuring containment closure was estabhshed. This nonrepetitive, hcensee-identified and corrected victaton is beirg treated as a noncited violaton consistent with Section Vll.E.1 of the NRC Enforcement Potcy.
08/15/98 NCV IR 98-14 LIC OPS 1A 4C The hcensee failed to maintain a cooldown rate of 10 degrees per hour or less as required by Technical LER 96-14 Specification 2.1.2. The cause of this noncited violation (50-285/9814-03) was a lack of depth in review during the evaluaton which decreased the margin for the cooldown rate resulting in a decrease in operating margin for plant operations. This nonrepetitive, licensee-identified and corrected violation is being treated as a noncited violation consistent with Section Vll.B.1 of the NRC Erforcement Policy.
06/18/98 POS IR 98-10 NRC OPS 1A Operations personnel demonstrated good communication, coordinaton, and control of activities during initiaton of a Technical Specification required plant shutdown. Especially notable were the licensee's plan to commence the required plant shutdown and contingency plans for quicker power reductions if Diesel Generator 1 could not be declared operable.
05/27/98 NEG IR 98-12 NRC OPS 1A The pre-job briefing conducted for dynamic tuning of Auxiliary Feedwater Pump FW-10 was not in accordance with licensee management expectations. Th briefing was incomplete because turbine overspeed backout criteria were not discussed. The pre-job briefing was for testing of a rebuilt and modified speed control circuit with the turbine operating at various speeds. During the Pump FW-10 turbine start, the turbine oversped, and about 30 seconds elapsed before the turbine was secured. Operator actions to trip the turbine were satisfactory.
05/20/98 POS IR 98-il NRC OPS 1B Operators responded to the fault on House Service Transformer T1 A-3 in a expeditious manner and property characterized the event.
05/14/98 POS IR 98-09 NRC OPS 1A During a refueling outage, operators exhibited quick, decisive decision making to preclude any inadvertent criticality following an unexpected increase in the count rate on the Channel B ride range nuclear instrumentation by emergency borating the reactor coolant system. The hcensee prepared and executed the reduced inventory evolutions in a professional mantier. The licensee stressed safety over maintaining the outage schedule.
04/25/98 NEG IR 98-09 LIC OPS 1A During emergency diesel generator restoration following maintenance, operators overlooked the fact that the offsite low signal (Iow bus voltage) would cause the diesel to start. When operators moved the mode selector switch from off auto to emergency standby, the diesel generator started as designed. This was not antcipated by operations personnel.
04/24/98 NEG 1R 98-07 NRC OPS 2B The positioning of lights and use of visual aids in fuel handling within the reactor vessel were poor.
October 28,1998 2
Fort Calhoun Station
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ENCLOSURE 1 PLANTISSUES MATRIX FORT CALHOUN STATION DATE TYPE SOURCE ID SFA TEMPLATE ITEM CODE 04/24/98 POS IR 98-07 NRC OPS 2B Improvements have been made in the clarity of water in the refueling pool and the spent fuel pool. While the use of the neutron audible count rate in containment during the inspection was an improvement, its use was not a requirement.
. 04/02/98 VIO IR 98-09 LIC OPS 1A Failure to adhere to 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion 5, resumed in inadequate procedure guidance during a SLIV IR 98-05 plant cooldown. This, in conjunction with operations personnel confusion over wide rege pressure instrumentation inaccuracies, resulted in the reactor coolant system pressure being lowered to the point where Reactor Coolant Pump RC-3C cavitated. This chsed Unresolved item 285/9805-02.
03/05/98 NCV IR 98-05 LIC OPS 1A 3A
. Operations personnel failed to verify a danger tag seriea number using the danger tag sheet. Add.tionally, operations personnel did not venfy the location of a tagged component prior to removing the tag. Failog to pertcrm self-checking and lack of attention to detail resulted in operations personnel clearing the wrong tag.
This nonrepetitive, licensee-identified and corrected violation is being treated as a noncited violation consistent with Section Vll.B.1 of the NRC Enforcement Policy.
02/28/98 STR 1R 98-04 NRC OPS SA Plant review committee activities regarding safe operation of the plant were rigorous and in depth. This observation was based on the inspectors attendance at weekly plant review committee meetings for approximately 6 months.
02/26/98 VIO IR 98-05 NRC OPS 1A 3A The licensee conducted the safety-related activity of lowering the spent fuel pool level without a procedure SL IV containing precautions and instructions. This is a violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V.
02/13/98 VIO 1R 98-02 NRC OPS SA Two examples of a violation of Technical Specification 5.8.1 were identified where the licensee failed to SLIV immediately initiate a condition report- (1) the licensee *s identification that a quality assurance lead auditor was not qualified in accordance with the required training program, and (2) the licensee's identification that a quality assurance surveillance report was not issued.
02/13/98 VIO IR 98-02 NRC OPS 38 5A The failure to ensure that a quality assurance lead auditor had completed the quality assurance auditor gt gy qualification manual prior to conducting quality-related audits was a violation of Technical Specification 5.8.1.
02/13/98 WK IR 98-02 NRC OPS SA SB SC in general, findings in condition reports, quality assurance audits, and surveillance reports were appropriately dispositioned in accordance with site procedures. However, Surveillance H12-96-1 pertaining to radiation protection, was initiated in December 1995 but was never issued. This failure to property control a planned quality assurance activity to assure that identified concerns were documented, distributed, evaluated, and resolved was a weakness.
l 01/17/98 POS IR 97-20 NRC OPS 1C 3C The licensee maintained good control of operator aids.
l 01/17/98 VIO IR 97-20 NRC OPS 1C Operations memorandums were being used, in effect, to implemeat procedure changes without being SLIV processed in accordance with administrative requirements.
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l October 28,1998 3
Fort Calhoun Station
ENCLOSURE 1 PLANT ISSUES MATRIX FORT CALHOUN STATION DATE TYPE SOURCE ID SFA TEMPLATE ITEM CODE ew 01/14/98 NEG IR 98-04 LIC OPS 1A 3A 4B Competing priorities and poor communications rzulted in system engineering personnel not providing timely feedback to the control room operators regarding the operability of the postaccident sampling system. This resu!!ed in the entire postaccident sampling system being declared inoperable when only the gaseous portion needed to be declared inoperable.
12/06/97 VIO IR 97-19 NBC OPS 1C The licensee's containment integrity operating instruction was inadequate in that all containment penetrations SLIV needed to establish containment integrity were not included in the operating instructx)n. Five penetrations (4 electrical and 1 piping) were omitted during the last procedure revision.
12/06/97 VIO IR 97-19 NRC OPS 1A Improper installation of a locking device on a raw water intet valve would not have prevented manipulation of the SLIV valve.
11/21/97 VIO IR 97-19 NRC OPS 1A 3A in general, the conduct of operations was professional and safety-conscious. However, the inspectors identified SLIV an atmosphere which was nonprofessional in that breakfast was being cooked in the main control room.
10/25/97 POS 1R 97-18 NRC OPS 1A 3a in general, the conduct of operations was professional and safety-conscious. The inspectors noted marked improvement in the clarity and the thoroughness of shift tumovers.
10/25/97 NCV IR 97-18 LIC OPS 2A 2B Utilization of a Technical Specification interpretation in December 1995 allowed all charging pumps to be LER 96-004 irrperable for approximately 10 hours1.157407e-4 days <br />0.00278 hours <br />1.653439e-5 weeks <br />3.805e-6 months <br />.
October 28,1998 4
Fort Calhoun Station
ENCLOSURE 1 PLANT ISSUES MATRIX FORT CALHOUN STATION 4
i DATE TYPE SOURCE ID SFA TEMPLATE ITEM CODE 10/08/98 POS tR 98-21 NRC MAINT 3A The inspectors observed excellent performance throughout the planning, assessment, and implementation of repair on the feedwater check valve. Especially notable was the performance by maintenance supervision in conducting prejob briefings, emphasizing nuclear and personnel safety prior to containment entries for the removal of insulation, and peening and welding on the valve in a hot steam environment.
09/09/98 NEG IR 98-20 LIC MAINT 3A 3B Maintenance work instructions did not meet management's expectation regarding level of detail and a nonlicensed operator failed to notify the control room prior to manipulating plant equipment. This resulted in an inadvertent start of the motor-driven fire pump.
07/07/98 NCV IR 98-14 LIC MAINT 3A vB Maintenance personnel failed to follow maintenance work control procedures and ensure that valve bloclu ne property removed after completion of maintenance activities. The individual who performed the independent verification for removal of the valve blocks was not quahfied to perform that task. This nonrepetrtive, licensee-identified and corrected violation is being treated as a noncited violation consistent with Section VII.B.1 ci the NRC Enforcement Pohcy.
6/25/08 NEG IR 98-10 LIC MAINT 2A The licensee identified six areas of pitting corrosicciin the fire protection system p ping since July of 1997. The inspecters verified that identified leaks were documented e.nd either repaired or schedu;ed for repair.
06/12/98 VIO 1R 98-08 NRC MAINT 3B Balancing of reliability and availability for the reactor protection system and the engineered safety features SL IV system was not performed, which constituted a violation of 10 CFR 50.65 (a)(3).
C3/12/98 NOV 1R 98-08 LIC MAINT 3B The communication system, turbine building, and switchyard structures, were not originally included within the scope of the Maintenance Rule program as required by 10 CFR 50.65(b). These examples were the result of,
the ricensee's efforts to apply incustry experience to the Maintenance Rule program and were evaluated as a noncited violation of 10 CFR 50.65(b) pursuant to Section Vll.B.1 of the NRC Enforcement Policy.
06/12/98 STR 1R 98-08 NRC MAINT 3A The use of a "living* probabilistic risk assessment that included updated plant configuration and plant data every 18 months or within 3 months after each planned refueling outage was viewed as a programmahc strength.
06/12/98 POS IR 98-08 NRC MAINT 3C Compared with previous assessments, the November 1997 self-assessment was critical, thorough, comprehensive, identified numerous sound findings and recommendations, and provided meaningful feeoback to management. The November 1997 self-assessment was essential to the success of the Maintenance Rule program.
CS/12/98 VIO 1R 98-08 NRC MAINT 3B The performance of the selected systems was such that the structures, systems, or components were being SL IV monitored in accordance with 10 CFR 50.65(a)(1) or (a)(2), as appropriate. Five examples (125 Vde, circulating water, chemical and volume control, emergency core cooling, and the engineered safety features) of inadequate goal se* ting or performance monitoring for the selected systems were identified as a violation of 10 CFR 50.65 (a)(1).
October 28,1998 5
Fort Calhoun Station
ENCLOSURE 1 PLANT ISSUES MATRIX FORT CALHOUN STATION DATE TYPE SOURCE ID SFA TEMPLATE ITEM CODE 06/12/98 NCV IR 98-08 LIC MAINT 3B The hcensee had not included operator errors as maintenance preventable functional failures when evaluating the TOXGAS functional group, and this was considered a noncited violation of 10 CFR 50.65 (a)(2) pursuant to Section Vll.B.1 of the NRC Enforcement Pohey.
05/27/98 NCV IR 98-12 LIC MAINT 3A 28 38 The maintenance organization demonstrated poor work control practices. Two examples of a violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Cntena V, occurred. The first example involved machinists adjusting a Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump FW-10 speed control linkage, and the second involved an instrument and control technician disconnecting a Pump FW-10 speed control air line. Both activities were performed without adequate procedural guidance. On a subsequent Pump FW-10 start, this violation resulted in a Pump FW-10 overspeed occurrence. This non-repetitive, licensee-identified and corrected violation is being treated as a non-cited violation, consistent with Section Vll.B.1 of the NRC Enforcement Policy.
05/27/98 NEG IR 98-12 LIC MAINT 3A 28 The maintenance planning organization missed an opportunity to identify the Pump FW-10 speed control deficiencies prior to Pump FW-10 start, by not performing testing to verify the overspeed govemor set point.
05/23/98 NEG IR 98-09 LIC MAINT 2A During a refueling outage inspection of containment, the inspectors discussed with the licensee the poor material condition of component cooling water piping inside containment. Rust and peeling / flaking paint was evident on the pipes. Pitting was also occurring on some pipes. Due to the poor condition of the pipes the licensee performed an analysis that showed that the structural integrity of the piping was sound and that the peeling / flaking paint would not affect the recirculation strainers. The licensee removed loose paint and rust from the piping.
05/20/98 VIO IR 98-11 NRC MAINT 1B 5A Operations personnel did not initiate a maintenance work document to document a deficiency with Alarm Te:A SLIV Valve FP-230 in accordance with Standing Order SO-O-1. This was a violation of 10 CFR Part 50. Appendix B, Cnterion V.
05/20/98 WK IR 98-11 LIC MAINT 2B The root cause of the inadvertent deluge of House Service Transformer T1 A-3 was determined to be the failure to perform preventive maintenance on the entire deluge system. This was considered a weakness in the preventive maintenance program.
04/24/98 VIO IR 98-07 NRC MAINT 3B As a result of a misinterpretation of a regulatory requirement, a violation of 10 CFR 50.55a(g) was identified for SLIV the licensee's failure to submit in 1984 and 1994 relief requests following the first and second 10-year intervals for ASME Code Class welds that did not receive 100 percent full examination coverage.
03/03/98 LER LER 98-001 LIC MAINT 2B During a self-assessment, the licensee identified that the In-Service Test Program did not provide a test to venty satisfactory operation of the remote position indication function of several passive, safety-related valves.
32/28/98 POS 1R 98-04 NRC MAINT 2A A modification to the diesel-driven auxiliary feedwater pump was successful in reducing the ruagnitude of vibration for engine mounted components. Historica!!y, this pump had exhibited high vibration ind required frequent preventive maintenance.
October 28,1998 6
Fort Calhoun Station
' ENCLOSURE 1.
PLANTISSUES MATRIX FORT CALHOUN STATION DATE TYPE SOURCE ID SFA TEMPLATE ITEM CODE-s
_0t/17/W NEG IR 97-20 NRC MAINT 28 No preventive maintenance order existed to ensure periodic testing of a fan required for alternate cooling of the control room.
-12/06/97 NCV IR 97-19 LIC MAINT SC Inadequate corrective actions resulted in licensee personnel failing to properly test a containment penetration..
LER 96-13 10/25/97 VIO IR 97-18 NRC MAINT 2A 3B Licensee personnel failed to obtain the required approval prior to deferring preventive maintenance on the spent SLIV fuel pool heat exchanger.
10/25/97 POS IR 97-18 NRC MAINT 2A 3A 5A Electrical maintenance personnel and the diesel generator system engineer were aggressive and timely in their efforts to identify and replace a degraded diode in the diesel generator field flashing circuit with a higher amperage diode.
l October 28,1998 7
Fort Calhoun Station
ENCLOSURE 1 PLANT ISSUES MATRIX FORT CALHOUN STATION DATE TYPE SOURCE ID SFA TEMPLATE ITEM CODE 08/15/98 POS 1R 98-14 NRC ENG 4B The scope of the assessment performed to evaluate tne susceptibility of the Fort Calhoun Staten to the failure of the fire protection system and subsequent flooding in the emergency core cooling system room was good.
The assessment concluded that the Fort Calhoun Staten had reasonable assurance it was not sbsceptible to water hammer similar to that experienced at the Washington Nuclear Diant.
08/11/98 NEG IR 98-12 NRC ENG 4B SC Engineenng crganization actions to resolve an auxiliary feedwater single failure design issue were inettcetive because of erroneous informaton supplied by a vendor. In 1990, the engineering organization identiSe# hat a particular failure of the Turbine-Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump FW-10 overspeed govemor could over pressurize common auxiliary feedwater piping. Actions to correct the deficiency with a hardware modificaton were not taken until 1998 because of vendor information which stated that the turbine would fait pnor to over pressurizing downstream piping.
05/27/28 NEG IR 98--12 NRC ENG 4B System engineers provided incorrect information concerning adjustments to the Pump FW-10 speed corittener to the maintenance craft, which resulted in an ar-tual Pump FW-10 overspeed occurrence.
05/23/98 NEG
!R 98-09 UC ENG 3A 48 Dunng the development of a modification package, design engineering personnel incorrectly interpreted the effect of removing power from certain electrical distribution panels. When power was removed from Electncat Distnbution Panet Al-41B, the diesel-driven fire pump recerved an inadvertent start signal.
05/23/98 NCV IR 98-09 LIC ENG 4A During initial construction, the licensee failed to maint&in adequate design control regarding tornado venting LER 96-005 and modifications to the auxiliary building. This resulted in structures being built on top of the vents which would impede their venting capability. This nonrepetitive, licensee-identified and corrected violation is being treated as a noncited violation, consistent with Section Vll.B.1 of the NRC Enforcement Policy.
03/31/98 NCV IR 98-05 NRC ENG 3B 4B Failure to understand the requirements for use of engineering judgement and to property document the use of engineering judgement resutted in a pipe vibrator being used on 3-inch piping when it had only been evaluated for use on 4-inch piping. This failure is being treated as a noncited violation consistent with Section IV of the NRC Enforcement Policy.
03/10/98 NEG IR 98-01 NRC ENG 4A There was a failure to identify that cable qualification fire test criteria conducted in 1971 did not support a 10 minute response period for a cab!e spreading room fire. This was considered to be an engineering weakness in the fire protection program. Compensatory actions were implemented and modifications were planned to eliminate reliance on the cable qualification fire test enteria.
02/28/98 STR 1R 98-04 NRO ENG 2A 2B The licensee had implemented a good program for testing molded-case circuit breakers and failure rates were being appropriately evaluated to determine whether acceleration of the test program was necessary. Based on the system Engineer's evaluation, none of the failures would have adversely affected system coordination. The equipment that had been electrically supplied from breakers that had f ailed functional tests would not have been, and had not been, prevented from starting or operating.
October 28,1998 8
Fort Calhoun Station
1 ENCLOSURE 1 PLANTISSUES MATRIX FORT CALHOUN STATION DATE TYPE SOURCE-ID SFA TEMPLATE ITEM CODE 02/25/98 NEG IR 98 LIC ENG 3A 3B The methods for qualifying new fuel receipt inspectors were inconsistent, resulting in a co-op student inspecting -
new fuel. New fuel receipt inspection by a cog student did not meet licensee management's expectations and resulted in the reinspection of 24 new fuel bundles.
12/06/97' NCV IR 97-19 LIC ENG 48 in 1995, licensee pramel failed to perform an annual evaluation of nonfuel items in the spent fuel pool 11/07/97 LER.
LER 97-017 LIC '
ENG 2A The low pressure safety injection system may be susceptible to water hammer loads in excess of piping support EN 33232 allowables. The licensee believes the current operating configuration ensures system operability, but the system may have been operating in an unanalyzed condition in the past.
10G5G7 POS IR 97-18 NRC ENG 4B The licensee analysis regarding availability of the diesel-driven auxiliary feedwater pump was conservative in that the pump's performance was bounded by the risk analysis assumptions for both demand and run failures.
10G5/97 NEG IR 97-18 LIC ENG 3A 4A The licensee changed plant drawings to "c
- incorrect charging pump bladder configuration. Drawings were changed in 1996 following incorrect detere.
dan that the correct bladder was installed.
10/17/97 LER LER 97-015 LIC ENG 2A 4A The station batteries may not be capable of supplying the 8 hour9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> design capacity in all accident scenarios.
EN 33102 Compensatory measures involving operator actions to minimize loads under design basis accident conddions were implemented to restore battery operability concems.
L October 28,1998 9
Fort Calhoun Station
ENCLOSURE 1 PLANT ISSUES MATRIX FORT CALHOUN STATION DATE TYPE SOURCE ID SFA TEMPLATE ITEM CODE 10/27/98' NEG 1R 98-21 NRC PS 3A The inspectors identified an operator workaround in the area of radiation monitoring. Specifically, the backup containment atmosphere radiation monitor had to be removed from service when a containment atmosphere grab sample was taken. The licensee promptly added this item to their operator workaround list for appropriate corrective action.
09/18/98 POS IR 98-22 NRC PS SA Comprehensive quality assurance audits and surveillances of the radological environmental monitoring program were performed by qualified personnel 09/18/98 STR IR 98-22 NRC PS 1A 1C Overall, an effective meteorological program was in place. The meteorological monitoring equipment was maintained in excellent operating condition. Calibrations were performed at the required frequencies.
Housekeeping of all observed areas was very good. Meteorological data recovery in 1997 was 97 percent.
09/18/98 STR 1R 98-22 NRC PS 1A 1C Overall. an effective environmental monitoring program was implemented. Environmental air sampling statens were property maintained. Excellent sampling and handling practices were used for collecting environmental air samples. Sample shipment and analyses were property performed. The addttion of a control air and thermoluminescent dosimetry station in 1997 increased the effectiveness of the radiological environmental monitonng program's ability to determine the plant's impact on the environment.
09/16/98 POS IR 98-20 NRC PS 3A The licensee did an excellent job of planning, controlling and performing the transfer of a high integrity container of waste into a shipping cask for removal offsite.
09/02/98 URI 1R 98-18 NRC PS 1C An unresolved item was identified related to changes made to emergency action levels that may have resulted in a reduction in the effectiveness of the emergency plan.
08/15/98 POS IR 98-14 NRC PS 1A 2A Radiation protection personnel continued to reduce contaminated areas within the radiologically controlled area.
7/31/98 POS IR 98-15 NRC PS 1C Performance in the physical security area had improved and was very good. An excellent security system testing and maintenance program was conducted and properly documented. Effective protected and vital area barriers and detection systems were maintained. The barriers and detections systems provided proper delay and detection to attempted unauthorized entry. Compensatory measures were propertyimplemented. A very good program for reporting security events was in place. An excellent security training program had been implemented.
07/10/98 VIO IR 98-16 NRC PS 3A A violation, with four examples, of Technical Specification 5.8.1 was identified related to the solid radwaste SLIV management program because waste stream sampling and intemal quality assurance procedure was not WK implemented properly. Documentation associated with solid waste management and transportation activities was insufficient to demonstrate the bases for some licensee decisions. Some records were missing or incorrectly completed. Some forms were outdated. Management oversight of the solid radwaste management program and radioactive transportation activities was minima!.
October 28,1998 10 Fort Calhoun Station
I ENCLOSURE 1 PLANT ISSUES MATRIX FORT CALHOUN STATION DATE TYPE SOURCE ID SFA TEMPLATE ITEM CODE 07/10/98 URI IR 98-16 NRC PS 3A An unresolved item was identdied pending the licensee's attempt to locate documentaten that authorized a change from annual audits to biennial audits of the radcactrve materials transportation program.
07/10/98 STR IR 98-16 NRC PS 3A 38 Good performance was noted in the radioactive materials transportation program. Proper training was provided to the individuals involved. Packaging was correctly chosen, surveyed, marked, and labeled.
07/04/98 NCV IR 98-10 LIC PS 3A An auxiliary operator entered a high radiation area without dosimetry required by Technical Speedication 5.11.1.
LER 97-005 The cause of the violation (50-285/9810-02) was a lack of self-checking by an auxiliary operator to ensure proper dosimetry was obtahed prior to entering the radiologically controlled area. The licensee took appropriate corrective actions to address this istue; therefore, it was treated as a noncated violation, as allowed by Section Vll.B.1 of the Enforcement Policy.
06/2b/98 POS IR 98-10 NRC PS 38 The licensee was self-critical in the identification of areas for improvement and performance issues during an emergency plannir*g training exercise. These items included obtaining assistance from the technical support center and operations support center personnel earlier in the event and operator confusion due to the setup of the simulator prior to initiation of the exercise. The exercise provided valuable training for emergency response personnel.
05/05/98 NCV IR 98-09 LIC PS 3A The licensee failed to property label 15 bags of radioactive material in the radioactive waste building as required by 10 CFR 20.1904. This nonrepetrtive, licensee-identdied and corrected violation is being treated as a noncited violatm, consistent with Section VII.B.1 of the NRC Enforcement Policy.
04/10/98 NEG IR 98-06 NRC PS 1A 1C isolated weak ALARA program elements, involving the evaluation of the effects of dose gradients on dosimetry location and the procedural guidance for evaluating the need for respiratory protection equipment, were noted.
04/10/98 VIO IR 98-06 LIC PS 1A 1C Declining radiation workar performance was noted. Problems involving improper entry into high radiation areas, SLIV dosimetry use and contamination control were identified. A noncited violation was identified when individuals NCV entered a high radiation area improperly. Discretion was exercised in accordance with Section Vll.B.1 of the WK NRC Enforcement Policy. However, a violation of Technical Specifcation 5.11 was identdied when another radiation worker entered a restricted high radiation area improperly. A noncited violation was identified when an individual entered the reactor containment building without a thermoluminescent dosimeter. Discretion was exercised in accordance with Section Vi!.B.1 of the NRC Enforcement Policy.
04/10 S 8 STR 1R 98-06 NRC PS 1A 1C Radiaton protection performance was good, overall A good ALARA program was implemented with isolated exceptions. Generally, planned work activities were reviewed thoroughly by ALARA personnel and dose saving measures were integrated appropriately. ALARA prejob briefings were effective in communicating potential radiological hazards and good radiation protection practices to radiation workers. Good radiation exposure controls were implemenied, in most cases, and good job coverage was provided by radiation protection personnel Surveying and monitoring were performed property and effective contamination controls were used.
October 28,1998 11 Fort Calhoun Station
L ENCLOSURE 1 PLANT ISSUES MATRIX FORT CALHOUN STATION DATE TYPE SOURCE ID SFA TEMPLATE ITEM CODE 04/10/98 POS IR 98-06 NRC PS 1A 1C The licensee prepared well for the refuelirig outage and the effects of leaking fuel. Additional engineering controls were used, additional time was encluded in the shut down schedule, and additional radiaton worker training was provided.
0Y25/98 NCV IR 98-05 LIC PS 3A Lack of proper posting by radiation protection personnel resulted in maintei.ne personnel entering into a high radiation area to erect scaffolding. This nonrepetitive, licensee-identified and corrected violation is being treated as a noncited violation consistent with Section Vll.B.1 of the NRC Enforcement Policy.
03/18/98 NCV IR 98-03 LIC PS 1A 1C A noncited violation was identified involving the licensee's failure to: (1) verify activities during intenuptions of employment in excess of 30 days for five individuals; (2) perform an adequate criminal history record check for one individual; (3) verify a military period of service for one individual; and (4) document verifcation of identity for six individuals.
03/18/98 STR 1R 98-03 NRC PS 1A 1C Per'ormance in the physical secunty area remained at a high level, except for one problem noted regarding compensatory measures. Senior management support for the security organization was very good, and secunty program audits were very thorough and excellent quality. Very good radio and telechc..e communication systems, and a very good program for searching personnel and packages were maintained. Assessment aids provided a high quality and complete assessment of the perimeter detection zones. A very good security event reporting program was in place. The alarm stations were redundant and well protected.
03/18/98 WK IR 98-03 LIC PS 1A 1C 5A The licensee's Quality Assurance audit determined that the access authorization program was only marginalty effective.
03/18/98 NCV IR 98-15 LIC PS 1A 1C An unresolved item was identified involving a background investigation file (50-285/9803-01). The licensee IR 98-03 continued with its investigation of the file. This item was closed in IR 98-15 as an example of a noncited violation addressed in IR 98-03.
03/10/98 STR 1R 98-01 NRC PS SB With the exception of the reliance on the cable qualificadon fire tests, self assessments and audits were effective in providing a critical evaluation of the fire protection program. Performance in this area had improved since the previous fire protection inspection.
02/09/98 POS 1R 98-04 NRC PS 18 1C The fire brigade and the control room operators demonstrated a good response to a fire alarm inside containment.
Mir"3 NEG 1R 98-04 NRC PS 3B A weakness was identified in the thoroughness of a prejob briefing for movement of a radwaste container in that questions concerning actions to be taken if the waste container were dropped were not answered.
01/27/98 NEG IR 98-04 NRC PS 1C 3B A firewatch was determined to be unsure of his duties and responsibilities. The guidance provided to the cable spreading room firewatches regarding notification to the control room could not be performed as originally written.
October 28,1998 12 Fort Calhoun Station
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PLANT ISSUES MATRIX FORT CALHOUN STATION DATE TYPE SOURCE ID SFA TEMPLATE ITEM CODE
.'01/17/98 ' NCV IR 97-20 LIC PS-3A 3B Two licensee personnel entered the radiological contror.ed area without proper dosimetry. This was determined to be due to lack of personnel accountability, training derciencies, unclear expectations.
10/25/97 POS IR 97-18 NRC PS 1A 3A 38 Plant workers exhibited good radiation protection practices. Especially notable was performance of plant personnel during the replacement of Purifcation Filter CH-178. Workers exhibited good knowleoge of the requirements of their radiation work permit.
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October 28,1998 13 Fort Calhoun Station l
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ENCLOSURE 2 -
GENERAL DESCRIPTION OF PWR TABLE LABELS Actual da'.e of an event or segruhcant issue for those dems15at have a clear date of occurrence, the date the source of the informahon was issued (such as the LER date). or, lor mspecton reports.
the last date of the inspecten penod. If the event date is earher than the current assessment (plarit performance review) period, the document issue datefend of inspC:tm should be used and the Defe event date documented in the ITEM DESCR!PTION column.
Type The categorizaton of the issue see the Type item Code table. -
SFA SALP Functonal Area Codes: OPS for Operatons, MAINT for Mantenance; ENG for Engmeemg and PS for Plant Support.
Sourree The document that contams the issue informatort IR for NRC inspecten Report; LER for tscensee Event Report; letter for NRR letter.
identdicaten of who discovered issue: NRC for NRC; LIC for Licensee; or SELF for Seit idenbtying (events).
gp heue Description -
Detads of the ass A from the LER text or from the IR Executive Summanes.
Codse Template Codes - see table.
TEMPT. ATE CODES TYPE ITEM CODES EA Enforcement Achon Letter with Ovd Penaty 1
Operatonal Pecormance: A - Normal Operations; 8 Operanons Dunng Transents; and C - Programs ED -
Enforcement '.hscretion - No Cawd Penalty.
2 Matenal Conditerr A - Equipment Cond ton or 8 - Programs and Processes STR Overas Strong Licensee Performance WK Overat Weak Licensee Performance 3
Human Performance: A - Work Performance; 8 - Knowtedge, Skills, and Atahtes / Trairung: C Work Environment EEt
- Escalated Enforcement item - Waiting Final NRC Acton 4
EngineemgOesign: A - Deset 8 - Engmeenng Support; C - Programs and Processes VIO Volaton Level 1,11, Ill, or N S
Problem identdicaten and Resolution: A-Idennhcaten; 8 - Analysis; and C Res% tion NCV Noncited Vio!ation DEV Deviaton from Licensee Commitment to NRC NOTES:
- Eels are eithet (1) apparent violations of NRC requirements that are being considered for escalated enforcement acten in M
e Finding accordance with the " General Statement of Policy and Procedure for NRC Enforcement Action"(En;~.se Pohey), NUREG-1600 NEG Indrvidual Poor inspechan Finding or (2) issues, which may represent a SL IV potential violabon, that rernain open pendog receipt of the licensee's correctrve achons to determme if an NCV or VIO exists. However, the NRC has ru:t reached its final enforcement decision on the issues idenbfied by the i
LER Licensee Event Report to the NRC EF's and the PIM entries wid be rnockhed when the final decisaons are made. Before the NRC rnakes its decision for escalated enforcernent items, the hcensee will be provided with an opportunity to eithet (1) respond to the apparent violation or (2) request a URt
- Unresolved item from inspecten Report enforcernent conferenct LIC hs4 isme fmrn M "URis are unresolved items about which more information is required to determine whether the issue in question'is an acceptable MISC Miscellaneous - Emergency Preparedness Findog (EP),
item, a deviation, a isw.L..
ce, or a violation. However, the NRC has not reached its final conclus:ons on the issues, and the Declared Emergency, Nonconformance issue, etc.
PIM entries wiR be modified when the f:nal conclussons are made, t
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ENCLOSURE 3 FORT CALHOUN STATION INSPECTION PLAN IP -Inspection Procedure Tl-Temporary Instructen Core inspection - Minimum NRC Inspection Program (mandatory all plants)
Safety initiative - Directed by Program Office nare==r INSPECTION TITLE /
NUMBER OF -
DATES TYPE OF INSPECTION / COMMENT 1-PROGRAM AREA INSPECTORS
. c,; ; p;.Q m
37001,37550, Engineering and Technical Support,10 6
12/14-18/98 Core Inspection 93809 CFR 50.59 Safety Evaluation Program 1/4-8/99 Ti 2515/138 Evaluation of the Cumulative Effect of 3
2/8-12/99 Safety initiative Operator Workarounds Ti 2515/139 Inspection of Licensee's implementation of 2
6/28-7!2/99 Safety Initiative Generic Letter 96-01 Testing of Safety Related Logic Circuits
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