ML20198S747

Rev 5 to AP600 Emergency Response Guidelines

ML20198S747
Person / Time
Site:	05200003
Issue date:	10/31/1997
From:	Ncintyre B, Nydes R WESTINGHOUSE ELECTRIC COMPANY, DIV OF CBS CORP.
To:
Shared Package
ML20198S741	List: ML20198S747 ML20198S760 NSD-NRC-97-5406, Forwards Rev 5 to Ergs,Rev 2 to Rept WCAP-14477,formal Response to NRC & Formal Transmittal of Responses Previously Provided to NRC & Incorporated in 970619 W Ltr to NRC
References
GW-GJR-100, NUDOCS 9711140111
Download: ML20198S747 (97)

Text

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Emergency Response Guidelines, Revision 5.

t i

Recipients of this attachment should replace changed pages throughout their ERG binders.

Also included are cover pages f

for each of the Background Information documents whichshould replace the cover pages currently housed throughout Background Books 1 and 2.

Revision 5 ERG changes are limited to:

AFR-C.1 AES-1.1 AES-1,2 ERG Background Document changes are:

Introducion AE-3 pe es 4-47 and 4-61 AES-0.1 page 4-17 and AES-0.2 page 4-4 AES-1,2 page 4-34 AFR-C.1 pages 4-10, 4-14, 4-20, and 4-24.

new page 4-21a:

AES-1.1 Step 17 - Caution new page 4-24a:

AES-1.2 Step 12 - Caution 6

m:

1 -

Neber Title Rey /Date AFR-C.1 AP600 RESPONSE TO INADEQUATE CORE COOLING Rev. 5 p

10/31/97 i

(,~j i

i A.

PURPOSE This guideline provides actions to restore core cooling.

B.

$YMPTOMS OR ENTRY CON 0!TIONS This guideline is entered from AF-0.2. CORE COOLING Critical Safety Function Status Tree, on a RED condition.

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N aber 11tle Rev./Date AFR-C.1 AP600 RESPONSE TO INADEQUATE CORE COOLING Rev. 5 10/31/97 l

RESPONSE N0f OBTAINED STEP ACTION / EXPECTED RESPONSE 1

Turn On Hydrogen Igniters 2

Verify CMT Actuated:

Actuate CMT initiation. lE valves will 1101 open. Ilia manually open CMT injection valves - OPEN valves as necessary.

e 3

Verify All RCPs Tripped Manutlly trip RCPs.

4 Start All RCS Makeup Pumps 5

Check RCP Support Conditions -

Try to establish support AVAILABLE conditions.

(include additional AP600 details in E0Ps]

6 Check SI Accumulator Isolation Valve Status:

a.

Restore power to isolation valves b.

Isolation valves - OPEN b.

Open isolation valves unless closed after accumulator discharge.

7 Check Core Exit TCs a.

Core Exit 1Cs - LESS THAN a.

Go to Step 8.

1200*F b.

Return to guideline and step in effect O

Page 2 of 9

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e limber Title Rev./Date AFR.C.1 AP600 RESPONSE TO INADEQUATE CORC COOLING Rev. 5 10/31/97 STEP-ACTION / EXPECTED RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED 1

CMTION lf IRMST level decreases to less than (Lil), RNS alignment to rne contafnaent sum should be veriffed.

8 Depressurize RCS To Inject IRWST:

a.

Actuate ADS b.

Verify first stage ADS b.

Manually open valves as isolation valves - OPEN.

necessary.

t c.

Check second stage ADS c.

M (T01) seconds have valves - OPEN elapsed from first stage ADS signal, M verify second stage ADS valves open. H HQI, M manually open second stage ADS valves as necessary, i

d.

Check third stage ADS d.

M (102) seconds have O-valves - OPEN elapsed from second stage ADS signal, IHER verify third stage ADS valves open.

IE N01, M manually open third stage ADS valves as necessary.

e.

Align RNS to inject into RCS e.

H RNS injection into RCS can 801 be established, E detuate fourth stage ADS and IRWST injection.

f.

Verify proper valve f.

Manually align valves as alignment necessary.

(includeadditionalAP600 detailsinE0Ps]

9

-Check Core Exit TCs:

a.

Core Exit TCs - LESS THAN a.

E decreasing, M return 1200*F to Step 1.

H HQI, M go to Step 10.

b.

Return to guideline and step

- O in effect Page 3 of 9

N atier iltje Rev /Date AFR-C.1 AP600 RESPONSE TO INADEQUATE CORE COOLING Rev. 5 10/31/97 g

STEP ACTION / EXPECTED RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED CAUUON A faulted or ruptured SG should not be used in subsequent steps unless PRHR is not avaliable and no intact SG is available.

10 Check Intact SG Levelst a.

Narrow range level - GREATER a.

Maintain total feed flow THAN (LO3)%

(LO4)% FOR greater than (f01) gpm until ADVERSECONTAINMENT]

narrow range level nreater

~

than (Lc3)% [(LO4)% for adverse containment] l feed in at least one SG. 1E tota flow greater than (F01) gpm can HQI be established. IHG continue attempts to establish a heat sink in at least one SG and go to Step 17.

b.

Control feed flow to maintain narrow ran e level between(LO3)%[(LO)%for adverse containment and 50%

O Page 4 of 9

[

Neber iltle Rev./l.d t e AFR-C.1 AP600 RESPONSE TO INADEQUATE CORE COOLING Rev. 5 10/31/97 STEP ACTION / EXPECTED RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED Partial uncovery of SG tubes is acceptable in the NOTE following steps.

• After the low steamline pressure Si signal is blocked, main steamline isolation will occur if the high steam pressure rate setpoint is exceeded.

11 Depressurire All Intact SGs To (P15) PSIGt a.

Dump steam to condenser at a.

Dump steam at maximum rate m imum rate using SG PORVs.

b.

Clieck SG pressures - LESS b.

H SG pressure decreasing.

THAN (P15) PSIG EIN return to Step 10. H N01. E verify PRHR actuated and go to Step 17.

c.

Clieck RCS hot leg c.

H RCS hot leg temperatures O.

temocratures - AT LEAST TWO decreasing, M return to LESS THAN (TOS)*F Step 10. H BDI. E verify PRHR actuated AND go to Step 17.

d.

Stop SG depressurization 12 Check If SI Accumulators :hould 1

Be Isolated:

a.

At least two RCS hot leg a.

Go to Step 17.

temperatures - LESS T.uAtl (105) *F b.

Close all Si accumulator b.

Vent any unisolated isolation valves accumulator.

13 Depressurize All Intact SGs To Atmospheric Pressure l

a.

Dump steam to condenser at.

a.

Dump steam at maximum rate maximum rate using SG PORVs. E steam can NOT be dumped, M verify tO PRHR actuated AND go to Step 17.

l-i Page S of 9

N aber 11tle Rev./Date AFR C.1 AP600 RESPONSE TO INADEQUATE CORE COOLING Rev. 5 10/31/97 STEP ACTION / EXPECTED RESPONSE RESPONSE HOT OBTAINED 14 Yerify RNS Flow Continue efforts to establish RNS flow, l.E core exit TCs less than 1200*F 111EN return to Step 13.

If 1101, liif H go to Step 17.

15 Check Core Cooling a.

Core exit TCs - LESS THAN a.

Go to Step 17.

1200 f b.

At least two RCS hot leg b.

Return to Step 13.

temgeratures-LESSTHAN 350 F c.

RCS hot leg level indication c.

Return to Step 13.

-GREATERTH/,N(L32)%[(33)%

FOR ADVERSE CONTAINMENT 16 Go To AE-1. AP600 LOSS OF REACTOR OR SECONDARY COOLANT, Step 13 17 Initiate Reactor Cavity Flooding Open cavity flooding squib e

valve O

Page 6 of 9

_ - -, _. ~.. - - -.. - - _.. ~.

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Number 11tle Rev./Date AFR-C.1 AP600 RESPONSE TO INADEQUATE CORE COOLING Rev. 5

(

10/31/97 STEP ACTION / EXPECTED RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED NOTE Nomal cond1t1ons are desired but not required for starting the RCPs.

18 Check If RCPs should Be Started:

a.

Core exit TCs - GREATER THAN a.

Go to Step 19.

i 1200*F b.

Check if an idle RCS cooling b.

Perform the following loop is available:

1. Open ali other vent paths Narrow range SG level -

to containment.

e GREATERTHAN(LO3)%

[(LO4)% FOR ADVERSE

2. Go to Step 19.

CONTAINMENT)

RCP in associated loop--

e AVAILABLE AND NOT OPERATING c.

Start RCP in one idle RCS cooling loop d.

Return to Step 18a.

19 Check Core Exit TCs - LESS THAN 1E core exit temperatures 1200"F decreasing, IllEN return to Step 18. 1E core exit temperatures increasing and RCPs running in all available RCS cooling loops,111EN go to SACRG-1, SEVERE ACCIDENT CONTROL CONTROL ROOM GUIDELINE INITIAL RESPONSE, Step 1.

20 Try to Depressurize The RCS By Try to locally depressurize SGs Cooling Down With PRHR to atmospheric pressure.

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E 1

Number Title Rev./Date AFR-C.1 AP600 RESPONSE TO INADEQUATE CORE COOLING Rev. 5 l 10/31/97 STEP ACTION / EXPECTED RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED 21 Check If SI Accumulators Should Be Isolated:

a.

RNS flow indicators - AT a.

Return to Step 20.

LEAST INTERMITTENT FLOW b.

Close all $1 accumulator b.

Vent any unisolated isolation valves accumulator.

22 Check If RCPs Should Be Stopped:

a.

At least two RCS hot leg a.

Go to Step 23.

temgeratures-LESSTHAN 350 F b.

Stop all RCPs i

23 Verify RNS Flow Perfom the following:

h

a. Continue efforts to establish RNS flow,

b. Actuate fourth stage ADS.

c. Verify IRWST injection isolation valves open. If 1101.

111EN manually open valves.

24 Check Core Cooling:

Return to Step 18.

Core exit TCs - LESS THAN 1200 F RCS hot leg level indication -

e ADVERSE CONTAINMENT,(L33)% FOR GREATER THAN (L32)%

At least two RCS hot leg e

temperatures - LESS THAN LO F 25 Go To AE-1. AP600 LOSS OF REACTOR OR SECONDARY COOLANT Step 13

- END -

Page 8 of 9

\\

1 Naber Title Rev./Date AFR-C.1-AP600 RESPONSE TO INADEQUATE C0RE C0OLING Rev. 5 O

10/31/97

-i i

i F001 NOTES Refer to FOOTNOTE DEFINITION Document for a description of all footnoted parameters used in this guideline.

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e Neber iltle Rev./Date l

r~S AE5 1.1 AP600 PAS $1VE SAFETY SYSTEMS TERMINATION Rev. 5

'Q 10/31/97 f

n A.

PURPOSE i

Thi_s guideline provides the necessary instructions to terminate safety injection and stabilize plant conditions.

B.

$YMPTOMS OR ENTRY CONDITIONS This guideline is entered from AE-0, REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION, Step 26, and AE-1, LOSS OF REACTOR OR SECONDARY COOLANT, Step 6, when specified temination criteria are satisfied.

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Number Title Rev./Date AES-1.1 AP600 PASSIVE SAFETY SYSTEMS TERMINATION Rev. 5 g

10/31/97 STEP ACTION / EXPECTED RESPONSE RESPONSE NC's QTf.f NED NOTE Foldout page should be open.

1 Reset SI 2

Reset Containment Isolation 3

Close CMT Injection Valves 4

Verify CMT Injection dot Required:

a.

RCS subconling based on core a.

Perform the following:

exit TCs - GREATER THAN (501) F [(S02 CONTAINMENT] ) F FOR ADVERSE

1) Hanually open CMT injection valves.

2) Go to AE-1, AP600 LOSS OF REACTOR OR SECONDARY COOLANT, Step 1.

b.

PRZR level - GREATER THAN b.

Perform the following:

CONTAINMENT])% FOR ADVERSE (LOS)% [(L23 a)HanuallyopenCMT injection valves.

b) Go to AE-1, AP600 LOSS OF REACTOR OR SECONDARY COOLANT, Step 1.

O Page 2 of 9

. ~..

N eber iltle Rev./Date AES-1.1 A?600 PASS!VE SAFETY SYSTEMS TERMINATION Rev 5 10/31/97

~

STEP ACTION / EXPECTED RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED CA!IHON 1f adverse contafnment conditfons extst, RCS makeup should be operated in manual to maintain pressurtzer level.

Check RCS Makeup Status:

/

a.

PRZR level - GRr.ATER THAN a.

Verify one makeup pump (LO5)%[(L23)%FORADVERSE running. If NOI, IHEN CONTAINMENT]

manually start one makeup purp.

b.

PRZR level - LESS THAN b.

Verify all makeup pumps (LO6)%[(L31)%FORADVERSE stopped. IE HDI IllIN CONTAINMENT]

manuallystopallmakeup pumps.

c.

Operate makeup and letdown as necessary to maintten PRZR level - BETWEEN (LOS)%

O AND (LO6 %[BETWEEN (L23)%

V AND (L31 % FOR ADVERSE C0itTAINM NT]

6 Check If PRHR Should Be Isolated a.

Check the following:

a.

Go to Step 7.

• SFW - IN OPERATION Narrow range level in at e

least one SG - GREATER THAN (LO3)%

(LO4)% FOR ADVERSECONTAINMENT]

b.

Close PRHR isolation,alves 7

Realign Other Components To Pre-SI Configurations a.

(includeadditionalAP600 detailsinE0Ps]

l Page 3 of 9

Naber Title Rev./Date AES-1.1 AP600 PASSIVE SAFETY SYSTEMS TERMINATION Rev. 5 l10/31/97 STEP

, ACTION / EXPECTED RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED l

[

8 Check If Passive Containment t

Cocling Should Be Stopped:

a.

Passive containment a.

Go to Step 9.

L cooling - OPERATli b.

Containment pressure - LESS b.

Continue with Step 9. M

(

THAN (P10) PSIG containment pressure less thar (P10) psig, E do Steps 8c and d.

L c.

Reset passive cortainment cooling signal d.

Stop passive containment cooling and place in standby:

lnclude additional AP600

{etails in E0Ps]

1 9

Verify All Control Rods Fully 1E two or more control rods HOI Inserted fully inserted, E imediately borate (B01) ppm for each control rod not fully inserted.

10 Check RCS Makeup Control System:

Adjust controls as necessary a.

Makeup set.cr nrw ter than or equal to cett.hutdown RCS boron concentration b.

Makeup set for automatic contrcl 11 Transfer Condenser Sicam Dump To if condenser HOI available, M Pressure Control Mo's use SG PORVs.

12 Check RCS Hot Leg Temperature -

Control steam dump and total feed STABLE flow as necessary to stabilize RCS temperatures.

Page 4 of 9

thanber Title Rev./Date AES-1.1 AP600 PASSIVE SAFETY SYSTEMS TERMINATION Re/. 5 10/31/97 STEP ACTION / EXPECTED RESPONSE RESP'ih. NOI OBTAINED 13 Control PRZR Pressure:

a.

Check letdown - IN SERVICE a.

Try to c:stablish letdown, b.

Maintain pressure stable using PRZR heaters and PRIR auxiliary spray as necessary 14 Check Intact SG Levels:

a.

Narrow ran e level - GREATER a.

Maintain total feed flow THAN (LO3)

[(LO4)% FOR greater than (F01) gpm until ADVERSE CONTAINMENT]

narrow ran e level greater than (LO3)

[(LO4)% for adverse containment] in at least one SG.

b.

Control feed flow to b.

IE narrow range level in any O

maintain narrow range level SG continues to increase, between (LO3)% [(LO4)% for IHEh stop feed flow to that adverse containmeat] and 50%

SG.

Check RCP Cooling:

Establish normal cooling to RCP(s). Refer to [ Include e RCP CCS flow - NORMAL additional AP600 details in RCP temperature (s) - NORMAL e

16 Verify All ECS AC Busses -

Try to restore offsite power to ENERGIZED BY OFFSITE POWER ECS ac busses. 1E offsite power can NQLbe restored, IHEN load the following equipment on ac emergency busses:

[ Include additional AP600 details in E0Ps]

O Page 5 of 9

Number Title Rev./Date AES-1.1 AP600 PASSIVE SAFETY SYSTEMS TERMINATION Rev. 5 10/31/97 STEP ACTION / EXPECTED RESPONSE RESPCHSE KOT OBTAINED CAUTION Natural circulation should be verified prior to RCP start to prevent inadvertent criticality.

NOTE RCPs 1A and 18 should be run to provide normal PRZR spray.

17 Check RCf Status - AT LEAST TWO Try to start RCPs 1A and IB:

RUNNING

a. Estaolish conditions for starting RCPs:

[ Include additional AP600 details in E0Ps]

b. Start RCPs 1A and IB. If no RCP can be started, IBEN refer to ATTACHMENT A to verify natural circulation. If natural circulation H01 verified, IHEN increase dumping steam from intact SGs.

18 Check If Source Range Detectors Should Be Energized:

a.

Check interinedtate range a.

Continue with Step 19. luiEN flux - LESS THAN (V02) flux less than (V02), IHEN do Step 18b.

b.

Verify source range b.

Manually energize source detectors - ENERGIZED range detectors.

19 Check If Diesel Generators Should Be Stopped:

a.

Verify ECS AC busses -

a.

Try to restore offsite power to ENERGIZED BY OFFSITE ECS ac busses.

POWER b.

Stop any unnecessary di el generator and place in standby O

Page 6 of 9

Number Title Rev./Date AES-1.1 AP600 PASSIVE SAFETY SYSTEMS TERMINATION Rev. 5 -

10/31/97

\\

STEP ACTION / EXPECTED RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED 20 Shut Down Unnecessary Plant t

Equipment:

[IncludeadditionalAP600 details inE0Ps]

21 Maintain Plant Conditions -

STABLE PRZR pressure e

e PRZR level RCS temperatures e

e Intact SG levels 22 Verify CMT Injection Not Required:

a.

RCS subcooling based on core a.

Perform the following:

exit TCs - GREATER THAN (S01) F [(S 2) F FOR ADVERSE

1) Manually open CMT CONTAINMENT injection valves.

2) Go to AE-1, AP600 LOSS OF REACTOR OR SECONDARY COOLANT, Step 1.

b.

PRZR level - GREATER THAN b.

Perform the following:

(LOS)% [(L23 CONTAINMENT])% FOR ADVERSE a) Manually open CMT injection valves, b) Go to AE-1, AP600 LOSS OF REACTOR OR SECONDARY COOLANT, Step 1.

23 Go To Appropriate Plant Procedure 01

- END -

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Number Title Rev./Date AES-1.1 AP600 PASSIVE SAFETY SYSTEMS TERMINATION Rev. 5 10/31/97 ATTACHMENT A The following conditions support or indicate natural circulation flow:

RCS subcooling based on core exit TCs - GREATER THAN (S01) F [(S02) F FOR ADVERSE CONTAINMENT]

o SG pressures - STABLE OR DECREASING RCS hot leg temperatures - STABLE OR DECREASING e

o Core exit TCs - STABLE OR DECREASING RCS cold leg temperatures - AT SATURATION TEMPERATURE FOR SG PRESSURE o

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Page 8 of 9

r Number-Title Rev./Date

' j AES-1.1 AP600 PASSIVE SAFETY = SYSTEMS TERMINATION Rev. 5~

10/31/97 FOOTNOTES Refer to FOOTNOTE DEFINITION Document for a description of all footnoted parameters used in this guideline.

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l Number Title Rev./Date l

AES-1.2 AP600 POST LOCA C00LDOWN AND DEPRESSURIZATION Rev. 5 10/31/97 A.

PURPOSE This guideline provides actions to cool down and depressurize the RCS to cold shutdown conditions following a loss of reactor coolant inventory.

B.

SYMPTOMS OR ENTRY CONDITIONS This guideline is entered from AE-1, AP600 LOSS OF REACTOR OR SECONDARY COOLANT, Step 12 when RCS pressure is greater than the RNS cut-in pressure and ADS is not actuated.

O Page 1 of 15 f

Number Title Rev,/Date AES-1.2 AP600 POST LOCA C00LDOWN AND DEPRESSURIZATION Rev. 5 10/31/97 STEP ACTION / EXPECTED RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED NOTE foldout page should be open.

1 Verify All ECS AC Busses -

Try to restore offsite power to ENERGIZED BY OFFSITE POWER ECS ac busses. E offsite power can HQI be restored, IHER load the following equipment on ac busses:

[ Include additional AP600 details in E0Ps]

If IRWST level decreases to less than (L11), RNS CAUTION alignment to the containment sump should be veriffed.

If adverse containment condit1ons ex1sta RCS makeup should be operated in manual to maintsin pressurizer level.

2 Check RCS Makeup Status a.

PRZR level - GREATER THAN a.

Verify one makeup pump (L05)%[(L23)% FOR ADVERSE running. H HQI, IEEN CONTAINMENT]

manually start one makeup pump. E level continues to decrease or cannot be restored, IBEN start second makeup pump.

b.

PRZR level - LESS THAN b.

Verify all makeup pumps (LO6)%[(L31)% FOR ADVERSE stopped. IE HDI. ItifR CONTAINMENT]

manually stop all makeup pumps.

c.

Operate makeup and letdown as necessary to maintain PRZR level - BETWEEN (LO5)%

AND (1.06)%[BETWEEN (L23)%

AND (L31)% FOR ADVERSE CONTAINMENT]

O Page 2 of 15

Number Title-Rev./Date AES-1.2-AP600 POST LOCA C00LDOWN AND DEPRESSURIZATION Rev. 5 10/31/97 STEP ACTION / EXPECTED RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED 3

Check If PRHR Should Be Isolated a.

Check the following:

a.

Go to Step 4.

• SFW - IN OPERATION Narrow range level in at e

least one SG - GREATER THAN (LO3)% [(LO4)% FOR AbVERSE CONTAINMENT]

b.

Close PRHR isolation valves 4

Check Intact SG Levels:

a.

Narrow range level - GREATER a.

Maintain total feed flow THAN (LO3)% [(LO4)% FOR greater than (F01) gpm until ADVERSE CONTAINMENT]

narrow range level greater O

than (LO3)% [(LO4)% for

\\

adverse containment] in at least one SG.

b.

Control feed flow to b.

IE narrow range level in any maintain narrow ran e level SG continues to increase in between (LO3)% [(LO )% for an uncontrolled manner, IllEN adverse containment and 50%

go to AE-3, AP600 STEAM-GENERATOR TUBE RUPTURE, Step 1.

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l Page 3 of 15

Number iltje Rev./Date AES-1.2 AP600 POST LOCA C00LDOWN AND DEPRESSURIZATION Rev. 5 g

10/31/97 STEP ACTION / EXPECTED RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED Low steamline pressure SI and low T-cold Si should NOTE be blocked when PRZR pressure decreases to less than (PO6) psig.

• After the low steamline pressure SI signal is blocked, main steamline isolation will occur if the high steam pressure rate setpoint is exceeded.

Shutdown margin should be monitored during RCS cooldown.

5 Initiate RCS Cooldown To Cold Shutdown:

a.

Maintain cooldown rate in RCS cold legs - LESS THAN 100 F/HR b.

Dump steam to condenser from b.

Dump steam from intact SG intact SG using SG PORV.

c.

Use RNS if in service d.

Use PRHR as necessary 6

Turn All PRZR Heaters OFF O

Page 4 of 15

Number Title Rev./Date AES-1.2 AP600 POST LOCA C00LDOWN AND DEPRESSURIZATION Rev. 5 10/31/97 STEP ACTION / EXPECTED RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED i

Volding may occur in the RCS during RCS CAUUON depressurization.

This will result in a rapidly increasing PRZR level.

Cycling of the PRZR ADS valves should be minimized.

7 Depressurize RCS To Refill PRZR:

a.

RCS subcooling based on core a.

Go to Step 8.

exit TCs - GREATER THAN (501) F [(S 2) F FOR ADVERSE CONTAINMENT b.

Use auxiliary spray b.

Use one set of first stage PRZR ADS valves.

c.

PRZR level - GREATER THAN c.

Continue with Step 8. When CONTAINMENT])%FORADVERSE

[(LO9)% for adverse (LO7)% [(LO9 level greater than (LO7)%

containment], IllEN do

\\

Step 7d.

d.

Stop RCS depressurization O

Page 5 of 15

N eber Title Rev./Date AES-1.2 AP600 POST LOCA C00LDOWN AND DEPRESSURIZATION Rev. 5 10/31/97 l

STEP ACTION / EXPECTED RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED 8

Check If ADS Should Be Actuated:

a.

CMT level - LESS THAN (L01)%

a.

H RCS hot leg level indication reater than (L32) [(L33 % FOR ADVERSE CONTAINMENT, IHEfi go to Step 9. H HQI, E manually actuate ADS.

b.

Verify first stage ADS b.

Manually open valves as isolation valves - OPEN necessary.

c.

Check second stege ADS c.

M (T01) seconds have valves - OPEN elapsed from first stage ADS signal, M verify second stage ADS valves cpen. H HQI, E manually open second stage ADS valves as necessary.

d.

Check third stage ADS d.

M (T02) seconds have valves - OPEN elapsed from second stage ADS signal, M verify third stage ADS valves open.

E EQI, M manually open third stage ADS valves as necessary, e.

Align RNS to inject into RCS f.

Verify proper valve f.

Manually align valves as alignment necessary.

[IncludeadditionalAP600 details in E0Ps]

g.

Go to AE-1, AP600 LOSS OF REACTOR OR SECONDARY COOLANT, Step 13.

O Page 6 of 15

Number 11tle Rev./Date AES-1.2 AP600 POST LOCA C00LDOWN AND DEPRESSURIZATION Rev. 5 10/31/97 STEP ACTION / EXPECTED RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED 9

Check If CMT Injection Should Be Isolated:

a.

ADS - NOT ACTUATLD a.

Go to Step 10.

b.

RCS makeup - OPERABLE b.

Go to Step 10.

c.

RCS subcooling based on core c.

Go to Step 10.

exit TCs - GREATER THAN (501) F [(S02 CONTAINMENT] ) F FOR ADVERSE d.

PRZR level - GREATER THAN d.

Go to Step 10.

(LOS)% [(L23)% FOR ADVERSE CONTAINMENT]

e.

Close CMT injection valves d

10 Verify CMT Injection Not Required:

a.

RCS subcooling based on core a.

Manually open CMT injection exit TCs - GREATER THAN valves.

(S01) F [(S02 CONTAINMENT] ) F FOR ADVERSE b.

PRZR level - GREATER THAN b.

Manually open CMT injection (LOS)% [(L2 )% FOR ADVERSE valves.

CONTAINMENT 11 Check RCP Cooling:

Establish nonnal cooling to RCP(s). Refer to [ Include RCP CCS flow - NORMAL additional AP600 details in RCP temperature (s) - NORMAL e

O Page 7 of 15

Nanber l Title Rev./Date AES-1.2 AP600 POST LOCA C00LDOWN AND DEPRESSURIZATION Rev. 5 g

10/31/97 STEP ACTION / EXPECTED RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED i

CAUTION Natural C1rculation should be verified pr1or to RCP start to prevent inadvertent critical 1ty.

NOTE RCPs 1A and 18 should be run to prov1de normal PRZR spray.

12 Check If RCPs Should Be Started:

a.

All RCPs - STOPPED a.

Stop all but RCP 1A and IB.

Go to Step 13.

b.

RCS subcooling based on core b.

Go to Step 13.

exit TCs - GREATER THAN (501)'F [(S 2) F FOR ADVERSE CONTAINMENT c.

PRZR level - GREATER THAN c.

Return to Step 7.

CONTAINMENT])% FOR ADVERSE (LO7)% [(LO9 O'

d.

Try to start RCP 1A and IB:

d.

E no RCP can be started, Ii1LH refer to ATTACHMENT A

1) Establish conditions for to verify natural starting RCPs:

ci rculation. E natural circulation H0I verified,

[ Include additional AP600 IHEN increase dumping steam.

details in E0Ps]

2) Start RCPs O

Page 8 of 15

1 Number lTitle Rev./Date AES-1.2 AP600 POST LOCA C00LOOWN AND DEPRESSURIZATION Rev. 5 10/31/97 ST EP..

ACTION / EXPECTED RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED CAUTION Voiding may occur in the RCS during RCS depressur1zat1on. This w111 result in a rapidly increasing PRZR level.

Cycifng of the PRZR ADS Valves should be minimized.

If CMT injection is necessary to maintain PRZR level, RNS pumps should be started to in the RCS when RCS pressure is less then (ject into.P03) [(PO4)

FOR ADVERSE CONTAINMENT) 13 Depressurize RCS To Minimize RCS Subcooling:

a.

Use normal PRZR spray a.

Use auxiliary spray. If auxiliary spray HQI available. IHEN use one set of first stage PRZR ADS valves.

lI RU b.

Turn on PRZR heaters as l

necessary c.

Depressurize RCS until EITHER of the following conditions-satisfied:

PRZR level - GREATER THAN (L13)%[(L14)%FOR ADVERSECONTAINMENT]

l

-0R-RCS subcooling based on core exit TCs - LESS THAN (503) F [(SO4) F FOR ADVERSECONTAINMENT].

14 Verify Adequate Shutdown Margin:

a.

Sample RCS j

b.

Shutdown margin - ADEQUATE b.

Borate as necessary.

Page'9 of 15

Naber 11tle R v./Date AES-1.2 AP600 POST LOCA C00LDOWN AND DEPRESSURIZATION Rev. 5 10/31/97 STEP ACTION / EXPECTED RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED 15 Check If SI Accumulators Should Be Isolated:

a.

RCS subcooling based on core a.

If both RCS hot leg exit TCs - GREATER THAN temperatures less than (501) F [(502 (T05) F, IEEN 90 to CONTAINMENT] ) F FOR ADVERSE Step 15c. lE HOI, IEEN 90 to Step 16.

b.

PRZR level - GREATER THAN b.

Return to Step 7.

(LO7)% [(LO )% FOR ADVERSE CONTAINMENT c.

Restore power to isolation valves d.

Close all Si accumulator d.

Vent any unisolated isolation valves accumulators.

O O

Page 10 of 15

Number iitie Rev /Date AES-1.2 AP600 POST LOCA CO LDOWN AND DEPRESSURIZATION Rev. 5 10/31/97 STEP ACTION / EXPECTED RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED 16 Check If Diesel Generators should Be Stopped:

a.

Verify ECS ac busses -

a.

Try to restore offsite power ENERGIZED BY OFFSITE POWER to ECS ac busses. If offsite power can H01 be restored, E loadthe following equipment on ac busses:

[ Include additional AP600 details in E0Ps]

b.

Stop any unnecessary diesel generator and place in standby 17 Check If Passive Containment Cooling Should Be Stopped:

O()

a.

Passive containment a.

Go to Step 18.

cooling - OPERATING b.

Containment pressure - LESS b.

Pontinue with Step 18. WiiEti THAN (P10) PSIG v tainment pressure less s (P10) psig, E do Steps 17c and d.

c.

Reset passive containment cooling signal d.

Stop passive containment cooling and place in standby:

[IncludeadditionalAP600 details in E0Ps]

18 Check If Source Range Detectors Should Be Energized:

a.

Check intermediate range a.

Continue with Step 19. WiiEtf flux - LESS THAN (V02) flux less than (V02), IllEN do Step 18b.

()

b.

Verify source range b.

Manually energize source detectors - ENERGIZED range detectors.

~

Page 11 of 15

Number iltle Rev./Date AES-1.2 AP600 POST LOCA CGOLDOWN AND DEPRESSURIZATION Rev. 5 10/31/97 STEP ACTION / EXPECTED RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED 19 Shut Down Unnecessary Plant Equipment:

[IncludeadditionalAP600 details inE0Ps]

20 Check If RCP(s) Must Be Stopped:

a.

Check RCS pressure - GREATER a.

Stop RCPgs).

THAN (P07) PSIG

[ Additional steps related to normal AP600 cooldown will be placed after Step 20]

21 Check If RNS Can Be Placed In Service:

a.

Check the following:

a.

Go to Step 22.

RCS temperatures - LESS THAN (T06)*F [(T07) F FOR ADVERSE CONTAINMENT]

RCS pressure - LESS THAN (P08) PSIG [(P09) PSIG FORADVERSECONTAINMENT]

b.

Determine if RNS should be placed in service in accordance with [ Include additional AP600 details in E0Ps]

22 Check RCS Temperatures - LESS Return to Step 2.

THAN 200*F 23 Evaluate Long Term Plant Status And Maintain Cold Shutdown Conditions

- END -

Page 12 of 15

~_.

Number i t *.le Rev /Date

)s AES-1.2 AP600 POST LOCA C00LD0WN AWd DEPRESSURIZATION Rev. 5 10/31/97

(

i i

ATTACHMENT A-The following conditions support or indicate natural circulation flow:

RCS subcooling based on core exit TCs - GREATER THAN (S01) F L(502) F FOR ADVERSECONTAINMENT]

SG pressures - STABLE OR DECREASING RCS hot leg temperatures - STABLE OR DECREASING Core exit TCs - STABLE OR DECREASING RCS cold leg temperatures - AT SATURATION TEMPERATURE FOR SG PRESSURE l

l l

Page 13 of 15

hunber Title Rev./Date j

AES-1.2 AP600 POST LOCA C00LDOWN AND DEPRESSURIZATION Rev 5 10/31/97 FOLD 00T FOR AE-1 SERIES GUIDELINES

1. EliT. JECTIOh CRITERIA Open CMT injection valves if EITHER condition listed below occurs:

RCS subcooling based on core exit TCs - LESS THAN (501) F [(502) F FOR ADVERSECONTAINMENT]

PRZR level - CANNOT BE MAINTAINED GREATER THAN (LOS)% [(L23)% FOR ADVERSECONTAINMENT]

2. RED PATM

SUMMARY

a. SUBCRITICALITY - Nuclear power greater than 5%.

b. CORE COOLING - Core exit TCs greater than 1200 F

c. HEAT SINK -

Narrow range level in all SGs less than (LO3)%:(LO4)% FOR ADVERSE CONTAINMENT] MD total feedwater flow ' ess than (F01) gpm MD PRHR not in service

d. INTEGRITY -

Cold leg temperature decrease greater than 100 F in last 60 minutes MD RCS cold leg temperature less than (T14) F

e. CONTAINMENT - Containment pressure greater than (P21) PSIG

3. SECONDARY INTEGRITY CRITERIA Go to AE-2, FAULTED STEAM GENERATOR ISOLATION, Step 1, if any SG pressure is decreasing in an uncontrolled manner or has completely depressurized, and has not been isolated.

4. AE-3 TP.ANSITION CRITERIA Go to AE-3, STEAM GENERATOR TUBE RUPTURE, Step 1, if any SG level increases in an uncontrolled manner or any SG has abnormal radiation.

O Page 14 of 15

. ~,.. _ -

~.

--~

. - -. _ =.

I b

Y i

Naber Title Rev./Date AES-1.2 AP600 POST LOCA C00LDOWN AND DEPRESSURIZATION Rev. 5 10/31/97 e

FOOTNOTES Refer to FOOTNOTE DEFINITION Document for a description of all footnoted parameters used in this guideline, t

O n

v Page 15 of 15

O AP600 Emergency Response Guidelines A P600 Document Number GW-GJR-100 O

Background Information Book 1 l

l O m

r-- - -

m.

--..-.. _ ~

t i

]j

= Introduction x

The AP600 Emergency Response Guidelines (ERGS) provide functional guidelines for terminating accidents and transients that affect plant safety. De ERGS contain the technical basis for constructing the Emergency Operating "rocedures (EOPs). The two-column format used to present the ERGS contain rules of usage which supplement the technical instructions. The Critical Safety Function -

Status Trees have their own format and rules of usage. Priorities established between the Optimal Recovery Guidelines and Function Restoration Guidelines direct operator action to the most urgent operational or safety conditions. De background documents, which are presented separately from the guidelines, contain additional detail about each operator action step which may affect how the EOPs are written or presented in training.

De EOPs will be developed using the functional guidelines from the ERGS in a presentation philo>ophy that directs the operating staff to provide timely implementation, ne EOPs and their presentation may not resemble ERGS, but will accomplish the functional guidance provided. The use of historical terminology in the ERGS (e.g., " status trees") does not imply any specific form of implementation, and therefore no constraints are placed on the Man Machine Interface System (MMIS) design 'lle ERG 4 do rot pecify the degme of automated plant response nor the degree of user control over the pace of working through the accident resporw. The task allocation between the operator and the compute.' will be decided when designing the features of the MMIS. De format end features of the EOPs will be determined by the Human Factors Engineering (HFE)/MMIS design process. This process includes the development of EOPs; development of functional requirements and design basis for the comput.:rized procedure system; man-in-the-loop prototype / concept testing; workload analysis, detailed design of hardware end software and the final HFE verification and validation.

The plant functional guidelines within each ERG are represented by numbered, bold-faced steps. The order of these steps may be modified during the development of the EOPs. During the development of the EOPs, consideration will be given to designating certain steps as continuous action steps that the operator can continuously attempt during the excecution of subsequent steps and/or procedures. The ERG background documents indicate certain steps that should be considered for this designation, However, additional steps could be considered for this designation based on development of the EOPs and the HFE/MMIS design process.

^

Under each guideline step, a number of distinct actions, responses, and/or indications are specified.

These specific actions, responses, and reference to indications reflect the potential actions and responses needed to meet the functional guideline for AP600. During the development of the AP600 MMIS design and EOPs, it may be shown that each distinct action, response, or indication identified in the ERGS may not be required to meet the higher level functional guideline. Additionally, the extent of main control room automation versus manual operator action is also a cont.ideration in the achievement of the high level functional guideline.

, o Wy 5\\20MwVrg toc.wpf:Ib llN97 yij REVISION: $

i ne AFo00 employs passive safety-related systems that automatically protect the plant in the event of an accident, without the need for immediate operator actions. De AP600 also employs nonsafety-related defense in-depth systems that, if available, can automatically protect the plant for the more probable postulated transients and accidents, if these systems are available and operate correctly, they will generally prevent the need for the passive safety related systems. De AP600 ERGS integrate the use of the nonsafety rt'ated defense-in-depth systems and the passive safety-related systems to maximize the protection of the plant for design basis and beyond design basis accidents. In general, the ERGS mitigate more probable events, and also contain contingencies for beyond design basis accidents.

The AP600 ERGS are in a formst consistent with the Standard Westinghouse ERGS (Reference 1), and incorporate both active nonsafny-related defense-in-depth systems, and passive safety-related systems.

In general, the first level of defense against an accident are the nonsafety-related defense-in-depth systems, if these systems are unavailable, or insufficient to mitigate the consequences of an event, the passive safety related syvems automatically protect the plant.

The ERGS are written to cover all transients r'r accidents that cause a reactor trip or safeguards actuation, such as a safety injection signal. The use of the nonsafety-related defense-in-depth systems as the first level of defense may not always be apparent. The plant abnormal procedures will cover plant transients prior to a reactor trip or safeguards actuation signal. In general, those procedures use only nonsafety related systems such as the main and startup feedwater systems, and the chemical and volume control system. Once an abnormal event leads to a reactor trip or e safeguards actuation si nal, the operator transitions to the EOPs.

F in the event of a reactor trip or a safeguards actuation signal, the ERGS instruct the operators to:

Verify operation of, or the need for operation of, the passive safety-related systems.

Verify operation of, or the need for operation of, the nonsafety-related defense-in-depth systems.

Diagnose the event and transition through the applicable optimal recovery guideline.

The ERGS are entered from a reactor trip or a safeguards actuation signal via Optimal Recovery Guideline AE-0. He operator verifies that the critical safety functions are met, determines if the termination criteria for the passive safety-related systems are met, and when the nonsafety-related systems can be relied upon to recovcr from the accident. As the operator follows through AE-0, diagnosis points are provided for the operator to transition to the appropriate Optimal Recovery Guideline. Eventually, assuming tetmination criteria are met, the Optimal Recovery Guidelines provide the operator with guidance to transition to nonnal plant procedures.

O o \\rev.,5\\20MwWrg4ocmpr:ltrl0x61 viii REVISION: 5

Q Several ERGS finish with a step labeled " Evaluate Long Term Plant Status." This step is generally D

reached when the conditions in the plant do not allow a transition to a normal procedure. These conditions ccaid exist following any loss of coolant accident that leads to the actuation of the automatic depressurization system. Due to the scenario-dependent nature of stch events, recovery is complex and scenario dependent. As discussed in SSAR section 13.3.1., the Combined License applicants referencing the AP600 certified design will address the emergency planning including post-72 hour actions and its communication interface. Aspects of accident management planning, as it relates to unique features of the AP600, are discussed in the background documents for the individual guidelines where this step appears.

The ERGS provide symptom-based, as opposed to event-based guidance to the operator. For that reason, the ERGS do not immediately instruct the operator to attempt to diagnose an event. He ERGS guide the operator to assess the plant parameters and operability of the available systems, and provide the most straightforward direction to the operator.

In general, the operator performs the following types of actions:

Verifies plant parameters Monitors automatic operation of safety-related and nonsafety related systems Controls operation of the nonsafety-related systems a

Terminates operation of the safety-related systems Transitions to normal procedures with nonsafety related systems he ERGS also use Critical Safety Function Status Trees. These trees graphically depict the critical safety functions, and assist the operator in prioritizing the status of the critical safety functions. There are six different trees, each tree evaluates a sep.. rate safety aspect of the plant. At any given time, a Critical Safety Function status is represented by a single path through its tree. Each path is color coded and/or line pattern coded at the terminus and las' branch line. A transition to the appropriate guideline, if required by that safety status, is also included in the path if the status is normal for a particular Critical Safety Function, no transition is specified, and the condificq is clarified by the words CSF SATISFIED.

A path can be color coded ei her RED, ORANGE, YELLOW, or GREEN. GREEN represents a t

• satisfied" safety status, and indicates that the conditions for that safety function are within the plant normal range. De other colors represents an action level that should be addressed according to the rules of priority, RED being the highest priority; ORANGE being the next highest priority; and YELLOW being a lower priority.

The six status trees are always evaluated in the sequence:

(m i

1)

Suberiticality (S)

')

'~

2)

Core Cooling (C) oirev 5\\?OMwkrg-toc.wpf ItwlloN7 ix REVISION: 5

3) lleat Sink (II) 4)

Integrity (P) 5)

Containment (Z) 6)

Inventony (P)

If identical color priorities are found on different trees dt. ring monitoring, the required action priority is determined by this sequence.

If a RED or ORANGE condition is encountered during the monitoring of the Critical Safety Functions, the operator is instructed to immediately stop any Optimal Recovery Guideline in progress,'-

and to perform the Functional Restoration Guideline required by the terminus, if during the performance of any RED-condition Functional Restoratica Guideline, a RED condition of higher priority arises, then the higher priority condition should be addressed Orst, and the lower priority RED-condition Functional Restoration Guideline suspended. Otherwise, the Functional Restoration Guideline must be performed to the point of the defined transition regardless of whett.er the RED condition has been cleared. Likewise,if during the performance of any ORANGE condition Functional Restoration Guideline, an ORANGE condition of higher priority arises, then the higher

arity cowition should be addressed first.

A YELLOW terminus does not require immediate operator attention. A yellow condition often indicatm an off normal and/or ter porary condition which will be restored to normal status by actions already in progress. In other cases, the YELLOW status might provide an early indication of a developing RED or ORANGE condition. Following Functional Restoration Guideline implementation, a YELLOW condition might indicate a residual off normal condition. The operator decides whether or not to implement any YELLOW condition Functional Restoration Guideline.

The ERGS provide guidance to the operator to determine the optimal means of recovering from an accident, and provide contingencies for low probability scenarios. The AP600 System / Event Matrix (Reference 2) describes how the systems protect the reactor core during different events. For each event, different safety and norsafety-related systems that are listed can protect the core. Systems that provide reactor shutdown, RCS makeup, core decay heat removal, ar.d containment cooling are iden;ified. Reference 2 provides flow charts for a wide variety of events. Each chart contains the appropriate first level of defense. the safety-related means of mitigating the event, and contingencies for multiple-failure scenarios. The following charts, taken from Reference 2, have been modified to show the appropriate ERG and Functional Restoration Guideline which guides the operator during such an event.

The ERGS contain the technical basis for constructing the EOPs. Other licensing submittals, such as the AP600 Standard Safety Analysis Report and Probabilistic Risk Assessment, will also be available to support constmetion of the EOPs. In addition, Section 3 of the Adverse Systems interaction Report (I eference 3) should be used in the construction of the AP600 EOPs. This section provides an evaluation of human commission errors that can have an adverse effect on the performance of the passive safety systems during an event.

owv_5\\20MwWg-te f.It>103097 x

REVIStoN: 5

l 1

References

-(

l.

-LWestinghouse Owners Group Emergency Response Guidelines; Low Pressure Version, Revision IB, February 1992.

2.

WCAP-13793 Rev. I, "AP600 System / Event Matrix", June 1994.

3.

WCAP-14477 Rev. 2, "The Adverse System Interactions Evaluation Report", November 1997.

LIST OF FIGURES Elanitt f.ast 11 AP600 - Loss of Offsite Power xii 1-2 Af%00 - Loss of Main Feedwater xiii 1-3 AP600 - Small Steam Line Break xiv I-4 AP600 Large Steam Line Break xy 15 AP600 - SG Tube Rupture -

xvi 16 AP500 - RCS Leak (0-3/8")

xvii

]

l-7 AP600 - KCS Leak (3/81")

xviii D

l8 AP600 - Small LOCA (1 10")

xix l9 AP600 Large LOCA (>10")

xx l 10 AP600 - Eanhquake (SSE) xxi o:Wy.$UOMwwrg toc wpf Itrl10497 xi REVISION: 5

L h-b 5&

4 4-n.

--ma,6-A.

m e-

-4 mkt.

M m.

a

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44

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wrw+*,+b o

4--N 4-k

' STEP DESCRIFt10N TABLE FOR AES 0.2

'(

STEP 1' NOTE 1 v

EQH:

Foldout page should be open PURPOSE' To remind the operator that the foldout page for the AE-0 series of guidelines should be open 33311:

The fo!dout page provides a list of important items that should be continuously monitored. If any of

~ he parameters exceed their limits, the Wupiiate operations should be initiated, t

ACTIONS:

N/A INSTRUMENTATION:

N/A CONTROLEOUIPMENT:

. N/A KNOWLEDGE:

Since each fridout page for a particular series of guidelines is potentially unique, the operator should know what items comprise each foldout page, Refer to the FOLDOUT PAGE Section in the appropriate background documents.

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:

N/A J

4-mWouwwi42.=pt;th-12 296 43 REvistoN: 2

..z

STI'.P D13CRIPTION TAllt.1:I'OR A110.3 STEP 1 NOTE 2 NQlD RCPs I A and IB should be run to provide normal PRZR spray "URPOSE:

To inform the operator of a preferred order for stalting RCPs IM115:

Subsequent steps require operator actions to cc.itrol itCS pressure. The preferred means of control is normal pressuriter spray since this conserves reactor coolant inventory. Since spray line connections are provided in only two loops, the RCPs should be run in those loops.

In addition, operation of oither RCP I A or 1(CP ID precludes the possibility of developing reverse flow through the PRilR 11X, which can potentially lead to the degradation of the PRilR as a heat sink.

When any RCP is operating, either RCP I A or 113 shall be operating Restart of the RCPs is permitted under this guideline if pressunter level has been recovered. The detailed RCP restart criteria should include censideration of piessuriter water level.

ACIl0NS:

N/A INSIlu!ML:NTATION:

N/A CON 72hdAiOUfPMENT:

NIA I

KNOWLEDGE:

N/A

/ODITIONAL,]ELORhDT10N.

N/A O

o Wmlut9NOMmWs$ws42 w pr It> 10XW7 44 REVISION: 5

STEP DESCRIMION TABLE FOR AFR C.!

f S1EP N CAUTION CAUTION-if IRWST level decreases to less than (Lil). normal residual heat removal splem aligrunent to the containment sump should be veriDed PURPOSE:

To ensure coolant flow to the core by switching to nortnal residual heat removal system recirculation if the IRWST level decreases below the switchover setpoint g.

[

If the switchover level in the IRWST is reached, the operator should venty that passive core cooling has transferred to passive recirculation to maintain coolant Dow to the core. When IRWST level decreases to (L1!), the isolation valves in the passive core cooling system recirculation lines open to provide a continuous suppiv of injection. The recirculation lines p 9 vide safety relatea long tenn core cooling. If available, the nonnal residual heat removal system pumps can also take suction from the recirculation lines and supplement passive recirculation core cooling.

AGlQts.:

Determine if IRWST level decreases to less than (Lil)

INSTRUMENTAT10N:

l IRWST level indication CONTROL /EOUIPMENT:

N/A KNOWLEDGE:

The operator is expected to know the altert92 functions of the normal residual heat removal system.

passive core cooling system recirculation alignment in this case, as it applies to this caution.

ADDITIONAL INFORM ATION:

(Lil) Enier specific value corresponding to IRWST recirculation line alignment setpoints.

i in p ow. w <typt.ib :Inwa 49 RIvlstoN: 2

STEP DE3CRIPTION TAllLE FOR AIGC.!

STEP 8 SIII:

Depressurire RCS To inject IRWST l'URPOSE:

To depressurire the RCS using ADS so that inWST injection can take place to provide core cooling IMSIS:

The IRWST provides safety related low pressure injection into the RCS for emergency core cooling purposes. At this point in AFR-C.1, the higher pressure injection sources are inadequate for mitigating the inadequate core cooling condition. Therefore, the RCS is depresourized using ADS which provides controlled RCS depressurization, allowing passive IRWST injection to occur.

De normal residual heat removal system has alignment capability for injecting the IRWST into the RCS. His a^ tion supplements the safety related passive IRWST injection as described in the previous paragraph. Also, the CAUTION for this step alerts the operator to switch over the normal re,idual heat removal system to recirculation if/when the switchover setpoint is reached in the IRWST.

ACTIONS:

Actuate ADS hianually open first stage ADS valves if necessary Check if second stage ADS salves are open When (T01) seconds has elapsed after first stage valve opening, manually open second stage valves Check if third stage ADS valves are open When (T02) seconds have elapsed after second stage valve opening, manually open third stage valves Align normal residual heat removal system to inject into RCS Actuate fourth stage ADS and IRWST injection if normal residual heat removal system injection cannot be established hianually align valves as necessary INSTRUh1ENTATIQN:

Indication for:

ADS actuation status (PhtS and DAS)

ADS isolation valves position Normal residual heat removal system valve position Normal residual heat removal system RNS status IRWST isolation valves position 1RWST actuation status (PhtS and DAS)

CONTROL /EOUIPhiENT:

hianual ADS acttation (PhtS and DAS)

Normal residual heat removal system valves controls Normal residual heat removal system pumps controls o bem projMNmWv54fr<l wpf Itw10AN7 4 10 REVISION: $

STEP DE'SCRIFFION 14 tile FOR AFR C.l

[Ji STEP 10. CAttrlON L

CAlfTION:

A faulted or ruptured SG should not be used in subsequent steps unless PRHR is not availaNe and no intact SG is available PliRPOSE:

To rninirnize potential radioactive releases to the atmosphere during the subsequent RCS cooldown 11 ASIS:

Depressurizing a ruptured SG rnay create a path to the atmosphere for release of radioactive materials. In addition, a faulted SG has probably already depressurized. Therefore, to obtain the most effective RCS depressurization, intact SGs should te used if available. If no intact SGs are available, this caution pennits the operator to feed a faulted or ruptured SG.

ACTIONS:

Determine if an intact SG is available INSTRIfMENTATION:

Indication for:

SG narmw range level p)

SG pressure

(

Feedwater flow CONTROL /EOl11PMENT:

N/A KNOWLEDGE:

N/A ADDITION AL INFORM ATION:

N/A i

m l

mW20tuarsixpr.l>1:1896 4 13 REVISION: 2

STEP DI3CRIPTION TAllLE FOR AFR C.!

STEP 10 STTP.

Check intact SG Levels IMRPOSE-To ensure adequate feedwater now or 50 inventory for recondary heat sink requirements BASIS:

'N minimum feedwater How requirement of (F01) gpm satis 0es the feedwater flow requirement of the lleat Sink Status Tree. Narrow range level is reestablished in all intact SGs to maintain symmetric cooling of the RCS. The control range ensures adequate inventory with level readings on span.

If the inadequate core cooling symptoms were caused by a loss of secondary heat sink. [ total feedwater How is less than (F01) gpm in combination with a loss of high RCS pressure emergency core cooling], then the operator is instructed to go to Step 17, Step 17 is initiated to ensure that the reactor cavity is flooded in a timely manner to prevent vessel failure and moted core relocation in containment.

ACTIONS:

Determine if SG narrow range level is greater than (LO3)% [(LO4)% for adverse containment]

Determine if total fecouater now is less than (F01) gpm Increase total feedwater now to restore narrow range level greater than (LO3)% [(LO4)W for

+

adverse containment)

Control feedwater How to maintain narrow range level between (LO3)% [(LO4)% for adverse containment) and 50%

INSTRUMENTAT QN:

1 Indication for:

SG narrow range level Total feedwater now Feedwater flow control valve position CONTROISOUIPMENT:

Feedwater flow control valves KNOWLEDGE:

Th's step is a continuous action step. Ilowever, if SG level is less than (LO3)% [(LO4)% for adverse containment) and total feedwater flow above (F01) gpm cannot be established, the operator should go to Step 18.

ohwprtiN%4wWv$\\afr<l wpr Itul0M7 4.}4 REVtSION: $

STI:P Di3CRIPTION TAllLE l'OR AES-0.1

(

)

STEP 10 v

SIIT:

Check RCP Status AT LEAST MO RUNNING PURPOSli:

To establish forced coolant now, if possible, or to verify natural circulation now if RCPs cannot be started IIASIS:

Forced coolant Oow is the preferred mode of operatiou to a!!ow for normal RCS cooldown and provide pressurlier spray. If no RCP is running, certain conditions are nonnally desired prior to starting an RCP. In addition, RCPs I A and ID are started to obtain nonnal pressurirer spray now capability as mon as possible. If RCPr. cannot be started, then natural circulation How should be verified using Attachment A to ensure adequate RCS heat removal. If nateral circulation cannot be verified, steam dump should be increased to remove heat from the primary system and reestablish natural circulation. Restart of the RCP= ir pg eted under this guideline if pressurizer level has been recovered. The detailed RCP restart crik:4 wh Laclude consideration of pressurizer water level.

ACIlONS:

Detennine if at least two RCP are running Try to start RCPs I A and IB

]

Detennine if an RCP cannot be started (V

e Determine if natural circulation cannot be verified Establish conditions for starting an RCP

• Start RCPs I A and 111 Refer to Attachment A to verify natural circulation increase dumping steam e

INSIl[UhiENTATION:

Indication for:

RCP ltatus RCP support conditions status RCS pressure Core exit thennocouples temperature Steam pressure RCS hot leg temperature RCS cold leg temperature Position indication for; Condenser steam dump valves SG PORVs chulwjNOMwWvh-0lvpf itsluM7 4 17 REVI$loN: $

STEP DE'SCRIITION TABLE FOR AES-0.1 9J STEP 10 (Cont.)

CONTROISOUIPMENT:

Controls for:

• RCP controls RCP suppon equipment contmis Stearn dump to condenser SG PORVs KNOWLEDGE:

Recognize natural circulation flow Reverse flow through the RCS caused by operartion of RCP 2A and 2B can adversely affect PPJIR natural circulation flow. Therefore, RCP 1 A and IB should be run prior to starting RCP 2A or 2B.

RCP 2A and 2D should not be run unless either RCP 1 A or IB or both are operating.

ADDITIONAL INFORM ATION:

Suppon conditions for staning an RCP O

mspanow.%e 41.wpf 1h12179^

4 18 REVISION: 2

--- - -.. ~

STEP DESCRIPTION TABLE FOR AFR C.1 l

i STEP 11 (Cont.)

ACTIONS:

Determire if 50 pressures are less than (P15) psig Determine if SO pressure is decreasing l

Determine if at least two RCS hot leg temperatures are less than (TOS)*F Determine if RCS hot leg temperatures are decreasing Dump steam to condenser at maximum rate Dump steam at maximum rate using SO PORVs Stop SO depressurization INSTRUMENTATION:

t trxlication for:

SO pressure RCS hot leg temperatures Position indication for:

Condenser steam dump valves SO PORVs CONTROlJEOUIPMENT:

Switches for:

Condenser steam dump valves

• SG PORVs KNOWLEDGE:

N/A ADDITIONAL INFORM ATION:

(PIS) Enter specific value which prevents accumulator nitrogen injection. Refer to background document for AFR C.I.

~ (TVS) Enter specific value which prevents accumulator nitrogen injection Refer to background document for AFR.C.I.

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l STEP 12 STEP-Check if SI Accumulators Should Be Isolated I

PURPOSE:

To prevent accumulator nitrogen from being injected into the RCS IMSIS:

Safety injection accumulators are isolated to prevent nitrogen injection into the RCS when the RCS hot leg temperature criterion is satisfied ((two resistance temperature detectors are used to ene that one resistance temperature detectors is not giving an erroneous reading). Nitrogen could collect in the high places and produce either a "hard' pressurizer bubble or cause gas binding and reduced heat transfer in the SG U tubes. Venting the nitrogen gas from the accumulators also prevents injection.

If it is necessary to vent the nitrogen, the operator should open the vent lines and then cratinue with this guideline.

The method of determining the hot leg temperature criterion of (11)S)*F is discussed in the Step Ikscription Table for Step i1.

ACTIONS:

Detennine if at least two RCS hot leg temperatures are less than (TOS)'F Close all safety injection accumulator isolation valves e

Vent any unisolated accumulators INSTRUMENTATION:

Indication for:

RCS hot leg temperature Safety injection accumulator isolation valve position Safety injection accumulator vent valve position e

CONTRQ1/EOUIPMENT:

Controls for:

Safety injection accumulator isolation valve Safety injection accumulator vent valve KNOWI4DfA:

N/A ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:

(TUS) Enter specific value which prevents accumulator nitrogen injection. Refer to the Background Document for AFR-C.I.

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STEP 18 NOTE NOTE-RCPs I A and IB should be run to provide normal PRZR spray PURPOSE:

To inform the operator that an RCP should be run in loops I A and IB to provide pressurizer spray BASIS:

Subsequent steps require operator actions to control RCS pressure. 'Ihe preferred means of control is normal pressurizer spray since this conserves reactor coolant inventory. An RCP should be run in one of the loops with spray line connections, if possible.

In addition, operation of either RCP 1 A or RCP IB precludes the possibility of developing reverse flow through the PRHR HX, which can potentially lead to the degradation of the PRHR as a heat sink. When any RCP is operating, either RCP 1 A or IB shall be operating.

ACTIONS:

N/A INSTRUMENTATION:

N/A p)

CONTROL >EOUIPMENT:

N/A KNOWLEDGE:

If an RCP in a loop with a ruptured SG is started, steam flow from that SG via a secondary side break will increase. Although this.may increase radiological releases due to steam relief, it will also reduce accumulation of water in the SG and decrease the possibility of overfill. Consequently, for such multiple failure events in which SG overfill appears imminent, starting an RCP in the affected loop may be beneficial.

ADDmONAL INFORMATION:

Which RCPs can provide spray and the prefe:Ted order of operation

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STEP DESCRIPTION TABLE FOR AE.3 STEP 18 SJEE:

Check If An RCP Should Be Staned PURPOSE:

To establish forced coolant flow, if possible IlASlS:

RCP operation is preferred to provide normal pressurizer spray and to ensure homogeneous fluid temperatures and boron concentrations. His step provides guidance on establishing conditions for starting an RCP to prevent RCP damage and minimize any penurbations in RCS conditions. Rese include RCS subcooling to prevent cavitation at the pump suction during startup and pressuri*er level to minimize changes in RCS pressure and provide reactor coolant inventory trends. Normal RCP startup requirements, such as RCP cooling, should also be enforced to prevent pump damage. It should be noted that if the PRiiR is not isolated, then PRiiR flow must be throttled to avoid an excessive cooldown following reactor coolant pump restart.

If all RCPs are stopped and none can be started, the operator should monitor system conditions to verify natural circulation flow. He conditions indicative of natural circulation are provided as Attachment A and include RCS subcooling, stable or decreasing core exit thermocouples, and cold leg temperatures in the active loops approximately equal to saturation at the associated SG pressure.

De cold leg temperature may be less than the saturation at the associated SG pressure due to PRilR operation or due to colder CVS flow entering the cold leg loop upstream of the temperature instrumentation.

O ACTIONJi:

Check RCP status Check RCS subcooling Check pressurizer level Establish conditions for starting an RCP Stan one RCP Stop all but one RCP i

l Increase steam flow from intact SGs l

INSTRUMENTATION:

i Indication for:

Pressurizer level RCP status RCP support conditions status l

RCS subcooling Core exit thermocouples e

Wide range RCS pressure RCS toop flow l

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