ML20198R003
| ML20198R003 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Point Beach  |
| Issue date: | 06/04/1997 |
| From: | Devitto R, Paul R NRC OFFICE OF ENFORCEMENT (OE), NRC OFFICE OF INVESTIGATIONS (OI) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20198Q977 | List: |
| References | |
| 3-97-008, 3-97-8, NUDOCS 9711130113 | |
| Download: ML20198R003 (22) | |
Text
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". CASE No. 3-97-008
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United States , j l Nuclear Regulatory Commission .....
l Report of Investigation l
) POINT BEACH NUCLEAR PLANT f
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l Alleged Material False Statements Regarding Availability of Plant Cooling Systems By l Plant Management to the NRC
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Office of Investigations Reported by 01: RIII Y~
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Title:
POINT BEACH NUCLEAR PLANT
. ALLEGED HATERIAL FALSE STATEMENT REGARDING AVAILABILITY--
0F PLANT COOLING SYSTEMS BY PLANT MANAGEMENT TO THE NRC Licensee: Case No.: -3 97 008 Wisconsin Electric Power Company- - Report Date: June 4, 1997.
231 W. Michigan Street Hilwaukee, WI 53201 Control Office: .01:RIII '
Docket No.:. 50 266/50 301 _
Status: CLOSED -
7 Reported by: Reviewed and Approved by:
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,Y , / YpC. 0 Richard L. DeVitto, Special Agent- Richard C. Paul, Director
.0ffice of Investigations Office of-Investigations Field Office. Region III Field Office. Region III Particioatina Personnel :
Anthony-HcMurtray. Senior Resident Inspector.
Point Beach Nuclear Plant WAO'ING
-D FhNAEPLACE!INTH )UBL[C :UM tlT OR CUSS THE C NT INTS DF T ilS REPOR" Of INVESTI ION OLTSIDE!N W::THOUT AUTfj0RIT/ 0F TfiE APP 80 /ING Ff < IAL OF'TH]S R . PORT. ' UNAUTHORIZED DISCLOSURE! IN MaY/RE ULT
.I ADVERSE ADrilNISTRAT::yE 4CTION AND/OR ( MI L j
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SYNOPSIS .
This investigation was initiated by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), Office of Investigations (01), Region III (RIII), on February 24, 1997, 1 to determine if the Point Beach Nuclear Plant (PBNP), plant manager, had
. deliberately omitted material safety related information in the licensee's February 20, 1997 request-for enforcement discretion and in subsequent telephone conferences with the NRC, Specifically, the licensee had requested an exemotion to certain plant' technical specifications, due to the inopera)ility of certain service water-and component cooling water (CCW) pumps, and to mafntain the plant in a hot shutdown condition, Based on evidence developed during the course of this investigation, it is concluded that the plant manager willfully made a material false statement by omission with regard to the plant's capability to cross connect the Unit I and Unit 2 CCW systems should the system in one unit fail, 4
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TABLE OF CONTENTS Page SYN 0PSIS.............................................................. 1 LIST OF INTERVIEWEES.................................................. 5 y DETAILS OF INVESTIGATION.............................................. 7 Appl i cabl e Regul a ti ons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 Pur mse of Investigation......................................... 7 B a c (g ro u nd . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 Coordination with Regional Staf f. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 Coordination with Regional Counsel............................... 8 Allegation (Alleged Material False Statement Regarding Availability of Plant Cooling systems by Plant Management to the NRC).............................. ......... 8 Evidence................................................. 8 Age nt ' s An al ys i s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 Concl u si on . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION.............................................. 17 LIST OF EXHIBITS...................................................... 19 f\
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LIST OF INTERVIEWEES
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-CAYIA Alfred J., Plant Manager, Point Beach Nuclear ,
Plant (PBNP)................................................... 15 HARVEY, Robert J., Shift Superintendent, PBNP.................... 11 JOHNSON, Douglas F., Manager of Regulatory Services & Licensing, Wisconsin Electric Power Company (WEPC)........................ 14 MALAN0WSKI. Thomas G., Senior Project Engineer of Licensing, WEPC.'......................................................... 13 ZILLER. Erich Shift Outage Coordinator. PBNP.................... 12
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DETAILS OF INVESTIGATION-
- ~ Acolicable Reaulat' ions 10 CFR 50.9: 1 Completeness and accuracy.ot-information (1997_ Edition)'
10 CFR 50,5: Deliberate misconduct--(1997 Edition) 118 USC-1001:-= Statements or. entries generally (1997 Edition)
Puroose of Investiaation This investigation was' initiated by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), Office of Investigations _ (01), Region III (RIII), on February 24, 1997, to determine if Alfred CAYIA, Point Beach Nuclear Plant (PBNP), plant manager,
= had deliberately omitted material safety related information in the licensee's- -
% February 20, 1997 request for a Notice of Enforcement = Discretion (NOED) and inL -
subsequent telephone conferences with the NRC, Specifically, the licensee had
> requested an exemption to certain plant technical specifications, due to the inoperability of certain service water and component cooling water'(CCW)-
pumps, and to maintain the plant in a hot shutdown condition (Exhibit-1) .
Backaround On February 20, 1997. CAYIA through Douglas .)0HNSON. PBNP Manager of .
Regulatory Services.and Licensing, requested in a written letter to the NRC
-_( faxed February 20, 1997, 4:13 p.m. CST) to keep the plant in hot shutdown E condition, instead of-going to cold shutdown.as required by plant technical specifications, This exemption was requested to allow plant repairs to i certain' service water and component cooling water pumps that-were not: complete.
(Exhibit 2),
AGENT'S NOTE: The first draft of the ' request for a NOED dated:
February 19, 1997, was prepared with CAYIA as the signer (Exhibit 3).
L The N0ED had-been verbally _ granted earlier by the NRC in a telephonic.
- conference call .on February 19,1997, at 6:30 p.m. and the NRC exercised
-discretion fromLenforcement from February 19,71997, 6:30 p.m. -until- -
. February 21,12iOO p.m (Exhibit 4. - p. 3). -However,=during telephone--
conversations with the NRC - and later in the written request for the NOED, CAYIA had committed to several' comunsatory measures, which included that they had the ability to cross connect tw Unit 1 and Unit 2 component cooling water systems should the system in one unit fail (Exhibit 5), However, on February 20,11997, Erich ZILLER, PBNP shift outage coordinator, at a 6:45-a,m, plantistaff meeting advised CAYIA that the component water cooling cross-
. connect valves would be very hard to open due to torquing _down on those valves c
over the years to prevent cross system leakage : CAYIA instructed ZILLER, at
-this February 20, 1997 meetingc to write a condition report detailing the (situation (Exhibit.6). ZILLER stated, in the condition report that "these
,a , valves have never been positioned since being over torqued, and have never N.T FOR P LI DI CL SURE W THOUT ROV L OF
/ FI LD CyFI E D' IRE T R. FI 0F IN ST AT N, GI L II Case.No. 3 97 008 .
l-been utilized to perform their design functi6n" (Exhibit 7), CAYIA failed to notify the NRC of the questionable operability of these valves, until it was brought up as an issue by the NRC during a February 21, 1997 (2:00 3,m.)
I telephone cortference call. However, when the NRC asked CAYIA when le became l
aware of the condition, he erroneously stated it was on February 21,1997, and ,
said he would update the compensatory measures. Later, that same day (February 21, 1997, sometime between 3:00 4:00 p.m.), CAYIA telephonically contacted the NRC and indicated that he believed the CCW cross connect system valve would not close after being opened. However, CAYIA never amended the N0ED to reflect this change in the compensatory measures (Exhibits 810).
Coordination with Reaional Staff On April 11,1997, 01:RIII Special Agent Richard L. DeVitto and 01 Field Office Director Richard C. Paul attended a meeting convened by John GROBE, Deputy Director, Division of Reactor Projects (DRP). Also in attendance was Bruce BERSON, Regional Counsel, Jim McCORMICK BARGER and Michael KUNOWSKI.
.DRP. The meeting was also tele conferenced with Anthony McHURTRAY, PBNP Senior Resident Ins)ector, James LIEBERMAN, Director, Office of Enforcement and Linda GUNDRUH, )roject Manager, Headquarters Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (HNRR). The meeting was held to determine whether the possible inoperability of the cross connect valves of the CCW system was material. It was determined that the possible inoperabilit" condition of the valves would have changed the compensatory measures that tile NRC had relied upon to issue the N0ED and was a materiality issue.
Coordination with Reaional Counsel c
On February 24, 1997, a RIII Allegation Review Board (ARB) was convened and it was requested that 01 initiate an investigation into this matter. The ARB set the priority of this investigation as high. During a subsequent meeting on A)ril 11, 1997, in which BERSON, RIII Counsel, was present, he concurred that tie licensee's apparent intentional failure to make the proper notification to the NRC regarding the CCW system's possible inoperability, was material and clearly a violation of applicable NRC rules and regulations regarding the completeness and accuracy of information.
Alleaation: Alleged Material False Statements Regarding Availability of Plant Cooling Systems By Plant Management to the NRC Evidence q Interview of Robert J. HARVEY (Exhibit 11J HARVEY, PENP shift superintendent, was interviewed by 01:RIII on March 4, 1997, at the PBNP concerning his knowledge of the events surrounding the N0ED.
HARVEY acknowledged that he was present at either Wednesday or Thursday's (February 19 or 20th, 1997) morning manager's briefing, when the N0ED was discussed. HARVEY recalled that ZILLER said that the valves were over torqued and he (ZILLER) was concerned whether that was.taken into consideration or not. HARVEY said that he recalled that probably in 1981. when he was an
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auxiliary operator, he had been involved in ever. torquing the vah or at least putting a large torque on them. HARVEY stated that, at that ura, CAYIA asked that a condition report be written. HARVEY related that ZILLER trought him the condition report later that afternoon-and that he reviewed and signed it (signed and dated by HARVEY, February 20, 1997) (Exhibit 11, pp. 10 11),
HARVEY, upon being shown a copy of the~ condition report (Exhibit 7),
acknowledged his signature of February 20. 1997. HARVEY said that he 'X'd the
, box that indicated, is the structure, system or component operable, but further analysis required to strengthen initial operability call. HARVEY described ZILLER's condition report to summarize that the two cross connect valves that go between the two systems, that's CC722 alpha and bravo, to have been historically grossly over torqued in the shut direction, Furthermore, that during one of these events, it was over torqued to the point where a body to body leak occurred. HARVEY indicated that he had not actually examined the system himself, however, he was personally aware of the condition of the valves. HARVEY admitted he had looked at them within the last two months. HARVEY said he didn't recall discussing the condition of the valves at any other meeting prior to that time. HARVEY denied ever discussing with CAYIA the condition of the valves. HARVEY said that because he didn't think there was a problem with operability of the valves, no other action was required of him (Exhibit 11, pp. 14 19).
HARVEY explained that to the best of his knowledge, he didn't know of the valves being opened in the 17 years he has been at the plant. HARVEY said that he didn't recall for sure what time it wat on the 20th (February), he signed off on the condition report, but he thought about "three ish" in the afternoon. HARVEY didn't recall having any further discussions with CAYIA regarding the condition report on February 21 or subsequent to his sign off (Exhibit 11, pp. 19 22).
Ir.terview of ZILLER (Exhibit 12) l ZILLER. the PBNP shift outage coordinator, was interviewed by 01:RIII on l March 4,1997, at the PBNP concerning his knowledge of the events surrounding the N0ED.
- ZILLER acknowledged that he didn't have anything to do with supplying information for the N0ED however, he was asked by JOHNSON, who had some
! concerns, if he thought applying for the N0ED was a wise thing to do. ZILLER said that had happened on the 19th of February around "3:30 or quarter to four." ZILLER stated that he was familiar with the design of the original CCW system at the PBNP (Exhibit 12, pp. 9 11).
ZILLER confirmed that the condition report was a result of the 6:45 morning meeting of the 20th (February), when he first heard what contingency actions i the com3any was taking credit for under the N0ED. ZILLER indicateo that the i system lad been a concern of his, to the point, that he had voiced verbal
! concern based on his experience over the years. ZILLER said they had a period of time where they had some cross leakage and in order to stop it, he had to use a persuader on the hand wheel of the discharge connect and that two of
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them hanging on this targe valve persuader were unable to~ move the hand wheel even a millimeter, "the thing was rock solid", ZILLER confirmed that the ,
torquing incident was at least 5 or more years old and that it might have been in the 1989 time frame. ZILLER said he was concerned that there may have been a situation where the valves were perhaps over torqued, ZILLER recalled there ,
was a preponderance of people present at the 6:45 morning meeting: the NRC resident, CAYIA and basically all the department heads, ZILLER said the valves may_have been over torqued and that they were not going to open them.
AGENT NOTE: On review of his statement, ZILLER took exception with the statement, "they're not going to open" (the valves), however, upon playing the tape cassette of this recording, that is what he said.
ZILLER recalled that he knew of no test that was ever done that o>ened those valves. ZILLER explained that in voicing his o) inion, it had not11ng to do with the fact that the valves may not open, ratwr that they may not achieve leak tightness during their attempts to re close them (Exhibit 12, pp.1216),
ZILLER acknowledged that when he voiced his concern at the 6:45 meeting about the valves positioning, it was in front of the whole body, ZILLE't said that he felt comfortable using the term over torquing. ZILLER said he wrote the condition report and completed it late on the afternoon of the 20th and hended a copy to Felicia HENESSEY, his boss. ZILLER indicated,that he didn't bother taking the condition report up to the work control center until the following morning, because he did not view it as an immediate operability concern.
ZILLER believed that the valves-were capable of being opened, because they were gate valves and generally tako less opening force. ZILLER said he did not consider that fact there was potential damage (to the valves), until he found out the extent of over torquing after the 6:45 meeting on the morning of the 20th. ZILLER said he was wrong about the potential damage to the stems of the valves and that radiography showed very good definition, and there was no apparent image (Exhibit 12, pp.18 22),
ZILLER stated that he attended the 6:45 morning meeting on the 21st of February. ZILLER recalled that just before that meeting, he bumped into HARVEY and that HARVEY had signed the condition report.
AGENT's NOTE: HARVEY acknowleoged he had signed and dated the condition report. February 20, 1997.
ZILLER said the condition report was not discussed at the February 21, 1977 morning meeting. ZILLER recalled he may have advised CAYIA on or subsequent to February 21, 1997, that the condition report was in the system, but that was about the extent of any exchange between them. ZILLER said CAYIA already knew his concerns with the amalitude he had expressed verbally, during the 6:45 meeting the former day (Exhibit 12, pp. 27 30),
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I Interview of Thomas G. MALAN0WSKI (Exhibit 13) c HALANOWSKI, a Wisconsin Electric Power Company (WEPC) Senior Project Engineer for Licensing, was interviewed by 01:RIII on March 4,1997, at the PBNP concerning his knowledge of the events surrounding the N0ED.
MALAN0WSKI acknowledged that he prepared the first draft of the N0ED on February 19, 1997, based on notes and telephone conversations that they had with the NRC on February 19, 1997 (Exhibit 3). MALAN0WSKI said he posted the draft N0ED onto the local network system on Wednesday evening (February 19, 1997), so it could be accessed by others and revised. MALAN0WSKI indicated that there was no mechanism for concurrence or a concurrence page associated with the NOED (Exhibit 13, pp. 8 12).
MALAF0WSKI acknowledged that the final N0ED was a combination of efforts and inaut from others in the plant, which was subsequently signed off by JOHNSON.
HA_AN0WSKI recalled that the February 19, 1997, tele > hone conference with the NRC was initiated by WEPC and dealt with the inopera)ility of the CCW pump and service water pump and it proceeded into a request for enforcement discretion.
MALAN0WSKI identified CAYIA as the principal leader of the discussions with the NRC during this February 19, 1997 telephone conference (Exhibit 13, pp.
13 15).
MALAN0WSKI denied (ny specific knowledge of the condition of the CCW cross-connect valves, until it was brought up in another telephone conference with the NRC on February 21, 1997. MALAN0WSKI recalled, that during this call, that CAYIA had discussed with the NRC the status of repairs and that Jim McCORMICK BARGER of the NRC began asking questions about how long the condition with the valves had existed (Exhibit 13, pp.18 21).
Interview of JOHNSON (Exhibit 14)
JOHNSON, WEPC Manager of Regulatory Services and Licensing, was interviewed by 01:RIII on March 4.1997, at the PBNP cencerning his knowledge of the events surrounding the N0ED.
JOHNSON identified the N0ED (Exhibit 2) as the document that he was the primary reviewer and approver on February 20, 1997, at approximately 3:30 p.m.
JOHNSON said that the original draft (Exhibit 3) of the 10ED was written by MALAN0WSKI on the evening of February 19. 1997 and that JOHNSON assumed responsioility for the N0ED on February 20, 1997 (Exhibit 14, pp. 10 11),
JOHNSON recalled that CAYIA had reviewed the draft N0ED on at least two occasions on February 20, 1997, sometime between the hours of 1:30 through 3:00 p.m.. JOHNSON said that the N0ED was then faxed to the NRC by 4:00 p.m..
JOHNSON recalled that discussions regarding the N0ED had begun sometime on February 18. 1997, and that they took place in CAYIA's office and in the front office building (Exhibit 14. pp. 14 18).
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JOHNSON acknowledged that he was present with Gthers at the February 19, 1997 (a'a proximately 4:00 p.m.) conference call with the NRC and that CAYIA had ta(en the lead during the discussions. JOHNSON said that during this ,
conference call there were discussions regarding the cross connect between Unit 1 and 2 in the CCW system and that CAYIA made commitments to the plant's capabilities to cross connect the CCW system. However, there was no -
discussion whatsoever, regarding the condition of the CCW cross connect valves. (Exhibit 14, pp.19 22).
JOHNSON acknowledged that there was no concurrence page for the NOED and no way to reconstruct who had reviewed or made chbnges to the original N0ED (Exhibit 14, p. 23).
JOHNSON stated that the first time the condition report (Exhibit 7) was brought to his attention was at a manager's staff meeting at 1:00 p.m. on February 21, 1997. The meeting dealt with emerging issues identified in the condition report. JOHNSON said that he had several discussions with CAYIA subsequent to the meeting of February 21, 1997, 1:00 p.m., and in fact, he admitted spending most of the afternoon with CAYIA. JOHNSON denied having any knowledge that the cross connect valves were o/er torqued prior to the manager's staff meeting of February 21, 1997, at 1:00 p.m. (Exhibit 14, pp.
24 29).
JOHNSON denied attending the 6:45 a.m. daily staff meeting for February 19, 20 or 21 (1997). JOHNSON admitted to sending a representative to the meetings identified as Terry GUAY. JOHNSON denied discussing with ZILLER the condition of the cross connect valves, however, he did recall asking ZILLER for some advice on February 18 or 19, regarding whether he (ZILLER) thought it was a good idea keeping the plant in a hot shutdown condition. 10HNSON also denied having any discussions with HARVEY at anytime the week of February 17.
specifically, about the condition report. JOHNSON also denied having any discussions with CAYIA on February 20, regarding the condition report on the CCW cross connect system (Exhibit 14, pp. 30 32).
Interview of CAYIA (Exhibit 15)
CAYIA. PBNP plant manager, was interviewed by 01:RIII on March 5,1997, at the PBNP concerning his knowledge of the events surrounding the NOED.
CAYIA stated that he first saw a copy of the NOED on the afternoon of February 20, 1997, however, he recalled seeing an earlier draft version, which was left on his chair. CAYIA denied seeing MALAN0WSKI's draft version (Exhibit 3).
AGENT'S RJTE: This chronology of events was confirmed by JOHNSON in his statement. JOHNSON was cuoted as saying that on February 20. 1997. "So I walkec the document into CAYIA's office.
He was not in his office, so I laid the letter on his chair with a note asking him to review it" (Exhibit 14, p. 14).
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CAYIA was unable to answer why the N0ED's first draft (Exhibit 3) had hin as the authorized signer and the later edition submitted to the NRC had JOHNSON
-* as the authorized signer, CAYIA acknowledged that he had provided comments to.
the NOED as they went through the draft and final versions. CAYIA believed that the NOED pre)aration process began sometime on Fabruary 19, 1997, with
, some discussions aeginning possibly late on February 18, 1997. CAYIA admitted that he played a lead role in providing oversight for the N0ED action (Exhibit 15, pp. 11 15), s t
CAYIA admitted that at the 6:45 a.m. Plant Status Update Meeting at least a f minimum of 15 people were known to attend, with at times a representative from the Regulatory Services Group. CAYIA said that at the February 19, 1997.
Plant Status Update Meeting, that he did not believe that any issues relative to the operability of the CCW system and the possibility the valves had been over torqued had come up as an issue. CAYIA indicated that he was not aware of any concurrence page associated with the N0ED (Exhibit 15, pp. 16 19),
CAYIA said that as discussions progressed on February 19, 1997, with their working group on the pros and cons for either maintaining the plant in its current condition, or complyina with the technical specifications, no mention of the cross connect system valves being over torqued ever came up (Exhibit 15, pp. 22 24).
CAYIA explained that the decision to seek enforcement discretion was a collective recommendation of the working group and subsequently the manager's su>ervisory staff on site review committee. CAYIA described his role in a Fearuary 19, 1997 conference call to the NRC as a spokesperson. CAYIA indicated that JOH!lSON and others were present during the call and that the call was placed to seek enforcement discretion from the NRC. CAYIA said that during this call. it was stated that they had as compensatory measures, specifically, the capability of cross connecting component dater coling.
CAYIA continued by saying that he would require auxiliary operators to go to the component water cooling system and locate the valves that would have to be o>erated, if'the abnormal operating pressure were im)1emented. CAYIA said tlat, at the time of this call (February 19, 1997), le had no knowledge as to when those valves had been opened last (Exhibit 15, pp. 28 33).
CAYIA admitted that the first time he became aware of a potential problem with the cross connect valves was at the 6:45 a.m. staff meeting on February 20, 1997. CAYIA said that ZILLER mentioned that the valves had been shut hard in the past to stop a problem with cross leakage through the valves. CAYlA advised that he told ZILLER to write a condition report. CAYIA indicated that HARVEY was also present at the 6:45 a.m. meeting of February 20,1997, and that HARVEY had commented that they had been shut since the early eighties.
CAYIA s id that the first time he had seen ZILLER's condition re> ort was sometime on the morning of February 21, 1997. CAYIA explained tlat he was surprised by the way the information was characterized in the report and stated. "this did draw on the question of whether or not the valves could ultimately he o >ened". CAYIA said that he didn't recollect whether he had any discussions wit 1 anyone from the NRC regarding this condition, because the l station doesn't rely on him to notify e NRC o every single condition report NOT F0 P LIC Sci,. SUR TH UT PR <
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l that comes in. CAYIA belic,ved that the NRC was aware cf the condititn, because there was an NRC inspector present at the 6:45 a.m. meeting vhen ,
ZILLER made the statement (Exhibit 15, pp. 36 43), -
j CAYIA acknowledged that he was aware that they would have to clarify the l situation relative to the compensatory measures, as stated in the N0ED, and * '
their capability to the cross connect capability for abnormal conditions. l CAYIA said, in his view, that the original safety basis for maintaining the plant in a condition above 350 degrees to conduct the repair of the CCW pump did not change. CAYIA believed that ZILLER's condition report that the valves were over torqued had not changed his feelings on the condition, because they were gate valves and CAYIA had personal experience that the valves were torqued shut using a wheel wrench and could be opened (Exhibit 15, pp. 43 45).
CAYIA said that it was his belief that whether or not the cross connect valves were either in the original design basis ir the plant or not, would have not changed the basis which the enforcement discretion was requested. CAYIA advised that subs'e'quent radiographs (February 21 or 22, 1997) of the valves disclosed that the stem was perfectly straight and increased his belief that the valves were onreble and could be opened (Exhibit 15, pp. 48 56). CAYIA admitted that he lad been asked to review the NOED by JOHNSON.
CAYIA said that the cross connect capability was a viable and normal casualty response function and there was no doubt in his mind that they (the valves) would open (Exhibit 15, pp. 58 62).
CAYIA believed that even though ZILLER had described the valves as being torqued hard, it did not strike him as being that unusual, because tney were large gate valves. CAYIA indicated that he believed that he was at the 6:45 morning meeting on February 21, 1997, but didn't believe that the condition report was discussed (Exhibit 15, p. 63).
Aaent's Analysis After a careful analysis of the evidence developed during tN course of this investigation, it was determined that CAYIA became aware of the potential integrity problem (over torquing) associated with the CCW cross connect valves on February 20, 1996, while attending the 6:45 a.m. staff meeting. CAY!A acknowledged that ZILLER had identified, at this meeting, that CCW cross-connect valves had a history of being grossly over torqued in the shut direction. Based on tnis operability issue, CAYIA requested ZILLER report his f ~ndings in a condi#. ion report for follow up evaluation by Engineering and Operations personnel. However, CAYIA chose to omit these facts to the NRC and failed to amend the N0ED's compensatory measures. The condition of these valves was determined to be material by the NRC and if disclosed may have affected the terms and conditions of the NOED.
NOT O PIBLI D CLOS RE WITH0 PPR VA 0F FC IR T R, 0 FIC- 0F NVE TIGA I S. EG Ot
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.II Case No. 3 97-008 14 i - _ _ _ -
Conclusion ,_
Based on evidence developed during the course of this investigation, it is concluded that CAYIA made a willful material false statement by omission with i
regard to the plant's capability to cross connect the Unit -1 and Unit 2 CCW systems should the system in one Unit fail.
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Case No.23 97 008 ,
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SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION
- On May 20, 1997, William P. SELLERS, Esq,, Senior Legal Advisor for --
' -Regulatory Enforcement, Freud Section, Criminal Division. U.S. Department of Justice, Bond Building,- Room 2428,-1400 New York Ave, N.W., Washington, DC
, 20005, was apprised of the results of the investigation. Mr SELLERS _ advised that, in his view, the case did not= warrant prosecution and rendered an oral declination.
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LIST OF EXHIBITS Exhibit-No; _Descriotion 0
1- Investigation Status Record (ISR), dated-February 24, 1997.
2 February 20, 1997, Notice of Enforcement Discretion (NOED). This exhibit corresmnds to Exhibit 'A' of the transcribed interviews -
of HARVEY, ZIL.ER, HALANOWSKI, JOHNSON and CAYIA.
3 February 19, 1997, Draft NOED. This exhibit corresponds to Exhibit 'C' of the transcribed interview of CAYIA.
4 March 3, 1997 NRC response to PBNP's NOED, 5 John GROBE, Deputy Director DRP, March 3,1997, Memo to File, regarding CAYIA and the N0ED.
6 Charles KELLER, Resident Inspector PBNP, March 6,1997, Memo to File, regarding CCW cross connect valve issue and June 3,1997 Addendum.
7 Erich ZILLER's February 20, 1997, PBNP Condition Report regarding CCW cross connect valves. This exhibit corres znds to Exhibit 'B' of the transcribed interviews of HARVEY, ZILLER, HALANOWSKI, JOHNSON and CAYIA. -
8 James McCORMICK BARGER, DRP, February 24, 1997, Memo to-File, regarding telephone conversations with CAYIA.
9 Linda GUNDRUM, Project Manager, HNRR, March 3, 1997, E Mail Memo, regardin0 N0ED conference calls.
10 Patrick LOUDEN, Resident Inspector PBNP, March 6, 1997 Memo to File, regarding his involvement with the N0ED.
11 Sworn statement of HARVEY, dated March 4, 1997. .
I 12 Sworn statement of ZILLER, dated March 4,1997.
13 Sworn statement of MALAN0WSKI, dated March 4, 1997.
14 Sworn statement of JOHNSON, dated March 4, 1997.
15 Sworn statement of CAYIA, dated March 5, 1997.
1 / 0 F0 P;BLI DIS LOSUR WI H0 AP R0 VAL JF I ELD 0 FI E IRCTf,OFICETFIN,ESIGATINS. 'G N1 I C se o. 3 7 00 9
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i cAGEND. 3-97-008 EXHIBIT 11
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