ML20198H866

From kanterella
Jump to navigation Jump to search

Forwards RAI Re Util 941229 Response to GL 88-20,Suppl 4, Individual Plant Exam of External Events for Severe Accident Vulnerabilities
ML20198H866
Person / Time
Site: Crane 
Issue date: 01/08/1998
From: Colburn T
NRC (Affiliation Not Assigned)
To: Langenbach J
GENERAL PUBLIC UTILITIES CORP.
References
GL-88-20, TAC-M83685, NUDOCS 9801130411
Download: ML20198H866 (5)


Text

__

Jah ary 8,.1998 Mr. J:mes W. Lcngenbach, V!:e President -

and Director - TMI-1 GPU Nuclear Corporation

. P.O. Box 480 Middletown, PA 17057

SUBJECT:

. REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION FOR THE THREE MILE ISLAND NUCLEAR STATION, UNIT NO.1 (TMI-1), RELATED TO "lNDIVIDUAL PLANT EXAMINATION FOR EXTERNAL EVENTS"(IPEEE) RESPONSE TO GENERIC LETTER 88-20, SUPPLEMENT 4 (TAC NO. M83685)

Cear Mr. Langenbach:

The staff has reviewed your :. ecember 29,1994, submittal in response to Generic Letter (GL) 88-20, Supplement 4, " Individual Plant Examination for Extemal Everits for Severe Accident Vulnerabilities." Based on the review, the staff has determined that the enclosed additional information is needed to complete the review.

We request that you respond to this request for additional information in writing within 60 days receipt of this letter, if you have any questions, please contact me at (301) 415-1402.

Sincerely, Original signed by Timothy G. Colburn, Senior Project Manager Project Directorate I-3 Division of Reactor Projects - 1/II Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Docket No. 50-289

Enclosure:

Request for Additional Information ccw/ enclosure: See next page DISTRIBUTION:

Nb TColburn PUBLIC TClark h' 90k l \\

PDI-3 Reading ACRS BBoger OGC MCunningham RHernan REaton CHehl, RI DOCUMENT NAME: A:\\TMI83685.RAI To receive _ a copy of this document,-indicate in,th,epx:

"C" -. Copy without attachment / enclosure - E" - Copy with attachge$t/le,nclosure "N" - No copy CFFICE PM: POI 3

%lE LA: POI 3 a J/) lf.

U:@4 ~

l l

l NAME TColburn/rst TClark W V REatg@lA)

DATE 01/ 7 /98 01/ S /98 01/Oy98 01/ /99 01/ /98 Official Rdcord Copy

n"nen 7a8%

ll I.l l.lill llill IlII.I em

J.Langenbach Three Mile island Nuclear Station, Unit No.1 cc:

Michael Ross Regiona! Administrator, Region I Director, O&M; TMI U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission GPU Nuclear Corporation 475 Allendale Road P.O. Box 480 King of Prussia, PA 19406 Middletown, PA 17057 Robert B. Borsum John C. Fomicola B&W Nuclear Technologies Director, Planning and Suite 525 Regulatory Affairs -

1700 Rockville Pike GPU Nuclear Corporation Rockville, MD 20852-100 interpace Parkway Parsippany, NJ 07054 William Domsifs, Acting Director Bureau of Radiaticn Protection Jack S. Wetmore Pennsylvania Depa iment of Manager: TMl Regulatory Affairs Envi;onmental Resources GPU Nuclear Corporation P.O. Box 2063 P.O. Box 480 Harrisburg, PA 17120 Middletown, PA 17057 Dr. Judith Johnsrud l

Emest L. Blake, Jr., Esquire National Energy Committee Shaw, Pittman, Potts & Trowbridge Sierra Club 2300 N Street, NW.

433 Orlando Avenue Washington, DC 20037 State College, PA 16803 Chairman Peter W. Eselgroth, Region 1 -

Board of County Commissioners U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission of Dauphin County 475 Allendale Road Dauphin County Courthouse King of Prussia, PA 19406

)

Harrisburg, PA 17120 l

Cnairman Board of Supervmors of Londonderry Township i

R.D. #1, Geyers Church Road Middletown, PA 1','057 Wayne L. Schmidt Senior Resident inspector (TMI-1)

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission P.O. Box 311 Middletown, PA 17057

THREE MILE ISLAND NUCI FAR STATION. UNIT 1 -

REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION (RAll ON IPEEE SUBMITTAL Fire avants 1.

- Fire propagation between fire zones AIT-FZ-1 and AIT-FZ 1a in the air intake tunnel (AIT) -

was ana yzed in Section 4.3.2 Both of these zonas_ wore screened due to the presence of automatic suppression and a low combustible loading. However, the submittal indicates that each of these fire zones is equipped with an automatic Halon explosion suppression system which is actuated by ultraviolet or pressure detectors. in addition, each of these areas is equipped with an automatic deluge system. What hazard is the Halon suppression system designed to protect? Provide an analysis of the particular hazard this system is designed to protect.

2.

Fire zone CB-FA-2f (East Battery Room) is one of the eight fire zones that survived screening and were included as prirt of the detailed analysis.. In the detailed analysis of the East Battery Room, a 1E cable contained in a cotMult is credited with protecting the cable from damage and dissipating heet from the fire. T his is not a valid assumption. - Please i

reanalyze fire zone CB-FA-2f without crediting the conduit for protecting the 1E cable.

L 3.

The relay room (CB-FA 3d)'is one of five areas in the plant with combustible loading l

greater than 80,000 Btu / square feet. As a result, a fire severity factor of 0.5 (ane of every two fires would be significant enough te cause significant damage to some support cables

- in the area in addition to damaging all equipment physically located in the area) was used for the detailed modeling step of the analysis, in addition to the fire severity factor, creoit g

was given for automatic suppression. For all other areas, no credit was taken for automatic suppression.' The application of both a severity factor, which accounts for the success of automatic and/or manual suppression, and credit for automatic suppression is double cnunting credit for automatic suppression. Please revise the analysis of the relay room without credit for automatic suppression or without the use of a severity factor, Seismic Events

!~

l 1,

in Section 3.1.1.5 of the submittal, the seismic capacities of critical buildings are listed based on the analyses performed by EQE Intemational. Considering the ralatively low safe shutdown earthquake (SSE) value of 0.12g and the age of construction, the tabulated fragility values seem to be too high - No information ir provided in the submittal regarding the seismic input spectra structural response analysis and/or the fragility

-j

- evaluation methodclogies. To confirm the adequacy of the fragility evaluation results, please provide Reference 3.1 on the fragility evaluation.: If information regarding the input response spectra, as well as the analysis methods and assumptions of the soil-structure interaction (SSI) analyres, is not included in Reference 3.1,' please ' provide this

. Information alco.

L 1

=

Enclosure-

1,.

2-2.

In tho' submittal, no information is provided regarding the evaluation procedures for j

component and equipment fragilities. To provide confidence on the adequacy of the l

L component fragility values, please provide the detailed calculations and their results for the following components:

a.

Train B ES bus 480V (median = 0.31g) b.

Condensate storage tank (median = 1.1g) c.

Borated water storage tank (median = 0.84g) d.

Decay heat removal heat exchanger DH-C-1 A (median = 0.64g)

. 3.

In Section 3.1.4.1, it is stated that all relays that cannot pass any seismic screening criteria will be replaced during an upcoming rafueling outage. Please provide the list of the relays to be replaced, as well as a brief description of the current status for each of these relays.

4.

In Section 7.2 of the submittal a number of plant improvements were suggested, but were not accounted for in the seismic analysis. These items include the following:

a.

Losd Centers 1P,1R,1S, and 1T gusset weld reinforcements, b.

Modification of the control room ceiling, c.

Restraining of the penetration pressurization tank PP-T-1 A to prevent potential impact on the purge line isolation valve,

' d.

Modification of the suppor;a for the fuel oil tanks and batteries for the diesel-driven fire pumps, e.

Modification of the anchorage for the decay heet service heat exchangers, and f.

Anchoring of the air receiver pedestals to the floor of the Class 1E emergency diesel generator, s

- Please describe the carrent status of these suggested improvements. For each improvement, please state whether a.

it was implemented and the date of impi; mentation, or b.

It will be implemented and the planned date of implementauon, or j

c.

It has been dropped from consideration and the reason why it was dropped.

1 i

,r--

lr,~.,

,-am r

m

. ~

8 5.-

it is stated in Section 6.3.2 of NUREG-1407 that "The effects of seismically ir'duced extemal flooding and intemal flooding on plant safety should be included." However, seismically induced floods are not discussed in the IPEEE submittal. Please provide the information relevant to seismically induced floods at TMI-1, as requested in Section 6.3.2 of NUREG 1407.

HEOs There are no RAls in this area.

l l'