ML20198H570

Requests Addl Info,Per NRC Review of Util 860515 Response to Confirmatory Action Ltr 86-10.Util Should Be Prepared to Discuss Items on Encl List at 860519 Meeting & follow-up W/Written Supplemental Response

ML20198H570
Person / Time
Site:	Pilgrim
Issue date:	05/16/1986
From:	Kane W NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
To:	Harrington W BOSTON EDISON CO.
References
CAL-86-10, NUDOCS 8605300498
Download: ML20198H570 (4)

Text

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MAY 101986 Docket Nc. 50-2-33 Boston Edison Company M/C Nuclear ATTN: Mr. Williaa D. Ha rrington Senior Vice President, Nuclear 800 Boylston Street Boston, Massachusetts 02199 Gentlemen:

Subject:

Elaston Edison Response to Confirmatory Action Letter No. 86-10 We have received your response, dated May 15, 1986, to NRC Confimatory Action Letter (CAL) No. 86-10. After reviewing that response, we have concluded that we will need certain additional information before we car, complete our evalua-tion of your restart request.

As part of the discussions at our meeting on May 19, please be prepared to dis-cuss those items identified in the attachment to this letter and follow that with a written supplemental response. We will need to receive the supplemental response prior to making a final decision on your restart request. Finally, please notify us promptly if you find that the May 19, 1986 meeting is too early for you to address these items adequately.

Thank you for your cooperation.

Sincerely, l

Original S gned syg William Kane, Deputy Director Division of Reactor Projects cc w/ encl:

L. Oxsen, Vice President, Nuclear Operations C. J. Mathis, Station Manager Joanne Shawell, Assistant Attorney General Paul Levy, Chairman, Department of Public Utilities Chairman, Board of Selectmen Plymouth Civil Defense Director J. D. Keyes Senator Edward P. Kirby Public Document Room (PDR) local Public Document Room (LPDR)

Nuclear Safety Information Center (NSIC)

NRC Resident Inspector Commonwealth of Massachusetts (2) 8605300498 860516 PDR ADOCK 05000293 ICIAL RECORD COPY P PDR 276STROSNIDER5/16/86 - 0001.0.0 05/16/86

Boston Edison Company 2 bcc w/ enc 1:

Region I Dccket Room (with concurrences)

Management Assistant, DRMA (w/o encl)

Section Chief, DRP W. Raymond, SRI, Vermont Yankee T. Shediosky, SRI, Millstone 1&2 H. Eichenholz, SRI, Yankee P. Leech, LPM, NRR RI:DRP RI:DRP sStrosnider 4 Kister j 5/[5/86 5//(/86 5//6/86 0FFICIAL RECORD COPY 276STROSNIDER5/16/86 - 0002.0.0 05/16/86 I

Supplementary Response Items to CAL 86-10 I Please provide a written clarification of the following items

Spurious Isolation Problem

a. Please submit a written assessment of the loose wires and drawing;' wiring discrepancies that were identified during your investigation. The assess-ment should address what was found, the implications with regard to the unanticipated primary containment isolations, other safety implications, and your ccrrective actions. The assessment should provide a basis for concluding that similar conditions do not exist in other safety related systems.

b. How are channel separation and separation of Q and non-Q circuits ensured between the monitored points and the GETARS system?

c. What is the schedule for the installation of the EPIC computer system?

RHR System

a. What was the rationale for not refurbishing both the 288 and 298 RHR valves and how will you control the normally closed injection valve in the "B" RHR loop in the future to isolate the RHR system?

b. What is the scope of the planned inspection for 288 valve?

c. Which recommendations in Attachment 4 to your letter apply to both RHR loops? For example, will pressure and temperature instrumentation be installed on both loops?

d. Are baseline torque measurements on the RHR motor operated injection valves to be taken?

e. What method will be used to control RHR system leakoff? How will the amount of leakage into the low pressure portion of the RHR system be measured? If a bypass valve is used, when will it be opened or closed?

Will any administrative' procedures be put in place to monitor and control letdown to the suppression pool and suppresion pool level? A safety evaluation should be submitted to the NRC which evaluates the leakoff method.

f. What type of test (water or air) will be used to check the pressure drop across the 68 check valves? What test pressure will be used? What ac-ceptance criteria will be used? Will this test be conducted at refueling outages or after each time the check valves are cycled?

g. Item C.1.c in Attachment 4 to your letter indicates that a check valve position indication system will be designed. Will this indication system supplant more quantitative means of verifying valve position (e.g., leak rate testing)?

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h. Will the RHR pressure gauges be used on a routine basis to check system pressure? If so, at what frequency will they be checked?

Will they be located.in both RHR loops? Will they be alarmed? Will they be used during valve operability testing to ensure valve closure? What will be their calibration frequency? Where will they be read out? What will be lost by the removal of the pressure gauge in item C.3.c?

1. What specific action will be taken if the RHR system high pressure alarm annunciates in the control room? A copy of the revised alarm procedure (item C.S.a) should be submitted to Region I prior to restart. What are the maintenance and calibration histories of the RHR high pressure alarm switches?

j. How will the RHR system be vented? Will the "A" RHR loop also require venting between the 28 and 68 valves?

k. How will RHR system temperature monitoring be conducted and at what frequency? What locations will be monitored (relative to injection valves and other RHR components)?

1. What is the schedule for completion of items C.1.c, C.4.a, and C.4.b?

With regard to the footnote in Attachment 4 to your letter, long term action items should be included in the next Long Term Plan revision submitted to NRR. However, the proposed schedule should also be submitted to Region I prior to restart of the plant.

Main Steam Line Isolation Valves

a. Discuss the design review and implementation process associated with the 1983 modification of the MSIVs.

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