ML20198G155
| ML20198G155 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 12/16/1998 |
| From: | Stewart Magruder NRC (Affiliation Not Assigned) |
| To: | Essig T NRC (Affiliation Not Assigned) |
| References | |
| PROJECT-689 NUDOCS 9812280305 | |
| Download: ML20198G155 (36) | |
Text
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UNITED STATES g
j NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
_i WASHINGTON, D.C. 20066-0001
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December 16, 1998 h
MEMORANDUM TO:
Thomas H. Essig, Acting Chief Generic issues and Environmental Projects Branch Division of Reactor Program Management Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation 1-3 FROM:
Stewart L. Magruder, Project Manager ML A
Generic issues and Environmental Projects Branch Division of Reactor Program Management Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation e
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SUBJECT:
SUMMARY
OF MEETING HELD ON NOVEMBER 3,1998, WITH NEl TO DISCUSS BACKFITTING RULE (10 CFR 50.109) ISSUES i
Members of the NRC staff met with representatives of the Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI), the
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-Nuclear Utility Backfitting and Reform Group (NUBARG), and other interested parties in the NRC offices on November 3,1998. The purpose of the meeting was to discuss the implementation of the backfitting rule (10 CFR 50.109). A list of attendees is included as -
The first topic discussed at the meeting was an audit of the effectiveness of NRC control of plant-specific backfits that will be conducted by the NRC's Office for Analysis and Evaluation of Operational Data (AEOD). Representatives of AEOD made a brief presentation on the audit plan. They noted that they were interested in feedback from the industry before they begin the audit on where to look for examples of actual backfits and attempted backfits. A copy of the audit plan ir, included as Attachment 2. The NEl and NUBARG representatives agreed to provide the AEOD staff with feedback before the audit begins.
j Representatives of NUBARG next discussed some backfitting rule issues and provided some examples of burdensome plant-specific backfits. The industry representatives agreed that one of the problems faced by licensees is the perceived lack of training and controls on NRC inspectors. They noted that some inspectors don't seem to understand the differences between individual plant licensing bases.
The next topic was a brief discussion of the necessity of considering averted onsite costs in
- severe accident mitigation alternative analyses. The, NEl representatives noted that their concem in this area is focused on license renewal and that they believe that averted costs should not be considered. The staff noted that the NRC's position was based on the Commission's interpretation of an Executive Order. The NEl representative agreed to provide a position paper on this issue.
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l December 16, 1998 MEMORANDUM TO:
Thomas H. Essig, Acting Chief Generic issues ar.d Environmental Projects Branch Division of Reactor Program Management Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation L
FROM:
Stewart L. Magruder, Project Manager hrd4 b d Generic issues and Environmental Projects Branch
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Division of Reactor Program Management Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation f
SUBJECT:
i
SUMMARY
OF MEETING HELD ON NOVEMBER 3,1998, WITH NEl TO DISCUSS BACKFITTING RULE (10 CFR 50.109) ISSUES i
Members of the NRC staff met with representatives of the Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI), the Nuclear Utility Backfitting and Reform Group (NUBARG), and other interested parties in the
)
l NRC offices on November 3,1998. The purpose of the meeting was to discuss the implementation of the backfitting rule (10 CFR 50.109). A list of attendees is included as.
The first topic discussed at the meeting was an audit of the effectiveness of NRC control of l
plant-specific backfits that will be conducted by the NRC's Office for Analysis and Evaluation of Operational Data (AEOD). Representatives of AEOD made a brief presentation on the audit plan.- They noted that they were interested in feedback from the industry before they begin the l-audit on where to look for examples of actual backfits and attempted backfits. A copy of the audit plan is included as Attachment 2. The NEl and NUBARG representatives agreed to provide the AEOD staff with feedback before the audit begins.
Representatives of NUBARG next discussed some backfitting rule issues and provided some l
examples of burdensome plant-specific backfits. The industry representatives agreed that one of the problems faced by licensees is the perceived lack of training and controls on NRC inspectors. They noted that some inspectors don't seem to understand the differences between individual plant licensing bases.
The next topic was a brief discussion of the necessity of considering averted onsite costs in severe accident mitigation alternative analyses. The NEl representatives noted that their l
concern in this area is focused on license renewal and that they believe that averted costs should not be considered. The staff noted that the NRC's position was based on the Commission's interpretation of an Executive Order. The NEl representative agreed to provide a position paper on this issue.
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T. Essig December 16, 1998 l
- The final topic was a discussion of the compliance exception of the backfitting rule. The l
NUBARG representatives briefly discussed a paper they have written on trends in the NRC's use of the compliance exception. The paper is included as Attachment 4. The industry l
consensus is that the staff should be clearer regarding what it expects from licensees in response to generic communications and that the compliance exception is used too frequently.
The industry representatives agreed to provide additionalinput on how they believe the l
compliance exception sho'lld be used and on an improved protocol for interactions with the staff on generic issues.
' Project No. 689 Attachments: As stated cc w/atts: See next page DISTRIBUTION: See attached page Document Name G:\\simi\\msum1103.9%
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SC;PQEh OFFICE PGEB NAME SMagruderY RDYnnig Fhhh DATE 12/ \\ 6 /98 12/ l b /98 Mh/98 \\
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4 T. Essig
-2 December 16, 1998 The final topic was a discussion of the compliance exception of the backfitting rule. The NUBARG representatives briefly discussed a paper they have written on trends in the NRC's use of the compliance exception. The paper is included as' Attachment 4. The industry
- consensus is that the staff should be clearer regarding what it' expects from licensees in TdspOnse to generic Communication's and that the compliance exception is used too frequently.
The industry representatives agreed to provide additional input on how they believe the compliance exception should be used and on an improved protocol for interactions with the staff 1
- on genaric issues.
Project No. 689 Attachments: As stated i
cc w/atts: See next page i
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(E pistribution: Mtg. Summary w/ NEl Re Backfitting Rule Dated December 16, 1998 l
Hard Coov i
/ Docket FiIe PUBLIC PGEB R!F OGC ACRS SMagruder i
RDennig -
EMail SCollins/RZimmerman BSheron JRoe DMatthews ~
TEssig FAkstulewicz SMagruder JStoltz FCostanzi JShapaker JTappert
. RAuluck BRichter' MMarkley, ACRS JRosenthal, AEOD GLanik, AEOD WJones, AEOD JKauffman, AEOD RTripathi, AEOD GMizuno, OGC
, GTracy, EDO i
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List of Attendees -
Name oraanization Alex Marion NEl Robert Bishop NEl
- Kurt Cozens NEl.
Lynne Neal NEl George Wrobel
- Rochester Gas & Electric Bob Temple
.Winston & Strawn Dan Stenger
.Winston & Strawn David Stellfox McGraw Hill Cha.1es Gepford NUS Nancy Chapman SERCH/Bechtel i
Bob Dennig.
NRC/NRR John Stoltz NRC/NRR Nick Costanzi.
NRC/NRR Jim Shapaker NRC/NRR Brian Richter NRC/NRR
~ Raj Auluck NRC/NRR
' John Tappert NRC/NRR Stu Magruder NRC/NRR
-Geary Mizuno NRC/OGC
~ George Lanik NRC/AEOD Jack Rosenthal NRC/AEOD William Jones NRC/AEOD
~ John Kauffman NRC/AEOD Mike Markley_.
NRC/ACRS l
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,t PLAN FOR PERFORMANCE-BASED ASSESSMENT OF THE EFFECTIVENESS OF U.S. NRC CONTROL OF PLANT-SPECIFIC BACKFITS
~ Goal:
Conduct a targeted audit of the agency's plant-specific backfit process based on explicit industry complaints related to recent plant-specific backfits.
This plan is intended to accomplish the following objectives:
(1) Identify and assess industry complaints re'ated to plant-specific backfits and (2) Assess the agency's plant-specific backfit process as described in MC-0514.
l The focus will be on the time period after June 1996 when the last AEOD assessment of the plant-specific backfit control process was conducted.
Part 1 - Review Regulations and Guidance t
Existing regulations and headquarters and regional guidance for control of plant-specific backfits will be identified and reviewed to become familiar with the rules and criteria for performing backfits. This review will provide information about wha; constitutes appropriate or inappropriate plant-specific backfits.' Based on the guidance in NRC approved backfit documents, criteria will be developed for judging actual or attempted inappropriate plant-specific backfits. Existing regulations and headquarters and regional guidance for control of i
plant-specific backfits include: 10 CFR 50.109, "Backfitting"; NUREG-1409, "Backfitting Guidelines," July 1990; MC-0514, "NRC Program for Management of Plant-Specific Backfitting of Nuclear Power Plants'; MC-0350, ' Staff Guidelines for Restart Approval"; Enforcement Manual Chapter 4.6,"Non-Escalated Enforcement Actions"; AEOD Procedure 11,' Monitoring of Plant-specific Backfitting," October 9,1991; and regional procedures and guidance.
Part 2 - Obtain Explicit Examples from industry a)
NEl has been contacted and requested to provide explicit examples of actual or attempted inappropriate plant-specific backfits. NEl has agreed to provide examples at the NEl/NRC meeting to discuss the backfit issue on November 3,1998. At that time we will have the opportunity to discuss the examples further and start the process to obtain more information, if needed Also, at that meeting we will discuss the possibility of NEl providing a list of licensees who would be willing to discuss their experience regarding explicit plant-specific backfd issues.
b)
Depending on the results of the above activities, a limited number of licensees may be contacted to solicit comments and feedback regarding their experience with actual or 1
I attempted inappropriate plant-specific backfits. If necessary, staff performing this study will meet with licensee representatives so as to be able to fully understand this licensee l
feedback. For efficiency, these trips would be combined with visits to the regional office.
l Part 3 - Review Regional Documentation Agency documents which could indicate evidence of actual or attempted inappropnate plant-specific backfits will be reviewed. For the regions, a sample of the following agency records will l
be reviewed:
l a)
Regional backfit logs. Logs will be reviewed and assessed for actual or attempted i
inappropriate plant-specific backfits and their associated causes.
l b)
Recent inspection Reports (irs). irs related to specific industry complaints will be examined for actual or attempted inappropriate plant-specific backfits and their associated causes. If no information connecting irs to backfits is obtained from NEl or licensees for the region of interest, a sample of about 20 irs will be reviewed.
c)
Recent Enforcement Actions (EAs). EAs related to specific industry complaints will be examined for actual or attempted inappropriate plant-specific backfits and their associated causes. If no information connecting EAs to backfits is obtained from NEl or licensees for the region of interest, a sample of about 10 EAs will be reviewed.
d)
Recent reactor CALs. Information gathered by the NRR Division of inspection and Support Programs (DISP) in their review of CALP. in response to issues raised during Senate hearings and a stakeholder meeting will be reviewed and summarized.
e)
Visits to regional offices will be conducted with a two-man team which includes an AEOD staff men ber and a regional backfit coordinator from a region other than the one being visited. Regional personnel may be nked to discuss explicit examples of actual or attempted inappropriate plant-specific backfits and their associated causes.
Problems implementing the backfit gul dance will also be discussed. Visits to selected reactor sites will be conducted, if necessary.
Part 4 - Review NRR Documentation For NRR, a sample of the following agency records will be reviewed:
a)
NRR backfit information including database, procedural guidance, and interview of NRR l
staff will be done to check for actual or attempted inappropriate plant-specific backfits l
and their associated causes.
b)
Recent RAls. RAls and associated documentation related to specific industry complaints will be examined for actual or attempted inappropriate plant specific backfits and their associated causes. If no information connecting RAls to backfits is obtained from NEl or licensees, a sample of about 20 RAls will be reviewed.
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i c)
Standard Review Plans (SRPs) and Regulatory Guides (RGs). SRPs and RGs related to specific industry complaints will be examined to aid in evaluating actual or attempted j
inappropriate plant-specific backfits and their associated causes.
Part 5 - Assess NRC Processes Related to Plant-specific Backfits a)
Review existing backfit appeals to obtain information about the appeafs and to evaluate the backfit appeal process.
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b)
The examples collected in the prior activities will be assessed independently by AEOD, based on the criteria, to classify them as actual or attempted inappropriate plant-specific backfits. Specific examples which are judged to be allegations or examples of wrongdoing will be forwarded to appropriate NRC program offices.
c)
If the documentation regarding the examples of explicit actual or attempted l
inappropriate plant-specific backiits is not sufficient, interviews of licensee and NRC l
personnel who were involved in the decisions may be conducted.
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d)
For those examples which are judged as inappropriate, an analysis of all relevant I
documentation will be conducted to attempt to determine where weaknesses may exist in the NRC plant-specific backfit control process.
Part 6 - Document Findings l
l a)
A draft report will be prepared. The assessment process and criteria will be discussed.
l The report willinclude a listing of the most relevant examples of actual or attempted inappropriate plant-specific backfits and their disposition. Findings related to the NRC plant-specific backfit process and areas for improvement will be discussed.
l b)
NRC and industry comments will be solicited.
c)
A final report will be prepared and distributed.
PLAN SCHEDULE AND STAFFING DETAILS An estimate of the duration and effort required to execute this plan is shown on the next page.
The assessment is expected to last about 41 calendar weeks from the stcrt date and use approximately 47 person-weeks of effort.
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l' ASSESSMENT PLAN SCHEDULE AND STAFFING Duration Effort (Calendar-(staff-Activity weeks) weeksi staff Part 1 Review Guidance 1
3 AEOD Part 2 Obtain Industry Examples 2(a)
NEl meeting and input 6
2 AEOD 2(b)
Licensee input 2
2 Team Part 3 Review Regional Documents 3(a)
Backfit logs 1
Team 3(b)
Inspection reports 2
Team 3(c)
Enforcement actions 2
Team 3(d)
Review CALs 1
Team 3(e)
Visit Regions 4
Team 3(f)
. Review NRR Process 1
Team Part 3 Total 6
Part 4 Review NRR Documents Review RAls 2
8 AEOD Part 5 Assess NRC Processes 5(a)
Review Backfit Appeals 1
1 AEOD 5(b)
Develop criteria 2
2 AEOD 5(c)
Identify backfits 2
2 AEOD 5(d)
Interview staff 2
1 AEOD 5(e)
Analyze 4
6 AEOD Part 6 Document Findings 6(a)
Draft report 2
2 AEOD 6(b)
Solicit comments 5
1 AEOD 6(c)
Final report 2
2 AEOD Total 41 47 i
Notes: Team - 3 AEOD,1 NRR, Regional backfit coordinators Estimated regional and NRR effort - approximately 3 staff-weeks per office l
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AE00 Procedure 11 Monitoring of Plant Specific Backfitting Purpose To provide guidance on AE00 actions to monitor plant specific backfit programs.
Discussion 1.
The Director, Office of AE00 is responsible for monitoring the plant specific backfit process.
This includes:
Assuring that process controls for overall agency management and a.
oversight of the plant specific backfit process are developed and maintained.
These include procedures, training, tracking and evaluating the views of NRC staff and industry. (NRC Manual Chapter 0514-032) b.
Coordinating the implementation of procedures within other offices and regions. (NRC Manual Chapter 0514-032)
Assuring that each licensee is informed of these programs and c.
i substantive changes in these programs are communicated to licensees.
(NRC Manual Chapter 0514-32) l d.
Review of office procedures for plant-specific backfitting prior to l
approval. (NRC Manual Chapter 0514-033, 034, 035) l Approval of office procedures for plant-specific backfitting, under l
e.
authority delegation by the E00, Advising the EDO of ineffective procedures and other difficulties encountered in carrying out this delegated authority.
(Memorandum for E. Jordan from J. Taylor, dated November 7, 1989 )
2.
Obvious activities to be conducted in carrying out these responsibilities include:
reviewing and approving backfit procedure changes, providing advice and assistance in dealing with backfit issues, informing the l
industry about backfit programs and advising the EDO of problems.
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3.
In addition, the routine activities listed below will normally be conducted in carrying out these responsibilities.
The schedules listed l
are flexible to allow for exercise of judgment as to where monitoring resources are needed.
For example, in 1990, considerable resources were expended on publishing a NUREG document on backfitting and conducting industry /NRC backfitting workshops; however, routine reviews of office programs were not conducted.
a.
Review the plant specific backfit tracking system for timeliness and accuracy of entries.
Provide feedback to office backfit coordinators.
(Quarterly to semiann'ually).
b.
Review office programs for plant specific backfitting.
Normally this includes a review of procedures, a review of some specific cases handled, and interviews with appropriate personnel.
Provide feedback to the office directors / regional administrators.
(Annually to biannually).
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Conduct backfit training for NRR technical personnel and regional c.
office personnel, including resident inspectors.
(Annually to i
biannually).
Conduct backfit training for new personnel via the fundamentals of inspection course.
(As needed).
Credit may be taken for appropriate training conducted by personnel from the affected office.
Note that the staff committed to continue periodic training of NRC personnel in response to the Regulatory Impact Survey.
(SECY-91-172, June 7, 1991, item III.B.1.)
l d.
Obtain industry comments on how the backfit process is working.
The means may include written questionnaires to licensees, regulatory l
impact surveys, NRC/ industry backfitting workshops, interviews with licensee personnel or meetings with industry groups.
Proviae feed-back to office directors / regional administrators.
(Annually to biannually).
L NRC/ industry workshops also serve the purpose of providing information to the industry.
Note that the staff committed to hold such workshops periodically in response to the Regulatory Impact Survey (SECY-91-172, June 7, 1991, item III.B.2).
Provide appraisals of office / region programs for plant specific e.
backfitting in connection with SES appraisals.
(Annually) 4 It is worth noting that the Director, Office of AE00 also acts as Chairman of the Committee to Review Generic Requirements (CRGR), which includes I
considerable involvement in the oversight of generic backfitting.
This relates to some of the. activities discussed above.
For example, NRC/
l industry workshops typically devote considerable attention to generic l
backfitting questions.
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,j Backfitting Rule Implementation Issues i
The Backfitting Rule is not being applied as intended l
Compliance Exception 10 C.F.R. f 50.54(f) Information Requests i
Burdensome Plant ~ specific backfitting e New requirements are being imposed l
without an understanding of the costs and benefits i
The Commission m auld fully understand the effects of a proposed backia before its imposition." 50 FR 38097 (9/20/85).
NUBARG 11/3/98 2
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Compliance Exception 4
l e Use of the Compliance Exception NRC Generic Letters
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> 1996 14; Compliance Exception: 9**
> 1996-98 Total with Backfitting Analysis: O NRC Bulletins
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> 1996 3; Compliance Exception: 1 i
> 1996-98 Total with Backfitting Analysis: 0 l
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Compliance Exception bac it can be a new sta position interpreting the Commission's rules" Compliance Exception SOC for the backfitting rule -- the compliance exception is intended to apply to " situations in which the licensee has failed to I
meet known and established standards" not to new or modified interpretations of what constitutes compliance.
Use of broad regulatory standards, e.g., GDC or Appendix B, not appropriate
> E.g., Generic Letter 97-01, " Degradation af Control Rod Ddve Mechanism Nozzle and Other Vessel Closure Head Penetrations," dated Apr.1,1997; Proposed Generic Communication; " Effectiveness of Ultrasonic Testing Systems in Inservice Inspection Programs", dated Dec. 31,1996 (61 Fed. Reg.
69,120); Generic Letter 96-06: " Assurance of Equipment Operability and Containment Integrity During Design-basis Accident Conditions," dated Sep. 30, 1996.
> GDC do not apply to plants with construction permits issued prior to May 21, 1971. SRM dated Sep. 18,1992.
NUBARG 11/3/98 5
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i Use ofInfonnation Requests under 50.54fD 1
l Commission addressed interface between information requests and backfitting in 1985 final rule -- err on side of performing backfitting analysis.
Commission's direction has not been followed "Information requests" have required new actions or
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analysis beyond existing licensing basis, e.g.:
> Proposed Generic Letter 97-XX on " Laboratory Testing of Nuclear-Grade Activated Charcoal," dated Feb. 25,1998.
l
> Generic Letter 97-04," Assurance of Sufficient Net Positive Suction Head for Emergency i
4 Core Cooling and Containment Heat Removal Pumps," dated Oct. 7,1997.
> " Request for Information Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.54(f) Regarding Adequacy and Availability l
of Design Bases Inform. ion," dated Oct. 9,1996.
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e RAls used to impose plant-specific backfits i
NUBARG 11/3/98 6
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amples ofBurdensome Plant-SpecificBackfits Control Room HVAC NUREG-1606 positions on 10 CFR 50.59 Multiple Spurious Actuations Extension of AOT for EDGs e TS Requirements for Qualification of Personnel e BarrierDoors e Criticality Monitors e Zircalloy Fire Calculations NUBARG 11 M 8 7
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a ggested Solutions to Problems with pplication ofthe Backfitting Rule Compliance exception should be limited to conditions where the licensee fails to comply with explicit requirements of a rule or its licensing basis Higher threshold to invoke the exception e Support generic communications improvements COMSECY-98-024 -- (IV.F.)
Higher threshold for finding safety issue warranting generic action orinformation request issued to allplants 50.54(t) requests clearly limited to requests for existing information NUBARG 11M98 8
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ggested Solutions to Problems with Application ofthe Backfitting Rule Greater management review ofplant-specific correspondence, RAls, and inspection results e Easier appeals process Generic backfits Plant-specific backfits Ombudsman NUBARG 11398 9
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7.
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Trends in the NRC's Use of the j
Compliance Exception to the Backfitting Rule l
4 i.
INTRODUCTION l
In several proposed or final Generic Letters issued in recent months, it j
appears that the NRC has misinterpreted the " compliance" exception of 10 C.F.R. {
50.109(a)(4) to bypass requirements to perform an analysis to show that the r==*d.
j actions will provide a substantial increase in safety for the estimated costs involM.
i These Generic Letters have been issued or proposed under the " compliance'_' exception-j even though they appear to impose new Staff positions that should receive a proper i
cost-benefit analysis under the backfitting rule. The details of selected examples of 1
these Generic Letters are discussed below. The common concern with these Generic Letters is that there seems to be a pattern developing that raises a policy issue and legal questions as to the proper interpretation of Section 50.109.
The practice of using the compliance exception to the backfitting rule ultimately could defeat the fundmental policy behind the backfitting rule. When the NRC promulgated the current backfittmg rule in 1985 (as amended in 1988), it intended to promote greater regulatory stability so as not to require licensees to cantinually update their facilities to conform with any and all new developments or new ideas for improving the operation of nuclear power plants. The rule is structured to allow imposition of only those new requirements and Staff positions that offer substanual safety benefits for the costs involved in implementing the changes at existing facilities?
If new positions are routinely imposed under exceptions to the rule without the reqmsite cost-benefit analysis, the same instability that led to the need for the backfitting rule will be created again. As the Commission recognized in 1985, a proper cost-bene 6t analysis of proposed new initiatives will actually promote regulatory stability and overall safety by ensunng that only cost-justified, substantial safety enhancements are mandated and are properly prioritized and scheduled in view of existing work.
Generally, the backfittmg rule has brought about a great deal of regulatory stability and allowed licensees to make improvements to their facilities in a managed, l'
10 C.F.R. { 50.109(a)(3).
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rather than reactionary, environment. Recently, however, the NRC has issued or proposed a number ofinfonnation requests pursuant to Section 50.54(f) under the
" compliance exception" to the backfitting rule. These so-called "information requests" in some mstances have caused extensive evaluations or plant modifications (e.g.,
Genenc Letter 96-06) and would mandate new programs using new regulatory criteria (e.g., proposed Generic Letter on effectiveness of ultrasonic testing). In these respects, the NRC's actions or proposed actions appear inconsistent with Section 50.109 and Section 50.54(f).
DISCUSSION According to the Statement of Considerations for the backfitting rule, the compliance exception was intended to address those situations "in which the licensee has failed to meet known and established standards of the Commission because of omission or mistake of fact. It should be noted that new or modified interotetations of what constitutes comoliance would not fall within the exceotion and would require a backfit analysis and application of the standard (of Section 50.109(a)(3)]."# Thus, new I
requirements, or new Staffintapretations of existing requirements (including new Staff positions),F were not intended to fall within the compliance exception.
The Commission explained in the 1985 rule that the use of the compliance exception should l
be rare, and that the exception should be narrowly interpreted considering the intent of the rule."
j Further, the use of Section 50.54(f) to request information to detenmne compliance with existing requirements is inconsistent with the language and intent of that rule. The Commission modified Section 50.54(f) in 1985 at the same time that it adopted the present backfitting rule, and clarified when an infonnation request would cross the line into backfitting. In the Statement of Considerations accompanying the 1985 amendments to Section 50.54(f), the NRC stated that an information request that 50 Fed. Reg. at 38,103 (emphasis added).
F The NRC stated in the Statement of Considerations for the final backfitting rule that "[s]ince there is no practical difference between a backfit that is imposed pursuant to a rule or a staff position interpreting a rule, the Commission will alter the final rule to require a documented analysis of required backfits regardless of the source." 50 Fed. Reg. at 38,101 (1985).
F 50 Fed. Reg. at 38,097.
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mvolves extensive effort would be " evaluated to determine whether the burden imposed by the information request is justified in view of the potential safety significance of the issue to be addressed." The NRC went on to say that those "(r]equests for mformation to detemune compliance with exi3 ting facility requirements" would not usually be made pursuant to Section 50.54(f), and that " extensive information requests [should] be carefully scrutinized by Staff management prior to initiating such requests." Finally, the NRC stated that in instances where it is not clear whether a backfit will follow an information request, the resolution would be in favor of performmg a backfitting analysis. 50 Fed. Reg. at 38,102.
Section 50.54(f)is derived from Section 182a of the Atomic Energy Act which deals with the plant-specific review of operating license applications. Section 50.54(f) seems to be reserved for significant issues when the Commission must l
detemune whether or not the license of a facility "should be modified, suspended, or revoked." Thus, by its terms and history, it would appear that the use of Section 50.54(f) was intended to be limited to significant plant-specific issues rather than generic requests.
In any event, the Staff has recognized that "[s]ome infonnation res promulgate new or revised staff positions and request that licensees, in their responses, state whether they will adopt the new positions. Even though these actions do not impose backfits, ac a mattw ofinternal staffpractice they are identified as backfits and justified accornagiy befoit they are issued, as required by NRC procedures.... this is often the case with generic letters and bulletins."F Accordingly, any action, including information requests pursuant to Section 50.54(f), brought fmward under the compliance exception should be adequately justified as necessary to mamtain compliance with "known and established" regulatory requirements - i.e., exnlicit provisions of NRC regulations or orders. As discussed further below, the justification given in recent Generic Letters (or proposed Generic Letters) has failed to support use of the compliance exception. Additionally, one principal concem is that the NRC is invoking the compliance exception by referencing very gegal regulatory criteria (e.g.,10 C.F.R. Part 50, Appendices A and B), either without citing specific regulatory requirements that licensees are failing to meet or r
i F
NUREG-1409, "Backfitting Guidelines." at 5 (July 1990).
3 L
when licensee programs already comply with specific requirements currently in force (e.g.,10 C.F.R. } 50.55a).
In the current regulatory environment of stnct compliance, regardless of safety significance, the NRC's claim that actions are necessary to ensure compliance with existing requirements must be closely scrutinized. Such claims potentially put each plant into an immediate nonconforming condition. Depending on the specifics o the " requirement," this could have such consequences as a plant shutdown or a delaye stanup, according to the guidance in Generic Letter 91-18, " Degraded Conditions and Operability," dated November 4,1991. It is ironic that a plant could be operatmg one.
day in full compliance with the regulatory requirements, and the next day, due to a Generic Letter pupcniiug to identify a concern as a compliance backfit, the plant is in a nonconfornung condition, yet operating under the same conditions as the day before.
This creates a very reactionary regulatory environment and could be detrimental to safety by causing plant shutdowns or divening plant resources. Even when a Generic l
Letter is purponed to be only an information request, such consequences could result if the Generic Letter contains a new staff position on what actions are considered acceptable for full compliance. This places a burden on the licensee to justify the continued adequacy of requirements as previously interpreted and enforced by the NRC.
9 This trend has already resulted in an undue burden on licensees and will t
place additional burdens on them as more regulatory actions are " justified" using this approach.
Such action can leave licensees vulnerable to reinterpretation of requirements and thereby create an unstable regulatory environment. Repeated use of the compliance exception also reinforces its acceptability to the Staff, potentially resulting in the exception becoming the rule.
The claim is not that there would never be cases that fit the compliance exception to the backfitting rule; however, the NRC should be careful in its application.
Also, any generic application of the compliance exception is suspect because each plant's licensing basis is unique due to many factors (e.g., the date oflicensing of the l
plant and its relation to the regulations that existed at the time the plant was licensed, I
licensee commitments, plant modifications since initial licensing).
The backfit discussion in recent Generic Letters (or proposed Generic Letters) generally fails to include enough details to make this distinction or even to indicate the specific requirements that apply. The ambiguity also makes the burden on licensees more 4
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t
9 I
difficult when they must determine the specific requirements that apply to the proposed Generic Letter, particularly when broad, general requirements such as 10 C.F.R. Part 50, Appendix B criteria are referenced.
In properly applying the compliance exception to the backfitting rule, the NRC would generally issue a plant-specific backfit which would cite the soecific regulatory requirements for which the licensee is in noncompliance, and give a specific l
j regulatory basis for why it believes the licensee is not in compliance. Similarly, the proper application of Section 50.54(f) for requesting information would generally be on a plant-specific basis or would apply to a specific regulatory concern existing at all the plants subject to the request. Generally, detennining compliance with existing regulatory requirements is more appropriately conducted through the inspection and enforcement process rather than through generic information requests.
i Recognmng that technology progresses continually, licensees and l
regulators may both agree that some improvements are worthwhile.
- However, imposition of develop:nents in technology should be carefully scrutinized if the Staff attempts to justify the imposition under the compliance exception to the backfitting rule, as in the proposed generic letter on the effectiveness of ultrasonic testing. New technology that creates new requirements should be imposed through rulem=We or should be applied by licensees voluntarily. Agency rulemaking may be used to drive technology as, for example, adding requirements for augmented reactor vessel l
exammation requirements in 10 C.F.R. g 50.55a(g)(6)(ii)(A). The point here is that rulemaking is the proper cource of action to impose new requirements that necessitate the use of new or developing technology, rather than using information requests in Generic Letters to imply that without the use of new technology, a licensee does not comply with existing regulations.
EXAMPLES OF RECENT USE OF " COMPLIANCE" EXCEPTION Generic Letter 96-06, " Assurance of Equipment Operability and Containment Integrity During Design-Basis Accident Conditions," October 21,1996 The NRC did not publish a notice of opportunity for public comment in the Federal Register because of the perceived urgent nature of this Generic Letter. The Generic Letter concerned (1) potential water hammer or two-phase flow that could j
cause damaae to the service water piping to contamment coolers, and (2) potential pipe c
j 5
rupture from overpressurization ofisolated contamment penetration piping due to the thermal effects from rising containment temperature and containment air cooler heat transfer following a loss-of-coolant accident. The specific events discussed in the Generic Letter are dependent upon the design of the systems involved (e.g., interaction of safety-related and non-safety related piping)*' and may be related to the age of the plants (e.g., design code edition). As for application to other plants on a generic basis, the design of the piping systems, the design of the contamment penetrations (e.g., valve type, number of penetrations, existing pressure relief devices), and the age of the plant would have affected actions taken in response to the Generic Letter. The particular edition of the American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) Boiler and Pressure:
Vessel Code (the " Code"), or B31.1, " Power Piping Code," used in designing the piping systems may also determme whether the water hammer and thermal effects we' re.
required to be considered in the stress analysis of the piping.
~
Neither the Generic Letter general " Discussion" section nor the "Backfit Discussion" section references specific paragraphs in the Code that are at issue. The "Backfit Discussion" section of the Generic Letter discusses several General Design Criteria from Part 50, Appendix A, as well as 10 C.F.R. Q 50.55a, " Codes and Standards," without reference to specific parts of the regulation or the Code. Thus, the Generic Letter is ambiguous as to the specific requirements in 10 C.F.R. { 50.55a and the ASME Code (or B31.1 Code) for the noncompliance concerns. Nevertheless^, the NRC concluded that the information r==*~i was related to existing requirements and any modifications made as a result of the Generic Letter were considered compliance backfits.
The Committee to Review Generic Requirements ("CRGR") Review Package ' contams questions and answers related to the Generic Letter. Question "ix" I
addresses " adequate protection or compliance backfits evaluated pursuant to 10 C.F.R.
Q 50.109(a)(4)." The Staff s response to this question refers to General Design Criteria See Nuclear Safety Advisory Letter.96-003," Containment Fan Cooler Operation Dunng a Design Basis Arddw " Wesunghouse Energy Systems Business Unit, June 20,19% (noting that"[t]he applicaixhty of this issue to a given nuclear unit depends on plant specific aspects of the containment cooling system design and its heat removal").
I' to " Documents Associated with NRC Generic Letter 96-06, Assurance of Equi== Operalxhty and Contamment Integnty Dunng Desmg-Basis Accident Conditions,"
James W. Shapaker to Document Control Desk. September 30,1996.
6 i
l
("GDC") m Appendix A to 10 C.F.R. Part 50 for the design of safety-related systems used to remove heat from the reactor contamment (GDC-38) and to transfer heat from vructures, systems, and components imponant to safety (GDC-44).
For overpressurization ofisolated piping due to thermal effects, the Staff refers to the
" design code criteria as defined in each licensee's final safety taalysis report" as contauung provisions that require piping systems, having the " potential to experience pressurization due to trapped fluid expansion," to be designed to withstand the l
increased pressure or be designed with provisions to relieve the excess pressure. No l
specific requirements are referenced beycnd these references to general criteria.
i i
For some plants, the pottion of Generic Letter 96-06 dealing with overpressurcation from thermal expansion ofisolated piping effectively applies ASME Code design requirements to non-safety related portions of piping systems (i.e., the example of overpressunzation ofisolated piping sections at the Maine Yankee plant relates to non-safety related, non-ASME Code, piping sections of the cooling water l
system.5) and imposes a new interpretation of the design requirements for stresses to the ASME Code Class 2 piping penetrating contamments. To justify the infonnation request and applicacion of the compliance exception to the backfitting rule, the Staff should have identified the specific provisions of the ASME Code that required the design features at issue in the Gernric Letter. Failing to provide the specific ASME Code pamgraphs, and to explain the NRC's position as to adequate implementation of l
these Code requirements results in a lack of clarity. Additionally, the backfitting discussion does not indicate whether the few plants known to have design i
configurations that created a potential for waterhammer or thermally-induced stresses were representative of all facilities. Neither does the Genetic Letter indicate whether The design configuration contains a check valve that may have been assumed to close for contamment isolation if the piping inside containment ruptured. The Generic Letter concern i
is that the check valve would, instead, open if the non-safety related piping inside containment mptured (i.e., flow would be into the contamment if cooling water pressure exceedmg contamment pressure), divening cooling water flow from safety-related coolers. Generally, l
non-safety related piping is not subject to the requirements of 10 C.F.R. Q 50.55a and the ASME Code. The Generic Letter goes on to discuss the potential for systems to fail to perform their " safety" functions as a result of overpressunzation. However, in the Maine Yankee example, it appears that the valve at the interface of the non safety related and the safety-related ponion of the system was the component that would not perform its safety function (ensure that flow is not diverted if the non-safety related portion of the piping fails i
i for any reason).
7
the design con 6gurations were original design or were modifications following plant startup.
Generic Letter 97-01," Degradation of Control Rod Drive Mechanism and Other Vessel Closure Head Penetrations," April 1,1997 This Generic Letter required licensees of pressurized-water reactors
("PWRs") to provide written responses, including a description of their program for inspection of PWR control rod drive mechanisms ("CRDMs") and other vessel-head penetrations ("VHPs"). The "Backfit Discussion" section of the Generic Letter says the following:
Under the provisions of Section 182a of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, and 10 C.F.R. Q 50.54(f), this generic letter transmits an inforrneion request for the purpose of venfying compliance with applicable existing regulatory requirements. Specifically, the requested information would enable the NRC staff to determme whether or not the licensees' margins required by the ASME Code, as specified in.. 10 C.F.R. Q 50.55a... are met, that the guidance of General Design Criterion 14 of Appendix A to 10 C.F.R. Part 50... continues to be satisSed, and to ensure that the safety significance of VHP cracking..
remains low. The requested information is also needed to determine whether an augmented inspection program, pursuant to 10 C.F.R. Q 50.55a(g)(6)(ii), is required to mamtam public health and safety.
Additionally, no backfit is either intended or approved in the context of issuance of this generic letter. Therefore, the staff has not performed a backfit analysis?
Note that the Generic Letter requests information on the inspection program, yet states that 8'
the informazion will be used to determme if an aug'.unented inspection program is necessary.
This implies that the Staff agrees that 10 C.FA Q 50.55a does not currently require such inspection program Therefore, the Staff relies on General Design Criterion 14, " Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary," as the basis for the inspection requirements that the compliance exception is based upon yet the design criterion does not discuss inspections. The cr does, however, discuss testing, which licensees generally conduct in accordance with requirements in 10 C.FA Q 50.55a(g) and the ASME Code, and which generally incl system leakage testing. Presumably, then, if a licensee responded that the visual ins performed during system leakage testing included the CRDM nozzle and other VH f
S L
l The Generic Letter states that "[i]f a plan has no.t been developed to periodically inspect the CRDM nozzle and other VHPs, provide the analysis that l
suppons why no augmented inspection is necessary." Imposition of this new inspection l
requirement goes beyond simply asking for information. Instead, the new requirement to develop an inspection program is a modification or addition to the operational procedures resulting from the imposition of a new regulatory staff position. The i
Commission has indicated that a backfitting analysis should be performed in close cases. 50 Fed. Reg. 38,097 at 38,102 (1985)("The Commission recognizes that there may be instances where it is not clear whether a backfit will follow an infornation l
request. Those cases should be resolved in favor of analysis."). Accordingly, the.
i Generic Letter should have been subject to a backfitting analysis prior to being issued.
l l
Proposed Generic Communication, " Effectiveness of Ultrasonic Testing Systems In Inservice Inspection Programs," 61 Fed. Reg. 69,120 (December 31,1996)
Regulations for the conduct ofinservice inspection of certain components and systems in nuclear power plants are given in 10 C.F.R. Q 50.55a, " Codes and M
Standards." Section 50.55a incorporates by reference 'Section III and Section XI of the American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) Boiler and Pressure Vanal l
_C.g.dn (the Code). The latest edition of Section III and Section XI of the Code j
incorporated by reference in paragraph (b) of i 50.55a is the 1989 Edition. The Code is a set of piwgAive rules for conducthg a variety of activities to ensure the integrity l
. of pressure-retaming components and systems.
Sections of the Code include i
requirements for the qualification of nondestructive examiners and the rules for performing ultrasonic testing. Accordingly, licensees subject to these regulations must comply with the ASME Code requirements fur exammers and testing unless they have NRC approval of altematives to these requirements or relief from those requirements that are impractical.
I licensee's program should be considered in compliance. Accordingly, augmented inspections would not be necessary unless new or different inspections are imposed through rulemakmg to Section 50.55a.
18' The legal effect ofincorporation by reference is that the material is treated as ifit were published in full in the Federal Register and the matenal, like any other properly issued j
regulation, has the force oflaw. See 5 U.S.C. Q 552(a).
9 i
One purpose of the proposed Genenc Letter would be to inform addressees of certain issues related to the effectiveness of ultrasonic exammations of reactor vessels and piping for reliably detecting and sizing flaws.
The backfit discussion section of the proposed Generic Letter indicates that it is an information request to determine if licensees are taking appropriate action to qualify future ultrasonic testing exammations. It states further that "[t]o the extent that the actions requested in this letter may result in corrective actions taken by addressees that are considered backfits, the backfits are justified under the compliance exception of the backfit rule, i.e.,10 CFR 50.109(a)(4)(i)." The backfit discussion in the proposed Generic Letter fails to identify the "known and established standards" licensees are failing to meet for conducting ultrasonic testing.
'The proposed Generic Letter would request that licensees submit information to justify certatn aspects of existing inservice inspection programs that are implemented according to the requirements of Section 50.55a, and by reference, the ASME Code. The proposed Generic Letter references 10 CFR 50, Appendix B,
" Quality Assurance Criteria for Nuclear Power Plants and Fuel Reprocessing Plants,"
as the basis for a compliance exception to the backfit provisions of 10 CFR 950.109.
Specifically, Criterion XVI, " Corrective Action," and Criterion II, " Quality Assurance Program," are referenced in the proposed Generic Letter. Based on referencing these criteria of Appendix B, the proposed Generic Letter implies that nondestructive exammers are not pro 6cient, that ultrasonic testmg systems are unreliable, and that licensees could fail to identify flaws that require corrective action unless Appendix VIIIW echniques are used.
t In this regard, the proposed Generic Letter implies that the existing requirements of Section 50.55a may not adequately specify the detection and sizing of flaws and the corrective actions necessary to ensure the integrity of the reactor coolant system and the emergency core cooling systems. While the proposed Generic Letter purports to be a request for information, it implies that iflicensees fail to take action f
Appendix VIIIis an appendix to Section XI of the ASME Code. It was first added in the n'
1989 Addenda to the Code and replaced cenain requirements for the performance of ultrasonic testing. It is a performance demonstration standard and the requirements are not one-for-or.e replacements of the current requirements. Thus, implementation of Appendix VIII in addition to compliance with current requirements creates a mix of prescriptive and performance based requirements that would be impractical for licensees to meet.
10
to improve the ultrasonic testing techmques used to conduct their insemce inspection program, they are subject to NRC enforcement actions based on the referenced criteria of Appendix B. As stated in the proposed Generic Letter:
For addressees that fail to have or implement appropriate qualification methods for future UT exammations where subsequent inspections find previously unidentified or improperly dispositioned flaws, the staff will consider whether such circumstances (a) are the result of failing to adequately take into account the need for special controls, skills, and traming needed to ensure suitable proficiency in the conduct of UT examinations contrary to the requirements of Criterion II, " Quality Assurance Program," of Appendix B, " Quality Assurance Criteria for.
o Nuclear Power Plants and Fuel Reprocessing," of 10 CFR Part 50; and/or (b) represent inadequate corrective action for known inadequacies contrary to the requirements of Criterion XVI, " Corrective Action," of Appendix B, of 10 CFR Part 50.
The proposed Generic Letter thus imposes new positions for ultrasonic testing systems from later editions.of the ASME Code, which are not yet incorporated by reference into Section 50.55a, and which are, therefore, not yet generically approved by the NRC. Iflicensees meet the reqmrements specified in Section 50.55a and the ASME Code, and these requirements are properly implemented in plant procedures, they should not be put into the position of having to justify the adequacy of the ASME Code each time new technology is developed that improves an inspection process.
Such an action is clearly more than an information request.
With respect to citing Appendix B criteria ;< the basis for a compliance backfit exception, full compliance with the more specific requirements of Section 50.55a should be adequate to ensure compliance with Appendix B. This position is clearly supported in NRC Inspection Manual Part 9900: 10 CFR Guidance, "10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion II, Maintenance of Proficiency for Personnel Performmg Activities Affecting Quality," where the NRC Staff Position states (emphasis added):
Except as otherwise clarified by NRC reguladons, guidance, or conditions.of a license for specific job descriptions or activities, licensee QA programs should have instructions comparable to the following for ensuring that all individuals who perfonn activities affecting the quality 11
of the mstallation or operation of a nuclear power plant have maintained the required proficiency.
The NRC requires the use of the more specine requirements of the ASME Code in Criterion IX," Control of Special Processes," which says that measures are to be established to assure that nondestructive testing is controlled and accomplished by quahfied personnel using quahned procedures in accordance with applicable codes and standards. Licensees meet this criterion through the application of the ASME Code in accordance with Section 50.55a.
Implying that Appendix B criteria supersede or override the more specific.
requirements in Section 50.55a and the ASME Code appears to imply that Mi=*vy consensus standards are inadequate to ensure the quality of activities conducted in accordance with the standards. If this is the case, the NRC must conduct rulemaking to specify adequate requirements in the specific regulations for an activity such as inservice inspection. The criteria specified in Appendix B are too general to provide j
the necessary requirements on the proficiency of nondestructive examiners and the adequacy of ultrasonic testing examinations; rather, Appendix B criteria provide general guidance for quality assurance programs as oversight of specific activities.
A Proposed Generic Communication, " Loss of Reactor Coolant Inventory'and Associated Potential for Loss of Emergency Mitigation Functions Whue in-a Shutdown Condition" The proposed Generic Letter would request licensees to (1) assess the susceptibility of their emergency core cooling systems ("ECCS") to common-cause faihtre as a result of reactor coolant system ("RCS") dram down while in a shutdown condition, and (2) submit information pursuant to 10 C.F.R. Q 50.54(f) concerning their findings regarding potential pathways for inadvertent RCS dram down and the suitability of configuration control and operating practices during reactor shutdown cooling. 'Ibe information is to enable the NRC Staff to venfy whether addressees comply with regulatory and license requirements, specifically verifymg the adequacy of maintaining the residual heat removal safety function to transfer fission product decay and other residual heat from the reactor (General Design Criterion 34 of Appendix A to Part 50) and the ECCS to provide abundant emergency core cooling when required (General Design Criterion 35).
12
l/
1 The particular event desenbed in the proposed Genenc Letter concemed management of outage activities rather than system design adequacy. Certain activities were ongoing that, when perfomied concurrently, resulted in an open drain-down path from the RCS to the refueling water storage tank. The "Backfit Discussion" section i
{
of the proposed Generic Letter refers to compliance with 10 C.F.R. Q 50,46, j
" Acceptance Critena for Emergency Core Cooling Systems for Light Water Nuclear Power Reactors," to justify the information request to confirm the adequacy of existing ECCS configuration control and operating practices regarding residual heat removal.
The "Backfit Discussion" section of the proposed Generic Leuer states:
I 4
ne actions requested in this generic letter, if required, would be backfits i
in accordance with NRC procedures and are necessary to ensure that addressees are in compliance with existing NRC rules and regulations.
)
Specifically,10 CFR 50.46 requires that the ECCS be designed to provide i
adequate flow capability to mamtain the core temperamre at an acceptably i
low value and to remove decay heat for the extended period of time i
required by the long-lived radioactivity remaining in the core. The Wolf j
Creek event has demonstrated that the adequacy of ECCS configuration i
control and operating practices regarding residual heat removal can I
adversely impact ECCS performance and could prevent the ECCS from performing its safety function following events at reactor facilities l
involving inadvertent loss of reactor coolant inventory while the reactor is shut down. Therefore, this generic letter is being issued as if the requested actions were compliance backfits under the tenns of 10 CFR I
50.109(a)(4)(i).
j The actions requested in the proposed Generic Letter are inappropriately charactenzed as compliance exceptions to the backfitting provisions of Section 50.109.
The requirements of Section 50.46 relate to specific design features of the ECCS, whereas the problem desenbed in the proposed Generic Letter relates to "the adequacy of ECCS configuration control and operating practices." The actions requested by the proposed Generic Letter more appropriately relate to conducting and coordmanng activities while in a shutdown condition. By citing Section 50.46 as the basis for the compliance exception to the backfit provisions of 10 C.F.R. Q 50.109, the proposed Generic Letter implies that the ECCS must be designed to prevent such scenarios, when licensees generally rely on admmistrative controls to prevent placing the RCS and ECCS in such a configuration. According to the NRC's Standard Review Plan, the 13
4 ECCS is designed to refill "the vessel in a timely manner for a loss-of-coolant accident resulting from a spectrum of postulated piping breaks within the reactor coolant pressure boundary."2 Even though operator actions may result in a potential pathway for loss of reactor coolant inventory during shut down conditions, the consequences are not commensurate with a pipe break at full power operations, and modifications to the design features of the ECCS may not be the most appropriate corrective actions to address this situation. The NRC Staff position implied in the proposed Generic Letter appears to be a new interpretation of the regulations in Section 50.46 which would be subject to the backfitting provisions of Section 50.109.
CONCLUSION In summary, the backfitting rule was intended to prevent an ever-changing regulatory scheme, to promote discipline in the regulatory process, and to offer a level of stability in a technology-driven industry. The reasons for the backfitting rule when promulgated are as applicable today as they were then, if not more so. The NRC can continue to carry out its mission and still comply with the backfitting rule without indiscrimimta use of the compliance backfit exception. The above examples indicate that the NRC is not carefully scrutinimg either the use of the compliance exception to the backfitting rule or the use of Section 50.54(f) for information requests to confirm compliance with existing regulations. Continually allowing the backfitting rule to be misused can lead to a de facto change to the regulations without the requisite rulemaking.
l 0
See NUREG-0800, Section 15.6.5, Revision 2, July 1981.
14
l Nuclear Energy. Institute Project No. 689 cc: Mr. Ralph Beedle Ms. Lynnette Hendricks, Director l
Senior Vice President
. Plant Support and Chief Nuclear Officer Nuclear Energy Institute Nuclear Energy Institute Suite 400 l
Suite 400 1776 i Street, NW 1776 i Street, NW Washington, DC 20006-3708
' Washington, DC 20006-3708 Mr. Alex Marion, Director Mr. Charles B. Brinkman, Director Programs Washington Operations Nuclear Energy Institute ABB-Combustion Engineering, Inc.
Suite 400 12300 Twinbrook Parkway, Suite 330 1776 i Street, NW Rockville, Maryland 20852 Washington, DC 20006-3708 Mr. David Modeen, Director Engineering Nuclear Energy Institute Suite 400 1776 i Street, NW Washington, DC 20006-3708 Mr. Anthony Pietrangelo, Director Licensing Nuclear Energy Institute Suite 400 1776 I Street, NW Washington, DC 20006-3708 Mr. Nicholas J. Liparulo, Manager Nuclear Safety and Regulatory Activities Nuclear and Advanced Technology Division Westinghouse Electric Corporation P.O. Box 355 Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania 15230 Mr. Jim Davis, Director Operations Nuclear Energy Institute Suite 400 1776 i Street, NW Washington, DC 20006-3708 l
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