ML20198D132
| ML20198D132 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Arkansas Nuclear  |
| Issue date: | 05/15/1986 |
| From: | Craig Harbuck, Hunter D, Johnson W NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20198D124 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-313-86-13, 50-368-86-13, NUDOCS 8605230160 | |
| Download: ML20198D132 (9) | |
See also: IR 05000313/1986013
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APPENDIX B
U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION IV
NRC Inspection Report: 50-313/86-13
Licenses: DPR-51
50-368/86-13
Dockets: 50-313
50-368
Licensee: Arkansas Power & Light Company (AP&L)
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P. O. Box 551
Little Rock, Arkansas 72203
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Facility'Name: Arkansas Nuclear One (ANO), Units 1 and 2
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. Inspection At: ANO Site, Russellville, Arkansas
Inspection Conducted:
April 1-30, 1986
Inspectors:
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R. D. J
son, Senior' Resident
Date
Reacto Inspector
(pars. 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8)
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3/C/2b
C. C. Harbuck, Resident Reactor
Date
Inspector
(pars. 3, 4, 5)
Approved:
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M/S ,W
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D. R. Hunter, Chief, Project
Date
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Section B, Reactor Project Branch
8605230160 860519
ADOCK 05000313
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Inspection Summary
Inspection Conducted April 1-30, 1986 (Report 50-313/86-13)
Areas Inspected: Routine, unannounced inspection including operational safety
verification, maintenance, surveillance, followup on IE Bulletins, followup on
IE Information Notices, and followup on licensee's response to selected safety
issues.
Results: Within the six areas inspected, no violations or deviations were
identified.
Inspection Sumary
Inspection Conducted April 1-30, 1986 (Report 50-368/86-13)
Areas Inspected: Routine, unannounced inspection including operational safety
verification, maintenance, surveillance, followup on IE Bulletins, followup on
IE Information Notices, followup on licensee's response to selected safety
issues, and followup on Licensee Event Reports.
Results: Within the seven areas inspected, one apparent violation was
identified (inadequate maintenance procedure, paragraph 5).
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DETAILS
1.
Persons Contacted
- J. Levine, Director of Site Nuclear Operations
R. Ashcraf t, Electrical Maintenance Supervisor
B. Baker, Operations Manager
M. Bolanis, Health Physics Superintendent
- P. Campbell, Licensing Engineer
H. Carpenter, I&C Supervisor
A. Cox, Operations Technical Support Supervisor
- E. Ewing, General Manager, Technical Support
G. Fiser, Radiochemistry Supervisor
B. Garrison, Operations Technical Support
L. Gulick, Unit 2 Operations Superintendent
C. Halbert, Mechanical Engineering Supervisor
- D. Howard, Special Projects Manager
H. Hollis, Security Coordinator
D. Horton, Quality Assurance Manager
- L. Humphrey, General Manager, Nuclear Quality
D. Johnson, Licensing Engineer
H. Jones, Field Construction Manager
R. Loyd, Operations Technical Support
- D. Lomax, Licensing Supervisor
J. McWilliams, Unit 1 Operations Supervisor
- J. Orlicek, Field Engineering Supervisor
V. Pettus, Mechanical Maintenance Superintendent
- S. Quenuz, General Manager, Plant Operations
- D. Provencher, Quality Engineering Supervisor
P. Rogers, Plant Licensing Engineer
- L. Schempp, Nuclear Quality Control Manager
C. Taylor, Operations Technical Support Supervisor
B. Terwilliger, Operations Assessment Supervisor
R. Tucker, Electrical Maintenance Superintendent
D. Wagner, Health Physics Supervisor
R. Wewers, Work Control Center Manager
G. Wrightam, I&C Supervisor
S. Yancy, Mechanical Maintenance Supervisor
C. Zimmerman, Operations Technical Support
- Present at exit interview.
The inspectors also contacted other plant personnel, including operators,
technicians, and administrative personnel.
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2.
Licensee Event Report (LER) Followup (Unit 2)
Through direct observation, discussions with licensee personnel, and
review of records, the following event reports were reviewed to determine
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that reportability requirements were fulfilled, immediate corrective
action was accomplished, and corrective action to prevent recurrence has
been accomplished in accordance with Technical Specifications.
85-023-00
Reactor trip - loss of condenser vacuum
85-025-00
Failure to perform control element assembly
calculator (CEAC) surveillance test
a.
LER 85-023 reported a reactor trip which resulted from loss of vacuum
in the main condenser when one circulating water pump was secured and
circulating water flow through the main condenser was lost due to the
idle circulating water pump's discharge valve failing to close. The
NRC inspector reviewed Report of Abnormal Condition (RAC) 2-85288 and
Job Orders (J0s) 703621 and 589. These J0s were issued to repair the
control valve which failed to close and to stake and lockwire the set
screw holding the motor shaft mechanical key on the other circulating
water pump discharge valve. We have no further questions of this
matter at this time.
b.
LER 85-05 reported a failure to perform a surveillance test within
the required time. The NRC inspector reviewed RAC 2-85303 and the
records of training sessions conducted to ensure that maintenance
groups understand the surveillance scheduling system and the meaning
of the critical completion date. We have no further questions of
this matter at this time.
No violations or deviations were identified.
3.
Operational Safety Verification (Units 1 and 2)
The NRC inspectors observed control room operations, reviewed applicable
logs, and conducted discussions with control room operators. The
inspectors verified the operability of selected emergency systems,
reviewed tagout records, verified proper return to service of affected
components, and ensured that maintenance requests had been initiated for
equipment in need of maintenance. The inspectors made spot checks to
verify that the physical security plan was being implemented in accordance
with the station security plan. The inspectors verified implementation of
radiation protection controls during observation of plant activities.
The NRC inspectors toured accessible areas of the units to observe plant
equipment conditions, including potential fire hazards, fluid leaks, and
excessive vibration. The inspectors also observed plant housekeeping and
cleanliness conditions during the tours.
The NRC inspectors walked down the accessible portions of the Unit 1
reactor building spray system. The walkdown was performed using
Procedure 1104.05, " Reactor Building Spray System Operation,"
Attachment ' A', Revision 17, and Drawings M-232,11-236, and M-233.
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These reviews and observations were conducted to verify that selected
facility operations were in conformance with the requirements established
under Technical Specifications,10 CFR, and administrative procedures.
No violations or deviations were identified.
4.
~ Monthly Surveillance Observation (Units 1 and 2)
The NRC inspector observed that the Technical Specification required
surveillance testing on the number one diesel generator for Unit 2,
(Procedure 2104.36, Supplement 1) and verified that testing was performed
in accordance with adequate procedures, test instrumentation was
calibrated, limiting conditions for operation were met, removal and
restoration of the affected components were accomplished, test results
conformed with Technical Specifications and procedure requirements, test
results were reviewed by personnel other than the individual dirceting the
test, and any deficiencies identified during the testing were properly
reviewed and resolved by appropriate management personnel.
The inspector also witnessed the following test activities:
Station Battery Pilot Cell tests (procedure 1307.16) (JO 710850).
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Station Battery Pilot Cell tests (procedure 2307.16) (JO 710851).
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Part of sodium hydroxide pump 'B' (2P-136B) monthly test
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(procedure 2104.05, Supplement 5).
Post-maintenance test of 2P89C, the 'C' high pressure safety
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injection pump (procedure 2104.39).
Part of monthly test of plant protection system, channel
'D'
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(procedure 2304.40).
Part of fire detection instrument operability testing
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(procedure 1307.12).
No violations or deviations were identified.
5.
Monthly Maintenance Observation (Units 1 and 2)
Station maintenance activities of safety-related systems and components
listed below were observed to ascertain that they were conducted in
accordance with approved procedures, Regulatory Guides, and industry codes
or standards; and in conformance with Technical Specifications.
The following items were considered during this review: the limiting
conditions for operation were met while components or systnms were removed
from service; approvals were obtained prior to initiating the work;
activities were accomplished using approved procedures and were inspected
as applicable; functional testing and/or calibrations were performed prior
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to returning components or systems to service; quality control records
were maintained; activities were accomplished by qualified personnel;
parts and materials used were properly certified; radiological controls
were implemented; and fire prevention controls were implemented.
Work requests were reviewed to determine status of outstanding jobs and to
ensure that priority is assigned to safety-related equipment maintenance
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which may affect system performance.
The following maintenance activities were observed:
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Replacement and repair of Unit 1 'B' reactor coolant pump (P328)
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underpower relay (JO 711065) (Procedures 1403.159 and 1403.126).
Replacement of reduction gear assembly for Unit 2 'B' charging pump
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(2P36B) (JO 709842, Procedure 2402.32).
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Seal repair for Unit 2
'C' high pressure safety injection (HPSI) pump
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(2P89C) (JO 710873, Procedure 2402.36).
Service water pump 2P4C motor preventive maintenance (JO 526487).
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Job Order 710873 was issued to replace the stuffing box extension gasket
to repair a small leak at the 'C' high pressure safety injection pump
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outboard flange.
Revision 2, entitled, grocedure used for this job was
The
2402.36,
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2P89 High Pressure Safety Injection Pump
Maintenance." The scope of this procedure included complete disassembly,
inspection, and reassembly of the pump and its sub-conponents. Since the
only work needed at this time was to replace the stuffing box extension
gasket on the outboard end of the pump, many of the procedure steps were
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not necessary. The procedure allowed for partial performance, with the
other sections being marked "N/A" (not applicable) per the instructions of
the cognizant supervisor.
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During the observation of this maintenance effort, the NRC inspector noted
several discrepancies as outlined below:
The copy of the procedure used at the job site did not have the steps
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which were not to be performed marked "N/A."
The lead craftsman
appeared to have a good understanding of which steps should be
performed, but there were occasional delays due to confusion on which
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steps were to be deleted.
Prerequisite 6.1 required that baseline vibration data be recorded on
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a form attached to the procedure. This was not done.
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The service water cooling lines to the seal and bearing must be
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removed prior to thrust bearing removal. These lines were not
specifically mentioned in a procedural step. There was only a ncte
stating, " Disconnect auxiliary piping and wiring as necessary for the
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particular disassembly to be performed." A step near the end of the
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procedures stated, " Reconnect auxiliary piping . . . ." The craftsman
had to initiate a Plant Engineering Action Request to obtain the
desired torque values for the flange bolts involved.
The mechanical seal has two eccentric washers which must be rotated
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into the shaft sleeve groove prior to mechanical seal removal. The
procedural steps and the attached figure indicated only one eccentric
washer.
The procedure provided torque values for pump components during
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reassembly, but only the final torque value was given. The number of
passes desired and the intermediate torque values were not provided.
The craftsman determined the number of passes and the intermediate
torque values based on his training and experience.
The procedure, with certain steps marked "N/A", does not provide a
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step for reinstallation of the shims (Part number 2578). These shims
were apparently installed following step 7.16.2.
At this point there
was a note stating, "0mit shims (257B) at this time."
Through observation of major portions of this maintenance activity and
witnessing of the post-maintenance testing, the NRC inspector concluded
that the job was satisfactorily performed, but that the procedure was
inadequate. This is an apparent violation.
(368/8613-01)
6.
Followup on IE Bulletins (Units 1 and 2)
The NRC inspector reviewed the licensee's actions taken in response to two
IE Bulletins (IEBs) issued to the licensee for information in 1985. No
written response was required for these bulletins, so the review included
verification that the IEBs were received by the licensee and were reviewed
for applicability by appropriate licensee personnel.
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a.
IEB 85-01, entitled " Steam Binding of Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps," was
issued on October 29, 1985. A response was not required since
licensee corrective action had been previously performed and this
action had been verified by the NRC. We have no further questions
regarding this matter at this time,
b.
IEB 85-02, entitled "Undervoltage Trip Attachments of Westinghouse DB-50
Type Reactor Trip Breakers," was issued on November 5, 1985. Licensee
review of this IEB concluded that it was not applicable at Arkansas
Nuclear One.
We have no further questions regarding this matter at
this time.
No violations or deviations were identified.
7.
Followup on IE Information Notices (Units 1 and 2)
The NRC inspector reviewed the licensee actions taken in response to
IE Information Notices (IENs) issued in 1985. The IENs included in this
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review included 85-51 through 85-101 and the earlier 1985 IENs for which
the licensee had not yet completed its review at the time of the last NRC
inspection in this area. The review ircluded verification that the
notices were received by the licensee, that they were distributed to
appropriate personnel for an applicability r? view, and that appropriate
corrective actions were taken or scheduled.
The NRC inspector found that the licensee had received the IENs, and that
it has a system for distributing the IENs for review and for assignment
and tracking of responsive actions. The NRC inspector reviewed the
documented ifcensee reviews and responsive actions for a sampling of the
completed IENs and found the reviews to be appropriate in scope and depth
and the responsive actions to be comprehensive.
The licensee has nct completed a review of the following IENs:
85-21
85-84
85-27
85-85
85-28
85-86
85-32
85-87
85-45
85-91
85-53
85-92
85-59
85-94
85-73
85-96
85-74
85-101
As some of these IENs have licensee assigned due dates for review as far
back as June or July of 1985, the NRC inspector concluded that the Itcensee
should improve its timeliness of IEN review.
No violations or deviations were identified.
8.
Followup on Licensee's Response to Selected Safety Issues (Units 1 and 2)
The NRC inspector reviewed licensee actions taken in response to certain
safety issues which were discussed in various NRC and industry notices.
a.
Biofouling of Cooling Water Systems and Heat Exchangers (Units 1
and 2)
The licensee established Procedures 1311.01 and 2311.02, entitl ed,
" Service Water Flow Test" for Unit 1 and Unit 2, respectively. These
procedures are performed each refueling outage, using temporary and
permanent instrumentation to measure flow through the safety-related
heat exchangers served by service water. The flow values obtained
are compared to design values to determine whether biofouling has
degraded heat exchanger performance.
If heat exchanger performance
is found to be degraded, the heat exchanger and its associated
equipment is declared inoperable and the Technical Specification
Limiting Condition for Operation dictates further actions. The
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licensee has an action plan for periodic inspections of heat
exchangers and other portions of the service water system. During
the upcoming refueling outages, several heat exchangers and pipe
sections in each unit are scheduled for inspection. Periodic flushes
are performed on the fire protection system headers.
b.
Natural Circulation Cooldown (Unit 1)
The NRC inspector discussed this issue with operations personnel and
reviewed the following procedures:
1202.01
Emergency Operating Procedures
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1203.13
Natural Circulation Cooldown
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1104.04
Decay Heat Removal System Operations
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These procedures included guidance in the following areas:
Determining reactor coolant inventory when pressurizer
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level is not indicative of reactor coolant inventory.
Corrective actions if an abnormal rise in pressurizer level
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occurs during depressurization.
Ensuring reactor coolant inventory by maintaining margin to
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saturation.
Placing pressurizer level control in manual during periods
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of anomalous pressurizer level indication.
Securing letdown upon reactor trip.
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Maximum natural circulation cooldown rate to avoid
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formation of a steam void in the reactor vessel head area.
Conditions to be met prior to restarting reactor coolant
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pumps.
The NRC inspector concluded that the licensee had provided an appropriate
response to each of these two issues.
No violations or deviations were identified.
9.
Exit Interview
The NRC inspectors met with Mr. J. M. Levine, Director, Site Nuclear
Operations, and other members of the AP&L staff at the end of this
inspection. At this meeting, the inspectors summarized the scope of the
inspection and the findings.
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