ML20197G031

Responds to Re NRC Knowledge of Leak Rate Falsification.Nrc Did Not Know Leak Rate Test Results Had Been Falsified

ML20197G031
Person / Time
Site:	Three Mile Island
Issue date:	08/22/1983
From:	Dircks W NRC OFFICE OF THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR FOR OPERATIONS (EDO)
To:	Weiss E HARMON & WEISS
Shared Package
ML20197G036	List: ML20197G031 ML20197G057 ML20211P939 ML20211P945 ML20211P975 ML20211P996 ML20211Q010 ML20211Q022 ML20211Q028
References
NUDOCS 8308310110
Download: ML20197G031 (1)

Text

r +.

5h- 7 TE~ s .m emr;.t AUG 2 21983 Docket No. 50 289 eu w 7- g Ellyn R. Weiss Attorney at Law Harmon & Weiss 1725 I Street, N.W.

Suite 506 Washington, D.C. 20006

Dear Ms. Weiss:

This is in response to your letter of August 11, 1983 commenting on a memo I wrote in reply to a question Comissioner Gilinsky had posed to me.

Apparently you and I understand the Comissioner's question differently in at least one critical respect. You characterize the question as assuming "that the senior staff knew that the leak rates had been falsified ..."

(emphasis added). However, the question itself phrases the premise as follows:

... senior NRC staff members apparently believed by March or April of 1980 that leak rate test results had likely been falsified ..." (emphasis added). ,

The senior staff did not know that the leak rate test results had been falsified. Rather, the premise of Comissioner Gilinsky's question properly reflects the senior staff's understanding of matters. Since the coments in your letter appear to be predicated upon what I believe to be a misinter-pretation of the Comissioner's question, any further response on my part would not appear worthwhile.

Sincerely, (Signed)Wi!!iam J. Dircks William J. Dircks Executive Director for Operations cc: TMI-1 Service List DISTRIBUTION:

Chairman Palladino JPMurray EDO R/F Comissioner Gilinsky GHCunningham RDeYoung Comissioner Roberts EChristenbury TMurley, Reg. I Comissioner Asselstine JGoldberg JRoe Comissioner Bernthal MCutchin TRehm

~

MWagner VStello RRawson HDenton

/ ! C Yr  %, JGray ECase f30g/D piiks EDO #13439 j - 1 OELD FF (2)

,wL 0FC  : DELD  : EDO , ~ /.  :  :  :  :

_____:____________:g g ' @', ___________:____________:____________: ___________.___________

NAME :JPMurray:mjp: .  :  :  :  :  ::

1) ATE - 8/ /F2 -

8/svi83  ;  :  :  :  :

e t,f HAnxox & WEISS 5725 ST A c cT. N.W suiTc sos osia wco At tvv MA AMON WAS HINGToN, D. C. 2 coos Tc'ca"c~c E gtv N A wEis5 :202'E23 SC7C WILLIAM 5. JORD AN, lil LCE L. BIS MCP DIANC CU A A AN LUCI A 5 CATM E'""' "5 August 11, 1983 William J. Dircks Executive Director for Operations United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 Re: TMI-l Restart, Docket 50-289 SP

Dear Mr. Dircks,

On July 19, 1983, you sent a memorandum to Commissioner Gilinsky in response to his question of June 29, 1983. The Commissioner's question was:

> Since senior NRC staff members apparently believed by March or April of 1980 that leak rate test results had likely been falsified prior to the March 28, 1979 incident at TMI-2, and that this was a potentially serious matter, why was this belief not communicated to the Licensing Board or the Commission?

(emphasis added).

Your response of July 19, 1983 begins with the observation:

"Maybe I am missing something" and goes on to argue that "it is reasonable and logical to infer", from the fact that the matter was referred to DOJ, that the staff believed that the leak rates had likely been fasified and that the matter was potentially serious. I suggest that, judging by your response you are indeed " missing something." The question assumes that senior staff knew that the leak rates had been falsified and that the matter was potentially serious; the question asks why you did not so inform the ASLB or Commission.

Your sole response on this point is to refer to supplements I and II of NUREG-0680, which did, in fact, constitute the sum total of the staff's' communication to the ALAB and the hearing record regarding this matter.

I RtU g i ,o '!c( C) v

- - - - - - - - - - - -- )

Hanxox & WEISS William J. Dircks Page Two The pertinent sections of these documents which you cited without quoting are reproduced in their entirety below:

A separate investigative effort is being conducted by the Department of Justice (DOJ) in response to concerns regarding falsification of leakNRC rateinterviews test datawith forthe plant Reactor Coolant System (RCS).

personnel and records review revealed that continuing leakage from one or more of the pressurizer relief vavles had existed since the Fall of 1978. A review of the REC leakage procedure and a Temporary Change Notice to the procedure " revealed that the basic procedure was in error The resulting in miscalculations of the RCS leak rate."

leak rates, recalculated by the Office of Inspection and Enforcement using a corrected procedure on Unit 2 data, exceeded limits allowed by the Units' Technical Specifications. Additional details regarding the procedure are described in Section I .1.2.3. , "RCS Leakage," of NUREG-0600. During interviews with the NRC, the SIG, and the media, allegations were made by a former TMI cperator concerning the implementation of the RCS leakage procedure

> and improper data collection. The allegations raised concerns regarding the principles of compliance with operating procedures and management philosophy and actions. Investigative effort was initally undertaken by the NRC. Subsequently, af ter consultation with the DOJ, the DOJ convened a Grand Jury which is currently hearing testimony in this matter. Pending completion of the DOJ investigation, the NRC has suspended its inquiry into the matter so as not to interf ere with the DOJ investigation.

We can draw no conclusions on this item pending the completion of the two investigations described above.

Based upon the outcome of the investigations, further

' enforcement action, which is under the jurisdiction of the NRC, will be taken if appropriate. At this time, the staff cannot predict when these investigations will be concluded.

NUREG-0680, Supp. I at 37, Nov. 1980, emphasis added.

That investigation was initially undertaken by NRC and

' identified a number of apparent problems related to procedure adherence. NRC investigative effort was suspended pending the conclusions of the DOJ investigation, at their request, to avoid parallel administrative and criminal proceedings. The DOJ investigation is still ongoing, and the NRC does not possess any information as to when it may be completed. NRC personnel involved in the

0 Harotox S: weiss

• illiam J. Dircks Page Three suspended investigation have been requested by DOJ not to discuss the details of the matter. Since completion of the investigation of this matter by the NRC could turn up information which is related to past management practices, the matter was included in Supplement 1 to the Evaluation Report. The NRC will resume its investigation of the concerns when DOJ has completed its investigation of the matter. However, the staff has reviewed the information that it has obtained to date on tne matter, and has concluded on he basis of informaton thus far obtained that there appears to be no direct connection with the Unit 2 accident.

NUREG-0680, Supp. II, at 9-10, March, 1981, emphasis added.

To the extent that your memo is responsive at all to Commissioner Gilinsky's question, it implies that the above-quoted language sh.ould have conveyed to the Boards and the Commission (and presumably, the parties) that the staff believed that the TMI-2 leak rates had been systematically falsified and that this was."a potentially serious problem."

> Such a suggestion is absurd and I am astonised that the NRC's Executive Director would make it. Not only do the plain words of the SER Supplements fail to convey this message,they convey precisely the opposite impression.

Supplement I specifically states that the staff draws "no --

cenclusions" pending the completion of the investigations.

Supplement II goes further in the direction of active misleading of the reader; it offers the following as the only conclusion of the staff's review: However the staff nas reviewed the information that it has obtained to date on the matter, and nas concluded on the basis of information thus far obtained that there appears to be no direct connection with the l

Unit 2 accident.

l The only possible intent of that last sentence was to l

denigrate the significance of the leak rate falsification by claiming that it was not related to the accident. Not only was such a conclusion in direct conflict with the conclusion reached by Harold Ornstein, who investigated this matter for the Special Inquiry Group, the effect of offering it as the sole conclusion was to communicate two demonstrably false l

impressions: 1) that the issue was unimportant to the Restart

! proceeding and 2) that no conclusion had been reached as to the truth of the allegations.

. \

1 H ARMON 8: WEISS i

William J. Dircks Page Four Moreover, the staff's peculiarlyobsure choice of words to describe the underlying facts also served to hide the nature and significance of the issues involved. The Staff describes Hartman's allegations that TMI-2 leak rates had been systematically falsified on all shifts over a period of several months prior and up to the accident as follows:

. . . allegations were made by a former TMI operator concerning the implementation of the RCS leakage procedure and improper data collection. The allegations raised concerns regarding the principles of compliance with operating procedures and management philosophy and actions.

NUREG-0680, supp. I. supra.

The investigation. . . identified a number of apparent problems related to procedure adherence.

NUREG-0680, Supp. II, supra.

, Systematic, flagrant and continuing falsification of leak rate calculations in violation of the plant's-license conditions can harldly be described as raising only " apparent problems related to procedure adherence," unless the intent of the writer is to obsure rather than reveal the facts.

The sad truth is that the NRC staff not only failed to inform the ASLB that it believed the TMI-2 leak rates were, in fact, falsified and 't hat this matter was a serious one, it actively misled the Boards and the parties. That, of course, is why everyone who heard Tim Martin tell the Commissioners in May that the staff knew three years ago that the leak rates were falsified was astonished.

As Executive Director for Operations, your duty is to supervise the staff. Instead of making an effort to determine who is responsible for this episode and calling those persons to account, you appear to have engaged yourself in the bureaucratic coverup. I urge you to reconsider this course.

\ .

Very truly yours, Ellyn R. Weiss General Counsel UCS ERW/cpk cc: TMI-l Service List Commissioners

- .. _ - _ _ _ _ _ - -. _