ML20197D801
| ML20197D801 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 04/08/1975 |
| From: | Larson H NRC OFFICE OF THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR FOR OPERATIONS (EDO) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20197D284 | List:
|
| References | |
| SECY-75-155, SECY-75-155-R, NUDOCS 9712290129 | |
| Download: ML20197D801 (10) | |
Text
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NUct.EA] REGULA' T' oFiY COMMISslON THUuvw K..LAE,,1_510.1._1_ TEM socwn. SS lOL m
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,DATEDg1M5dEM-774 THEPROVIS%9Ofo,36 in By Authority of.7;/
e (De@fication
/ Number)6 Date of Deciatelfication 7
For:
The Ccmmissioners 7
Thru:
Executive Director for Operation
Subject:
NATIONAL SECURITY ASPECTS OF RELEASING SAFEGUARDS PROCEDURES AND DATA ON NUCLEAR MATERIALS
Purpose:
To recomend Comission action on the National Security Council Study on releasir.g safeguards information.
Category:
This paper covers a major policy matter requiring Comission approval.
Issue:
Commission's view of the National Security Council Study on National Security Aspects of Releasing Safeguards i
Pror.edures and Data on Nuclear Materials.
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e; Decision -Criteria:
Does the study provide the ne.cessary advice to the Comission regarding the national security signifi-N cance of the release of MUF information?
6 z-Will the study's recomendation effectively protect sensitive safeguards information?
Should special legislation be obtained to allow NRC to withhold sensitive safeguards informacion unoer 2
j2 T:5 the Freedom of Information Act?
Alternatives:
1.
Endorse the report including its conclusiors and recommendations.
2.
Endorse the conclusionsof the report that sensitive safeguards information requires. protection, pointing out problems with classification of licensee infor-mation.
Discussion:
In response to the AEC request for review of the national security implications of release of safeguards information,
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the National Security Council (NSC) instituted a study on NAh6HAC SECURITS the release of information relating to safeguards pro 3 cedures. A copywof' the letter from the NS.C_ditecting g/gnj.omwharrghedle thisWW v.ca.
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KOTE: TAB A AND TAB B/CCNFIDENTIAL ESCLOSURE 2/ SECRET p -.
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that the study be conducted is attached at Tab A.
The study was completed and delivered to the NSC and a copy of the letter transmitting the study from ERDA is attached at Tab B. is a sumary of the report and Enclosure 2 is a copy of the report as.so$-
s mitted to the NSC.
NRC has an immediate problem of insuring protection of sensitive safeguards 4 formation in the hands of licensees during the lengthy time period before a classification program for licensees could be implemented. Accordingly, a regulation to require licensees to control the oistribution of safeguards information must be implemented immediately. The. study does not address this immediate problem.
It should be noted that classification under Executive Order 11652 is now reviewable in court under a Freedom of Infdrmation Act request.
It would appear that the most positive level of protection that can be obtained for special safeguards informatior) is that given by a special statute.
Classification of safeguards information may be viewed as tantamount to classifying the nuclear industry and nuclear critics may argue this is being done to hide weaknesses in safeguards systems.
Alternative 1 - Endorse the repart.
Pro:
Provides advice to Comission regarding national security significance of release of MUF information and other safeguards related information.
Cons: Classification may not effectively protect sensitive safeguards information under the Freedom of Information Act.
Special legislation would be more difficult to obtain after information were classified.
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Alternative 2 - Endorse the conclusions of the report a6d-~ point out that special legislation will be sought.
Pros:
Provides advice to Commission regarding national security significance of release of MUF infor-mation and other safeguards related information.
Improves probability that final NSC recomendation will effectively protect sensitive safeguards information.
Preserves the option to request from the Congress an exemption from the Freedom of Information Act.
Recommendation:
Approve the letter to the NSC at Tab C transmf tting the Conmission's view endorsing the conclusions of the report and pointing out the problems associated with classification of licensee information, Alternative 2.
Coordination:
The Office of the Executive Legal Director has no legal objection to the recommendation.
It does, however, con-sider the difficulty identified in the report of requiring licensees, by regulation, to protect unclassified sensitive information to be exaggerated and considers that NRC has the authority to promulgate such a regulation.
If legislation is sought to permit withholding of sensitive information, NRC's authority to promulgate such a regu-lation could then be clarified.
Scheduling:
Schedule at the earliest convenient policy session.
oward J. L rsopl, ating Director rat vv Office of Nu ar Material Safety ard Safeguards
Enclosures:
Tab A - Ltr fm NSC Tab B - Ltr. ERDA to NSC Tab C - Ltr. NRC to NSC - Sunnary Enclosure '2 - Report
Contact:
Robert T. McWhinney, Jr.
c Ext. 720S l
4 1A - :
APPENDIX 1 NATIONAL SECURITY CdUNCIt.
(
WASHINGTON. D.C. 20504
~~
CONFIDENTIAL /CDS January 25, 1975 National security study Memorandum 216 TO:
The Secretary of Defense The Attorney Cencral The Deputy Secretary of State The Director, U.S. Arms Control
- and Disarmament. Agency
-The Administrator, Energy Research and Develoument Administration SUBJEC"T:
National Security Aspects of Releasing Safeguard J.rocedures and Data on Nuclear Materials There have been recent requests for public release of unclassified infor-mation relating to safeguard procedures that are used to protect and account for nuclear materials and the results of these procedures. Such information could possibly assist terrorists or other groups in the diversic=, misuse, or threat' of misuse of nuclear material, and could, as wc11, "~a international consequences.
The President ha s tharofore directed that a stady be made of the que.stien of the release of sue'u informati:n.
'The study should include but,'not be limited to a review of the following iscues relating to the release of information.
the types of information involved, its sensitivity, and the criticality of the timing of release; possibic international consequences, including relations with LAEA and impact on our non-prollieration stra' egy; the applicabic regulations, practices, and laws, especially the provlsions of the Freedom of Information Act; the available bases and mechanisms for the control of information; :
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' proposals for alternate courses of action, including possrible. guide-(
lines for the release of information.
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. APPENDIX 1 2
CONFIDENTIA L/CDS f
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The study shall be carric'd out by an Ad Hoc Group, chaired by a repre sentstive of the Administrator of, Energy Research and Development and comprising representatives of the addressees.
The study should be coordinated with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, and forwarde.
to the President for his consideration.no later than March 28, 1975.
1 A
CA enry A. Nissingery y cc: William A. Anders Chairman, Nuclear Regulatory Ccmmission Direc, tor of Central Inte111ge=ce t
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UNITED STATES ENERGY RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT ADMINISTRATION
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s April 1, 1975
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The President The White House Y
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Dear fir. President:
As directed by r!ational Security Study flemorandum 216,' a study was made of the national security aspects of releasing safeguards procedures and data on nuclear materials.
The study was made by an ad hoc group con-sisting of representatives of the Departments of Defense, Justice, and State, the U. S. Arms Control.and Disamament Agency, and chaired by a representative of the U. S. Energy Research and Development Administra tion.
The fluclear Regulatory Commission stoff has participated in meetings'of the ad hoc group and has provided information and coments that have been taken into consideration in the preparation of the report. However, I understand that the flRC~ Commissioners will provide their comments on the report directly to you.
In brief, the ad hoc group' recoct; ends approval, in principle, of clas-sifying certain sensitive safeguards infomation as flational Security Information.
Essentially all the sensitive safeguards information could be adequately protected as Confidential-tiational Security Information.
Special treatment is to oe accorded MUF (material unaccounted for) data with the provision for declassification at the end cf six months durino v:hich time tne MUF number can t,e assessed and analyzed.
ACDA recc: mends that MUF data te withheld on the basis of exemotion 7 cf
.ie Freedom of Information Act (investigatory records compiled for law ei.forcement pur-poses) rather than by classification.
The Energy Research and favelopment Administration and the Ituelear Regulatory Ccemission would be asked to submit plans to implement the recommendations for liational Security Council review within G0 days.
I recomend you approve the recommendations of the ad hoc group.
Respectfully yours, (Signed) Robert C. Seamans, Jr.
d,lb l})(#1 i Robert C. Seamans, Jr.
Administrator
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Enclosure:
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NUCLEAR R'EGULATORY COM' MISSION
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W ASHIN3TCN. D. C. 20555 Honorable Henry A. Kissinger Assistant to the President National Security Council Washington, D. C.'
20506
Dear Dr. Kissinger:
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission wishes to ap' prise you of its views on the conclusions 'and recomendations of the study
" National Security Aspects of Releasing Safeguards Procedures and Data on Nuclear Materials".
We agree with the conclusions of the study that certain sensitive safeguards infomation generated by NRC licensees should be withheld from public disclosure and that inventory discrepancy data can be released after some appropriate time period. However, we are concerned that the report fails to consider what actions must be taken to protect safeguards information during the period required to implement either classification or to obtain an eremption from the Freedom of Information Act from the Congress, a period of 6-12 months ;c longer in either event.
The Comission is planning to issue a regulation that will require licensees to limit dissemination of safeguards information to those with a need to know and to draft proposed legislation for submission to the Congress to provide statutory authority for withholding of sensitive safeguards information.
We hope these coments will be of assistance to you.
Sincerely.
William A. Anders Chairman po# %
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4 ENCLOSURE 1 -
SUMMARY
OF REPORT NATIONAL SECURITY ASPECTS OF RELEASING SAFEGUARDS PROCEDURES AND DATA ON NUCLEAR MATERIALS Conclusions The ad hoc group formed to conduct the_ study concluded:
safeguards information in general should be withhe.1d from:
public disclosure.to protect the public health and safety and to provide for the common defense and security from malevolent acts involving spec ~ial nuclear material or nuclear facilities or the threat of such acts. As an exception to-this general conclusion, the study group determined that MUF-information could be released six months after its generation.
. - the only effective methods to withhold safeguards information were (1) classification and (2) new legislation that _specifically
- exem' pts safeguards information from the Freedom of Information Act.
Recommendations The recommendations contained in the report are:
classify and withhold certain sensitive safeguards information recognizing MUF data as a category of information requiring special treatment.
declassify and-release MUF data six months after its generation (start of inventory) except when a MUF investigation is still underway.
The determination of what safeguards information should be classified is left to the discretion of the NRC. As a minimum; however, licensee security plans, fundamental material control plans and inventory work sheets and reports would need to be classified.
Information Classification of safeguards information would require licensees to implement an industrial security program. This program would entail a security clearance for licensee personnel as well as personnel of non-licensee companies having a need for access to security and accountability plans and information derived from or pertaining to these plans (construction or maintenance w
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personnel who install security equipment and transp storage for and controls of the information would have to'be providad.
Classification would restrict the licensee's choice of construction o maintenance companies and tiansportation companies to those with cleared personnel and could res. ult in-closing facilities-to officials, and state or other Federal inspectors such as OSHA inspectors).
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l ISTRIBUTION_
COPY NO._.
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1 ccretary 2
hairman Anders 3
ommissioner Rowden 4
ommissioner Mason 5
sommissioner Gilinsky-6 i
Conunissioner Kennedy 7
- Exec. Dir. for Operations 8
" Exec. Legni Director
' Nuclear Material Safe.y 6 9
SafeEuards J
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d, h'llEN SEPARATED FROM ENCLOSURES l
IIANDLE TilIS PAGE AS..........
UNCLASSIFIED __
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