ML20196F429
| ML20196F429 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Catawba  |
| Issue date: | 02/29/1988 |
| From: | Tucker H DUKE POWER CO. |
| To: | NRC OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATION & RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (ARM) |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8803040011 | |
| Download: ML20196F429 (4) | |
Text
e Duxu Pownn COMPANY P.O. DOX 33180 CatAlt!.OrrP., N.O. 28242 11AL B. TUCKER T m enonn
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n, (704) orM531 mm...o.m-February 29, 1988 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission vDocument Control Desk Washington, D. C. 20555
Subject:
Catawba Nuclear Station, Unit 2 Docket No. 50-414 Discretionary Enforcement Relief from Technical Specification 3.7.1.2 Centlement his letter constitutes written follow-up of a request for temporary waiver of Technical Specificar. ion requirements which was made (and subsequently granted) via a telecon between Duke Power Company personnel and members of your staff on Febru-ary 25, 1988. This temporary emergency relief from compliance with the Technical Specification Limiting Conditions for Operation (LCO) Action Statement was request-ed to avoid unnecessarily forcing Catawba Unit 2 to Mode 4 (HOT SHUTDOWN) since the LCO Action Statement would have expired at 0515 hours0.00596 days <br />0.143 hours <br />8.515212e-4 weeks <br />1.959575e-4 months <br /> on February 26, 1988.
The proposed relief request was the result of the Auxiliary Feedwater System Tur-bine Driven Pump (CAPT) inoperability due to turbine speed control problems.
De CAPT was declared inoperable at 0515 hours0.00596 days <br />0.143 hours <br />8.515212e-4 weeks <br />1.959575e-4 months <br /> on February 23, 1988 and Mode 3 (HOT STANDBY) had been entered at 2359 hours0.0273 days <br />0.655 hours <br />0.0039 weeks <br />8.975995e-4 months <br /> on February 21, 1988.
Continued inoper-ability of the CAPT without Discretionary Enforcement would have required the unit to enter Mode 4 (HOT SHUTDOWN) by 1115 hours0.0129 days <br />0.31 hours <br />0.00184 weeks <br />4.242575e-4 months <br /> on February 26, 1988 Duke Power Company personnel repaired the turbine governor and servo mechanism in order to resolve the turbine speed rantrol problem.
Further testing revealed additional problems and it was determiud that necessary repairs and testing would not be completed within the extended LCO period.
The decision was made to cool-down to Mode 4 and continue repairs to the turbine.
Mode 4 was entered at 2247 hours0.026 days <br />0.624 hours <br />0.00372 weeks <br />8.549835e-4 months <br /> on February 26, 1988.
The function of the CA oystem is to provide feedwater to the S/G's in the event that the Condensate /Feedwater System is lost.
His water ensures a decay heat removal path to cool the Reactor Coolant System until such time that the Residual Heat Removal Syctem may be operated, ne CA motor-driven pumps remained operable throughout tt.tr event.
[b 8803040011 880229 i g PDR ADOCK 0D000414 P
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-s Document Control Desk
-February 29, 1988 I
Fage 2 A Safety Evaluation (attached) was completed in accordance with 10CFR 50.59. This Safety Evaluation concluded that no unreviewed safety question exists and that granting this request posed no undue risk to the health and safety of the public.
Very truly yours, d'
lM Bal' B. Tucker RWO/36/jge Attachment xet Dr. J. Nelson Grace, Regional Administrator U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region II 101 Marietta St., NW, Suite 2900 Atlanta, Georgia 30323 t
Mr. P.K. Van Doorn p
NRC Resident Inspector Catawba Nuclear Station t
t r
b l
- e.
Document Control Desk-February 29, 1988--
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bxc A.l Carr R '. Futrell J.V. Hampton C.L. Hartzell M.D. McIntosh J.M. McGarry NC MPA-1 NCEMC PMPA SREC N.A. Rutherford R.O. Sharpe J.G. Torre L.T. Burba CN-801.02 (15).
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i NUCLEAP SAFETY EVALUATION CHECKLIST The extension of the turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pump inoperability time in Mode 3 by 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> does not create the possibility of an accident which is outside the parameters previously evaluated in the FSAR.
The plant status at the t ime the inoperability period extension would take effect is as follows:
- The reactor has been in a refueling outage for the past 64 days and thero-fore thermal reactor power is at a reduced level.
- The present major heat source in the Reactor Coolant System is the heat addition of the Reactor Coolant Pumps.
The heat energy added by these pumps is not adequate for extended operation of the Turbine Driven Auxil-iary Feedwater Pump.
Therefore, the Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump would not presently be a viable option for plant cooldown given the present plant condition.
- Both motor driven auxiliary feed pumps are operable and their associated emergency diesel generators are operable.
- All required Emergency Core Cooling Systems are operable.
During the worst case accident evaluated in the FSAR, a main feedwater line break, with the above initial conditions, the inoperability of the turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pump will not prevent taking the reactor to Mode 4 and initiating the Residual Heat Removal System.
The reactor could be taken to Mode 4 using one or both of the following:
- The motor driven auxiliary feedwater pumps.
~ Ihe use of the pressurizer PORVs and available steam generator inventory to reduce reactor pressure to allow the initiation of feed and bleed procedures using the safety injection pumps.
Based upon the plant condition and the availability of other plant equipment as discussed above, it has been determined that the extension of the turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pump inoperability time in Mode 3 by 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> did nor create an unreviewed safety question.
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