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Category:TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS
MONTHYEARML20217F9701999-10-14014 October 1999 Proposed Tech Specs,Incorporating ARC for Axial Primary Water Stress Corrosion Cracking at Dented Tube Support Plate Intersections ML20217E4301999-10-12012 October 1999 Proposed Tech Specs,Revising Requirements for Containment Penetrations During Refueling Operations ML20211M7341999-08-30030 August 1999 Marked-up & Revised TS Pages,Providing Alternative to Requirement of Actually Measuring Response Times ML20211K1721999-08-30030 August 1999 Proposed Tech Specs,Providing Clarification to Current TS Requirements for Containment Isolation Valves ML20209B7731999-06-30030 June 1999 Proposed Tech Specs Updating Requirmements for RCS Leakage Detection & RCS Operational Leakage Specifications to Be Consistent with NUREG-1431 ML20196F2211999-06-24024 June 1999 Proposed Tech Specs Pages for Amend to Licenses DPR-77 & DPR-79,allowing Use of Fully Qualified & Tested Spare Inverter in Place of Any of Eight Required Inverters ML20196G4701999-06-24024 June 1999 Proposed Tech Specs Pages Re Amends to Licenses DPR-77 & DPR-79,revising TS to Be Consistent with Rev to ISTS Presently Submitted to NEI TSTF for Submittal as Rev to NUREG-1431 ML20196G7961999-06-22022 June 1999 Proposed Tech Specs Bases,Clarifying Proper Application of TS Requirements for Power Distribution Systems & Functions That Inverters Provide to Maintain Operability & Providing Updated Info on Cold Leg Injection Accumulators ML20195E9841999-06-0707 June 1999 Proposed Tech Specs,Increasing Max Allowed Specific Activity of Primary Coolant from 0.35 Microcuries/Gram Dose Equivalent I-131 to 1.0 Microcuries/Gram Dose Equivalent I-131 for Plant Cycle 10 (U2C10) Core ML20206E1391999-04-29029 April 1999 Proposed Tech Spec Change 99-03, Main Control Room Emergency Ventilation Sys Versus Radiation Monitors. Changes Add LCOs 3.3.3.1 & 3.7.7 to Address Inoperability of Radiation Monitoring CREVS & NUREG-1431 Recommendations ML20206E1611999-04-29029 April 1999 Proposed Tech Spec Change 99-04, Auxiliary Suction Pressure Low Surveillance Frequency Rev. Change Deletes Surveillance ML20204H4081999-03-19019 March 1999 Proposed Tech Specs,Relocating TS 3.8.3.1,3.8.3.2,3.8.3.3 & Associated Bases Associated with Electrical Equipment Protective Devices to Technical Requirements Manual ML20207D6011999-02-26026 February 1999 Proposed Tech Specs Relocating TS 3.7.6, Flood Protection Plan & Associated Bases from TS to Plant TRM ML20207D6331999-02-26026 February 1999 Proposed Tech Specs Providing for Consistency When Exiting Action Statements Associated with EDG Sets ML20206S0131999-01-15015 January 1999 Proposed Tech Specs 3.3.3.3, Seismic Instrumentation & Associated Bases,Relocated to Plant Technical Requirements Manual ML20199K6001999-01-15015 January 1999 Proposed Tech Specs Adding New Action Statement to 3.1.3.2 That Would Eliminate Need to Enter TS 3.0.3 Whenever Two or More Individual RPIs Per Bank May Be Inoperable,While Maintaining Appropriate Overall Level of Protection ML20195H6111998-11-16016 November 1998 Proposed Tech Specs Revising EDG SRs by Adding Note That Allows SR to Be Performed in Modes 1,2,3 or 4 If Associated Components Are Already OOS for Testing or Maint & Removing SR Verifying Certain Lockout Features Prevent EDG Starting ML20154H7251998-10-0808 October 1998 Proposed Tech Specs Pages,Supplementing Proposed TS Change 96-08,rev 1 to Add CRMP to Administrative Controls Section & Bases of TS ML20238F1091998-08-27027 August 1998 Proposed Tech Specs Providing for Insertion of Limited Number of Lead Test Assemblies,Beginning W/Unit 2 Operating Cycle 10 Core ML20238F3001998-08-27027 August 1998 Proposed Tech Specs Replacing 72 H AOT of TS 3.8.1.1,Action b,w/7 Day AOT Requirement for Inoperability of One EDG or One Train of EDGs ML20236G5961998-06-29029 June 1998 Proposed Tech Specs Typed Pages for TS Change 95-19, Section 6 - Administrative Controls Deletions ML20249C6371998-06-26026 June 1998 Proposed Tech Specs Lowering Specific Activity of Primary Coolant from 1.0 Uci/G Dose Equivalent I-131 to 0.35 Uci/G Dose Equivalent I-131,as Provided in GL 95-05 ML20248F0051998-05-28028 May 1998 Proposed Tech Specs for Section 6, Administrative Controls Deletions ML20217N3511998-04-30030 April 1998 Proposed Tech Specs Pages,Modifying Surveillance Requirement 4.4.3.2.1.b to Change Mode Requirement to Allow PORV Stroke Testing in Modes 3,4 & 5 W/Steam Bubble in Pressurizer Rather than Only in Mode 4 ML20203J1681998-02-25025 February 1998 Proposed Tech Specs Pages,Revising EDG Surveillance Requirements to Delete Requirement for 18-month Insp IAW Procedures Prepared in Conjunction W/Vendor Recommendations & Modify SRs Associated W/Verifying Capability of DGs ML20202J7601998-02-13013 February 1998 Proposed Tech Specs Section 3.7.9 Re Relocation of Snubber Requirements ML20202J7141998-02-13013 February 1998 Proposed Tech Specs Adding New LCO That Addresses Requirements for Main Feedwater Isolation,Regulating & Bypass Valves ML20202J6961998-02-13013 February 1998 Proposed Tech Specs Incorporating MSIV Requirements to Be Consistent W/Std TS (NUREG-1431) ML20198T4311998-01-21021 January 1998 Proposed Tech Specs Re New Position Title & Update of Description of Nuclear Organization ML20199K4571997-11-21021 November 1997 Proposed Tech Specs Adding one-time Allowance Through Operating Cycle 9 to Surveillance Requirement 4.4.3.2.1.b to Perform Stroke Testing of PORVs in Mode 5 Rather than Mode 4,as Currently Required ML20211A3191997-09-17017 September 1997 Proposed Tech Specs Re Pressure Differential Surveillance Requirements for Containment Spray Pumps ML20137T0871997-04-0909 April 1997 Proposed Tech Specs Re Elimination of Cycle 8 Limitation for SG Alternate Plugging Criteria ML20137M8581997-04-0101 April 1997 Proposed Tech Specs 2.1 Re Safety Limits & TS 3/4.2 Re Power Distribution Limits ML20137C8421997-03-19019 March 1997 Proposed Tech Specs Re Conversion from Westinghouse Electric Corp Fuel to Framatome Cogema Fuel ML20136J0381997-03-13013 March 1997 Proposed Tech Specs Section 5.6.1.2,revising Enrichment of Fuel for New Fuel Pit Storage Racks ML20134P8631997-02-14014 February 1997 Proposed Tech Specs Requesting Discretionary Enforcement for 48 Hours Which Is in Addition to 72 Hours Allowed Outage Time Provided by TS Action 3.8.1.1.b ML20134K9981997-02-0707 February 1997 Proposed Tech Specs Revising TS Change Request 96-01, Conversion from W Electric Corp Fuel to Framatome Cogema Fuel (MARK-BW-17), to Ensure That Core Analysis Computer Code Output Actions Are Consistent W/Hot Channel Factor SRs ML20134L9261996-11-0808 November 1996 Proposed Tech Specs Re Placing of Channel in Trip for Reactor Trip & Engineered Safety Feature Instrumentation Sys Solely to Perform Testing as Not Requiring Channel to Be Declared Inoperable ML20129D2661996-10-18018 October 1996 Proposed Tech Specs,Removing Existing Footnotes That Limit Application of Apc for Plant S/G Tubes to Cycle 8 Operation for Both Units ML20129G7301996-09-26026 September 1996 Proposed Tech Specs 3/4.3.3 Re Fire Detection instrumentation,3/4.7.11 Re Fire Suppression Systems & 3/4.7.12 Re Fire Protection Penetrations ML20113G2691996-09-20020 September 1996 Proposed Tech Specs Change 96-09, Clarification of Work Shift Durations for Overtime Limits ML20117J3391996-08-28028 August 1996 Proposed Tech Specs Revising Psv & MSSV Setpoint Tolerance from Plus or Minus 1% to Plus or Minus 3% ML20117D1651996-08-22022 August 1996 Proposed Tech Specs of SQN Units 1 & 2,deleting Table 4.8.1, DG Reliability, & Revising Section 3.8.1 to Allow Once Per 18 month,7 Day AOT for EDGs ML20117D3121996-08-22022 August 1996 Proposed Tech Specs,Lowering Minimum TS ice-basket Weight of 1,155 Lbs to 1,071 Lbs.Reduced Overall Ice Weight from 2,245,320 Lbs to 2,082,024 Lbs ML20117D3141996-08-21021 August 1996 Proposed TS 3.7.1.3 Re Condensate Storage Tank ML20117D3341996-08-21021 August 1996 Proposed Tech Specs Re Deletion of Surveillance Requirement 4.8.1.1.1.b ML20112H0431996-06-0707 June 1996 Proposed Tech Specs,Revising Section 6, Administrative Controls, to Be More Closely Aligned W/Requirements of STSs ML20101N7071996-04-0404 April 1996 Proposed Tech Specs,Allowing Conversion from Westinghouse Fuel to Fuel Provided by Framatome Cogema Fuels ML20096B3761996-01-0404 January 1996 Proposed Tech Specs Extending Radiation Monitoring Instrumentation Surveillance Period Per GL 93-05 ML20096C2481996-01-0303 January 1996 Proposed Tech Specs,Revising Bases Section 3/4.7.1.2 to Indicate Current Operational Functions of turbine-driven AFW Level Control Valves Modified During Unit 1 Cycle 7 Refueling Outage 1999-08-30
[Table view] Category:TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS & TEST REPORTS
MONTHYEARML20217F9701999-10-14014 October 1999 Proposed Tech Specs,Incorporating ARC for Axial Primary Water Stress Corrosion Cracking at Dented Tube Support Plate Intersections ML20217E4301999-10-12012 October 1999 Proposed Tech Specs,Revising Requirements for Containment Penetrations During Refueling Operations ML20211M7341999-08-30030 August 1999 Marked-up & Revised TS Pages,Providing Alternative to Requirement of Actually Measuring Response Times ML20211K1721999-08-30030 August 1999 Proposed Tech Specs,Providing Clarification to Current TS Requirements for Containment Isolation Valves ML20209B7731999-06-30030 June 1999 Proposed Tech Specs Updating Requirmements for RCS Leakage Detection & RCS Operational Leakage Specifications to Be Consistent with NUREG-1431 ML20196F2211999-06-24024 June 1999 Proposed Tech Specs Pages for Amend to Licenses DPR-77 & DPR-79,allowing Use of Fully Qualified & Tested Spare Inverter in Place of Any of Eight Required Inverters ML20196G4701999-06-24024 June 1999 Proposed Tech Specs Pages Re Amends to Licenses DPR-77 & DPR-79,revising TS to Be Consistent with Rev to ISTS Presently Submitted to NEI TSTF for Submittal as Rev to NUREG-1431 ML20196G7961999-06-22022 June 1999 Proposed Tech Specs Bases,Clarifying Proper Application of TS Requirements for Power Distribution Systems & Functions That Inverters Provide to Maintain Operability & Providing Updated Info on Cold Leg Injection Accumulators ML20196G8071999-06-22022 June 1999 Revs to Technical Requirements Manual ML20195E9841999-06-0707 June 1999 Proposed Tech Specs,Increasing Max Allowed Specific Activity of Primary Coolant from 0.35 Microcuries/Gram Dose Equivalent I-131 to 1.0 Microcuries/Gram Dose Equivalent I-131 for Plant Cycle 10 (U2C10) Core ML20206E1611999-04-29029 April 1999 Proposed Tech Spec Change 99-04, Auxiliary Suction Pressure Low Surveillance Frequency Rev. Change Deletes Surveillance ML20206E1391999-04-29029 April 1999 Proposed Tech Spec Change 99-03, Main Control Room Emergency Ventilation Sys Versus Radiation Monitors. Changes Add LCOs 3.3.3.1 & 3.7.7 to Address Inoperability of Radiation Monitoring CREVS & NUREG-1431 Recommendations ML20204E8501999-03-21021 March 1999 Plant,Four Yr Simulator Test Rept for Period Ending 990321 ML20204H4081999-03-19019 March 1999 Proposed Tech Specs,Relocating TS 3.8.3.1,3.8.3.2,3.8.3.3 & Associated Bases Associated with Electrical Equipment Protective Devices to Technical Requirements Manual ML20207D6331999-02-26026 February 1999 Proposed Tech Specs Providing for Consistency When Exiting Action Statements Associated with EDG Sets ML20207D6011999-02-26026 February 1999 Proposed Tech Specs Relocating TS 3.7.6, Flood Protection Plan & Associated Bases from TS to Plant TRM ML20206S0131999-01-15015 January 1999 Proposed Tech Specs 3.3.3.3, Seismic Instrumentation & Associated Bases,Relocated to Plant Technical Requirements Manual ML20199K6001999-01-15015 January 1999 Proposed Tech Specs Adding New Action Statement to 3.1.3.2 That Would Eliminate Need to Enter TS 3.0.3 Whenever Two or More Individual RPIs Per Bank May Be Inoperable,While Maintaining Appropriate Overall Level of Protection ML20195H6111998-11-16016 November 1998 Proposed Tech Specs Revising EDG SRs by Adding Note That Allows SR to Be Performed in Modes 1,2,3 or 4 If Associated Components Are Already OOS for Testing or Maint & Removing SR Verifying Certain Lockout Features Prevent EDG Starting ML20154H7251998-10-0808 October 1998 Proposed Tech Specs Pages,Supplementing Proposed TS Change 96-08,rev 1 to Add CRMP to Administrative Controls Section & Bases of TS ML20238F1091998-08-27027 August 1998 Proposed Tech Specs Providing for Insertion of Limited Number of Lead Test Assemblies,Beginning W/Unit 2 Operating Cycle 10 Core ML20238F3001998-08-27027 August 1998 Proposed Tech Specs Replacing 72 H AOT of TS 3.8.1.1,Action b,w/7 Day AOT Requirement for Inoperability of One EDG or One Train of EDGs ML20209J1631998-08-0707 August 1998 Rev 41 to Sequoyah Nuclear Plant Odcm ML20236G5961998-06-29029 June 1998 Proposed Tech Specs Typed Pages for TS Change 95-19, Section 6 - Administrative Controls Deletions ML20249C6371998-06-26026 June 1998 Proposed Tech Specs Lowering Specific Activity of Primary Coolant from 1.0 Uci/G Dose Equivalent I-131 to 0.35 Uci/G Dose Equivalent I-131,as Provided in GL 95-05 ML20248F0051998-05-28028 May 1998 Proposed Tech Specs for Section 6, Administrative Controls Deletions ML20217N3511998-04-30030 April 1998 Proposed Tech Specs Pages,Modifying Surveillance Requirement 4.4.3.2.1.b to Change Mode Requirement to Allow PORV Stroke Testing in Modes 3,4 & 5 W/Steam Bubble in Pressurizer Rather than Only in Mode 4 ML20203J1681998-02-25025 February 1998 Proposed Tech Specs Pages,Revising EDG Surveillance Requirements to Delete Requirement for 18-month Insp IAW Procedures Prepared in Conjunction W/Vendor Recommendations & Modify SRs Associated W/Verifying Capability of DGs ML20202J7651998-02-13013 February 1998 Technical Requirements Manual ML20202J7141998-02-13013 February 1998 Proposed Tech Specs Adding New LCO That Addresses Requirements for Main Feedwater Isolation,Regulating & Bypass Valves ML20202J6961998-02-13013 February 1998 Proposed Tech Specs Incorporating MSIV Requirements to Be Consistent W/Std TS (NUREG-1431) ML20202J7601998-02-13013 February 1998 Proposed Tech Specs Section 3.7.9 Re Relocation of Snubber Requirements ML20198T4311998-01-21021 January 1998 Proposed Tech Specs Re New Position Title & Update of Description of Nuclear Organization ML20199F8231997-11-30030 November 1997 Cycle 9 Restart Physics Test Summary, for 971011-971130 ML20199K4571997-11-21021 November 1997 Proposed Tech Specs Adding one-time Allowance Through Operating Cycle 9 to Surveillance Requirement 4.4.3.2.1.b to Perform Stroke Testing of PORVs in Mode 5 Rather than Mode 4,as Currently Required ML20211A3191997-09-17017 September 1997 Proposed Tech Specs Re Pressure Differential Surveillance Requirements for Containment Spray Pumps ML20203B9731997-08-0505 August 1997 Rev 1 to RD-466, Test & Calculated Results Pressure Locking ML20217J5581997-07-31031 July 1997 Cycle Restart Physics Test Summary, for Jul 1997 ML20210J1671997-04-30030 April 1997 Snp Unit 1 Cycle 8 Refueling Outage Mar-Apr 1997,Results of SG Tube ISI as Required by TS Section 4.4.5.5.b & Results of Alternate Plugging Criteria Implementation as Required by Commitment from TS License Condition 2C(9)(d) ML20137T0871997-04-0909 April 1997 Proposed Tech Specs Re Elimination of Cycle 8 Limitation for SG Alternate Plugging Criteria ML20137M8581997-04-0101 April 1997 Proposed Tech Specs 2.1 Re Safety Limits & TS 3/4.2 Re Power Distribution Limits ML20137C8421997-03-19019 March 1997 Proposed Tech Specs Re Conversion from Westinghouse Electric Corp Fuel to Framatome Cogema Fuel ML20136J0381997-03-13013 March 1997 Proposed Tech Specs Section 5.6.1.2,revising Enrichment of Fuel for New Fuel Pit Storage Racks ML20134P8631997-02-14014 February 1997 Proposed Tech Specs Requesting Discretionary Enforcement for 48 Hours Which Is in Addition to 72 Hours Allowed Outage Time Provided by TS Action 3.8.1.1.b ML20134K9981997-02-0707 February 1997 Proposed Tech Specs Revising TS Change Request 96-01, Conversion from W Electric Corp Fuel to Framatome Cogema Fuel (MARK-BW-17), to Ensure That Core Analysis Computer Code Output Actions Are Consistent W/Hot Channel Factor SRs ML20138F2581997-01-17017 January 1997 Rev 39 to Sequoyah Nuclear Plant Odcm ML20134L9261996-11-0808 November 1996 Proposed Tech Specs Re Placing of Channel in Trip for Reactor Trip & Engineered Safety Feature Instrumentation Sys Solely to Perform Testing as Not Requiring Channel to Be Declared Inoperable ML20129D2661996-10-18018 October 1996 Proposed Tech Specs,Removing Existing Footnotes That Limit Application of Apc for Plant S/G Tubes to Cycle 8 Operation for Both Units ML20129G7301996-09-26026 September 1996 Proposed Tech Specs 3/4.3.3 Re Fire Detection instrumentation,3/4.7.11 Re Fire Suppression Systems & 3/4.7.12 Re Fire Protection Penetrations ML20134J9991996-09-23023 September 1996 Fuel Assembly Insp Program 1999-08-30
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ENCLOSURE 1 PROPOSED TECHNICATISPECIFICATION CHANGE SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT UNITS 1 AND 2 ,
DOCKET NOS. 50-327 'AND 50-328 ,
i (TVA-SQN-TS-88-25) j LIST OF AFFECTED PAGES Unit 1 3/4 4-4a Unit 2 ,
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REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM
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RELIEF VALVES - OPERATING LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION l
1 3.4.3.2 Two power relief valves (PORVs) and their associated block valves .
shall be OPERABLE.
APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, and 3.
ACTION: ggE /\1TgenED q((7 ,,t#
- a. With one or more PORV(s) inoperable, within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> either restor t ORV(s) to OPERABLE status or close the associated bio a ve(s) and re. power from the block valve (s); otherwise n at least HOT STANDB hin the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in COL DOWN within the following 30 hou
- b. With one or more block va noperable, within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> either restore the block valve o BLE status or close the block valve (s) and remo ower from the b valve (s); otherwise, be in R16
. ..s at least HD DBY within the next 6 ho and in COLD SHUTDOWN i withi following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />. .
. The provisions of Specification 3.0.4 are not applicable.
IP SURVEILLANCE REOUIREMENTS 4.4.3.2.1 In addition to the requirements of Specification 4.0.5, each PORV shall be demonstrated OPERABLE at least once per 18 months by:
- a. Performance of a CHANNEL CALIBRATION, and
- b. by operating the valve through one complete cycle of full travel.
4.4.3.2.2 Each block valve shall be demonstrated OPERABLE at least once per 92 days by operating the valve through one complete cycle of full travel.
4.4.3.2.3 The emergency power supply for the PORVs and block valves shall be demonstrated OPERABLE at least once per.18 months by:
e
- a. Transferring motive and control power from the normal to the emergency power supply and .
- b. Operating the valves thri Jgh a complete cycle of f ull travel.
a s A r, n - m e mnn c v Nw-SEQUOYAH - UNIT 1 -
3/4 4-4a ' n nda;n'. '!;. "
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REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM RELIEF VALVES - OPERATING LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.4.3.2 All power operated relief valves (PORVs) and their associated block valves shall be OPERABLE.
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APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, and 3. -
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ACTION: 5GE MM# srdf6BfM -
With one or more PORV(s) inoperable, within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> either rest e PORV(s) to OPERABLE status or close the associated bl valve (s) ano ve power from the block valve (s); otherwise ^
in at least l HOT STAN ithin the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in C0 TOOWN within the l following 30 h
- b. With one or more b' lock va operable, within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> either restore the block valve o : BLE status or close the block valve (s) and remov er from the b valve (s); otherwise, ce in a BY within the next 6 ho at least HOT and in COLD SHUTOOWN within ollowing 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />.
I c, e provisions of Soecification 3.0.4 are not applicable.
SURVEILLANCE REOUIREMENTS l 4.4.3.2.1 In addition to the requirements of Specification 4.0.5, each PORV shall be demonstrated OPERABLE at least once per 18 months by:
i a. Performance of a CHANNEL CALIBRATION, and l
- b. Operating the valve through one complete cycle of full travel.
4.4.3.2.2 Each block valve shall be demonstrated OPERABLE at least once per 92 days by operating the valve through one complete cycle of full travel.
4.4.3.2.3 The emergency power supply for the PORVs and block valves snall be demonstrated OPERABLE at least once per 18 months by: '
- a. Transferring motive and esntrol power from the normal to the emergency power supply, and
- b. Operating the valves 'through a complete cycle of full travel. ,
i SEQUOYAH - UNIT 2 3/4 4-8 .
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3/4.4.4 RELIEF VALVES LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.4.4 All power-operated relief valves (PORVs) and their associated block .
valves shall be OPERABLE.
APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, and 3.
ACTION!
.c eqsve & 1&S Preudeceskrs\ -
-a. With one or more PORV(s) inoperable, b: = = d = n ni:: :=
!=h ;;, within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> either restore the PORV(s) to CPERA8LE status or close the associated block valve (s); otherwise, be in at least HOT STANOBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />, an inceable *! %S Pcesure coa nd -
- b. With one PORV inoperable Jo. te eee;e e t.'e. tr.e;; na n i n :=
10&;e, within i hour either restore the PORV to OPERABLE status or close the associated block valve and remove power from the block valve; restore the PORV to OPERABLE status within the following 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> or be in HOT STAN08Y wtihin the nuxt 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in COLD v SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />, a m4. ;nce:Me .c Sc.s presswe e..a,.)
.. c. With both PORV(sl inoperable e: u :=:n :th:r th= ===i= :=
!:&; , within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> either restore each of the PORV(s) to OPERABLE status or close their associated block valve (s) and remove power from the block valve (s1 and ba in HOT STANOBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and COLD SHUTCCWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />.
- d. With one or = ore block valve (s) inoperable, within 1 hour:
(1) restore the block valve (s) to OPERABLE status, or close the block valve (s) and remove power from the block valve (s), or close the PORV and recove power from its assoicated solenoid valve; and (2) apply the ACTION b. or c. above, as appropriato, for the isolated PORV(s).
- e. The provisions of Specification 3.0.4 are not applicable.
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yc ENCLOSURE 2
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PROPOSED TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION CHANGE SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR FLANT UNITS 1 AND 2 DOCKET NOS. 50-327 AND 50-328 (TVA-SON-TS-88-25)
LESCRIPTION AND JUSTIFICATION FOR RELIEF VALVE ACTION STATEMENTS l
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. ENCLOSURE 2 Description of Change Tennessee Valley Authority proposes to modify the Sequoyah Nuclear Plant units 1 and 2 technical specifications to revise the action statements of limiting conditions for operation (LCO) 3.4.3.2 for the pressurizer power-operat1d relief valves (PORVs) and their associated block valves.
The propoaue change will require different actions based on the cause of valve inoperability. With one or more PORVs inoperable but capable of reactor coolant sys:em (RCS) pressure control, power operation may continue, provided the associated block valve is closed (power does not
- have to be removed from the closed block valve). With one or more PORVs or block valves inoperable and incapable of RCS pressure control, reactor shutdown will be required.
Reason for Change The Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) accident analysis for a steam generator tube rupture (SGTR), section 15.4.3, assumes that with a loss of
- offsite power, RCS pressure is reduced to 1.100 pounds per square inch a absolute by using the pressurizer PORVs. This pressure reduction is required to minimize the amount of reactor coolant transferrtd to the
, secondary side and eventually terminate RCS break flow.
The current action statement for an inoperable PORV requires the associated block valve be closed and its power removed. Once the block i
valve is closed and power removed, there is no time limit to return the PORV to operable status because the action was only intended to ensure that a leaking PORV could not be a source of uncontrolled RCS leakage.
This action does not enaure availability of at least one PORV for RCS depressurization following a postulated SGTR accident coincident with a loss of offsite power and a single failure. For example, the normal pressurizer spray system is not available during a loss of offsite power, and a single failure of a battery board would render one PORV inoperable.
Justification for Change j The pressurizer PORVs are designed to limit the pressurizer pressure to a value below the high-pressure reactor trip setpoint for all design transients up to and including the design percentage step load decrease with steam dump but without reactor trip. The PORVs are operated i
automatically or by manual control. The operation of these valves also 11mits the undesirable opening of the spring-loaded safety valves, j Remotely operated block valves are provided to isolate the PORVs if 1 excessive leakage occurs. 'Ihe FSAR analysis for overpressure protection I during modes 1, 2, and 3 assumes that the PORVs do not actuate. The j pressurizer safety valves provide the required pressure relief.
The PORVs are also used to reduce RCS pressure following an SGTR accident. The emergency instructions require at least one block valve be 1
open so that a PORV will be available for pressure reductions. When normal pressurizer sprays are not available, the PORVs arc.to be used.
The FSAR accident analysis for an SCTR takes credit for the use of the i
PORVs to mitigate this accident.
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, The proposed change to the SQN technical specifications is similar to revision 5 of NUREG-0452, Westinghouse Standard Technical Specifications (STS). Howeser, revision 5 places more stringent action requirements on PORV and block valve inoperability in order to ensure PORV operability following an SGTR.
The STS actions distinguish between valve inoperability because of excessive seat leakage and inoperability because of causes other than excessive seat leakage. TVA proposes to make this distinction based on valve capability of effecting RCS pressure control. The need for this change is based on the availability of the PORV to reduce the RCS pressure '
following an SGTR. The PORV can be inoperable in other ways than seat leakage and still be capable of RCS depressurization. For example, a failed pressure transmitter or pressurizer pressure controller failure would cause automatic PORV actuation to be inoperable, but remote manual valve operation is still available. Also, the term "excessive seat leakage" is not defined and, therefore, difficult to interpret. RCS pressure control is directly related to the safety function and easy to interpret.
The only change made to action (a) for an inoperable PORV is that power does not have to be removed from the closed block valve. Once the block valve is closed, inadvertent pressure reductions because of the inoperable PORV are prevented. Also, both the PORV and the block valve are closed, and therefore, no single failure (spurious opening) could lead to RCS leakage. Because power to the closed block valve is available, operator action can be taken to open the block valve and the PORV during an SGTR.
PORV leakage would be inconsequential. Additionally, specification 3.4.6.2 adequately covers RCS leakage.
Actions (b) and (c) are addr.d to ensure assumptions made in the FSAR are valid during an SGTR with loss of offsite power and a single failure. If the PORV failed in such a way that it could not be opened and thus be incapable of reducing RCS pressure, reactor shutdown would be necessary.
This action is also added for an inoperable block valve.
The proposed change ensures that PORV operability not only addresses the need for protecting the RCS pressure boundary integrity, but also addresses availability of the PORVs for purposes of pressure control.
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ENCLOSURE 3
__._.. PROPOSED. TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION CHANGE SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT UNITS 1 AND 2 DOCKET NOS. 50-327 AND 50-328 (TVA-SQN-TS-88-25)
DETERMINATION OF NO SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS CONSIDERATIONS .
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[ ENCLOSURE 3 1
1 Significant Hazards Evaluation l
L TVA has evaluated the proposed technical specification change and has determined that it does not represent a significant hazards consideration based on criteria established in 10 CFR 50.92(c). Operation of SQN in accordance with the proposed amendment will not:
(1) Involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of ,
an accident previously evaluated. The pressurizer PORVs are designed to limit pressurizer pressure and prevent the undesirable opening of the safety valves. The FORVs are also used for automatic and manual l . pressure control. The FSAR analysis for overpressurization protection during modes 1, 2, and 3 assumes that the PORVs do not actuate. The pressurizer safety valves provide the required pressure relief. However, the FSAR accident analysis for an SGTR does take i credit for pressure reduction using the PORVs. The proposed change l ensures PORV operability for this purpose. If the PORV is incapable j of RCS pressure control, then reactor shutdown is required. Thus, the proposed change ensures the assumptions made in the FSAR are j valid and the resulting consaquences of the SGTR accident remain I
within conservative limits.
(2) Create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any previously analyzed. The change to the action statements does not require any hardware changes nor any changos to the operating procedures. The change simply places more restrictive limitations on continued power operations when a PORV is inoperable and incapable of RCS pressure control. Thus, the possibility of a new or different kind of accident is not created.
(3) Involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety. The intended design and operation of the PORVs have not been changed. The valve function to provide overpressure protection is the same, while valve availability for pressure control has increased. The more stringent action statements prevent operation in an unanalyzed condition and therefore improve the margin of safety.
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