ML20195D722
| ML20195D722 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | 07200022 |
| Issue date: | 06/02/1999 |
| From: | Brunsdon B AFFILIATION NOT ASSIGNED, STONE & WEBSTER, INC. |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20195D715 | List: |
| References | |
| ISFSI, NUDOCS 9906100034 | |
| Download: ML20195D722 (30) | |
Text
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1 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Before the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board 1
In the Matter of
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PRIVATE FUEL STORAGE L.L'C.
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Docket No. 72-22
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(Private Fuel Storage Facility)
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DECLARATION OF BRUCE BRUNSDON
_ Bruce E. Brunsdon states as follows under penalties of perjury:
1.
I am a Lead Mechanical Engineer for Stone & Webster Engineering Corp.
In that position I analyze the dynamic responses of mechanical systems in nuclear facilities. I am providing this declaration in support of a motion for partial summary l
_ disposition of Contention Utah K in the above captioned proceeding to show that accidents at the Tekai Rocket Engine Test Facility, including potential explosions of rocket motors and rocket motors potentially escaping their test stands during firing, would pose no significant hazard to the Private Fuel Storage Facility (PFSF).
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2.
My professional and educational experience is summarized in the I
curriculum vitae attached as Exhibit I to this declaration. I have extensive experience since 1980 in the dynamic response analysis of:ne hanical systems, structures, piping l
systems, and vessels in the commercial nuclear power industry and DOE weapons programs. I am familiar with techniques for evaluating barrier penetration and impact.
effects using energy balance and ductility ratio considerations. I have over twelve years experience'in directing project activities for DOE facilities at Rocky Flats, Lawrence Livermore National Laboistory, Idaho National Engineering Laboratory and the Savannah River Site.
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I am knowledgeable of the location of the PFSF and the Tekoi test facility and of the design of the PFSF and the spent fuel casks that will be used there. I am also knowledgeable of the means of estimating the effects of explosions on structures of L
nuclear facilities and the means for estimating the likelihood that an accident-generated missile would strike a facility. I am also knowledgeable of the capability of structures, j;
systems, and components important to safety at the ISFSI, including the spent fuel casks,
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to withstand explosions and potential impacts from missiles.
l 4.
In the bases for Utah Contention K, the State alleged that PFS inadequately considered the potential for credible accidents at the Tekoi Rocket Engine
- Test Facility to harm the PFSF, in that PFS failed to consider the possibility that the PFSF could be harmed by an explosion or by a rocket motor that escaped from its test hamess.
5.
The Tekoi test facility is owned by Alliant Techsystems, Inc. (Alliant) and is located on the Reservation'of the Skull Valley Band of Goshute Indians. Tekoi encompasses two operational areas: a high hazard explosive test area and a static test range. ' The static test range includes three test bays. The PFSF is located over two miles from the Tekoi test facility. Specifically, the closest part of the PFSF Restricted Area, in which the spent fuel casks and all systems important to safety at the PFSF will be located, is 2.3 miles (12,100 ft.) north by northwest of the Tekoi test bay in which the largest rocket motors are tested. That bay is the location closest to the PFSF at which explosives or rocket motors are tested at Tekoi. (The relative locations of the Tekoi test facility and the PFSF are shown on the portions of the USGS topographical maps attached as Exhibit 2 to this declaration). The PFSF canister transfer building is located 2.4 miles (12,700 ft.) from the same test bay. The closest storage pads on which the spent fuel storage casks will be located will be 2.5 miles (13,200 ft.) from the bay.
6.
Both operational areas at Tekoi-4he high hazard explosive test area and the static test range-are sited for explosive test operations, in accordance with the safe 1
offset distances for the quantity of explosives to be tested, as prescribed by the 1
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Department of Defense Contractors' Safety Manual for Ammunition and Explosives (DoD 4145.26M). Rocket motor explosions in testing are rare because of the design of the rocket motors and the safety precautions that are taken during testing. Nevertheless, the siting of explosive test operations assumes that an explosion will occur sometime in
-the life of the facility. Therefore, safe offset distances are established to protect against
_ the effects of overpressure, fragments, and heat that could be produced by an explosion.
- 7. '
The Tekoi high hazard explosive test area tests all classes of explosives,
' and intentional detonations are an inherent part of the testing. The high hazard test area
' currently has an explosive limit of 200 lbs. Class 1.1 explosives. The " class" of a hazardous material indicates its hazard class and division designator under the United
. Nations Organization system. Class 1.1 consists of mass detonating material, which can detonate almost instantaneously upon ignition. Class 1.1 includes bulk explosives and some propellants. Class 1.3 (material of which class is contained in rocket motors tested at Tekoi) consists of mass fire material, which burns vigorously with little chance of being extinguished in storage. Explosions involving Class 1.3 material, however, are normally confined to pressure ruptures of containers and do not produce propagating shock waves or damaging blast overpressure at ranges as long as those at which explosions involving Class 1.1 material produce such effects.
8.
The Tekoi static test range consists of three bays. Bay 1 is used for machining oflarge rocket motors containing Class 1.1 and 1.3 propellants. Bay 3 is used for static testing of full scale rocket motors containing both explosive Class 1.1 and 1.3 propellants. Bay 2 is not currently used. Static firing includes rocket motors under development and in production. Test limits are set in terms of Class 1.1 propellants because they produce explosion damage at ranges greater than those at which Class 1.3 propellants produce such damage. Bay 1 of the static test area has an explosive limit of 100,000 lbs. of Class 1.1 propellants. Bay 2 has an explosive limit of 50,000 lbs. of Class 1.1 propellants. Bay 3 has an explosive limit of 1.2 million Ibs. of Class 1.1 propellants.
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The limits are fixed by the designs of the test bays and Department of Defense
- regulations and may not be exceeded.
9.
The Department of Defense Contractors' Safety Manual for Ammunition and Explosives provides means to calculate the efTects of explosions as a function of the amount of explosives involved and the distance from the explosion. Based on this Manual Alliant has calculated, as shown in the chart attached to this declaration as Exhibit 3, that to be reasonably protected from the overpressure, fragments, and heat that would be produced by an explosion of 1.2 million Ibs. of Class 1.1 propellant (the maximum amount that can be tested at the Tekoi facility) the nearest inhabited building or the nearest property line must be at least 5,313 ft. away. Furthermore, based on the DOD Safety Manual, Alliant has calculated that an explosion of 1.2 million Ibs. of Class 1.1 propellant would produce an overpressure of 0.5 psi at a distance of 7,970 ft. Exhibit 4 (Figure I from the Baseline Risk Assessment for the Tekoi High Hazard Test Area, Alliant Techsystem Bacchus Works (March 1996)) shows that the buffer zone established by Alliant around the Tekoi facility extends to a distance of 1.5 miles (7,920 ft.) from the facility.
10.
As stated in Regulatory Guide 1.91, Evaluations of Explosions Postulated to Occur on Transportation Routes Near Nuclear Power Plants (Revision 1 (for comment)
Feb.1978), blast overpressure is the explosive effect most likely to cause significant damage to a nuclear facility. According to Reg. Guide 1.91, an overpressure of 1.0 psi is a safe threshold below which the damage from an explosion would likely not be significant. The guide states:
The effects of explosives that are of concern in analyzing structural response to blast are incident or reflected pressure (overpressure), dynamic (drag) pressure, blast-
- induced ground motion, and blast-generated missiles. It is thejudgement of_the NRC staff that, for explosions of the magnitude considered in this guide, and the structures, systems, and components that must be protected, overpressure effects are controlling.
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This regulatory guide describes a method for determining distances from critical plant structures to a [ point] beyond which any explosion that might occur... is not likely to have an adverse effect on plant operation....
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- A method for establishing the distances referred to above can be based on a level of l
peak positive incident overpressure... below which no significant damage would be expected. It is thejudgement of the NRC staff that, for the structures, systems, and components of concem, this level can be conservatively chosen at 1 psi (approximately 7 kPa).
11.
According to the PFSF Safety Analysis Report (SAR), section 3.3.6, no structures, systems, or components important to safety at the PFSF (which include the canister transfer building and the spent fuel casks) would suffer significant damage from an explosion that produced an overpressure of 1 psi or less at the facility. More specifically regarding the spent fuel casks, as described in SAR sections 4.2.1.5.1.I and 4.2.2.5.1.I, respectively, the Holtec HI-STORM 100 storage cask and the BNFL TranStor storage cask are designed to withstand overpressures of greater than 1 psi.' Under 10 C.F.R. 71.71(c)(4), spent fuel transportation casks must withstand an extemal overpressure of 5.3 psi (20 psi absolute). Therefore, explosions that produced I psi or less at the PFSF would cause no significant damage to structures, systems or components important to safety.
12.
Figure 1 of Reg. Guide 1.91 considers the effects of an explosion of 5,000 l
tons (10 million pounds) of TNT equivalent material (the maximum quantity of explosives likely to be transported on a river vessel). The figure shows that the overpressure resulting from an explosion of 10 million pounds of TNT would decrease to 1 psi at a distance of 9,695 ft from the blast location. (See also SAR section 3.3.6 for an indication of the distances at which explosions of various quantities of explosives would produce an overpressure of 1 psi.) Ten million pounds is significantly more explosive material than the 1.2 million pounds that would be contained in the largest rocket motors
- permitted to be tested at the Tekoi test facility, as indicated in paragraph 8 above.
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Therefore, the overpressure created by the explosion of the largest rocket motor -
1.
permitted to be tested at Tekoi would be significantly less than 1 psi at a distance of 5
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9,695 ft from the blast. Calculations using equation (1) in Reg. Guide 1.91 indicate that an explosion of 1.2 million pounds of TNT would produce an overpressure of 1 psi at a distance of 4,782 ft. The table attached as Exhibit 3 indicates that an explosion of 1.2 million pounds of Class 1.1 rocket propellant would produce an overpressure of 0.5 psi at a distance of 7,970 ft. Thus, because the PFSF Restricted Area is over 12,000 ft. from the Tekoi test bay where the largest motors are tested (Bay 3), structures, systems or components important to safety in the Restricted Area would not experience an overpressure of I psi from the explosion of such a motor and hence they would not suffer significant (lamage. This result holds even without considering the reduction in blast overpressure at the PFSF that would result from the presence of Hickman Knoll between Tekoi and the PFSF. Therefore, the potential explosion of a rocket motor at Tekoi would not pose a significant hazard to the PFSF.
q 13.
In addition to explosions in a Tekoi test bay not posing a significant hazard to the PFSF, a hypothetical rocket motor explosion that might take place on the access road to the Tekoi test facility or on Skull Valley Road would also not pose a j
significant hazard. The Tekoi access road runs due east from the Tekoi facility and intersects Skull Valley Road. At its closest point of approach to the PFSF Restricted Area. the Tekoi access road is 2.25 miles (11,900 ft.) away from the Restricted Area. At its closest point of approach, Skull Valley Road is 1.9 miles (10,000 ft.) from the I
Restricted Area. Thus, because the explosion of the largest rocket motor tested at Tekoi (1.2 million pounds of propellant) would produce an overpressure of 1 psi only at a distance of 4,782 ft. or less and would produce an overpressure of 0.5 psi only at a distance of 7,970 ft. or less, such an explosion on either the Tekoi access road or Skull Valley Road would not cause significant damage to the structures important to safety in the PFSF Restricted Area.
14.
In the bases Contention Utah K, the State also alleged that PFS failed to consider a credible accident in that a rocket motor could potentially escape from a test stand and strike the PFSF. Such a postulated series of events would not pose a significant 6
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hazard to the PFSF because the likelihood that a rocket motor would escape from a test stand, fly the distance between Tekoi and the PFSF, and strike the PFSF and cause a.
release of radioactivity is extremely low. The Tekoi test facility is carefully designed to prevent rocket motors from escaping from a test bay during testing. The rocket motor firing pad in Bay 3, the bay in which rocket motor test firing takes place at Tekoi, possesses a large thrust block in front of the rocket motor which resists the forward thrust
' forces of the motor. The static tests are conducted with the rocket motor in a horizontal position or in a vertical position with the front end down and the nozzle up. The rocket motor firing pad is of massive construction, containing approximately 180 cubic yards of heavily reinforced concrete with embedded structural steel restraining members. The structural steel restraining members maintain the alignment between the rocket motor and
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the thrust block during firing. The members wold also retain large fragments in the 1
unlikely event of a rocket motor explosion. A thick concrete slab is emplaced on each side of the firing pad.
15.
' In addition to the facility design, safety procedures at the Tekoi test facility also help to assure that a rocket motor will not leave the firing pad. First, before a motor is tested, it is X-rayed, its manufacturing and inspection records are reviewed, and all deviations from the motor's design are evaluated. Any deviation from design requires engineering and quality approval before the motor is tested. Only motors which are -
expected to perform successfully are tested at the facility. Second, during a test, should a i
_ rocket motor begin to perform in an erratic manner where it appears that the potential i
exists for it to escape its restraining harness, actions are prescribed that preclude the motor from escaping. See Bureau ofIndian Affairs, Uintah and Ouray Agency; F.nvironmental Impact Analysis, Rocket Motor Test Site, Skull Valley Band of Goshute Indians, Skull Valley Reservation, Fort Duchesne, Utah; March 28,1975, the relevant j
portions of which are attached to this declaration as Exhibit 5.
j 16.
The design of the Tekoi facility and the safety procedures employed before and during test firings, as described above, make it extremely unlikely that a 7
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rocket motor would escape a test stand while being fired. Mr. Floyd Davis, a Senior Safety Specialist with Alliant Techsystems Inc., who has 37 years experience working
. with rocket motor and explosives testing at the Tekoi test facility and the Alliant i
Bacchus Works plant in Magna, Utah, has informed us that no rocket motor has ever j
1 escaped from the harness at Tekoi. A rocket motor escaped from the harness at Bacchus l
in the early 1960s, but that was before the emplacement of modern safety features at that site. Mr. Davis indicated that in May 1974, a rocket motor exploded in place while being tested at the Bacchus Works, but nevertheless did not escape its test stand. See also j
Bureau ofIndian Affairs; Environmental Impact Analysis, Rocket Motor Test Site, for a description of the May 1974 incident.
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17.
Moreover, in the extremely unlikely event that a rocket motor would j
escape its test stand, it would be highly unlikely that the motor would strike the PFSF.
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i First, the PFSF Restricted Area, where the spent fuel would be located, is small compared to the area to which a rocket motor might fly ifit were to fly 2.3 miles away from Tekoi (the distance to the PFSF). The Restricted Area is only 2,000 ft. wide. PFS SAR, Fig.
1.2-1. That represents an arc of a width equal to only 2.6 percent of the circumference of a circle with a radius equal to the distance between Tekoi and the PFSF, which represents j
the potential area to which the motor might fly. Thus, assuming that a motor would fly i
from the test stand in a random direction, it would have at most a 2.6 percent chance of hitting the facility. Furthermore, if a motor did fly in the direction of the PFSF, it would likely be stopped by Hickman Knoll, a rock formation that is located between the rocket test stand at Tekoi and that is approximately 270 ft. higher in elevation than Tekoi and 400 ft. higher than the PFSF. See PFS Safety Analysis Report (SAR), p. 2.2-1. In order to strike the PFSF, a rocket motor would have to escape the firing pad and take an upward trajectory to clear Hickman Kndil, then rapidly change ' o a downward trajectory t
so as not to overfly the PFSF. This would be highly unlikely in that the rocket motor would be unguided after it escaped. The combination of the small size of the PFSF Restricted Area compared to the area to which an escaping motor might fly and ;he likelihood that any motor headed toward the PFSF would be stopped by Hickman Knoll 8-
i make it extremely remote that an escaped motor would hit the PFSF. That, coupled with the extremely low probability that a rocket motor would escape its test stand in the first place, make it not credible that the PFSF would be struck by a rocket motor escaping from th'e Tekoi facility.
. I 8.
In sum, the Tekoi Rocket Test Facility poses no significant hazard to the PFSF. Rocket motor explosions would not cause significant harm to the PFSF and it is 4
. not credible that a rocket motor would escape a test stand at Tekoi and fly to and strike the PFSF.
I declare under penalty and perjury th' t the foregoing is true and correct.
a Executed'on June 2,1999.
Bruce E. Brunsdon y.
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i BRUNSDON --
EXIIIBIT 1
BRUCE E. BRUNSDON EDUCATION.
Massachusetts Institute of Technology - BSME 1980 UCLA Extension Short Ccurse in Pressure Vessel Engineering - November 1982 Stone & Webster Project Simulation Workshop - 1981 DOE Natural Phenomena Hazard Mitigation Workshop - November 1998 LICENSES AND REGISTRATION Registered Professional Engineer - Colorado i
Registered Professional Engineer - South Carolina CLEARANCES DOE "Q" Clearance - Active at Rocky Flats Environmental Technology Site EXPERIENCE
SUMMARY
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l Mr. Brunsdon has extensive experience in the dynamic response analysis of mechanical systems, l
' structures, piping systems, and vessels in the commercial nuclear power industry and DOE weapons programs. He is experienced in calculating system response using linear elastic and non-linear finite element analysis methods under static, response spectra modal dynamic, time j
history modal dynamic, and direct integration transient loading. He is also familiar with
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techniques for evaluating barrier penetration and impact effects using energy balance and l
ductility ratio considerations.
He has over twelve years of expenence in the design and
' analytical evaluation of nuclear material processing systems and directing project activities for DOE facilities at Rocky Flats, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, Idaho National.
Engineering Laboratory, and the Savannah River Site.
Mr. Brunsdon is experienced in the application of DOE Orders and Standards to seismic l
qualification and nuclear safety analysis, including DOE Orders 6430.1A and 5481.lB, DOE-STD-1020-94. and DOE-STD-1021-93. He is familiar with a wide variety of computer codes used for static and dynamic structural analysis.
STONE & WEBSTER ENGINEERING CORPORATION, DENVER, COLORADO - 1980 TO PRESENT Actinide Packaging and Storage Facility (Jan 1998 to Present)
Department of Energy Savannah River Site As Lead Dynamic Analyst, Mr. Brunsdon was responsible for all seismic design and reseponse analysis activities associated with the Actinide Packaging and Storage Facility, a 10,000 square foot plutonium processing and storage complex to be installed at the DOE Savannah River Site.
Design responsibilities included the development of detailed drawings and specifications for safety class storage systems for nuclear material; gloveboxes, bandling systems, and tooling for use in disassembling nuclear material shipping packages; and first-of-a kind, massive security barriers and deployment systems using air bearing and linear motor technology. Analysis responsibilities included seismic qualification of all safety class structures, systems, and components, generation of the acceleration response spectra used in seismic qualifications,
Bruce E. Brunsdon L
oversight of the detailed soil-structure interaction analyses performed on major structures, and evaluation of security barriers under bulk explosive, missile, and penetration weapon attack.
Principal structures analyzed included an underground Material Access Area building, Auxiliary Building, Diesel Storage Tank Vault, and a secure Truck Bay. Safety class utility systems and their associated supports, including building and glovebox ventilation systems, emergency power distribution systems, and buried diesel fuel oil supply piping, were designed and qualified in l
accordance with applicable nuclear codes and standards.
Salt Residue Stabilization and Repack (May 1995 to Dec 1997)
- Department of Energy Rocky Flats Environmental Technology Site l
As Project Engineer, Mr. Brunsdon was responsible for the technical direction of all project l
coval design, title design, and field engineering activities through startup for a $6.0 million L
retrofit of a plutonium processing line to stabilize actinide residues at the DOE Rocky. Flats Environmental Technology Site. The project involved recoefiguration of existing glovebox and I
process facilities for nuclear material receipt and unpackaging, stabilization, non<lestructive assay, and repackaging activities. Signi&=at technical issues addressed as part of the project included demolition and modification of existing contaminated gloveboxes; design and tie-in of new gloveboxes and safety class utilities to the existing glovebox line; design of pyrochemical furnaces, stirring mechanisms, and utility and control systems and associated glovebox pass-throughs; integration of through-wall non-destructive assay spectroscopy equipment into the glovebox design; and design and installation of contamination control cells and safety class l
storage facilities for out-of-line handling of special nuclear material. Extensive criticality, i-shielding, and seismic and related dynamic response evaluations were prepared to support the design and develop the nuclear safety basis for operatmg the facility. Tne facility is currently stabilizing actinide residues in support of the cleanup and decommissioning of Rocky Flats.
Cooper Nuclear Station (Oct 1993 to Apr 1995)
Nebraska Public Power District l
As Systems Engineer, responsible for the review of site engineering activities impacting the i
service water system to ensure compliance with regulatory and site requirements, commitments made in response to Generic Letter 89-13, and safety analysis assumptions and single failure criteria. The review was conducted in preparation for a comprehensive audit of the service water i
system conducted by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. The scope of the review included maintenance histories of major service heat exchangers and pumps, Microbiologically Induced Corrosion detection and mitigation activities, and preventative maintenance activities to evaluate i
the potential for biofouling, flooding, or other system hazards. Operating and surveillance
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l activities used to verify operability in accordance with plant safety analyses, ASME XI test l
activities used to monitor and trend equipment performance capabilities, and corrective actions resulting from nonconformances or deficiencies were also reviewed. The review resulted in recommendations to upgrade maintenance procedures and preventative maintenance practices, develop calculations to demonstrate compliance with regulatory requirements, and establish progriumustic controls for regulatory commitments.
Additional responsibilities included development of a system to trend safety related heat exchanger performance, preparing responses to Nuclear Regulatory Commission bulletins, dispositioning nonconformance reports, reviewing maintenance practices and component classifications, and evaluating the applicability of generic industry issues to plant systems.
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y Eruce E. Crunsdon Healy Clean Coal Project (Apr 1993 to Sept 1993)
Alaska Industrial Development Authority -
As Engineer, responsible for preparation of stress analyses for main steam and extraction steam piping for a DOE clean coal power project. Also developed pipe support designs and loading requirements for a variety of high energy piping systems for the plant.
NOx Abatement Facility (May 1992 to Mar 1993)
Department of Energy Idaho National Engineering Laboratories As Lead Seismic Engineer, responsible for the implementation of all seismic analysis activities i
associated with the project in accordance with DOE and site regulations, as well as national l
codes and standards. Principal analyses included facility structural analysis incorporating the effects of soil-structure interaction, buried piping analysis, dynamic analysis oflarge above-ground ammonia storage vessels, dynamic analysis of nuclear piping and equipment, and qualification of components required to operate during and after seismic events. Related activities included development of a seismic analysis plan to document analysis scope and calculation techniques and coordination with site safety analysis staff to ensure consistent implementation of DOE regulations.
Resumption of Plutonium Operations - Blds 559 (Aug 1991 to Apr 1992)
Department of Energy Rocky Flats Plant As System Engineer, responsible for development and processing of Maintenance Work '
Requests to support resumption of operations in a DOE Plutonium Analytical Laboratory. MWR
. development included review and approval of planned work instructions, specification of syste;n isolation and post-maintenance test requirements and resolution of non-conformances resulting
- from the modifications. Primary responsibility was the glovebox fire detection system.
i Resumption of Plutonium Operations - Bid 771 (May 1991 to July 1991)
Department of Energy Rocky Flats Plant
~ As Lead Mechanical Engineer, responsible for review / revision of the scope of work and estimation of resources required to define system operability in support of resumption of operations at a DOE Plutonium Recovery facility. Also responsible for directing the development of walkdown packages and processing of field verified data in order to create mechanical P&ID's for safety systems at the facility. Walkdown package development included procedure development and plant document research activities. Data was also gathered during walkdowns to support systems analyses to be perfonned after P&ID's were prepared in accordance with plant standards, national codes and industrial practice.
Resumption of Plutonium Operations - Bldg 559 (Feb 1991 to Apr 1991)
Department of Energy Rocky Flats Plant -
As Engineer, responsible for ysy.. ion of engineering analysis of a vacuum sampling system in a DOE Plutonium Analytical Laboratory to resolve system operability issues. Analysis included both technical evaluation to establish overall system capacity and provide a basis for alarm setpoints, and operational testing to verify performance in accordance with established procedures. -As a result of the analysis, design modification packages were prepared to reset critical setpoints and rewire control circuits to enhance the backup capability of the system.
Eruce E. Bruesdon j
L Resumption of Plutonium Operations - Bid: 559 (July 1990 to Jan 1991)
Department of Energy Rocky Flats Plant As Engineer, responsible for developing mechanical sections of a design basis reconstitution
~ ilot program for vital safety systems at a Department of Energy weapons fabrication facility.
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. The program was designed to recover system performance capabilities for use in justification of plant safety analysis and support of plant modification projects. Two phases were implemented, including a document search and compilation phase to generate the historical account of regulatory and siteispecific requirements and system design which meets those requirements, and a design verification phase to ensure that the system as installed met the perfonnance requirements. The pilot program was implemented on a confinement HVAC system for a laboratory used to analyze plutonium samples.
, Tritium Research Facility Safety Analysis Report (Feb 1990 to July 1990)
Department of Energy Lawrence Livermore National Laboratories As Lead Mechanical Engineer, responsible for researching and writing mechanical sections and integrating other disciplines' sections in a safety analysis report for a Department of Energy tritium research facility. The effort included researching design capabilities and responses of mechanical systems under various accident scenarios, and evaluating and identifying deficiencies in documents used to support the accident analyses.
Plutonium Research Facility Triton Separation Project (Oct 1989 to Feb 1990) 7
. Department of Energy Lawrence Livermore National Laboratories As Engineer, responsible for design and analysis of gas cooling system piping for Triton Isotope
. Separation process. Stress calculations were performed in accordance with ANSI B31.1 Piping
, Codes, under normal operating and design basis accident loading. Static and modal dynamic firi'e element analysis techniques were used in the calculations.
j Fort St. Vrain Nuclear Power Station (Aug 1989 to Sept 1989)
- Public Service Company of Colorado As Engineer, responsible for database reconstitution and trending analysis of data from a system used to monitor control rod drive performance to ensure compliance with plant Technical Specifications. Also used data and other analyses to identify and document the failure mechanism for a control rod drive which failed to insert during surveillance testing.
Plutonium Research Facility Engineering Demonstration Project (Oct 1987 to July 1989)
Department of Energy Lawrence Livermore National Laboratories 1
As Engmeer, responsible for design and analysis of process equipment and utility systems associated with the Engineering Demonstration System prototype version of the Laser Isotope j
' Separation process. The process is being developed as a means of enriching plutonium using j
high energy laser light. The process environment must meet stringent vacuum and radioactive containment requirements, throughout normal operation and postulated accident scenarios.
Systems analyzed include gas scattering cells, a rail-based transport and lift system, and vacuum roughing and utility piping.
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I Eruce E. Brunsdon Salton Sea #3 Geothermal Power Station (June 1987 to Sept 1987)
Union Oil of California As Engineer, responsible for the design and analysis of brine and steam piping and supports in accordance with ANSI B31.1 codes.
Fort St. Vrain Nuclear Power Station (Jan 1985 to May 1987)
Public Service Company of Colorado As Engineer, responsible for design review and coordination of qualification testing of dry-film lubricated bearings for the control rod drive mechanisms in a HTGR. Tasks included analytical investigations as well as design and implementation of test rigs, development of test specifications and evaluation of bearing failure mechanism at vendor test facilities. Other j
responsibilities included design and implementation of a system to monitor the performance of the control rod drive mechanisms on-line. This system utilizes the capacitance-generated
, back-EMF voltage signal in CRD shim motors to detect machine faults in gear trains and bearings via fourier analysis techniques. The system is implemented on HP 200 series computer systems, using codes developed in Basic and Pascal.
River Bend Nuclear Power Station-Unit No.1 (May 1984 to Dec 1984)
Louisiana Power and Light -
As Engineer, responsible for qualification of pipe whip restraints on high energy piping inside containment. Tasks included development of thrust loads based on limit analyses, resolution of applied loads through nonlinear energy absorbing components, and time-history dynamic analyses of support structure response using STARDYNE computer program.
Nine Mile Point Nuclear Power Station-Unit No. 2 (Mar 1984 to May 1984)
Niagara Mohawk Power As Engineer, responsible for seismic qualification of polar crane in containment and auxiliary cranes in diesel-generator building. Dynamic models were developed and modal analysis performed using STARDYNE computer program.
Enrico Fermi Il Nuclear Generating Station (Oct 1983 to Feb 1984)
Detroit Edison As Engineer, responsible for on-site inspection and evaluation of pipe supports. Also processed QC Category I design change requests and piping deflection interference problems.
WPPSS-Unit No. 2 (July 1983 to Sept 1983)
Washington Public Power Supply System As Engineer, responsible for inspection and analysis of nuclear safety-related pipe supports as part of an independent third party review of as-built program for quality Class I piping and supports. Also, implemented computerized tracking system to identify trends in support deviations.
n Bruce E. Brunsdon Rancho Seco Nuclear Generating Station (Mar 1983 to July 1983)
Sacramento Municipal Utility As Engineer, responsible for the design and analysis of pressurizer reliefline supports inside primary containment. Analysis involved nonlinear finite element techniques using ANSYS computer program.
Fort St. Vrain Nuclear Power Station (May 1981 to Feb 1983)
Public Service Company of Colorado As Engineer, responsible for onsite computer stress analysis of as-built, nuclear safety-related piping and supports for the seismic review program on a high temperature gas-cooled reactor.
Analysis was in accordance with ANSI B31.1 and AISC Codes and NRC requirements.
Computer programs used include NUPIPE, STRUDL, and ANSYS.
Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Station (Mar 1981 to Apr 1981)
Northern States Power Company As Engineer, responsible for seismic stress analysis of nuclear safety-related piping for modifications to the contaimnent cooling system.
SMUDGEO No.1 Geothermal Power Station District (Dec 1980 to Feb 1981)
Sacramento Municipal Utilities As Engineer, responsible for dynamic finite element analysis of turbine building and turbine pedestal to support the licensing effort.
Fort St. Vrain Nuclear Power Station (May 1980 to Nov 1980) i Public Service Company of Colorado As Engineer, responsible for breakdown of as-built, nuclear safety-related piping systems into packages for computer analysis, as part of the seismic review program.
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EXHIBIT 2 i
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' Exhibit 3 Overpressure Produced by Rocket Motor Explosions as a Function of Distance i
Explosive Quantity inhabited Building 0.5 psi Overpressure 0.2 psi Overpressure Class 1.1 Distance / Property Line Distance Distance j
Distance i,200,000 lbs.
5,313 ft.
7,970 ft.
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EXHIBIT 5 e
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,1 BUREAU OF INDIAN AFFAIRS 6
UINIAH AND OURAY AGE 2 ICY
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DNIRONME2ffAL IMPACI ANALYSIS
' J' ROCKET ICIOR TEST SITE SKULL VAUIY BAND.OF GOSHUIE INDIANS 4
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II.TfBODOOTION 1.
Project Description E
, background i
a.
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. lierculcu Incorpurat.ed has been a major coitd prcpellsnt, rc.eket n:otor vtnuracters r for t.he Ar:ny, thvy, Air Force, and HUA clnce lo'(.
A major facility for developint*, producing, and tectine,these
,notorn its prece.ntly.1:. cat.ed at hechus Workc near ;taa,na, Utah.
In lby.19'ih, a ce'*ond stage motor being developed for the I:avy's Trident pro;;ran malfunctioned at the !hechus Works and dentroyed part or the inot.or tunting facility. Fellowing the malfuncticn-lug lucident, the cont.inued uno cf the hechun cite vas evaluated.
',In view of t.he encreaciunent or pri ntt.c and co:n:ncretal development on the -
boundarlen or lheehno Works and t.he poccible ut,Lendant threat t.o lire and p roperty, it wan* cone' Laded t. hat inrther invectment,c in larce motor testin.t fae.l tit,lec 'at 11acchus Wurho uns not advicabic. Thercrore,,t bere is a need by licreules for a racility to ctatic tect colid propellant rocket motors that in rc:notely 1ccated fro:n populatio'n centerc..
.The Jmmediate need by IIcrculen le to static fire netors:
In capport of I.hc Navy'n Trident Ch ' development program. The Trident
. preg mn conclots or *t rive year dqveJopment 'phace wi t.h follow-on increment.n firine;s in the deve19p.nent p:i.'ait additional five yearc or mere.
or production t.o conctnue fpu Ct.atic nce are needed to,dctermine performance, reliabilJty, neceptuace and other technical data verification.
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prop ml Action
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It ja propoced that !!crentec 'bu nilowed to lenne for t, heir exclucive ure, an area ')00 reet by 500 feet (5.*(h screc) for the rirIn.i put and accociated htmters, and,a cocond areg 500'rcet by 500 rect, ().*(h nerec), approximately one-hair mile, fro:n Lhc fJ rnt arca, for rr.mc.tc fJ rin';,of rocket, ent;1 nun.
(1) conntruction e
All nt,ructuren will be deninned t.d ennply with, t,he Uniforn I3u!1 din!; Code and titate of Utah requirements. Incpcetions durine. nnd after construction will be performed by registered profecnicnal enr,incern.
(2)
Oy:mtIco tEstin firing nr nll tliren ct.ai en or, the Trident miccIle ic planned at t.he proposed tent citu. Firitu;u urc to be coinlueted on a routine bacts.. Procedureu involved in each firing and ucc of each
- m379 m - l otructure are deceribed in 1.hc paragraphs which follow.j.y...,.,. :
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thea utstic fi rine..ic expceted t.n 1 set. Approx.
- Innt.ety 70-nercndo. 1)nr.inc. thin perled, thern wnl be ai conut t e wr1 vitir:st.icnal effcetu and a ele ud vf non-t.oxic c. colic and duct is e n!tted from the 1. cat ult.e.
1} pen ecmpletten or static firing, a boon vill cving into position at t.he rear of the rocket to in,)cet apprcxtmst,cly
- ,SV rajlunr. c r ignench wat.er 1rit,o the e.npty rocket chat.b.fr! Tht c procedi:re will then be dloannrmt' led frun the tect t.tand and rettirned t.o the hechne Plant for enginecr!nt; c..ab:atlon.
E'ct !nning the fourth quart.cr of 1975 (the cite readineco date) the firing cchedule is expected to averar,e approximately 2-1/2 motore per month with a maximum of four motors in nny onre nonth from January 1970 t.hroner.h th.y 1978 (t.hc lat,t.cr part of the present development prera:n). A mixt.nre or riret, cecond, and t.hlrd stage motorn are r.rheduled t,o I.c rired. lierculen han cent.rncLed for nn init3nt production pregrain cubcespient to devetep nent and ant.h lpat.en addi tional foi.1. w.i.n pronta nn
-y wit.h a ct.al.le fi rine, f reituency of approxlunt.ely one per moot.h.
Traffic to the test site v1 1 concist of persennel. '. '
fro o licrculec, Lockheed Mirn11cc and Space Company ' Incorporated (UCCT),
j Havy tuid ot.hi:e vinlLorc.
Il. 'iu expecLed t. hat npproximat.cly fif teen Herculec employcen will be requi red to opernt.c the ~ci t c.
It. In planned for thece Individualn to starr t.he nit.e on a 1 P-5 banic (onc cir,ht, hour nhlft.
. per slay, ri ve il.tya per we.ek) plun ovdrtime rus.re.pa,lred. '
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rerronnel t.rarfle d4e t.o'.1.t::CT, Navy, and ot.ber -
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viniten in expect.ed to I u heavlent en the daf or ench t. col..
An msny an i
ten to twenty obcervers nny visit t.hc cite on teot days with one-half of these nt.nying for the firine,. Flormal operattnn proceduren would permit a noximan of t.cn Individualn to remain in the firine, control bounc during carh terr.t.
All ot.hcr perconnel will be required t.o ponition themceivec hays.n.d t.hc bu ffer nona.
(i)
AccidenLtd lut.oint.ls.n I
lh:ed en expertenec and thorpt,te.)j cvaluat.lon or t.he nynt.cmn, the 11kel.Jh ol of an accidental, det.onation Ir. exLremely The e on:e of the bhy l')Ti incident has been ascertaine.1 and l
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procedurca iollfled t.o prevent a recurrence. Follov.up,tect.c have been eenducted at the Ihval Weapon Center in China Lake, California. -
Intentf or.nl detonat. tons have been conducted nt thic alte to det.uct and.
c recolve any ot.her 1otent.lal weaknecces in the cyctem nnd operatiotal-procedurec..
Chnold an arc 1 dental detoin't ton occuri it, vonia be accos: panted by overprencure, chcrt duratton nulce, 'clou.d of cnoke and
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,, dusty, sus 11 f ragment dispersal and probably small patches of range fires.
Large fragments would be confined to.the firing pad by.che test stand.
2.
Environmental Setting 4
a.
l Environment Prior.co Proposed Action Flora at the proposed rocket test fscility is typical of that found in the shsdscale-budsage plant community.
This type of plant life is charseteristically associsted with the gently sloping siluvial fans crested by runof f into Pleistocene Lake Bonne-ville from adjacent mountain peaks.-
Shadscale (Atriplex confertifolis) is the most abundant plant comprising 66 percent of the plants counted while bud-(,
sage (Artemisia spinescens) comprises 28,9 percent. Other browse species include Gressewood (Sacrobatus species). The base of some of the shsdscale plants harbor scanty growth of grasses; largely cheat grass (Bromus tectorum) and squirral tail (Sitanion hystrix) with an.
! occasional stand of Indian ricegrass (Oryzopsis hymenoides), needle and,
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thread (Stipa comata), Western wheatgrass (Acropyron smithii), Sandburg bluegrass (Poa secunda).
Of,'the',23 plant species which populate the l
shadscale-budsage community, all are found at least occasionally in the area. Average height of these plants is 10 to 12 inches, but some -
grow to a height of 24 inches. Vegetation is rather sparse with the two dominant species occurring at a combined density of 3.1 plants per-square meter.
l Soils in this type of plant community are generally l
.of a fine, sandy Joam to a light losmy ccxture.
In some of thu moro L-elevated.arcas and in those extending west of the Reservation, the soils will vary slightly from a sandy loam to a loamy '7snd in texture.
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/' All these soils have a high pH ranging from 8.4 to 9.2.
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1 pSdli(A) 7"ov et TocB(A) c47/g c4F/S
'FidD(A) 1i,00 rt codB(A) 2Sda(A) 1600 ft 88dB(A) c4T/S
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s A ca.rtli :enount or routine crricc/laboratcrv vuote consiottnit or paper, m.:tal, c. lace, r:bber, wood and pla:stic will be dicpoced of lu 15 nearby latulfill. This vill not conctitute an environmental proble.n.
i:.annim of 20,000 callons or vater por month will
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.not tax the well to be entab33ched.
The In-h: u:a: heat,'.i nerateil by t.he inotor in d Ii ecta.d
%yetat.lon at, lhecinin ohma no nign or cearing a l m. in t, t.o t.a l ly 1.o I.he rea r.
30 rect. t o t.be niile or I.he :nidline. The blact, divert,er acrect thlu heat
..pua -d. Geencloittily, exall particleu of pre. pellant.:ny 1.e clected, o
Pleochet ol*r the illverter,. latul*In 1.he dettert, rund pocnt hly start n tani t. r:vige ri re.
Wen Lt 6u;4 the ver.ct,ation in rathur sparce und a fire voald not, nprea.1 s spid.1,,, fire ris'.hting erjylonent will be on !rtud 19rinr; cru:h t,es.L.
C.
_ASc tdent.a1 Iktonut.lun The only t.hne.a motor will be cainble or 1r,uttinrt in when the electronic ignition Ocvice is in:talled. This ic donc im:nedtately prior to testin.. livrore a : noter is cubjected to ctatic teut, it is Xrayed, c untracturing and in :yection records reviewed, und all devi:iti, ns fro.n o
the design evaluat,ed. Any deviatien frcen da:$gn requirec engineering and r
cluslity approval. Only mctor: which are expected to perform succer: fully.
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vill, be tested at the proponed ter,t otte.
tuvatillately arter t he : cot.or in iniloailed anil necure 1 n:
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.e nt, pn', t.h : env1rottnenI,al et.ntrol bn1ldlair wlla he to ILICudd o'ter d
t.le: tc:t 14d and aiutor. The st,ler funetton or t hin building in to previda te :'; c rat,u \\ control *cul duct; protect!on for the toekct niotor. Failure to
- retintain prolv.tr Lt.nperut.ure conditirning vill, not 1 c lutnardous to perro :nel In the area, but adverr.e t caiperatures cr.uld plen! rie.tntly arrcet the'
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pcrfoer.ance of the mot.or. Wlth t.hc environmental buildinr. In pl'tec, !.I'c no!.or '4111 b;.: 1.ht.r:co:bly incrected for dairge that sty have occurtcd 1
duritc, rhlppind and truid11on. Upon ucceptance, the n.otor will be in::talled l
I In I.he 1,ent. nt.aiul.
All. hone,li t.he pos:nibility or un accident, in ext.rc.ncly
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renot.e, t,he fellowing annlynin Er the coutuituencen sn* an aceldent.d det.onat.lon in treratut,cd t,. -nbow that., ::hould cuch no incident ocenr,11.
vould have a neg11gibic a:nvironnental effect.
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- The planned facilitics comply with quantity / distance t rcquirements contained in D0D Directive-4145',26M.- The worst case would
. involve the Fir 8t Stage. Trident I C4 motor.
Consequently, the followfpg pertains to-this, motor:
There,will be no effect on water and air quality with
(
an accidental detonation.
Since essentially the s:me air pollutants and quantities will, be released during an accidental detonation, compared to routine l
opersting conditions, the effcces will be basically the same.- The only.
difference _ is that the pollutants'will be released more quickly and l
concentrations in the cloud may be higher. A mitigating factor will be that the bl.mt will tend to disperse the cloud more rapidly.
~
, The safe limit for peak Japulse noine LH 140 dB(A).
'Under usun1' condition 8 thlx will occur tegn than 1,800 fcer from the pad.
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llowever..the actuni distance is very susceptible to meteorological
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conditions. The threshold overpressure causing eardrum rupture occurs at 2.3 to 5.-pounds per square inch (psi). The. distance. calculated for' /.-
an, overpressure of 2.3 pal from n first stage detonation.in 1.114 fect.
The dintance calculated for the second stage detonation ir 847 feet.- An overpreuxure of 2.9 pul has been measured at' 300 foot during an intentional-second 8tage eletonation. Apparently the 100 feet fir,ure contains an adequate margin of' safety. Light g'laus ' damage occuen.it 0.02 psi whilu I
heavy damage occurs at 1 pal: 3 Since the nearest glass-structures are l;
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' located several alica'away, gissa damage is not expceted.,
After the May 1974 incident at Bsechus, in which
.approximately 12,000 pounds of propellant detonated, 90 percent of all
' fragments were found within 6,000 feet of the _ test pad. The Trident 4
First Stage contains approximately 44,000 pounds of the same' propellent.
Assuming no propellent has been consumed prior to detonation, 90 percent of all1 fragments from a first stage trident would fall within 7,400 feet and 95 percent:of all fragments would fall within 7,920 feet (1.5 miles). The above first stage fragment danger zone is based on the following document:
+
UENERAL SAFETY ENGINEERING DES 1CN CRITERIA.
C!ll211 CAL ROCKET PR0 PELLANT llAZARDS CPIA PUBLICATION NO. 194
- OCTOBER 1971.
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only motors which are expected to perform successfully will be tested at the proposed' site.
It is unlikely that a motor would detonatu','but if:lt did. occur, it would not happen until part of the propellant'had been consumed.
Thus,'~it is evident that the 1.5 mile 1
buffer' sone,is adequate for 's fragment safety zone.
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