ML20195D762

Affidavit of J Cole.* Affidavit of J Cole in Support of Motion for Partial Summary Disposition of Contention K to Indicate Risk of Aircraft or air-delivered Weapon Accidents Impacting Proposed Pfsf for Storage of Spent Nuclear Fuel

ML20195D762
Person / Time
Site:	07200022
Issue date:	06/03/1999
From:	Cole J AFFILIATION NOT ASSIGNED
To:
Shared Package
ML20195D715	List: ML20195D712 ML20195D722 ML20195D736 ML20195D751 ML20195D756 ML20195D762 ML20195D774 ML20195D779 ML20195D811 ML20195D815 ML20195D847
References
ISFSI, NUDOCS 9906100042
Download: ML20195D762 (73)

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{{#Wiki_filter:- L UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Before the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board In the Matter of- ) ) PRIVATE FUEL STORAGE L.L.C. ) , Docket No. 72-22 ) (Private Fuel Storage Facility) )' i DECLARATION OF JAMES COLE, JR. i James L. Cole, Jr. states as follows under penalties of perjury: 1. I am Executive Director of the National Air Traffic Controllers' Associa-tion (NATCA) and an associate with Burdeshaw Associates, Ltd. In 1994 I retired from the United States Air Force with the rank of Brigadier General. I am providing this affi-davit in support of a motion for partial summary disposition of Contention Utah K in the above captioned proceeding to indicate the risk of aircraR or air-delivered weapon acci-dents impacting the proposed Private Fuel Storage Facility (PFSF) for the storage of spent nuclear fuel in Skuil Valley, Utah. 2. My professional and educational experience is summarized in the cur-riculum vitae attached as Exhibit I to this affidavit. I have extensive experience in and knowledge of aircraR operations and aviation safety. From 1991 to 1994, I served as Chief of Safety of the United States Air Force and directed the entire USAF safety pro-gram. I was responsible for accident prevention and investigation in all aspects of ground i and air operations. Furthermore, I am specifically knowledgeable about the safety of the - civilian and military aircraR that fly in and around Skull Valley, Utah, including the j military aircraR that fly from 11i11 Air Force Base and on or around the Utah Test and Training Range and Dugway Proving Ground. i 9906100042 990607' PDR -ADOCK 07200022 PDR n,

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p r.. i j ~ 3. In the bases for Contention Utah K, as admitted by the Licensing Board, the State asserts in part that Applicant Private Fuel Storage (PFS) inadequately consid- ~ ered the impact on the PFSF of credible accidents involving materials or activities at or ' emanating from Salt Lake City International Airport, Hill Air Force Base, the Utah Test and Training Range, and Dugway Proving' Ground (which is the location of Michael Anny Airfield). I have reviewed information and data conceming the potential hazard to the PFSF from air crashes and air-delivered weapons used in testing and training at these - facilities and have determined that they pose no credible or significant hazard to the PFSF. I have prepared a report documenting my assessment which is attached as Exhibit

2. The major conclusions from my report are summarized below.

i 4. In conducting my research, I consulted a wide range of sources that are re- ) flected in the footnotes attached to my report. Regarding civilian aviation activities and aviation safety, I relied on a number of reports published by govemment sources, in-cluding the Department of Transportation, the National Transportation Safety Board, the Federal Aviation Administration, and National Aeronautical Space Administration. I also ) i relied on a number of reports published by companies in the aviation industry. Regarding j military aviation and air-delivered weapons usage, I relied on documents provided by the U.S. Air Force in response to Freedom ofInformation Act requests, briefings and docu-

ments provided by the Headquarters U.S. Air Force, Safety Issues ' Team, at the Pentagon, and other govemment-related documents. In addition, I conducted an on-site visit to Hill j

Air Force Base and discussed key issues regarding flight operations in the UTTR with the Vice Commander of the 388th Fighter Wing, which fly the F-16, and key members of his staff. 5. Crashes involving aircraft flying to or from Salt I' ake City International Airport or in airways near Skull Valley pose no significant hazard to the PFSF. Modern aviation in the United State's has an excellent safety record. In 1996 there were only 38 large air carrier " accidents" in the entire United States with an accident rate of only 0.28 per 100,000 flight hours. " Hull losses" with fatalities, which usually involve an aircraft 2

impacting the ground and being damaged beyond repair or totally destroyed, really repre-sent the only potential threat to the proposed PFSF. Of the 38 large carrier accidents which occurred in the United States in 1996 (final data), only three were hull losses with fatalities, or only one for ever 1,262,439 square miles of the United States. This is an in-consequential probability for a specific point ofimpact, such as the PFSF, particularly given the location of the PFSF away from takeofrand departure corridors, approacu.md landing corridors, and airways. See Fv.hibit 2, pp. 3-5. 6. The proposed PFSF facility location is not situated under the takeoff and departure corridor nor the approach and landing corridor of any airport. This is important since the majority of Hull Loss aircraft accidents for large air carriers,23.7% and 44.6% respectively, occur during these phases of flight. Climbs and descents account for only~ 7.3% and 6.4% respectively, while only 4.7% occur during cruise. See Exhibit 2, p. 5. 7. Salt Lake City International Airport is located 50 statute miles northeast of the PFSF. In 1998, Traffic Control logged 365,000 total takeoffs and landings at Salt Lake City International Airport. The major runways at the airport have a north / south alignment which places the PFSF well away from the takeoff and landing segments of flights departing and arriving Salt Lake City Intemational Airport. Thus, there is no dan-ger of a crash during departures or arrivals at Salt Lake City International Airport im- . pacting the PFSF. See Exhibit 2, p. 5. . 8. There are two airways that pass near Skull Valley and neither one is close enough for crashes of aircraft flying in them to pose a significant hazard to the PFSF. High altitude Jet Route 56 with a minimum en route altitude of 33,000 feet MSL passes .10 nautical miles (11.5 statute miles) north of the proposed PFSF site. For the purpose of analysis, one can consider Jet Route 56 to have a width of 8 nautical miles (9.2 statute miles). Thus, the closest edge ofJet Route 56 would be more than 5 statute miles from the PFSF. Low Altitude Route Victor 257 runs north / south with a minimum en route al-titude of 12,300 feet MSL and a width of 12 nautical miles (13.8 statute miles). It passes 17 nautical miles (19.5 statute miles) east of the proposed PFSF site. Thus, the closest 3

i edge of Victor 257 would be more than 10 statute miles from the PFSF. Taking the 4.7% figure for Hull Loss accidents that occur during the cruise portion of flight, together with the distance of the PFSF from commercial airways, makes the odds of an aircraft falling out of the sky and crashing on the proposed PFSF site too small to compute and so highly improbable as to even contemplate. See Exhibit 2, p. 6. 9. Crashes of other civilian aircraft flying to or from Salt Lake City airport also pose no significant hazard to the PFSF. The PFSF is located in a Military Operating Area (MOA), referred to as SEVIER B, which is adjacent to (just east of) military re-stricted airspace, Restricted Areas R6406 and R6402. Sevier B airspace extends up to 9,500 ft altitude. Civilian aircraft are prohibited from operating in the Restricted Areas and generally avoid flying in Military Operating Areas. R6406 and R6402 airspace both extend up to 58,000 ft (FL580) and are in continuous military use. The proximity of the SEVIER B MOA to the Restricted Areas makes it unlikely that civilian air traffic would transit the area near the PFSF. See Exhibit 2, p. 7. 10. Furthermore, similar to large commercialjet airliners, only a small frac-tion of other civilian aircraft accidents occur during the cruise phase of flight. Any ci-vilian aircrafl near the PFSF would be in that mode, since Salt Lake City International Airport is 50 statute miles away and there are no other airports near the PFSF at which such aircraft might land. Thus, higher risk takeoff and landing traffic for other civilian aircraft would be located far from the proposed PFSF site. See Exhibit 2, pp. 8-9. Con-sequently, crashes of other civilian aircraft will pose no significant risk to the PFSF. I 1. The State has also allbged in the bases for Contention Utah K that aircraft flying to and from Hill Air Force Base and Michael Army Airfield and aircraft flying over the Utah Test and Training Range (UTTR) would pose a crash hazard to the PFSF. I have reviewed the potential for crashes involving military aircraft associated with these installations and the UTTR and have concluded that they do not pose a significant hazard to the PFSF. 4

12. Hill Air Force Base is located on the eastern shore of the Great Salt Lake, north of Salt Lake City. See Map,"UTTR Military Airspace,"in Exhibit 2, p. 9a. It is l 65 statute miles from the PFSF. Air Force aircraft based at Hill and military aircraft based outside the State of Utah train on the UTTR The UTTR is an Air Force training and testing range over which the airspace is restricted to military operations. The UTTR is divided into a North Area and a South Area. See Map,"UTTR Military Airspace." - The North Area is a roughly S-shaped area located on the western shore of the Great Salt Lake, about 10 miles noith ofInterstate 80. The southern edge of the UTTR North Area is approximately 35 miles from the PFSF. The UTTR South Area is a roughly rectangu-lar area located to the west of the Cedar Mountains, south ofInterstate 80 and northwest of Dugway Proving Ground. See Map,"UTfR Military Airspace." Michael Army Air-field is located on Dugway Proving Ground, southwest of the Cedar Mountains. See Map,"UTTR Military Airspace." Michael is over 17 miles from the PFSF. 13. Crashes of military aircraft would not pose a significant hazard to the PFSF. Military aircraft, almost all of which are F-16's, fly in Skull Valley when en route to the Utah Test and Training Range, South Area. F-16 fighter aircraft depart Hill AFB under positive Radar Departure Control en route to the UTTR. They are handed off to Clover Control (Range Control) and fly south passing west of Deseret Peak, near the Stansbury Mountains to practice terrain masking to evade radar, approximately five miles east of the proposed PFSF site. F-16's fly no lower than 1,000 ft. Above Ground Level (AGL) as they transit Skull Valley and are normally at 3,000 ft. to 4,000 ft. AGL. During this phase of flight, the aircraft are not engaging in any threat reaction or tactical maneu-vering but rather are simply transiting the area. There is no aggressive maneuvering until - they are well south of Dugway,15 miles south of the PFSF, at which point they tum north and west to proceed to the ranges on the UTTR. See Exhibit 2, pp.10-11. q 1

14. '

F-16 traffic passing through Skull Valley varies, but averages approxi-mately 10 aircraft daily. According to the U.S. Air Force, there were 3,871 Skull Valley i transits in 1998, and they were almost entirely F-16 flights from Hill AFB to the UTTR 5

South Area. No run-in headings for weapons delivery transit over the Skull Valley area. When the F-16's complete their work on the UTTR South Area, they fly north to return to Hill AFB and do not pass near the PFSF. F-16's that work in the UTTR Northern Area are not a factor since during ingress, range work, and egress they do not pass near the PFSF. See Map,"UTTR Military Airspace," Exhibit 2, p. 9a; Exhibit 2, p. I 1. 15. In the past 28 years,50 U.S. Air Force fixed-wing aircraft have crashed in the entire state of Utah (82,076 square miles). See Exhibit 2, pp.10-11. The exclusion of 17 crashes (which are known to have occurred within 10 miles of an airfield) results in a l crash rate of 1.18 crashes per year for the entire state. This rate is a conservative number l since it includes several older aircraft that were less reliable and had higher accident rates that are no longer flying. The five F-16's that crashed during the past five years all. 1 l-crashed within the UTTR, where they frequently engage in stressful maneuvers in train-ing and testing, unlike the way they fly over Skull Valley. Consequently, the probability of a specific impact on the proposed PFSF site is extremely low. Although approxi-mately 3,900 aircraft transit Skull Valley each year, given the current routes of flight and range procedures, there is no reason to presume any significant risk to the proposed PFSF site from a military aircraft crash. See Exhibit 2, pp.13-14. ' 16. Other military aircraft that use the UTTR for a wide variety of training missions include B-52's, B-l's and B-2's dropping bombs or launching cruise missiles, as well as A-10's, F-18's, F-117A's and A-6's. They pose no hazard to the PFSF, how-ever, in that their activities are generally confined to the northern and western portions of the UTTR and are approximately 30 statute miles away from the PFSF. Weapon run-ins, drops, and launches are normally done from north to south or east to west e.nd are thus di-j rected away from the PFSF. See Exhibit 2, p.12. 17. Takeoffs and landings at Michael Army Airfield on Dugway Proving Ground also do not pose a hazard to the PFSF. The PFSF is located 17.25 statute miles i northeast of the airfield. It is outside the crash risk area of near-airport operations (which ) does not extend more than 10 miles from the airfield) and the direction to the PFSF is at l 6

m right angles (90 ) to the runway alignment and the direction for takeoff and landing traf-fic at Michael AAF. Therefore, the PFSF is located under neither the takeoff nor landing flight paths of the airfield and the risk to the proposed PFSF site from takeoffs and land. ings at Michael AAF is negligible. See Exhibit 2, pp.15-18. I 8. Aircraft flying to and from Michael AAF use military airway IR-420 which passes over the PFSF. Nevertheless, because the number of aircraft doing so is small and the types of aircraft that fly into Michael AAF exhibit particularly low crash rates, they do not pose a significant hazard to the PFSF. I did a safety analysis using the methods of NUREG-0800, section 3.5.1.6 to determine the risk and probability of aircraft using IR-420 impacting the PFSF. Using an in-flight crash rate of 4E-10 per mile (from NUREG-0800) and the number of flights per year (414), along with the area of the PFSF Restricted Area (0.1546 square miles), and the width of the airway 10 nautical miles (11.5 stat'ite miles), the probability of an aircraft crashing into Restricted Area (where the spent fuel will be located) was computed to be 2.23 E-9 per year. The crash rate of 4E-10 per mile is applicable to the aircraft flying into Michael AAF because they are mostly C-5's, C-141's, C-17's, C-130's, C-12's, C-21's and other transport aircraft that exhibit crash rates similar to those of commercialjetliners. Consequently, there is very low risk and a very low probability of a crash into the PFSF by aircraft flying into Michael AAF. See Exhibit 2, pp.18-20. 19. The State has also alleged in the bases for Contention Utah K that the use . of air-delivered munitions (e.g., bombs and missiles) in testing and training on the UTfR and Dugway Proving Ground would pose a hazard to the PFSF. I have reviewed the use of air-delivered munitions on the UTTR and Dugway and have concluded that they would not pose a significant hazard to the PFSF. 20. First, no aircraft over-flying Skull Valley are allowed to have their arma-ment switches in a release capable mode, and all switches are " safe" until inside DOD i land boundaries, which are 9 statute miles to the southwest (Dugway Proving Ground) at . the closest point. In addition, each weapon tested on the UTTR has a run-in heading (ap-f- 7

f proach to the target) established during the complete safety review process conducted prior to flight. Footprints (impact area), time of fall, altitude at release and release air-speed dictate the release locations and headings allowed. The UTTR has never experi-enced an unintended munitions release outside of designated launch / drop / shoot boxes. The boxes are at least 30 statute miles from the proposed PFSF site. Wildcat Range is the range closest to the proposed PFSF site where live ordnance is expended, and it is 30 statute miles west by northwest of the proposed site. See Map,"UTTR Military Air-space." As indicated above, aircran do not make run-ins for weapon delivery over Skull ~ Valley and after aircraft are finished on the range, they retum to Hill via a northerly. route, away from the PFSF. Therefore, air-delivered weapons use on the UTTR is simply too far away to threaten the PFSF. See Exhibit 2, pp. I1,22. 21. Cruise missile launches, which occur within military airspace around the - UTTR, would also not pose a significant hazard to the PFSF. Cruise missile launches are infrequent, their intended target areas are far from the PFSF, and special precautions are taken to ensure that the missiles do not cause harm outside their intended target areas. - There are approximately six cruise missile launches per year on the ranges in Utah. Mis-site launches are generally confined to the northem and westem portions of the UTTR and are approximately 30 statute miles away from the PFSF. Run-ins, drops, and launches are normally done from north to south or east to west and are thus directed away 'from the PFSF. Most cruise missiles used in testing and training do not carry live war-heads. Five cruise missiles have been lost in crashes in Utah in the past five years. Of those, only one carried a live warhead. None impacted anywhere near the proposed PFSF site. See Exhibit 2, p. 23. - 22. Furthermore, cruise missiles that have a capability of exceeding range i boundanes are required to have a Flight Termination System (FTS) installed prior to i - testing on the UTfR. The FTS systems are designed to destruct the weapons and termi-nate the weapon flight path in the event of a weapon anomaly. Before an aircraft launches a cruise missile, the Mission Control Center verifies that the missile's remote I 8 g

control and flight control systems are working properly. At all times throughout the flight the cruise missile's FTS must detect a signal that in effect permits the missile to keep flying. If the missile does not detect the signal for a preset time, the FTS destroys the missile automatically. Safety officers, who monitor the flight of the missile continu-ously, can also activate the FTS, if required, at any time. The Range Safety Officer at Mission Control and the Airborne Range Instrumentation Aircraft are also both capable of terminating missile flight almost immediately. The UTTR has never experienced a FTS failure. Therefore, it is highly unlikely that a cruise missile would fly off the UTTR and strike the PFSF. See Exhibit 2, pp. 23-24. 23. In the December 1997 incident, in which a cruise missile tested at Dugway Proving Ground struck a trailer being used for astronomy experiments, the missile guid-l ance system and the missile FTS did not fail. See excerpt from Accident Investigation Board Report, United States Air Force AGM-129 (December 10,1997), attached as Ex- ' hibit 3 to this affidavit. That missile was programmed to fly a test course, release a l dummy warhead, and then fly into the ground. Exhibit 3, pp. Il-12. Range personnel L planning the test were unaware that the laboratory test trailer was located in the test range for the missile and inadvertently programmed the missile to fly into the ground at the point at which the trailer was located.- Ibid. During the test, the missile flew its pro-grammed course, released its dummy warhead, flew into the ground as programmed, and struck the trailer. Ibid. at p.14-15. During the test, the missile FTS continuously re-ceived a signal (because the missile did not deviate from its programmed course) and therefore never attempted to terminate the flight. At no time did the missile leave the test range on the Dugway Proving Ground.' The only error that occurred in the test was the failure of a test engineer to communicate with an airbome missile controller in time for the controller to steer the missile off its programmed course, as had been the plan, to cause the missile to strike the ground at an attemative location on the range. See Exhibit 3, pp.15-17. That error did not involve the missile and did not increase the chance that the missile would depart from its programmed course or the test range. Thus, the Dug-9

N ] l L way incident does not indicate that cruise missile testing is unsafe or that it would pose a l hazard to the PFSF. 24.- The State also asseited in the bases for Contention Utah K that aircraft flying and ladding at Michael Army Airfield with " hung bombs," i.e., ordnance that faildd to release from the aircraft in training or testing, would pose a hazard to the PFSF. I have reviewed this issue and have determined that aircraft flying and making emer-gency landing at Michael Army Airfield with hung bombs would not pose a significant. v. hazard to the PFSF. 25. First, the number of aircraft doing so each year is sery small. According to the U.S. Army, there were only five hung ordnance aircraft diversions / recoveries into Michael AAF during 1998. See Exhibit 2, p. 20. Second, aircraft making hung ordnance recoveries at Michael do not fly over Skull Valley. Ibid. The pilot maneuvers the aircraft

to the northwest, approximately 20 statute miles from the PFSF, and proceeds directly to Michael Army' Airfield, avoiding rapid or steep turns and abrupt climbs or descents. Test facilities or any populated areas are avoided..A long straight-in approach from the northwest with a shallow rate of descent is established to a full stop landing on runway 12

. (to the southeast). After landing, Dugway Proving Ground Explosive Ordnance Disposal personnel inspect and safe the bombs. Thus, such operations take place too far from the PFSF to pose a significant hazard. See Exhibit 2, pp. 20-22. 26. Finally, the State alleged in the bases for Contention Utah K that tests of j th'e X-33 space plane, which is scheduled to land at Michael Army Airfield, would pose a hazard to the PFSF. I have also reviewed this matter and concluded that the X-33 would not pose a hazard to the PFSF. The X-33 is an unmanned half-scale demonstrator launch vehicle planned to test critical components for the next generation space transport system. ~ The X-33 will not pose a hazard to the PFSF because, first, tests for the X-33 at Michael Army Airfield are scheduled to be completed by mid-2000, before the PFSF would be operational, and second, the X-33's flight plan does not take it over Skull Valley near the i PFSF. See Exhibit 2, pp. 24-25. L I 10

r-l 27. In conclusion, air crashes and the use of air-delivered weapons pose no significant hazard to the PFSF. Most aircraft flights in the region and all weapons use take place far enough from the PFSF site that the risk that a crashing aircraft or an errant munition would strike the PFSF is negligible. Those aircraft that fly through Skull Val.- ley near the PFSF site pose no significant hazard because the likelihood of their crashing and impacting the PFSF is extremely low. I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed on June 3,1999. Wk.C James L. Cole, Jr. I i1 1

I I 1 l i l ] l l j 1 I i l COLE - - EXHIBIT 1

JAMER L. COLE o 7711 enIFFIN POND C0tIRT e aPRINGFIELD. VIRGINIA 2215a (7oa) 455 68ao SENIOR MANAGER PROFESSIONAL PROFILE: Eighteen years top level executive decision-making experience in air tes.gon iion, association==e7 =', safety program managemant, risk analysis, and flight crew traimng Seasoned and skilled in the U.S. Govermnent interagency process and legislative liaison with Congress. Expert in policy formulation and strategy development. Accomplished public speaker with many keynote addresses and trips to Capitol Hill. EDUCATION: E-*% Development Program, Cornell Umversity i MBA, Auburn University MA, Ohio State Umversity BS,U.S. AirForce Acad y 1996-Present, Chief of Staff, National Air TraGle Controllers Aanaelation (NATCA). hhssion is the improvement of air trafBc safety and working conditions for air trafBc controllers. Manage full time staff of twenty-five, an annual budget of $7 million, and maintain effective liaison with the U.S. Congress, the Federal Aviation Administration, the National Transportation Safety Board, and the aerospace and aviation communities. Built effective coalitions with other associations and expanded NATCA's safety advocacy role by ed NATCA's input to the White House Commission on Aviation Safety and Security Briefed members of Congress and GAO on aviation safety issues 1994-1996, President and CEO, National Aeronautic Association (NAA). Mission is the adv=a==* and promotion of the art, sport, and science of aviation and space flight. NAA sanctions and certifies aviation and space records; awards major aviation EA and represents the U.S. intemationally as the National Aero Club of the United States. Reorganized and reinvigorated NAA while achieving single grossest year of aggregate membership growth in over twenty years. Doubled Corporate Memberships (added 23) and tripled Affiliate Memberships (added 33) Doubled Individual Memberships (added 500) 1991-1994, Chief of Safety, U.S. Air Force. Directed cotire U.S. Air Force Safety program with authority and accountability for accident y.ce a;on and investigations for 500,000 y cd and 9,000 aircraft in all aspects of ground and air operations. Managed all flight, ground, and weapons safety as well as nuclear surety of all USAF nuclear weapons. Achieved " Safest Year in USAF History." Produced lowest number of airmaft mishaps and lowest aircraft mishap rate ever Achieved lowest number of air and ground mishap fatahties ever 1990 1991, Assistaat DCS Operattoms and Transportation, Military Airlift Crwa==ad U.S. Air Force. Directed all air aa- *% and transportation functions for Military Airlift Co==*ad, including world-wide airlift, aeromedical evacuation, special operations and air rescue operations. Managed training, qualification, standardization and evaluation of all aircirws Mpanniaad and managed world-wide positive command and control system Worked DE8ERT SHIELD / DESERT STORM airlift of 482,000 troops and 513,000 tons of cargo

198S 1990, Inspector General, Military Airlift Cv-. -- 4, U.S. Air Force. Led Inspection and Safety functions for Military Airlift Command. Set and enforced operational standards and inspection criteria for active and air reserve airlift units totalling 160,000 personnel and 1,400 aircraft. Planned and administered all Operational Readiness and Maa=gement Effectiveness Inspections l Managed flight, ground, and weapons safety as well as nuclear weapons airlift surety Investigated and resolved complaints and rMd successfully to congressional inquiries 1986 1989, Senior Advisor for Joint Matters, Joint Staff, Joint Chiefs of Staff. Produced National Secunty papers and y.-x =lons for the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff and the service Chiefs of Staff for their scheduled meetags three times each week and their weekly meetmg with the Secretary of Defense. Pmy. red Chairman for National Security Council meetings with the President Orchestrated national policy and strategy issues in the U.S. Government Interagency Arena Briefed Secretary of Defense, Joint Chiefs of Staff, and members of Congress many times 1985-1986, Commander,89th Military Airlift Wing, Andrews AFB, Military Airlift Co==nad, U.S. Air Force. Directed and operated worldwide VIP air i. por= tion for U.S. President, Vice President, senior government officials and foreign dignitaries. Assets included three operational flying squadrons, a flying detachment overseas, a mamtenance coniplex, an air passenger and cargo terminnt, and a supply organization. Recruited and trained 1,500 top quality flight crew and support personnel Managed $10 million annual up.i.tieg budget Earned OUTSTANDING ratings on all operational and management inspections Won Flight Safety Achievement Award SPECIAL SKII IR AND ACCOMPLISHMENTS: AVIATOR - USAF Command Pilot with 6,500 total flying hours. Flight Framiner and Instructor q==Wd Designed and taught Flight Instructor Orientation Course on quality traming, risk management, and optimal instructing techniques which increased student throughput and decreased costs by 10%. Certificated Hight Instructor /C(- = cial Pilot with instrument rating and 1,500 flying i bours as flight instructor in C-141 (L-300), C-47 (DC-3), and T-41 (Cessna 172). HISTORIAN - Served as Assistant Professor of History on U.S. Air Force Academy faculty. Taught Modern European and U.S. Military History. Certified as Western European Area Specialist. Course Chairman for Modern European History Honors Course and History of Air Povier Course. Extensrve experience in c.eurse development and syllabus properation. Won "Outstandag Instructor of the Year" Award. Couiilsiisg author to Fivmg Combat Aircraft. published by Iowa State Unrversity Press. Published several articles and many book reviews in professional joumals. Member of PHI ALPHA THETA (History Scholarship). i BOARDS - Member, Advisory Committee to Safety and Surety Assessment Center, Sandia National I.aboratories. Member, Board of Trustees, Air Force Historical Foundation. Member, Board of Di..etors, Air Force Academy Society of Washington D.C. Member, Board of Directors, National Aeronautic Association. SECURITY CLEARANCE - TOP SECRET (SCI with SBI). t

1 i I i i l i l COLE - - EXHIBIT 2 i

g f June 3,1999 RISK ASSESSMENT OF CREDIBLE AIRCRAFT OR MISSILE ACCIDENTS IMPACTING PRIVATE FUEL STORAGE LLC INDEPENDENT SPENT FUEL STORAGE INSTALLATION James L. Cole, Jr. Brigadier General US AirForce(Ret.) Associate Burdeshaw Associates, Ltd. I

INDEX Page INTRODUCTION: I ISSUE ONE: Heavy Jet Commercial Passenger or Transport Aircraft 3 ISSUE TWO: Turbine Powered Business Aviation Aircraft or General Aviation Aircraft 7 i j ISSUE THREE: Military Jet Fighter or Other MilitaryAircraft 9 ISSUE FOUR: Michael AAF 15 ISSUE FIVE: Hung Ordnance 20 j ISSUE SIX: Missiles 22 ISSUE SEVEN: X-33 24

SUMMARY

CONCLUSION: 25 APPENDIX A: Aircraft Crash Rates by Category, Subcategory, and Flight Phase APPENDIX B: Accident Analysis for Aircraft Crash into Hazardous Facilities. i i L i L i

o o INTRODUCTION - Any risk ' assessment of aircraft or missile accidents impacting a proposed Independent Spent (Nuclear) Fuel Storage Installation (ISFSI) located at 40 24'50"N and ,112 47'37"W involves multiple aspects and many phases of flight operations and aerial maneuvers. This assessment will examine all operations,and activities, no matter how infrequent or remote, that could threaten the safety and security of such a facility. By exploring every_ possibility of even the most unlikely accident, we can identify and assess any relevant risks and inake informed decisions. Aircraft operations, missile operations, routes, and procedures will all be carefully examined and assessed to ensure every possible aspect and angle is thoroughly covered

With regard to aircraft, an impact frequency evaluation is useful to determine the anticipated likelihood or frequency of an aircraft impacting a specific location or facility during a given period of time. The ISFSI site covers 820 acres, but the actual restricted area containing the spent nuclear fdel is only 99 acres. Aircraft operations must be specifically analyzed with respect to the airport environment, since arrivals and departures, to include takeoffs and landings, at airports have historically produced a higher rate of mishaps than other phases of flight. Aircraft operations should also be evaluated by category and type, since accident rates are generally lower for civilian and military large multi-engine aircraft such as commercial airliners, cargo aircraft, bombers

- and tankers, than smaller aircraft such as fighters, attack aircraft, trainers, and general l aviation aircraft.' W e

F: Weapons and ordnance such as bombs, missiles, and ammunition add an additional 1 consideration to any risk assessment. In the event of a crash, the explosive impact of an aircraft with weapons or ordnance aboard can be significantly greater. In the event of an error or malfunction, an errant bomb or missile adds a new dimension to a risk assessment. Unmanned cruise missiles which are launched from aircraft or surface platforms merit special consideration as well, since they are dependent upon electronic ' guidance systems after launch rather than direct human control inputs. Risk is commonly defined as the product of the probability or likelihood of an event and the consequence or magnitude of that event integrated over all events being considered. This risk assessment will be confined to determining the likelihood or probability of an aircraft or missile accident impacting the proposed Independent Spent (Nuclear) Fuel Storage Installation (ISFSI). Any evaluation of crash impact effects to the proposed facility are beyond the scope of this assessment. w 2

ISSUE ONE: Heavy Jet Commercial Passenger or Transport Aircraft Issue: Consideration of the probability of heavy-jet commercial passenger or transport aircraft crashing into an Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation (ISFSI) located at 40 24'50"N and 112 47'37"W. Assessment: The Air Transport industry has steadily decreased both risk and accidents over time through improved modern equipment, better selection and training of personnel, and data collection and analysis. Despite growth of air traffic volume, studies show an " improving world trend in the fatal accident rate... for western built jet aircraft operations."' The United States' record is even better. From 1959 to 1996, there were 577 hull losses worldwide, of which only 154 were U.S. operations. In the last ten years there were 205 hull losses, of which only 4I were U.S. operations.2 The United States National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) has publicly cited "the advances we've made in transportation safety over the past few decades". 3 In 1996 there were only 38 large air carrier " accidents" in the entire United States with an accident rate of only.28 per 100,000 flight hours. 4 (1996 investigations / data final) An aircraft accident as defined by the NTSB is an occurrence associated with the operation of an aircraft that takes place between the time any person boards the aircraft with the intention of flight until such time as all such persons have disembarked, and in which any person suffers a fatal or serious injury as a result of being in or upon the aircraft or by direct contact with the aircraft or anything attached thereto, or in which the aircraft receives substantial damage.8 An " accident" would not necessarily even be of sufficient 3

I magnitude to pose a risk to an ISFSt. The NTSB further defines a " major" accident as one where the aircraft was destroyed or there were multiple fatalities, or there was one fatality and the aircraft was substantially damaged.6 " Hull losses" with fatalities, which usually involve an aircraft impacting the ground and being damaged beyond repair or j totally destroyed, really represent the only potential threat to the proposed ISFSI. A study by the Boeing Company concluded that the probability of a third party fatality, or an individual on the ground being killed by an airplane falling from the sky, is about one in a hundred million per year.7 Of the 38 large air carrier accidents which occurred in the United States during 1996, only three were hull losses with fatalities. Three over the total territory (3,787,319 square miles) of the United States in a year, or one in approximately every 1,262,439 squase miles, pose an inconsequential probability of a specific point impact, i.e. the proposed ISFSI site. In addition, only three hull losses with fatalities for over 12 million flying hours and over 550 billica revenue passenger miles by U.S. commercial air carriers in 19% underscores the high level of safety and the low level of risk.8 "In short, compared to other national aviation systems or to the world's safest road system, U.S. commercial aviation is remarkably safe."' In addition, our government strives for even greater improvements in the future by continually identifying potential problem areas and proactively reducing major risks that can lead to accidents, fatalities, and associated economic costs. The U.S. Department of Transportation's number one management issue is aviation safety and promoting public health and safety by working toward the elimination of transportation related deaths, injuries and property damage." I I 1 There are three main flight phases which merit careful consideration. The takeoff phase includes the takeoff roll and initial climb. The in-flight phase includes the climb to 4

y L cruise, cruise /in-flight, and the descent from cruise. The landing phase includes the landing approach and landing roll. - The proposed ISFSI facility location is not situated under the takeoff and departure corridor nor the approach and landing corridor of any airport. This is important since the - majority of Hull Loss aircraft accidents,23.7% and 44.6% respectively, occur during these phases of flight.38 Climbs and descents account for only 7.3% and 6.4% respectively, while only 4.7% occur during cruise. .I Salt Lake City International Airport is located 50 statute miles northeast of the proposed ISFSI site. Major runways at Salt Lake City International Airport include 16 Right/ 34 Left,16 Left/34 Right and 17/35. The north / south alignment of the runways places the i proposed ISFSI location well away from the takeoff and landing segments of flights departing and arriving Salt Lake City International Airport. The Standard Instrument I Departure (SID) routes are Jazz One, Oquirrh One, Milford Two, and Fairfield Three. ) All three SIDs avoid the proposed ISFSI site, and departing aircraft are tracked by radar as well. Of the nation's 22 Air Route Traffic Control Centers, Salt Lake City Center ranked only number 19 of 22 for 1998 in number of aircraft handled. In 1998, the Salt Lake City International Airport Traffic Control tower logged 365,000 total (takeoffs and landings) operations. Of the 50 busiest FAA Airport Traffic Control Towers in the nation, Salt Lake City International Airport ranked only number 27 in 1998.12 r 5 A

44 ' Provo Municipal Airport is located 55 statute miles east by southeast of the proposed ISFSI site and its main runway 13/31 also places takeoff and landing traffic well away fmm the proposed ISFSI site. As noted previously, only 4.7% of Hull Loss accidents occur during the cruise portion of flight. High altitude Jet Route 56 with a minimum en route altitude of 33,000 feet MSL has a designated route which passes 10 nautical miles (11.5 statute miles) north of the proposed ISFSI site. However, as with all designated high altitudejet routes, it has no specified width. For analysis purposes, it is reasonable to assume a width on the order of eight nautical miles (9.2 statute ' miles) given the practice of pilots to follow and track the designated course. Low Altitude Route Victor 257 runs north / south with a minimum en 'l . route altitude of 12,300 feet MSL and a width of 12 nautical miles (13.8 statute miles). It passes 17 nautical miles (19.5 statute miles) east of the proposed ISFSI site. Taking the 4.7% figure together with the distance of the ISFSI from these airways makes the odds of an aircraft falling out of the sky and crashing on the proposed ISFSI site too small to i compute and so highly improbable as to even contemplate.

== Conclusion:== The probability of a heavy jet commercial passenger or transport aircraft crashing into an ISFSI at the proposed site is extremely remote. i ~ r ~ 6 e

ISSUE TWO: Turbine Powered Business Aviation Aircraft or General Aviation , Aircraft Issue:.. Consideration of the probability of a Turbine Powered Business Aviation Aircraft or General Aviation aircraft crashing into an Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation (ISFSI) located at 40 24'50"N and 112 47'37"W. . Assessment: The proposed ISFSI site is located in a Military Operating Area (MOA), SEVIER B, which is adjacent to the airspace of Restricted Areas R64% and R6402. Sevier B airspace extends up to 9,500' altitude. Civilian aircraft are prohibited from operating in the Restricted Areas and generally avoid flying in Military Operating Areas. R6406 and R6402 airspace both extend up to 58,000' (FL580) and both are listed as being in continuous use. The proximity of the SEVIER B MOA to the Restricted Areas makes it unlikely that Turbine Powered Business Aviation Aircraft would even transit the area and be' anywhere near the proposed ISFSI site. Turbine Powered Business Aviation Aircraft generally range from the six-seat 10,400-lb. gross weight Cessna Citationjet to the dozen-seat 90,900-lb. gross weight Gulfstream V. They can also include smaller turbo prop aircraft. However, business aircraft pilots who do wish to transit the Sevier B MOA are instructed to contact Clover Control on 134.1 for range activity status. In 1996, these aircraft had 20 accidents nationwide for a fatal accident rate of.34 per 100,000 flight hours which is comparable to the 38 accidents and a rate of.28 per 100,000 flight hours for large air carriers that same year." General Aviation aircraft can, and do, occasionally transit the MOA, but records of volume of civilian aircraft flying around the Utah Test and Training Range (UTTR) are \\ 7 j

q-not recorded by the U.S. Air Force.' The Cessna 172, a four-seat 2,500 lb. gross weight j reciprocating eitgine-powered aircraR typifies the' General Aviation category of aircraft, although some types are somewhat larger and heavier. Because of their relatively slow speed and light weight, crashes of small aircraft would not pose a significant hazard to the PFSF, in that the structures, systems, and components important to safety at the PFSF are designed so that they can withstand the impact of such aircran. PFS has demonstrated that the PFSF can withstand Spectrum I missiles that would be produced by the design basis tornado. PFS SAR { 8.2.2.2 Such missiles include a 3,960 lb. (1,800 kilogram) automobile impacting the facility at 126 m.p.h. Id. at 8.2-17. Light aircraft, such as the Cessna 172, typic' ally weigh about 2,500 lbs. In a crash, such aircraft typically impact the ground at 100 knots (114 mph) or less, in that the pilot is often attempting to fly the aircraft or land without engine power. Because the typical light. aircraft is less massive and would impact the ground at a lower velocity than the design l basis automobile in a tomado, the aircraft will impact with less energy and less momentum and hence will cause less damage than the automobile. Thus, because the . PFSF is designed to withstand such an automobile impact, it can also withstand the aircraft impact. i Further, according to the NTSB, a breakdown of the 2,078 total and 419 fatal General Aviation accidents nationwide in 1995, indicates that 85 fatal accidents occurred during the cruise phase of flight, or 4.1% of the total General Aviation accidents." This j correlates closely to the 4.7% cmise hull loss rate of accidents experienced by large air i i carriers as well as their single hull loss with fatalities experienced in 1995. High risk j General Aviation takeoff and landing at Salt Lake City International Airport is located far 8 !~ i

from the proposed ISFSI site. Other airpons in the region at which such aircraft could land are also located far from the proposed ISFSI site. Tooele Airport is 26 statute miles east by northeast of the proposed ISFSI site; Bolinder/Tooele Valley Airport (Private) is

27. statute miles northeast of the proposed ISFSI site; Cedar Valley Airport (Private) is 40 tatute miles east of the proposed ISFSI site; and Salt Lake City No.2 Airport is 45 statute s

miles east by nonheast of the proposed site. Consequently, crashes of General Aviation aircraft will pose no significant risk to the proposed ISFSI site.

== Conclusion:== The probability of a Turbine Powered Business Aviation Aircraft or a General Aviation aircraft crashing into an ISFSI at the proposed site is extremely remote. ISSUE THREE: Military Jet Fighter or Other Military Aircraft i Issue: Consideration of the probability of military jet fighter aircraft or other types of military aircraft crashing into an Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation (ISFSI) located at 40 24' 50"N and 112 47' 37" W. Assessment: The UTTR is used by the U.S. Air Force as a training area for simulated ' air-to-air combat, air-to-ground attack missions using live munitions, and testing of military ordnance. The UTTR was established in January 1979 and is located in northwestem Utah and eastem Nevada, within the Great Salt Lake Desen, approximately 70 miles west of Salt Lake City, Utah. (See map following page.) High country desert, sand dunes, mountains, and rolling hills characterize the landscape. The ever-changing seasons and the 2,800 square miles oflandmass make the UTTR an ideal choice for testing airbome, air-to-ground, and ground-to-air weapon systems. The UTTR also 9

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F suppons the Ogden Air Logistics Center shelf-life testing program for conventional munitions and irovides an unparalleled arena for combat training units. Many types of Department of Defense (DOD) aircraft use the UTTR, and there are thousands of training sorties flown there each year. The proposed ISFSI site is located within the Sevier B MOA and two statute miles outside the edge of R 6402B airspace and 9 statute miles from the closest boundary of DOD owned land space. 1 Hill Air Force Base (AFB) is located 65 statute miles northeast of the proposed ISFSI site. An' Air' Operations Center (AOC) at Hill AFB is the central air traffic control and l weapons control facility for the UTTR.- All air traffic control radar data is displayed on ' he Fleet Area Control and Surveillance Facility Air Tracking System (FACTS), and all -j L t weapons control radar data is displayed on the AN/UPA-62C analog radar scope at the j Hill AFB AOC. Radar data is provided at three long-range radar sites and three short-range radar sites.' Radio coverage is provided at six remote sites. All data from remote sites is brought into the AOC by landline, microwave, or fiber optics. All operations in i the UTTR are positively controlled and carefully monitored.is j-F-16 fighter aircraft depart Hill AFB under positive Radar Departure Control en route to i the UTTR. They are handed off to Clover Control (Range Control) and fly south passing west of Desert Peak (11,031' elevation) near the Stansbury Mountains to practice terrain f masking to evade radar, approximately five miles east of the proposed ISFSI site. Clover l Control is a cenified air traffic control facility augmented by the 729* Air Control I Squadron, with three ASR-9 short-range radar sites (Bovine Mountain, Cedar Mountain, and Trout Creek) in the UTTR. Long range radars (200 nautical miles) are located at l 10 L=

[ Francis Peak, Battle Mountain, and Cedar City. F-16's fly no lower tLan 1,000' Above Ground Level (AGL) as they transit Skull Valley and are normally at 3,000' to 4,000' ' AGL. During this phase of flight, the aircraft are not engaging in any threat reaction or tactical maneuvering but rather are simply transiting the area. There is no aggressive maneuvering until they are well south of Dugway,15 miles south of the proposed ISFSI site. F-16 traffic passing through Skull Valley v, aries, but averages approximately 10 aircraft daily. According to the U.S. Air Force, there were 3,871 Skull Valley transits in 1998, ) l and they were almost entirely F-16 flights originating from Hill AFB. Of those, less than i 1 a quarter were actually carrying live ordnance. No combat maneuvers are performed, but clearing turns (looking for other aircraft) and "G" awareness maneuvers (range warm-up) are conducted on a routine basis. No aircraft over-flying Skull Valley are allowed to have their armament switches in a release capable mode, and all switches are " safe" until inside DOD land boundaries, which are 9 statute miles to the southwest at the~ closest < point. The UTTR has not experienced an unintended munitions release outside of ' designated launch / drop / shoot boxes. The boxes are at least 30 statute miles from the i proposed ISFSI site. The F16's work in the south ranges.. Wildcat Range is the range ' closest to the proposed ISFSI site where live ordnance is expended, and it is 30 statute i l' miles west by northwest of the proposed site. No run-in headings for weapons delivery currently transit over the Skull Valley area. When the F-16's complete their work on the range, they fly north to return to Hill AFB and do not pass near the proposed ISFSI site. F-16's that work in the northern ranges are not a factor since during ingress, range work, and egress they do not pass near the proposed ISFSI site. Both Hill AFB and Michael 11

i i Army Air Field (AAF) are available for hung live ordnance recovery. Michael AAF is located 15 nautical miles (17.25 statute miles) south by southwest of the proposed ISFSI site. The F-16's use it as an emergency landing field, when required, and a recovery field for landing with a " hung bomb", i.e. live ordnance that did not release and failed to drop from the aircraft on the range. The main runway (12/30) at Michael AAF is 13,125' long and aligned southeast and northwest. Approaches and landings are usually made from L the northwest to land to the southeast (Runway 12). There is also an aircraft-arresting ) barrier at the end of Runway 12. Consequently, there is no overflight or directional vector risk to the proposed ISFSI site with respect to emergency landings or hung l L ordnance recoveries at Michael AAF. Even a MK84 GP 2000 lb. Bomb (Net Explosive Weight: 945 lb.), the largest carried by the F-16, would not pose an explosive threat to ' the proposed ISFSI site at a distance of 15 nautical miles (17.25 statute miles) from the airfield. F-16 jettison and controlled bailout areas (Hill AFB Tactical Air NavigationfrACAN-channel 49 - 242' radial /53 nautical mile fix) are well to the west and north,45 statute miles from the proposed ISFSI site, and also pose no hazard. 'Other military aircraft use the UTTR for a wide variety of training missions to include B-52's, B-l's and B-2's dropping bombs or launching cruise missiles as well as A-10's, F-l 18's, F-117A's and A-6's. Their activities are generally confined to the northem and westem portions of the UTTR and are approximately 30 miles away from the proposed j ISFSI site. Run-ins, drops, and launches are normally done from north to south or east to west and are thus directed away from the proposed ISFSI site. 12 1 (-'

The UTTR reports aircraft activity status to the FAA on a regular basis. These reports include an extensive list of aircraft that could conceivably use or transit the UTTR. These reports irJic.Je only possible use of the airspace by the cited aircraft, and as a practical matter, the aircraft flow through Skull Valley consists almost entirely of F-16 flights originating from Hill AFB. In the past 28 years 50 USAF fixed-wing aircraft have crashed somewhere in the state of Utah (82,076 square miles). There have been five USAF and no Army, Navy, Marine - Corps or foreign aircraft accidents on the Utah Test and Training Range in the past five years. The UlTR includes 17,000 square miles of airspace and 2,800 square miles of landmass. The USAF losses in the entire state include 34 F-16's, six F-4's', four F-105's*, two F-5's*, and one each B-52, EB-57*, F-111 *, and T-38. (Asterisked aircraft are no longer flown by the U.S. Air Fome). The apparently high number of F-16 crashes is a reflection of their proportionately large numbers in the USAF inventory, s since they constitute slightly over half of all USdF combat aircraft. F-16 mishap rates are actually comparable to those of other fighter aircraft. The F-16 Class A Mishap rate for fiscal year 1998 was 3.89 per 100,000 flight hours. The F-16 lifetime Class A Flight Mishap rate is 4.38 per 100,000 flight hours, while the lifetime rates of the F-15A, F-15C, F-111, and F-117 are 3.65,2.42,6.13, and 5.71 mpectively. Older fighter aircraft such as the F-86, F-100, and F-105 experienced even higher mishap rates (see chart on next page), particularly when they first entered the USAF inventory." The 50 crashes in Utah are classified as USAF Class A Flight Mishaps, which means there was a fatality, a destroyed aircraft, or damage in excess of $1 million. At least 17 of these occurred within 10 miles of an airfield, so they would have posed no threat to the proposed ISFSI 13 _m

r site, since there are no airfields, military or otherwise, within 10 miles of the site. This leaves 33 crash' s in the entire state of Utah (82,076 square miles) which represents 1.18 e crashes per year in the entire state. This rate is a conservative number since it includes several older aircraft that were less reliable and had higher accident rates that are no longer flying. The five F-16's that crashed during the past five years all crashed within the UTTR. Consequently, the probability of a specific impact on the proposed ISFSI site is extremely low. Although approximately 3,900 aircraft transit Skull Valley each year, given the current routes of flight and range procedures, there is no reason to presume any significant risk to the proposed ISFSI site from a military aircraft crash. The prevailing flight pattern is along the Stonsbury Mountain, five miles east of the proposed ISFSI. Given the lack of any aggressive training maneuvers, the only likely cause of crash would be mechanical, electrical or other equipment failure. At the low altitudes at which they transit the valley (3,000 ft. to 4,000 ft. AGL), if such a failure were to occur, however, it is highly unlikely that the crash would impact the site five miles away, particularly given iheir 11ight pattern along the Stansbury Mountains not directed toward the FFSF. Further, aircraft flying through Skull Valley will not interfere with the ISFSI communications and security systems, nor will those systems interfere with the aircraft. There is a list of specific systems and requirements for noninterference specifications used by the Department of Defense and Department of Energy. As long as systems from this list are installed in the ISFSI, there will be no interference problems with the site and aircraft in transit through Skull Valley. 14

p d

== Conclusion:== The probability of an F-16 or other military aircraft crashing into an ISFSI t the proposed site is extremely low. a ISSUE FOUR: Michael AAF Issue: Consideration of the probability of aircraft operating to and from Michael AAF crashing into an Independent Spent Fuel Storage Facility located at 40 24'50" North and I 112*47'37" West. l L Assessment: Runway designations at airports are determined by their directional 1 - alignment with respect to magnetic noah. At Michael AAF, the main runways are 12 and

30. This means an aircraft approaching to land on runway 12 will be heading i

approximately 120* (east by southeast), and an aircraft taking off and departing will also , be heading approximately 120* (east by southeast).- The primary runway for instrument approaches and landings and emergency recoveries at Michael AAF is Runway 12. Runway 12,'as well as Runway 30, is 13,125' long and 200' wide. l l

Approaches and landings for military aircraft often involve an initial approach to the runway, aligned with the landing runway, and then a turn to a downwind leg which is parallel to the mnway and on a reciprocal heading from the runway direction. The aircraft then makes a descending turn to a base leg, which is 90* to the runway heading, followed by a descending tum to final approach which is aligned with the runway

~ heading and places the aircraft in a position to land. The initial approach, downwind leg, base leg, final approach sequence is normally performed on a specified side of the landing runway, either right or left. If no side is specified the sequence is normally 4 15 l' '1 l L

p executed to the left. Normally known as the pattem side, any local operations such as L touch-and-go practice landings are flown on that side of the runway. Since there is a l' concentration of traffic on one side of the runway, this would influence crash _ probabilities and risk assessments for the area on that side of the runway. . Crash probabilities for near airport operations at Michael AAF represent an important , consideration for any risk assessment of credible aircraft accidents impacting the proposed ISFSI site, which is located 15 nautical miles (17.25 statute miles) north by l northeast of Michael AAF. The Department of Energy Analysis for Aircraft Crashes into Hazardous Facilities provides useful information regarding near airport operations as they apply to Michael AAF.38 The analysis uses the Cartesian coordinate convention with the origin at the center of the runway and the X-axis along the runway extended centerline. and the positive direction being the direction of flight. The Y-axis is perpendicular to the X axis with the positive direction created by a 90 counterclockwise rotation of the positive X. axis. -7 ) l The location of a facility is expressed in terms of distance (R) and bearing (0) from the j facility to the airfield. The X,Y values of the facility in the specified coordinate system L are determined in the following manner: i i X= -Rcos (0-() Y= Rsin (0-$) Where: i R= distance from the facility 16

}q 0 = bearing from the facility to the airport (= runway bearing as an angle with respect to magnetic north (runway number times ten) l Tables were prepared for the following cases: l l Commercial Aircraft-Takeoff 1 Commercial Aircraft-Landing r General Aviat:on Aircraf1-Takeoff - General Aviation Aircraft - Landing l L Large Military Aircraft - Takeoff-Pattem side Len and Right l l Large Military Airport - Landing - Pattem side Left and Right Small Military Aircraft - Takeoff-Pattem side Left and Right Small Military Aircraft -- Landing - Pattem side Left and Right The DOE analysis found some significant differences between where takeoff and landing crashes are expected to occur. In commercial aviation, landing crashes extend out only a mile from the end of the runway, while military landing crashes are more widespread and can occur up to 10 miles beyond the end of the runway. Takeoff crashes for military l-aircraft are concentrated along the extended centerline of the runway. Landing crashes l-for military aircraft are more spread out, simply because an aircraft that experiences difficulties and tums back to attempt recovery on the landing mnway and then crashes would be considered a landing crash. Hence, military landing crashes extend up to 10 miles from the runway. It is important to note that current published instrument approach procedures for Michael AAF include a TACAN to Runway 12, Global Positioning L 17 j u L

j o System (GPS) to Runway 12, Copter Non-directional Beacon (NDB) 080*, and NDB or GPS A. None of these approaches involves overflight nor directional vector risk to the c proposed ISFSI site. The most important conclusion from this portion of the DOE analysis is that the proposed ' ISFSI site, located 17.25 statute miles away on a magnetic bearing of 315 is outside the crash risk area of near-airport operations and at right angles (90*) from the direction of flow for takeoff and landing traffic at Michael AAF. Consequently, the proposed ISFSI site is located under neither the takeoff nor landing flight paths of the airfield, the historical location for over half of all crashes that occur. Consequently, the risk to the proposed ISFSI site by departure (takeoff) and arrival (landing) traffic at Michael AAF is minimal. q The airspace over the Dugway Proving Ground is restricted'and flights into Michael AAF are on a Prior Permission Required (PPR) basis only. A military airway, IR-420, which l is 10 nautical miles (11.5 statute rniles) wide, passes over the proposed ISFSI site. Traffic to and from Michael AAF use this airway. IR-420 is classified as a Military l Training Route and extends from 100' Above Ground Level (AGL) to 8,000'. l I A safety analysis using the methods of NUREG-0800 was conducted to determine the risk and probability of an aircraft using IR-420 impacting the proposed ISFSI site. The methodology is as follows:" l P= C x N x A/W where 18 t

l P= Probability per year of an aircraft crashing into the proposed ISFSI site. C= In-flight crash rate per mile N= Number of flights per year along the airway A= EfTective area of the ISFSI site in square miles l . W= Width of airway in miles l Using an in-flight crash rate of 4E-10 per mile and the number of flights per year (414) . along with the area of the proposed site (0.1546 square miles) and the width of the airway 10 nautical miles (11.5 statute miles) the probability of an aircraft crashing into the proposed ISFSI site was computed to be 2.23 E-9 per year.20 This is an extremely low. probability of occurrence, well below the NUREG-0800 standard of acceptable risk, _ which is 1E-7 per year. Consequently, there is very low risk and a very low probability of a crash into the proposed ISFSI site by aircraft using IR-420. Based on information provided by Dugway Proving Grounds, there are currently approximately 414 flights annually at Michael AAF.2: These include C-5's, C-141's, C-17's, C-130's, C-12's, C-i 21's and others. For the probability of an aircraft crash at the proposed ISFSI site to j ' reach the minimum level of concern, the number of flights per year would have to greatly increase far above the current level. Military security, cargo airlift, and other related L flights currently operating to and from Michael AAF should remain at approximately the l same level with no appreciable increase in risk. l ' The safety analysis using the methodology of NUREG-0800 confirms the conclusions of the DOE' analysis, in that the aliport to proposed ISFSI distance (D=17.25 statute miles) exceeds 10 statute miles, and the number of annual flights (414) is less than 1,000 D2 19 s

squared. Consequently, takeoff and landing traffic at Michael AAF as well as aircraft using IR-420 pose minimal risk to the proposed ISFSI site.

== Conclusion:== The probability of aircraft operating to and from Michael AAF crashing into an ISFSI at the proposed site is extremely low. ISSUE FIVE: Hung Ordnance Issue: Consideration of the probability of" hung ordnance" unintentionally or inadvertently releasing and impacting an independent spent fuel storage facility (ISFSI) located at 40'24'50" North and 112*47'37" West. Assessment: The probability of a " hung ordnance" situation is relatively low since most i i aircraft do not actually carry live ordnance but instead carry training ordnance such as j Bomb Dummy Units (BDU) or inert filled or empty MK82 500lb bombs. Consequently, training ordnance is not considered live ordnance. The weight of these bombs absent explosive charges pose little risk to the proposed ISFSI site. BDU-33's have ballistic characteristics similar to MK 82 bombs and carry only a small smoke charge for marking purposes. They weigh 25 pounds and are often termed the weapon of choice for training missions. According to the U.S. Air Force, only approximately 15% of the 8,711 sorties flown in Fiscal Year 1998 actually carried live ordnance. Michael AAF is the designated primary airfield for aircraft landing with live hung ordnance that has failed to release. According to the U.S. Army, there were only five hung ordnance aircraft diversions / recoveries into Michael AAF during 1998.22 Since only approximately 15% 1 of the aircraft sorties carry live ordnance, a total of only five hung ordnance recoveries in l 20

1998 for a total of about 1,300 sorties (approximately 15% of 8,711) produces a ~ probability for failing to release of approximately one in two-hundred and fiRy. A failure to release does not mean there will necessarily be an inadvertent release or an inadvertent release and explosion. The UTTR has nm experienced an unintended munitions release outside of designated launch / drop / shoot boxes.23 All of these are obviously within the UTTR and at least 30 statute miles from the proposed ISFSI site. In the event of hung ordnance, according to the U.S. Air Force, the first priority is to . maintain aircraft control and then assess the situation and taire appropriate action. Pilots contact Clover Control Air Traffic Control Facility and advise them of the situation. When hung ordnance is encountered, the pilot has the option of eitherjettisoning the rack and munitions on the range, if able, or recovering to base. Michael AAF is the designated primary recovery base for hung ordnance, although Hill AFB is available as well. Pilots request clearance to Michael AAF for a hung ordnance recovery / landing. . Pilots maintain a stable flight path and remain in Visual Meteorological Conditions by avoiding clouds. Clover Control provides assistance as required and ensures Michael ' AAF is prepared to receive the aircraft to include fire fighting equipment and medical . personnel standing by. The pilot maneuvers the aircraft to the northwest, approximately 20 statute miles from the proposed ISFSI site, and proceeds to Michael AAF, avoiding rapid or steep turns and abrupt climbs or descents. Test facilities or any populated areas are avoided. A long straight-in approach with a shallow rate of descent is established to a i l full stop landing on runway 12 (to the southeast). Runway 12 is 13,125' long and 200' L wide with a barrier cable at the end. After landing, Dugway Proving Ground Explosive L Ordnance Disposal personnel inspect and safe the bombs. f l 21 l

i 'l i l Based on information provided by the U.S. Air Force, the UTTR has not experienced an unintended munitions release outside the designated launch / drop / shoot boxes within the 1 l ' UTTR. In addition, aircraft overflying the Skull Valley are not allowed to have their-armament switches in a release capable mode. All switches are " Safe" until inside D6partment of Defense (DOD) land boundaries within the UTTR. Master Arm switches are not actually armed until the aircraft are on the ranges within the UTTR where the ' bombs are to be dropped.24 In addition, each weapon tested on the UTTR has a run-in 1 - heading established during the safety review process. Footprints, time of fall, altitude at. L release and release airspeed dictate the headings allowed. No run-in headings are currently over the Skull Valley area. l l

== Conclusion:== Since there have not been any unintentional releases oflive ordnance in i _ Skull Valley or at the Skull Valley reservation, and technological improvements, weapons reliability acd training have improved over time and will continue to do so, the probability of either event occurring is extremely low. i~ l-ISSUE SIX: Missiles Issue: Consideration of the probability of a missile impacting an Independent Spent Fuel i Storage Installation (fSFSI) located at 40 24'50" North and 112 47'37" West. 1 i Assessment: Since January 1,1983,21 missiles have been lost in class A mishaps in the state of Utah (89,904 square miles). These included 12 AGM-86's (conventional air launched cruise missile),4 BGM-109's* and 4 AGM-124's (advanced cruise missile). ! I i i I 22 p L ^T:

- (Asterisked missiles are no longer used.) One LGM-30 (Minuteman ICBM) was damaged during ground movement.25 ) ~ 4 At least 10 of these missiles impacted within the confines of the Utah Test and Training , Range and four crashed within three minutes oflaunch. Of the five missiles lost over the past five years, only one carried a live warhead. None impacted anywhere near the proposed ISFSI site. There are approximately six cruise missile launches per year. Missile launches are generally confined to the northern and western portions of the l UTTR and are at least 30 statute miles away from the proposed ISFSI site. Run-ms, i drops, and launches are normally done from north to south or east to west and are thus directed away from the proposed ISFSI site. Weapon systems that have a capability of exceeding range boundaries are required to have a Flight Termination System (FTS) installed' prior to testing on' the UTTR. The FTS j systems are designed to destruct the weapons and terminate the weapon flight path, on command, in the event of a weapon anomaly. Before a bomber launches a test cruise tnissile, the Mission Control Center verifies that the missile's remote control and flight control systems are working properly. At all times throughout the flight the cruise missile FTS must detect a signal that in effect permits the missile to keep flying. If the missile does not detect the signal for a preset time, the FTS activates. Safety officers can also activate the FTS, if required, at any time. The Range Safety Officer at Mission Control and the Airborne Range Instrumentation Aircraft are also both capable of terminating missile flight almost immediately. The UTTR has never experienced a FTS failure.26 23 i

I-l 1-

== Conclusion:== . The probability of a missile crashing into an ISFSI site at the proposed site j \\ l is extremely low. l-L ISSUE SEVEN:' X-33 ~ { l 4 . Issue: Consideration of the probability of the X-33, a suborbital prototype for a single stage-to-orbit launch vehicle space plane, utilizing Michael AAF, crashing into an 1 ~ Independent Spent Fuel Storage I.nstallation (ISFSI) located at 40'24'50" North and 112 47'37" West. Assessment: The X-33 is an u:nnanned half-scale demonstrator launch vehicle planned l to test critical components for the next generation space transport system. The planned test program consists of five flights during a six-month time period starting in December 1999. The flights will originate from Edwards AFB, CA, and land at Michael AAF. X-33 - Gross Lift Off Weight (GLOW) is estimated to be 285,000lbs'and empty weight,75,000 lbs or 26% of GLOW. The planned approach is to enter the UTTR airspace R 6402 at -l l 60,000' from the southwest. Once overhead Michael AAF it will initiate a descent turning north and continue tuming until lined up on Runway 12 which is 13,125' long. Tum radius is estibated at 4-6 miles.27 The X-33 will not fly over Skull Valley. ] Therefore, the approach pattem and landing would pose no overflight nor directional l vector risk to the proposed ISFSI site. Most fuel would be expended by the time of landing.' Once on the ground, the X-33 will be purged of any remaining fuels and oxidizers and readied for truck transport back to Edwards AFB, CA. Once these five flights are completed, the second phase consists of two flights from Edwards AFB to ~Malmstrom AFB, MT. l 24 ^2

1 1. r: P

== Conclusion:== . The probability of the X-33 crashing into an ISFSI at the proposed site is extremely low. 1 l

SUMMARY

CONCLUSION I Since 1960, the annual accident rate for U.S. air carriers has decreased from 1.84 accidents per100,000 flight hours to less than 0.39, yet over the same period, total i scheduled airline departures have increased from 3.9 million per year to 11.7 million per l year and the number of passengers has increased from 62 million per year to 605 million - 2: 4 per year. Airline travel in the United States is the safest in the world, and it has been l getting safer over the years. Stated another way, the National Safety Council cites a death rate of 0.04 per hundred million passenger miles in l994, the most recent year for which the Council has published this calculation. The same rate for passenger automobiles was 0.86, over 21 times greater.29 U.S. major air carriers completed 1998 by flying over 615 million passengers with no hull loss accidents and not a single passenger fatality. More specifically, no passenger died in an accident involving any type of U.S. commercial airplane anywhere in the world...this appears to be the first year since the dawn of commercial aviation for such an achievement.30 The Federal Aviation Administration's preliminary 1998 civil aviation accident statistics reflect remarkable achievements as well as promising trends. There were 48 Federal Aviation Regulation (FAR) Part 121 Accidents, (domestic, flag, and supplemental air carriers and commercial operators oflarge aircraft) in 1998, down from 49 in 1997. Only l one of these accidents was fatal, down from four in 1997.' There were no passenger l l 25 1 c-

fatalities in 1998, although one ramp worker was killed. There were a total of eight fatalities in 1957. There were 8 FAR Part 135 Commuter Accidents in 1998, down from 17 in 1997. None of the accidents in 1998 were fatal; there were 5 fatal accidents in 1997 with 46 fatalities. 1 All of the commuter accidents in 1998 occurred in Alaska. There were 79 FAR, Part 135 Air Taxi Accidents in 1998, down from 1997 when there were 82 accidents. Seventeen of the 1998 accidents were fatal, two more than in 1997. Fatalities were up slightly from 39 in 1997 to 45 in 1998. Thirty-four of these accidents occurred in Alaska.3' This constitutes an amazing achievement and a tribute to the impressive advances in aviation technology and reliability as well as the recruitment of top quality aviation professionals and vastly improved training. General Aviation has also made remarkable improvements in safety. Accidents and fatal accidents have declined for the past two years while General Aviation hours flown have increased.32 1998 statistics are not yet totally complete, but in 1997 General Aviation had the lowest accident rate for fatal accidents since 1982.33 In addition,the number of fatalities has also decreased from 660 in 1997 to 621 in 1998. The U.S. Air Force finished 1998 with the second safest year in their history. Their 1991 mishap rate of 1.11 Class A Flight Mishaps per 100,000 flight hours has been the best year in Air Force history, but there were actually more Class A Flight Mishaps (41) in that year than in 1998 (24). The high number of flight hours associated with Desert Shield / Storm drove the 1991 mishap rate down. With significantly less flight hours in ~ 4 26' I

1998, that year's rate exceeded the 1.11 rate even though the number of mishaps was significantly less.The Class A Flight Mishap rate for the U.S. Air Force for 1998 was 1.14 per 100,000 flight hours.34 To underscore the impressiveness of this achievement, the U.S. Air Force Class A Flight 4 I Mishap rate was 10.4 in 1958,3.9 in 1%8,2.93 in 1978 ana 1.64 in 1988.35 The numbers and the trend speak for themselves. This is an amazing achievement and indicative of remarkable technology and reliability advances in equipment and improved human performance due to selection and training. The U.S. Army had a Class A Flight Mishap rate of 1.63 for 1998.3' The U.S. Navy Class A Flight Mishap rate for 1998 was 2.32. The U.S. Marine Corps Class A Flight Mishap rate for 1998 was 2.52, which was their second best year ever.37 The entire Department of Defense, considered in total, finished 1998 with a Class A Flight Mishap rate of 1.6 mishaps per 100,000 flight hours, which makes 1998 the fourth safest year in 'DOD's history. Historically, about two thirds of aircraft fatal and hull loss accidents occur near airports, mostly during approach and landing, while less than 5 percent of hull loss accidents happen during cruise.3s In addition, landing accidents account for over half of the total i number of accidents.3' Because of the proposed ISFSI site distance from airports, only the cruise risk applies, and that is minimal. Careful planning, positive control procedures, and Flight Termination Systems minimize the missile risk as well. ' Considered individually and in total the risk and probability of an aircraft or missile 27 I - 5 i

accident impacting the proposed ISFSI site are minimal. The phenomenal advances in ^ technology and great improvements in training acmss the board in civilian and military aviation have significantly decreased risk and the probability of accidents across the i entire spectrum of aviation. The future promises even greater improvements, which I should continue to drive down risk and decrease the probability of accidents. Careful examination of all air operations in the vicinity of the proposed ISFSI site has disclosed nd significant risks that would preclude construction of such a site. Fully subscribing to the commendable goal of"Zero Accidents" means carefully examining every angle' and every aspect of all operations and activities and identifying and assessing every possible risk. Only then can one discern any compelling arguments to recommend for or against a particular course of action. This assessment has donejust that in the case of the proposed ISFSI site, and found no compelling argument to prohibit construction of such a facility on the selected location. 28 1 1

t NOTES: 1 Ashford, Ronald. " Fatal Accident Rate Trends". Presentation at the International Society of Air Safety Investigators Conference, Barcelona, Spain, October 2,1998. Page 2.- 2. Statistical Summary of Commercial Jet Airplane Accidents,1959-1996 Boeing Commercial Airplane Group. Seattle, Washington 98124, U.S.A. June 1997. Pagel1. 3-We Are All Safer, National Transportation Safety Board, Washington, DC 20594, July 1998, page 3. FAA Administrator's Handbook. U.S. Department ofTransportation. The Federal Aviation Administration, Washington, DC 20591, March 1999, Page 4. 8-National Transportation Safety Board, Article 830, SUBPART A Definitions, page ' 865. National Transportation Safety Board, Washington, DC 20594 ; National Transportation Safety Board Accident Classifications, WWW.NTSB. GOV.NTSB, Washington, DC 20594 7-The Boeing study was cited in " Airport Growth and Safety," Rand Report #MR297, . Rand,1700 Main Street, Santa Monica, CA 90407. Page 7. s The Aviation & Aerospace Almanac,1998 Edition, Aviation Week Group, McGraw Hill Companies,11 West 19th Street, New York, N.Y.10011, ppl92-195. Huettner, Charles. Toward a Safer 21" Century. National Aeronautics and Space Administration, Washington DC 20546 December 1996. Page 1.

• Top Ten Management issues, Office of the Inspector General, Department of Transportation, Report Number TW-1000-031, December 9,1998 page 1-1.

1 " Statistical Summary, Boeing, page 13.

12. FAA Administrator's Handbook, March 1999, page 12.

' '?Turbihe Powered Business Aviation Aircraft Accidents", Aviation Data Service, Wichita, Kansas,67201. March 10,1999. ] ' Annual Review of Aviation Accident Data. U.S. General Aviation, CY 1995 ' " Phases of Operation in all Accidents and Fatal Accidents." National Transportation . Safety Board Report, NTSB, Washington, DC 20594,1999. s. 29

s "" " Air Traffic and Range Control for UTTR," 388* Fighter Wing, Hill AFB, UT 84056, response to FOIA Request dated December 18,1998. ~ " Weapons testing on the UTTR," 388* Fighter Wing, Hill AFB, UT 84056. Response to FOIA Request, December 18,1998. '7' ' Briefing, US AF Safety Issues Team, HQ USAF, Pentagon, Washington, DC 20330. t November 20,1998. ' Accident Analysis For Aircraft Crash Into Hazardous. Facility,~ U.S. Department of-Energy, DOE Standard 3014-96, October 1996. Washington, DC 20585

• U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Standard Review Plan, NUREG 0800, Office

" of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, Washington, DC 20555, pages 3.56-3-3.5.16-4. j i 2 " Ibid. 2i. Letter, Lt. Col. F. Gil Brunson, USA Command Judge Advocate, U.S. Army Dugway Proving Ground, Utah, to Mr. John Donnell, Project Manager, Stone & Webster Engineeting Corp., April 2,1997.

22. Ler.er, Lt. Col. F. Gil Brunson, U.S.A, Command Judge Advocate U.S. Army Dugway Proving Ground, Utah, to James L. Cole, Jr. Brig Gen., USAF, (Ret.), January 25,1999.

23. " Weapons Testing on the UTTR South Range" 388* Fighter Wing, Hill AFB, UT, 84056, Response to FOIA Request, December 18,1998.

j l 2' Ibid. i - 25. : Briefing, USAF Safety Issues Team, HQ USAF, Washington, DC 20330. November -) 20,1998. " Weapons Testing on the UTTR South Range" 388* Fighter Wing, Hill AFB, UT, 26. 84056, Response to FOIA Request, December 18,1998.

27. "X-33 Contingency Operations Plan" Michael AAF, UT, provided by 388 Fighter

. Wing Hill AFB, UT 84056. Response to FOIA Request December 18,1998.

28. Mission performance indicators, Federal Aviation Administration Annual Report for 1996, Federal Aviation Administration, Washington, DC 20591, page 7.

2t Aviation Safety Information, Federal Aviation Administration, WWW.FAA.GOWPUBLICINFO.HTM Federal Aviation Administration, Washington, DC 20591 4 30

3* " Airlines have 615 million passengers in 1998, no deaths," Washington Times, January 7,1999. 3' "1993 Civil Aviation Accident Statistics Annual Report", Office of Accident Investigation, Federal Aviation Administration, Washington, DC 20591. March 4,1999,, Page i.- . 32. ^ FAA General Aviation Forecast Conference Proceedings, March 24-25,1998, Remarks by Ms. Louise Maillett, Assistant Administrator for Policy, Planning and International Aviation, Federal Aviation Administration, Washington, DC 20591, page 25. 33-FAA General Aviation Forecast Conference Proceedings, March 24-25,1998, Remarks by. Guy.Gardner, Associate Administrator for Regulation and Certification, Federal Aviation Administration, Washington, DC 20591. Page 11. 3* Briefing, USAF Safety Issues Team, HQ USAF, Pentagon, Washington, DC 20330, Y May 25,1999. i 3f Annual Flight Class A Rate, U.S. Air Force Safety Center, WWW-AFSC. SAIA.AF. MIL; Kirtland AFB, NM 87117 3'- U.S. Army' Aviation Accidents, U.S. Army Safety Center, SAFETY. ARMY. MIL / STATS /AVNST ATP.HTML; Ft. Rucker, AL 36362 0 Aviation Rates and Statistics, U.S. Navy Safety Center, WWW. 37 SAFETYCENTER. NAVY. MIL; Norfolk Naval Base, VA 23511 3s. " Airport Growth and Safety," Rand Report #MR288, Rand 1700 Main Street, Santa Monica, CA Page 103. F Ibid., Page 142. l 1 i I 31

i APPENDIX A Extracted from Department of Energy Standard Accident Analysis for Aircraft Crash Into Hazardous Facilities, October 1996, U.S. Department of Energy (DOE STD-3014-96, Appendix B) Washington, D.C. 20585 Aircraft crash rates by cateaorv. subcateoorv and fliaht phase Aircraft Crash Rate (P) Takeoff Landing (per takeoff) (per landing) General Aviation

1. Fixed Wing Single Engine 1.1 E-5 2.0E-5 Reciprocating

2. Fixed Wing Multiengine 9.3E4 2.3E-5

) i Reciprocating

3. Fixed Wing Turboprop 3.5E4 8.3E-6

4. Fixed Wing Turbojet 1.4E-6 4.7E4 Representative Fixed Wing 1.1 E-5 2.0E-5 Representative Helicopter' 2.5E-5 See note 1 Commercial

1. Air Carrier 1.9E-7 2.8E-7

2. Air Taxi 1.0E4 2.3E-6 Military

5. Large Aircraft' 5.7E-7 1.6E-6

6. Small Aircraft

• 1.8E-6 3.3E4 Helicopter crashes are considered on a per flight basis and are reported under takeoff for convenience.

8 2 Large military aircraft includes bombers, cargo aircraA and tankers. 8 Small military aircraft includes fighters, attack aircraft and trainers.

l \\ APPENDIX B Extracted from Department of Energy Standard Accident Analysis for Aircraft Crash into Hazardous Facilities, October,1996 U.S. Department of Energy (DOE-STD-3014-96, Appendix B) Washington, DC 20585 i Site Air Carrier Air Taxi Large Military Small Military Maximum 2E 8E-6 7E-7 6E-6 Minimum 7E-8 L7 6E-8 4E-8 Average CONUS 4E-7 1E-6 2E-7 4E-6 Argonne National 7E-7 4E-6 9E-8 8E-7 Laboratory Brookhaven National 2E-6 8E-6 7E-7 2E-7 Laboratory Hanford 1E-7 1E-6 1E-7 4E-8 Idaho National ~ 7E-8 4E-7 9E-8 7E-7 Engineering Laboratory Kansas City 4E-7' IE-6' 2E-7 IE-6 Los Alamos National 2E-7 3E-6 1E-7 SE-6 Laboratory Lawrence Livermore 5E-7 2E-6 2E-7 3E-6 National Laboratory Mouidd 6E-7 3E-6 1E-7 2E-6 Nevada Test Site SE-7 2E-6 2E-7 6E-6 Oak Ridge National '6E-7 2E-6 IE-7 6E-7 Laboratory Pantex 2E-7 3E-7 IE-7 SE-6 Pinellas 4E-7 1E-6 2E-7 4E-6 Rocky Flats 2E-7 6E-7 9E-8 9E-7 Sandia National 2E-7 3E-7 1E-7 SE-6 Laboratories Savannah River Site 6E-7 2E-6 IE-7 6E-7 " The Average CONUS was used for these sites. 2.Ihe Average CONUS was used for these sites.

I COLE - - EXHIBIT 3 4,. e

,- c.u 64 6 :w va. c4 P.02 /* 6, t 9 ACCIDENT ~ ISVESTIGATICN BOARD ~ REPORT UNITED STATES AIRFORCE AGM-129 Advanced Cruise Missile SerialNumber 90-0061 y f. 97 7 3 +p = ^ ^ ^ ... i; S., gu = ,./ 10 December 1997 Dugway Proving Ground, Utah Volume I ofIII e I UT-39450

r FED-22-1900 03:26 P.03 l DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE HEADQUNrfElt5 WR COMSAT CoMMmo LANGLEYWR F08CE Mst, VIRGdNW omCs or ms couumoen N-20s oooo souurvAno surrt ion LANG3Y AFs VA 2366s 2788 MEMORANDUM FOR ACC/JA

SUBJECT:

AFI51-503, Aircraft Accident Investigation Report, AGM-129,49' TS,53d WG and 388* RS,3ss' WG, S/N 90 0061,10 December 1997 I have reviewed the Aircraft Accident Investigation Report regarding the AGM-129 mishap at Dogway Proving Ground, Utah, on 10 December 1997. 'Ihe report was prepared by Cdosel Chades M. Westenhoff and compiles with the requirements of AFI 51-503. ' Ibis report is approved. 1 RICHARD E. RA Y General, USAF Connaander 1 l

Attachment:

Aircraft Accidentinvestigaties 4 I e 't e U N UT-39451

e em-eg-twu tw db P.04 ^ .m AFI 51-503 i . REPORT OF MISSILE ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION

l. AUTHORITY AND PURPOSE

a. Authority: On 30 Jan 98, the Commander, USAF Air Warfare Center, pursuant to Air Force Instruction 51-503, appointed Colonel Charles M. Westenhoff and legal and technical advisors to conduct an investigation of the 10 Dec 97 crash ofa USAF AGM-129 Advanced Cruise Missile.'

i

b.

Purpose:

This was an investigation into the facts and circumstances surrounding the 10 Dec 97 crash of a United States Air Force AGM-i 129 Advanced Cruise Missile number 90-0061 near Dugway, Utah. The niissile crashed at the completion of Nuclear Weapons System Evaluation Program test 98 02. It hit tlie ground at a site occupied by - a cosmic ray observatory operated by a consortium of universities. The crash damaged two trailen used to support telescope operations. ) The purpose of the investigation was to determine the relevant facts and circumstances of the accident and, ifpossible, to determine the cause or causes. The investigation obtained and preserved evidence for claims, litigation, disciplinary and administrative action, and for all other purposes deemed appropriate by competent authority.* 8 Y 1. 8 ne direceive govesning tis invesdsstion was Air Foros insouction 51 5031 Jul 95: 1 I Tf1TO O End +- UT-39452

asa-n-19ec ca: 9 .o m

2.

SUMMARY

OF FACTS: i

a. Mishap Summa'ry. On 10 Dec 97 the United States Air Force conducted a test of AGM-129 serial number 90-0061, an Advanced. ' ~

Cruise Missile. The Test Director planned the missile flight trajectory to stay away from known avoidance areas and to remain within protected airspace, and supervisors thoroughly reviewed this trajectory and the test plan. Test planners were unaware that a consortium of universities had .l established an astrophysical observing array on Cedar Mountain, and that the missile trajectory would cross over that site at a critica1 point in the mission.' The test was delayed due to adverse weather on 9 Dec 97, but began as planned on the backup day,10 December. After a series of pre-launch tests, a B-52 aircraft over the Utah Test and Training Range launched the missile. The missile flew its planned course, monitored by telemetry, tracking instruments, four chase aircraft, an Airborne Range Instnunentation Aircraft (abbreviated as ARIA), and the test range Mission Control Center. After three hours and 38 minutes of flight, the i missile made a planned abrupt climb and simulated warhead firing to complete the profile programshed into the missile. Immediately after the warhead fired,in accordance with the mission plan the test Lead Engineer attempted to call test team members on the ARIA, instructing them to take control of the missile. Four separate indications appeared to confirm that the Lead Engineer was transmitting, but the communications configuration of the Mission Control Center blocked transmission of the calls. At the same time the Lead Engine was trying to dimet actions on the ARIA, the missile was nosing over into a steep dive. Whenthe ARIA did not respond to two calls from the Lead Engineer, the Test Director again called for airbome controllers to control the missile. This radio call was transmitted, but it was too late to be effective. The missile descended rapidly and hit the ground before airbome controllers could establish control of the missile. The impact site was in the middle of an ' astrophysical observing array. The impact did not amage the d observatory instruments, but did damage one trailer at the site and caused minor damage to another tmiler. Utah Test and Training Range officials immediately secured the site and began recovering the simulated warhead and missile remains. The 388* Wing responded to the media attention generated by the minhaa. Explaleed in doenu at paragraph 2. C. (8) 3. below 8 2 UT-39453 muum.u umse missue. L nere nave Decn.D tuant tests of tbc rmsstle. an

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.:JJ;;: T ; '.%. . ;;,:.. :) ; ' i: Wi?t.:.*? : ...ai,'.U7 $.,.:"."E_:A,k...'; . ::::a.::.. . M.. Communlostens ruisysee GrumdtrucMng station Communioedone relay ste .. r 2 Chase $ghters i and 2 AGM 120 Test Element Role B 52H hamh* Imunrh missile EC-135 AirborneRangeInstrumentation Airwaft Monitors missile 5, 6 r.:r., opeentes remote (mdfied B~iv 707) control, filaba termination systeau 4 F 15/P 16 f1*ers Providevisualobservation. s KC-135 007) or KC 10 (DC 10) Refuels fishters Missten Connel Cente Directs. controls and memimes test H 60 h*Hmpter & RecoveryTeam Recovers remams of warhead and missile

• O.2.U 150 s O.1.K 242 0.1.B.18 3 t, 0.1.D.106, 0.1.D.113 115,0.2.M.55-84. O.2.N.109 117 5

3 i vr. - s mIsstItnestmg antt; tne ma ten aquieron, pians ano conducts each test." Tests are designed to verify weapons reliability and efrectiveness, provide information on tactics, and assess performance of the total weapons system (to include mission planning tools, B-52, missile, software, logistics, and the warhead).i2 A Memomodum of Understanding between the USAF and the Department of Energy covers joint tests of nuclear-capable weapons g systems.88 Officials of Sandia National Laboratories and the Air E n Force install test instruments on test missiles in place of a functional g warhead. This pemtits verification of wartiead electrical and mechanical functions as well as proper weapon handling, installation, II The mietile, tett kit incItideS A.mnlemmant nmcadmae

r v.~..~ w-instrum:nts, transmitters to relay instrum2nt data, tracking devices, a remote ccntrol kit, and a means of rapidly stopping the missile's flight in the event of an emergency. (2). Cruise Missue Test Procedures. The Air Force Flight Test- ~ Center established cruise missile test procedures for the AGM-86 Air Lau'nched Cmise Missile in 1983. Those procedures have guided'75 tests to date. When tests of the AGM-129 Advanced Cmise Missile began, the Air Force Flight Test Center modified those proven ' O.1.E-137. 8 0.1.E.138,02M-55,0.2.U 154 ' Office of the Chaannan, Joint Chich of stag MCM.22 9028 Nov 90 (Classified CONFIDENTIAL) ) O.l.D 104,0.1.E.138 142; see V.24 104-ilo and V.25 li t-il2 for'unplemernation la the subject test " O.l.E-138 O.2.M-54,0.4.B 2 3 '20.1.D 104,0.1.E.137 142,0.2.M.55 ) " O.l.E-137 " O.l.D ll5,0.1.E-143,181 183,194-195 u O.l.E -142 O.l.B.18 E O.1.D.106 109 " O.l.A L 16 '* 0. l.K-242 -244 4 i t UT 39455

CES-22-1900 DC 21 r,w m m f procedums for the new missile and accepted them after they passed - formal safety review on 9 May 85. The safety review included an 0 serational Hazard Analysis which established the following primary 1 measures to minimize risks:

1. Missas preparation

2. Aircraft software g%.Gwi

3. 842 proflight inspec$on

4. Miseas loedng by trained personnel, under supervision, with checklists

5. Software and misaNo fault tests

6. Missile ejection circuitry analysis

7. Real 6me mondoring of launch circuitry by test personnel

8. Routes planned to avoid property and personnel

9. Remote Command and Comrol (RCC) capability to steer missile

10. Flight Termination System (FTS)

11. Weather minimums ensure chase aircraft can foNow missile

12. ARIA aircraft relay of telemetry data to Mission Consol Center (MCC) t 3. MCC reaHime picture for timely safety decisions

14. Remote control system and flight temunetion system parameters and plans keep missiesin safe arosa

15. Flight termination system components are independent of missile normal control mode

16. ARIA Crew member training on RCC/FTS

17. ARIA relay of totemetrylets test conducsor know if missile 's receMng FTS carder

18. ARIA permits rado relay from MCC to chase

19. ARIA monitors FT8 signal and crew can wem chase or MCC of hazards

20. ARIA transmits FTS canier signal

21. Weather critada ensure chase can see missle & ground

22. Weather critpria ensure chase can refuel from tarter

23. Weather critoria for test esecudon prevent exceedin0 these Emits

24. Four chase aircraft required (3 retnimum for go)

25. Tanker for refuoEng requhed for go

26. ARIA aircraft required forgo 27 OperationalMCCrequiredlorgo

28. Ground recovery team required for go

29. Helicopter for recovery team required for go

30. What-f procedures cmwor steps to take if elements drop out

31. Multiple tracion0 **P"h"'M monilor flight path at af Ilmes The organization responsible for conducting operational tests of the Advanced Cmise Missile (49th Test Squadron) published detailed test instructions specifying sdditionai safety criteria, test team memh Mp and duties, and detailed cbacklista.'" In addition.they

==Im=3W a comprehensive lessons 1-==ad program from earlier tests.2i. O.l.8-21 -26 '

• O.l.D.!l3115, O.L.Q 127 -332,0.2.8 3,0.2.D 9,0.2.I.31. O.2.1,36 -47 O.2.M 54 84.O.2.N.109 120, o.2.T-138 -145 8' O.l.F-217 222. O.l.K-242 -244 are represcorative enciassified euenples.

UT-39456

1 FEB-22-19c0 c.4:21 p, g m (3). Utah Test and Training Range. The armed forces have operated tes't and training ranges on the Salt Lake Desert since 1937.' The US Air Force has flown tests on these ranges since 1947. When the Air Force Flight Test Center first idendfied the requirement to tsst-long range cruise missiles in 1976, it identified Utah as the most advantageous site.23 The Utah range's isolation, barriers between the range and population centers (three mountain ranges), low electromagnetic interference, and instrumentation supported this conclusion.2' The US Air Force organization responsible for the Utah Ti:st and Training Range has chan,ged several times in recent years.25 The current organization, the 388 Range Squadron, belongs to the 338* Wing of Air Combat Command. The US Air Force control.s the airspace over the Utah ranges.26 The US Army's Dugway Proving Ground controls most of the land including all target areas for Advanced Cmise Missiles of the type tested on 10 Dec 97.27 gy, mutual Memorandum of Agreement of 2 Aug 90, Dugway Proving Ground establishes safety criteria and participates in Utah Test and Training Range test safety reviews.2: The primary safety measure protecting Dugway Proving Ground facilities established in the Memorandum of Agreement is the " upside-down doghouse" flight avoidance area 2rdepicted below: 1-m- w...a 8 3 9.e.isi T.cw. ga.? S. - t& ....w.4 ~ 1 ..,,. ( -Q-4.@ W

~M y.;T w-n AE u

....,,y, w M " Doghouse" flight avoidance area as Dugway having Ground l 8' O.4.A-1 " O.4.C-4 -19. O.4.D 20 2t 8' O.4.F.37 " V.2 14 16. V.13 67 72; no:e also organindons referred to la 0.1.817 21.O.l.D 96 -99,0.l.H 225, O.1.0 254,0.1.P 291 ff.O.4.D 20 21 & O.4.F-23 fI l a* O.3.A. l. O.3.5 3 -4 " O.3.A-l. O.3.B 2 -13. O.4.A-1. Y.24105,V.25.I12

• O.3.B.2 3

O.3.8-10. I3 O.1.P -314 6 UT-39457 ^

CES-22-1900 01:22 F.e4 e m Key capabilitics of the Utah Test and Training Range used to support cruise missile tests are optical tracking, radar tracking, radio and telemetry relay, and ground stations capable of trammitting either - remote control or flight termination instructions to the missile.3' Test functions are remotely monitored and operated from the test Mission Control Center at Hill Air Force Base, Utah 3' 388th Range Squadron cruise missile testing procedures developed by Air Force Flight Test ) Center require operational hazard analyses and formal safety reviews of all testgrograms as well as safety reviews of particular test nussions. - (4). Missile Termination / Command and Control. (a). Termination. Before a bomber launches a test cruise missile, the Mission Control Center verifies that the Inissile's remote control and flight termination systems are working property.33 At all times throughout the flight the emise missile flight termination system must detect a signal that in effect permits the missile to keep flying.8' If the missile does not detect the signal for a preset time, the flight termination system activates, causing the missile to tumble and crash.33 This arrangementis functionally equivalent to a dead-man switch. The missile transmits measurements which confirm it is receiving the authorizing signal (and the strength of that signal) to Mission Control throughout flight 3' Safety officers can also activate the flight termination system in case of need at any time.3' The Range Safety Officer at Mission Control and the Airborne Range Instrumentation Aircraft are both capable of terminating missile flight almost instantly," (b). Command and Control. The missile also relays any instructions its remote control system receives at the same time it carries out those instructions. Mission Control at Hill Air Force " O.4.5-2 3,0.4J 38 -40,0.1.D 116 8' O.4.5 2 3,0.4J 38 -39 880.1.s -17 ff,0.1.P-3o6,-308,-314,-318 0.1.3 -22 24. O,t.C-51 -60, 68, 69. O.l.D 111,0.2.M-74 75. O.2.N-9I -93 88 80.1.C -57. O.1.5-2s, 0.2.N-89 ~ 88 0.1.5 28,0.1.C 49,-86 " O.1.B 23 24,0.1.C-s1,-60. -48, 69 8'O.l.B 28,0.1.C 61.O.1131E,0.2.N 89 i 880.1.5-23 -2s,0.1J-320 321 8' O.l.B 22,0.1.C 60 -68,-75 7 UT-39458

FES-22-1900 04:22 .es n m Base and the Airborne Range Instrumentation Aircraft monitor these signals throughout the missile's flight." The missile remote control system permits steering the missile to avoid weather and. hazards, and allows manual intervention in' case the missile malfunctions.*' Mission Control at Hill AirForce Base and the ' Airborne Range Instmmentation Aircraft can control the missile '2 Transmitters located on the range relay any commands from Mission Control. These transmitters are on high termin but they" do not provide continuous line of sight to missiles at low altitude. The preferred control platform is the ARIA aircraft, because its signals are less likely to be blocked by terrain.'8 Soon after the missile is launched on every test, ARIA takes manual command of the missile to check its response." Because ARIA cannot see the missile,'it works with chase aircraft to check the missile's performance.*' (c). Chase aircraft. Fighters chase the missile throughout flight to ensure safety." They remain behind, monitoring the missile's performance and where it is heading. If the missile is tracking toward a cloud, or if another aircraft enters the area, or any other problem exists, the chase pilot tells controllers on the ARIA bow to steer.the missile to koeg'it safe. Chase aircraft follow the missile untilithits the ground.

c. Summary of Events (1) Missica. The mission was planned as a routine periodic test of the AGM-129 Advanced Cruise Missile in support of the NuclearWyA SystemEvaluationProgram of A 8

Ca=Mt Co==aa

• 0.1&25-26,0.1.D ll211s,0.1.P 320 321
• O.l.B-22,0.2.M-66-s3 d0.1.B-23-24,C.I.D 119,0.1.514s.lS0 & 200 214
• O.l.O.2s4-290

" O.l.0 254-290,0.1.Q-327 330. O.4.B 3; O l.G-223 -224 illusvates coverage in colar

• O.1.0-254-290. O.4.5 3 "O.l.B.I8,0.2.M 76,0.2.N-112 113

" O.1.5 25 O.!J-230 232.O.2.M 62.O.2.N l12113.117 " O.l.518 4 25,0.2.M-62,0.2.N ll2-113.117

• O.2.M-62,-76 8' O.l.B Is,0.2.M 62,-76,0.2.N 117-120 i

88 0.2.M 76,0.2.N 112113,117 s 0.2.M 54; see also V.24104105 and V.25-11I s UT-39459

w a nuu

w.. a p.es p

l Mission objectives were to: Assess the terminal accuracy of the missile Assess weapon system reliability Assess the operational suitability of the carrier aircraft and missile Assess the ability of aircraft navigation systems Assess the effectiveness of the Air Force mission planning system Assess the cruise missile free-flight performance Evaluate the perfonnance of Department of Energy components Launch and execute using an Emergency Action Message promulgsted by US Strategic Command (2). Planning. Mission planning began with assignment of the l 83 test team on 1.7 Oct 97 and completion of the Air Operations Plan on 29 Oct 97.5" Test members checked the missile I trajectory on 5 Nov 97 and mailed trajectory documents to test I participants the following week.38 The test team published the Air Operations Plan for the mission, including detailed checklists, on 10 Nov 97. Test planners mailed mission preparation packages to the chase pilots in mid-Novembe/' and briefed them via videoconference on 4 Dec 97.88 On 1 Dec 97 the test team had a final meeting before travelling from Barksdale Air Force Base Louisiana to four other bases for their test duties.8' Test participants completed a final conference call on g Dec 97 at 1400 Mountain Standard Time. i l l (3). Missile Flight Path. The missile flight path was programmed to remain within pmtected airspace on the Utah Test and Training Range. The map below depicts the flight path (in blue) and areas the flight path was designed to avoid (in red).'* sa O.21-36 " O.2.C-4 i "OLC4 "01C4 l

• • 0 1 C-5 l

"01L-36 34 l " O.2.C-$ " O.2.M-80 01C-4,0.2.U l61, o.2.K-33, o.2.L-47 O.2.U-161 9 UT-39460

8: a-:<.v .wi, F I kh 'O .. q yg, f e ~~ s ~ I t

g.

rf 4 'r n c. (..g-t.,

i p

hj ~, ' h.kl$ q -m n F?'% M d '#ll ..J3; ,.j b n i 'l-{' Y}ll8 L'th0..;_'a-N., *5.

i

-- n. r

>1 =, Advanced Cruise Missile Test 98-02 Programmed Trajectory 10 UT-39461

I FEE-22-Ic00 0.1:25 P.06 e m The 388* Range Squadron reserved the required ranges for ~ exclusive use throughout the period of the test." The primary cdterion used to minimize risk was avoiding known occupied'- sites and no-fly areas by a minimum of one nautical mile (6,076 l feet) as established by regulation." In practice,49th Test l Squadron and 388* Range' Squadron safety increased this buffer by employing a'two mile rule." Test personnel and chase pilots were informed of known avoidance areas." The missile was l programmed to fly at low altitude throughout the cruise phase of l flight. Four chase aircraft (capable ofpassing steering commands to ARIA in order to avoid weather, steer around any aircrtft intruding in the protected airspace, or to address any other hazard) were scheduled to accompany the missile throughout its flight, two at a time." (4). Missile Termination Plan. The most important part of the i flight for Sandia National Laboratories was the simulated warhead test. Advanced Cruise Missiles can end their flights in three programmad ways." For mission 98 02, the test plan called for a climb to the point where the warhead test would take place (labeled primary function / test point in the illustration below). Test planners designed the Snal programmed flight segment to l arrive at the programmed test position while maintaining two l nautical miles of separation from established avoidance areas.7' They were unaware that a high-value site had been bidit on the exta=Aad flight path." After the warhead test the missile would dive rapidly to earth, in accotdance with the missile's Pro mrd b=Ama terminadon instructions qto ardve at.the j s backup im' act location as illustrated below).'; p 1 " 0.2.P.132. l " O.1,P 306 i " O.2.N.I 19, V.2144 ) " 0.2K 35,0.2.T-13 s -145. O.2.U-161,.IC -164, o.l.F.310 " O.l.B 25,018-3. O.2.C 5,0.2X-35,0.2.M-57 5s " O.1.L.245 246

• V.9 43, V.10-54, V.24 104 110, V.2s-I 12. I is

V.21 94 '8 ses pers (s)g: V.24107 '8 0.1.L.245 -246 i i1 l UT-39462 l L

FEB-22-19Co 04:M g.e9 e l ASCEMOtNG TEWMAl. MANEUVER l " " " " " " ' 3 vuxnCAl.PROFE.2 ~ .nacMuP 5, tes .pacy use.um

• 4 2,,5syg.w-q,

<.

' s'../.

Mg gg i w m A.rcending TerminalManeuver Profile To prevent that and speed recovery of the missile, test planners devised a checklist to take remote control after the warhead test and fly the missile to an optimum recovery site instead MaM to recovery orbit (see next figure) medanr-i-a-n urfas name eeneet (5). Missile Termination Checklist. On 24 NoV 97 the Test Dimetor and Lead Engineer developed a checklist for taking control of the missile after simulated warhead firing 7' The checklist called for the Lead Engineer to call remote control commands to the Airbome Range Instntmentation Aircraft for the latter to execute,7s While every position in the Mission Control Center was equipped to make these radio calls, the Test Director undentood that the Lead Engineer had the best ability to execute the plan. Information available to the Lead Engineer included missile telemetry, two separate precision tracking systems and l " O.2.D-9; see also o.2.s 137, o.2.K-35, V.19-89 V.24105, v.25 112 j " O.2.131 V.19-89, V.20-92. V.21-94, V.22 96, V.23-99, V.24 105 -106, V.25-112. t 13 " O.2.D-9, V.19-89, V.20 92, V.21-94, V.22 96, V.23 99, V.24 t05 106, V.25112 -113. Iteviews of the prorde by Air Force and contractor missile engineers unifonnly indicase there was time to take control the toissile, as previous tests fosairing wer==Ful saanaal terminados profiles finther confum. l l V.25-120,V.24-106. O.1J 233 241, o.1.M-247 12 i UT-39463

F ES-2.MW C4:26 S.14 m real-time video relayed from ground tracking stations." In i response to the scripted calls from the Lead Engineer, the Airbome Range Instrumentation Aircraft would then fly the missile to a planned im;iact point." The Lead Engineer had access., to controls which theoretically would have permitted him to take ~ l remote control of the missile from the Mission Control Center." However, test planners knew that ground transmitters had less i reliable coverage and that t rocedures consequently established ARIA as the primary control station because ofits unobstructed l radio line of sight." The checklist called for ARIA controllers to { fly the missile to the west, slow it, fly an orbit over the mud flats, and then point it towards the selected impact point. The test j team selected an optimurn impact point to ensure recovery of i depleted uranium in the warhead and all pieces of the stealth missile body 2 The Lead Engineer coordinated these procedures within the test team, with the Airbome Range Instrumentation Aircraft crew on 24 Nov 97, and with the chase pilots on 4 Dec 97." . : ^ rrm s E, ye,

e. g

,,. yg tjef h. V '" 8 .\\ Wuv . :...g D E SIE R: T-S, A. ~t. ,4 x./ .A ). i ~ ? 4 . -.- 4.. 1.* L s.v N 1.gh. O,..,ii.. M.'. T,Q.. - 5 ;) ',- ee m Q.,...:. ~ Q.... / w .3, ...g , "*sso7 : y,i,, g Planned mt.trile trajectory ofher warhead test (recovery orbit) " V.2195,0.l.M 247,0.4.B 2 3 0.45 3s 39 " V.2194 95, V.22-96 -97, V.23-99 102, V.24106-108, V.25-118. O.2.D 9. O.2.M 61. O.2.s 137

• O l.B-25 -26,0.1.D.106,0.1J.23) -241

" O.l.O.223 -224. O.1.0 254 290. O.2.M-62. O.t.Q.327; added :seks & would essail are described at V.23101 102 and V.24108 O.2.D 9 O.2.1-31 O.2L35. 88V.9 43 V.2194,V.24-10$.V.25 il2.O.2.D-9,0.2.E 16 17

• O.2.C-4 7. O.2.1 31. O.2.L 36 -39, V.19 09. V.22-96, V.23-99 V.24 106. V.23 112 -113 13

~e. e e. e. UT-39464

me-u-in *a .u A A (6). Pre 81ght properaties. The Test Duvetor, CaptaNDavid G. Salcunos, condmased a telephone conference widt participating unit project onicers on 16 Nov 97." On 2 Dec 97 the 388* Range Squadron seat a mismo asking Dugway Proving Ground to prohibit access to the test site and nearby areas throughout tbs test." Weapons *=daieia== performed initial tests of the ACM rnissile on 3 Dec 97,maakored Semiia's non mr.loor verification of the weapon on 4 Dec and oosspleted additional pre mianian checks of the adssile on 5 Dec " Test participants confinned all campa==== were mission ready via teleconferosos on 8 Dec 97. The team had achadalad the test for 9 Dec 97 but postponed k for 24 hopes due to wessbar." Chase pilots completed a detailed ruission briefing."1hc Masion Control Center was activated and checked before the minion." The B-$2 crew planned their mission thoroughly and filed their flight plan two hows and thirty minutes priorto takeoff. (7). Misses Aestvity.11 e B 52 anived at the roses at 0900 Moustnia Standard Tkne, aos hour befbre missile launch." The Airborne Rangs and lastrumentadon Aiscrat and Mission Cosmol Caseer obecked tbs opendon of sadety and coetrol systems on the missile, as well as tedias insenenestation and talernetry." Five minutes prior to missile launch, with all aircr A la tbs test area, the Mission Connot Ceaser Miread a pre laundi safety check and conSemed the anos was safa." AAer missile launch at 1008, chase pilots veri 6ed it was Gying well and checked tbs effectiveness of the somote connot systers." The missile then j l ~ flew its planned couris within protected airspecs fbr three hours

-,ssa.o. - m.s, -

+ who 0213a..se I

• oir.433 J
• c1A.:

Y o.2mn 3 a.2 mss,w.2 o

• c1K.3s.01T.13s 148
• 0.2.Q 133 13s V.ts.113
• K.I l
• o2 % 1s I
• o.2 4 75 "o.2h75.010133 83s
• o.2 M 1a. V.lf.?s a

14 UT-39465

FES-22-1900 EM:27 P.82 m and 38 minutes. During these three plus hours the missile flew in protected' airspace, heading generally north and south except ~ during turns." The final segment of the programmed missile i trajectory took it to a point in space chosen for camera tracking - and signal reliability to ensure the mission met warhead test objectives." At 1342:29, two minutes before the warhead test, the missile turned east to a heading of 105.6 degrees, maintaining an altitude of 4800 feet above Mean Sea Level. The sequence of i events that followed is explained in the following table and graphically depicted below in relation to a sixty second clock: Time Event 1344:53 Missile besan a 2 G pull up fo(warhead kit test (thirteen seconds) Missile maintained the 2 G pull-up r 1345:06 Warhead kit test occurred 1345:08 Missile began pushina over from its climb at minus one O Once telemetry Engineer from Sandia National Laboratories informed the showed warhead kit Lead Rap==-e test complete 1345:13 Test Lead Faeiaaar called " THIRTY-ONE ROMEO - - LEVEL, COME LEFT TO A HEADING OF TWO NINE ZERO DEGREES" (on MCC interphone - call ws: not tran=nined over radio - ARIA did not hear) 1345:16 Missile reached its highest altitude of 9971 feet Continued to push over into a steep dive 1345:25 Test Lead Engineer made a second call, " THIRTY-ONE ROMEO -, LEVEL, COME LEFT TO A HEADING OF TWO NINE ZERO DEGREES NOW"(on Whene) Missile cantinued to dive untilits nose was 59 degrees below the horizon 1345:29 Missile hitthe around 1345:30 Test Director called the ARIA with the instruction " THIRTY-ONE ROMEO LEVEL COMMAND LEFT TURN NOW" 1345:34 Controllers on ARIA acknowledged the Test Director's call TestJsymmens qfewnts " V.21-96, V.22 91, V.23-102, V.25-114 O.2.M-76,0.2.0125-131 ' " V.2196, V.22 97, V.23102, V.2s 114,0.2.U 161 " V.9 43. O.2.E.16 " O.2.E 16,0.2.0125 131; V.20-93 wtum paired with 0.2.019-22 neah a precise tuning nierence 15 UT 39466

FEB-Z2-b%% W di

e. u R

Firit. ~ suam# radio call ~ second head Tem anan g radio call Impact Pull. 45:12' 43:16 i 45:13 l 4528 l

• n l Test aqueme ofmnts compared to sixty scorads (Missus apexat twelve o' clock)

Narration ofthe data depicted above: At 1344:53, thitteen seconds before it reached the test point, the missile began a 2 G pull up for the warhead test. The missile maintained the 2 G pull-up from 1344:53 until the warhead test occurred at 1345:06. After the simulated warhead test the missile continued to climb in a ballistic arc for two seconds. At 1345:08 the missile began pushing over from its climb at minus one G. As soon as telemetry showed the warhead test was complete, the engineer from Sandia. National Laboratories informed the Lead Engineer. The Lead Engineer made the call " THIRTY-ONE ROMEO - - LEVEL, COME LEFT TO A HEADING OF TWO NINE ZERO DEGREES" at ~ 1345:13. In the Mission Control Center the Lead Engineer's call sounded like it was being trannnitted over the radio, but it was not in fact transmitted. The missile reached its highest altitude of 9971 feet at 1345:16 and continued to push over into a steep dive. At 1345:25 the Lead Engineer made a second call," THIRTY-ONE ROMEO - LEVEL, COME LEFT TO A HEADING OF DVO 16 UT-39467

ccc-/t A'Jud 04*40 7 64 R er s { i NINE ZERO DEGREES NOW." Again, in the Mission Control i Center the call sounded like a radio transmission but was not in ~ fact transmitted. The missile continued to dive untilits nose was 59 degrees below the horizon. Twelve seconds after the peak of ' its flight, at 1345:29, the missile hit the ground. At 1345:30 the - 1 Test Director called the ARIA with the instniction " THIRTY ONE ROMEO LEVEL col @(AND LEFT TURN NOW 1345:34.

• 0," and controllers on ARIA. acknowledged the call at (8). Impact. The missile hit the ground in the center of an astrophysical observatory site and was destroyed. 'l The missile hit graded ground four feet east of the trailer.8'y control sheared the southeast corner off the observator The chase pilot remained above the i=W site momentarily and confirmed impact while the missile recovery crew flew to the scene in a helicopter.

(9). Crash Response. The =ieilarecovery crew aboard the helicopter included the on-scene cornmander, two radiation of5cers, a missile technician, an exglosives disposa1 technician, and a missile recovery technician. The team observed no explosion or Ereball from the impact, but found a small fire four meters from the impact crater and extinguished it. The . Explosives Ordnance Disposal technician formed an initial inspection of the site and declared it safe.1 The team im=Mintaly secured all visible pieces of the missile and recovered all discernible pieces of depleted uranium. " The - radiation of5cers qed the site with radiation survey meters and calibrated probes. Although access to DugwayProving Ground is controlled and access to the range is further restricted, the on-scene commancier posted a security team at the cite for the duration of the effort to recover sensitive materials.'" All soil 1 '" O.2.G-19 -22,0.2.0 128 -131. Videotaps 84716,0.2.Q-133 134 '" O.7.A 1, s.2 treesh 8.11, R 2 '" S.2 ovough s.11,0.7, R-2 '" V.15-77, V.25-114,0.7.A 1 -2 '" O.2.F-1s '" O.7.A-1 '" O.7.A l 1 '" O.7.A-L -3, V.11 $s 39 "" O.7.A 1,-3' '" V.11-5s -59 l 17 UT-39468

FEB-22-1900 BC 29 P.19 m ] from the vicinity of the crater was excavated, samples were taken, and the soil was transported to a secure storage site."' Tests of I the soil samples indicated traces ofmissile rivet material but no other contaminants."' Once the area was snow-free, the site w'ns i l covered with four inches of soil to complete its restoration."2 (10). Fly's Eye Cosmic Ray Observatory on Cedar Mountain.. j 1

a. Background. Extremely powerfbl cosmic rays occasionally enter the earth's atmosphere and resulting j

radiation can be detected by sensitive instruments, particularly on clear moonless nights. These mys are of interest for three masons. They have more energy than can be produced in any particle accelerator, their origin is unknown, and ace =nisted observation may provide data on profound astrophysical questions."* ' rw; 7y g.i.h At.ier:W

.lj~.i @W lyS-[c!'. ';ifj.T -)..I.

Univershy ofUtah ' M.. ~ - j Cosmic Ray I f. #.Q i. f. %m f.f t t.: ... -3 74 r ze....i. 4. Observation Sites

s.. ::

s, 7 L. n 3' .y. .....c ... a- -;h <- c ,ru r 9;*Q g. .r gyyg m y,:.Y,...-.. R..*- w

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