ML20155F638

Forwards Safety Evaluation for Mod 2285,Rev 0 Re Util App R Fire Protection

ML20155F638
Person / Time
Site:	Peach Bottom
Issue date:	10/05/1988
From:	Gallagher J PECO ENERGY CO., (FORMERLY PHILADELPHIA ELECTRIC
To:	Butler W Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
NUDOCS 8810130337
Download: ML20155F638 (22)

Text

___________ _ ____ -

-o PHILADELPHIA ELECTRIC COMPANY 2301 MARKET STREET P.O. BOX 8699 PHILADELPHIA PA 19101 tats) eat sooi

oseni w. cattroncn October 5, 1988

,2 3 : %'::,%.

Docket Nos. 50-277 50-278 Mr. W. R.

Butler, Director Project Directorate I-2 Division of Reactor Projects I/II U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attn: Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555

Subject:

Peach Bottom Atomic Power Statio.

Appendix R Pire Protection Modification

Reference:

Letter from J. W. Gallagher (PECo),

to W. R. Butler (NRC), dated October 16, 1987

Dear Mr. Butler:

My letter of October 16, 1987 forwarded safety evaluations to you to satisfy a request made during the July 30, 1987 meeting at Peach Bottom with your staff relative to fire protection modifications.

I The design of modification 2285 has since been completed and its safety evaluation is enclosed in order to fully satisfy the i

request of your staff.

The modification will assure minimum flow protection for the RHR pumps which are required to operate during a postulated Appendix R fire.

This modification will be implemented on Unit 3 during the current ploe replacement outage and on Unit 2 during the next refueling outage.

As discussed in the July 30, 1987 meeting, temporary modification 2084 has been implemented on Unit 2 and assures conformance with the Appendix R requirements on Unit 2 until Modification 2285 is implemented.

0810130337 091005 00 ADOCK05000{7 f

PDR f

9F 1

Mh.

W.

R.

Butler, Director October 5, 1988 Page 2 If you have any questions or require additional information, please do not hesitate to contact us.

Very truly yours, Attachment cc:

Addressee 1 White Plint North 11555 Rockville Pike Rockville, MD 20852 W.

T.

Russell, Administrator, Region 1,

USNRC T.

P.

Johnson, USNRC Senior Resident Inspector T.

E.

Magette, State of Maryland J.

Urban, Delmarva Power J.

T.

Boettger, Public Service Electric & Gas H.

C.

Schwemm, Atlantic Electric l

i l

1

• 4 NUCLUR Err.!NEEF lts' ATTACHMENT N2-1, 2301 Market Stree

~

Safetv Evaluation for Mod 2285, Rev. O Peach Bottom APS Unit 3 Flie: Safety 2 (Mod 2285)

Doctype 565 I

SUBJECT:

This rrodification provides mlnitrun flov protection to PHR Pu o 3AP35 in the event of an Appendix R fire in Fire Area 13 North by Installing an alternate power supply to RHR Minlrun Flov Bypass Valve MO 3-10-16A.

i 11 CONCLUS!Or t:

It does This rrodification affects safety-related coulpnent.

]

involve an unreviewed safety cuestion. A change to the Techn!-

not This rrodification does in-a cal Specifications is not required.however safe shutdown capability f

volve safe shutdown equipment, Neither a license amendment in the event of a fire Is maintained.

nor prior NRC approval Is required.

A sIgnifIcant hr.:a rds i

consideration is not involved, i

l t

!!! DISCUSSION:

of the analysis of ssfe shutdown cacability in As a result cor ollance with loCFR50, Appendix R, a rrodification to the power supply for RHR MinirnJm F1cw Bypass \\'alve MO 3-10-16A is recuired.

This analysis shcvis that a fire In Fire Area 13 North (13N) could Illty and,eopard!:e mininum flow T"Ote: kn affect valve 0 era:

for-RHR Pep 3Ac35.

)

An Appendix R fire in Fire Area 13N reculres RHR Puro 3AP35 i

for suporession pool cooling, a0 proximately 3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> into the fire scenaric, to r-alntain suppression pool temperature within RHR Pump NPSH limits.

Normally, when the puro is running without a suf-ficient ciscnarge path, MO 3-10-16A opens on a high differential Load Center 30810, which pressure slgnc1 to prevent puno damage.

feeds MO 3-10-16A via ICC 30536, is located in Fire Area 13N and R fire in this fire could beccme de-energt:ed during an Aopendly Minimun flov protection for Pump 3AP35 is lost when the area.

puro starts autcrratically on valid signals with no power available to MD 3-10-16A.

There r ay not be enough tire for an operator to i

recognl:e the situation and trip the pu o.

This redlfication relocates MD 3-10-16A trotor control eculo-

't Pover ment from 400V MCC 30E36 to an auxiliary motor controller.

I to the auxillary retor controller will be supplied fecm a kBOV autcr-a-l tic transfer swltch.

Non-21 paver to the switch will be supolled from the present pcwer supply, MCC 30936 (Safeguard Chan-nel ZA).

Tne auto-transfer sultch will operate on a several second tire delay after normal power is lost. Unit 2 MCC 20836,

-~-j-,-,.,--m-

,-4,,--.m.-y_m,

&,_,_~y---.m--_

,-ume

,p. c

..y.-. -.,e.-

-y-

which is e iallable during a fire in Fire Area 13N, will serve as the backup power supply to the switch.

The time delay will prevent the auto-transfer switch f rom operating during the loss of one offsite source and consecuential transfer of affected 4kV busses to the other off-site source.

The auto-transfer swltch will be located in the E13 Emergency The aux 111ary r:utor controller will be Auxiliary Switchgear Rocm.

located in the Unit 3 Rect re M-G Set Rocm. Both are safety-related and envirorynentally and seismically cuallfled as required.

The automatic transfer is accorrolished by a rnechanically-This ensures Interlocked, solenold-operated double throv switch.

or backup.

only one of two possible switch positions - nonnal The auxillary trotor controller contains a There is no off position.

manual bypass switch to permit bypassing the auto-transfer switch In the normal position, the aux 111ary retor for testing purposes.

In the bypass controller is f ed f rom the auto-transfer switch.

position, the auxillary notor controller is fed directly f rom MCC 30836.

room valve controls, position Indication and Existing control i

ennunciation are not changed by this overload trotor thermal Additional control room annunciators are provided rodification.

to alarm when the auto-transfer swltch operates, the auxillary retor opened or the manual bypass switch is in the controller door 15 bypass position.

There Is no significant net increase in load on the plant Unit 2 MCC electrical system as a result of this modification.

capacity to power ft 3-10-16A If recuired.

20B36 has sufficient

! sol tion via circu't breakers is provided betweer. W Electrical normal and backup power sources and the auto-transfer switch.

The design of this modification meets the Intent of Standby Gulde 1.6, "Independence Between Redundant Regulatory Pover Sources and Between Their Olstribution Systems," and IEEE 308-1978, "IEEE Standard Criterla for Class IE Pover Syster.s for Nuclear Pover Generating Stations."

Reg. Guide 1.6 and IEEE 308-1978 do not permit automatic transferring of loads between redundant standby Class 1E poner sources. For this modification, the norrral and backup pover supplies to the auto-transfer switch are not redundant since they originate frcm the same emergency diesel-generator.

During the normal and design basis accident operation of RHR Ptmp 3AP35, MD 3-10-16A is ocwered frem its norrral 480V source and d

will function as designed previous to irrelementation of this r-od i f i cat i on.

The autcr atic transfer to the Unit 2 backup source occurs on a tlrne delay after normal pover is lost and on the condition that backup pcwer is evallable. The time delay prevents an auto-transf er unless a sustelned 1 css of normal ocwer is sensed s

by the switch circultry.

The auto-transfer switch resets auto-r-atically when nortral pover is restored.

In the event of a fire in Fire Area 13N, mininum ficw protec-tion for RHR Pttnp 3AP35 could be delayed due to the auto-trar.sfer switch time delay.

The maxinun delay would be 10 seconds.

This maxinun delay would occur if MO 3-10-16A received a signal to open and nonral 480V power to this valve is lost siruttaneously.

Operating RHR Puno 3AP35 with no mininun flow protection for an additional 10 seconds over the present design would not result in excessive ptrrp/rrotor overheating.

Since this rrodification does not affect any radwaste system, the guldance provided In IE Circular 80-18 is not applicable.

The plant as described in the UFSAR is being changed by this Appropriate Single Line Dlagrams will be uodated to nodi ficat ion.

reflect the new design.

Sections 4.8, 6.4, 6.5, 7.4, 8.4 and 8.5 were reviewed to make this determination. Chapter 5 and Table A-3 l

of the PBAPS Fire Protection Program (FPP) have been reviewed and will also be revised, r

IV 10CFR50.59 CKt6'GES, TESTS, Ato EXPERIMENTS:

1.

This codification does not involve an unreviewed safety cues-tion because of the following:

i a)

The probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or rralfunction of eculpment important to safety previously evaluated in the safety analysis report Is not increased. The present valve operator con-trols, Indication, anc 480V pcwer supply for RHR Mininun Flow Bypass Valve MO 3-10-16 A are traintained.

MO 3-10-16A operates as p. eviously designed to 9Povide mininun flow protection for RHR Pu o 3AP35 during normal operation or design basis events.

This rnodification adds a backup power source to this valve for an Appendix R fire, b)

The possibility for an accide.nt or tralfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the safety analysis report is not created.

RHR Minimtin Flow Bypass Valve FC 3-10-16 operates as previously This nodification ensures minittun flow designed.

protection for RHR Pum 3AP35 during a loss of normal 480V power to PC 3-10-16A due to a fire in Fire Area 13N.

PC 3-10-16A will norTnally be powered f rcm its On a sustained loss of norms 1 4E0V present source.

power, an auto-transfer switch will operate and

= -

\\

.u-

\\

l supply pcwer to MO 3-10-16A f rcm a Unit 2 backup source.

The E-1 diesel-generator feeds both the normal andThis backup power sources to the auto-transfer switch.

deslgn meets NRC Reg. Guide 1.6 and IEEE 308-1978 criterla.

The auto-transfer switch, auxiliary rmtor controller which controls MO 3-10-16A, and associated cable rerouting are designed and constructed in accordance with criteria I

appilcable to safety-related and Appendix R safe shutdown The cable routing associated with the backup systems.is designed and constructed in accordance with source Appendix R safe shutdown criteria.

This rrodification does not reduce the margin of safety c) as defined In the basis for any Technical Specification.

The RHR system initletion and operability recul rements as described in Sections 3.5 and 4.5 are unchanged by this modification.

The operabl11ty of MO 3-10-16A is maintained to provide miniram flow protection for RHR Pum 3AP35 In the event of a fire in Fire Area 13N.

2.

No changes to the Technical Specifications are reaut red based on the review of Sections 3.5 and 4.5.

i V

10CFR50.92 SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS DETEPPINATION*

A license a: endment is not reautred; therefore, this section is not applicable.

t i

5-l e

VI APPROVALS:

h'U 'N DATE:

Prepared By:

v Qesponsible Engineer)

Pfni/1$,E/,:h.

DATE: h.lN2l$;'}

Reviewed By:

(

D1 '. ndepe ent 'P',eviewer)

I

/

DATE:

(Le'()Divisio Seef M9t/ Branch Head l

6 !2. 8

~

DATE:

(Non-Lead Div. Respoisible Engineer) 0!P H 2

fWu DATE:

em r)

(NonM.eaf Div. Independent Revi M

DATE: c, )s ele 9'

'M d

_. lor / ection/ Branch Head)

Obn ' Lead Divi d(

7 1!Ii3 DATE:

(Nuclear GlEnvironmental Section Head)

/ /.

j JDK: sic 1

sc10587m!30 2

(

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PEAPS PPP HPCI-Pump Turbine Exhaust PS2-23-97B HPCI Pump Turbine Steam Press PS2-23-6BA l

HPCI Pump Turbine Steam Press PS2-23-6SB HPCI Pump Turbine Steam Press PS2-23-6SC HPCI Pump Turbine Steam Press I

PS2-23-6BD HPCI Steam Leak Detection TE-5941A HPCI Steam Leak Detection TE-5941B

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~Pos Writec F: e in A?e'a (c)

Ignitien of electrical cabling in cable trays (an unlikelv c::urren:e in the absen:e cf a f tre source l

l (1) the cabling since it is cf the self-l' external ::

ex inguishing :ype).

2 and 3 - P.HP pumps, HPC: pumps <

Lube oil from UnitsEre:irculating pump M-G sets, recir:ulatin M-0 850 (2) lube cil pumps, P.CIC pumps either leaking on :

t h

tin; c.

with subsequen-1;..ition cf the oil or an over ea the pumps causing ignitien of the cil.

i 0al filters in -he SGTS air p;enur.

t l

(3)

Char:

harcoal filters in filter ro0m 235.

f (4)

Spent Orage area I

1;nition Of tras* '

-Se radwaste trash s:

(5) from an external source.

I;nition cf paper in the radwaste con rcl roe-f ro-an I

f (6) ex ernal seur:e.

7ir,Suppres,icn Consequence f 71, gg 3 g;ggy, (d) 1 smoke,;enerated by a fire will a::!vate smoke dete

-ause an audible-visual alarm a..u.:iatien 1.. thecf an alarm f rem an f

I"a ;. ;" e*7 n.r e, ::::',

,;je the fire brigade will be dispatch'ed *:Tnl UP:n re:eip a

• he are9

[7'"8

.sh,.he. ire.

_g~ g'p;P, rc0.s will a::ivate smoke de:e::er's whien the ftre alarm

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e-v.sual alar-annuncia:1cn at I

g am C, 5/E6 P. e v.

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Emcrg ney Switchgear Room 267 E.3.25 Fire Arec 33:

(Elev. 135'-0*).

Area Structural and Architectural Design Teatures of Fire Eatinc (a)

Construction 2-hr Cor. crete r.asonry units 3-hr Walls:

N 2-hr

- Reinforced concrete E

- Concrete masonry units 2-hr 5

- Concrete tasonry units W

3-br Reinforced concrete 3-br floor:

Reinforced concrete Ceiling:

7"'\\.

Daer cent.ecting to fire area 32

/

boer cont.ecting to fire area 50 A:s LLk6 Accer :

Us.t 3,___;

Related Components in Tire Area

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f. h ) Pb 4 c.

wegency Auxiliary Switchgear

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40'.or Control'C_enti ~r

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( c ' Pe si u.a -

r ';:: cal cabling in cable tray, (an unthe a sence c c t he ).

.a '#-er cable'is cf the sel!-extinguishing type le-

t.

'5 ot,ur.

OESIP,

> Suppression Conseque.. o of T're with Active Fi:

a fire vill activate smoke detectors (d) the annun:iation at The Sroke generated byill :Tuse an audible-visual alar Upon re:e!7 0f sh'en

n the ta.n :en:r:1 recr.the plant fire brigades '... ce fi-9 annuncia:c En3.lbr:

n the control root, to er.tinguish the fire.

dispatcheu (ei Effect of Fire on Safe Shutdown associated vito centains cables and equipmentand C fer Units 2 and 3 Cables Tire area 33 shutdevn rethods A, 3,shutd;vn re:hed 3 ::

f:

are encapsulated oy a 3-hcar-rated fire barrier c, encapsulated, su;7:r:

required ::

be taken to recover anv functions that eculd be lest.C loc cables that are n0:

Equipment asso:!a:ed with shutdown method 3 ::

lo:ated componen:

ken this fire area either have a redundantoutside the fire area or 7neref:re, to recever any fun::!cns that could be lost.

F.e v. O, 9/!f 5.3-95 d

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l PEAPE TPP

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(Page 8 of 46)

TABLE A-3 (Cont'd) i; l

i Hot Cold Shutdown Shutdoq Tire Methods Area Equipment Component Description i

Number _

12 3C Core spray pump D Unit 2 3DP37 2A,2E,2C,2D Unit 3 47 HPSW pump D 3A,33,3C,3D 3DP42 i

I 2

3A t

RCIC barometric condenser i

30E32 2

35,3D HPCI auxiliary lube oil l

1 30P26 pump 2

3A 30P46 RCIC vacuum pump l

j 2

3A RCIC condensate pump l

30P48 d.i ttt 2

33,3D r

a.A > '3 053 7 HPCI turbine m

~~ikh.-5.3C 1s U^^ 3 t

m I.i' 5 [( ~'-[.dd'._Yi i. N, ~E(,4to V 4C_"c7 i

(b

---up.

9

)

sc~es:

".2 Un;;; e

..,...,a,--

~

.E

. e.

~ oic..

nP3n unit intertie valve 3A,35,3C,3D i

a Uni-2 2A,23,2C,2D n.<...

3 47 5163 HPSW unit intertie valve

. A, 3..,. -

2,

=

r-o.-

i U..1 - 3 2

P.HF/HPSW dif f erential t

l DPI3-?0-179 pressure indicator Unit 1 10 3D RHP/HPSW dif f erential DP'3-10-179

y. essure rans.itter 4

2$

2A l

?.CIC fl0w 000t;0119:

i f

PCO-13-51

. = -,. -

9

.........e.

st.

. - +.

.T-

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3A 1

P. IC flow :entr:11er "C3-13-91 25 33

C3-23-10S HPCI flow contr:11er i

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l

• A,*3,2','?

Uni-3 l

"5

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i PBAPS TF.

(lage if' cf 44)

A3' E A.3 ( Con t ' d )

Hot Cold Fire Shutdown s

Methods _

Shu t o c>wn Eculpment Cx.conent Descriotion Area Unit 2 Nu.ber 2A,23,2C,2D Unit 3 39 460V ac motor control 3A,35,3C,3D o

HCC20359 center Unit 2

]

2A,23,2C,2D 37 Uni 3

l 480V ac noter control 3A,25,3C,3D MCC20360 e

center Unit 2 j

2A,23,2C,2D 2

Unit 3 460V ac meter control 3A,3B,3C,3D I

HCC30336 Unit 2 i

center 13N 2A,25,2C,2D Un!* 3 j

HCC3'0337 420V ae rnoter control 3A,3E,3C,3D center 4

Unit 2 135 2A,25,2C,2D Uni' 3 450V ac mo2er control 3A,23,3C,3D J

l MCC30338 center

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ALARA REVIEW CHECKLIST, REV. d l

hM P.$

Unit i 3

Responsible Eng. [ O. Ve 3 a -

l S:ation 2.2.9 [

l Mod i n

l..

Mod

Description:

4\\br.nc1, f4_u-S.n[ 4 8e HO H 0-( l Il is located in high that Non-radicactive equipmen:

increases worker 1.

areas) radia:!cn environmen:c ("het" To lessen exposure during operation and maintenance.having high reliability and

nts exposure only equipment see low maintenance /calibra:Acn requirements shou.d beDo in "hot" areas?

in these areas.

locate non-radicac:ive equipmen:

Y Yes No l

l If Yes. Erylain l

l -

l areas in non-:adi ca:-ive in : eases ::ke: exp:sure f:: a *. '. 4 :- i v i - i e s :1::ied ru:

. aceme..- ef "ge:" equip::.e..:

I cap u: e sy s. ::-

Shielding and p;cvisions ::

Does

.eakage can ::inimize exp:sure and centa: ina:ic..in n:n-:adicactive pn the area.

this cesign 10: ate "ne:" equipmen-a:eas?

Y_

Yes N:

l i :f Yes. D:: *. s i.

l _

s i

I

..-a.e

~.

;.=...

.r.

i

j-(crud) in pi;;ing Deposition cf activation products

!cr all plant 3.

systen;s results in increased exposureThe f ollowing design consideratio i

workers.

minimi:e crud de; ssition.

i eliminate low spots by sloping all horizontal runs 1

l a.

j.

l b.

eliminate elbows use burt welds instead of socket welds l

c.

l provide flush and drain connections for equipa,ent 9

d.

i and piping runs l

promote eliminate the use of materials that unich is activation (e.g. Stellite contains Cobalt e.

t significant activation product).

the mest Does this design f ail to incorporate tne above considerations in radioactive systems?

i t

No X Yes -

4 t

l i

i l : f Ye s. t>:elair.

1 T

l l

I I

i i

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4 I,

sr.i eld.ng 'ry l

Does the design change perranent ;..a n t 4

adding penetrations er cutou s in the snie*. ding?

l 4.

i b

l N:

Yes l

2 l If Yes. E).Ol a i ".

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v...

.<.=i tya. : :f a v

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N : mal ventilation flow is item non-radioactive areas

• .o I

high radiation areas in order to minimize the spread of 5.

Does this design alter these airborne contaminants.

flow paths?

Y Yes No l

j :f Yes, Exclain l

I l

i a

W::ker exp sure during routine maintenance in high

.I 6.

considered:

se it can P cvide flanged nne::icns en equipment be ::ved := clean areas fe: maintenance.

a.

Iquiptert/ materia; *.aydewn areas sneuid be provided l

b.

l cc side Of the ni;. rad areas.

e:e::i:n Of ns:a.a:icn of permanen p'.a:f:::s vs.

c.

5 3,.4 2.,......,.

ne e:e :icn cf emp::ary shielding.

I d.

7:: vide fe:

h: ea t..

.; ai Investiga:e :ne ;;;ximi y ::

e.

nne::icns.

Does :he design fail :: 1,.:: p::a e the ab:ve cen s id e r a:i ct.s ?

'f I

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es l

w s

.,e.

3 1

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Branch for be referred to the Nuclea:

Any ite.s n.arked Yes must m

cc: p;e:ier. Of See: ion :1.

. 2".

~

b. D.

(b.t,

. Date l Prepared by:

(J f//f NY 7[ 7d fb Date j Tseviewed by:

• ecuiremer.:s/resciutions of 1:er.s 1-6 marked Yes.

j ::.

h1 l

1 I

I p { 6.

Oate repared '): ~(:;;;. e a : 5. a r. r. )

I il Oate l App::ved :):

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i.

4.I. Cadie ' ?2 6 P.$)

5*a*ict Supe ir.:ende.:

CA: ( :::ype =so ;

..D. TOs %.

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FIRE PROTECTION REVIEW CHECKLIST, REV. b

.f l

Station

__ Unit i 3 Responsible eng. M 0. %tmo m MOD i N

I.

Mod

Description:

hdecuk Le Swb b No 5-t(7-l(cA w

New penetrations through rated fire barriers are being 1.

created.

Existing penetrations require removal or r

modification (not including cable penetrations).

(See Architectural Fire Barrier Dwg.)

No X

Yes r

Description, location 1

New equipment represents an incrcase in the combustible l

2.

loading to the site.

Items to be considered are lubricants, fuels, combustible gases, bulk gas storage, insulation, plastics, etc.

No Yes N i

r List quantity, nature, and location of combustibles,q.

[

(,t-sv.')

cNu

e..

Met o h.

P at, e M.( CA obb c, A

l AO Men ef t

m i< i s r%..

,L.,

sut.L..-

n A. ws 3.,

bu ( m isN rsc,osvt

.i.

Relocation or addition of any safety related l

I equipment / component / cabling.

No Yes Y x,.\\\\ k h u A d b4 "

a Description Oc M (As c.ucc.v/ wa 3.go.q A Mct o um L.~ M.t-sa h Le ca.g kr MM -* ~ M i

.+53 mout.ev a_

3, agte-m n. s ars _, w e e, 3 ~ --

i l

m Sw %.

% 4. % na t4 U "

I Relocation or addition of any safety related l

4.

equipment / components / cabling identified as safe shutdown in the FPER and circuit and raceway schedules.

No Yes Y

l

\\.

1 Description Seo Ma "3

e.h.. * % d\\.\\ i,.s. a Mw cn C

i ke e -s Mrt t06%,,,. o

-n>.k.

,.3 t d. A h ow 4

n\\t u nuk i o e ca.m e 6

Mc wt0-n A V. n.,

4ku n.da - ires f u.

ss.'4 A.

EXHIBIT 3.3-VI 4/86 (Page 1 of 2)

Will the codificction interforo with tho offoetivonoss of such as 5.

existing fire detection and suppression equipment; require modification to sprinkler piping, or block a Is there suppression or sprinkler head or fire detector?

detection equipment within one foot of new equipmentWill access to detection:

installed for this modification?

suppression; fire dampers be compromised?

M Yes No Description b 5'M h

l

~.

_Date Prepared by:

M

!-f

_ Da,te f////96 Reviewed by:

Any items marked Yes must be referred to the Buildings Facilities Branch for compl'etion of Section II.

I. Requirements / resolutions of items 1, 2, 3, or 5 mar,ked Yes.

L ?.L tl T. 5 Nod me_ Anc+1 f

Qc c-T? 8b ou r uL 9 cc, e oc.e.o l

0 0 C-s.

Nw h4

.w sdee ec,e i d e%-r op

-r sA W e.e_

9eeger_ncv Ar Maues.

G//7/bN N

_ Date Prepared by:

(B. F. Branch)

Date (c II 600

[bb Reviewed by:

I (F. 7). Branch)

/ 4 M u W, v ]l.

Raquirements/ resolutions of item 4 marked Yes. JS6Fhd[cP/

4J 07G~$r 8[9hf C.g gp i

Date Prepared by: _ (O d 'Mf /

+

(E.E.' Div. )

[

3b tt Nb b.

Date l

Reviewed by:

j,,

(E.E. Diiv.)

u d!/7

[ _

Approved by:

((

Date

/

/

(Supv. Engr. BFB)

J :ct E-I-C Industrial MPE EPE 4

Station Superintendent DAC (Doctype = 197)

Q.Q oC WO EXHIBIT 3.3-VI 4/86

(? age 2 of 2)

)

4

No.

FP M a O_h)

~'

Fact 11ttes Branch FPRC Evaluation Form Rev. 1 3'% -I to Mod.

2186 Fire Area / Zone

? - SR Station VOxs-6 Elev.

,_Lfi' Resp FB Eng PDF Date 6 / 4 /w.

Items Checked Yes:

1.1. (1) If PBAPS, require seals to be Installed per pg Spec M-610 (2) If LGS, require seala to be installed per Spec M-629 j

1.2 (1) Will increased loading inpact on a ccrrbustible

.M.E free zone g,% 6-W be.e. Si 4 a)

PBAPS - 1.

FPP Set!:n: S.O 2.

FPP Sections 5.3.e 3.

FPP F.lgures 5.3.f b)

LGS -FPER Sections 5.4.e

-,......._ _..__ c) _3 f 3 t,_3 2.1~. a ' &~ b i nc l ude ' any - I t ems ma r ked y e s, ' - - ~- ' ~ ~ " ~ ~ ~ ~

infcrm the responsible engineer that this is not acceptable without additional analysis by Electrical Engineering or fireproofing the hazard.

d)

Calculate quantity of cerroustibles to be added in units consistent with those given in the FPP for PBAPS or the FPER for LGS.

Aw t u% ein e u,

A* e -

a r c.ee ww 3 w.:,

a oc %

A.

r.n um ee ato Nuts sw A+

e e.sc soe c r o 45 A m (.-

n o +%D --

w vaAA a '.,

(2) Will increased ccrrbustibles be added to an area containing safety-related eculpment/ cables wtilch is NC not protected by automatic cetection?

!! yes, add detection, recuest an exer otton pelor to approval of work or relocate ccmbustibles.

Nsecr w cv %

io rict..s er a f t.,.'e a.

2 -st<.

, t. M 4 ~~ ~ f Lo.

6

+

Will increased ccnbustibles cause ccmbustible (3) loading to be in excess of a requested exemption PC for PBAPS - refer to FPP Sections 5.3.f's (se c. 3 7.. %.e()

[

If yes, determine if increased loading defeats the l

Intent of the exenotion request.

If no, Inform the if yes, r

NRC in accordance with established mechanism, i

request an exanption prior to start of work.

l (4) Will the loading be added to an area in which there is unprotected structural steel?

I 6

a)

Refer to PLC Structural Steel Su1 mary PIA Calc tk.

Yes I

Go to 1.1.4.b

/

i te I

Go to 1.2.5 I

b)

Determine if increase is greater or eaual i

to 10% of the ortoinal_ fixed loading the cale

[

...._...... j 3. ba s e d on - - ~ ~ ~

i l

1.

If no, go to 1.1.4.d 2.

If yes, go to Structural Steel calc f

and re-perform analysis. After completing analysis, go to 1.2.4.c j

t l

c)

Did the Increased loading cause steel to fall?

I 1.

1i no, go to 1.2.4.0 2.

If yes, determine corrective action and l

r inform responsible engineer to go to I

1.2.4.d i

I l

l l

J l

_ _____ _ e (d) Update analysis:

If loading is greater than 10%, add an additional 10% or the total arTount of increased loading which causes the steel to fall, which ever is less.

If (original 10f) t so that the next calculation will be based on the original 10% less any subsequent nods which have added ccnbustibic nuterial to the area.

(5) Does increased loading represent an unevaluated hazard to safety-related coulpmnt?

V a) tb, go to 1.2.6 Gu A7.O.D b)

Yes, go to 1.2.5.c 1

I c)

Determine if there is any adverse Inpact l

and any additional fire protection f

enhancements rcQulred.

l 1

Af ter satisf actorily resolving items 1.2.1 through !.2.5 f

(6) on this evaluation form and items !.3 and I.5 on the FPRC, forward this evaluation and the FPRC to the respcnsible Facilltles Branch engineer for the FPP for PBAPS or the 1

FPER for LGS to revise the appilcable sections of the

- - - ~ -- ~ - respective rescets arreculred by this-evaluation.--

l (7) Sections of FPP or FPER reviewed.

Q?Ccd 4 4 ta Cic rwk

6. L1 4 6. h ? 5 (D i s cs c, - b

(!) !s en LDON (LGS) or a UFCCF (PBADS) required to MD specifically address Fire Protection?

Eesocrstbility for ccs clettn; (if apollcable).

(9) Ccmmnts:

r

_4

, ',. ' ',,1, (10)

Conclusion:

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. Av.

AA D6% %

for<c-av Tin rs e.c renveevio Ar m e c, e.,c.au w.

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ch Tx (oww % wv A

G atwtuee puo wua ecr ec c.ommta.o

\\

)N T 4 g.

C.c t*P ubT*MtE b@h \\W1o 4 sve%M h Ih (9 OPAG-

• C " #""'

e.m. r + Fm Tuc 4 ccas (D Db v.cv w us c%.

JCP/vvg/01088805 i

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