ML20155D756
| ML20155D756 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Zion File:ZionSolutions icon.png |
| Issue date: | 04/15/1986 |
| From: | James Keppler NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20155D743 | List: |
| References | |
| EA-86-049, EA-86-49, NUDOCS 8604170421 | |
| Download: ML20155D756 (2) | |
Text
_____ -
t 4
NOTICE OF VIOLATION AND PR0p0 SED IMPOSITI0F 0F CIVIL PENALTY Commonwealth Edison Compary Docket No. 50-295 Zion Generating Station, Unit 1 License No. DPR-39 EA 86-49 An NRC inspection was conducted from January 27 through February 14, 1986, as a result of your identification of a violation of NRC requirements. In accordance with the " General Statement of Policy and Procedure for NRC Enforcement Actions," 10 CFR Part 2, Appendix C (1985), the Nuclear Regulatory Commission proposes to impose a civil penalty pursuant to Section 234 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, ("Act"), 42 U.S.C. 2282, PL 96-295, and 10 CFR 2.205. The particular violation and associated civil penalty are set forth below:
Technical Specification 3.7.2.A.(1) and (2) requires that during plant operation in Modes 1, 2, and 3, three independent steam generator auxiliary feedwater pumps shall be operable with two motor driven and one steam turbine-driven auxiliary feedwater pump. With one motor-driven auxiliary feedwater pump inoperable, the pump must be restored to status within seven days, or the plant.must be in Mode 4 within the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />.
Contrary to the above, from December 21, 1985 until January 12, 1986 with the plant operating in Mode 1, one motor-driven auxiliary feedwater pump was inoperable with the applicable action statement not satisfied, in that the pump was not restored to operable st&tus within seven days and the plant was not in Mode 4 within the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />.
This is a Severity Level III violation (Supplement I). (Civil Penalty -
$25,000).
Pursuant to the provisions of 10 CFR 2.201, Commonwealth Edison Company is hereby required to submit to the Director, Office of Inspection and Enforcement, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, D.C. 20555, with a copy to the Regional Administrator, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Region III, 799 Roosevelt Road, Glen Ellyn, IL 60137, within 30 days of the date of this Notice a written statement or explanation, including for each alleged violation:
(1) admission or denial of the alleged violation, (2) the reasons for the violation if admitted, (3) the corrective steps that have been taken and the results achieved, (4) the corrective steps which will be taken to avoid further violations, and (5) the date when full compliance will be achieved. If an adequate reply is not received within the time specified in this Notice, the Director, Office of Inspection and Enforcement, may issue an order to show cause why the license should not be modified, suspended, or revoked or why such other action as may be oroper should not be taken. Consideration may be given to t
$h& - ;
Notice of Violation APR f 51986 extending the response time for good cause shown. Under the authority of Section 182 of the Act, 42 U.S.C. 2232, this response shall be submitted under oath or affirmation.
Within the same time as provided for the response required above under 10 CFR 2.201, Corrmonwealth Edison Company may pay the civil penalty by letter addressed to the Director, Office of Inspection and Enforcement, with a check, draft, or money order payable to the Treasurer of the United States in the cumulative
! amount of Twenty-Five Thousand Dollars ($25,000) or may protest imposition of i the civil penalty in whole or in part by a written answer addressed to the l Director, Office of Inspection and Enforcement. Should Commonwealth Edison Company fail to answer within the time specified, the Director, Office of Inspection and Enforcement, will issue an order imposing the civil penalty in the amount proposed above. Should Commonwealth Edison Company elect to file an answer in accordance with 10 CFR 2.205 protesting the civil penalty, such answer may: (1) deny the violation listed in this Notice, in whole or in part; (2) demonstrate extenuating circumstances, (3) show error in this Notice; or (4) show other reasons why the penalty should not be imposed. In addition to l protesting the civil penalty in whole or in part, such answer may request remission or mitigation of the penalty.
In requesting mitigation of the proposed penalty, the five factors addressed in Section V.B of 10 CFR Part 2, Appendix C (1985), should be addressed. Any
- l written answer in accordance with 10 CFR 2.205 should be set forth separately from the statement or explanation in rely pursuant to 10 CFR 2.201, but may incorporate parts of the 10 CFR 2.201 reply by specific reference (e.g.,
citing page and paragraph numbers) to avoid repetition. Commonwealth Edison's attention is directed to the other provisions of 10 CFR 2.205, regarding the procedure for imposing a civil penalty.
Upon failure to pay any civil penalty due which has been subsequently determined in accordance with the applicable provisions of 10 CFR 2.205, this matter may be referred to the Attorney General, and the penalty, unless compromised, remitted, or mitigated, may be collected by civil action pursuant to Section 234c of the Act, 42 U.S.C. 2282.
FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION CwS Nh gamesG.Keppler Regional Administrator Dated at Glen Ellyn, Illinois, this 15th day of April 1986.
(
q
,g umiso #):Tes 8
- ' Ag NUCLEA] CEIULATORY, COMMIS$ TON nacios m g .E .
no moosavatt moap g
'f GLEN ELLYN, ILUNGh' 40137 l Docket No. 50-295 Docket No. 50-304 y Commonwealth Edison Company '
ATTN: Mr. Cordell Raed l Vice President .
l Post Office Box 767 l Chicago, IL 60690 Gentlemen:
This refers to the routine safety inspection conducted by NRC inspectors M. M. Holzmer, L. E. Kanter, and J. N. Kish of this office on January 4 through February 14, 1986, of activities at the Zion Nuc) ear Generating Station authorized by Licenses No. DPR-39 and No. 09R-48 and to the discussion of our findings with Mr. G. Plimi at, the conclusion of the inspection.
The enclosed copy of our inspection report identifies arns examined during the inspection. Within these areas, the inspection consisted of a selective examination of procedures and representative recdrds, observ 'tions, and interviews with personnel.
During this inspection, certain of your activities appeared to be in violation of NRC requirements. This violation is being reviewed for potential escalated enforcement action. You will be notified in subsequent correspondence as to the resolution of this finding.
In accordance with 10 CFR 2.790(a), a copy of this letter and the enclosure will be placed in the NRC Public Document Room.
We will gladly discuss any questions you have concerning this inspection.
Sincerely, 1
Charles E. Norelius, Director Division of Reactor Projects
Enclosure:
Inspection Reports No. 50-295/86002(DRP);
No. 50-304/86002(DRP)
See Attached Distribution NNW VffY
Commonwealth Edison Company 2 Distribution cc w/ enclosure:
D. L. Farrar, Director of Nuclear Licensing G. P11m1, Station Manager Jan Norris, Project Manager, NRR DCS/RSB (RIDS)
Licensing Fee Management Branch Resident Inspector, RIII Phyllis Dunton, Attorney General's Office, Environmental Control Division Mayor, City of Zion l
l l
U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGICN III Reports No. 50-295/86002(DRP); 50-304/86002(DRP)
Docket Nos. 50-295; 50-304 License Nos. DPR-39;DPR-48 Licensee: Commonwealth Edison Company P. O. Box 767 Chicago, IL 60690 Facility Name: Zion Nuclear Power Station, Units 1 and 2 Inspection At: Zion, IL Inspection Conducted: January 4 through February 14, 1986 t
Inspectors: M. M. Holzmer ,
- L. E. Kanter J. N. Kish Approved By
- . W. Hehl, Chief 3//3 Reactor Projects Section 2A Da'te Inspection Summary Inspection on January 4 through February 14, 1986 (Reports No. 50-295/86002(DRP); 50-304/86002(DRP))
, Areas Inspected: Routine, unannounced resident inspection of auxiliary l electrical rooms; control rod drive motor generator rooms; review of l
' electrical distribution prints for reactor trip breaker modifications; Unit 2 containment tour prior to its closure; operational safety and engineered safety feature (ESF) system walkdown; surveillance; maintenance; and licensee event reports (LERs). The inspection involved a total of 274 inspector-hours onsite, including 57 inspector-hours onsite during off-shifts.
Results: Of the eight areas inspected, one violation was identified in one area. This violation, the inoperability of 18 Auxiliary Feedwater pump, was referred to a Region III enforcement board to determine whether escalated enforcement it- sppropriate.
hbbNNb ] T
DETAILS
- 1. Persons Contacted
- G. Plini, Station Manager
- E. Fuerst, Superintendent, Production j
- T. Rieck, Superintendent, Services R. Johnson, Assistant Station Superintendent, Maintenance L. Pruett, Unit 1 Operating Engineer ,
J. Gilmore, Unit 2 Operating Engineer N. Valos, Rad Waste Operating Engineer R. Budowle, Assistant Superintendent, Technical Services M. Carnahan, Training Supervisor R. Cascarano, Technical Staff Supervisor A. Ockert, Assistant Technical Staff Supervisor
- C. Schultz, Regulatory Assurance Administrator R. Aker, Station Health Physicist J. Ballard, Quality Control Supervisor D. Kaley, Quality Control Engineer
- W. Stone, Quality Assurance Supervisor D. McHenamin, Quality Assurance Engineer
- T. Printz, Assistant Technical Staff Supervisor
- W. Kurth, Assistant Superintendent Operating
- Indicates persons present at exit interview.
- 2. Summary of Operations l Unit 1
, The unit operated at power levels up to 100% throughout the inspection period.
Unit 2 I
The unit remained shutdown for refueling and the 10 year in-service inspection for the first part of the reporting period.
On January 1, 1986, Safeguards Bus 248 was deenergized due to the loss of the normal supply from non-vital Bus 243. This resulted in an automatic
, start of the 2A diesel generator. Paragraph 3 contains further details
! on this event.
On January 22, 1986, the licensee was performing PT-5 and 5A (Reactor i
Protection Logic Tests) when the Train B Reactor Trip Breaker opened.
Paragraph 5 contains further details on this event.
Initial criticality for the cycle was achieved at 9:55 p.m. on January 26, 1986, and the unit was tied to the grid at 5:30 a.m. on February 4, 1986, and operated at power levels up to 60%.
2
- 3. Bus Drop On January 17, 1986 at about 8:05 a.m., with Unit 2 in cold shutdown (Mode 5), Safeguards Bus 248 was deenergized due to the loss of the normal supply from non-vital Bus 243. The event resulted in an automatic start of the 2A diesel generator (DG) which functioned as designed.
Bus 243 was supplied from the system auxiliary transformer through 4160 volt breaker 2432. The alternate supply, from the unit auxiliary transformer, through breaker 2431 was not available because the unit was shutdown. Breaker 2432 opened during maintenance on the red " breaker closed" indication light socket on the main control board. The apparent 1 cause was the defective socket. When breaker 2432 opened, the bus tie j between Bus 243 and Bus 248 opened on undervoltage, deenergizing Bus 248.
The normal breaker alignment was restored at 9:00 a.m. the same day. l The bus drop resulted in the temporary loss of the 2B RHR pump, the 2B service water pump, and the A reactor containment fan cooler. Four con-tainment isolation valves also stroked. The necessary NRC notifications were made pursuant to 10CFR 50.72.
l
- 4. Inoperability of IB Auxiliary Feedwater Pump 1
On December 21, 1985, a service water system hydrostatic test was being conducted during the Unit 2 outage. The valve lineup for the test shut ISW 0660, a manual valve which normally supplies the 18 auxiliary feedwater (AFW) pump lube oil cooler from the Unit 2 side of the service water (SW) system. The valve lineup neglected to open ISW 0659, which would have supplied the IB AFW pump from the Unit I side of the SW system.
As a result, SW to the IB AFW pump oil cooler was isolated, rendering the pump inoperable.
On December 28, 1985, as part of the Unit 2 outage, work on 2MOV-SW101, which supplies service water to the 2B AFW pump suction, had been attempted, but the licensee was unable to get the header drained so that repairs could proceed. The shift engineer directed the radwaste foreman on shift to connect a hose to the flange between the SW header and l
2SW 0656 to help drain the header. This was done, and after observing the drainage flow, the foreman felt that there was pump head somewhere on the header. In an attempt to determine the source, he closed ISW 0656.
He stated that he felt that this valve was allowing SW flow from the Unit I side to be cross connected to the Unit 2 side, thus preventing the SW header from draining. At this time, both valve ISW 0656 and valve ISW 0660 were out of position (closed) isolating normal SW to the IB AFW pump oil cooler.
When his shift had ended, the radwaste foreman told the oncoming shif t engineer that he isolated the cross connect from Unit I to Unit 2. The oncoming shift engineer understood this to mean a SW crossconnect, and felt that there would not be any impact on Unit 1, being unaware that 3
v--
Unit 2 SW was the normal supply to the IB AFW pump lube oil cooler. He also thought, as a result of his turnover with the off going shift engineer, that the 2MOV SW101 maintenance team would be requesting operator assistance later in the shift, and he would then send the shift foreman to ensure that the lineup was correct. In addition, he assumed that the hydrostatic test return to service valve lineup or the startup valve lineup would assure that the cross connect valve would get to the correct position before it was needed for Unit 2 operations. As a result, he did not initiate a "non-routine valve line-up" sheet.
Non routine valve line-up sheets' as stated in Zion Administrative Procedure (ZAP) 3-51-48, " Procedure for Non-routine Valve Line-ups" are applicable for " changes made in valve line-ups of safety related systems, that are not covered in the out of service (005) card system and last for a duration greater than one shift, which differ from the routine valve line-ups as stated in the Zion Station System Operating Instructions."
On January 6,1986, the Unit 2 hydrostatic test return to service valve line-up was completed, and ISW 0660 was opened. The valve may have been opened earlier, but this cannot be conclusively shown from the valve line-up. The sheet only shows that the valve line-up was completed on January, 6,1986. Since manual valve ISW 0656 had been closed as described above and was not addressed on the hydrostatic test valve line-up, SW to the IB AFW pump oil cooler remained isolated.
On January 12, 1986, with Unit 2 still in cold shutdown, a B-operator on normal rounds identified the need to remove the header drain hose which had been connected to facilitate repair of valve 2MOV SW101. In the process of determining how to go about disconnecting and removing the hose, it was discovered that both valves ISW 0656 and ISW 0659 were closed. ISW 0656 was immediately opened, restoring the IB AFW pump to operability.
Root Cause Analysis The following root causes or contributors to this event were identified:
An error in the Unit 2 SW hydrostatic test procedure valve line-up caused the isolation of the IB AFW pump oil cooler. (ISW 0660 was shut without opening ISW 0659)
The radwaste foreman shut ISW 0656, and neither he nor the oncoming shift engineer initiated a non-routine valve line-up sheet to track or document this activity.
Communications between the radwaste foreman and the oncoming shift engineer were vague, and unspecific. This probably contributer v.o the feelings of the shift engineer that there was no urgency associated with the repositioning of ISW 0656.
4 e
Some shift engineers were unaware of the normal line-up for the AFW lube oil coolers, which is that some components are normally supplied from the opposite unit. This apparently contributed to the misconception that shutting "a crosstie" would not normally affect the other unit.
The procedure for non-routine valve line-ups has not been consistently applied, and is in need of review and possible revision.
During the review of the event, it was discovered that the Unit 1 SW hydrostatic test procedure which had been used earlier that year also isolated the 28 AFW pump oil cooler in a similar manner to that described above. However, the error was immediately identified and corrected by a temporary procedure change initiated during the Unit 1 SW hydro. This change was not made permanent.
Immediate Corrective Actions ISW 0656 was opened immediately after identification.
The shift engineer immediately ordered a verification of the line-up of the SW valves supplying all Unit 1 AFW pump oil coolers. The same valves on Unit 2 were also checked, although there was no immediate need to do so.
Performance tests were performed on all 3 unit 1 AFW pumps on the shift following discovery, as these tests were previously scheduled for performance during that time period.
Long Term Corrective Actions The SW hydrostatic test procedure will be corrected to ensure that SW is provided to both motor driven AFW pumps on the operating unit the next time the procedure is used.
A copy of the Potentially Significant Event notification which was given to the corporate office will be routed to all personnel involved in hydrostatic test package review. A memo will accompany the event description, to caution reviewers to give appropriate attention to detail during their reviews.
A change to the ZAP will be initiated to require that all procedure changes clearly state the reason for the change. Training will be provided for this ZAP change.
The procedure for non-routine valve line-ups will be reviewed and revised if necessary.
Valve line-up checklists will be reviewed relative to components supplied with SW from the opposite unit and changed as appropriate.
5
9 There will be a review to determine whether it is necessary for one unit's components to be normally supplied by SW from the opposite unit. -
Alert all shift supervisors by memo that these cross connected conditions exist and may potentially exist in other support systems.
Training will be provided to radweste foremen on ZAP's which pertain to operations. The training will emphasize procedure adherance.
Off going maintenance supervisors will be required to provide a status update to the shift engineer for jobs which were in progress.
This is to be done before leaving for the night.
The radwaste foremen's desk will be moved to the shift engineer's office, and radwaste foremen will be required to turnover there.
Safety Significance I
FSAR section 6.7.1, AFW design basis, states, "One of the two motor-driven auxiliary feedwater pumps supplying two of the four steam generators will provide enough feedwater to safely cool the unit down to the temperature at which the residual heat removal system can be utilized. The single turbine-driven auxiliary feedwater pump has twice the capacity of either motor-driven pump." The 1A (turbine-driven) and the IC (motor-driven) AFW pumps and their associated support systems and power supplies were operable while the IB AFW pump was out of service. The IB AFW pump could have run for approximately 20 minutes with its lube oil cooler isolated, according to the results of a test on the 1A AFW pump run several years ago.
The licensee performed about 58 hydrostatic tests in the last Unit I and 2 outages, and this is the only known example of a valve line-up error which wasn't detected during the review process. As a result, this appears to be an isolated case.
The licensee was slow to realize the significance of this event, in that it was discovered on January 12, 1986, and was processed as a routine deviation report (DVR) until approximately January 27, 1986, when the Operating Assistant Superintendent determined that this event could have represented a significant reduction in the margin of safety, and informed the NRC resident inspector. The licensee usually informs the resident office immediately when significant events occur. The fact that the licensee informed the resident inspector indicates that they were beginning to treat this as a more serious matter.
Technical Specification (TS) 3.7.2.a precludes reactor operation in I Mode 1 for more than seven days with one motor-driven AFW pump inoperable. !
Operation of Unit 1 in Mode 1 from December 21, 1985 until January 12, l 1986, a period of approximately 22 days, with the IB motor-driven AFW l pump inoperable is a violation of TS 3.7.2.a. (295/86002-01) )
l
)
- 5. Reactor Trip Breaker Opening On January 22, 1986, at 11:31 a.m., with the unit in the hot shutdown mode, the licensee was performing Periodic Test (PT) 5 and SA when the Train B reactor trip breaker opened. The PT was being utilized as a check to ensure proper installation of recently completed modifications (Ring Bus and Shunt Trip) as well as for Generating Operating Procedure (GOP) startup testing for the nearly concluded refueling outage. As part of its investigation, the licensee physically traced the conduit runs and found them to be connected to the wrong trains (i.e., A to B and B to A).
A review of the same modification performed on Unit I during testing refueling outage did not identify similar concerns. Later the same day, the conduits were installed correctly and PT-5 was rerun and successfully completed at 3:20 a.m. on January 23, 1986.
The licensee is presently looking into the possibility of an additional verification test prior to performing their post modification check for proper installation. (Note: this is just being considered since their post modification test did perform its intended function.) This matter will be considered an Open Item pending further review by the resident inspectors into the root cause of the event (304/85002-01).
No violation or deviations were identified. One Open Item was identified.
- 6. Followup of Region III Requests In a memorandum from E. G. Greenman dated November 7, 1985, all resident inspector offices were directed to provide infomation concerning the use of Licensed Reactor Operators in supervisory positions. In accordance with the above request, the inspectors reviewed the appropriate Zion Administrative Procedures (ZAP). A discussion with the operating engineer on the subject was also conducted. Their procedures showed compliance with requirements of 10CFR 50.54(m)(2) iii,10 CFR 55.4(d) and 10 CFR55.4(e).
No violations or deviations were identified.
- 7. Followup of NRR Requests In a maintenance questionaire from Harold R. Booher, all resident inspector offices were directed to obtain plant-specific primary data as part of NRR's Maintenance and Surveillance Program. The survey is being utilized to assist in the characterization of maintenance programs and practices at each specific plant. In accordance with the above request the questionaire was filled out without assistance from the licensee.
The results of this survey will be presented in a report to the Executive Director for Operations (EDO) in the spring of 1986.
- 8. Emergency Preparedness Exercise The licensee conducted an emergency preparedness exercise on February 10, 1986, involving various federal and state agencies. The licensee utilized Emergency Operating Procedures to mitigate the consequences of 7
O
i~.,
the simulated event. Details of the exercise and evaluations thereof are contained in Inspection Reports No. 295/86001(DRSS) and No. 304/86001(DRSS).
The resident inspector attended the exit for the exercise on February 11, 1986.
No violations or deviations were identified.
- 9. Operational Safety Verification and Engineered Safety Features System Walkdown The inspectors observed control room operations, reviewed applicable logs and conducted discussions with control room operators from January 4,1986 through February 14, 1986. During these discussions and observations, the inspectors ascertained that the operators were alert, fully cognizant of plant conditions, attentive to changes in those conditions, and took prompt action when appropriate. The inspectors verified the operability of selected emergency systems, reviewed tagout records and verified proper return to service of affected components. Tours of the auxiliary and turbine buildings were conducted to observe plant equipment conditior.s, including potential fire hazards, fluid leaks, and excessive vibrations and to verify that maintenance requests had been initiated for equipment in need of maintenance.
The inspectors, by observation and direct interview, verified that the physical security activities were being implemented in accordance with the station security plan.
The inspectors observed plant housekeeping / cleanliness conditions and verified implementation of radiation protection controls. From January 4 to February 14, 1986, the inspectors walked down the accessible portions of the auxiliary feedwater system, component cooling system, and auxiliary electrical and control rod drive motor generator rooms to verify operability. The inspectors also witnessed portions of the radioactive waste system controls associated with radwaste shipments and barreling.
These reviews and observations were conducted to verify that facility operations were in conformance with the requirements established under Technical Specifications, 10 CFR and administrative procedures.
No violations or deviations were identified.
- 10. Monthly Surveillance Operation The inspector observed Technical Specifications required surveillance testing on the containment spray system and verified that testing was performed in accordance with adequate procedures, that test instrumen-tation was calibrated, that limiting conditions for operation were met, that removal and restoration of the affected components were accomplished, i that test results conformed with technical specifications and procedure ;
requirements and were reviewed by personnel other than the individual l
l 1
8 !
~ , . . _ . - - _ _ . . _ _ , . _ - - _ , _ _ _ , _ . -.-,- .-- _--
directing the test, and that any deficiencies identified during the testing were properly reviewed and resolved by appropriate management personnel.
The inspector also witnessed or reviewed portions of the following test activities:
PT-6 Containment Spray Tests and Checks PT-7B Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Service Water Valves Operability Check (Last Two Months' Tests)
PT-27 Refueling Outage Miscellaneous Valve Tests No violations or deviations were identified.
- 11. Monthly Maintenance Operation Station maintenance activities on safety related systems and components listed below were observed or reviewed to ascertain whether they were conducted in accordance with approved procedures, regulatory guides, industry codes or standards, and in conformance with Technical Specifications.
The following items were considered during this review: the limiting conditions for operation were met while components or systems were removed from service; approvals were obtained prior to initiating the work; activities were accomplished using approved procedures and were inspected as applicable; functional testing and/or calibrations were performed prior to returning components or systems to service; quality control records were maintained; activities were accomplished by qualified personnel; parts and materials used were properly certified; radiclogical controls were implemented; and fire prevention controls were implemented.
Work requests were reviewed to determine status of outstanding jobs and to assure that priority is assigned to safety related equipment maintenance which may affect system performance.
The following maintenance activities were observed or reviewed:
20 Main Steam Isolation Valve Maintenance (MSIV)
Unit 2 Source Range Channel Maintenance Unit 2 Intermediate Range Channel Maintenance Review of Unit 1 and Unit 2 modification package for installation of an annunciator in the control room for iodine sampling after a 15% power change 9
- o Review of Unit I and Unit 2 Shunt Trip Modification No violations or deviations were identified.
- 12. Licensee Event Reports (LER) Followup Through direct observations, discussions with licensee personnel, and review of records, the following event reports were reviewed to determine that reportability requirements were fulfilled, immediate corrective action was accomplished, and corrective action to prevent recurrence had been accomplished in accordance with Technical Specifications. The LERs listed below are censidered closed:
Unit 1 LER No. Description 85-40 Automatic Start of Penetration Pressurization Air Compressors 85-43 Automatic Start of Penetration Pressurization Air Compressors 85-44 Inadvertent Reactor Trip Due to Steam Flow Transmitter IFT-512 85-46 Failure of Both Source Range Channels Following Reactor Trip 85-47 Missed Surveillance for Reactor Coolant Iodine Following 15%
Power Range Unit 2 Ler No. Description 85-29 Purge Isolation Due to Low Temperature and High Radiation Signal 86-001 Inadvertent Operation of the Pressurizer Power Operated Relief Valves Regarding LER's 295/85040 and 295/85-43, " Automatic Start of Penetration Pressurization (PP) Air Compressors," the LER's will be closed. A maintenance program is being tracked by the station. The events were reported per 10CFR50.72. Due to heightened emphasis on ESF actuation reporting requirements, it is most probable that these will not be reported in future occurrences per 50.72 since the PP air system is started by a process signal. This decision was arrived at as a result of a meeting between the licensee and Region III personnel January 16, 1986.
Regarding LER 295/85-44, " Inadvertent Reactor Trip Due to Steam Flow Transmitter 1FT-512," the LER will be closed. The trip was caused by a steam flow transmitter drifting out of tolerance (00T). The flow 10
r s
transmitter was a Fisher-Porter type and has had a history of drifting 00T. This type of transmitter will be replaced under a station modifi-cation. For details on the trip refer to inspection report 50-295/85042; 50-304/85043.
Regarding LER 295/85-047, " Missed Surveillance for Reactor Coolant Iodine Following 15% Power Change". This item is considered a licensee identified violation for which r.o citatior, will be given (50-295/86002-02).
An event of similar nature occurred on Unit 2 in August 1984. During this event, Radiation Protection (RP) was not notified of the 15% power change and corrective action included revision to the appropriate start-up procedures. In this present event, notification was made to RP but misunderstood. Corrective action will include a description of this event in the operators' required reading package and will also be distributed to RP-personnel. In addition, a modification package which was initiated after the last event is being processed for both Unit I and Unit 2 to install an annunciator in the control room so in the future, iodine sampling will be performed in accordance with Technical Specifications.
Regarding LER 304/85-029, "P9rge Isolation Due to Low Temperature and High Radiation Signal," the LER will be closed. However, an Open Item will be issued pending further investigation into the root cause of the event (304/86002-02).
No violations or deviations were identified. One licensee identified violation and one Open Item were identified.
- 13. Open Items Open Items are matters which have been discussed with the licensee, which will be reviewed further by the inspector, and which involve some action on the part of the NRC or licensee or both. Two Open Items disclosed during this inspection are oiscussed in paragraphs 5 and 12.
- 14. Exit Interview The inspectors met with licensee representatives (denoted in Paragraph 1) throughout the inspection period and at the conclusion of the inspection on January 4 through February 4,1986 to summarize the scope and findings of the inspection activities. The licensee acknowledged the inspectors' comments. The inspectors also discussed the likely informational content of the inspection report with regard to documents or processes reviewed by the inspectors during the inspection. The licensee did not identify any such documents or processes as proprietary.
11 O