ML20155B234

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Forwards Initial Technical Response to NRC Bulletin 88-008, Thermal Stresses in Piping Connected to Rcs. Encl Outlines Action Plan & Technical Basis for Insp & Monitoring Programs to Be Implemented During Current Refueling Outage
ML20155B234
Person / Time
Site: Summer South Carolina Electric & Gas Company icon.png
Issue date: 09/29/1988
From: Bradham O
SOUTH CAROLINA ELECTRIC & GAS CO.
To:
NRC OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATION & RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (ARM)
Shared Package
ML20155B238 List:
References
IEB-88-008, IEB-88-8, NUDOCS 8810060242
Download: ML20155B234 (2)


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  • "a ^~ September 29, 1988 Document Control Desk U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Comission Washington, DC 20555

Subject:

Virgil C. Sumer Nuclear Station Docket No. 50/395 Operating License No. NPF-12 NRC Bulletin 88-08 Gentlemen:

Attached is the South Carolina Electric & Gas Company (SCE&G) initial technical response to NRC Bulletin 88-08, "Thermal Stresses in Piping Connected to Reactor Coolant Systems." This response was prepared in conjunction with Westinghouse Corporation, which SCE&G considers to be the most knowledgeable to date in the industry on the thermal cycling phenomenon addressed by the NRC in Bulletin 88-08. Additional reports required by the Bulletin will be transmitted as applicable action items are completed The attached report outlines the action plan and technical basis for the inspection and monitoring programs to be implemented during the cu* rent refueling outage at the Virgil C. Sumer Nuclear Station. These prograu were developed to ensure the concerns of the NRC Bulletin were addressed in a responsible manner and that the continued safe operation of the plant was maintained. The programs include installing temperature monitoring devices 4

on applicable unisolable sections of piping connected to the reactor coolant system and performing nondestructive examinations on identified critical weld and base metal locations. Not all weld and base metal locations on all sections of affected piping are scheduled to be examined as a portion of the programs; to do so would not nrovide a significantly greater assurance of safety comensurate with the increased radiation exposure to individuals.

However, contingency plans do call for increased inspections if the regular inspections reveal nonconformances. Therefore, the programs being implemented by SCE&G to address the requirements of NRC Bulletin 88-08 have been determined to be both technically justifiable and responsive to safety concerns.

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t-Document Control Desk September 29, 1988 j Page 2 -

Should you have any questions, please contact us at your convenience.  !

Very truly yours, }

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0. S. Bradham i AMM/OSB: led ,

Attachment '

c: b A. Nauman/J. G. Connelly, Jr./0. W. Dixon, Jr./T. C. Nichols, Jr._

l E. C. Roberts W. A. Williams, Jr. G. O. Perciva J. N. Grace R. L. Prevatte J. J. Hayes, Jr. J. B. Knotts, Jr.

General Managers NSRC C. A. Price /R. M. Campbe1.i, Jr. RTS (!EB 880008) i R. B. Clary NPCF l K. E. Nodland File (816.02)

J. C. Snelson 1

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