Text

Amend 164 to License NPF-49,revising Shutdown Margin Requirements & Adds TS 3/4.3.5 to Provide Limiting Condition & Surveillance Requirements for Shutdown Margin Monitors
	ML20155A426
Person / Time
Site:	Millstone
Issue date:	10/21/1998
From:	Bill Dean; NRC (Affiliation Not Assigned)
To:	;
Shared Package
ML20155A430	List: ML20155A426; ML20155A439;
References
	NUDOCS 9810290093
	Download: ML20155A426 (25)
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__. _ __

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UNITED STATES e*

4 j

,j NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON, D.C. 20565-0001

- - - - l NORTHEAST NUCLEAR ENERGY COMPANY. ET AL.

DOCKET NO. 50-423 MILLSTONE NUCLEAR POWER STATION. UNIT NO. 3 AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE Amendment No.164 License No. NPF-49 1.

The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:

A.

The application for amendment by Northeast Nuclear Energy Company, et al.

(the licensee) dated May 9,1997, as supplemented August 4,1998, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I; B.

The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission; C.

There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations; D.

The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and E.

The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.

9810290093 981021

~

PDR ADOCK 05000423 P

PDR

. 2.

Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Facilit) perating License and j

Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment, and paragraph 2.C.(2) of Facility Operating License No. NPF-49 is hereby amended to read as follows:

i (2)

Technical Soecifications The Technical Specifications contained in Appendix A, as revised through Amendment No.164, and the Environmental Protection Plan contained in Appendix B, both of which are attached hereto are hereby incorporated in the license. The licensee shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications and the Environmental Protection Plan.

I in addition, paragraph 2.C.(5) of Facility Operating License No. NPF-49 is amended to read as follows:

(5)

The Additional Conditions contained in Appendix C, as revised through Amendment No.164, are hereby incorporated in the license. The licensee shall operate the facility in accordance with the additional conditions.

3.

This license amendment is effective as of the date of issuance, to be implemented within 60 days of issuance.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION f'V William M. Dean, Director Millstone Projact Directorate Division of Reactor Projects -l/ll Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Attachment:

Changes to the Facility Operating License and Technical Specifications Date of issuance: October 21, 1998 i

e ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO.164 FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-49 DOCKET NO. 50-423 Replace the following page of the Facility Operating License with the attached page. The revised page is identified by amendment number and contains a vertical line indicating the area of change.

4 Remove Insert Appendix C Appendix C Replace the following pages of the Appendix A, Technical Specifications, with the attached pages. The revised pages are identified by amendment number and contain verticallines indicating the areas of change.

Remove losert vii vii xiii xiii 3/4 1-3 3/4 1-3 3/4 1-4 3/4 1-4 3/4 1-5 3/4 1-5 3/4 1-6 3/4 1-6 3/4 1-7 3/4 1 7 3/4 1-8 3/4 1-8 3/4 1-9 3/4 1-9 3/4 3-4 3/4 3-4 3/4 3-5 3/4 3-5 3/4 3-6 3/4 3-6 3/4 3-12 3/4 3-12 3/4 3-14 3/4 3-14 3/4 3-82 3/4 3-83 8 3/4 1-3 8 3/4 1-3 8 3/4 3-3 8 3/4 3-3 B 3/4 3-3a B 3/4 3-3b B 3/4 3-7 B 3/4 3-8 B 3/4 3-9 6-20a 6-20a

APPENDIX C ADDITIONAL CONDITIONS OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-49 Northeast Nuclear Energy Company (NNECO) shall comply with the following conditions on the schedules noted below:

Amendment Condition Number Additional Condition Comoletion Datt 162 Millstone Unit No. 3 will incorporate the changes into During the next revision of the Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) as the FSAR required by 10 requested by letter dated January 22,1998, as CFR 50.71(e) or no later supplemented by letter dated July 17,1998, that than June 30,1999.

accepts the use of epoxy coatings on service water system components. Future changes to the design described in this submittal may be made in accordance with the provisions of 10 CFR 50.59.

164 Millstone Unit No. 3 will incorporate into Technical To be submitted to the NRC Specification 6.9.1.6, references to the shutdown within 90 days from margin analysis methods reviewed and approved by October 21,1998.

the NRC.

Amendment No. fle,164

IMX LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION AND SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SECTION Pf_gf TABLE 3.3-13 RADI0 ACTIVE GASE0US EFFLUENT MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION...................... 3/4 3-75 TABLE 4.3-9 RADI0 ACTIVE GASEOUS EFFLUENT MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS......... 3/4 3-78 3/4.3.4 TURBINE OVERSPEED PROTECTION 3/4 3-81 3/4.3.5 SHUTDOWN MARGIN MONITOR.................. 3/4 3-82 l

)

3/4.4 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM 3/4.4.1 REACTOR COOLANT LOOPS AND COOLANT CIRCULATION Startup and Power Operation................

3/4 4-1 Hot Standby........................ 3/4 4-2 Hot Shutdown 3/4 4-3 Cold Shutdown - Loops Filled 3/4 4-5 Cold Shutdown - Loops Not Filled 3/4 4-6 I s ol at ed Loop...................

3/4 4-7 Isolated Loop Startup................... 3/4 4-8 3/4.4.2 SAFETY VALVES Shutdown 3/4 4-9 Operating......................... 3/4 4-10 3/4.4.3 PRESSURIZER Startup and Power Operation................

3/4 4-11 FIGURE 3.4-5 PRESSURIZER LEVEL CONTROL...............

3/4 4-11a Hot Standby................

3/4 4-llb 3/4.4.4 RELIEF VALVES.......................

3/4 4-12 3/4.4.5 STEAM GENERATORS 3/4 4-14 TABLE 4.4-1 MINIMUM NUMBER OF STEAM GENERATORS TO BE INSPECTED DURING INSERVICE INSPECTION................

3/4 4-19 TABLE 4.4-2 STEAM GENERATOR TUBE INSPECTION 3/4 4-20 3/4.4.6 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM LEAKAGE Leakage Detection Systems................. 3/4 4-21 Operational Leakage.................... 3/4 4-22 TABLE 3.4-1 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM PRESSURE ISOLATION VALVES 3/4 4-24 3/4.4.7 CHEMISTRY.........................

3/4 4-25 TABLE 3.4-2 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM CHEMISTRY LIMITS 3/4 4-26 TABLE 4.4-3 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM CHEMISTRY LIMITS SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 3/4 4-27 3/4.4.8 SPECIFIC ACTIVITY.....................

3/4 4-28 MILLSTONE - UNIT 3 vii Amendment No. 177,164 0518

INDEX BASES SECTION EAgf 3/4.0 APPLICABILITY B 3/4 0-1 3/4.I REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS 3/4.1.1 B0 RATION CONTROL.....................

B 3/4 1 I 3/4.1.2 B0 RATION SYSTEMS.....................

B 3/4 1-2 3/4.1.3 MOVABLE CONTROL ASSEMBLIES................

B 3/4 1-3a 3/4.2 POWER DISTRIBUTION LIMITS B 3/4 2-1 3/4.2.1 AXIAL FLUX DIFFERENCE B 3/4 2-1 3/4.2.2 and 3/4.2.3 HEAT FLUX HOT CHANNEL FACTOR AND RCS FLOW RATE AND NUCLEAR ENTHALPY RISE HOT CHANNEL FACTOR B 3/4 2-3 3/4.2.4 QUADRANT POWER TILT RATIO B 3/4 2-5 3/4.2.5 DNB PARAMETERS......................

B 3/4 2-5 3/4.3 INSTRUMENTATION 3/4.3.1 and 3/4.3.2 REACTOR TRIP SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION AND ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES ACTUATION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION B 3/4 3-1 3/4.3.3 MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION................

B 3/4 3-3 3/4.3.4 TURBINE OVERSPEED PROTECTION...............

B 3/4 3-6 3/4.3.5 SHUTDOWN MARGIN MONITOR B 3/4 3-7 l

3/4.4 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM 3/4.4.1 REACTOR COOLANT LOOPS AND COOLANT CIRCULATION B 3/4 4-1 3/4.4.2 SAFETY VALVES B 3/4 4-2 3/4.4.3 PRESSURIZER B 3/4 4-2 3/4.4.4 RELIEF VALVES B 3/4 4-2b 3/4.4.5 STEAM GENERATORS.....................

B 3/4 4-3 3/4.4.6 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM LEAKAGE..............

B 3/4 4-4 3/4.4.7 CHEMISTRY B 3/4 4-5 4

3/4.4.8 SPECIFIC ACTIVITY B 3/4 4-5 l

3/4.4.9 PRESSURE / TEMPERATURE LIMITS B 3/4 4-7 MILLSTONE - UNIT 3 xiii Amendment No. pp, pp. Jpp 164 0519

~

3/4.1 REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS 3/4.1.1 _B9p Tf0N CONTROL SHUTDOWN MARGIN - MODES 3. 4 AND 5 LOOPS FILLED LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.1.1.1.2 The SHUTDOWN MARGIN shall be greater than~ or equal to the limits shown in Figures 3.1-1, 3.1-3 and 3.1-4 for four loop operation and in Figure 3.1-2 for three loop operation.*

l APPLICABILITY: MODES 3, 4 and 5 FJJDfi:

With the SHUTDOWN MARGIN less than the required value, immediately initiate and continue boration at greater than or equal to 33 gpm of a solution containing greater than or equal to 6600 ppm boron or equivalent until the required SHUTDOWN MARGIN is restored.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.1.1.1.2.1 The SHUTDOWN MARGIN shall be determined to be greater than or equal to the required value:

a.

Within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months after detection of an inoperable control rod (s) and at least once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months thereafter while the rod (s) is inoperable.

If the inoperable control rod is immovable or untrippable, the above required SHUTDOWN MARGIN shall be verified acceptable with an increased allowance for the withdrawn worth of the immovable or untrippable control rod (s); and b.

At least once per 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months by consideration of the following factors:

1)

Reactor Coolant System boron concentration, 2)

Control rod position, 3)

Reactor Coolant System average temperature, 4)

Fuel burnup based on gross thermal energy generation, 5)

Xenon concentration, and 6)

Samarium concentration.

4.1.1.1.2.2 Valve 3CHS-V305 shall be verified closed and locked at least once per 31 days.

Additional SHUTDOWN MARGIN requirements, if

required, are given in Specification 3.3.5.

MILLSTONE - UNIT 3 3/4 1-3 Amendment No. pp, JJ7, m 0491

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REQUIRED SHUTDOWN FOR MODE 3 WITH FOUR LOOPS IN OPERATION

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RCS CRITICAL BORON CONCENTRATION (ppm) l

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S FIGURE 3.1-4 REQUIRED SHUTDOWN MARGIN FOR MODE 5 WITH RCS LOOPS FILLED m -

REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS SHUTDOWN MARGIN - Col.D SHUTDOWN - LOOPS NOT FILLED LINITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.1.1.2 The SHUTDOWN MARGIN shall be greater than or equal to a) the limits shown in Figure 3.1-5* or l

b) the limits shown in Figure 3.1-4*, witn the chemical and volume l

control system (CVCS) aligned to preclude reactor coolant system boron concentration reduction.

APPLICABILITY: MODE 5 LOOPS NOT FILLED ACTION:

l a.

With the SHUTDOWN MARGIN less than the above, immediately initiate and 1

continue boration at greater than or equal to 33 gpm of a solution containing greater than or equal to 6600 ppm boron or equivalent until the required SHUTDOWN MARGIN is restored.

b.

With the CVCS dilution flow paths not closed and secured in position in accordance with Specification 3.1.1.2(b), immediately close and secure the paths or meet the limits shown in Figure 3.1-5.

l SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.1.1.2.1 The SHUTDOWN MARGIN shall be determined to be greater than or equal to the above:

a.

Within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months after detection of an inoperable control rod (s) and at least once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months thereafter while the rod (s) is inoperable.

If the inoperable control rod is imovable or untrippable, the SHUTDOWN MARGIN shall be verified acceptable with an increased allowance for the withdrawn worth of the immovable or untrippable control rod (s); and b.

At least once per 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months by consideration of the following factors:

1)

Reactor Coolant System boron concentration, 2)

Control rod position, 3)

Reactor Coolant System average temperature, I

4)

Fuel burnup based on gross thermal energy generation,

Additional SHUTDOWN MARGIN requirements, if required, are given in Specification 3.3.5.

NILLSTONE - UNIT 3 3/4'l-8 Amendment No. pp, 77, # 7, 164 out

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REQUIRED SHUTDOWN MARGIN FOR MODE 5 WITH RCS LOOPS NOT FILLED

g5 TABLE 3.3-1 (Continued)

F$

REACTOR TRIP SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION E

m MINIMUM TOTAL NO.

CHANNELS CHANNELS APPLICABLE E

FUNCTIONAL UNIT OF CHANNELS TO TRIP OPERABLE MODES ACTIM 4

17. Reactor Trip System Interlocks (Continued) w c.

Power Range Neutron Flux, P-8 4

2 3

1 8

d.

Power Range Neutron 4

2 3

1 8

Flux, P-9 e.

Power Range Neutron Flux, P-10 4

2 3

1,2 8

,s

18. Reactor Trip Breakers (2) 2 1

2 1, 2 10, 13 2

1 2

3*, 4*, 5*

11

19. Automatic Trip and Interlock 2

1 2

1, 2 13A Logic 2

1 2

3*, 4*, 5*

11 k

s 20.

Three Loop Operation 8

2 8

1, 2 1

k Bypass Circuitry (1 switch per (From differ-s.,

loop in each ent loop train) switches in p

bypass)

21. DELETED l

4

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1 TABLE 3.3-1 (Continued)

TABLE NOTATIONS

When the Reactor Trip System breakers are in the closed position and the Control Rod Drive System is capable of rod withdrawal.

- Above the P-7 (At Power) Setpoint.

- - Above the P-9 (Reactor Trip / Turbine Trip Interlock) Setpoint.

1. Below the P-6 (Intermediate Range Neutron Flux Interlock) Setpoint.

1. 1. Below the P-10 (Low Setpoint Power Range Neutron Flux Interlock) Setpoint.

l (I)

The applicable MODES and ACTION statements for these channels noted in Table 3.3-3 are more restrictive and, therefore, applicable.

(2)

Including any reactor trip bypass breakers that are racked in and closed for bypassing a reactor trip breaker.

ACTION STATEMENTS ACTION 1 - With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement, restore the inoperable channel to OPERABLE status within 48 hours5.555556e-4 days 0.0133 hours 7.936508e-5 weeks 1.8264e-5 months or be in HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months .

ACTION 2 - With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the Total Number of Channels, STARTUP and/or POWER OPERATION may proceed provided the following conditions are satisfied:

a.

The inoperable channel is placed in the tripped condition within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months , b.

The Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement is met; however, the inoperable channel may be bypassed for up to 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months for surveillance testing of other channels per Specification 4.3.1.1, and c.

Either, THERMAL POWER is restricted to less than or equal to 75% of RATED THERMAL POWER for four loop operation or 50% of RATED THERMAL POWER for three loop operation and the Power Range Neutron Flux Trip Setpoint is reduced to less than or equal to 85 % of RATED THERMAL POWER for four loop operation or 60% of RATED THERMAL POWER for three loop operation within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months ; or, the QUADRANT POWER TILT RATIO is monitored at least once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months per Specification 4.2.4.2.

NILLSTONE - UNIT 3 3/4 3-5 Amendment No. J/, JP, 77,164 WW2 i

i

i TABLE 3.3-1 (Continued)

ACTION STATENENTS (Continued)

ACTION 3 -

With the number of channels OPERABLE one less than the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement and with the THERMAL POWER level:

a.

Below the P-6 (Intermediate Rarge Neutron Flux Interlock)

Setpoint, restore the inoperable channel to OPERABLE status prior to increasing THERMAL POWER above the P-6 Setpoint, and l

b.

Above the P-6 (Intermediate Range Neutron Flux Interlock)

Setpoint but below 10% of RATED THERMAL POWER, restore the inoperable channel to 0PERABLE status prior to increasing THERMAL POWER above 10% of RATED THERMAL POWER.

l ACTION 4 -

With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement, suspend all operations involving positive reactivity changes.

ACTION 5 -

(Not used) l ACTION 6 -

With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the Total i

Number of Channels, STARTUP and/or POWER OPERATION may proceed i

provided the following conditions are satisfied:

a.

The inoperable channel is placed in the tripped condition within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months , and b.

The Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement is met; however, the inoperable channel may be bypassed for up to 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months f.:r surveillance testing of other channels per j

Specification 4.3.1.1.

(Not used)

ACTION 7 ACTION 8 -

With less than the Minimum Number of Channels OPERABLE, within I hour determine by observation of the associated permissive annunciator window (s) that the interlock is in its required state for the existing plant condition, or apply Specification 3.0.3.

1 MILLSTONE - UNIT 3 3/4 3-6 Amendment No. 77, pp, JU,164 i

0492

x TABLE 4.3-1 (Continued)

REACTOR TRIP SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION SURVEILLANCE RE0UIREMENTS a

m TRIP ANALOG ACTUATING MODES FOR s

E CHANNEL DEVICE WHICH CHANNEL CHANNEL OPERATIONAL OPERATIONAL ACTUATION SURVEILLANCE Q

FUNCTIONAL UNIT CHECK CALIBRATION TEST TEST LOGIC TEST IS REQUIRED 18.

Reactor Trip Breaker N.A.

N.A.

N(7,11)

N.A.

1 2 4, $*3*,

4

19. Automatic Trip and N.A.

N.A.

N(7) 1 2 4, $*3*,

Interlock logic 1

i

20. Three Loop Operation N.A.

N.A.

R N.A.

1, 2 Bypass Circuitry i

21.

Reactor Trip Bypass N.A.

N.A.

N[7R(l$)15)

N.A.

I 2 4, $*3*,

Breaker 1

22.

DELETED

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m_

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4

i TABLE 4.3-1 (Continued)

TABLE NOTATIONS (Continued)

(10)

Setpoint verification is not applicable.

(11)

The TRIP ACTUATING DEVICE OPERATIONAL TEST shall independently verify the OPERABILITY of the undervoltage and shunt trip attachments of the Reactor Trip Breakers.

(12)

(not used)

(13)

Reactor Coolant Pump Shaft Speed Sensor may be excluded from CHANNEL CALIBRATION.

(14)

The TRIP ACTUATING DEVICE OPERATIONAL TEST shall independently verify the OPERABILITY of the undervoltage and shunt trip circuits for the Manual Reactor Trip Function. The test shall also verify the OPERABILITY of the Bypass Breaker trip circuit (s).

(15)

Local manual shunt trip prior to placing breaker in service.

(16) Automatic undervoltage trip.

(17)

(not used).

(18)

The surveillance frequency and/or N0 DES specified for these channels in Table 4.3-2 should be reviewed for applicability.

l i

i i

i NILLSTONE - UNIT 3 3/4 3-14 Amendment No. JJ, PP, 77, 77, ouw JPP.164

INSTRUMENTATION 9

3/4.3.5 SHUTDOWN NARGIN NONITOR LINITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 1

3.3.5 Two channels of Shutdown Margin Monitors shall be OPERABLE a.

With a minimum count rate as designated in the CORE OPERATING LIMITS REPORT (COLR), or b.

If the minimum count rate in Specification 3.3.5.a cannot be met, then the Shutdown Margin Monitors may be made operable with a lower minimum count rate, as specified in the COLR, by borating the Reactor Coolant System above the requirements of Specification 3.1.1.1.2 or 3.1.1.2.

The additional boration shall be:

1.

A mir,imum of 150 ppm above the SHUTDOWN MARGIN requirements of Figure 3.1-1 (Mode 3 - 4 loops in operation) and Figure 3.1-2 (Mode 3 - 3 loops in operation), or 2.

A minimum of 350 ppm above the SHUTDOWN MARGIN requirements of Figure 3.1-3 (Mode 4), Figure 3.1-4 (Mode 5 - RCS loops filled) and Figure 3.1-5 (Mode 5 - RCS loops drained).

i APPLICABILITY: MODES 3*,

4, and 5.

ACTION:

a.

With one Shutdown Margin Monitor inoperable, restore the inoperable channel to OPERABLE status within 48 hours5.555556e-4 days 0.0133 hours 7.936508e-5 weeks 1.8264e-5 months .

b.

With both Shutdown Margin Monitors inoperable or one Shutdown Margin Monitor inoperable for greater than 48 hours5.555556e-4 days 0.0133 hours 7.936508e-5 weeks 1.8264e-5 months , immediately suspend all operations involving positive reactivity changes via dilution and rod withdrawal.

Verify the valves listed in Specificatinn 4.1.1.2.2 are closed and secured in position within the next 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months and at least once per 14 days thereafter.**

Veri'fy compliance with the SHUTDOWN MARGIN requirements of Specification 3.1.1.1.2 or 3.1.1.2, as applicable, within I hour and at least once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months thereafter.

The shutdown margin monitors may be blocked during reactor startup in accordance with approved plant procedures.

- The valves may be opened on an intermittent basis under administrative controls as noted in Surveillance 4.1.1.2.2.

NILLSTONE - UNIT 3 3/4 3-82 Amendment No.164 0496

INSTRUMENTATION 3/4.3.5 SHUTDOWN MARGIN MONITOR (continued)

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 1

4.3.5 a.

Each of the above required shutdown margin monitoring instruments shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by an ANALOG CHANNEL OPERATIONAL TEST at least once per 92 days that shall include verification that the Shutdown Margin Monitor is set per the Core Operating Limits Report (COLR).

b.

At least once per 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months VERIFY the minimum count rate (counts /sec) as defined within the COLR.

i l

MILLSTONE - UNIT 3 3/4 3-83 Amendment No.164 0496

REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS BASES 80 RATION SYSTEMS (Continued)

MARGINfromexpectedoperatingconditionsequivalenttothatrequiredbyFigure3.1-4l after xenon decay and cooldown to 200*F.

The maximum boration capability (minimum boration volume) requirement is established to conservatively bound expected operating conditions throughout core operating life.

The initial RCS boron concentration is ba:ed on a minimum expected hot full power or het zero power condition (peak xenon).

The final RCS boron concentration assumes that the most reactive control rod is not inserted into the core.

This set of conditions requires a minimum usable volume of 21,802 gallons of 6600 ppm borated water from the boric acid storage tanks or 1,166,000 gallons of 2700 ppm borated water from the refueling water storage tank (RWST). A minimum RWST volume of 1,166,000 gallons is specified to be consistent with ECCS requirement.

With the plant in MODE 4, one boron injection flowpath is acceptable without single failure consideration for emergency boration requirements on the basis of the stable reactivity condition of the reactor, the emergency power supply requirement for the OPERABLE charging pump, and the fact that the plant is administratively borated to at least MODE 5 requirements prior to cooldown to MODE 4.

Also, the primary grade water addition path to the charging pumps is surveilled to be locked closed to prevent a direct dilution accident in MODE 4.

With the plant in MODES 5 and 6, one boron injection system is acceptable without single failure consideration on the basis of the stable reactivity condition of the reactor and the additional restrictions prohibiting CORE ALTERATIONS and positive reactivity changes in the event the single boron injection system becomes inoperable.

The limitation for a maximum of one centrifugal charging pump to be OPERABLE, when cold overpressure protection is in service, provides assurance that a mass addition pressure transient can be relieved by operation of a single PORV or RhR suction relief valve.

The boron capability required below 200*F is sufficient to provide a SHUTDOWN MARGIN of 1.3% Ak/k after xenon decay and cooldown from 200*F to 140*F. This condition requires either a usable volume of 4100 gallons of 6600 ppm borated water from the boric acid storage tanks or 250,000 gallons of 2700 ppm borated water from the RWST.

The unusable volume in each boric acid storage tank is 1300 gallons.

The contained water volume limits include allowance for water not available because of discharge line lucation and other physical characteristics.

The limits on contained water volume and boron concentration of the RWST also ensure a pH value of between 7.0 and 7.5 for the solution recirculated within containment after a LOCA. This pH band minimizes the evolution of iodine and minimizes the effect of chloride and caustic stress corrosion on mechanical systems and components.

The minimum RWST solution temperature for MODES 5 and 6 is based on analysis assumptions in addition to freeze protection considerations.

The minimum / maximum RWST solution temperatures for MODES 1, 2, 3 and 4 are based on analysis assumptions.

MILLSTONE - UNIT 3 8 3/4 1-3 AmendmentJJ,pp,SJ,JJJ,2%f,164 0496

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INSTRUMENTATION l

ma m REACTOR TRIP SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION and ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES ACTUATION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION (Continued)

The Engineered Safety Features Actuation System interlocks perform the following functions:

P-4 Reactor tripped - Actuates Turbine trip, closes main feedwater i

valves on T below Setpoint, prevents the opening of the main o

feedwater valves which were closed by a Safety Injection or High Steam Generator Water Level signal, allows Safety Injection block i

so that components can be reset or tripped.

I Reactor not tripped - prevents manual block of Safety lajection.

3 P-ll On increasing pressurizer pressure, P-11 automatically reinstates Safety Injection actuation on low pressurizer pressure and low.

steam line pressure.

On decreasing pressure, P-11 allows the manual block of Safety Injection actuation on low pressurizer pressure and low steam line pressure.

)

P-12 On increasing reactor coolant loop temperature, P-12 automatically provides an arming signal to the Steam Dump System. On decreasing

^

reactor coolant loop temperature, P-12 automatically removes the arming signal from the Steam Dump System.

P-14 On increasing steam generator water level, P-14 automatically trips all feedwater isolation valves, main feed pumps and main 2

turbine, and inhibits feedwater control valve modulation.

3/4.3.3 MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION 3/4.3.3.1 RADIATION MONITORING FOR PLANT OPERATIONS The OPERABILITY of the radiation monitoring instrumentation for plant operations ensures that:

(1) the associated action will be initiated when the radiation level monitored by each channel or combination thereof reaches its Setpoint, (2) the specified coincidence logic is maintained, and (3) suffi-1 cient redundancy is maintained to permit a channel to be out-of-service for testing or maintenance. The radiation acnitors for plant operations senses l

radiation levels in selected plant systems and locations and determines whether or not predetermined limits are being exceeded.

If they are, the signals are 1

combined into logic matrices sensitive to combinations indicative of various accidents and abnormal conditions. Once the required logic combination is completed, the system sends actuation signals to initiate alarms.

MILLSTONE - UNIT 3 -

B 3/4 3-3 Amendment No. JJJ, 164 0497

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INSTRUMENTATION BASES 3/4 3.5 SHUTDOWN MARGIN MONITOR The Shutdown Margin Monitors provide an alarm that a Boron Dilution Event may be in progress.

The minimum count rate of Specification 3/4.3.5 and the SHUTDOWN MARGIN requirements of Figures 3.1-1, 3.1-2, 3.1-3, 3.1-4, and 3.1-5 ensure that at least 15 minutes are available for operator action from the time of the Shutdown Margin Monitor alarm to total loss of shutdown margin.

By borating an additional 150 ppm above the SHUTDOWN MARGIN required by Figure 3.1-1 or 3.1-2, or 350 ppm above the SHUTDOWN MARGIN required by Figure 3.1-3, 3.1-4, or 3.1-5, lower values of minimum count rate are accepted.

Shutdown Marain Monitors Backaround:

The purpose of the Shutdown Margin Monitors (SMM) is to annunciate an increase in core subcritical multiplication allowing the operator at least 15 minutes response time to mitigate the consequences of the inadvertent addition of unborated primary grade water (boron dilution event) into the Reactor Coolant System (RCS) when the reactor is shut down (Modes 3, 4, and 5).

The SMMs utilizes two channels of source range instrumentation (GM detectors).

Each channel provides a signal to its applicable train of SMM.

The SMM channel uses the last 600 or more counts to calculate the count rate and updates the measurement after 30 new counts or 1 second, whichever is longer.

Each channel has 20 registers that hold the counts (20 registers X 30 count -

600 counts) for averaging the rate. As the count rate decreases, the longer it takes to fill the registers (fill the 30 count minimum).

As the instrument's measured count rate decreases, the delay time in the instrument's response increases.

This delay time leads to the requirement of a minimum count rate for OPERABILITY.

During the dilution event, count rate will increase to a level above the normal steady state count rate. When this new count rate level increases above the instrument's setpoint, the channel will alarm alerting the operator of the event.

Apolicable Safety Analysis The SMM senses abnormal increases in the source range count per second and alarms the operator of an inadvertent dilution event.

This alarm will occur at least 15 minutes prior to the reactor a:hieving criticality.

This 15 minute window allows adequate operator response time to terminate the dilution, FSAR Section 15.4.6.

LED LC0 3.3.5 provides the requirements for OPERABILITY of the instrumentation of the SMMs that are used to mitigate the boron dilution event.

Two trains are required to be OPERABLE to provide protection against single failure.

MILLSTONE - UNIT 3 B 3/4 3-7 Amendment No.164 0498

BASES (continuad)

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o j

Acolicability l

The SM must be OPERABLE in MODES 3, 4, and 5 because the safety analysis identifies this system as the primary means to alert the operator and mitigate the event.

The SMMs are allowed to be blocked during start up activities in MODE 3 in accordance with approved plant procedures.

The alarm is blocked to j

allow the SMM channels to be used to monitor the 1/M approach to criticality.

i The SMM are not required to be operable in MODES I and 2 as other RPS is credited with accident mitigation, over temperature delta temperature and power range neutron flux high (low setpoint of 25 percent RTP) respectively.

The SM s are not required to be OPERABLE in Mode 6 as the dilution event is precluded by administrative controls over all dilution flow paths (Technical Specification 4.1.1.2.2).

i Actions Channel inoperability of the SMMs can be caused by failure of the channel's electronics, failure of the channel to pass its calibration procedure, or by the channel's count. rate falling below the minimum count rate for operability.

This can occur when the count rate is so low that the channel's delay time is in excess of that assumed in the safety analysis.

In any of the above conditions, the channel must be declared inoperable and the appropriate action statement entered.

If the SMMs are declared inoperable due to low count rates, an RCS heatup will cause the SMM channel count rate to increase to above the minimum count rate for operability.

Allowing the plant to increase modes will actually return the SMMs to OPERABLE status. Once the SMM channels are above the minimum count rate for operability, the channels can be declared operable and the LC0 action statements can be exited.

LC0 3.3.5, Action a. -

With one train of SMM inoperable, Action a. requires the inoperable train to be returned to OPERABLE status within 48 hours5.555556e-4 days 0.0133 hours 7.936508e-5 weeks 1.8264e-5 months .

In this condition, the remaining SMM train is adequate to provide protection.

If the above required action cannot be met, alternate compensatory actions must be performed to provide adequate protection from the boron dilution event.

All operations involving positive reactivity changes associated with RCS dilutions and rod withdrawal must be suspended, and all dilution flowpaths must be closed and secured in position (locked closed per Technical Specification 4.1.1.2.2) within the following 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months .

LC0 3.3.5, Action b. -

With both trains of SMM inoperable, alternate protection must be provided:

l'.

Positive reactivity operations via dilutions and rod withdrawal are suspended. The intent of this action is to stop any planned dilutions of the RCS.

The SMMs are not intended to monitor core reactivity during RCS temperature changes. The alarm setpoint is routinely reset during the plant heatup due to the increasing count rate.

During cooldowns as the count rate decreases, baseline count rates are continually lowered automatically by the SMMs.

The Millstone Unit No. 3 boron dilution analysis assumes steady state RCS temperature conditions.

MILLSTONE - UNIT 3 8 3/4 3-8 Amendment No.164 i

o4es

BASES (c:ntinu:d) 2.

All dilution flowpaths are isolated and placed under administrative control (locked closed). This action provides redundant protection and defense in depth (safety overlap) to the SMMs.

In this configuration, a boron dilution event (BDE) cannot occur. This is the basis for not having to analyze for BDE in Mode 6.

Since the BDE cannot occur with the dilution flow paths isolated, the SMMs are not required to be operable as the event cannot occur and operable SMMs provide no benefit.

3.

Increase the shutdown margin surveillance frequency from every 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months to every 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months .

This action in combination with the above, provide defense in depth and overlap to the loss of the SMMs.

Surveillance Reauirements The SMMs are subject to an ACOT every 92 days to ensure each train of SMM is fully operational.

This test shall include verification that the SMMs are set per the Core Operating Limit Report, 4

MILLSTONE - UNIT 3 B 3/4 3-9 Amendment No. 164 0498

ML20155A426

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