ML20154Q099

Discusses NRC Evaluation of Readiness Review of Mechanical Equipment Module 4 Submitted on 880118.Mechanical Equipment Acceptable Based on Current Info & Complies W/Applicable Regulatory Requirements Except Encl Items

ML20154Q099
Person / Time
Site:	Vogtle
Issue date:	05/23/1988
From:	Grace J NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
To:	Mcdonald R GEORGIA POWER CO.
References
NUDOCS 8806060186
Download: ML20154Q099 (3)

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MAY 2 3 1988 Docket No.:50-425 License No. CPPR-109 G3orgia Power Company W TN: Mr. R. P. Mcdonald, Executive Vice President-Nuclear Operations P. O. Box 4545 Atlanta, GA 30302 Gentlemen:

SUBJECT:

NRC EVALUATION OF V0GTLE UNIT 2 READINESS REVIEW 0F MECHANICAL EQUIPMENT MODULE N0. 04 The NRC has performed a review of the Mechanical Equipment for Vogtle Unit 2 covered by Readiness Review Module 04 submitted on January 18, 1988. This review has been performed as part of our routine inspection program.

(Reference NRC Inspection Report 50-425/88-12 enclosed). Based upon the NRC review and inspection of those activities identified in the module, we have determined that the Mechanical Equipment at Vogtle Unit No. 2 is acceptable and complies with applicable regulatory requirements with the exception of those items in Enclosure 1. This decision is based on information currently available to the inspectors and reviewers. Should information subsequently become available which was not considered during this review or which conflicts with earlier information, it will be evaluated to detennine what effect it may have on the above conclusion.

Please contact us should you have any questi;..is concerning this letter.

Sinc"ely, ORIG 1NAL SIGNED By' A % mg J. Nelson Grace Regional Administrator

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Enclosures:

1. List of Open Items

2. NRC Inspection Report o U"#}

50-425/88-12 C Su cc w/encis: (See page 2) hbR DO K 25

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3 Georgia Power Company- 2 MAY 2 3 1988

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. D. Rice, Vice President, Project Jirector W. W. Hayes, Vogtle Quality Jssurancehanager W. Bockhold, Jr., General Manager, Nuclear Operatiens (ET Gucwa, Manager, Nuclear Safety jnd Licensing W. A. Bailey, Project Licensing Manager T W. Churchill, Esq., Shaw, Pittman, Potts and Trowbridge

@,/Kirkland, III, Counsel, Office of the Consumer's Utility Council I Feig, Georgians Against Nuclear Energy bec w/encis:

g Reis, j 0GC W Hopkins, NRR N Hawkins, NRR M. Sinkule, RIl DfS, Technical Assistant LNRC Resident Inspector Document Control Desk State of Georgia 11 RIl Ril NRR:HQ NRR:HQ R!l 1 atterson MSi kule VL ownlee ttNwsP is L R M nst g/l//88 5//7/88 5/g<g/88 /)//88 5// 7/88 5/('/88 5;

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. ENCLOSURE 1 LIST OF OPEN ITEMS Violation, 50-425/88-12-01, "Failure to Provide Adequate Instructions to Ensure the Proper Installation of Flow Elements And Orifices".

Inspection Followup Item, 50-424/88-12-02, "Followup Licensee's Corrective Action Relative to The Identification of Unit Applicability for Calculations".

Inspector Followup Item, 50-425/88-12-03, "Review. and Revised Calculation X4C1202V43 Regarding Design Objectives and Conclusions".

Inspector Followup Item, 50-425/88-12-04, "Review Revised Calculation X4C1202V18 Regarding Case 3C Description".

Inspector Followup . Item, 50-425/88-12-05,'"Review Revised Calculation X4C1202S00F1 Regarding the Evaluation of Flow Failure Detection & Effect on System Safety Function for Item Nos. 85b, 86b, 87b, 88b, 89b, & 90b".

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ENCLOSURE'2 UNITED STATE 0

• [. p [ tog g NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

, j' d o REGION ll J, 3 j 101 MARIETTA STREET, N.W.

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APR 2 '6 1988' Docket No. 50-425 s License No. CPPR-109 Georgia Power Company ATTN: Mr. George F. Head Senior Vice President P. O. Box 4545 Atlanta, GA 30302 Gentlemen:

SUBJECT:

NOTICE OF VIOLATION (INSPECTION REPORT NO. 50-425/88-12)

This refers to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) inspection conducted by Messrs. R. J. Schepens, C. A. Patterson; and C. W. Burger on February 17 -

March 31, 1988. The inspection included a review of activities authorized for your Vogtle facility. At the conclusion of the inspection, the findings were j

[] discussed with those members of your staff identified in the enclosed inspection report.

Areas examined during the inspection are identified in the report. Within these areas, the inspection consisted of selective examinations of procedures and representative records, interviews with personnel, and observation of activities in progress.

The inspection findings indicate that certain activities violated NRC-require-ments. The violation, references to pertinert requirements, and elements to be included in your response are presented in the enclosed Notice of Violation.

In accordance with Section 2.790 of the NRC's "Rulec of Practice," Part 2, Title 10, Code of Federal Regulations, a copy of this letter and the enclosure will be placed in the NRC Public Document Room.

The response directed by this letter and the enclosures are not subject to the clearance procedures of the Office of Management and Budget issued under the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1980, PL 96-511.

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Georgia Power Company 2 APR 2 6 N98-

s. Should you have any questions concerning this letter, please contact-us.

Sincerely, l

KdL Virgil Brownlee, Chief Reactor Projects Branch 3 Division of Reactor Projects

Enclosures:

1. Notice of Violation

2. Inspection Report cc w/encls:

P. D. Rice, Vice President, Project Director C. W. Hayes, Vogtle Quclity Assurance Manager G. Bockhold, Jr. , General Manager, ,

Nuclear Operations F

. L. Gucwa, Manager, Nuclear Safety l

and Licensing J. A. Bailey, Project Licensing

! Manager

B. W. Churchill, Esq., Shaw,

, Pittman, Potts and Trowbridge l D. ".irkland, III, Counsel, Office of the Consumer's Utility ,

Council D. Feig, Georgians Against-Nuclear Energy r

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ENCLOSURE 1 h0TICF 0F VIOLATION Georgia Power Company Docket No. 50-425 Vogtle 2 License No. CPPR-109 During the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) inspection conducted on February 17 - March 31, 1988, a violation of NRC requirements was identified.

In accordance with the "General Statement of Policy and Procedure for NRC Enforcement Actions," 10 CFR Part 2, Appendix C, the violation is listed below.

10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, and the accepted Quality Assurance (QA) Program (FSAR 17.1.5) collectively require that activities affecting quality be prescribed by drawings and be accomplished in accordance with these drawings.

P & ID 2X40B119 details the high head safety injection flow path to be from the Safety Injection (SI) discharge valves through Flow Elements (FEs) - 924, 925, 926, ar.d 927 into the reactor coolant system (RCS cold

,/ ' legs for loops 1, 2, 3, and 4 respectfully.

Contrary to the above, actit ities af fecting quality were not adequately implemented in that an NRC walkdown conducted on March 3, 1988, of portions of the High Head Safety Injection System revealed that FEs -

924, 926, 927 were installed backwards.

This is a Severity Level IV violation (Supplement *I).

Pursuant to the provisions of 10 CFR 2.201, Georgia Power Company is hereby .

required to submit a written statement or explanation to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555, with a copy to the Regional Administrator, Region II, and a copy to the NRC Resident Inspector, Vogtle, within 30 days of the date of the letter transmitting this Notice. This reply should be clearly marked as a "Reply to a Notice of Violation" and should include: (1) admission or denial of the violation, (2) the reason for the violation if admitted, (3) the corrective steps which have been taken and the results achieved, (4) the corrective steps which will be taken to avoid further violations, and (5) the date when full compliance will be achieved. Where good cause is shown, consideration will be given to extending the response time. If an adequate reply is not received within the f m c m~ w w M,G; -

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I <. . . Georgia. Power Company 2 ' Docket No. 50-425 Vogtle 1 License No. CPPR-109 time specified in this Notice, an order may be issued to show cause why the license should not be modified, suspended, or revoked or why such other action as may be proper should not be taken.

FOR THE NUCLEAP. REGULATORY COMMISSION

/ 'i(fLL 'N 71rgil Brow: lee, Chief Reactor Projects Branch 3 Division of Reactor Projects 4

l Dated at) tlanta, Georgia

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Report No.: 50-425/88-12 Licensee: Georgia Power Company P.O. Box 4545 Atlanta, GA 30302 Docket Nos.: 50-425 Construction Permit No.: CPPR-109 Facility Name: Vogtle Unit 2 Inspection Conducted: February 17, 1988 - March 31, 1988 Inspectors: b*0 ,~

R. J. Schepens, Senior Resident inspector bhl %

Date Signed

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[AC.W. Burger,ResidentInspector Date Signed 04- -

C. A. Patterson, Project Engineer Nu]58 Date Signed i

Accompanying Personnel: P. A. Balmain Approved By: n.fW Ofte Signed

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M. V. Sinkule, Section Chief Division of Reactor Projects

SUMMARY

Scope: This inspection entailed a routine, unannounced resident inspection effort in the area of the preoperational testing and a special announced resident and region inspection effort in the area of Readiness Review Module 4, Mechanical Equipment and Piping.

Results: One violation was identified in the area of system walkdown (Failure to provide adequate instructions to ensure the proper installation of flow elements and orifices).

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REPCRT DETAILS

1. Persons Contacted Licensee Employees

• P. D. Rice, Vice President, Vogtle Project Director

• R. H. Pinson, Vice President, Project Construction G. Bockhold, General Manager T. V. Greene, Plant Support Manager

• C. W. Hayes, Vogtle Quality Assurance Manager

• E. O. Groover, Quality Assurance Site Manager - Construction

• S. T. Haltom, Quality Assurance Support Supervisor D. M. Fiquett, Project Construction Manager

• G. A. McCarley, Project Compliance Coordinator

• C. L. Coursey, Maintenance Superintendent (Startup)

• H. M. Handfinger, Startup Manager

• A. W. Harrelson, Electrical Construction Manager

• R. E. Hollands, Electrical Compliance Supervisor

• C. W. Rau, Mechanical Construction Manager

• J. J. Gilmartin, Mechanical Engineer N L. N. Brooks, Civil Construction Manager V

) *L. B. Glenn, QC Manager

• R. W. McManus, Readiness Review Manager Lead Mechanical Engineer

• R. C. Sommerfield, Readiness Review

• J. E. Sanders, Assistant. Project Manager

• W. C. Ramsey, Project Engineering Manager L. D. Harless, Manager, Quality Concerns

• P. T. Ciccanessi, Senior Regulatory Specialist

• M. L. Hobbs, I & C Superintendent

• M. O. Duncan, I & C Supervisor 1

l Other licensee employees contacted included craftsmen, technicians, supervision, engineers, inspectors, and office personnel.

l Other Organizations l

1 C. Marcum, Westinghouse Project Manager

0. L. Kinnsch, Project Engineering - Bechtel

• T. E. Richardson, Project Engineering Manager - Bechtel

• D. W. Strohman, Project Quality Assurance Engineer - Bechtel

• A. J. Ayob, VSAMU, Westinghouse, Supervisor B. Edwards, Site Manager, PPP J. Miller, Quality Assurance Manager

• D. D. Smith, Construction Engineer - Oglethorpe Power Company i

• Attended Exit Interview O

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'-' 2. Exit Interviews - (307^1C)

The inspection scope and findings were summarized on March 31, 1988, with those persons indicated in paragraph 1 above. The inspector described the areas inspected and discussed in detail the inspection results. No dissenting comments were received from the licensee. The licensee did not identify as proprietary any of the materials provided to or reviewed by the inspector during this inspection. Region based NRC exit interviews were attended during the inspection period by a resident inspector. The following items were identified during this inspection:

(0 pen) Violation, 50-425/88-12-01 "Failure to Provide Adequate Instructions to Ensure the Proper Installation of Flow Elements And Orifices" - Paragraph 5.d.(1)(c).

(0 pen) Inspector Followup Item, 50-424/88-12-02 "Followup Licensee's Corrective Action Relative To The Identification Of Unit Appli-cability For Calculations" - Paragraph 5.b.(1).

(0 pen) Inspector Followup Item, 50-425/88-12-03 "Review Revised Calculation X4C1202V43 Regarding Design Objectives and Conclusions" -

Paragraph 5.b.(1).

(S (0 pen) Inspector Followup Item, 50-425/88-12-04 "Review Revised i,'-') Calculation X4C1202V18 Regarding Case 3C Description" Paragraph 5.b.(1).

(0 pen) Inspector Followup Item, 50-425/88-12-05 "Review Revised Calculation X4C1202500F1 Regarding The Evaluation Of Flow Failure Detection & Effect On System Safety Function For Item No's. 85b, 86b, 87b, 88b, 89b, & 90b" - Paragraph 5.c.(1).

3. Licensee Action on Previous Enforcement Matters - (92702)

Not inspected.

4. Preoperational Test Program Implementation / Verification - (70302)(71302)

The inspector reviewed the present implementation of the preoperational test program. Test program attributes inspected included review of administrative requirements, document control, documentation of major test events and deviations to procedures, operating practices, instrumentation calibrations, and correction of problems revealed by testing.

Periodic inspections were conducted of Control Room Operations to assess plant condition and conduct of shif t personnel. The inspector observed that Control Room operations were being conducted in an orderly and professional manner. Shif t personnel were knowledgeable of plant condi-tions, i.e., ongoing testing, systems / equipment in or out of service, and alarm / annunciator status. In addition, the inspector observed shift

[n] turnovers on various occasions to verify the continuity of plant testing, lO L

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operational problems and other pertinent plant information during the turnovers. Control Room logs were reviewed and various entries were discussed with operations personnel.

Periodic facility tours were made to assess equipment and plant condi-tions, maintenance and preoperational activities in progress. Schedules for program completion and progress reports were routinely monitored.

Discussions were held with responsible personnel, as they were available, to determine their knowledga of the preoperational. program. The Inspector reviewed numerous operation deviation reports to determine if requirements were met in the areas of documentation, action to resolve, justification, corrective action and approvals. Specific inspections conducted are listed below:

a. Preoperational Tests (1) Test Witnessing (70312)

The inspector witnessed selected portions of the following preoperational test procedures as they were conducted. The inspection included attendance at briefings held by the test supervisor to observe the coordination and general knowledge of the procedure with the test participants. Overall crew f% performance was evaluated during testing. A preliminary review of the test results was compared to the inspector's own observations. Problems encountered during performance of the test were verified to be adequately documented, evaluated and dispositioned on a selected basis.

Procedure NRC Insp. Test Title Activity Observed No. &

2-38G-01,R-0 70433 CVCS Preop Preop Of Charging Isolation Valve 2HV-8105 2-3BJ-01,R-0 70434 SI Preop Intermediate Head SI Cold Leg Flow Balance And Pump i Run Out Verifica-tion 2-3BJ-03,R-0 70434 SI Preop Accumulator No. 2 Dump L/D t

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5. Readiness Review Module 4 Inspection The following topics are discussed Introduction-Review of Commitments Engineering and Design Review Safety-Related System Piping Insulation Review Safety-Related Equipment Installation Review Safety-Related Valve Installation Review Conclusions

a. Introduction This inspection report documents Region II inspection activities relative to the evaluation of Georgia Power Company's (GPC's)

Readiness Review Module 4, Mechanical Equipment and Piping. The scope of GPC's Module 4 encompassed the design, procurement, and construction activities regarding safety-related mechanical equipment and piping systems classified as American Society of Mechanical Engineers Boiler and Pressure

• Vessel Code,Section III, Class 1, 2, and 3, which are included in Unit 2 piping systems and are not a part s of the nuclear steam supply system.

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() Readiness review Module 4 is one in a series of modules being condue.ted by GPC that provide an evaluation of the design, construc-tion and preoperation testing of the Vogtle Electric Generating Plant Unit 2 to assure its operational readiness in accordance with scheduled plans for obtaining an operating license. Module 4 is intended to describe the method GPC complied with the project commitments found in the Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) and is not intended to make further coranitments or revise in any way, prior commitments.

The inspection was conducted to aid in determining whether Modeie 4 provided an acceptable basis for it's reported conclusion -

that adequate controls exist to ensure the quality of work and the implementation of FSAR commitments within the scope of mechanical equipment and piping for Vogtle Electric Generating Plant (VEGP)

Unit 2. The inspection report contains a description of the inspector's activities and findings,

b. Review of Commitments This section of the module defines commitments as project obligations to regulatory guides, industry standards, branch technical positions, and other licensing requirements, to the extent defined in the FSAR.

This section also identifies the source of the commitments to be v .

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restricted to the FSAR and responses to NRC questions associated with the FSAR. As. . de fi ned, commitments which were considered by the licensee to be most appropriately categorized in this module were tabulated in a c'ommitment matrix identified in section 3.2 of the module. The licensee identified 248 commitments as being most appropriately categorized in this module.

This section of the module also defines an implementing document as a working level document, either program control or test procedure, that fulfills a construction commitment applicable to a specific activity. Implementing documents were identified for each of the 248 commitments and this infonnation was tabulated in an implementation matrix identified in section 3.2 of the module.

The evaluation of this section consisted of revicwing the commitment and implementation matrices delineated in section 3.2 as discussed below.

(1) Evaluation of The Commitment arid Implementation Matrix ,

Comtr.i tme nt s applicable to- the Nuclear Service Cooling Water (NSCW) system were selected and reviewed to determine that:

1) All project commitments detailed in licensing documents for ,

r3 the NSCW system had been properly identified, 2) Licensing

!b) commitments had been recognized and were addressed in primary design / construction documents and whether responses to .those commitments have been included in the appropriate working level documents, and 3) Whether the commitment and implementation matrices are accurate and demonstrate proper implementation of licensing commitments. The following commitments were reviewed for the above noted attributes:

Ref. FSAR Document / Design /Const.

No Source Subfact Feature Implementation 6S3.00 1.9.2.7.2 Ultimate RG 1.27 OC 1202-A-1.0 Heat Sink l, 1743.00 3.1.5 PIP'G Sys. 10 CFR 50, DC 2415-2.0 i Penetrating APP.J Cnmt.

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l ASME III CL3 4917.00 3.2.2-1 NSCW Sys. NSCW OC 1202-3.1E Design PIP's & VLU'S p Inside Cnmt.

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< 1782.00 3.8.2.7 Testing af ASME III, 'K4AQ10-8.2 CL,? Pipe I.C-6000 ,j' '

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s5026.00 3.9.B.1.5.1 Weld Inspt. ASME III .I( X4AZ01-I

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,7lASMEIII 1 3.9.B.1 CL2 & 3 DC10Q-2.1;/

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4914.00 9.2.1-1 NSCW Sys. Min. NSCW f4d126P'p3 '

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No Source' Subject Feature Imolementation (cont'd).

3525.00 9.2.1.1.1-C NSCW Sys. Seismic DC 1202-3.1E Safety Cat. 1 Oesign Basis 3749.00 9.2.1.1.1-G NSCW Sys. Designed To DC 1202-3.1A Safety Perform Basis Function Following L.0.C.A.

Automatically, Assuming Single Failure Coincident With a L.O.0.P 4912.00 9.2.1.1.1-H NSCW Sys. NSCW Designed DC 1202-3.1P Safety To Prevent Design Boiling Basis Cnmt. Coolers During L.O.C.A.

3750.00 9.2.1.1.1-1 NSCW Sys. Sys. Pressure DC 1202-3.1H

Safety Greater Than i Design Cnmt. Bldg..

i Basis Max. Design i Pressure 4915.00 9.2.1.2.8 NSCW Sys. NSCW Press. OC 1202-3.1H i

Oper. Higher Than X4C1202V15 l Fluid In

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400.00 9.2.5 UHS RG 1.27 DC 1202-A-1.0 Design t

401.00 9.2.5.1 UHS Seismic DC 1202-A-3.1A Towers & Cat. 1 Basin Design

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No Subject Feature Implementation

[ cont'd) ' Source 3755.00 9.2.5.1.1.A UHS Single DC 1202-A-3.1C 3542.00 Safety Failure Design With Basis L.0.0.P 418.00 9.2.5.1.1.8 UHS RG 1.27 DC 1202-A-1.0A Safety Design Basis 3541.00 9.2.5.2.2 UHS Fan Motors DC 1202-A-3.18 Component Powered by Descriotion Class 1E 402.00 9.2.5.2.4 UHS BTP ASB 9-2 DC 1202-A-1.0 Performance 403.00 9.2.5.2.4 UHS RG 1.27 DC 1202-A-1.0 Performance 4777.00 9.2.5.2.4 UHS BTP RSB 5-1 DC 1202-A-3.1C b Performance 4221.00 NRC QUES. NSCW Sys. ASME III, DC 1010-T1 Q210.11 Cooling CL3 Water Supply &

Return Piping For Pump Motor Coolers During the review of the implementation of the above noted commitments, the inspectors had the following comments:

COMMITMENT NO. 3750.00 & 4912.00 Coinmitment No. 3750.00 states that "the NSCW system is to be designed such that system pressure is greater than containment building maximum design pressure." The design implementation for this commitment is referenced as being contained in DC 1202-3.H. However, the inspector could not verify this o be the case. Therefore, the following question was raised to the licensee: What are the first and second order implementation documents for the subject commitment?

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A The licensca's ros;;onse was a follows: It has been assumed that the "Interiacing Heat Transfer Systems" referred to in DC 1202-3.1H included the containment building air coolers,- and that the NSCW system Serving them would be designed with a higher pressure than the containment atmosphere. Upon further investigation, it has been discovered that the "Interfacing Heat Transfer Systems actually refer to the Component Cooling Water (CCW) and Auxiliary Component Cooling Water (ACCW) Systems.

Currently, there is no first order implementation of commitment 37S0 in DC 1202. To correct this, design engineering will issue Design Manual Change Notice No.1202-6 which will add paragraph 3.1R to address a commitment requirement that the NSCW system pressere be greater that the maximum calculated containment atmosphere pressure following a LOCA. FSAR Change Notice No. 559. filed - on February 27, 1987, makes the change in paragraph 9.2.1.1.1-I from "Maximum Design Pressure" to maximum calculated pressure. This change notice will be reflected in FSAR Amendment 35. The licensee issued DMCN 1202-6 on March 8, 1988. therefore, this item is considered to be closed.

Regarding the second order implementation, the licenseo informed the inspector that it was contained in two design calculations:

X4C1202V21, Rev. 2 Verification Of No Boiling In Containment

/] Coolers and X4C1202V43, Rev. O NSCW Flow Balance. After further discussions with the licensee on this matter, the licensee informed the inspector that calculations X4C1202V21, X4C1202S19, and X4C1202V09 were originally applicable to both Units 1 and 2. Due to later developments, it was decided to recalculate the pressure drops across the restricting orifices to balance the flows in the Unit 2 NSCW system. Therefore, calculation X4C12'V43 was prepared to apply to Unit 2 only.

Revision 1 to thi. calculation was issued on March 2, 1988, and covers train "B" of the NSCW system. Revision 2 is currently in preraration and wii) cover train "A".

The inspector questioned the method utilized by the licensee for determining which unit a calculation was applicable to? The liccnsee stated that the Calculation Control Log (CCL) was the document for determining unit applicability of a calculation.

The inspector noted that the current Calculation Control Log (CCL) reflected that calculations X4C12C2V21, X4C1202S19, and X4C1202V09 as being applicable to both units. The inspector raised the concern relative to correctness of the Calculation Control Log. Also, the inspector questioned the appropriateness of using this method of documenting unit applicability versus specifying the unit applicability in the calculation so as to s provide a positive means for documenting engineering review and sign off of the calculation for Unit II applicability.

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v The licensee confirmed that when calculation X41202V43 was issued for Unit II, the common calculations (X4C1202V21, X41202S19, and X4C1202V09) were not changed to Unit 1 on the CCL and remained as common. Furthermore, the licensee conducted a re'iew of all mechanical calculations to determine the extent of the problem. This inspection revealed 4 additional calculations with incorrect designators. Therefore, a total of seven out of eleven-hundred-forty six mechanical calculations had the incorrect unit designator on the CCL. Based on the above finding, the licensee has committed to re-review all calcula-tions and insert a cover shaet which will specify the applicable unit designator and will be initialed and dated by the respon-sibb engineer and engineering group supervisor. The inspector inferned the licensee that, pending the completion of the above noted corrective action this matter will be identified as Inspector Follow Item 50-s25/88-12-02 "Followup Licensee's Corrective Action Relative To The Identification Of Unit Applicability For Calculations."

Calculation X4Cl202V43 was identified by the licensee as the working level document for implementing commitment numbers 3750.90, "NSCW system shall be designed such that system pressure is greater that containment building maximum calculated (N pressure" and 4912.00 "NSCW system shall be designed to prevent boiling in containment coolers during LOCA conditions".

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( The inspector reviewed the calculation and determined that the design did incorporate the subject commitments. However, the objective section of the calculatica did not reflect these commitments as objectives therefore the calculation did not contain any conclusions relative to these design objectives.

The licensee committed to include these commitments as objectives and state conclusions relative to these design objectives when Revision 2 of the subject calculation is issued.

The inspector informed the licensee that, pending the issuance of the revised calculation, this matter will be identified as Inspector Followup Item 50-425/88-12-03 "Review Revised Calculation X4C1202V43 Regarding Design Objectives And Conclusions."

During the review of FSAR sections 2.4.11, 9.2.1, and 9.2.5 the inspector questioned why was the following sentence in FSAR

9. 2.1.1.1-J not considered a licensing commitment? "The NSCW System Is Designed To Minimize The Effects Of Water Hammer Forces".

The licensee's response was as follows: This sentence was apparently taken in context with the seventh paragraph of FSAR 9.2.1.2.3 on page 9.2.1-4 in which the features of the NSCW l

system that minimize the effects of water hammer are described.

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In as much as these features appeared to implement the apparent commitment in paragraph 9.2.1.1.1-J it was interpreted as a descriptive statement when taken together with paragraph 9.2.1.2.3, and thus was not considered a licensing commitment.

The inspector considers the licensee's response to be acceptable and thus has no further questions on this matter.

COMMITMENT NO. 4913.00 Calculation X4C1202V18 NSCW/C0PATTA 11 Input Data /LOCA 1-Train" was reviewed to determine the ' adequacy of the implementation of FSAR commitment for a niaximum total NSCW heat load of 349.8 million BTU /HR during accident conditions given in FSAR table 9.2.1-1. This commitment was tracked by GPC as readiness review commitment Reference no. 4913.00. Results of all cases studied in this calculation to determine total NSCW heat load were higher than the values given in FSAR Table 9.2.1-1. GPC has initiated FSAR Change Notice 559 to update the table and will include the revised heat load values in FSAR Amendment 35. The inspector also noted that the description of one of the cases (case 3C) dealing with fouling factors in heat exchanger tubes was misleading. The licensee committed to correct this discrepancy in the next revision of th r3 calculation. The (A inspector ir. formed the licensee that, pending the issuance of-( the revised calculation, this matter will be identified as Inspector Followup Item 50-425/88-12-04 "Review Revised Calculation X4C1202V18 Regarding Case 3c Description."

COMMITMENT NO. 4914.00 NSCW calculation X4C1202V03 "Verification Of NSCW Constant Heat Loads And Flows" was reviewed to determine the adequacy of the implementation of FSAR commitment for a minimum NSCW flow of 15,733 GPM per train during accident conditions given in Table 9.2.1-1. This commitment was tracked by readiness review commitment reference no. 4914.00.

This calculation was performed to compile the latest available constant heat load and maximum required cooling water flow rate for all equipment cooled by the NSCW system, as well as the component pressure drops.

The inspector reviewed the calculation and noted that the data used was based upon the latest vendor data as of February 27, 1985, In particular, the number for the heat load per train of the standby diesel generator coolers was different than the number in the FSAR Table 9.2.1-1. The vendor number was 17.1 x 10 to the 6 BTV/HR. Since the FSAR had not been updated, the inspector questioned what was being used as the design basis of the plant.

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The licensee provided a copy of a FSAR Change Notice No. 631, which identified in January 1988, that the FSAR update was rieeded. A meeting was conducted on March 9, 1988 with the cognizant personnel concerning calculation reviews, FSAR changes, and licensing personnel to discuss this item. The licensee provided project instructions which required calcula-tions be reviewed for possible FSAR changes. This resolved the programmatic concern of updating the FSAR. The licensee provided a copy of a temporary exemption request from 10 CFR 50.71(e), FSAR annual update, dated January 15, 1988, to the inspector. The licensee is required to update the original FSAR within 24 months of the date of the issuance of the operating licensee. Unit I received its low power operating licensee on January 16, 1987, and the updated FSAR is due January 16, 1989.

The exemption would defer the submittal of the updated FSAR for units one and two until 12 months after the licensee for unit two expected in February 1989. The particular concern of the standby diesel generator coolers heat load would be incorporated in the update as requested by the exemption.

(2) Evaluation of Commitment Additions / Changes From Unit 1 To Unit 2 The Commitment matrix identified 13 commitments as charges from

-8 those presented in the Unit 1 Module. Of these, seven were not included in the Unit report, but were subsequently added by an

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FSAR amendment and the remaining six were subsequently changed by various FSAR amendments. The inspectors conducted a review of the added commitments to verify proper implementation by a working level document and the commitments which were revised were reviewed to evaluat+. the significance of the change.

The inspectors reviewed the following commitments which were not included in the Unit I report, but were subsequently added by FSAR amendments as noted below:

Ref. FSAR FSAR Design /Const.

@ Source Subject Amend Implementation 5107 3.6.2.1.1.B.4 No Welded 30 DC 1018-3.3.8.3 Attach. d.l.a.

Within 5 Pipe Dias.

Of Highest Stress Location On MS & MFW Systems

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Ref. FSAR FSAR Design /Const.

No Source Subject Amend Implementation

' { cont'd) 5108 3.6.2.1.1.B.4 No Welded 30 DC 1018-3.3.B.3 Attach. d.1.b

, Within 3X SQ.RT. Of Highest Stress i Location On High Energy Sys. Other Than MS & MFW . .

5026- 3.9.1.5.1 Weld Inspt. 20 X4AZ01-P.3.0.A Criteria PPP IX-3.7.0 ASME Code PPP IX-18 +

1 5027 3.9.B.5.1 Weld Inspt. 20 X4AZ01-P4.3.0.A  !

Criteria PPP IX-15-14 i 831.1 Code PPP IX-18

5348 3.9.B.3 ASME III, 34 OC 1017-2.1 CL I PIP'G Design Per Sub. NB '77 .

Edition Thru [

Summer '79 Addenda ,

l 5349 3.9.B.3 ASME III, 34 DC 1017-2.1

CL II & III PIP'G Design Per Sub. ,

l NC & NO '74 i

! Edition Thru Summer '75  ;

Addenda e P j 5091 3.11.B.1 BTP MSB 3-1 25 DC 1018 - 3.3.B.6

Designed To i Break  ;

Exclusion Criteria MS PIP'G Thru Cnmt.  :

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\- The inspectors reviewed the following commitments which were ,

included in the Unit I report, but were subsequently changed by various FSAR amendments as noted below:

4 Ref. FSAR FSAR Design /Const.

No Source Subject Amend Implementation 711 1.9.82.2 Sumps. For 19 Adequacy Of CS Pump Emerg. Core Available NPSH Cooling & Recalculated To CS Systems To Address Additional Factors 2295 3.F.4.4 Propagation 16 Design Basis Pipe Of Flood Failure Mode Change Waters From From A Critical Break In 96" Crack To A Full CW PIP'G Into Circumference Break Safety-Related In The 96" CW PIP'G Structures Precluded By Design 2816 6.3.2.2.9 RWST Designed 17 Stipulated A Recir O' To Seismic Category 1 &

Htr. Provided Htr. Is Provided To Maintain Min.

Wtr. Temp.

To Maintain Min. Wtr Temp. Of 50%

4923 9.2.2.3.A Peak Load On 20 Peak Load On CCW CCW Sys. Sys. And Time For 1-Train Oper. Achieving Cold Is 189 x 10 To Shu'down Was The 6 BTU / Hour Revised Upward Cold Shutdown Achieved In 34 Hours 3535 9.3.3.4.A Testing Of 19 Pressurized Pressurized Portions Defined i Portions Of As Pump Suc*.icn Waste And Discharge Collection PIP'G Systems Hydroed To 1 1/2 Times OP

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No Source Amend Implementation

[ cont'd) 3834 9.3.3.4.A Non Pressured 19 Non-Pressurized Portions Of_ Portions Chg'd To Waste Equip. & Floor Collection Orn's In Aux.

Hydroed At Bldg., Control Atm. Press. F.H, Radwaste Solidification, ARB, RW Transfer, And RW Tunnel Transfer

c. Engineering and Design Review (1) Calculation Review A representative sample of NSCW system calculations were reviewed to determine that objectives, assumptions, numbers and conclusions in the calculation were valid. The following calculations were reviewed:

s Calc. No./Rev Subject

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X4C1202500F1, Rev. 1 Failure Modes and Effect Analysis -

NSCW X4C1202V03, Rev. 1 Verification Of NSCW Constant Heat

, Loads and Flows X4C1202V14, Rev. 1 Ultimate Heat-Sink Weather Screening X4C1202V15, Rev. 1 NSCW - ACCW - CCW Pressure Differential Verification X4C1202V18, Rev. 3 NSCW/COPATTA - II Input Data /LOCA - 1 Train

X4C1202V43, Rev. 1 NSCW Train "B" Flow Balance Ouring the review of calculation No. X4C1202500F1 (Failure Modes And Effect Analysis For The NSCW System) the inspector questioned the correctness of the conclusion reached in the calculation for the method of failure detection and failure effect on system safety function capability evaluation for i failure mode item 85b. (NSCW pump P4-001 discharge bypass line t

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k N check valve). Item Nos. 86b, 876, 886, 89b, and 90b are also effected. The calculation presently states that if the train "A" bypa s s line check valve failed open with train "B" in service that this would be indicated by flow indicators and a low header pressure alarm in the control room. This would result in the starting of the train B standby pump.

The licensee reviewed the inspector's comment and concurred that the lower flow conditions would not be detected by the flow indicators in the control room since the indicators are in 500 GPM increments and the amount of flow bypassed would be approximately 200 GPM. In addition, this reduction of flow would not be sufficient to cause the starting of the train "B" standby pump, however, this condition would be detectable in the control room by the high flow alarm annunciator off of FSH 11776 on the train "A" inter tie line. The licensee committed to revise the calculation to reflect the correct method of failure detection and failure effect on system safety function capability for items 85b, 86b, 87b, 88b, 89b, 90b, The inspector informed the licensee that, pending issuance of the revised calculation, this matter will be identified as Inspector Followup Item 50-425/88-12-05 "Review Revised Calculation X4C1202S00F1 Regarding The Evaluation Of Flow Failure Detection

& Effect On System Safety Function For Items No s. 85b, 86b, 87b, 88b, 89b, & 90b."

(2) Review Of Code / Seismic Interfaces A representative sample of Nuclear Safety-Related Sy?'sms were selected and reviewed for ASME code and seismic category i n ta-f a:;c : . The purpose of this inspection was to verify that the systems were designed to meet seismic category 1 require-ments to ensure no loss of function during 6 safe shutdown earthauake. The inspector reviewed the following system design bases and P and ids to determine that appropriate ASME code and seismic interfaces were invoked.

Document No. Title DC-1203-6 CCW System Design Bases 2X40B136,R-13 CCW System P & 10 2X4DB137,R-14 Trains A & B DC-1202-5 NSCW System Design Bases 2X40B133-1,R-21 NSCW System P & 10 2X408134,R-18 Train A 2X408135,1,R-18

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Document No. Title (cont'd)

DC-1302-5 AFW System Design Basis 2X408161-1,R-19 AFW System P & ID 2X4DB161-2,R-18 Trains A & B As a result of the above inspection, the inspectors raised the following comments:

NSCW SYSTEM REVIEW NSCW drain valve 2-1202-U4-129 off of the RHR pump motor cooler shown on P and ID 2X408134 reflects incorrect code / seismic break. The inspector confirmed that isometric drawing 2K3-1202-155-01 which reflects the as-installed condition was correct. The licensee informed the inspector that this item was a result of a drafting error during incorporation of a DCN on to the P and ID. Isometric /P and ID reconciliation discovered this drain missing from the P and ID and a DCN was issued against 2X40B134 on December 22, 1986. When it was incorporated in April 1987 a drafting error was made switching the code / seismic A break exactly opposite of the isometric drawing. The licensee (b) considers this to be an isolated case, and to ensure that this is the case, the licensee conducted a review of ten safety related P and ids relative to the incorporation of 200 OCNs/

FERs. No additional incorporation errors were identified during this review. The licensee issued OCN No. 57 to P and ID 2X4DB134 to correct the identified discrepancy on March 28, 1988. The inspector finds the licensee's response to be acceptable, therefore this item is considered to be closed.

Also, during the above inspection, the inspector noted that P and ids in general don't reflect code / seismic breaks location for all vent, drain, and test connection piping. The licensee acknowledged this and issued DCN No.12 to P and ID 2X4DB101 which added a note to specify code / seismic locations for the type of corrections noted above. The inspector finds this action taken by the licensee to be acceptable, tnerefore, this item is considered to be closed.

d. Safety - Related System Piping Installation Review (1) System Walkdown Inspection Selected portions of the Nuclear Service Cooling Water (NSCW)

System Containment Spray (CS) System and High Head Safety O

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18 O) t b Injection System, were walked down. The constructed piping systems were compared to the piping and instrumentation diagrams and the fabrication isometric drawings. Examples of items checked were piping configuration, pipe class, weld location, valve location and appearance, orientation, labeling, piping l support location, ar.d engagement of threaded fasteners.

1 (a) NSCW System Walkdown Train "A" of the NSCW piping system was walked down in the NSCW tower and pump house, connecting tunnel to the auxiliary building, auxiliary building, connecting tunnel to the diesel generating building, diesel generator building, and east of the U-II construction barrier on i level 3 of the control building. The inspectors conducted the walkdown inspection with the piping and instrumentation diagram and fabrication isometric drawings to verify that the system was constructed as shown on the current approved revision and in accordance with the piping and instrumen-tation construction specification X4AZ01. The piping runs irlspected were designed and constructed to ASME boiler and pressure vessel code (B and PVC),Section III Class III and seismic Category 1 requirements. The following drawings

') were used in the walkdown.

P&ID/ ISO /Rev. Title 2X4DB133-1,R-21 P&ID NSCW System - Train "A" 2X4DB134,R-18 P&ID NSCW System - Train "A" 2X4DB135-1,R-18 P&ID NSCW System - Train "A" 2K5-1202-023-01,R-7 FAB. 150 - NSCW Supply Header 2K5-1202-031-01,R-7 FAB. ISO - NSCW Supply Header 2K5-1202-033-01,R-7 FAB. ISO - NSCW Supply Header 2K5-1202-004-02,R-8 FAB. ISO - NSCW Supply Header 2K5-1202-004-01,R-6 FAB. ISO - NSCW Supply Header 2K3-1202-004-05,R-4 FAB. ISO - NSCW Supply Header 2K3-1202-037-01,R-7 FAB. ISO - NSCW Supply Header 2K3-1202 181-02,R-5 FAB. ISO - NSCW Supply Header 2X3-1202-408-01,R-4 FAB. 150 - NSCW Supply Header 2K5-1202-181-012,R-6 FAB. ISO - NSCW Return Header 2K5-1202-037-01,R-5 FAB. 150 - NSCW Supply To DG 1-A 2K5-1202-037-02,R-6 FAB. ISO - NSCW Supply To DG 1-A 2K5-1202-037-03,R-3 FAB. ISO - NSCW Supply To OG 1-A 2K5-1202-035-03,R-3 FAB. ISO - NSCW Return From DG 1-A 2K5-1202-035-01,R-5 FAB. ISO - NSCW Return From DG 1-A 2K2-1202-104-02,R-9 FAB. 150 - NSCW To ESF Chiller 2K2-1202-104-03,R-11 FAB. ISO - NSCW To ESF Chiller 2K2-1202-134-03,R-13 FAB. ISO - NSCW From ESF Chiller 2K2-1202-134-02,R-6 FAB. 150 - NSCW From ESF Chiller 1

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' - ' In general for the items reviewed, the piping was found installed in accordance with the drawings. One question was raised for a support location on drawing 2KS-1202-033-01. The drawing showed a support at NODE NO. 241 location between the discharge of the NSCW pump and the pump house wall. However, the support was actually located outside the pump house on the other side of the pump house wall. The licensee stated that the node points on the isometric drawing do not reflect the support location but rather the pipe support drawings which are referenced show the as-installed location. The licensee confirmed that pipe support drawing (V2-1202-023-H004) which was referenced for node point 241 reflected the as-installed condition of the hanger. Therefore, this question was resolved.

(b) Containment Spray System Walkdown Train "B" of the Containment Spray System was walked down in the auxiliary building, fuel handling building, and containment building. The inspectors conducted the walkdown inspection with the piping and instrumentation diagram and the fabrication isometric drawings to verify that the system was constructed as shown on the current r'~'N)

(V approved revision and in accordance with the piping and instrumentation construction specification X4AZ01. The piping runs inspected were designed and constructed to ASME B and PVC,Section III Class II requirements. The following drawings were used in the walkdown.

P&ID/ ISO /Rev. Title 2X4DB131,R-14 P&ID CS System - Train "B" 2K3-1206-019-01,R-6 FAB. ISO. - Spray Additive TK Piping 2K3-1206-019-03,R-7 FAB. ISO - Spray Additive TK Piping 2K3-1206-037-01,R-4 FAB.150 - Spray Additive TK Piping 2K3-1206-048-01,R-8 FAB. 150 - Spray Additive TK Piping 2K3-1206-002-01,R-14 FAB. ISO - CS Suction Piping 2K7-1206-002-01,R-11 FAB. ISO - CS Suction Piping 2K3-1206-002-02,R-5 FAB. ISO - CS Suction Piping 2K3-1206-002-02,R-10 FAB. 150 - CS Suction Piping 2K3-1206-006-02,R-10 FAB. ISO - CS Discharge Piping 2K3-1206-006-03,R-5 FAB. ISO - CS Discharge Piping

, 2K3-1206-006-04,R-5 FAB. 150 - CS Discharge Piping 2K7-1206-006-01,R-5 FAB. ISO - CS Discharge Piping

, 2K4-1206-008-10,R-4 FAB. ISO - CS Discharge Piping The piping system was found installed per the applicable drawings for those items checked.

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(c) High Head Safety Injection System Walkdown This inspection consisted of a walkdown on the train-"A" centrifugal charging suction piping from the RWST and the discharge piping thru the SI discharge valves and into the four reactor coolant loops. The inspectors conducted the walkdown . inspection with the piping and instrumentation diagram to verify that the system was constructed as shown on the current, approved revision and in accordance with the piping and instrumentation construction specification X4AZ01. The piping runs inspected were designed and constructed to ASME B & PVC,Section III Class I and II and seismic category 1 requirements. The following drawings were used in the walkdown.

p&ID/ ISO /Rev. Title 2X4DB116-2,R-15 Chemical & Volume Control System DCN 35 & FCR MFCRB-8751F 2X4DB119,R-15 Safety Injection System 2X4DB121,R-17 Safety Injection System A DCN 79, FCR's

( 17,860,MFCRB

\ 17,741 During the walkdown, the inspector noted that P and 10 2X4DB119 did not reflect the correct installation of the vent valves on the loop 4 cold leg injection line. The P and ids reflected that the vent valves were installed inside the shield wall. However, the actual installation as shown on isometric drawing 2K4-1204-077-02,R-4, was outside the shield wall. The licensee has reconciled the P and ID to reflect the correct installation in accordance with the isometric drawing by issuing DCN 29 to P and ID 2X408111 and DCN 34 to P and 10 2X408119. The inspector considers t.his item to be satisfactory resolved.

In addition to the above noted discrepancy, the inspector identified that flow elements (FE's) - 0924,0926, and 0927 were installed backwards. .These flow elements are located downstream of the SI discharge valves in the SI injection lines to the reactor coolant system cold legs for loops 1, 3, and 4 respectfully.

Several meetings were held with the licensee to discuss tha above NRC finding as well as an NRC concern about the possibility for the performance of a preoperational flow O

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21 balance test with FEs/ fos installed backwards since there is no prerequisite in preops for test supervisors to check / verify the proper installation cf FEs and F0s.

As a result of the above finding, the licensee took appropriate corrective action consisting of but not limited to the following: 1) A walkdown of all FEs/ fos was conducted which identified an additional 17 installed backwards out of a total of 248. 2) PCN #7 was issued to i Pullman Power Products procedure IX-5 to specify installa-tion instructions and to require QC verification of orifice.

plate orientation in relation to flow. 3) Training was conducted of craf t personnel on how to install FE's/FO's.

4) FE/F0 installations will be limited to trained flush /

hydro personnel and 5) Test supervisors are requirad to verify FE/F0 orientation and document it in the test log prior to the performance of a test.

The foregoing in considered to be in violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criteria V and will be identified as Violation 50-425/88-12-01 "Failure To Provide Adequate Instructions To Ensure The Proper Installation Of Flow Elements And Orifices."

It should be noted that this item was not inspected by the Readiness Review Staff during the performance of Module No. 4 since it was secped to be inspected in Module No. 20 Instrementation and Controls.

The reason being that at the time of performance of Module No. 4 flow elements and/or orifices were not installed.

Therefore, it would not have been expected for the Readiness Review Staff to have identified this item during the performance of Module No. 4.

(2) Review Of Documentation For Pipine Installation 5 (a) NSCW Supply And Return Header Piping To Diesel Generator (DG-1A)

An inspection was conducted of the train "A" NSCW supply and return hesder piping to DG-1A piping fabrication sheets to verify the following attributes: Proper material type

, and certification per piping classification, properly documented code data report for NPP-1 for fabricated "

, nuclear piping subassemblies, proper weld history documen-tation, and proper non destructive examination (liquid penetrant) Documentation for ASME III, Class 3 piping. '

Piping fabrication sheets were reviewed for the following spool numbers. t

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Spool No. Fab. Sht. No. Description 2-1202-035-S-01 4107 10" Return Header Pipe Assembly 2-1202-035-5-02 4201 10" Return Header Pipe Assembly 2-1202-035-S-03 4202 10" Return Header Pipe Assembly 2-1202-035-5-04 4108 10" Return Header Pipe Assembly 2-1202-035-5-05 4109 10" Return Peader Pipe Assembly 2-1202-035-S-06 4110 10" Return Header Pipe Assemlily 2-1202-037-S-01 4114 ;0" Supply Header Pipe Assembly 2-1202-037-5-02 4115 10" Supply Header Pipe Assembly 2-1202-037-S-03 4116 10" Supply Header Pipe Assembly 2-1202-037-5-04 4205 10" Supply Header Pipe Assembly 2-1202-037-5-05 4117 10" Supply Header Pipe Assembly 2-1202-037-5-06 4118 10" Supply Header Pipe Assembly 2-1202-037-5-07 4119 10" Supply Header Pipe Assembly (b) NSCW Tower Header and Distributing Piping Documentation relating to selected portions of the NSCW tower distribution piping supplied by the Marley Cooling Tower Company was reviewed to verify that the piping met the requirements outlined in Construction Specification No. X4A002 "Specification For Nuclear Service Cooling Towers And Associated Equipment". This specification

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'- ' states that the design of the cooling tower, equipment, and piping shall be in accordance with ASME Section III, Class 3 and seismic Category 1 requirements. Specific drawings and documents listed below were used to verify that the NSCW Train "A" header (2-1202-007-12) and branch arm assembly (2-1202-007-8) were installed in accordance with these requirements.

Isometric Drawings 2V5-1202-007 Header 2V5-1202-007 Branch Arm Assembly Weld Process Sheets 007-W-101 - Branch Arm Assembly 8" Butt Weld 007-W-102 - Branch Arm Assembly 8" Butt Weld Pipe Support Installation Process Sheets V2-1202-T07-H045 - Header Support Assembly Brar.ket V2-1202-T07-H046 - Header Support Assembly V2-1202-T07-H048 - Branch Arm Saddle Assembly Bolting Verification Field Process Sheet Spool 007-5-04 to Vendor NPP-1 Code Data Reports

\- AP & E S/N 3692 - Header AP & E S/N 2903 - Branch Arm Assembly AP & E S/N 2932 - Branch Arm Assembly Supplier Quality Verification Documentation Lists Equipment Tag # 2-1202-W4-001 Distribution Piping And Supports Equipment Tag # 2-1202-W4-002 Distribution Piping And Supports Documentation Turnover Package 2-1202-P02 4

Marley Drawings 78-42913 Plan View Of Spray System 78-4717 Spray System Anchorage And Load Points 78-4718 Load Tables For Spray System 79-41025 Spray System Installation 79-41026 Spray System Installation Details 79-41027 Mechanical Equipment Installation 79-41271 Branch Arm Saddle Fabrication And Assembly i

79-41285 Header Assembly 79-41425 Header Support Bracket Assembly 81-4882 Specifications Required For NSCW Towers 83-2450 Standard Torque Recommendation For Fasteners

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e. Safety - Related Equipment Installation Review A representative sample of installed equipment was inspected to verify that the as installed condition was in accordance with the requirements specified in the applicable manufacturer drawing and installation manual, layout drawing, and piping and instrumentation drawing. The following attributes were inspected: proper documen-tation of installation on field process sheets (i.e. tightening or torquing of anchor bolts as required); proper evidence of equipment maintenance and cleanliaess during construction and startup; proper equipment tag number and code plate serial number, proper nozzle location, size and elevation; proper drain, vent, and relief connections; proper handling of equivaent; and proper code class.

The following equipment was selected on the basis of either being cooled by or part of the Nuclear Service Cooling Water System by the inspector and inspected for the above noted attributes:

Equip. No. Description Specification No.

4. 2-1202-p4-001 NSCW Pump - Train "A" 2X4AF02-33 2-1202-p4-005 NSCW Pump - Train "A" 2X4AF02-33 2-1203-E4-001 CCW Heat Exchanger 2X4AE01-4 2-1217-E4-001 ACCW Heat Exchanger 2X4AE01-50 p). 2-1501-A7-001 2-1501-A7-005 CTB Cooling Unit Coils CTB Cooling Unit Coils 2X4AJ16-2 2X4AJ16-2 (V 2-1511-E7-002 Reactor Cavity Cooling Unit Coils 2X4AJ16-4 2-1515-A7-001 Containment Aux. Cooling Unit 2X4AJ16-3 4-1592-C7-001 ESF Chiller 2X4AJ04-11

f. Safety - Related Valve Installation Review A Representative sample of installed valves were inspected to verify that the as installed condition was in accordance with the require-ments specified in the applicable piping and instrumentation drawings, isometric drawings, and instrumentation index or valve designation l!st. The following attributes were inspected: proper valve orientation and flow direction; proper valve sizing and type; proper piping class (i.e. code class, pressure rating, material type, and end connection type); proper tag and serial number; proper piping of instrument air to air operated valves to ensure that valve will fail to the safe position on loss of air pressure; and proper operator sizing to ensure closure against maximum operational differential pressure conditions. The following valves were randomly selected by the inspector and inspected for the above noted attributes:

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V . Valve No. Description Drawing No. Size / Type I 2HV-780 Reac Cav & 2X4AR01-375 10" Air Oper, Gate Cnmt Sump HDR ISO HV-2791A Hydrogen Monitor 2X5AC07-109 3/4" Solenoid ISO ' Operated Globe t 2HV-8030 PRT Fill ISO 2X6AA06-255' 3" Air Operatea Diaphragm  ;

2HV-8149C LTON Orifice ISO 2X6AA06-341 3" Air Operated Control 2HV-8160 CVCS LTDN ISO 2X6AA06-428 3" Air Operated Globe

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2HV-8986A RHR Cnmt 2X5AC07-153 1" Solenoid  !

Sump Pass Operated Sample Train "A" 2HV-10466 RHR Train "8" 2X5AC07-107 3/4" Solenoid Suct Line Vent 0perated Globe O 2HV-15214 CVCS Ltdn ISO 2X5AC01-291 3" Air Operated Control D2304-U6-003 SI RWST 2X6AA06-250 3" Globe Purif. Pump Disch o

, RWST ISO 2-1204-U6-128 SI RHR To 2X6AA06-389 8" Swing Check HL Loop 1 2-1204-U4-142 SI To C1 2X5AG08-58 2" Needle l Loop 4 2-1205-06-001 RHR Train "A" 2X6AA06-400 12" Swing Check Suct From RWST i

2-1205-U4-123 RHR Train "8" 2X6ARol-457 14" Check

, Suct From Cnmt Sump 2-1206-U6-017 CS Train "A" 2X6AA06-391 8" Gate HDR ISO O

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f k- Valve No. Description Drawing No. Size / Type (cont'd) 2-1206-V6-018 CS Train "B" 2X6AA06-391 8" Gate HOR ISO 4'

2-1208-U4-417 CVCS Sea' INJ 2X5AC08-50 1" Needle To RCP #4 2-1901-V4-039 WPSL CDT HX 2X4AR01-355 3" Swing Check Outlet HDR

g. Conclusions The inspectors have concluded based on a review on a representative sample of the commitments designated in section 3.2 of module 4 that the licensee has accurately defined licensing commitments from the FSAR, responses to inspection and enforcement bulletins, and

, correspondence to the NRC. In addition, the licensee has accurately defined the working level implementing document utilized by site personnel to ensure that these commitments (within the scope of module 4) are invoked during the design and construction phase.

Furthermore, based on independent NRC inspections of randomly selected mechanical equipment, and piping systems, the inspectors have concluded that the hardware inspected was installed per licensing commitments in accordance with Regulatory requirements.

Therefcre, it is recommended that this module be accepted by the NRC.

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