ML20153A997

Summary of 780214-15 Meeting W/Util Re Subj Facil Fire Protec Prog.All Mods Will Be Made Prior to Fuel Loading

ML20153A997
Person / Time
Site:	Diablo Canyon
Issue date:	03/29/1978
From:	Peter Hearn Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To:	Tedesco R Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
TAC-52060, NUDOCS 7811290307
Download: ML20153A997 (33)

Text

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, NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION ]

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MAR 2 91978 l Docke't Nos.: 50-275 2 50-323 MEMORANDUM FOR: Robert L. Tedesco, Assistant Director 1 for Plant Systems l Division of Systems Safety FROM: Peter C. Hearn Auxiliary Systems Branch '

Division of Systems Safety THRU: Victor Benaroya, Chief Auxiliary Systems Branch $

Division of Systems Safety '

• Donald C. Fischer, Section L Auxiliary Systems Branch Division of Systems Safety

SUMMARY

OF FEBRUARY 14 AND 15,1978 MEETING WITH PACIFIC '

GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY ON THE DIABLO CANYON NUCLEAR PLANTS, UNIT NOS.1 AND 2 FIRE PROTECTION PROGRAM On February 14 and 15,1978, we met with representatives of the Pacific Gas and Electric Company at the Diablo Canyon Site to discuss their answers to our first round request for information dealing with the Diablo  !

Canyon Nuclear Plants, Unit Nos. I and 2 fire protection program. We were  !

assisted by representatives of Gage-Babcock and Associates, our fire protection consultants. A representative of the Center for Law in the Public Interest was also present. An attendance list is provided in Enclosure 1.

The meeting included a walk-through of the plant and a discussion of the fire protection requirements for each area. At the conclusion of the meeting, we and the applicant compiled a list of items for which we had ,

agreement. A discussion of these items is shown in Enclosure 2.

j Since Diablo Canyon is located in a high seismic area, we had informed the applicant that the plant should have fire suppression capability following- l a postulated design basis earthquake. The applicant is proposing a seismi- I cally qualified water system with pipe stands capable to cover all areas l housing safety related equipment. Copies of drawings showing the qualidied '

systems are shown in Enclosure 3. 'We will review the adequacy of these systems and inform the applicant of our conclusions as soon as possible.

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e Robert L. Tedesco - MAR 2 91978 Enclosed is a summary of our discussions which incorporates the coninents from our firebrotection consultants. A major portion of the discussion involved the protection of safety related cables from exposure fires. Our trip report also includes the comments on fire protection of safety related cables as given in J. Knox's Diablo Canyon trip report dated March 24, 1978.

The applicant expects to implement all the fire protection modifications prior to the fuel loading. , .

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Peter C. Hearn Auxiliary Systems Branch Division of Systems Safety

Enclosures:

As stated 4

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SUMMARY

OF ITEMS DISCUSSED AT FEBRUARY 14 AND 15,1978 MEETING _ _ . .....

During the. course of our February 14 and 15,1978 meetings with Pacific Gas and Electric Company on the _Diablo Canyon Nuclear Plant, Unit Nos.

1 and 2 fire protection program, we discussed with the appifcant their responses to our first round request for additional information. Where appropriate, reference is made to the items listed in our first round request for additional information.

I Fire Area 1-A: Figure 3-9

1. For the penetration area inside containment, the app 1tcant identified a number of redundant conduits containing essential safe shutdown cables on drawing 57687. These conduits are located below the open floor grating at elevation 117 ft. We noted that open cable tr*ys were located above and that primarily piping was located below the conduits. Since this,pf ptng does not contain flammable liquids, gases, or oxygen, and since the open space at floor elevation 91 ft. and below the conduit is kept free of combustible materials, we agreed that a propagating fire is unitkely in this area and that the effects of a tMnstant fire over more than 20 feet diameter is improbable. Tne 4

applicant committed to post "no storage" signs for the open spaces at the 91 f t. level . We find this acceptable.

2. Fire Area 1-B: Figure 3-9 In the v'icinity of Reactor Coolant Pump 1-2, the applicant identified redundant safe shutdown instrumentation sensing lines (tubing) for L

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the pressuriter level and pressurizer pressure indications. The i

sensing itnes would be subject to simultaneous failure from an exposure fire from the reactor coolant pump oil leakage. The l

acclicant committed to protect these sensing lines by a heat j l

. shicid, which we find acceptable (Item 54).  !

The applicant was also requested to verify that the reactor can be cc: led by the Residual Heat Removal System whenever the high pressure cociant pump lube oil system is operating (Item 10). .

3. Fire Area 38: Figure 3-5 .

We agreed that doors to the residual heat removal pump rooms built to "A" label specifications with monorail penetrations are satis-factory (Item 11).  ;

4. Fire Areas 3F and 3H: Figure 3-6 The applicant will seal the hole in the wall between the centrifugal and reciprocating charging pump rooms with a three-hour barrier.

This is acceptable to us (Item 12).

The applicant was also requested to verify that the drainage system for each charging pump compa-tment is not interconnected (Item 12).

5. Fire Area 3J: Figure 3-6 We agreed that the component cooling water pipe trench connecting CCW pump room 1-3 to the penetration area is satisfactory since the three ,

component cooling water pumps are separated from each other and only

i one:ts required for a cold' shutdown (Item 18).

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On the walls and ceiling of the room'containing .the three component-

. cooling water pumps and the room containing the two c'entrifugal 1 charging punps, the appifcant identified redundant conduits containing cables essentfal' to safe ' shutdown on drawings 57691 and 57692. How-ever, during the site vistt, the applicant indicated that these conduite identified may not contain cables essential for safe shutdown or may 1

not contain redundant divisions of essential cables. If these condufts do' in fact contain cables essential for safe shutdown and are redundant, we informed the applicant we will require that the condutts be encased with a 2-hour rated fire barrier or provided with equivalent protec-tion. This protectio'n would be in addition to automatic area sprinklers.

The appitcant wd11 provide a description of the additional fire protec-tion for these essential cables.

6. Fire Area 3L (north east corner): Fioure 3-7 In the auxiliary butiding at elevations 85 feet and in the room adjoining the space descrfbed in Item 12, the motor driven auxfitary feedwater I pump ' conduits pass over and adjoin non-safety related electrical c' abinets and cable tr3ys. .These conduits are numbered K6998 and K6993 and are identified on drawing 57616. Because of the exposure, these essential conduits are subject to, and because of, the poor accessi- ,

bility[for manual Eff re fighting, we informed the applicant that we will 1

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require these cables be encasad. Further information from the applicant i

is requi, red to complete the review of fire area 3L. ,1 l

7. Fire Area 3-Q: Figure 3-8 ___. _ _ . _ . .

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The applicant will provide a non-combustible barrier (probably sheet ,

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.netal) from the ceiling to the floor of-the auxiliary feedwater pump  !

room to separate the turbine driven auxilf ary feedwater pump from the two motor driven auxfifary feedwater pumps. This is acceptable to us. (Item 16).

8. Fire Area 3X: Figure 3-8 The applicant will provide sprinklers in the vicinity of the boric acid transfer pumps. This is acceptable to us. (Item 17). 1 In the auxiliary building at elevation 91 feet between the boric acid transfer pumps and the room housing the auxiliary feedwater pumps, the applicant identified conduits containing cables essential for safe l

shutdown on ' drawing 57615. Because of the concentration of safety i related conduits in this' area, we informed the applicant that we will require automatic spr'nkers be installed between the boric acid transfer pumps and the room housing the auxiliary feedwater pumps.

The'appiteant was also requested to verif.y that the seal water injec-tion.ffiters are not required to reach the cold shutdown condition and a fire in the filter's vicinity will not breach the reactor pressure boundary. (Item 17)

. Further information'from the applicant ts required to complete the I t .

reff ew of' fire area 3X.

9. Fire Area 3-BB: Figure 3-7, 3-8, and 3-9 __ _ . - _ _

For the penetration area outside containment at elevation 85 ft., the app 1tcant identified conduits containing cables to valve operators required for safe shutdown on drawing 501450. The appitcant indicated that this system's redundant conduits are located on the opposite side of the containaent structure. On the basis of this separation, we agreed no additional protection is required.

Cables essentfal for safe shutdown pass through a concrete manhole adjoining the north wall of the auxiliary building at elevation 85 ft.

as identified by the applicant on drawings 57597 and 57606. Concrete walls and space provide acceptable divisional separation between redundant cables. The manhole walls extend above the 85 ft. floor level to form a curb. The manholes are covered with metal plates.

We agreed that no additional protection is required.

For the penetration area outside containment at elevation 115 ft., the appitcant identified numerous redundant conduits containing cables essential to safe snutdown on drawing 502079. Because of the concen-tration of safety related conduits, we informed the appifcant that we will . require all of this area be protected by automatic sprinklers.

In addition, the applicant was requested to identify all conduits

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where their redundant counterparts are separated by less than 15 ft.

1 The appitcant was informed that in addition to the general area

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sprinklers, redundant conduits with separation less than 15 feet should be encased with 2-hour rated fire barriers or be provided with equivalent . protectf on.

1 For the penetratton area outside containment at elevation 110 ft.,

and on the south-west wall and ceiling of the room, the applicant identified condutts where their redundant counterparts are separated by less than 15 feet. The conduits (KT 243 and KT 242) are associated with the motor driven auxiliary feedwater system valves, LCV 110, LCV.111, LCV 113, and LCV 115. These valves' redundant counterparts (LCV 106, LCV 107, LCV 108, and LCV 109) which are associated with the turbine driven Auxiliary Feedwater System, are located in conduits K5971 and K6254, and are separated by less than 15 feet as sher on drawings 502078 and 57580.

The app 1tcant indicated only the conduits KT 243 and KT 242 which are associated with the motor driven auxiliary feedwater system would be encased in a 2 hour2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> fire rated barrier to preclude redundant safe shutdown systems failure due to an exposure fire in the areas.

The applfcant was infonned of our position to install general area automatic sprinklers in this area as discussed in Item 10.

• l For the penetration area outside containment at elevation 100 feet, i

the applicant identiffed numerous redundant conduits containing cables essenttal to safe shutdown on drawings 502078, 57595, and I 1

57580. Because of the concentration of safety related coriduits, we infonned the applicant that wd will require all of this area be l protected by automatic sprinklers. In addition, the applicant was requested to identify all conduits where their redundant counter parts are separated by less than 15 ft. The applicant was informed that in addition to the general area sprinklers, redundant conduits with separation'less than 15 feet should be encased with 2-hour rated

1. ire barriers or provfded with equivalent protection.

l In additton, the appitcant indicated that the hydrogen piping passing through this area would be removed.

Further information from the applicant is required to complete our  !

review of this area. l

10. East Hall Area between fire area 3-88 and 3-L, Figure 3-7 On the hallway celling located between the east end of the penetration area at elevation 85 feet around the auxilfary building, the appiteant has identified conduit containing cables associated with the motor driven auxfitary feedwater pumps. These conduits are identiffed on drawing 500824. Because conduits associated with redundant turbine driven auxfitary feedwater pumps are located elsewhere and because this hallway space is now and will most likely remain free of combus-l l .

ttbles in the' future, we agreed that no additional protection is

, required. .

11. . Ftre Areas 388 and 14: Figures 3-8 and 3-9 _ . - - . ._

.The blow out panels between the turbine building and the penetration area will be redesigned to open after a high energy ifne break and remain closed during a fire. This is acceptable to us. (Item 41)

12. Ffie Area 4A: Figure 3-7

, In the space above the suspended ceiling and in the space bewtween partitions and surrounding walls of the laooratory area, three divf-sions of redundant conduf t containing cables essential to safe shutdown have been fdentiffed by the appifcant on drawings 57691, 57606, and 57502. The laboratory area below the suspended ceiling is protected by automatic sprinklers. The applicant proposed additional sprinklers above the suspended cefitng. The applicant was informed that this proposal is unacceptable. The additional sprinklers do not materf ally decrease the proabfif ty of failure of safe shutdown cables in case of fire in the space below. The suspended cefling had many missing tiles, access openings, and vents and exhaust > ducts passing through the cefling.

The ceiling with its many' openings provided an unacceptable method of protection for the safe shutdown conduf ts located above the ceiling.'

The appifcant was informed it is our position that the laboratory cefitng should be replaced with a-membrane fire rated ceiling, with

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. i access openings strictly Itmited and of designs approved for use in fife-rated assemblies. In regard 'to safe shutdown conduits located in the wall space, the applicant was informed that we will require ,

the conduf ts be encased with a 2-hour fire rated barrier' or provided with equivalentprotection.

13. Fire Area No. 4A and SA: Figure 3-7 and 3-8 In the floor adjacent to the Remote Hot Shutdown panel, there is a steel equipment hatch shown on drawing 57601 and Figure 3-8. Below l this equipment hatch there is a room designated for use as an office on (figure 3-7) that contains a whole-body radiation counter. This room is p'.ovided with automatic sprinklers, and removable ceiling  !

panels are installed below the hatch. Because of the convenient loca-tion to the laboratory and decontamination areas, w'e are of the opinion that there is a high probability that the room could become a storage area. If combustible materials would be stored in this room, a fire would subject the hot shutdown panel, located above, to an unacceptable fire hazard. The app 1tcant was informed that it is our position that the removable panels remain in place and that signs reading "No Storage of Any Kind permitted in This Room" or sfmflar 1

wording be posted in the room. l l

14. Fire Area No. 5-A: Figure 3-8 j On the West wall of the 480 voit switchgear room area, conduits K7236 and K7237 were . identified by the applicant as containing cables essen-tial to safe . shutdown. These conduf ts are shown on drawings 57601

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57691. The appitcant-indicated that the conduits contain control and a

power cables associated with the auxilf ary system valves and that the ,

valves would go to.the safe open positfon upon loss of power or loss of af r. We agreed that additional protection is not required.

For the area adjacent to and surrou'nding the three divisioned 480. volt switchgear rooms, shown on drawing 57601, the applicant indicated that the encasement of redundant division conduits would not be feasible 1

and that normally .nintmal. fire load would. exist in the room. We will require that the applicant post "No Storage" signs in this room.

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15. Fire Areas 5A, 58, 6A: Figures 3-8 and 3-9 Existing steel hatch covers provide adequate fire protection against j l

the hazards in the particular areas where they are located. The areas containing the three hatches in the Auxiliary Building (between the cable spreading room battery area and the 480 volt switchgear area) will be marked as "No Storage" areas. We find this acceptable. (Item SA)

16. Fire Area 6-A: Figure 3-9 For the battery' room area at elevation 115 ft. in the auxiliary building, conduits containing cables essential to safe shutdown or that have been identified.by the applicant are shown on drawing 57600.

In ;the room adjacent to the Number 1-3. battery room, numerous safety-related and redundant division conduits were identified in addition to  !

those identified in drawing 57600. The room also contains the reactor

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tr{p switchgear and motor generator sets associated with the control rod d'r ive system. The applicant indicated that loss of the motor . , i generator set function would scram the reactor.

In the rooms adjacent to each of the three redundant battery rooms, we noted that numerous conduits are routed over and to the redundant divisions battery chargers and inverters. The appitcant indicated i that loss of these cfreuits would not affect safe shutdown. Further information on the effects of the loss of the motor generator sets and the condutts routed near redundant divisions of battery chargers is required from the applicant to complete the review of fire area 6A.

We also requested that the applicant verify that the control room alarm system that annunciates the loss of ventilation flow in the Battery Rooms is a Class IE system. (Figure 21)

17. Fire Area 7: Figure 3-11 The applicant will provide information on the adequacy of tha Albi intumescent paint used to fireproof the safety related condutts in the cable spreading rooms and verify that the vendor or qualified personnel ~ will apply the Albf paint to the conduits. (Item 22C) l

18. Fire Area 8A: Figure 3-10  !

Smoke detectors will be added to the computer room area. This is acceptable to us. (Item 23A) l i

19. Fire Area 88: Figure 3-10 ..

Thfee-hour fire dampers will be provided in ventilation ducts that penetrate the three-hour fire barrier that defines the control room ,

complex. The auxtlfary butiding air supply ducts at the 140-foot el avation (two per unit) will have 3-hour dampers installed.

At a meetino -

'iarch 14,1978, the applicant changed his commitment to install 3-nour fire dampers on the ventilation ducts for the control room ventflation equipment room and the auxiliary butiding ventilation equipment room. In place of the 3-hour fire dampers, the applicant connitted to installing smoke detectors and automatic sprinklers in the control room ventilation equipment and auxiliary butiding ventila-tion equipment rooms. The above change is acceptable to us. (Item 23b) l l

20. Fire Area 8-G: Ffoure 3-10 The applicant will provide the number of smoke detectors and the Halon concentration used in the Safeguards Room. We will require a minimum of 5% 1301 Halon concentration.

Verification by the appifcant that the fire dampers in the Safeguards Room are rated for 3-hours is necessary for us to complete our review of this area. (Item 24). ,

21. Fire Area 8-G and 8-H: Figure 3-10 Halon will be discharged into the safeguards cabinets as well as the safeguards room itself. This is acceptable to us. ((tem 24) h

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We,will require that a minimum of 5% concentration of Halon 1301 be l 2

esed.

22. Below Fire Area No.10: Figure 3-1 and 3-2 On the east wall of the 12 kilovolt switchgear cable spreading room below fire area No.10, a number of conduits containing redundant cables essenttal for shutdown have been identtfied by the appitcant on drawing 57572. These conduits, with one exception, are encased in the wali and are, therefore, effectively isolated from an exposure fire. We conclude this encasement would be acceptable. Conduits, 1

associated with bus "H" 4.16 kilovolt power division, however, are not l 1

encased. Since only on division of safe shutdown systems would be l l

effected by an exposure fire in this room, we agreed that additional protection would not be required.

l The main ~ transformers are located near the east wall and are protected '

by a deluge water spray system. The wall betw;en the conduits and the j transformers is a two-hour rated fice barrier, with the exception of j ventilating openings. The appitcant proposed the use of rolling fire shutters on the exterior of the butiding to upgrade the openings to a two-hour' barrier. We agreed that the rolling fire doors in 1

addition to the two-hour barrier around each divisions conduits .

wouid provide adequate protection.

On,the east and west walls of the 12.KV switchgear room, a number of conduits containing redundant cables essential for shutdown have been identiffed by the applicant on drawing 57568. Additional essential conduits were also identiffed during the site visit on the west wall.

We informed the applicant that we will require all conduits containing cables essential for safe cold shutdown in this room should be identi-fied and encased with a 2 hour2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> fire rated barrier or provided with equivalent protection.

23. Fire Area 11 and 22: Figures 3-1 and 3-15 The trenches that run frorn the diesel generator rooms to their radiator areas will be scaled. This is acceptable to us.. (Item 26).

In order for us to complete our review of.this area, the applicant will describe the ventilation system for the emergency generator in the diesel generator compartments and verify that the walls between the diesel generator air intakes #111 be extended to separate the air intakes from each other. (Item 26)

24. Fire Area No.12, Figure 3-2 In the room adjacent to and west of the three 4.16 KV vital bus cable spreading room, a number of conduits containing redundant cables j essential to safe cold-shutdown were identified on drawing 57563.

- Additional conduits were also identiffed during the site visit.

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We2 f nformed the applicant that we will require all conduits containing cable essential f,or safe cold shutdown in this room be identi-ffed and encased with 2-hour fire rated barrier or provided with equivalent protection.

In the 4.16 KV switchgear bus "G" cable spreading room, Conduf t K2669 was identified by the applicant on drawing 57563 as containing essen-tfal shutdown cable associated with the redundant 4.16 KV switchgear bus "F". Likewise, the 4.16 KV switchgear bus "F" cable spreading room, conduit K2637 was identified as containing essential shutdown cable associated with the redundant 4.16 KV switchgear bus "G".

However, during the site visit, the applicant indicated that these ,

1 two identified conduits contain associated but not essential cables for safe shutdown. The applicant was informed that if these conduits do in fact contain cables essential for safe shutdown, we will require i the conduf ts be encased with a 2 hour2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> rated fire barrier or provided with equivalent. protection.

In the corridor of fire arec number 12 and east of the diesel generator exhaust silencers, a number of conduits containing redundant cables  ;

essential to. safe cold shutdown were identffed. These conduits associated to the control circuits of the Auxiliary Feed Water Pumps (conduits K2266 and X2665), were identified by the appitcant on drawing 57563. Additional essential conduits were also identified during the site visit. The applicant was infonned that it is our position

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that all condutts containing cable essential for' safe shutdown in 1

this corridor be identified and encased with a 2-hour fire rated barrier or provided w'ith equivalent protection. .

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25. Fire Areas 12 and 13: Figures 3-2 and 3-3_ _, .

l Structural steel in the walls and cefitng of the 4.16 KV cable spreading rooms will be 'ff re proofed with a rated material but not necessarily one that was described in the applicant's response to Item 5. Three hour fire dampers will be provided for the exhaust ducts from the i l

4.16 KV switchgear rooms to the turbine building operating floor. l Exposed steel beams that are part of the 4.16 XV cable spreading room will be plastered to upgrade their fire resistance to two-hours.

Steel panel adjacent to the doors to the 4.16 KV cable spreading rooms will be cerff fied as "B'? labeled doors. These are acceptable to us.

(Item 27) 1

26. Fire Area 14A: Figure 3-1 and 3-2 In the turbine building, above the non-safety Feed Water Pumps, conduf ts containing control cables for the safety related Auxfitary Feed Vater j

. Pumps were identiffed by the applicant on drawing 57570 as essential for safe shutdown. However, during the site visit, the applicant indicated the control cables were associated with the auxiliary feed water pumps, but not essential for shutdown. Nevertheless, the general area is provided with automatic sprinklers and the hazardous equipment in the area are protec'ted with water deluge systems. We agreed that l

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the existing protection is adequate providing the conduits identified did not contain essential safe shutdown cables.

l On the sout-east wall of the turbine butiding at elevation 104 ft. -

to 119 ft., redundant conduits containing safe shutdown cables have been identified by the appiteant on drawing 57566. The applicant  !

fndicated that these cables are t'o be encased with a 2-hour rated fire l barrier. The general area is provided with automatic sprinkler protection. We agreed that the existing and proposed p'{otection for these conduits would be adequate.

1 On the south-east ceiling of the turbine building at elevation 104 ft., l 1

redundant conduits containing control and power circutts associated f I

with the auxtitary salt water system valves, were identified by the  !

applicant on drawing 57571 as essential to safe shutdown. The appif-cant indicated that these valves would go to the safe open position upon loss of power or loss of afr. The general area is provided with automatte sprinkler protection. We agreed that the protection provfded l these conduits is adequate. I In additten, a conduit containing power an'd control cable for a valve - l (FC 355) required for isolation was identiffed by the applicant on drawings 57571 and 57567. This valve can be opened or closed manually.

The associated redundant cable for valve FCV 355 is not in this area.

And the general area is provided with automatic sprinkler protection.

' We agreed that the existing protection for this conduit is adequate, ,

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l Emkedded in the south-west portion of the turbine building between the vacuum pumps and air receive tanks at elevation 85 ft. , redundant safe shutdown conduits are located in a manhole as identtfted by the appit-cant on drawing 57576. The applfcant identified these cables as control cables for valves that go to the safe position on loss of power. I The manhole is covered by a concrete cover with no oil lines in the victntty. We agreed that the existing protection provided these j conduits is adequate.

We also agreed with the applicant that the structural integrity of i l

the turbine building roof will not be affected by a fire.. (Item 30)

27. Fire Area 28: Figure 3-1 l

In order for us to complete our review we require from the applicant an analysts of the effects of the main transformer fire on safe shutdown. (Item 31) l l

28. Miscellaneous j The applicant connf tted to electrical superviston of the key valves, j l

and on a weekly basts, the other important fire protection system valves. I l

The valves in one of the supply lines from the raw water reservoir l will be locked open. This is acceptable to us. (Item 8)

In areas where the ventilation ducts ! ave been fire proofed, the duct 1

j supports will also be fire proofed. This is acceptable to us. (Item 20)

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1 Infrder fo us to complete our ceview, we requested the following infonnation from the applicant:  !

a. The locat.fon and fire test infonnation for the pyrocrete used in

• plant construction. (Item 5A).

b. The rating of all doors in the plant that are part of the fire barriers that define fire areas and fire zones with a justifica- i tion for any locations where "A" labeled doors are not used.

(Item 5A)

c. Verification that electrical penetrations through fire barriers (other than containment) have three hour ratings. (Item 5B)

d. -The. location of the power cables for the heat tracing for the i boron system. (Item 14).

e. A more explicit description of the backup power to the 120 volt instrument AC system. (Item 35)

f. Description and detafis of the seismic Category I portions of the fire protection system. (Item 45) 9 Effects of failures of non-seismic components on the seismic

, Category I portion of thefire protection system (Item 45)

h. Description of method of isolating the non-seismic yard loop from the sefsmic Category I Fire Water Tank. (Item 45)

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f. Verification that the applicant will commit to meeting the fire I

tra!ntng and guidance as given in " Nuclear Plant Fire Protection Fungttorial Responsibilf tfes, Administrative Controls, and Quality -

Assurance."

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Description of the manufacturing specifications of the one and half-hour rated fire dampers in the plant. (Item 5d)

k. We will require the applicant to install portable bottles for the hydrogen supply for the chemical and volume control system in the l

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, volume control tank compartrent and disconnect all hydrogen lines that pass through areas containing equipment essential for cold shutdown.

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. ENCLOSURE 1

- ATTENDANCE LIST FEBRUARY -]4 AND 15,1978 FIRE PROTECTION MEETINGS o DIABLO CANYON NUCEEAR PLANT, UNIT NOS. 1 AND 2 ,

PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC _, ,_ _ ,

S. E. Traisman J W. Sale H. J. Gormly J. B. Hoch R. Patterson T. Crawford R. A. Young

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E. A. Zelter NUCLEAR UTILITIES SERVICE. ~

R. A. Eman CENTER FOR LAW IN THE PUBLIC INTEREST Letty Belin GAGE AND BASCOCK AND ASSOCIATES Bert John Jim Behn NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION V. Benaroya P. Hearn J. Knox

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ENCLOSURE 2 1

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SUMMARY

OF AGREEMENTS REACHED BETWEEN P G AND E AND NRC February 15, 1978 Question Ag/eement

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Existing steel hatch covers provida adequate fire protection against- ,

the hazards in the particular areas where they are located. The three hatches in question in the auxiliary building (between cable spreading

' room, battery area, and 480. volt switchgear area) will be marked as "No Storage" areas.

1 8 Fire protection valves will still be seated and administratively super-vised on a weekly basis. Circuits for electrical supervision of the key valves will be supervised circuits. One of the two valves at the raw water reservoir will be locked open.

11 Doors to the RHR pumo rooms built to "A" label specifications with monorail penetrations are satisfactory.

12 The hole in the wall between the centrifugal and reciprocating charging pumps rooms will be sealed and have a three hour rating.

16 P G and E will provide a non-combustible barrier (probably sheet metal) from ceiling to floor of the auxiliary feedwater pump room to separate the turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pump from the electric motor driven auxiliary feedwater pumps.

17 Sprinklers will be provided in the vicinity of the boric acid transfer pumps.

18. The component cooling water pipe trench connecting CCW pump room 1-3 to the penetration area is satisfactory as is considering the modifications P G and E commited to in Question 13.

20 In areas where ventilation ducting has been fireproofed, the duct supports will also be fireproofed.

Summary of Agreements Reached February 15, 1978 Between P G and E and NRC Page 2 Question _ Agreement 22a Equipment hatch is sat',2 factory as is. Refer to agreement for .

question Sa.

23a Computer room is satisfactory as described in our response (smoke .

detectors are being added to this area). I 23b Three hour fire dampers will be provided in the ventilation ducts that penetrate the three hour fire barrier that defines the control room i complex. The auxiliary building air supply ducts at elevation 140' (two per unit) will have three hour dampers also.

24 Halon will be discha ged into the safeguards cabinets as well as the room itself.

26 The trenches that run from the diesel generator rooms to their radiator j areas will be sealed (if not already sealed).

27 Structural steel in the walls andn, jeiling of the 4.16K/ cab.le d.,..r..onuay - . .e spreading rooms will be fireproofed with ai'materiaP6as described in our response to Question 5. Three hour fire dampers will be provided for the exhaust ducts from the 4.16KV switchgear rooms to the turbine building operating floor.

30 P G and E response acceptable as is. ,,

4 tY l i

_ _5- - . _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _

l l

ENCLOSURE 3

. a SEISMIC PORTIONS OF THE FIRE PROTECTION SYSTEM -

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