ML20151W248
| ML20151W248 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Vogtle |
| Issue date: | 04/22/1988 |
| From: | Burger C, Patterson C, Schepens R, Sinkule M NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20151W233 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-425-88-12, NUDOCS 8805030336 | |
| Download: ML20151W248 (27) | |
See also: IR 05000425/1988012
Text
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UNITED STATES
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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REGION 11
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101 MARIETTA STREET. N.W.
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ATLANTA. GEORGI A 30323
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Report No.:
50-425/88-12
Licensee: Georgia Power Company
P.O. Box 4545
Atlanta, GA- 30302
Docket Nos.:
50-425
Construction Permit No.: CPPR-109
Facility Name: Vogtle Unit 2
Inspection Conducted:
February 17, 1988 - March 31, 1988
Inspectors:
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p R. J. Schepens, Senior Resident Inspector
Date Signed
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Ll.f & g g
h C. W. Burger, Resident Inspector
Date Signed
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C. A. Patterson, Project Engineer
Date Signed
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Accompanying Personnel:
P. A. Balmain
Approved By:
z3, L
M.
V'. Sinkule, Section Chief
Dite Signed
Division of Reactor Projects
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SUMMARY
Scope:
This inspection entailed a routine, unannounced resident inspection
effort in the area of the preoperational testing and a special announced
resident and region inspection effort in the area of Readiness Review Module 4,
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Mechanical Equipment and Piping.
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Results: One violation was identified in the area of system walkdown (Failure
to provide adequate instructions to ensure the proper installation of flow
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elements and orifices).
P8P 28834 88888 6 il
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REPORT DETAILS
1.
Persons Contacted
Licensee Employees
- P.
D. Rice, Vice President, Vogtle Project Director
- R. H. Pinson, Vice President, Project Construction
G. Bockhold, General Manager
T. V. Greene, Plant Support Manager
- C. W. Hayes, Vogtle Quality Assurance Manager
- E. D. Groover, Quality Assurance Site Manager - Construction
- S. T. Halton, Quality Assurance Support Supervisor
D. M. Fiquett, Project Construction Manager
- G. A. McCarley, Project Compliance Coordinator
- C. L. Coursey, Maintenance Superintendent (Startup)
- H. M. Handfinger, Startup Manager
- A. W. Harrelson, Electrical Construction Manager
- R. E. Hollands, Electrical Compliance Supervisor
- C. W. Rau, Mechanical Construction Manager
- J. J. Gilmartin, Mechanical Engineer
L. N. Brooks, Civil Construction Manager
- L. B. Glenn, QC Manager
- R. W. McManus, Readiness Review Manager Lead Mechanical Engineer
- R. C. Sommerfield, Readiness Review
- J. E. Sanders, Assistant. Project Manager
- W. C. Ramsey, Project Engineering Manager
L. D. Harless, Manager, Quality Concerns
- P. T. Ciccanessi, Senior Regulatory Specialist
- M. L. Hobbs, I & C Superintendent
"M. D. Duncan, I & C Supervisor
Other licensee employees contacted included craftsmen, technicians,
supervision, engineers, inspectors, and office personnel.
Other Organizations
C. Marcum, Westinghouse Project Manager
D. L. Kinnsch, Project Engineering - Bechtel
- T. E. Richardson, Project Engineering Manager - Bechtel
- D
W. Strohman, Project Quality Assurance Engineer - Bechtel
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- A. J. Ayob, VSAMU, Westinghouse, Supervisor
B. Edwards, Site Manager, PPP
J. Miller, Quality Assurance Manager
"D. D. Smith, Construction Engineer - Oglethorpe Power Company
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- Attended Exit Interview
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2.
Exit Interviews - (30703C)
The inspection scope and findings were summari7ed on March 31, 1988, with
those persons indicated in paragraph I above. The inspector described the
areas inspected and discussed in detail the inspection results.
No
dissenting comments were received from the licensee.
The licensee did
not identify as proprietary any of the materials provided to or reviewed
by the inspector during this inspection. Region based NRC exit interviews
were attended during the inspection period by a resident inspector. The
following items were identified during this inspection:
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(0 pen) Violation, 50-425/88-12-01
"Failure to Provide Adequate
Instructions to Ensure the Proper Installation of Flow Elements And
Orifices" - Paragraph 5.d.(1)(c).
(0 pen) Inspector Followup Item, 50-424/88-12-02 "Followup Licensee's
Corrective Action Relative To The Identification Of Unit Appli-
cability For Calculations" - Paragraph 5.b.(1).
(0 pen) Inspector Followup Item, 50-425/88-12-03
"Review Revised
Calculation X4C1202V43 Regarding Design Objectives and Conclusions" -
Paragraph 5.b.(1).
(0 pen) Inspector Followup Item, 50-425/88-12-04
"Review Revised
Calculation
X4C1202V18
Regarding
Case
3C
Description"
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Paragraph 5.b.(1).
(0 pen) Inspector Followup Item, 50-425/88-12-05
"Review Revised
Calculation X4C1202500F1 Regarding The Evaluation Of Flow Failure
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Detection & Ef fect On System Safety Function For Item No's. 85b,
86b, 87b, 8Sb, 89b, & 90b" - Paragraph 5.c.(1),
3.
Licensee Action on Previous Enforcement Matters - (92702)
Not inspected.
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Preoperational Test Program Implementation / Verification - (70302)(71302)
The inspector reviewd the present implementation of the preoperational
test program.
Test program attributes inspected included review of
administrative requirements, document control, documentation of major test
events and deviations to procedures, operating practices, instrumentation
calibrations, and correction of problems revealed by testing.
Periodic inspections were conducted of Control Room Operations to assess
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plant condition and conduct of shif t personnel.
The inspector observed
that Control Room operations were being conducted in an orderly and
professional manner.
Shif t personnel were knowledgeable of plant condi-
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tions,
i.e., ongoing testing, systems / equipment in or out of service, and
alarm / annunciator status.
In addition, the inspector observed shift
turnovers on various occasions to verify the continuity of plant testing,
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operational problems and other pertinent plant information during the
turnovers.
Control Room logs were reviewed and various entries were
discussed with operations personnel.
Periodic facility tours were made to assess equipment and plant condi-
tions, maintenance and preoperational activities in progress.
Schedules
for program completion and progress reports were routinely monitored.
Discussions were held with responsible personnel, as they were available,
to determine their knowledge of the preoperational program. The Inspector
reviewed numerous operation deviation reports to determine if requirements
were met in the areas of documentation, action to resolve, justification,
corrective action and approvals.
Specific inspections conducted are
listed below:
a.
Preoperational Tests
(1) Test Witnessing (70312)
The inspector witnessed selected portions of the following
preoperational test procedures as they were conducted.
The
inspection included attendance at briefings held by the test
supervisor to observe the coordination and general knowledge of
the procedure with the test participants.
Overall crew
performance was evaluated during testing.
A preliminary review
of the test results was compared to the inspector's own
observations.
Problems encountered during performance of the
test were verified to be adequately documented, evaluated and
dispositioned on a selected basis.
Procedure
NRC Insp.
Test Title
Activity Observed
No.
No.
2-3BG-01,R-0
70433
CVCS Preop
Preop Of Charging
Isolation
Valve
2-3BJ-01,R-0
70434
SI Preop
Intermediate Head
SI Cold Leg Flow
Balance And Pump
Run Out Verifica-
tion
2-3BJ-03,R-0
70434
SI Preop
Accumulator No. 2
Dump L/0
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5.
Readiness Review Module 4 Inspection
The following topics are discussed
Introduction
Review of Commitments
Engineering and Design Review
Safety-Related System Piping Insulation Review
Safety-Related Equipment Installation Review
Safety-Related Valve Installation Review
Conclusions
a.
Introduction
This inspection report documents Region II inspection activities
relative to the evaluation of Georgia Power Company's (GPC's)
Readiness Review Module 4,
Mechanical Equipment and Piping.
The
scope of GPC's Module 4 encompassed the design, procurement, and
construction activities regarding safety-related mechanical equipment
and piping systems classified as American Scciety of Mechanical
Engineers Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code,Section III, Class I, 2,
and 3, which are included in Unit 2 piping systems and are not a part
of the nuclear steam supply system.
Readiness review Module 4 is one in a series of modules being
conducted by GPC that provide an evaluation of the design, construc-
tion and preoperation testing of the Vogtle Electric Generating Plant
Unit 2 to assure its operational readiness in accordance with
scheduled plans for obtaining an operating license.
Module 4 is
intended to describe the method GPC complied with the project
commitments found in the Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) and is
not intended to make further commitments or revise in any way, prior
commitments.
The inspection was conducted to aid in determining whether Module 4
provided an acceptable basis for it's reported conclusion - that
adequate controls exist to ensure the quality of work and the
implementation of FSAR commitments within the scope of mechanical
equipment and piping for Vogtle Electric Generating Plant (VEGP)
Unit 2.
The inspection report contains a description of the
inspector's activities and findings.
b.
Review of Commitments
This section of the module defines commitments as project obligations
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to regulatory guides, industry standards, branch technical positions,
and other licensing requirements, to the extent defined in the FSAR.
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This section also identifies the source of the commitments to be
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restricted to the FSAR and responses to NRC questions associated with
the FSAR.
As defined, commitments which were considered by the
licensee to be most appropriately categorized in this module were
tabulated in a commitment matrix identified in section 3.2 of the
module.
The licensee identified 248 commitments as being most
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appropriately categorized in this module.
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This section of the module also defines an implementing document as a
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working level document, either program control or test procedure,
that fulfills a construction commitment applicable to a specific
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activity. Implementing documents were identified for each of the 248
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commitments and this information was tabulated in an implementation
matrix identified in section 3.2 of the module.
The evaluation of this section consisted of reviewing the commitment
and implementation matrices delineated in section 3.2 as discussed
below.
(1) Evaluation of The Commitment and Implementation Matrix
Commitments applicable to the Nuclear Service Cooling Water
(NSCW) system were selected and reviewed to determine that:
1) All project commitments detailed in licensing documents for
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the NSCW system had been properly identified, 2) Licensing
commitments had been recognized and were addressed in primary
design / construction documents and whether responses to those
commitments have been included in the appropriate working level
documents, and 3) Whether the commitment and implementation
matrices are accurate and demonstrate proper implementation of
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licensing commitments. The following commitments were reviewed
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for the above noted attributes:
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Ref.
Document /
Design /Const.
No
Source
Subject
Feature
Implementation
683.00
1.9.2.7,2
Ultimate
DC 1202-A-1.0
Heat Sink
1743.00
3.1.5
PIP'C Sys.
DC 2415-2.0
Penetrating
APP.J
Cnmt.
4916.00
3.2.2-1
NSCW Sys.
DC 1202-3.1E
Design
& VLU's
Outside Cnmt.
ASME III CL3
4917.00
3.2.2-1
NSCW Sys.
DC 1202-3.1E
Design
PIP's & VLU'S
Ir. side Cnmt.
ASME III CL2
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Ref.
Document /
Design /Const.
No
Source
Subject
Feature
Implementation
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1778.00
3.8.2.1
Pipe
ASME III,
X4AQ10-4.1A
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Attached
CL2
To Cnmt.
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Wall Sleeves
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1782.00
3.8.2.7
Testing Of
ASME III,
X4AQ10-8.2
CL2 Pipe
NC-6000
Assemblies
5026.00
3.9.B.1.5.1
Weld Inspt.
ASME III
X4AZ01-
P3.3.0.A
Accept
'77 Edition
PPP IX-3-7.0
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Criteria
Thru Winter
PPP IX-18
Addenda '77
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5349.00
3.9.B.3
ASME III
CL2 & 3
DC 1017-2,1
CL 1,2 & 3
PIPG NC & NO
1
Components
'74 Edition
Thru Summer
'75 Addena
Ref.
Document /
Design /Const.
No
Source
Subject
Feature
Implementation
4913.00
9.2.1-1
NSCW Sys.
Max. Heat
X4C1202V18
Design
Load During
Accident
Conditions
349.8
Million
BTV/ Hour
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4914.00
9.2.1-1
NSCW Sys.
Min. NSCW
X4C1202V03
Design
From Per
Train During
Accident
Conditions
15,733 GPM
384.00
9.2.1-3
NSCW Equip.
NSCW Pumps
DC 1010-T1
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Design
ASME III,
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Ref.
Document /
Design /Const.
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Subject
Feature
Implementation
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[ cont'd)
3525.00
9.2.1.1.1-C
NSCW Sys.
Seismic
DC 1202-3.1E
Safety
Cat, 1
Design
Basis
3749.00
9.2.1.1.1-G
NSCW Sys.
Designed To
DC 1202-3.1A
Safety
Perform
,
Basis
Function
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Following
L.O.C.A.
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Assuming
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Loincident
With a L,0.0.P
4912.00
9.2.1.1.1-H
NSCW Sys.
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Safety
To Prevent
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Oesign
Boiling
Basis
Cnmt. Coolers
During L.O.C.A.
3750.00
9.2.1.1.1-I
N S C\\,' Sy s .
Sys. Pressure DC 1202-3.1H
Safety
Greater Than
Design
Cnmt. Bldg.
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Basis
Max. Design
Pressure
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4915.00
9.2.1.2.B
NSCW Sys.
NSCW Press.
DC 1202-3.1H
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Oper.
Higher Than
X4C1202V15
Fluid In
Cooled
1
Safety-
Related
Component
400.00
9.2.5
DC 1202-A-1.0
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401.00
9.2.5.1
Seismic
DC 1202-A-3.1A
Towers &
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Ref.
Document /
Design /Const.
No
Source
Subject
Feature
Implementhtion
[ cont'd)
3755.00
9.2.5.1.1.A
Single
DC 1202-A-3.1C
3542.00
Safety
Failure
Design
With
Basis
L.0.0.P
418.00
9.2.5.1.1.8
DC 1202-A-1.0A
Safety
Design
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Basis
3541.00
9.2.5.2.2
Fan Motors
DC 1202-A-3.1B
Component
Powered by
Description
Class 1E
402.00
9.2.5.2.4
BTP ASB 9-2
DC 1202-A-1.0
Performance
403.00
9.2.5.2.4
DC 1202-A-1.0
Performance
4777.00
9.2.5.2.4
BTP RSB 5-1
DC 1202-A-3.1C
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Performance
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4221.00
NRC QUES.
NSCW Sys.
ASME III,
DC 1010-T1
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0210.11
Cooling
CL3
Water
Supply &
Return
Piping
For Pump
Motor Coolers
During the review of the implementation of the above noted
commitments, the inspectors had the following comments:
COMMITMENT NO. 3750.00 & 4912.00
Commitment No. 3750.00 states that "the NSCW system is to be
' designed such that system pressure is greater than containment
building maximum design pressure."
The design implementation
for this commitment is referenced as Leing contained in DC
1202-3.H. However, the inspector could not verify this to be
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the case. Therefore, the following question was raised to the
licensee: What are the first and second order implementation
documeris for the subject commitment?
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The licensee's response was a follows: It has been assumed that
the "Interfacing Heat Transfer Systems" referred to in DC
1202-3.1H included the containment building air coolers, and
that the NSCW system serving them would be designed with a
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higher pressure than the containment atmosphere.
Upon further
investigation, it has been discovered that the "Interfacing Heat
Transfer Systems actually refer to the Component Cooling Water
(CCW) and Auxiliary Component Cooling Water (ACCW) Systems.
Currently, there is no first order implementation of commitment
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3750 in DC 1202. To correct this, design engineering will issue
Design Manual Change Notice No. 1202-6 which will add paragraph
3.1R to address a commitment requirement that the NSCW system
pressure be greater that the maximum calculated containment
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atmosphere pressure following a LOCA.
FSAR Change Notice
No. 559, filed on February 27, 1987, makes the change in
paragraph 9.2.1.1.1-1 from "Maximum Design Pressure" to maximum
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calculated pressure. This change notice will be reflected in
FSAR Amendment 35. The licensee issued DMCN 1202-6 on March 8,
1988, therefore, this item is considered to be closed.
Regarding the second order implementation, the licensee informed
the inspector that it was contained in two design calculations:
X4C120?V21, Rev. 2 Verification Of No Boiling In Containment
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Coolers and X4C1202V43, Rev. O NSCW
Flow Balance.
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further discussions with the licensee on this matter, the
licensee informed the inspector that calculations X4C1202V21,
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X4C1202S19, and X4C1202V09 were originally applicable to both
Units 1 and 2.
Due to later developments, it was decided to
recalculate the pressure drops across the restricting orifices
to balance the flows in the Unit 2 NSCW system.
Therefore,
calculation X4C1202V43 was prepared to apply to Unit 2 only.
Revision 1 to this calculation was issued on March 2, 1988, and
covers train "B" of the NSCW system. Revision 2 is currently in
preparation and will cover train "A".
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The inspector questioned the method utilized by the licensee for
determining which unit a calculation was applicable to? The
licensee stated that the Calculation Control Log (CCL) was the
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document for determining unit applicability of a c31culation.
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The inspector noted that the current Calculation Control Log
(CCL) reflected that calculations X4C1202V21, X4C1202519, and
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X4C1202V09 as being applicable to both units.
The inspector
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raised the concern relative to correctness of the Calculation
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Control Log. Also, the inspector questioned the appropriateness
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of using this method of documenting unit applicability versus
specifying the unit applicability in the calculation so as to
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provide a positive reans for documenting engineering review and
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sign off of the calculation for Unit II applicability.
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The licensee confirmed that when calculation X41202V43 was
issued for Unit II, the common calculations (X4C1202V21,
X41202519, and X4C1202V09) were not changed to Unit 1 on the CCL
and remained as common.
Furthermore, the licensee conducted a
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review of all mechanical calculations to determine the extent of
the problem. This inspection revealed 4 additional calculations
with incorrect designators. Therefore, a total of seven out of
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eleven-hundred-forty
six
mechanical
calculations had the
incorrect unit designator on the CCL.
Based on the above
finding, the licensee has committed to re-review all calcula-
tions and insert a cover sheet which will specify the applicable
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unit designator and will be initialed and dated by the respon-
sible engineer and engineering group supervisor.
The inspector
inforn:ed the licensee that, pending the completion of the above
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noted corrective action this matter will be identified as
Inspector Follow Item 50-425/88-12-02
"Followup Licensee's
Corrective Action Relative To The Identification Of Unit
Applicability For Calculations."
Calculation X4C1202V43 was identified by the licensee as the
working level document for implementing commitment numbers
3750.00, "NSCW system shall be designed such that system
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pressure is greater that containment building maximum calculated
pressure" and 4912.00 "NSCW system shall be designed to prevent
boiling in containment coolers during LOCA conditions".
The
inspector reviewed the calculation and determined that the
design did incorporate the subject commitments.
However, ths
objective section of the calculation did not reflect these
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commitments as objectives therefore the calculation did not
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contain any conclusions relative te these design objectives.
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The
licensee committed to include these commitments as
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objectives and state conclusions relative to these design
objectives when Revision 2 of the subject calculation is issued.
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The inspector informed the licensee that, pending the issuance
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of the revised calculation, this matter will be identified as
Inspector
Followup
Item 50 425/8S-12-03
"Review Revised
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Calculation
X4C1202V43
Regarding
Design
Objectives
And
Conclusions."
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During the review of FSAR sections 2.4.11, 9.2.1, and 9.2.5 the
inspector questioned why was the following sentence in FSAR
9. 2.1.1.1-J not considered a licensing commitment? "The NSCW
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System Is Designed To Minimize The Ef fects Of Water Hammer
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Fo rc e s" .
The licensee's response was as follows:
This sentence was
apparently taken in context with the seventh paragraph of FSAR
9.2.1.2.3 on page 9.2.1-4 in which the features of the NSCW
system that minimize the effects of water hammer are described.
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In as much as'these features appeared to implement the apparent
commitment in paragraph 9.2.1.1.1-J, it was interpreted as a
descriptive- statement when taken together with paragraph
9.2.1.2.3, and thus was . not considered a ' licensing commitment.
The inspector considers the licensee's response to be a.cceptable
and thus has no further questions'on this matter.
. COMMITMENT NO. 4913.00
Calculation X4C1202V18 NSCW/C0PATTA 11 Input Data /LOCA 1-Train"
was reviewed to determine the adequacy of the implementation of
FSAR commitment for a' maximum total NSCW heat. load of 349.8
million BTV/HR during accident conditions given in FSAR table
9.2.1-1.
This commitment.was tracked by GPC asl readiness review
commitment Reference no. 4913.00.
Results of all cases. studied
in this calculation to determine total' NSCW heat load were
higher than the values given in FSAR Table 9.2.1-1.
GPC has
initiated FSAR Change Notice 559 to update the table.and will
include the revised heat load values in FSAR Amendment 35. The
inspector also noted that the description of one of the cases-
(case 3C) dealing with fouling factors in heat exchanger tubes
was misleading.
The licensee committed to correct this
discrepancy in the next revision ~ of the calculation.
The
inspector informed the licensee that, pending the issuance of
the revised calculation, this. matter will be identified as
Inspector Followup
Item
50-425/88-12-04
"Review Revised
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Calculation X4C1202V18 Regarding Case 3c Description."
COMMITMENT NO. 4914.00
NSCW calculation X4C1202V03 "Verification Of NSCW Constant Heat
Loads And Flows" was reviewed to determine the adequacy of the
implementation of FSAR commitment- for a minimum NSCW flow of
15,733 GPM per train during accident conditions given in Table
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9.2.1-1.
This commitment was tracked by readiness review
commitment reference no. 4914.00.
This calculation was performed to compile the latest available
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constant heat load and maximum required cooling water flow rate
for all equipment cooled by the NSCW system, as well as the
component pressure drops.
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The inspector reviewed the calculation and noted that the data
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used was based upon the latest vendor data as of February 27,
1985,
In particular, the number for the heat load per train of
the standby diesel generator coolers was different than the
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number in the FSAR Table 9.2.1-1.
The vendor number was
17.1 x 10 to the 6 BTV/HR. Since the FSAR had not been updated,
the inspector qtestioned what was being used as the design basis
of the plant.
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The licensee provided a copy' of a FSAR Change Notice No. 631,
which identified in January 1988, that the FSAR update was
needed. A meeting was conducted on March 9,
1988 with the
cognizant
personnel
concerning calculation reviews,
. changes, and licensing personnel to discuss this item.
The
licensee provided project instructions which required calcula-
tions be reviewed for possible FSAR changes. This resolved the
programmatic. concern of updating the FSAR.
The ' licensee
provided a copy of a temporary exemption request from 10 CFR 50.71(e), FSAR annual update, dated January 15, 1988, to the
inspector. The licensee is required to update the original FSAR
within 24 months of the date of the issuance of the operating
licensee. Unit 1 received its low power operating licensee on
January 16, 1987, and the updated FSAR is due January 16, 1989.
.
The exemption would defer the submittal of the updated FSAR for
units one and two until 12 months after the licensee for unit
two expected in February 1989.
The particular concern of the
standby diesel generator coolers heat load would be incorporated
in the update as requested by the exemption.
(2)
Evaluation of Commitment Additions / Changes From Unit 1 To Unit 2
The Commitment matrix identified 13 commitments as changes from
those presented in the Unit 1 Module. Of these, seven were not
included in the Unit report, but were subsequently added by an
FSAR amendment and the remaining six were subsequently changed
by various FSAR amendments.
The inspectors conducted a review
of the added commitments to verify proper implementation by a
working level document and the commitments which were revised
were reviewed to evaluate the significance of the change.
The inspectors reviewed the following commitments which were not
included in the Unit I report, but were subsequently added by
FSAR amendments as noted below:
Ref.
FSAR
Design /Const.
No
Source
Subject
Amend
Implementation
5107
3.6.2.1.1.B.4
No Welded
30
DC 1018-3.3.B.3
!
Attach.
d.1.a.
Within 5
Pipe Dias.
'
Of Highest
Stress
location On
MS & tiFW
Systems
.
.-
.
'
-
,-
.
.
.
.
.
13
Ref.
FSAR
Des'ign/Const.
No
Source
Subject
Amend
. Implementation
{ cont'd)
5108
3.6.2.1.'1.B.4
No Welded
30
DC 1018-3.3.B.3
Attach.
d.1.b
Within 3X
.SQ.RT. Of
-
Highest
Stress
Location On
High Energy
Sys. Other
Than MS & MFW
5026
3.9.1.5.1
Weld Inspt.
20
X4AZ01-P.3.0.A
Criteria
PPP IX-3.7.0
ASME Code
PPP IX-18
5027
3.9.B.S.1
Weld Irispt.
20
X4AZOI-P4.3.0.A
Criteria
PPP IX-15-14
B31.1 Code
PPP IX-18
5346
3.9.B.3
ASME III,
34
DC 1017-2.1
CL I PIP'G
Design Per
Sub NB '77
Edition Thru
Summer '79
Addenda
5349
3.9.B.3
ASME III,
34
DC 1017-2.1
CL II & III
PIP'G Design
Per Sub.
l
NC & NO '74
Edition Thru
'
Summer '75
!
l
Addenda
5091
3.11.B.1
25
DC 1018 - 3.3.B.6
Designed To
L
Break
Exclusion
Criteria MS
PIP'G Thru
i
Cnmt.
l
l
i
l
.
..
.
2 .
'
'
,.
,.
.
.
.
14
The i nspectors reviewed the following commitments which were
included in-the Unit I report, but were subsequently changed by
various FSAR amendments as noted below:
Ref.
FSAR
Design /Const.
No.
Source
Subject
Amend
Implementation
711
1.9.82.2
Sumps. For
19
- Adequacy Of CS Pump
Emerg. Core
Available NPSH
Cooling &
Recalculated To
CS Systems
To Address
Additional Factors
2295
3.F.4.4
Propagation
16
Design Basis Pipe
Of Flood
Failure Mode Change
Waters From
From A Critical
Break In 96"
Crack To A Full
Circumference Break
Safety-Related
-
Structures
Precluded By
Design
,
2816
6.3.2.2.9
RWST Designed 17
Stipulated A Recir
To Seismic
Htr, Is Provided
Category 1 &
To Maintain Min.
Htr. Provided
Wtr. Temp.
To Maintain
Min. Wtr
Temp. Of 50%
4923
9.2.2.3.A
Peak Load On
20
Peak Load On CCW
CCW Sys.
Sys. And Time For
1-Train Oper.
Achieving Cold
Is 189 x 10 To
Shutdown Was
The 6 BTV/ Hour
Revised Upward
Cold Shutdown
Achieved In
34 Hours
3535
9.3.3.4.A
Testing Of
19
Pressurized
Pressurized
Portions Defined
Portions Of
As Pump Suction
Waste
And Discharge
Collection
PIP'G
Systems
Hydroed To
1 1/2 Times
DP
r
F
4-,
- ,.--- , ,
,e-------.v-
-n.,-~.
9g
-
x-
-,,yn,u
,-,,---en,,
,,e.n---c--
-m-
--y-,-
, - - , ,
.---------en
.n-ng-,
--
-
.
.,
-
.
.
.i
.
~
i
15
,
Ref.
FSAR
Design /Const.
No-
Source
Subject
Amend
Implementation
{ cont'd)
3834-
9.3.3.4.A
Non Pressured 19
Non-Pressurized
Portions Of
Portions Chg'd To
' Waste
Equip. &~ Floor
Collection
Drn's In Aux.
Hydroed At
Bldg., Control
Atm. Press.
F.H, Radwaste
Solidification,
And RW Tunnel
Transfer
c.
Engineering and Design Review
(1) Calculation Review
A representative sample of NSCW system calculations were
reviewed to determine that objectives, assumptions, numbers and
conclusions in the calculation were valid.
The following
calculations were reviewed:
Calc. No,/Rev
Subject
X4C1202S00F1, Rev. 1
Failure Modes and Effect Analysis -
X4C1202V03, Rev. 1
Verification Of NSCW Constant Heat
Loads and Flows
X4C1202V14, Rev. 1
Ultimate Heat Sink Weather Screening
X4C1202V15, Rev. 1
NSCW - ACCW - CCW Pressure Differential
Verification
X4C1202V18, Rev. 3
NSCW/COPATTA - II Input Data /LOCA - 1
Train
X4C1202V43, Rev. 1
NSCW Train "B" Flow Balance
During the review of calculation No. X4C1202500F1 (Failure Modes
And Effect Analysis For The NSCW System) the inspector
questioned the correctness of the conclusion reached in the
calculation for the method of failure detection and failure
effect on system safety function capability evaluation for
failure mode item 85b. (NSCW pump P4-001 discharge bypass line
.
'
.
,
,
.
16
Item Nos. 86b, 87b, 88b, 89b, and 90b are also
effected.
The calculation presently states that if the train
"A" bypass line check valve failed open with train
"B"
in
service that this would be indicated by flow indicators and a
low header pressure alarm in the control room.
This would
result in the starting of the train B standby pump.
The licensee reviewed the inspector's comment and concurred that
the lower flow conditions would not be detected by the flow
indicators in the control room since the indicators are in
500 GPM increments and the amount of flow bypassed would be
approximately 200 GPM.
In addition, this reduction of flow
would not be sufficient to cause the starting of the train "B"
standby pump. .However, this condition would be detectable in
the control room by the high flow alarm annunciator off of FSH
11776 on the train "A"
inter tie line.
The licensee committed
to revise the calculation to reflect the correct method of
failure detection and failure effect on system safety function
l
capability for items 85b, 86b, 87b, 88b, 89b, 90b.
The
inspector informed the licensee that, pending issuance of the
'
i
revised calculation, this matter will be identified as Inspector
Followup Item 50-425/88-12-05 "Review Revised Calculation
X4C1202S00F1 Regarding The Evaluation Of Flow Failure Detection
& Effect On System Safety Function For Items No's. 85b, 86b,
87b, 88b, 89b, & 90b."
(2) Review Of Code / Seismic Interfaces
A representative sample of Nuclear Safety-Related Systems were
selected and reviewed for ASME code and seismic category
interfaces.
The purpose of this inspection was to verify that
the systems were designed to meet seismic category I require-
ments to ensure no loss of function during a safe shutdown
earthquake. The inspector reviewed the following system design
bases and P and ids to determine that appropriate ASME code and
seismic interfaces were invoked.
Document No.
Title
DC-1203-6
CCW System Design Bases
2X4DB136,R-13
CCW System P & ID
2X4DB137,R-14
Trains A & B
DC-1202-5
WSCW System Design Bases
2X4DB133-1,R-21
NSCW System P & ID
2X40B134,R-18
Train A
2X4DB135,1,R-18
I
J
..
i
-
.
.
17.
Document No.
Title
(cont'd)
DC-1302-5
AFW System Design Basis
2X408161-1,R-19
AFW System P & ID
2X4DB161-2,R-18
Trains A & B
As a result of the above inspection, the inspectors raised the
following comments:
NSCW SYSTEM REVIEW
NSCW drain valve 2-1202-U4-129 off of the RHR pump motor. cooler
shown on P and ID 2X4DB134 reflects incorrect code / seismic
break.
The inspector confirmed that isometric drawing 2K3-
1202-155-01- which reflects the as-installed condition
s
correct. The licensee informed the inspector that this item was
a result of.a drafting error during incorporation of a DCN on to
the P and 10.
Isometric /P and ID reconciliation discovered this
drain missing from the P and ID and a DCN was issued against
2X4DB134 on December 22, 1986.
When it was incorporated in
April 1987 a draf ting error was made switching the code / seismic
break exactly opposite of the isometric drawing. The licensee
considers this to be an isolated case, and to ensure that this
is the case, the licensee - conducted a review of ten safety
related P and ids relative to the incorporation of 200 DCNs/
FERs
No additional incorporation errors were identified during
this review.
The licensee issued DCN No. 57 to P and ID
2X408134 to correct the identified discrepancy on March 28,
1988.
The inspector finds the licensee's response to be
4
acceptable, therefore this item is considered to be closed.
Also, during the above inspection, the inspector noted that P
and ids in general don't reflect code / seismic breaks location
for all vent, drain, and test connection piping. The licensee
acknowledged this and issued DCN No.12 to P and 10 2X408101
which added a note to specify code / seismic locations for the
type of corrections noted above.
The inspector finds this
action taken by the licensee to be acceptable, therefore, this
item is considered to be closed.
d.
Safety - Related System Piping Installation Review
(1) System Walkdown Inspection
i
Selected portions of the Nuclear Service Cooling Water (NSCW)
l
System Containment Spray (CS) System and High Head Safety
l
L
-
.
.
.
.
18
Injection System, were walked down.
The constructed piping
systems were compared to the piping and instrumentation diagrams
and the fabrication isometric drawings.
Examples of items
checked were piping configuration, pipe class, weld location,
valve location and appearance, orientation, labeling, piping
support location, and engagement of threaded fasteners.
(a) NSCW System Walkdown
Train "A" of the NSCW piping system was walked down in the
NSCW tower and pump house, connecting tunnel to the
auxiliary building, auxiliary building, connecting tunnel
to the diesel generating building, diesel
generator
building, and east of the U-II construction barrier on
level 3 of the control building. The inspectors conducted
the walkdown inspection with the piping and instrumentation
diagram and fabrication isometric drawings to verify that
the system was constructed as shown on the current approved
revision and in accordance with the piping and instrumen-
tation construction specification X4AZ01. The piping runs
inspected were designed and constructed to ASME boiler and
pressure vessel code (B and PVC),Section III Class III and
seismic Category 1 requirements.
The following drawings
were used in the walkdown.
P&ID/ ISO /Rev.
Title
2X4DB133-1,R-21
2X4DB134,R-18
2X408135-1,R-18
2K5-1202-023-01,R-7
2K5-1202-031-01,R-7
2K5-1202-033-01,R-7
2K5-1202-004-02,R-8
2K5-1202-004-01,R-6
2K3-1202-004-05,R-4
2K3-1202-037-01,R-7
2K3-1202-181-02,R-5
2K3-1202-408-01,R-4
2K5-1202-181-012,R-6
2K5-1202-037-01,R-5
FAB. 150 - NSCW Supply To DG 1-A
2K5-1202-037-02,R-6
FAB. ISO - NSCW Supply To DG 1-A
2K5-1202-037-03,R-3
FAB. ISO - NSCW Supply To DG 1-A
2K5-1202-035-03,R-3
FAB. ISO - NSCW Return From DG 1-A
2K5-1202-035-01,R-5
FAB. 150 - NSCW Return From OG 1-A
2K2-1202-104-02,R-9
FAB. ISO - NSCW To ESF Chiller
2K2-1202-104-03,R-11
FAB. ISO - NSCW To ESF Chiller
2K2-1202-134-03,R-13
FAB. 150 - NSCW From ESF Chiller
2K2-1202-134-02,R-6
FAB. ISO - NSCW From ESF Chiller
b
.
.
,
.
.
.19
In general for. the items reviewed, the piping was found
installed in accordance with the drawings.
One question
was raised for a support location on drawing 2K5-1202-
033-01.
The drawing showed a support .at N0DE NO. 241 -
location between the discharge of the NSCW pump and the
pump house wall. However, the support was actually located
outside the pump house on the other side of the pump house
wall.
The licensee stated that the node points on the
isometric drawing do not reflect the support location but
rather the pipe support drawings which are referenced show
the as-installed location.
The licensee confirmed that
pipe
support
drawing
(V2-1202-023-H004)
which
was
referenced for node point 241 reflected the as-installed
condition of the hanger.
Therefore, this question was
resolved.
(b) Containment Spray System Walkdown
Train "B" of the Containment Spray System was walked down
in the auxiliary building, fuel handling building, and
containment
building.
The
inspectors
conducted the
walkdown inspection with the piping and instrumentation
diagram and the fabrication isometric drawings to verify
that the system was constructed as shown on the current
approved revision and in accordance with the piping and
instrumentation construction specification X4AZ01.
The
piping runs inspected were designed and constructed to ASME
B and PVC,
Section III Class II
requirements.
The
following drawings were used in the walkdown.
P&ID/ ISO /Rev.
Title
2X4DB131,R-14
2K3-1206-019-01,R-6
FAB. ISO. - Spray Additive TK Piping
2K3-1206-019-03,R-7
FAB. 150 - Spray Additive TK Piping
2K3-1206-037-01,R-4
FAB. 150 - Spray Additive TK Piping
2K3-1206-048-01,R-8
FAB. ISO - Spray Additive TK Piping
2K3-1206-002-01,R-14
r
2K7-1206-002-01,R-11
'
2K3-1206-002-02,R-5
2K3-1206-002-02,R-10
FAB.150 - CS Suction Piping
2K3-1206-006-02,R-10
FAB. ISO - CS Discharge Piping
2K3-1206-006-03,R-5
FAB. ISO - CS Discharge Piping
2K3-1206-006-04,R-5
FAB. ISO - CS Discharge Piping
2K7-1206-006-01,R-5
FAB. ISO - CS Discharge Piping
2K4-1206-008-10,R-4
FAB. ISO - CS Discharge Piping
The piping system was found installed per the applicable
drawings for those items checked.
,
h
.
-_
_- _-
_ __
'
..
.
-
-
.
20
.
(c) High Head Safety Injection System Walkdown
This inspection consisted of a .walkdown on the train
"A"
centrifugal charging suction piping from the RWST and the
discharge piping thru the SI discharge valves and-into the
four reactor coolant loops. The inspectors conducted _the
walkdown inspection with the piping and ir.strumentation
diagram to verify that the system was constructed as shown
on the current, approved revision and in accordance with
the piping and instrumentation. construction specification
X4AZ01.
The piping runs inspected were designed and
constructed to ASME B & PVC,Section III Class I and II and
seismic category 1 requirements.
The following drawings
were used in the walkdown.
P&ID/ ISO /Rev.
Title
2X4DB116-2,R-15
Chemical & Volume Control System
DCN 35 & FCR MFCRB-8751F
2X4DB119,R-15
Safety Injection System
2X4DB121,R-17
Safety Injection System
DCN 79, FCR's
17,860,MFCRB
17,741
During the walkdown, the inspector noted that P and 10
2X4DB119 did not reflect the correct installation of the
vent valves on the loop 4 cold leg injection line. The P
and ids reflected that the vent valves were installed
inside the shield wall.
However, the actual installation
as shown on isometric drawing 2K4-1204-077-02,R-4, was
outside the shield wall. The licensee has reconciled the P
and ID to reflect the correct installation in accordance
with the isometric drawing by issuing DCN 29 to P and ID
2X408111 and DCN 34 to P and ID 2X4DB119.
The inspector
considers this item to be satisfactory resolved.
In addition to the above noted discrepancy, the inspector
.
identified that flow elements (FE's) - 0924,0926, and 0927
were installed backwards. . These flow elements are located
downstream of the SI discharge valves in the SI injection
lines to the reactor coolant system cold legs for loops 1,
3, and 4 respectfully.
Several meetings were held with the licensee to discuss the
above NRC finding as well as an NRC concern about the
possibility for the performance of a preoperational flow
t
,
.
. _ .
.
-
.
.
.
.
.
21
balance test with FEs/ fos installed backwards since there
is no prerequisite in .preops for test supervisors to
check / verify the proper installation of FEs and F0s.
As a result of the above finding, the -licensee took
appropriate corrective action consisting of but not limited
to the following:
1) A walkdown of all FEs/F0s was
conducted which identified an additional 17 installed
backwards out of a total of 248. 2) PCN #7 was issued to
Pullman Power Products procedure IX-5 to specify installa-
tion instructions and to require QC verification of orifice
plate orientation in relation to flow.
3) Training was -
conducted of craft personnel .on how to install FE's/F0's.
4) FE/F0 installations will be limited to trained flush /
hydro personnel and 5) Test supervisors are required to-
verify FE/F0 orientation and document it in the test log
prior to the performance of a test.
The foregoing in considered to be in violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criteria V and will be identified as
Violation 50-425/88-12-01 "Failure To Provide Adequate
Instructions To Ensure The Proper Installation Of Flow
Elements And Orifices."
It should be noted that this item was not inspected by the
.
Readiness Review Staff during the performance of Module
No. 4 since it was scoped to be inspected in Module No. 20
Instrumentation and Controls.
The reason being that at the time of performance of Module
.
'
No. 4 flow elements and/or orifices were not installed.
Therefore, it would not have been expected for the
Readiness Review Staff to have identified this item during
>
the performance of Module No. 4.
(2) Review Of Documentation For Piping Installation
(a) NSCW Supply And Return Header Piping To Diesel Generator
(DG-1A)
An inspection was conducted of the train "A"
NSCW supply
and return header piping to DG-1A piping fabrication sheets
to verify the following attributes:
Proper material type
and certification per piping classification, properly
documented code data report for NPP-1 for fabricated
nuclear piping subassemblies, proper weld history documen-
tation, and proper non destructive examination (liquid
penetrant) Documentation for ASME III, Class 3 piping.
Piping fabrication sheets were reviewed for the following
spool numbers.
.
. _
_
____.
__ -
_
_ . .
_ _.. _ _,_ _ _ _
_ _ _ _
,
-
(
-
.
.
.,
'
.
22
Spool No.
Fab. Sht. No.
~ Description
2-1202-035-S-01
4107
10" Return Header Pipe
Assembly
2-1202-035-S-02
4201
10" Return Header Pipe
Assembly
2-1202-035-S-03
4202
10" Return Header Pipe
Assembly
2-1202-035-S-04
4108
10" Return Header Pipe
Assembly
2-1202-035-S-05
4109
10" Return Header Pipe
Assembly
2-1202-035-S-06
4110
10" Return Header Pipe
Assembly
2-1202-037-S-01
4114
10" Supply Header Pipe
'
Assembly
'
2-1202-037-S-02
4115
10" Supply Header Pipe
Assembly
2-1202-037-5-03
4116
10" Supply Header Pipe
Assembly
-
2-1202-037-S-04
4205
10" Supply Header Pipe
Assembly
2-1202-037-S-05
4117
10" Supply Header Pipe
Assembly
2-1202-037-S-06
4118
10" Supply Header Pipe
,
Assembly
2-1202-037-S-07
4119
10" Supply Header Pipe
'
Assembly
(b) NSCW Tower Header and Distributing Piping
Documentation relating to selected portions of the NSCW
tower distribution piping supplied by the Marley Cooling
Tower Company was reviewed to verify that the piping met
the requirements outlined in Construction Specification
,
No. X4A002 "Specification For Nuclear Service Cooling
Towers And Associated Equipment".
This specification
e
,.
--
_
_
,_.~,.,.z_._,-...,____..
.-___,1-.___..._,_..___,.___.___.._.
_. - .- _
. . .
70'
,,
. *
y
,.
,
u
,
23
states that-the design of the cooling tower, equipment, and
piping shall be in _ accordance with ASME Section III,
Class 3' ~and seismic Category 1 requirements.
Specific
drawings and documents listed below were used to verify
that- the NSCW Train "A" header (2-1202-007-12) and branch
arm a ssembly _ (2-1202-007-8) were installed in accordance
with these requirements.
Isometric Orawings
2V5<1202 007-02 - Branch Arm Assembly
Weld Process Sheets
007-W-101 - Branch Arm Assembly 8" Butt Weld
007-W-102 - Branch Arm Assembly 8"' Butt Weld
Pipe Support Installation Process Sheets
V2-1202-T07-H045 - Header Support Assembly Bracket
V2-1202-T07-H046 - Header Support Assembly
V2-1202-T07-H048 - Branch Arm Saddle Assembly
Bolting Verification Field Process Sheet
Spool 007-S-04 to Vendor
NPP-1 Code Data Reports
AP & E S/N 2903 - Branch Arm Assembly
AP & E S/N 2932 - Branch Arm Assembly
Supplier Quality Verification Documentation Lists
Equipment Tag # 2-1202-W4-001 Distribution Piping And
Supports
Equipment Tag # 2-1202-W4-002 Distribution Piping And
Supports
Documentation Turnover Package
2-1202-P02
Marley Drawings
78-42913
Plan View Of Spray System
78-4717
Spray System Anchorage And Load Points
78-4718
Load Tables For Spray System
79-41025
Spray System Installation
79-41026
Spray System Installation Details
79-41027
Mechanical Equipment Installation
79-41271
Branch Arm Saddle Fabrication And Assembly
79-41285
Header Assembly
79-41425
Header Support Bracket Assembly
81-4882
Specifications Required For NSCW Towers
83-2450
Standard Torque Recommendation For Fasteners
..
T'
.
,
.
.
24
e.
Safety - Related Equipment Installation Review
A ' representative sample of installed equipment was inspected to
verify that the as installed condition was in accordance with the
requirements specified. in the applicable manufacturer drawing and
installation manual, layout drawing, and piping and instrumentation
drawing.
The following attributes were inspected: proper documen-
tation of installation on field process sheets (i.e. tightening. or
torquing of anchor bolts as required); proper evidence of equipment
maintenance and cleanliness during construction and startup; proper
equipment tag number and code plate serial number, proper nozzle
location, size and elevation; proper drain, vent, and relief
connections; proper handling of equipment; and proper code class.
The following equipment was selected on the basis of either being
cooled by or part of the Nuclear Service Cooling Water System by the
inspector and inspected for the above noted attributes:
Equip. No.
Description
Specification No.
2-1202-P4-001
NSCW Pump - Train "A"
2X4AF02-33
2-1202-P4-005
NSCW Pump - Train "A"
2X4AF02-33
2-1203-E4-001
CCW Heat Exchanger
2X4AE01-4
2-1217-E4-001
ACCW Heat Exchanger
2X4AE01-50
2-1501-A7-001
CTB Cooling Unit Coils
2X4AJ16-2
2-1501-A7-005
CTB Cooling Unit Coils
2X4AJ16-2
2-1511-E7-002
Reactor Cavity Cooling Unit Coils 2X4AJ16-4
2-1515-A7-001
Containment Aux. Cooling Unit
2X4AJ16-3
2-1592-C7-001
ESF Chiller
2X4AJ04-11
f.
Safety - Related Valve Installation Review
A Representative sample of installed valves were inspected to verify
that the as installed condition was in accordance with the require-
ments
specified in the applicable piping and instrumentation
drawings, isometric drawings, and instrumentation index or valve
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designation list.
The following attributes were inspected:
proper
valve orientation and flow direction; proper valve sizing and type;
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proper piping class (i.e. code class, pressure rating, material type,
and end connection type); proper tag and serial number; proper piping
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of instrument air to air operated valves to ensure that valve will
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fail to the safe position on loss of air pressure; and proper
operator sizing to ensure closure against maximum operational
differential pressure conditions. The following valves were randomly
selected by the inspector and inspected for the above noted
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attributes:
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Valve No.
Description
Drawing No.
Size / Type
Reac Cav &
2X4AR01-375-
10" Air Oper. Gate
Cnmt Sump
HDR ISO-
HV-2791A-
Hydrogen Monitor
2X5AC07-109
3/4" Solenoid
. ISO
Operated Globe
2X6AA06-255
3" Air Operated
LTDN Orifice ISO
2X6AA06-341
3" Air Operated
Control
2X6AA06-428
3" Air Operated
Globe
RHR Cnmt
2X5AC07-153
1"' Solenoid
Sump Pass
Operated
Sample Train "A"
RHR Train "B"
2X5AC07-107
3/4" Solenoid
Suct Line Vent
Operated Globe
2X5AC01-291
3" Air Operated
Control
,
2X6AA06-250
3" Globe
Purif. Pump
Disch
o
2X6AA06-389
8" Swing Check
HL Loop 1
,
2-1204-U4-142 SI To C1
2X5AG08-58
2" Needle
Loop 4
4
2-1205-U6-001 RHR Train "A"
2X6AA06-400
12" Swing Check
Suct From
2-1205-U4-123 RHR Train "B"
2X6ARol-457
14" Check
<
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Suct From
Cnmt Sump
2-1206-U6-017 CS Train "A"
2X6AA06-391
8" Gate
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Valve No.
Description
Drawing No.
Size / Type
-(cont'd)
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2-1206-U6-018 CS Train "B"
2X6AA06-391
8" Gate
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2-1208-U4-417 - CVCS Seal INJ
2X5AC08-50
1" Needle
To RCP #4
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2-1901-U4-039 WPSL _CDT HX
2X4AR01-355
3" Swing Check
Outlet HDR
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Conclusions
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The inspectors have concluded based on a review on a representative
sample of the commitments designated in section 3.2 of module 4 that
the licensee has accurately defined licensing commitments from the
FSAR,
responses to inspection and enforcement bulletins, and
correspondence to the NRC.
In addition, the licensee has accurately
defined the working level implementing document utilized by site
personnel to ensure that these commitments (within the scope of
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module 4) are invoked during the design and construction phase.
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Furthermore, based on independent NRC inspections of randomly
selected mechanical equipment, and piping systems, the inspectors
have concluded that the hardware inspected was installed per
licensing commitments in accordance with Regulatory requirements.
Therefore, it is recommended that'this module be accepted by the NRC.
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