ML20151T093
| ML20151T093 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Monticello  |
| Issue date: | 08/28/1998 |
| From: | Kim T NRC (Affiliation Not Assigned) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20151T096 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 9809090241 | |
| Download: ML20151T093 (10) | |
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UNITED STATES g
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION wAsnmoToN, D.C. seseddeM NORTHERN STATES POWER COMPANY DOCKET NO. 50-263 -
MONTICELLO NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE Amendment No.101 License No. DPR-22 1.
The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:
A.
The application for amendment by Northern States Power Company (the licensee) dated June 19,1998, as supplemented July 1,1998, and including information in the licensee's May 5,1997, letter, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I; B.
The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission; C.
There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations; D.
The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and E.
The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.
2.
Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment, and paragraphs 2.C.2 and 2.C.8 of Facility Operating License No. DPR-22 are hereby amended to read as follows:
i 9809090241 980828 i
PDR ADOCK 05000263 P
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C.2 Technical Soecifications 3:
The Technical Specifications contained in Appendix A, as revised through Amendment No. 101, are hereby incorporated in the license. The licensee shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications, i
CA Additional Conditions The Additional Conditions contained in Appendix C, as revised through Amendment No._ 101, are hereby incorporated into this license. The licensee shall operate the facility in accordance with the Additional Conditions.
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3.
This license amendment is effective as of the date ofissuance. Implementation of the license conditions shall be as specified in Appendix C.
I FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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Tae Kim, Senior Project Manager Project Directorate 111-1 Division of Reactor Projects - lil/IV Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation j
Attachments: 1 Changes to the Technical Specifications
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- 2. Page C-2 of Appendix C Date of Issuance: August 28, 1998 s
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APPENDIX C---continued Amendment implementation Number Additional Condition Date 98 Update Section 5.2 of the Updated Safety Within 90 days from the Analysis Report by incorporating Figure E.2 date of plant startup of the NSP submittal dated July 16,1997.
from the current ~
maintenance outage, or November 1,1997, whichever is later.
98 Process a 10 CFR 50.59 evaluation to Within 180 days from the change the EOP definition of adequate date of plant startup t
core cooling to 2/3 core height. The from the current corresponding EOP changes and the maintenance outage, or required operator training shall also be February 1,1998, completed. Finalimplementations shall be whichever is later.
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completed when all the 10 CFR 50.59 evaluation requirements are satisfied.
101 Conduct an independent evaluation of the Within 9 months of the testing methodology and the testing date of issuance of configuration of the EFT [ emergency Amendment No.101.
filtration testing] system by HEPA and charcoal filter testing experts. This evaluation shallinclude review of the exceptions to the ASME N510-1989 testing standard listed in Exhibit F of NSP's June 19,1998, letter. The evaluation results shall be reported to the NRC.
101 Initiate appropriate modifications to the Within 24 months of the EFT system to comply with the ASME date ofissuance of N510-1989 testing standard or obtain NRC Amendment No.101.
approval for continued use of the exceptions.
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C-2 Amendment No.101
ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO.101 FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-22 DOCKET NO. 50-263 Revise Appendix A Technical Specifications by removing the pages identified below and insertir.g the attached pages. The revised pages are identified by amendment number and contain vertical lines indicating the areas of change.
REMOVE INSERT 123 123 148 148
'229w 229w 229x 229x 229y 229y 229z 229z
A 3.0 LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION.
4.0 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.
The reactor vessel head bolting studs shall not be 4.
When the reactor vessel head studs are under under tension unless the temperature of the vessel tension and the reactor is in the Cold Shutdown head flange and the head are 270 F.
Condition, the reactor vessel shell flange temperature shall be permanently recorded.
C.
Coolant Chemistry C. Coolant Chemistry 1.
'The steady state radioiodine concentration in the l
reactor coolant shall not exceed 0.25 microcuries of 1.
(a) A sample of reactor coolant shall be taken at.
1-131 dose equivalent per gram of water.
least every 96 hours0.00111 days <br />0.0267 hours <br />1.587302e-4 weeks <br />3.6528e-5 months <br /> and b
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3.6/4.6 123 Amendment No. 0, 101
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Bases 3.6/4.6 (Continuedt q
C.
Coolant Chemistry a
in the event of a steam line rupture outside the drywell, calculations show the resultant radiological dose at the exclusion area boundary to be less than 10% of the dose guidehnes of 10 CFR 100. This dose was calculated on the basis of the radiosodine concentration limit of 2 pCi of I-131 dose equivalent per gram of water. In the event of a postulated high energy line break in the -
RWCU system outside the drywell, calculations show the resultant radiological dose at the exclusion area boundary to be less than 10% of the dose guidelines of 10 CFR 100. This dose was calculated on the basis of the radeosodine concentration limit of 0.25 pCi of I-131 dose equivalent per gram of water.
The reactor coolant sample will be used to assure that the limit of Specificetion 3.6.C.1 is not exceeded. The radioiodine concentration would not be expected to change rapidly dunng steady state operation over a penod of 96 hours0.00111 days <br />0.0267 hours <br />1.587302e-4 weeks <br />3.6528e-5 months <br />. In addition, the trend of the radioactive gaseous effluents, which is continuously monitored, is a good indicator of the trend of the radioiodirm -
concentration in the reactor coolant. When a significant increase in radioactive gaseous effluents is indicated, as specified, an additional reactor coolant sample shall be taken and analyzed for radioactive lodme.
Whenever an isotopic analysis is performed, a reasonable effort will be made to determine a signsficant percentage of those contributors representing the total radioactivity in the reactor coolant sample. Usually at least 80 percent of the total gamma i
radioactivity can be identified by the isotopic analysis.
it has been observed that radiosodme concentration can change rapidly in the reactor coolant dunng transient reactor operations such as reactor shutdown, reactor power changes, and reactor startup if failed fuel is present. As sr ecified, additional reactor coolant samples shall be taken and analyzed for reactor operations in which steady state radiosodern concentrations in the reactor
' coolant indicate various levels of iodine releases from the fuel. Smce the radiosodme concentration in the reactor coolant is not j
continuously measured, reactor coolant samping would be ' effective as a means to rapidly detect gross fuel element failures.
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However, some capability to detect gross fuel element failures is inherent in the radiation monitors in the off-gas system and on the main steam line.
Materials in the pnmary system are pnmarily 304 stainless steel and zircaloy. The reactor water chenvistry limits are established to I
prevent damage to these materials. The limit placed on chlonde concentration is to prevent stress corrosion cracking of the stainless steel.
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148 3.6/4.6 BASES Amendment No. O,101
3.0 LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION 4.0 SURVEILLANCE REQUIRERRENTS b.
When both filter trains of the control room emergency filtration system are inoperable, restore at least one train to operable status within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> or be in hot shutdown within the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> following the 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> and reduce the reactor coolant water temperature to below 2W W th % 24 h 2.
Performance Requerement Test 2.
Performance Requirements The in-place performance testmg of HEPA filter banks and charcoal adsorber banks shall be conducted in -
- a. WM %Ws accordance with Sections 10 and 11 of ASME (1) The results of the in-place DOP tests at 1000 N510-1989 with exceptions desenbed in Section 6.7,of cfm (110%) shall shows1% DOP penetration the USAR. The carbon sample test for methyliodide on each individual HEPA filter and shall show shall be conducted in accordance with ASTM
.s0.05% DOP penetration on the co nbaned D 3803-1SG9.
HEPA filters.
a.
At least once per 720 hours0.00833 days <br />0.2 hours <br />0.00119 weeks <br />2.7396e-4 months <br /> of system operation; or (2) The results of in-place halogenated once per operating cycle, but not to exceed 18 1
hydrocarbon tests at 1000 cfm (110%) shall months, whichever occurs first; or following painting, I
show50.05% penetration on the combined fire, or chemical release while the system is charcoal banks.
operating that could contaminate the HEPA filters or (3) The results of laboratory carbon sample charcoal adsorbers, perform the following:
j analysis sha'l simw50.4% methyl iodide penetration when tested at 30*C and 95%
(1) In-place DOP test the HEPA filter banks.
I relative humidity.
(2) In-place test the charcoal adsorber banks with I
halogenated hydrocarbon tracer.
(3) Remove one carbon test canister from the charcoal adsorber. Subject this sample to a laboratory analysis to verify methyl iodide removal efficiency.
(4) Initiate from the control room 1000 cfm (110%)
flow through both trains of the emergency filtration treatment system.
3.17/4.17 pg Amendment No. 66,101
3.0 UMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION 4.0 SURVElt.A.ANCE REQUIREMENTS -
b.
The system shan be shown to be operable with; b.
At least once per operatmg cycle, but not to exceed 18 months, the followmg conditions shall be (1) Combmed filter pressure drop 58 inches water.
demonstrated for each emergency filtratum system train:
(2) Inlet heater power output 5kw i 10%.
(1) Pressure drop across the combined firers of (3) Automaticinitiation upon receipt of a high each train shaR be measured at 1000 cfm radiation signal.
(110%) flow rate.
(2) Operability of inlet heater at nommal rated power shall be venfied.
(3) Venfy that on a simulated high radiation signal, the train swtches to the pressunzation mode of operation and the control room is maintamed at a posnive pressure with respect to adjacent areas at the design flow rate of 1000 cfm 3.
Post Maintenance Requrements a.
After any maintenance or testing that could affect the HEPA filter or HEPA filter mounting frame leak a.
After any mamtenance or testing that could affect tight integnty, the resuRs of the in-place DOP tests at 1000 cfm (110%) shaN show s1% DOP the leak tight integnty of the HEPA filters, perform in-place DOP tests on the HEPA firers.
penetration on each individual HEPA filter and shall show <0.05% DOP penetration on the cuirdAed HEPA Mers.
b.
After any maintenance or testing that could aWect the leak tight integnty of the charcoal adsorber b.
After any maintenance or testing that could affect banks, perform halogenated hyevceson tests on the chael adh the charcoal adsorber leak tight integnty, the resuRs of in-place halogenated hydrocarbon tests at 1000 I
cfm (110%) shall show50.05% penetration on the combined charcoal adsorber banks.
3.17/4.17 229x I
Amendment No. 65 101
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Bases 3.17:
A.
Control Room Ventilation System The Control Room Ventilation System provides air conditioning and heating as required to maintain a suitable environment in the main control room and portions of the first and second floors of the Emergency Filtration Train (EFT) building. The system is -
designed to maintain a nominal temperature of 78"F dry bulb in the main control room in the summer and a nominal temperature of 72*F in the winter. During normal operation, the CRV system recirculates the air in the control room envelope as needed. During a high radiation event, the Control Room Ventilation System continues to operate, and the Control Room Emergency Filtration Train system will start automatically to pressurize the control room protective envelope. The Emergency Filtration Train system can also be started manually.
All toxic substances which are stored onsite or stored / shipped within a 5 mile radius of the plant have been analyzed for their affe'ct on the control room operators. It has been concluded that the operators will have at least two minutes to don protective breathing apparatus before incapacitation limits are exceeded. For toxic substance which are transported on highways within 5 miles of the plant, it has been determined that the probability of a release from the plant due to incapacitation of the operators caused by a spill is sufficiently low that this scenario may be excluded. Protection for toxic chemicals is provided through operator training.
B.
Control Room Emeroency Filtration Systent The Control Room Emergency Filtration System assures that the control room operators will be adequately protected against the effects of radioactive leakage which may by-pass secondary containment following a loss of coolant accident or radioactive releases from a steam line break accident. The system is designed to slightly pressurize the control room on a radiation signalin the l
ventilation air. Two completely redundant trains are provided.
Each train has a filter unit consisting of a prefilter, HEPA filters, and charcoal adsorbers. The HEPA filters remove particulates from the Control Room pressurizing air and prevent clogging of the iodine adsorbers. The charcoal adsorbers are installed to remove any radioiodines from the pressurizing air. The verification of performance parameters combined with the qualification testing conducted l on new filters and adsorbers provide a high level of assurance that the Emergency Filtration System will perform as predicted in reducing doses to plant personnel below those level stated in Criterion 19 of Appendix A to 10 CFR 50.
Dose calculations have been performed for ue Control Room Emergency Filtration System which show that, assuming 85% standby gas treatment system adsorption and filtration efficiency and 98% control room emergency filtration system adsorption and filtration efficiency and radiolodine plateout, whole body and organ doses remain within NRC guidelines.
3.17 BASES 229y Amendment No. 65,89,101
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1 Bases 4.17:
f A.
Control Room Ventilation System Control roor. air temperature is checked each shift to ensure that the continuous duty rating for the instrumentation and equipment cooled by this system is not exceeded.
Demonstrating automatic isolation of the control room using simulated accedent signals assures control room isolation under accident conditions.
t B.
Control Room Emeroency Filtration System Air flow through the filters and charcoal adsorbers each month assures operability of the system.
f The frequency of tests and sample analysis is necessary to show that the HEPA filters and charcoal adsorbers can perform as evaluated. The charcoal adsorber tray is installed which can accommodate a sufficient number of representative adsorber sample modules for estimating the amount of penetration the system adsorbs though its life. Sample modules will be installed with the same batch characteristics as the system adsorbent and will be withdrawn for the methyl iodide removal efficiency tests. Each module withdrawn will be replaced or blocked off. In-place testing procedures will be established utikzog apphcable sections of ASME N510-1989 as desenbed in Section 6.7 of the USAR. If test results are unacceptable, all adsorbent in the train is replaced. Any I
HEPA filters found defective are replaced.
Pressure drop across the combined HEPA filters and charcoal adsoitmis of less than or equal to 8 inches of water at the system l
design flow rate will indicate that the filters and adsvibers are not clogged by excessive amounts of foreign matter.
Demonstrating automatic control room pressurization using simulated accident signals assures control room pressurization with l
respect to adjacent areas under accident conditions.
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4.17 BASES 229z Amendment No. 65,101
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