ML20151S923
| ML20151S923 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | 07000250 |
| Issue date: | 06/01/1982 |
| From: | Clark J, Morgan W, Rosenberg C BOEING CO. |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20151S885 | List: |
| References | |
| 2-3644-RE10-663, 70152, PROC-820601, NUDOCS 8602100016 | |
| Download: ML20151S923 (12) | |
Text
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ATTACHAfENT o4 January 11, 1982 2-3644-RE10-663 OPERATING PROCEDURE - AGREEMENT
SUBJECT:
PHYSICAL PROTECTION OF SPECIAL NUCLEAR MATERI AL '0F LOW STRATEGIC SIGNIFICANCE AFFECTED ORGANIZATIONS:
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Approved by ysics
'Date Technology - REL Boeing Aerospace Company Physics Technology
,/,Jf)A Radiation Effects Laboratory J,2 // S J Seattle Services Division
. Hn V. CLARK
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Medical Services RadiationHealthProtectionfoncurrenceby
' Fate Boeing Security-Security and Fire Protection I'
!?Ch?O k2--
Concurrenge 17/
D' ate Chief Radiation Health Protection
REFERENCES:
a.
Industrial Hazards Control Bulletin (IHCB) No.'76.
" Control of Radiological Hazards" b.
BREL Operating Procedure Agreement 846-005/4-1600-202 " Health Protection-Radiation Effects Laboratory" c.
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Regulatory Guide 5.59, Office of Standards Development, Task MP 711-4 dated January 1980 d.
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Comission Rules and Regulations, Title 10, Chapter 1, Part 73,
Physical Pratection of Plants and Materials" PURPOSE This procedure is intended to establish and identify the physical protection of special nuclear material (SNM) of low strategic significance located at the Socing Radiation Effects Laboratory.
I 060Ploooit. 051 j on Page 1 of 12 i
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D II.
SCOPE This procedure contains security requirements that must be followed to help maintain physical protection for the special nuclear material while in storage.
These requirements are only applicable to the Special Nuclear Material foils stored in the BREL Sigma Pile room security cabinet.
The following outlines the content of this procedure.
I.
Purpose II.
Scope III.
General Requirements V.
Responsibilities VI.
SNM Physical Protection System VII.
Unauthorized Access Response Procedure VIII.
Security Cabinet Access and Egress Operating Procedure Appendix A - Map of Location of SNM Storage Cabinet Appendix B - Emergency Response Procedure for SNM Appendic C - Seal Installation and Removal List Appendix 0 - Security System Function Test Check Procedure III.
GENERAL INFORMATION AND HAZARDS The BREL Special Nuclear Material (SNM) is in the form of calibration foils.
They are stored in a safe, installed inside a secured, cabinet located in the sigma pile room (see map in Appendix A).
The cabinet has been equipped with a security alarm system to help comply with reference c.
Therefore, the cabinet should not be bumped or tampered with while working in the area.
During normal operations, there are no personnel hazards in the Sigma Pile Room except low radiation dose rates from other miscellanonus sources stored within the room. However, if any of the source containers or cabinets are damaged there could be a high dose rate and/or personnel contamination hazard in the area.
If there are any cabinet damages do not enter the area.
(See Appendix B for Emergency ResponseProcedure.)
IV.
GENERAL REQUIREMENTS A.
Only invididuals who are approved users shall use the SNM foils.
B.
The foils should never be left unattended unless they are secured in the cabinet.
C.
All approved users are required to follow this procedure and other existing procedures approved by RHP.
D.
All personnel working with SNM fotis shall wear their assigned film badge and finger ring.
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U V.
RESPONSIBILITIES A.
Using Organization will:
1.
a.
Comply with this Operating Agreement, Reference a. and b, and any specific conditions listed on Boeing's radioactive material licenses.
b.
Maintain an accountability of all SNM foils c.
Not allow anyone who is not an approved user to use the SNM.
d.
Implement and maintain in operable condition the SNM protection system which includes the intrusion alarm, physical barriers, seals and locking features.
e.
Make functional test checks of the security system including the intrusion alarm and physical barriers once a month and post the results on the functional test check list form located on the outside of the cabinet.
(See Appendix 0 for Functional Test Check Procedure.) A permanent record of the functional test checklistformwillbemaintainedbytheBRELNuclear Material Custodian.
f.
Maintain accountability, storage and usage control of all numbered seals and the am/ disarm key to prevent any unauthorized cabinet access.
g.
Maintain and update this procedure and obtain concurrent from Boeing Radiation Protection and Security.
h.
If there are any SNM security violations, assist Radiation Health Protection and Security in taking an accountability of SNM and evaluate any damages.
2.
The approved users will:
a.
Comply with this Operating Agreement, IHCB No. 76, and the Boeing radioactive material licensing conditions along with any other procedures established by the Radiation Health Protection Section.
b.
Be approved by the Corporate Isotope Connittee for the SNM usage and not allow anyone else to handle the foils.
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c.
Conduct surveys of foils each time they are removed and before they are returned to the security cabinet.
Record the results on a survey form and submit the forms to Radiation Health Protection for NRC inspections.
If Alpha contamination is detected at any time during their usage, the operation shall be terminated and Radiation Health Protection notified inanediately.
d.
Fill out the " Seal Installation and Removal List" each time the foils are removed or returned to the security cabinet.
e.
Be responsible for the safe keeping of all SNM foils removed from the security storage cabinet.
f.
Be responsible for securing the cabinet with a security seal and energizing the security system alarm after any SNM foils are removed or returned to the security cabinet.
B.
Radiation Health Protection will:
1.
Be responsible for obtaining a proper license for, possession and usage of all radioactive material.,
2.
Monitor the SNM foil prior to each initial series of tests and help establish an adequate protection program concerning the safe use, transfer and storage of the foils.
3.
Provide calibrated radiation survey instruments and personnel dosimetry devices when required.
4.
Leak test all the foils at frequencies specified by the NRC.
5.
Maintain the necessary Federal and State records for inspections.
6.
Help investigate any SNM, theft or damage and notify Boeing Security and the proper authorities when required.
7.
Help review any changes to this procedure.
C.
Security will 1.
Make security checks of the security cabinet after regular i
work hours to detect unauthorized cabinet entries or l
tampering.
2.
Implement the Emergency Response Procedure in the event there are any unauthorized entries to the SNM cabinet.
(Appendix B) l Page 4 of 12
3.
Investigate any SNM thefts and assist the using l
organization and Radiation Health Protection in filing any security reports requested by the NRC authorities.
4.-
Help review any changes made to this procedure.
VI.
SNM PHYSICAL PROTECTION SYSTEM AND PROCEDURES A.
Description The security cabinet itself has two security features.
1.
Numbered security seals: A new numbered seal is installed on the two ocors of tne cabinet after each authorized cabinet entry and must be broken to gain access to the SNM. The security seals are used in numerical sequence and i
their removal and installation are recorded by the approved users on the " Seal Installation and Removal List." New seals are issued and controlled by the BREL Nuclear Material Custodian.
l 2.
Audible intrusion alarm system:
To maintain security when the cabinet is left unattenced, the alarm is activated by entering a code number into the. alarm control system.
NOTE:
Deactivation of the alarm can only be done by an approved user, the special nuclear materials custodian or Radiation Health Protection.
B.
Regular Work Periods Detection Plan During regular work periods security is maintained by the intrustion alarm and the use of the numbered security seals.
The area is monitored by Radiation Effects assigned personnel working l
within the laboratory. See Section VII for unauthorized access response procedure.
C.
Non-Work Period Detection Plan During non-work periods the area is patrolled by regularly scheduled Boeing Security Guard personnel.
See Section VII for unauthorized access response procedure. A security key punch located in the sigma pile room is to be used by the Guards each time the area is checked.
D.
Security Guards can detect unauthorized access or tampering by one or more of the following:
1.
Cabinet damage is observed.
2.
Security seal is missing.
3.
Security seal number is not in numerical sequence with the other numbers on Seal Installation and Removal List posted on SNM cabinet.
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t i
I 4.
Audible alarm is sounding.
VII.
UNAUTHORIZED ACCESS RESPONSE PROCEDURE The following steps are to be followed by management if unauthorized access or tampering to the SNM security cabinet is detected:
~
1.
Follow the Emergency Response Procedure (Appendix B).
2.
A representative of both Radiation Health Protection and BREL Management will arrive and Radiation Health Protection will survey the area for any contamination.
They will also inventory l
I the SNM fails to determine if there has been a theft or tampering with the foils.
3.
If any SNM foils are missing, the Radiation Health Protection and BREL management will notify Boeing Security and other proper authorities.
Note: When securing the area and remaining foils be careful not to destroy or contaminate any evidence.
4.
If no SNM foils are missing, Radiation Health Protection and BREL management will re-secure the ar,ea, preserve any evidence, help Boeing Security make any necessary written reports and change combination and key locks as required.
VIII.
OPEN AND CLOSE SECURITY CABINET OPERATING PROCEDURE NOTICE:
The fission foils shall only be removed from the SNM Safe / security cabinet and loaded or unloaded from their
)
storage contains in the Sigma Pile Glove Box (as described in the SNM User Procedures). Only persons listed on the approved user's list posted outside the cabinet can remove or use the foils.
-1.
Obtain the key to the Sigma Pile Room from BREL Nuclear Material Custodian or Radiation Health Protection.
2.
Obtain security cabinet arm / disarm key from BREL Nuclear Material custodian or Radiation Health Protection.
3.
Turn arm / disarm switch to disarmed position (counterclockwise).
4.
Break security seal.
Broken seals are turned in for new ones.
5.
Log in on " Seal Installation and Removal" List.
(See Appendix C for example.)
Enter the date and time the seal was removed, the reason and sign the " Remover" column.
Note:
You must be on the approved user list to sign the column.
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6.
Open combination lock on cabinet (obtain the combination from BREL Nuclear Material Custodian) then open cabinet.
7.
Open Safe. 'Obtain safe combination from BREL Nuclear Material Custodian or Radiation Health Protection.
8.
Use only procedures approved by Radiation Health Protection fer handling the fission foils (SNM).
9.
Return foils to safe.
10.
Lock safe.
- 11. Reset alann by pushing the reset (red) button and the alarm code (obtain code from BREL Nuclear Material custodian or Radiation Health Protection) and then again push the reset button and the code so that the test light is lit on the intrusion alarm box.
12.
Lock cabinet with combination lock.
13.
Install security seal. Obtain the next consecutive numbered seal from the BREL Nuclear Material Custodian or Radiation Health Protection.
- 14. Log new seal number.
Enter the date ' installed and sign ~the log
~
installer column.
- 15. Turn arm / disarm switch to arm position (clockwise).
When the alarm system is armed and the cabinet is secure, the area can -
be left unattended.
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APPEND 1X A LOCATION OF SPECIAL NUCLEAR MATERIAL (SNM) STORAGE CABINET Z
MAIN ENTRANCE g
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1
/l SNM STORAGE CABINET LOCATI0f WITH SEAL SECURITY KEY PUNCH FIRST FLOOR 15-10 BUILDING ROOM 111 Page 8 of 12 70152
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APPENDIX 8 EMERGENCY RESPONSE PROCEDURE FOR SECURITY OF SPECIAL NUCLEAR MATERIAL (SNM) 0F
~
LOW STRATEGIC SIGNIFICANCE Immediate Action if cabinet is damaged, seal is missing or broken, seal number is out of numerical sequence * (i.e., 07421, 07422, 07423 etc.), or the audible alarm is sounding, call the following:
Work Home 1.
Security Supervision **
655-7700 NA 2.
Radiaton Health Protection George S. Henman 655-4470 324-0261 At BREL or Melvin R. Kimmel 655-4470 243-7803 At BREL or George A. Whitsett 655-0500 244-4121 or Wiliam E. Morgan (Chief) 655-0500 932-3463 3.
BREL Management Donald R. Shoffstall 655-8220 631-4213 or' Dennis A. Russell 655-6712 546-4476 At~BREL Secondary Action 1.
Do not touch or handle anything in room.
2.
Close entry door and wait for assistance from.one of the above (Do not leave building).
See Seal Installation and Removal List on Security Cabinet Door.
- Phone Security during work periods only after it has been ' determined by management that a theft has occurred.
70152 Page 9 of 12
APPENDIX C SEAL INSTALLATION AND REMOVAL-LIST Seal Date & Time Signature of Reason for Date & Time Signature of Number Removed Remover Removal Installed Installer 4
i t
i 4
NOTICE:
See Attachment for approved Signature List.
1 1
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APPENDIX D SECURITY SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST CHECK PROCEDURE The functional test check will be performed monthly by the BREL Nuclear Material Custodian.
1.
Remove seal and fill out Seal Installation and Removal List and remove combination lock.
2.
To check door switch, leave arm / disarm switch in am position and open doors - alarm should sound.
3.
Reset alarm by pushing the reset (red) button and the alarm code (obtain code from BREL Nuclear Materia: custodian or Radiation Health Protection) and then again push the reset button and code so that the test light is lit on the intrusion alarm box.
4.
Close cabinet and re-arm system.
5.
To check the vibration sensor, shake the cabinet gently - alarm should sound.
If sensor is not sensitive enough it can be adjusted by a screw on the sensor.
6.
Reset alarm as was done in Number 3, above.
7.
Check cabinet for any physical damage or sign of forced entry.
8.
If all systems work then lock cabinet with cGabination lock, put new seal on, re-arm alarm and lock cabinet with combination loc.
(Fill out Seal Installation List.)
9.
If there is a system that does not work, notify BREL management /
Radiation Health Protection and arrange for imediate repair. Alternate security arrangements will be made by management when necessary.
- 10. Fil; out Functional Test Check List Form (Appendix E) with signature and date. This form is located on the outside of the cabinet.
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APPENDIX E FUNCTION TEST CHECK LIST Vibration Any Number Number of Door Switch Sensor Physical of Seal Signature Date Seal Removed Functioning. Functioning Damage?
Installed of Tester i
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