ML20151M157
| ML20151M157 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Fort Saint Vrain  |
| Issue date: | 12/11/1985 |
| From: | Jaudon J, Skow M NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20151M146 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-267-85-31, NUDOCS 8601020492 | |
| Download: ML20151M157 (15) | |
See also: IR 05000267/1985031
Text
' cu
,
,,
,
,
-
.
1
'
?
' APPENDIX B
,
,
~ U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION IV
~
.
~
NRC Inspection Report:
50-267/85-31
License: DPR-34
'
Docket: 50-267
,
Licensee:
Public Service Company of' Colorado
P. O. Box 840
Denver, Colorado 80201
Facility Name: Ft. St. Vrain
- ~ Inspection At:
Platteville, Colorado
Inspection Conducted: ' October ~21-25, 1985
M
/ 2. II 8b
- Inspector:
&_-
Date'
-
. @ow,/ Project Entyineer, Project Section A,
.
eacter I(.rojects' Branch
l/ @ '
-Approved:
M
L
audon Ch'ief, Project Section A
Date
tor P
ects Branch
Inspection Summary
Inspection Conducted October 21-25, 1985 (Report 50-267/85-31)
Areas Inspected: Routine, unannounced inspection of Fort St. Vrain Generating
Station. The inspection involved 39 inspector-hours'onsite by one NRC
inspector.
ph200492BD121e
G
DOCX 05000267
,
&
w
-L
__
- --
A
p
. - - ~ - -
,
,
-
.
,
f
-2-
DETAILS
1.
-Persons Contacted
- J. W. Gahm, Manager, Nuclear Power Operations
- C. .H. Fuller, . Station Manager
- L. W. Singleton, Manager,' Quality Assurance
~ *R. L. Craun, Site Engineering Manager
- T. Prenger, QA Services Manager
- F. J. Borst, Support Services Manager
- H. J. Ferris, QA Operations Manager
- G. L. Redmond, MQC Supervisor
- F. J. Novachek, Technical / Administrative Services Manager
- D. L. Frye, Sr. Licensing Speecialist
- W. A. Craine, Maintenance
T.~M. McIntire, Supe wisor, Nuclear Site Engineering
P.-M. Burch, Supervisor, QA Auditing
'
'
lM.-R. Quintana, Electrical Specialist
D. S. Stuart, Technical Services Engineer
.
J. E. Wojtisek, Plant Engineering Supervisor
-
M. Blossom, Maintenance Schedular
,
- Denotes those present at exit interview
+
.
.
- 2.
Followup to NRC Inspection Report 50-267/85-26
The NRC inspector performed a followup inspection of the NRC
' inspection documented in NRC Inspection Report 50-267/85-26.. The NRC
'
inspector also determined what, if any, corrective actions'had been taken
'..
by the licensee.
The paragraph numbers of NRC Inspection
~ Report 50-267/85-26, hereafter referred to as the PAT report, are used
,
4
"
,below to discuss the specific concerns of that report. Specific item
,.
numbers are also. identified, but some item numbers are made up of several
parts in various paragraphs. A summary of the item status is presented in
paragraph 3.
- .
PAT Report Paragraph 2.a.(1), Open Item 8526-01
The licensee's equipment control procedures did not comply with the
requirements of TMI Item I.C.6.
Procedure P-2, " Equipment Clearances and
Operation Deviations," Issue 13, did not require a second qcalified person
to' verify the correct implementation of tagging activities. On May 22,
1985,' NRC Region-IV'had requested a response within 120 days to a similar
finding that had been discussed at a Management Conference on November 14
1984. Clearance control form revisions were noted to be in progress
during this inspection.
- .
,
hA
-
,
.
,
.
E
e
-3-
Inspection Followup
The licensee has issued Station Manager's Administrative Procedure
SMAP-19 . Issue 1, dated September 10, 1985.
Paragraph 3.5.7 of SMAP-19,
Issue'1, provides independent verification ~ procedures. However,
evaluation was not completed to determine the adequacy of the new
'
procedures. 0 pen Item 8526-01 remains open.
PAT Report' Paragraph 2.a.(2), Unresolved Item 8526-02
Procedure P-1, " Plant Operations," did not provide adequate control of
H
temporary plant nodifications~
Specifically, Section 4.9, " Control of
.
Temporary Configuration," contained no provisions for ensuring the
temporary nature of modifications made under that procedure. At the time
of the inspection, 37 Temporary Configuration Requests (TCRs) were open
from 2 to 9 years. The licensee had initiated permanent Design Change
Notices (DCNs) for several of these TCRs, however, at least 11 of these
DCNs had been in preparation for over 2 years.
This lack of control of
temporary changes resulted in permanent changes being made to the station
without the necessary reviews being conducted.
Inspection Followup
The NRC inspector found that the licensee had initiated corrective action.
SMAP-18, Issue 1, dated' August 29, 1985, has been issued.
It provided
specific neans of controlling and reviewing temporary plant modifications
and identifying.the steps for processing TCRs and other forms required to
initiate a temporary change.
It also required that actions be initiated
~
within 3 months to make configurations permanent, if the configuration
cannot be returned to the original condition.
This portion of Unresolved Item 8526-02 remains open pending additional
inspection followup.
PAT Report Paragraph 2.c., Open Item 8526-03'
The NRC inspector had . concluded that it was evident that a significant
effort had been made'to upgrade the general: housekeeping conditions of the
plant.
Several major portions of the plant'were clean and -free of clutter,
debris, etc. Maintenance personnel were observed making a deliberate
effort to clean up the' work site after performing repairs. The licensee
had developed an extensive list of insulation repair requirements.
However, several safety hazards and basic housekeeping deficiencies were
noted. These included a fire hazard from oil in overhead cable trays,
poor lighting in some areas, an-open door on the back of an electrical
cabinet, graffiti on the walls, some plant components in need of cleaning
and repainting, a valve leaking onto exposed insulation repair work in
progress, damaged operating instructions posted on an ammonia injection
.
.
-
,
-4-
tank, chains for operating overhead valves hanging down into passageways,
and a safety seal missing from a relief valve.
The PAT report also noted that some of these deficiencies had been
identified in the past by Region IV inspection reports. The region had
made housekeeping an open item twice in previous inspection reports
(8325-03 and 8415-03), and the latest SALP report (May 7, 1985) noted that
housekeeping had continued to be a problem.
Procedure SMAP-13, " General
Housekeeping Program," specified inspection requirements, assigned
responsibility for designated plant zones, and provided directions for
reporting deficiencies. However, the procedure had no provisions for
tracking specific deficiencies to ensure appropriate corrective action and
management review.
Inspection Followup
SMAP-13 had no provision for tracking specific deficiencies to ensure
appropriate corrective action and management review. A computerized
tracking system "FSV Housekeeping System," has been implemented.
It
identifies the specific deficiency, its location, and management
responsibility. These reports are followed up by the managers performing
the tours and by the station manager.
Open Item 8526-03 is closed.
PAT Report Paragraph 2.d, Open Item 8526-04
The NRC inspector conducted a walkdown and performed a valve lineup of the
"B" diesel generator to observe equipment conditions and system lineups.
No valves were found in improper positions, but one valve was not in
,
accordance with the lineup sheet because of maintenance. Deficiencies
were noted in that the lineup procedure did not include verification of
the position of the following:
diesel engine cooling water temperature
control valves (TCVs), air valves on the TCV regulators, lube oil drain
valves, and lube oil drain plugs. The misposition of these items had the
potential for causing damage to the diesel engines to the extent that they
could fail to operate. The _ lube oil heater inlet and outlet valves were
not on the lineup sheets, and these valves were not labeled.
Inspection Followup
While this item referred to the Diesel Generator Lineup Sheets, the
licensee recognized that this also applies to other equipment. The
licensee stated that various " skid mounted" equipments have valves which
are listed generically in the individual operating manuals but that the
valves have not been given FSV numbers and included in the system lineups.
The NRC inspector roted that some of these valves, such as those
associated with the diesel, must be in certain positions when the diesel
receives a start signal in order to support continued operation of the
diesel. Those valves associated with safety-related equipment that are
.
.
-5-
_
required to be in a certain position to support proper operation of that
equipment when. called upon are required to be included in system Lineup
Procedures. This.is an apparent violation of the requirement to have
appropriate procedures for quality-related activities (8531-01). Open
Item 8526-03.is. closed, because it is incorporated into the apparent-
violation.
PAT Report Paragraphs 3.b.(1) and (2), Unresolved Item 8526-02
The weekly battery surveillance test, 5.6.2a-W, did not measure the
l-
temperature of cells adjacent to the pilot cell as_ required by
Technical Specification 5.6.2a.
,
Neither the monthly nor quarterly surveillance tests, SR 5.6.2b-M and
SR 5.6.2b-Q, measured the height of the electrolyte in the sampled cells
as required by TS 5.6.2b.
SR 5.6.2b-M verified that all cell electrolyte
levels were within the vendor specified operating band, but this was
i
recorded by a single check mark on the data sheet and there were no cell
measurements taken or recorded.
i
Inspection Followup
'
I
The failure of the licensee to develop procedures to adequately implement
TS surveillance requirements for determining battery operability is an
.
apparent violation. This portion of Unresolved Item 8526-02 is closed and
i
incorporated in violation 8531-01. The licensee has taken corrective
i
action by issuing Procedure Deviation Reports (PDRs)~ 85-1613 and 85-1640.
j .,
PDRs are the licensee's method for initiating beth temporary and permanent
,
changes to procedures. The inspector noted that the weekly.and monthly
l
surveillances performed since the PAT inspection have met the TS
requirements. This portion of violation 8531-01 is closed.-
'
{*
PAT Report Paragraph 3.b.(3), Unresolved Item 8526-02
The licensee modified the configuration of a station. battery and returned
i
the battery to an operable status without adequately considering whether
the modified battery would meet the requirements of TS 5.6.2.c.
The
annual discharge test of battery 1B conducted in April 1985 was performed
with a spare cell connected to the battery (59 cells total). On the basis
,
>
of the performance of this.59-cell battery during the discharge, the
3
i
licensee determined that battery capacity was acceptable in accordance
~
with TS 5.6.2c and the battery was operable.
Subsequently, the spare cell
p
i
was removed from battery IB, but there was apparently no discharge test or
evaluation conducted to determine that the resulting 58-cell battery would
'
meet the necessary operability requirements of the TS.
_
1
$1
3
)
}.
1
4
'
.
,_
_
_
_
-.
--
_
-
.
-6-
Inspection Followup
The NRC inspector found that the spare cell was removed because it would
not hold its charge following the discharge test.
Removal of a failed
cell was found to be an appropriate action. This portion of Unresolved
Item 8526-02 is closed.
PAT Report Paragraph 3.c.(1), Unresolved Item 8526-02
PDR 85-1032 revised the procedure to discharge the station batteries (lA,
IB) at 85 amps for 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> and the PPS battery at 70 amps for 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />
or until the battery terminal voltage reached 101.5 volts. Battery 18 was
discharged at 85 amps for only 19.2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> and the PPS battery was
discharged at 70 amps for only 9.6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> without either battery reaching
its minimum terminal voltage.
Interviews revealed that these discharges
were terminated by the personnel performing the tests without prior
management approval.
Inspection Followup
While the results of this discharge test appeared to meet the minimum
requirement of TS 5.6.2c, the procedure did not clearly permit the early
termination of the discharge. The licensee had also committed to meet his
proposed revised TS. The termination of the discharge was permissible by
these TS. This portion of Unresolved Item 8526-02 is closed. The NRC
inspector concluded from review of discharge data that the licensee had
capacity in excess of 80% on each battery.
PAT Report Paragraph 3.c.(2), Unresolved Item 8526-02.
The end of discharge specific gravities for each cell of battery 1A and IB
were all recorded at 1.110 and 1.160, respectively.
Interviews with
maintenance personnel revealed that these readings were the minimum
detectable values of the hydrometers used to record the end of discharge
data. The actual battery cell specific gravities were lower than the
recorded values and this information was not recorded on the surveillance
data sheet.
_ Inspection Followup
The specific gravity of the cells of batteries 1A and IB were below the
minimum detectable values of the hydrometers used to record the end of
discharge data. Thus, the actual data was not available to be recorded on
the surveillance data sheets. The minimum reading instead was recorded on
the data sheets.
The failure to follow Procedure SR 5.6.2c-A by measuring
and recording actual specific gravities is an apparent violation of the
licensee's own procedure, but it is not required by either the TS or
commonly accepted industry standards.
Accordingly, no violation is
issued. This portion of Unresolved item 8526-02 is closed.
!
_
-
.
-7-
The licensee stated that an electronic hydrometer has been obtained and
will be available and be capable to measure actual discharge condition
PAT Report Paragraph 3.c.(3), Unresolved Item 8526-02
The PAT report stated that, although cell 35 was jumpered from battery 1A
and did not participate in the discharge test, the final individual cell
voltage ICV and specific gravity readings decreased from 2.07 VDC to
1.88 VDC and 1.210 to 1.100, respectively.
These post discharge readings
were indicative of the cell participating in the battery discharge test.
Inspection Followup
The NRC inspector found that cell 35 of battery 1A was disconnected from
the other cells and jumpered after the test. The licensee further stated
that this was because cell 35 would not hold its subsequent charge.
Removal of the failed cell was an appropriate action. This portion of
Unresolved Item 8526-02 is closed.
PAT Report Paragraph 4.a.(1), Unresolved Item 8526-05
The safety-related frequency meter replaced by SSR 84500238 was procured
under a nonsafety-related purchase order without any of the required
certifications and no attempt was made to qualify the meter for
safety-related use.
The installation of this meter was apriroved by
Maintenance Quality Control (flQC).
Inspection Followup
The NRC inspector found that, while the inverter on which this meter was
installed is considered safety-related, the meter itself is not considered
safety-related. This is allowed by Administrative Procedure P-7,
Section 3.13.
The safety-related procedures involved in procurement do
not apply. This portion of Unresolved item 8526-05 is closed.
PAT Report Pa agraph 4.a.(2), Unresolved Item 8526-05
Safety-related snubber 0-rings, replaced by SSR 84500283/287,were
purchased via a parts distributor from a manufacturer not on the qualified
vendors list. A certification of confonnance was provided from the parts
distributor to the licensee without supporting documentation from the
manufacturer. This document was used as the basis for the receipt
inspection acceptance, even though the certificate was not traceable to
the original manufacturer and the original manufacturer did not have an
approved QA program.
I
,
-
.
.
.
-8-
i
Inspection Followup
,
The licensee's approved Quality Assurance (QA) plan is contained in the
FSAR, Appendix B.
The-NRC inspector found that the licensee had not
verified that the 0-ring procurement was equal to or better than the
original. This is a requirement of the licensee's approved QA plan. The
ordering of some parts by part number permits parts to be used which may
not be the same as the original.
The manufacturer may have changed the
material composition, or have performed some internal redesign such as the
number ~of balls in a bearing.
These changes may impact the part's ability
to perform in the design environment.
Such changes may not be readily
apparent, especially without a revised part number. This is an apparent
violation. This portion of Unresolved Item 8526-05 is closed and
incorporated into violation 8531-02.
PAT Report Paragraph 4.a.(3), Unresolved Item 8526-05
i
The motor installed on valve HV-2248 by SSR 84501102 was rewound by a
'
'
vendor not on the approved vendors list. The licensee identified this
deficiency.with NCR 85-563 and had performed a component qualification
'
test to upgrade the motor for safety-related applications. The
qualification test consisted of meggering the motor windings to confirm
proper electrical' refurbishment and a post-installation vibration test to
verify correct bearing installation. The only documentation of test
performance was the statement " Valve test cks okay:
Valve is electrically
okay." There was no record of the measured test results of the
instruments utilized to obtain the vibration and resistance measurements.
The licensee did not review the vendor's process or materials used for
rewinding the motor. The NRC inspectors concluded that the tests and
documentation were inadequate to ensure that the replacement motor was
equal to or better than the original construction phaue component.
Inspection Followup
The licensee presented additional documentation which detailed how the
motor was meggered.
Vibration testing was also performed and acceptance
criteria was included on NCR 85-563.
This portion of Unresolved Item
8526-05 is closed.
PAT Report Paragraph 4.a.(4), Unresolved Item 8526-05
This paragraph consisted of two parts which are presented separately.
Part 1
l
Gearcase oil used for Motor Operated Valve (MOV) applications
!
differed from that recommended by the vendor manual and nay not have
l
been suitable for the environment of all plant MOVs.
Procedure MP 39-3 and the vendor manual specify the use of SAE 80 EP
oil in the gearcase of motor operated valves.
Discussions with
e_
I
l
-
,
-9-
r
maintenance personnel revealed that Mobil 629 oil was being used for
>
all MOV applications. The licensee had not performed an engineering
evaluation to determine that the Mobil 629 oil was suitable for all
M0V applications or compatible rith residual oil that may have been
in the gearcase.
Inspection Followup (Part 1)
This part of the item remains unresolved and will be reviewed during
a. future inspection.
Part 2
The NRC inspector also noted that SAE 80 EP oil was rated for operation
only to 180*F and this was significantly below the 737"F helium
circulator inlet steam temperature listed in the updated FSAR,
Figure 10.2-3, for 100% power operations.
During the inspection, the
licensee measured the gearcase temperature of HV-2247 at
approximately 140 F with lower temperature steam being supplied from
the auxiliary boilers. The suitability of both Mobil 629 and
SAE 80 EP oil under these high temperature operating conditions is
questionable.
Inspection Followup (Part 2)
The NRC inspector foLnd that the gear case for HV-2247 is located on
the bonnet of the valve, at a distance from the valve body, such that
.it does not-sense process steam temperature.
The cold reheat steam
that was in this line during this followup inspection was 332*F, as
indicated in the control room.
The gear case was felt by the NRC
inspector and found to be at ambient temperature. The licensee
stated that the gear case temperature is not expected to approach
180 F as the cold reheat temperature approaches its highest
temperatures during power operations. This part of Unresolved
Item 8526-05 is closed.
PAT Report Paragraph 4.b.(1), Unresolved Item 8526-02
.
'
The electrical maintenance procedure for M0V motor installation, testing
and documentation was inadequate. Procedure EMP 45 provided for verifying
proper motor rotation by momentarily touching the motor leads to an
energized terminal and jogging the motor in the closed direction. This
appears contrary to the vendor manual which directs that the motor be
energized from the operating switch to verify rotation.
~ Paragraph 3.9 of procedure EMP-45 provided general guidance for
documenting the as found/as left condition of the valve but there was no
requirement to record the torque or limit switch settings when adjusting
-
-
I
.
.
h
i
-10-
these setpoints. A review of two completed SSR packages revealed that
these setpoint values were not recorded.
The post-installation testing for MOV motors consisted of cycling the
valve to verify proper operation, circuit integrity and position
indication. However, there were no quantitative acceptance criteria for
determining proper valve operation even though nominal valve operating
speeds were provided in the vendor manual. MQC was not required to
observe the test and the determination of proper valve operation was left
,
to the judgement of the workman performing 'the maintenance.
Inspection Followup
The NRC inspector found that maintenance quality control had been required
by EMP-45 to, and did, observe the test and verify operation. However,
the location and what was intended by the signature in the procedure was
confusing. The licensee stated that their maintenance procedures were
being rewritten to be more item specific.
In addition, clarification will
improve what testing, data, and inspection will be required. The
licensee's method of determining motor rotation direction is not condoned
by the NRC and appears to be an electrical safety hazard to maintenance
personnel.
It did appear to be a violation of NRC regul:<fons. This
portion of Unresolved Item 8526-02 is closed.
PAT Report Paragraph 4.b.(2), Unresolved Item 8526-02
The torque values listed for use in the MOV mechanical repair procedure
had an inadequate technical basis and their use was optional.
Procedure MP 39-3 had a table of MOV torque values that were based on bolt
size. The table was identical to one in procedure PM 92.10 for diesel
generator vendor manual. Additionally, a note at the bottom of the table
made torque wrench use optional by stating that:
"An average man on a 12-inch wrench can develop about 100 ft lb
of torque. Therefore, if a torque wrench is not available, or
cannot be used, use the following wrench-bolt combinations:
Bolt Sizes, Inches 1/2
9/16
5/8
3/4
7/8
1-1/8
Wrench Suas, Inches 6
9
12
18
24
36
"For larger bolting where specific torque values are not stated
and/or configuration precludes the use of torque equipment,
standard striking wrenches may be used by qualified mechanics
working to industrial journeyman standards."
The technical basis for this note was a vendor valve manual notation
applying to stud nuts and cap screws. The licensee had applied the torque
values -for diesel generators and other valves to MOVs without any apparent
i
engineering justification.
_ _
-
e
a
,
, .
,
-11-
Inspection Followup
The NRC inspector found that the use of alternative torque guidance in the
licensee's maintenance procedures was an attempt to augment the_ vendor
maintenance manual. This was written guidance for use when specific
torque data was not provided and when the use of a torque wrench would be
obstructed by physical interferences. This alternative torque guidance is
~
a written version of a standard craft practice. This portion of
Unresolved Item 8526-02 is closed.
PAT Report Paragraph 4.b.(3), Unresolved Item 8526-02
The post-maintenance testing of valve HV-2246 was signed off by MQC as
being complete when plant conditions would not support the operational
test. Procedure MP 39.3, Section 6.1, stated that the post-maintenance
testing acceptance criteria was " Valve Stroke and limit switch settings
are acceptable for system requirenents at operating pressure and
temperature." There were no quan-itative acceptance limits provided in
the procedure to determine this acceptability and MQC signed off this part
of the procedure on February 23, 1985, for SSR 84500240. At this time the
reactor was shutdown and steam was being supplied to the helium
circulators from the auxiliary boilers which are not capable of producing
steam at operating temperatures and pressures. There was no outstanding
action item to test this valve when the plant was at normal operating
temperatures and pressures. The licensee had no assurance that this valve
would operate as designed under expected operation conditions..
Inspection Followup
The NRC inspector reviewed MP 39.3 and found that only hand wheel related
work was performed.
The sections that may have affected the limit
switches was not performed. The MQC inspector signature block was
initially marked N/A to reflect no testing of the limit switches. After
reconsideration, the N/A was lined out and the MQC inspector signed the
block. The licensee stated that the inspection signature in MP 39.3 was
intended to only cover the work that was performed.
This situation
resulting from procedural steps which are not clear is being addressed by
the licensee's program to upgrade their maintenance procedures. This
portion of Unresolved Item 8526-02 is closed.
,
PAT Report Paragraphs 4.c.(1) and (2), Unresolved Item 8526-02
The battery ventilation low flow monitor was alarming in the control room
and exhaust air flow from battery rooms 1A and 18 appeared to be
insufficient to meet the vendor manual recomendations for removing
hydrogen gas during charging evolutions.
The upper temperature limit specified on the surveillance procedures for a
battery receiving a float charge was 110 F.
This was contrary to the
vendor manual which recommended maximum allowable battery temperatures of
110 F during equalizing charge evolutions and only 90*F for float charge
n
. .
.
-12-
conditions.
The NRC inspector observed a pilot cell temperature of 92 F in
'
,
battery 1A on August 22, 1985. The battery vendor manual stated that
continued operation at this elevated temperature could degrade the battery
'
capacity and life.
Inspection Followup
T$eNRCinspectorfoundpilotcelltempereturehadincreasedto96F
during this followup. The licensee stated that design effort had begun to
provide improved ventilation to the battery rooms and is documented by FSV
l
Action Request DCAR 795, dated September 23, 1985. This portion of
Unresolved Item 8526-02 remains open pending satisfactory installation of
the improved battery room ventilation.
PAT Report Paragraphs 4.c.(3) and (4), Unresolved Item 8526-02
,
Battery specific gravity and individual cell voltage (ICV) measurements
were not analyzed to determine whether an equalizing charge should be
performed. The battery vendor manual recommended that an equalizing
charge be conducted when the specific gravity of any cell dropped .010
from an initial standard value or any cell ICV was below 2.13 VDC.
Instead, the licensee performed an equalizing charge monthly in accordance
with S0P 92-06. There was no in-progress monitoring of these charges and
the end of charge parameters were not measured to verify improved battery
"
conditions.
There were no procedures for periodically checking battery intercell
resistances and connector tightness, adding water to individual cells, or
cleaning the battery with approved solvents.
,
Inspection Followup
The NRC inspector found that the acceptance criteria noted in SR 5.6.2b-M
did not appear consistent with the vendor's battery manual or the accepted
industry standards delineated in the IEEE standards. The test data and
acceptance criteria did not appear to support analysis for determining a
need for an equalizing charge.
Instead of performing the analysis for
need, the licensee instead performed the equalizing charge monthly.
The
licensee stated that the routine maintenance work performed on the
batteries is simply done by an electrician when he is in working on the
batteries. The failure to establish, implement and maintain adequate
battery maintenance and testing procedures is an apparent violation. This
portion of Unresolved Item 8526-02 is closed and incorporated into
apparent violation 8531-01.
C
PAT Report Paragraph 5, Unresolved item 8526-06
The licensee did not ensure that all required post-modification tests were
,
developed as part of modification work packages. The NRC inspector
reviewed Change Notices (CNs) 1798 and 1798-A and their associated
3
-
.
_ . . - .
,.*
-
-13-
Controlled Work Procedures (CWPs) 84-92, 84-93, 84-94, 94-95 and 95-560
which replaced Emergency Water Booster Pumps (Fire Water Booster Pumps)
P-2109 and P-2110 with pumps having a higher output head. These pumps
could be used to drive.the helium circulator turbine to achieve adequate
core cooling in the event of the failure of three feedwater pumps.
The
CWPs.for this modification did not contain post-installation flow tests
for the rew emergency water booster pumps'.
Inspector Followup
The NRC inspector found that, instead of performing the flow test as part
of the post-modification test in the CNs, the tests were performed using
surveillance test procedures. The licensee stated that it is changing
procedure TASMAP-7, " Fort St. Vrain Work Review Comittee Guidelines," to
ensure that all such testing is included with post-modification testing
and is documented as such. The work review committee is also being given
expanded responsibility to verify the adequacy of test procedures. This
unresolved item is closed.
3.
Followup Status by Item Number
Open item 8526-01 (0 pen) (PAT Report Paragraph 2.a.(1)) This item is
open.
Unresolved Item 8526-02
PAT Report Paragraph
Status
Associated Violation
2.a.(2)
Open
N/A
3.b.(1)
Closed
8531-01(Closed)
3.b.(2)
Closed
8531-01(Closed)
3.b.(3)
Closed
N/A
3.c.(1)
Closed
N/A
3.c.(2)
Closed
N/A
3.c.(3)
Closed
h/A
4.b.(1)
Closed
N/A
4.b.(2)
Closed
N/A
4.b.(3)
Closed
N/A
4.c.(1)
Open
N/A
.
.
- .
. - _
..
.
.
.
._
.
.
-
. .
T
'
-14-
Unresolved Item 8526-02
PAT Report Paragraph
Status
Associated Violation
4.c.(2)
Open
N/A
i
4.c.(3)
Closed
8531-01
4.c.(4)
Closed
8531-01
OpenItem'8526-03(Closed)(PATReportParagraph2.c). This iten is
closed.
L
Open Item 8526-04 (Closed)(PAT Report Paragraph 2.d) This item is closed
and incorporated into apparent violation 8531-01.
Unresolved Item 8526-05
'
PAT Report Paragraph
Status
Associated Violation
,
4.a(1)
Closed
N/A
4.a.(2)
Closed
8531-02
,
4.a.(3)
Closed
N/A
,
4.a.(4)(1)-
Open
N/A
4.a.(4)(ii)
Closed
N/A
Unresolved Item 8526-06 (Closed)(PAT Report Paragraph 5). This item is
closed.
4.
Review of Nonroutine Events
.
The purpose of this . inspection was to ascertain that LER 85-12 satisfied
reporting requirenents, corrective action discussed appears adequate and
if additional NRC response or inspection is warranted.
LER 85-12 reported a reactor trip on July 24, 1985, by the plant
protective system due to high moisture levels in the primary coolant. The
cause was listed as two bearing water pumps in operation vice one. The
cause the licensee initially suspected was the misoperation of a bearing
water drain valve, as discussed in NRC Inspection Report 50-267/85-21.
This misoperation was stated by the licensee as being included in their
LER "Cause" as a probable contributor to the moisture ingress events.
Corrective action discussed in che LER appears adequate for the primary
cause of the event.
This item is closed.
l
L
1
,
-
-
g.
g ', a , ,
e
.
-15-
'
,
i
5.-
Exit' Interview
-
i
An exit interview was held June 28, 1985. The NRC senior resident
inspector also attended this meeting. At the meeting, the scope of the
inspection and findings were sunnarized.
'
,
J
\\
-
-
.
. -
. - . . .
- - -
- -
-
-
- -
. - -
-
. -