ML20151A258

Rev 0 to App R,Cable to Cable Shorts for RCS High/Low Pressure Interfaces

ML20151A258
Person / Time
Site:	Sequoyah
Issue date:	07/01/1988
From:	Randy Hall, Jolley J TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY
To:
Shared Package
ML20151A243	List: ML20151A240 ML20151A258
References
SQN-CSS-024, SQN-CSS-024-R00, SQN-CSS-24, SQN-CSS-24-R, NUDOCS 8807190304
Download: ML20151A258 (108)

Text

. =.. -

ENCLOSURE 2 TVA Division of Nuclear Engineering Calculation "Appendix R, Cable-to-Cable For RCS High/ Low-Pressure Interfaces" Revision 0, Dated July 1,.-1988 B25 880701 829 I

a 4

i 4

a d

e 8807190304 geo7og -

{DR ADOCK 05000327 PDC 3

ORIGIYr""

hk &ggggy

' TVA 10697 (ON E 4 46)

DNE CALCULATIONS TITLE APPENDIX R CABLE To CABLE SHORTS FcR RCS i

PLANT / UNIT HIGH/ low PRESSURE IMTER FAC ES PREPARING ORGANIZATION SEQuoYAH UMIT-1 C

EEB KEY NOUNS (Consult RIMS DESCRIPTORS LIST) APPEMoix R, CABl E To CABLE S 40GTS, MiGW/ low PRESSURE IMTERFACE S BRANCH / PROJECT IDENTIFIERS Each time these calculations are issued, prepirers must ensure that the original (RO) A1MS sccession number is filled in.

SQM - CSS - 024 Rn Uor RIMS' use)

RIMS accession number Ro 825 880701 829 APPLICABLE DESIGN DOCUMENT (S)

A_

.a M/A R_

SAR SECTIONIS)

UNIO S YS TEMIS)

N/A VARioUS U

Revision 0 R1 R2 R3 Safety related?

Yes 7 No 0 ECN No. (or indicate Not Applicable)

~

i Statement of Problem Prepa d DETERMINE IF BIE EXISTING

~

APPEMDIX R TMTERACTioM

""hh//

CORRECTIVE Actions FoR.

RCS HIGH/LokJ Pressure Approved liluhal.

A IMTERFACES ARE BOUNDING Date 7-t-t(

FOR CABLE To CABLE SHORTS

(

List all pages added gj by this revision.

}l List all pages deleted 5

by this revision, n;i usianp.ses.s.neee NOMEN MW by this revision.

a Abstract

f/g4'

,. s2 ffJ b

',These calculations contain an unverified ssumption(s) y f.y>.'c that must be verified later.

Yes No 0 i

M FS A R coMPLI ANCE RE\\/l E kJ A L / A 9 ] I lt 7-t - 8 r g

Le/Asc THE APPENDIX R IMTERACTloMS BETWEEM REDUMDAMT PATHS IKhloLVlN6 RCS HIGW/ low PRESSURE IMTERFACES WERE REVIEWED FOR CABLE TO CABLE SHORTS. THE RESULT EVALU ATioN REVEALED TH AT THE ORIGitJ AL AMALYSIS W DID NOT Co4 SIDER CABLE To CABLE s

SHORTS CREDISLE ALoMG WlTH CoRRECTtvE ACTIOMS TAKEM A5 A RESULT OF TH E g

EVALUATiod oF slutiLI AR IMTERACTIONS FoR UMLT-2. ARE B00M bl M G FOR TH E UUIT-( RCS HIGH[Lotg PRESSURE

['

IMTERFACES.

O M.c,or.im and sto,e caicuia,

,m, m niuS Se, ce Ceni r.

h M.crofilm aad return cateuiat ons to:

u.c,oviim. nd dest c<. O Doc.umCHT(cNmsAtestas Hwac.cwear be, Address

• 4.Te g e, le 7 RIMS. SL 26 C-K cc:

7

't 'g SOM - C SS 4 j

APPENDIX R; CABLE TO CABLE SHORTS FoR REVISION LOG m e: RCS HIGH /Lov) PRE SSURE INTER FACES

.t

(,, 4 '

Revision A'<.

No.

DESCRIPTION OF REVISION

.:g.

Approved f.\\'

.j;y 0

INITIAL ISS UE 7/ffgg

.s iTi *

":Trp m i bY.'

-4 l

irr!

0 I

s 9

y' 4 *

• I;;..l.

, ; w...,

f

'd

,1

~

- 'f h.~

i

h...!-

. p.

s b

h *k e h l e

I s

J e

1 NEP-3.1

([(,

Page 1 of 1

:z

l, CALCULATION DESIGN VERIFICATION (INDEPENDENT REVIEW) FO

....y Setd - CSS - 02.4 d)

• kh Calculation No.

Rev'i s ion

.:.;.f'.

., +

Method of design verification (independent review) used (check method used):

1.

Design Review 2.

Alternate Calculation f.'

3.

Qualification Test r

.; m.

Justification (explain below):

Method 1:

In the design review method, justify the technical adequacy of the calculation and explain how the adequacy was verified (calculation is similar to another, based on accepted handbook methods, appropriate.

sensitivity studies included for confidence, etc.).

Method 2:

In the alternate calculation method, identify the pages where the alternate calculation has been included in the calculation package and explain why this method is adequate.

((

Method 3:

In the qualification test method, identify the QA documented k

ource(s) where testing adequately demonstrates the adequacy of this calculation and esplain.

TH E CA L C.U L A Tl on! STATE D TT'S PO R PoS E AMD Pea ronm e o 4-%

A REVIEW _OF TH E ORIG IN A L A PPEN DIX R AN

i

J E

I 'To THI S C A LCU L ATIO N

((

REFER ENC E D AMO IDENTI FIED. TH ARE L

_ METHOD OF REVIEW AND A MA L'f S IS ARE CON S i s 7A N 3

l

- U M I T - 2.

ANALV SIS AHO TJJ ACCORD ANCE

- ~

• +

?

w t 'rH GCDD EMGIN EEIqlttC?

,,[

I _ PRACTIC E. BASED CM TH E R EVI E %l TH E CAL mv

1. ,g l.._

ADecuATE.

q?,j:4

'r

'5.'.*,

~

,[

D k %L 1 n.-

Design / Verifier Date

~ '

(Independent Reviewer)

{w a m p A6 7-/ - ts'

_g.

4 -

• 3 B/P Ib _SGN-CSS- 024 sh Prepared By:

7 !e8

_ c/o

_ R_O

(

~

Checked By:

I

(/

(/

~

t.

kf A 4cy FSAR COMPLIANCE REVIEW

.W.

'%f' 6[

A review of FSAR Sections 7.7.7 discrepancy between this calculation and the FSAR.7.1.2.2, 8.1.4, 8.3.1.4.4, and 9 o

-!g *.

,1.*f,. ;~,

' k i*.kf.,

• a s.

y 5..(

r

.ue.

$hb F* )t

,4 e

C.-.

l Ce f.

t

.st!,*r.

",, @,i(('.

%tQ. 2.i'..':

. h-x sF' e

\\m g

DNE4-44939

.--,.w.---

-c- - -- - - -,.

,e-w--

r,-

r,,,

B/P ID _ SQd-CSS-024 sh I

c/o 2.

R o

(

Prepared By:

-. h 7[t[$8 Checked By: M [, Mg 7//g f

I.

PURPOSE The purpose of this calculation is to document the results of a Unit i evaluation of cable to cable shorts for those Appendix R interactions involving high/ low pressure interfaces.

Unit 2 high/ low pressure interactions are addressed in calculation SQN-CSS-023.

gj4 g g.

4

(

s

&M..F.... ~

.;j.ll$3,i';.-

. i -

4 h

0216E e

--,r.,--

w

. - ~ <

r n-

,y

l l

l B/P ID __ SOM -C.55 - 02.4-sh

,2 c/o 3

R o 7!'!$8..

Prepared By:

Checked By: // h.

1

~2[/86 O'

V i

II, ASSUMPTIONS 1.

The interactions identified in Attachment 1 encompass all of the interactions involving high/ low interfaces for units 1 and 2 (Unit 1 s

interactions addressed in this calculation).

2.

Referenced items 1 through 5 and item 16 on page 4 are as-designed drawings. These as-designed drawings represent the as-constructed status of the plant.

The assumptions listed above are unverified assumptions that, nust be verified before restart.

t*

g s

t

.i w

i 0216E

4 B/P ID _ SQd - C.S 5 - 02 4 sh 9

c/o 4-R O

Prepared By:

7/'/88_

Checked By*

j 8.

.ZM$

v v

v III. DEFINITIONS 1.

Hot Short Hot short is defined as the imposing of voltage from one circuit to another or from one cable to another.

2.

Interaction A situation where cables or equipment for redundant Appendix R shutdown paths do not comply with section III.G.2 of 10CFR50 Appendix R.

t't g

• l* i f,' s i

l l

l

)

0216E

-we---,

4 l

l

.o B/P ID _ SON-CSS - 02 4 sh 4-c/o _S R'

O Prepared By: _

(I 7!/!8A 4

Checked By:,l/. M__,d[L/40. 7//gs..

/

y IV.

REFERENCES -

1. Schematic Diagram ASN662-1, R8

2. Schematic Diagram ASN662-2, R9

3. Schematic Diagram ASN601-A, R6

4. Connection Diagram ASN1630-39, R2 5.ConnectionDiagram45N1630-55,k3 6.10CFRSO Appendix R ARSK 400-1 R1, -2 R1

7. QIR SQP-SQN-88-532, R0 (Attachment 7)

8. CAQR SQP880326, RO (Attachment 6)

9. Systers Operating Ir.struction SOI-26.2 (Attachment 3)

10. TVA letter to NRC dated Apcil 13, 1988 (L44 880413 809, Attachment 5) f

(

'11. NRC Confirmation of Action letter dated August 10, 1984 (A02 840817 011, Attachment 10)

12. NRC Inspection Report 50-1?7/86-40 and 50-328/86-4t. (A02 860813 001)

13. NRC Inspection Report 50-327/86-66 and 50-328/86-66 (A02 870121 005)

14. FCR 6868, R1 (Attachment 9)

15. Calculation SQN-CSS-023

16. Schematic Diagran 45N662-4, R1

17. TVA letter to NRC dated March 8, 1988 (L44 880308 806, Attachment 1)

18. CAQR SQP 880346 R0 (S13 880513 804)

19. Operations Sect ion Instruction Letter OSLA-73, Operations Firewatches (Attachment 11) m 0216E

-r

..o o

4 B/P ID SSd - CSS - O2.4 sh F

c/o 1. R O

(

Prepared By:

/ 88 Checked By: j. O' F//[g3.

f f

Q f

V.

DOCUMENTATION OF ASSUMPTIONS 1.

None required l

e e

's t

.,,.. i t: s !

, [,.

J e

t l

i 0216E e

q

t A

B/P ID StM - C.S5 - 02 4 sh (o

c/o 7

R O

(

7 [89 Prepared By:

7//![8 Checked By:

Y v

y VI.

ANALYSES The interactions listed in Attachment I were reviewed to identify those intei. actions involving Unit 1 (see Attachment 2).

Interactions for Unit 2 are addressed in calculation SQN-CSS-023.

For each of the Unit 1 interactions, the following evaluation was performed:

)

1.

The circuits were evaluated to determine if a fire induced hot short from another cable could result in the loss of required function or unacceptable spurious actuation of a required Appendix R device.

2.

Determine if the cable to cable hot shoct interaction is bounded by the original interaction corrective action or disposition.

r A

. 's; r

O e

e 8

0216E

---

r--.

i

.J B/P ID SOA} - CSS - 02 4 Interaction No.

19 sh

~7 c/o __8 R

O

(

Prepared By:. /I 4.[ uf 7[t[88 Checked By:

M O.

7k[8 r

y y

DESCRIPTION -

Interaction No. 19 (Attachment 2, sheet 1) identifies the cables and locations where redundant RCS normal letdown isolation paths do not adhere to the requirements of Section III.G.2 of Appendix R.

DISCUSSION -

The original analysis (Attachment 4, paragraph III) did not consider cable to cable shorts credible.

Additional evaluation of the interaction for cable to cable shorts confirms the original analysis is bounding, in that multiple (minirma of 3) shorts are required in order to prevent. isolation of the normal letdown path. A short must occur on the cables for valves FCV-62-69, FCV-62-70 and FCV-62-72 or FCV-62-73 or FCV-62-14 in order to establish a flow path through the RCS normal letdown.

In addition, SOI.26.2 (Attachment 3) has been revised to require the control air to the letdown valves be isolated on decreasing pressurizer level.

the letdown valves.

Isolation of control air will result in closing (TVA to NRC letter dated Apell 13, 1988--L44 880413 809) contains a discussion on the amount of time available to isolate normal letdown (in excess of 1-1/2 hours).

If all five letdown valves were open, the net loss from the system is 57 Gal /Hin.

2 s With the 60 percent pressurizer level inventory, in excess of 1-1/2 hours would be required for the pressurizer level to drop from 60 percent to 17 percent using the 57 Gal /Hin. flow mismatch.

l w

0216E j

a

.J B/P ID _SOrd - C SS - 02.4 Interaction No.

60 sh 8

c/o _ 9 R

O

(

Prepared By:

M 7[/[88

'7 [g8,.

Checked By:

v v

V y

DESCRIPIION -

3 N Y'Mt Interaction No. 60 (Attachment 2, sheet E) identifies the cables and locations where redundant RCS excess letdown isolation paths do not conform to the requirements of Section III.G.2 of Appendix R.

DISCUSSION -

~

The original analysis (Attachment 4, paragraph III) did not consider cable to cable shorts credible.

However, additional evaluation of the interaction for cable to cable shorts confirms the original analysis is bounding, in that multiple shorts are required to prevent isolation of the excess letdown flow path.

Two shorts are required to spuriously open the two valves on the inlet to the excess letdown heat exchanger.

The heat exchanger outlet valve is a modulating valve whose position is determined by the value of an analog signal.

Two shorts of the correct polarity from another analog circuit whose value is large enough to drivo the valve open would be required.

Attachaent 5 (TVA to NRC 1rtter dated April 13, 1988--L44 880413 809) states s

that the orifice in the cicess ^;etdown path will limit maximum flow to well within the capacity of a centrifugal charging pump.

Also, per SOI 26.2 (Attachment 3), control air to the isolation valves iu removed if pressurizer r

(

level is decreasing and letdown cannot be isolated through the normal controls.

i I

e 9

0216E 4

-y a,:,

n

---.w,

,e

,, ~,,,.. -

=e B/P ID SGAl-CSS-02A Interaction No.

63 sh 9

c/o (O

R 6

(

Prepared By: _. [.

7/ /89 Checked By: / /. [ M.g 7/f/pg f

DESCRIPTION -

Interaction No. 63 (Attachment 2. sheet 5) identifies the cables and location where redundant normal RCS letdown isolation paths do not adhere to the requirements of Section III.G.2 of Appendix R.

DISCUSSION -

See discussion under interaction No. 19.

I

' (

=,

i

\\

l i%

)

0216E

---

r w>.,---.,-

,n

I B/P ID SGAl-CSS- 024 Interaction No.

65 sh (O

c/c ll R C

(

Prepared By:

WlLL4 7lI $8 Checked Byt Al.b. hA) O

?f/f$ $

s r

y g

1 DESCRIPTION -

Interaction No. 65 (Attachment 2, sheet 's) identifies the cables and locations where redundant RCS normal letdown isciation paths do not adhere to the

' requirements of Section III.G.2 of A.ppendix R.

DISCUSSION -

((,,(iSeediscussionunderinteractionNo.19.

).;..

• g r\\

i 4

9 9

4 l

\\

j#

n DNE4-4493W 4

l

D/P ID S9 d - C SS'- 02.4 Interaction No.

109 sh ll c/o I 2.

R o

(

Prepared By: hd 7!/[88 4

Checked By:

MM v

g 7///88 DESCRIPTION -

Interaction 109 (Attachment 2, sheet.8) identifies the cables and location where the pressurizer series PORV>and block valve do not adhere to the requirements of Section III.G.2 of Appendix R.

t DISCUSSION -

The original analysis did not consider cable to cable shorts credible.

A further review of Appendix R ARSK 400-1 R1, -2 R1 drawings has revealed that a separation of greater than 20 feet exists between the redundant circuits at the location identified by the interaction.

Therefore, no interaction action exist and a single fire in the area listed would not result in the lost of control of both the PORV and block valve.

\\

I j

s 0216E 1

I B/P ID SG Al-CSS" 024 Interaction No.

111 sh 17-c/o I$

R,O

(

Prepared Ly:

b.8h 7// [88 Checked By:

M. [

E[

7///BF.

v i

/

DESCRIPTION -

Interaction 111 (Attachment 2, sheet 10) identifies the cables and location where the pressurizer series PORV and block valve do not adhere to the requirements of Section III.G.2 of Appendix R.

DISCUSSION -

I The original analysis did not consider cable to cable shorts credible.

This i

interaction is addressed in CAQR SQP880326. Item 4 (Attachmenc 6) and QIR SQP-SQN-88-532 RO, Item 4. Page 11 (Attachment 7).

The corrective action for Item 4 of the CAQR is to fire wrap the conduit containing the A train power supply for valve FCV-b6-333.

Upon implementation of corrective action for CAQR SQP880326 Train A power will be available for closing block valve

)

FCV-68-333.

e

(

l 8

9 4

I s

b 0216E 4

- - ~

,y e

e B/P ID SCAL-CS S- 07.4 Interaction No.

113 sh 13 c /o.._l+

R 0

(

Prepared By: _ O.e 0 4, 7/,/ss checxed By: //. 4 h.c0 74/gg.

v r

y y

DESCRIPTION -

Interaction 113 (Attachment 2, sheet 11) identifies the cables and location where the pressurizer series PORV and block valve do not adhere to the requirements of Section III.G.2 of Appendix R.

DISCUSSION -

The original analysis did not consider cable to cable shorts credible.

However, the corrective action was to reroute cable IV5596B such that it is located south of A-8 line when penetrating down to elevation 714 or to reroute in conduit from the bottom of panel 1-L-11B and wrap until the proposed fire wall at the A-8 line or until it penetrates Q-Line.

Item 19 on Page 14 of QIR SQP-SQh-88-532 RO (Attachment 7) states that cable IV5596B for valve PCV-68-334 has been entirely wrapped on elevation 714 and therefore is uneffected by a firo in this area.

e W

d216E

4 B/P ID _ SOM - C SS - 024 Interaction No.

117 sh 14 c/o _IS R.o

(

Prepared By:

~8 &V 7[I [88 Checked By:

/

7///AS v

v

(;; -

DESCRIPTION -

Interaction No.117 (Attachment 2, sheet 12) identifier cables and areas where a fire could result in the spurious operation of steam generator PORVs.

DISCUSSION -

This interaction does not involve high/ low LOCA pressura interfaces but does involve Type II spurious circuits.

in the original analysis.

Cable to cable shorts were not considered Each steam generator atmospheric dump valve is supplied control air from a control air header (for full open operation) or from a controller (for modulating operation).

These control air feeds are through two seties solenoid valves (see Attachment 8).

To spuriously actuate the atmospheric dump valve requires multiple faults because of the series solenoid valves.

For a fire in the area of the solenoids, both open and closed solenoids must be damaged (open energized and closed deenergized) to spuriously actuate the valve.

In addition to the solenoids, a sprinklor head has been installed in the control air line that f

will vent the air and close the valve (Attachment 9).

(

Spurious operation of the PORVs due to cable to cable shorts of the cables between the Main Control Room (MCR) and the Auxiliary Control Room (ACR) may be overridden with the normal / auxiliary control switch located in the ACR.

The control for both the open and close solenoid is contained in a single cable between the ACR and the junction boxes in the annulus (SG 2 and 3) and

,N the auxiliary building (SG 1 and 4).

To spuriously open the PORVs would require a cable to cable faule to the conductor of the open solenoid and the conductor for the close solenoid must be open such that power can not be applied to that solenoid.

(close function takes procedent over open function).Should both solenoids short, the The cables from the junction boxes to both solenoids are routed together in the same conduit (no other cables are in the condult).

Both cables are normally doenergized such that power is not normally available to spuriously open the valve.

If a solenoid were energized, the only possible cable-to-cable fault will energize both valven, thus closinr. the valve because energizing the "close" solenoid vents the valss From this evaluation it can be seen that a cable to cable short will not result in the spurious operation of two steam generator PORVs.

l A

0216E

I B/P ID, SGM - CSS - 024 Interaction No.

120 sh 15 c/o IG R

O

(

Prepared By:

08-

/ 7ltl99 A].h.huk.7f//89 Checked By:

V

/

DESCRIPTION -

Interaction No. 120 (Attachment 2, sheet 15) states there are several locations in the euxiliary building where a fire could result in the spurious operation of either VCT outlet valves (LCV-62-132, -133).

DISCUSSION -

The original analysis did not consider cable to cable shorts credible.

Cables for both Volume Control Tank (VCT) outlet valves run from thel'c respective motor control centers on elevation 749 through board rooms and transformer rooms on that elevations 714, 690, 669 general areas; and then into elevation 669 penetration roon into the valves themselves.

Spurious operation of either valve could cause inadvertent loss of suction to the operating centrifugal charging pump. Corrective action la to remove power from the VCT outlet valves when a fire is confirmed in the location listed above.

The operating CCP will be secured, valve FC6 '2-135 or FCV-62-136 to the refueling water storage tank (RWST) will be openeo and a CCP restarted.

In addition, the roving fire watch (Attachment 11) established in accordance with the NRC confirmation of action letter dated August 10, 1984 (A02 840817 001) and in accordance with Technical Specification 3.7.12 will be continued.

w $6pr'los Corrective action for CAQR SQP880346 (S13 880513 904-) wi 1 address long-term s

corrective actions for this interaction.

i 1

4 q

%s 1

0216E I

.t

A B/P ID 594 - C S S - 02.4 sh lG c/o 17 R

O Y 7//!M

(

Prepared By:

4 Checked By:

Mb k 70/88 y

VII.

SUMMARY

OF RESULTS For interactions 19, 60, 63, and 65 the original evaluation was bounding for cable to cable shorts except in the extremely low likelihood that all 5 nornal RCS letdown valves spuriously open (5 hot shorts).

If all 5 valves are open the net loss (Letdown versus makeup) from the system is 57 Gal / Min, with an initial pressurizer level inventory of 60 percent, the operator has in excess of 1-1/2 hoyrs to isolate the letdown based on the 57 Cal / Min, loss.

This inventory loss rate is acceptable until the flow path is isolated.

The operator can isolate the flow path by isolating control air to the letdown valves. On isolation of control air, the valves fail closed.

For interaction 109, a reevaluation revealed that redundant paths are separated by greater than 20 feet.

Corrective action for Interaction 111 is addressed by CAQR SQP880326.

Implementation of the corrective action for CAQR SQP880326 will resolve this interaction.

The original corrective action for Interaction 113, to reroute and/or

's fire wrap cable IV5596B, is bounding for cable to cable shorts.

For the cables involved in Interaction 117, it has been determined that depending on the location of the fire, cable to cable shorts:

1.

May be defeated with existing controls and/or corrective actions taken since the original analysis (installation of sprinkler heads in the control air line) 2.

That multiple shorts and/or shorts and open circuits are required i

for spurious operation of SG PORVs.

Multiple faults need not be l

considered since this interaction is not a RCS high/ low pressure interface.

3.

Can not occur as cables are routed in conduit and no other cabics are in these conduits.

For cables in Interaction 120, the original corrective action of removing power from the VCT dischargo valves upon a confirmed fire and the continuation of a roving fire watch has been approved by NRC for a short term solution.

Long-term corrective action will be addressed by CAQR SQP880346 (S13 880513 4441.

804547/./q w

0216E

O f

B/P ID SG Al - C SS - 02 4 sh 17 c/o R

O

(

Prepared By:

[-

d[Nu 7!/!88 Checked By: // h. M

. NM,

I r

y VIII. CONCLUSIONS The interactions in Attactiment 2 were reevaluated for cable to cable shorts.

It was determined that the original analysis and/or corrective actions to be taken as a result of the evaluation of similar interactions for Unit 2 are bounding for cable to cable shorts for RCS high/ low pressure interfaces for Unit 1.

e e

9 O

l num 0216E

.!L 4 4 880308 306 w

?

C.

$N 15?B Lookout Place MAR 081988 Attochment No--

I Sheet I af 2' U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Conaission Loop #/ identifier SOM-CSS- 02.4 ATTN: Document Control Desk -

Washington, D.C.

20555

, y.

Centlemen:

i In t,he Matter of J

)

':z.f.- if:..... Tennessee Valley Authority

)

Docket Nos. 50-327

,;p :v;-

50-328

' Y.5 SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT (SQN) - APPENDIX R' - REQUEST FO INFORMATION

Reference:

IVA letter to NRC dated March 2, 1988f As requested in a telephone call with R. Pierson of your staff. TVA is providing supplemental infor: nation to support the referenced letter for questions 12 and 14 the responses provided in If you have any question, please telephone M. R. Harding at 870-6422.

(615) f u.

Very truly yours, i

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY e

8 gt(.f /. '.r -

i

..u.;f. M '

R.

ridley, D' ector J/i,;'.,",'

Nuclear Licensing and Regulatory Affairs Enclosures ec: see page 2 l

i 2

I i

s e

L O

-2' Att:chment No I

Sheet 2 nf 3 Loop W/fdentifier SOAJ-C%- o2.4 J

The issue of type II associated circuits has been the subject of considerable review by NRC.

TVA provided additional information on the primary side

('

Reactor Coolant System (RCS) in a December 2,1982 let that letter is included in attachment 1, A copy of Attachment the current evaluation for high/ low-pressure interfaces that may create a2 pr LOCA.

spurious analysis of high/ low-pressure interfaces. Attachment 3 c portions of a TVA letter dated December

. contains W.

21, 1984, to NRC confirmation of action letter dated August to NRC where TVA responded "Interaction Identification," of that letter stated TVA's c Enclosure 5, 10, 1984 for various type II associated circuit interactions.

orrective actions letter also stated in Enclosure it This December 21, 1984 5"p"*

determining the components that must be prevented

' 5 Me ".

JY$

operation.

Diagram and Associated keys.These components are listed in the Fire Th Cable separation was evaluated for these corponents on the color cod drawings contained in enclosure 4.

e in reference 3 with respect Additional information is available to RCS pressure boundary isolation.

interactions determined from this spurious evaluation are also i The in enclosure S.

ncluded Reference 3 mentioned above is the letter included in attachm I

inspected TVA's reevaluation of Appendix R from January 14-18 The NRC jr documented the results in Inspection Report Nos.

, 1985, and

(,

50->28/85-01.

50-327/85-01 and With regard to the spurious signal concern, NRC statedt determine if the following conditions had been consi o

The false motor, control and instrument J,jh.s;.Kp.y). -

the 1975 Browns Ferry Fire. readings such as what occurred at 2%;g.-M.

fire initiated grounds, shorts or open circuits.These could be caused by

,w 7 23 Spurious operation of safety-related or non-safety-related

. 4,7lq.

that would adversel Isolation Valves). y af fect shutdown capat:1**y (e.g., RHR/RCS components e

The licensee's method for evaluation of fire induced spuriou that could affect the circuits required to bring the plant s signals shutdown was reviewed.

to hot signal-affected circuits and circuits that could affectThe licensee logic path through spurious actuation due to fire damage as the shutdows circuits.

between redundant shutdown paths.Therefore, these circuits were ev shutdown circuits that are powered from ungrounded ac or de power sourcT 4

d es.

d t

3-P i

Attochment No L

- SMt ATTACHMENT 3 M O'"

Interactions Involving High/ Low-Pr4ssure Interfaces INTERACTION #

Components 13 19 Lecdown (L) 48 L

L 60 63 L

~.

65 L

73 L

74 L and Head Vents (HV) 75 EV 77 L. HV 85 L

86 L

87 L. HV 100 HV 101 HV 109 L. HV 110 PRZ PORVS (PP) 111 PP 112 PP 113 PP 114 PP 117 PP 118 SG PORV, (SGP)

(note 1) 10 SGP (note 1) k*

VCT Outlet Valves (note 2)

NOTE 1:

but does involve type II spurious circuits.This interaction doe Additionally, as.an enhancement, System Operating Instruction 26.2 will be revised to inve fuser pulled or the transfer switch placed in auxiliary to ret trn any spurious opened steam generator PORV.

NOTE 2:

This interaction does not involve high/ low LOCA pressure interface but does involve type II spurious circuits.

L i

9 i

I s

9

,m-

\\

1 l

l Attcchment No.

2-Sheet I _of 19 Loop #/!dentifier SG^l-C.SS - 02A-Interaction Number:

19 1(

~'

's e

l l

Safety Tunction/ Unit:

RCS Inventony Control / Unit.1 Associated Interaction No(s):

None Associated Safety Func' tion (s):

None Location:

Area 1: Auxiliary Building, El 714, Common Area (A6/Q line)

Area 2: Auxiliary Building, El 734, Aux. Control Inst. Roos g

Area 3: Auxiliary Building, El 734, Aux. Control Room

==

Description:==

An interaction exists at the above three locations for l

all paths identified to accomplish isolation of normal 1

letdown. This is necessary for RCS pressure boundary l

,/

isolation. The following cables interact at the above locations.

(1) Elevation 714, Common Area (A6/Q Line) 3,

~

Path 1: FCV-62 IV4423A Path 2: FCV-62-70, - IV4435A Path 3: FCV-62 IV4473A FCV-62 IV4488A s '-

i TCV-62 IV4503A Cables routed from 714 up into panel 1-L-11A in Aux. Cont.

Inst. Rm 1A s- - -

~ -. - - - - -

r--

r--y-,,

e v----

w

l E

Sheet

2. of 19 Attachment No.

Sc Al-CSS - 02.4 L p #/ldentifier Interaction No.

19 (Continued) l (

n

~~.

Descriptions (Continued)

.(2) Elevation 734, Auxiliary control Instrument Room 1A Path 1: ' FCV-62-69 IV4420A, IV4421A, IV4425A, IV4423A Pa th 2: TCV-62-70 IV4432A, IV4433A, IV4437A,1V4435A

. Path,3:' FCV-62-72 IV4470A, IV4471A, IV4473A, IV4477A, IV4472A FCV-62-73 IV4486A, IV4487A, IV448&A, IV4485A, IV4492A IV4500A,IV4501A,IV4502A,IV4503A,IV45075 TCV-62-74 Cables routed from the 1-L-11A panel into the auxiliary control room (3) Elevation 734, Auxiliary control room Path 1: FCV-62-69 IV4420A, IV4421A, IV4425A Path 2: FCV-62-70 IV4432A, IV4433A, IV4437A

(

Path 3: TCV-62-72 IV4470A, IV4471A, IV4472A*, IV4477A s

s- '

FCV-62-73 IV4486A, IV4487A*, IV4485A, IV4492A FCV-62-74 IV4500A, IV4501A, IV4502A*, IV4507A Cables are routed from the auxiliary control instrument room into the 6.9 kV shutdown board room A, except for those marked with an asterick. The cables marked with an asterick are routed from the auxiliary control instrument room into the 1-L-10 panel.

Corrective Action:

Isolation of the RCS pressure boundry was addressed in a December 2,1982 letter from L. H. Mills to E. Adensas.

An additional review of these pathe verified that RCS depressurization is not credible through normal letdown since three paths are available for isolation. This item is closed.

---t e--

4- -, - -,

t

--.,,-.u.

-y

-,--1 e

v-

-=

,.e e---

e.

e

Attachmont No._

2. Shect[fC 100P #/ldentifler SGtd-CSS - 024

{

Interaction Number:

60 y

w./

. Safety Function / Unit:

RCS Inventory Control / Unit 1 Associated Interaction No(s):

None Associated Safety Tunction(s):

None

~

~

Location:

Area 1: Aux Bldg El 714, common area (AS-A8/Q-R)

Area 2: Aux Bldg, El 734, Auxiliary control room Area 3: Aux Blds, El 734, Auxiliary Control Instrument Room

==

Description:==

Cables for all three identified paths to isolate excess letdown interact at the above locations. This is necessary

(

to achieve RCS pressure boundary control. The following

)

cables interact at the above lopations.

1)

Elevation 714, common area (AS-A8/Q-R)

Path 1: TCV-62 IV4414 Path 2: FCV-62 IV4370

~

Path 3: FCV-62 IPV56 2)

Elevation 734, Auxiliary Control Room

, Path 1: TCV-62 IV4413 Path 2: FCV-62 IV4367 Path 3: TCV-62 IPM133 3)

Elevation 734, Auxiliary control Instrument Room Path 1: ICV-62 1V4411, IV4412, IV4413, IV4415 Path 2: FCV-62 IV4369 Path 3: FCV-62 1PH132, 1PH133, IPH134 l

N

l t

Attachment Noe 2-Sheet._4._of19 Loop #/tdentifier SQtJ-c.ss -c2,4 Interaction Number:

60 (Continued)

.,c.

Corrective Action: Isolation of the RCS pressure boundry was addressed in a December 2, 1982 letter from L. H. Mills to E. Adensas.

An additional review of these paths verified that RCS depressurization is not credible through excess letdown since three paths are available for isolation. This item is closed.

e D

%g e

.)

s o

e e

. =p

,f y.

e., e t

. e i',

t.'

'?..

'a g

e o

e*g e

a 6

I e

l J

e e

.,,..,, - -. n

,+,,

2' Sheet S of 19 Attochment No-N"O"

~

Interaction Number:

63

.a Safety Tunction/ Unit:

RCS Inv Cont / Unit 1 Associated Interaction No(s):

78 4

Associated Safety Function (s):

Onsite Electrical Supply Location:

Auxiliary Building, El. 734, 6900V Shutdown Board Room A,

"escription:

An interaction exists at the above location for all paths identified to accomplish isolatica of normal letdown. This is necessary to achieve RCS Pressure Boundary Isolation The following cables interact:

)

(

\\.

/

Path 1 - IV4420A, 44'21A, 4425A (FCV-62-69) i s

Path 2 - IV4432A, 4433A, 4437A (FCV-62-70) s-Path 3 - IV4470A, 5471A, 4477A (FCV-62-72) 1V4485A, 4486A, 4492A (FC/-62-73)

IV4500A, 4501A, 4507A (FCV-62-74)

The cables are routed from the auxiliary control instrument room through the auxiliary control room and into the 6.9

, kV shutdown board room A.

This interaction is for the shutdovn board room only. Other rooms are addressed in different interactions.

Corrective Action: ' Isolation of the RCS pressure boundry was addressed in a December 2, 1982 letter from L. H. Mills to E. Adensam. An

,,,/

additional review of these paths verified that RCS depressurizatio.n s,

is not credible through normal letdown since three paths are v

svailable for isolation. This item is closed.

e

+r u.-

l Attochment No.

2-Shcot 6 of 19_

~'

Loop #/\\dentIfler S0^1~ C SS - 02 4

{

Interaction Number:

65

.w.-

Safety Function / Unit:

RCS Inv Cont / Unit 1 Associated Interaction No(s):

None Asso:iated Safety Function (s):

None 1

Le, cation:

Auxiliary Building, E1. 734, 480V Shutdown board ru 1B-23 A3-A4/Q-R line and elevation 734,125V vital battery board room I

\\

==

Description:==

An interaction exists of the above location for all paths identified to accomplish isolation of normal letdown. This

(

is necessary to achieve RCS pressure boundary isolation. The following cables interact:

Path 1: 1V4420A, l.421A (FCV-62-69)

Path 2: IV4433A, 4432A (FCV-62-70) l'ath 3: IV4470A, 4471A (FCV-62-72) 1V4485A, 4486A (FCV-62-73)

IV4500A, 4501A (FCV-62-i4)

, These cables are routed fron the auxiliary control instrument room through the auxiliary control room, 6.9 kV shutdown board room A 480V shutdown board room 1B-2, and into the 12iv vital. battery board room I.

Cables routed through the auxi'liary control room, auxiliary control instrument room, and 6.9-kV shutdown board room are addressed in other interactions.

.m..

,9 i -.-

y

\\

Attachment No.-

2-Sheet 7 nfA i

Loop #/ldentificr _ SOM - CSS - 024

(.

Interaction Number:

65 (Continued)

'N sw.=

e Corrective Action: Isolation of the RCS pressure boundry was addressed in a December 2, 1982 letter from L. H. Mills to E. Adensam.

An additional review of these paths verified that ROS depressurization is not credible through normal letdown J

since three paths are available for isolation. This item is closed

\\

r

(.

'M l

e a

e f

9 0

0 9

0 g

4 e 9, O

e 0

e V

i 9

Attachment No 2

~ Sheet r o g l C

gCP #. /!dentifici_SO A[~ CSS- 024 In'c Netion Number:

109 y/

Safety Function / Unit:

RCS Pressure Control, Unit 1 Associated Interaction No(s):

NA 4

Associated Safety Function (s):

NA Location:

Auxiliary Building Elevation 734, S/D Board Room A.

A2-6/R-S'line.

((

v

==

Description:==

FCV-68-332 cable IV2449B interacts with PCV-68-340A

{

cable IV5611A at the above location.

Corrective Action: Corrective action is not required. Schematic diagram 45V668-1 shows that PCV-68-34,0A will spuriously open M

only if wires RBCP and RBC6 or RBC3 are shorted.

.\\.

Cable IV5612% dnes n:,t ciTYF % ifs pair' combinations; therefore, the PORV will not spuriously open.

8

-c

0 t

1 Attachment No 2

Sheet _jkof is l

• -L5cp #/ identifier.J.ofd - Os S - 02.4 C

Interaction No.

109 (Continued) i c.

An external. fault was not considered. The control power source for each of these valves is from a fused 480-V - 120-V ac ungrounded transformer. Before a component supplied by a two-wire, ungrounded ac circuit could spuriously operate and adversely affect safe shutdown of the plant, two circuits (one energized and one deenergized) would have to be damaged by a fire and then shorted together in such a manner that power would be supplied to the deenergized circuit.

1 For this to occur, either two pairs of conductors would have to.short together or two conductors short f(

to ground and the other two conductors short together without faulting across the line. A similar sequence of events would have to occur for two wire ungrounded de circuits.

iEfkj.rt i

M.',f This interaction is closed.

e e

e g.

e 4

~

- + - - -

---~-e

..-pwr

- -. ~ - --

wa

J Attochment No 2.

to------?

- Sheet kOP #/ldentlflor SO^l-CSSMof~19

(

Interaction Number:

111 4,

=

Safety Function / Unit:

RCS Pressure Control, Unit 1 Associated Interaction No(s):

NA 4

Associated Safety Function (s):

Auxiliary Power Location:

Auxiliary Building Elevations 749, 480-V Transformer Room 1A, A3/S-V line.

l g

i.

==

Description:==

PCV-68-334 cable IV5598B is routed through the above location. A fire at this location tsay cause the loss

.T of cable IV5598B and train ~A power to FCV-68-333.

c, I.

e Corrective Action: Corrective action is not required. Schematic diagram 45N668-1 shows that PCV-68-334 vill spuriously

,i, open only if wires RBDP1 and RBD6 or RBD3 are shorted.

Cable-1V5598B does not carry this combination of wires; therefore, the PORV will not spuriously open. Refer to Interaction No. 109 for more information. This inter-action is closed.

b e

e 9

+-p

<,,a w,-, -

.)

ttachment No 2

~ ~ ~

"WeMN-c 3 Q

"'ction Number:

113 a

J Safety Tunction/ Unit:

RCS Pressure Control, Unit 1 4

Associated Interaction No(s):

NA

)

,o Associated Safety Function (s):

Auxiliary Power Location:

Auxiliary Building Elevation 714, A6-8/Q-R Line.

1 i

f

(

==

Description:==

PCV-68-334 cable IV5596B interects with cables associated with train A auxiliary power at the above location.

l If train A pouer is lost, (due to auxiliary power train A i

at this location) block valve FCV-68-333 will.not be operable to close and isolate line.

Corrective Action:

Reroute cable IV5596B such that it is located south of A-8 line when penetrating d'own to elevation 714.

Another option would be to reroute in conduit from the. bottom of panel 1-L -11B and wrap until the proposed fire wall at the A-8 line or until it penetrates Q line.

(i.e. keep cable IV5596 south of A 8 wall or prcrect when north of A-8).

a

,n e.-..~

w

i l

.a Attachment No._

2.

Shect LZ_.or g L66p '#/Identlficr _SOM - css - 024

(

Interaction Number:

117

'd Safety Function / Unit:

Secondary Side Pressure Control Unit 1 9.

Associated Interaction No(s):

NA i

Associated Safety Function (s):

NA Location:

Auxiliary Building Elevations 734/714, A3-A6/Q-R.

o C

==

Description:==

The shutdown logic requires that 1-PC.V-1-5, -12, -23, -30.

must not spuriously operate. Cables for these valves run throughout the auxiliary building. An evaluation revealed that cables IV7521A, IV7568B IV7537A, IV7582B contain the pair combination of wires which could possibly cause the g

valves to spuriously operate..

i 'i Corrective Action: Turther evaluation b.is shown that this spurious operation is not credible.

• vo

-v.

,-.77-.

- ~ _,

-,.w

Attachment No 2

a Sheet _l}__of_lQ.

L56p' #/ldentifier S M - ? S S - 0 2.9-Interaction Number:

117 (Co tinued)

(:

V An evaluation identified cables which, if involved in a fire, could cause the valve's opening solenoid to energize.

Schematic disgram 45N601-4 shows that PCV-1-5 could spuriously operate if wires IS3AP and 153A3/ or IS3AS are shorted and energizes the "A" solenoid. Cable IV7521A carries this pair-1 combination of wires.' A similar cable exists for all of the above listed'PCV's: 1V7568B,for PCV-1-12, IV7537A for PCV-1-23, IV7582 for PCV-1-30.

Turther evaluation revealed that since the PCV has two solenoid valves (one for closing and one for opening), the operator may, if the valve spuriously opens, place the HS in the closed position and energize the "B" solenoid to close the valve. The "B" closing

(

solen,oid is in series with the "A" opening solenoid and overrides the ope'ning signal keeping the valve closed with both solenoids energized.

'e *

4.s

. r,;

In the event both solenoids are deenergized (fuses blown in f:

,.j.

circuit), the PCV would be allowed to modulate via a pressure j

controller. The control system for the PORV's consist of a transmitter located in the valve roo, a controller located in the main control room, and an I/P converter located in the valve room.

f t

Nw

• t 4

b

. - _ _.... ~~.-,

e Attachment No-

- Sheet i+ of I9

.s E

Ep W/ldehtifle? SG4 - CSS - 02.4

(

Interaction Number:

117 (Continued)

G' If a fire were to short the cable from the transmitter to the j

)

cyntroller and cause the control system to open the valve, the operator can place the controller in manual and run the valve closed. Should the cable from the transmitter open, the control e

system would keep the valve, closed. If the fire'should short or,

i t

open the cable from the controller to the I/P converter, the converter would see the same result in both cases, no current, and the valve would remain closed. Therefore, based on this full evaluation, it is not credible for the SG PORV's to spuriously operate. Operating procedures will address placing the valve handsvitch in.the closed position and the controller

(

in manual-elosed in the event the PCV spuriously opens.

s V

j l

i

't..

n1 e

?*

\\

f j

e 1

m-,.--

,,.----.--,-,--,y.

.,m,..,----,.,,,,-.e-,

-w--

,-,,.-e------,--m.-

-d Attachment No 2

.SheetIS ofR g

Interaction Number: _ 120 Lo5p #/ldentifier SGd - C.SS-02.4

s.,

v.s Safety Function / Unit:

RCS Inventory Control Keys 4 & 5 Unit 1 & 2 Associated Interaction No(s):

NA associated Safety Function (s):

NA Location:

Auxiliar'y Building multiple elevations

~

==

Description:==

Cables for valve 1-LCV-62-132 and 1-LCV-62-133 exists at multiple locations. Spurious operation of either valve could be caused by a fire along the path of cables IV2761A, IV2764A, and IV2765A for valve 1-LCV-62-132 or cables IV2771B, IV2774B, and IV2775B for valve 1-LCV-62-133. The same applies to unit 2.

4 9

e G

0 e

a 4

v r..

l

?

s i

Aycchment No Z

{

Interaction Number:

120 (Continued)

C

~D

~

.q Corrective Action: Cables IV2761A, IV2764A, and IV2765A for valve 1-LCV-62-132 are routed from panel 1-H-5 in the control room to the 1Al-A 480-V Reactor MOV board.

From the reactor MOV board they are routed in conduit to the U line wall. They are embedded in

~

the wall down to elevation 690. On elevation 690 they are routed from the U line wall to the valve.

A fire anywhere along the exposed cable path could cause LCV-62-132 to spuriously close by short circuiting any of the following wire pairs:

'EX1 and 3EC2 3

(

3EX1 and 3EC11 g

3El and 3EC2 Ref Drawing 45N779-11 3El and 3EC11 3E3 and 3EC2 3E3 and 3EC11 A fire at either the Reactor HOV board or VCT room labyrinth could cause the same situation to occur.

Cables IV2771B, IV2774B, and IV2775B for valve 1-LCV-61-133 are routed from panel 1-H-5 in the control. roorn. to the 1B1-B. Reactor MOV board. From the HOV board the cables are routed down through the various floors in cable trays and conduit until

.V E

g y

y.,,

,c 4

Attachment No..

2. ~ Sheet.12 or g II)3p ' /ldcntificGSOH ~ CSS- 024 i

Interaction Number:

120 (Continued)

~

..]

=

J reaching the valve room on elevation 690. A fire anywhere along the path could cause LCV-62-133 to spuriously close by short circuiting any of the i

following wire pairs in the cable:

8BX,1 and 8BC2 8BX1 and 8BC11 8B1 and 8BC2 Ref. Drawing 45N779-11 8B1 and BBC11 8B3 and 8BC2 8B3 and 8BC1,1 A f' ire at either the 1B1-B HOV board or VCT room

(,.

labyrinth could cause the same spurious operation.

An external f ault van not considered. The control power source for each of these valves is from a fused 480-V - 120-V ac ungrounded transformer. Before a i

component supplied by a two vire, ungrounded ac circuit, could spuriously operate and adversely affect safe shut-down of the plant, two circuits (one energized and one deenergized) would have to be damaged by a fire and then shorted together in such a manner that power would be supplied to the deenergized circuit. For this to occur, either two pair of conductors would have to short together or two conduc. ors short to ground and the other

%, af

(3 Interaction Number:

120 (Continued)

Attachment N0=

2

@p. /ldchtlfici SAM - C S S -oz4 Sheet.)

I 6

v

]

i two conductors short together without faulting across

{

the line. A similar sequence of events would have to occur for two wire engrounded de circuits.

During normal plant, operation only one charging pump is running. Since both LCV-62-132 and LCV-62-133 are

)

in series from the Volume Control Tank to the centri-fugal charging pumps, the spurious closing of either valve would cause the loss of suction to the pump and the loss of.the pump itself.

\\

(

s' i

Our corrective action is to remove power from these N

{

two valves.(62-132, 133) or switch over suction to the RWST by opening valves 1-LCV-62-135 and 1-LCV-62-136 during a confirmed fire in the cable locations.

~f-described above. With power removed, these valves 4

cannot spu:iously operate. )tanual operation would still be possible. The Fire Shutdown Logic will be revised to incorporate the above corrective action.

Operating procedures will address this iten.

e NBC Insfecfian Refed ll14/s 7 A 02. 87el2J 005 U en ct cushnnec) Arc. In 0?c f

c0fc iso!"ss t e fewer }o h

N s.ob ed vsI/e.s as Il b e.

Hee J

ye meted.

4 Attachment No--

2-

- Sheet & f ~1.9 R

% ~ /IdentifleV OM-C S S - 02.4

\\

S Interaction Number:

120 (Continued)

For normal operation and for a safety injection signal valves 1-LCV-62-135 or 1-LCV-62-136 must open before 1-LCV-62-132 or 1-LCV-62-133 closes. Valves62-135 and 62-136 are in parallel from the RWST to the charging pumps. This valve movement could be defeated during a fire. The two following examples are the most simple combinations that could cause this event to occur:

1.

A fire must cause a short circuit between wires 3EC3 and 3EC2 in cable IV2763A, must cause a short circuit between wires 8BC2 and 8BC3 in emble IV1773B, and a Volume Control Tank lo-lo level, signal must be present from level control

'r loop 62-129A or 62-13QA.

2.

A fire must cauen a short circuit between wires 3EC3 and 3EC2 in cable IV2767A, must cause a

.... 2, ;. c,.r _.

short circuit between wires 8BC2 and 8BC3 in

..:, a :.!u.:= G....

ECZ T" ~ ~ '..

~

cable IV2777B, and a Volume Control Tank lo-lo W-l

.4y,-9.w..s:-;

..f *;:.7d *.C'

~ -" '

level signal must be present from level control

,. ~

loop 62-129A or 62-130A.

Multiple and simultaneous failures that could cause the defeat of this particular safety function are considered incredible.

The above evaluation also applies to Unit 2 (change valve and cable number prefix from 1 to 2).

i o

. b

- -,. ~,,.

n

,Y r-s Attachment No 3

sheet I of E Lcep p/ldentifier SOM - C S S - 024 TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT

{

~ '

SYSTEM OPERATING INSTRUCTION S01-26.2 I~

FIRE INTERACTION MANUAL 1

Revision 9 I

UNIT QA REVIEW REQUIRED 0E 1E 28 N/A D YES E NO O c'

-g s

RESPONSIBLE SECTION: Operations PREPARED / REVISED BY:_ Jafhes T. Sprinorield SUBMITTED BY:_

k [i G

~

o esponsible Section Supervisor QR: LA Hia

/

/

SITE QA CONCURRENCE:

I 96!r i

APPROVED BY:

Appropriat Responsible Manager

~

DATE APPROVED:

/Nhb s

r-The last page of this instruction is number:

151 I

em.

I

~

~ ~~ ' ~

~

Ate:chment No.

3 Shact 2 of 2.

Loop yldentifier SoM-css - 02.4 SON SOI-26.2 Page 2 Revision 9 IV.

_ PRECAUTIONS A.

Fires in certain areas may cause spurious valve operation or prevent equipment from operating.

In the event of spurious operation deenergization of the power supply (i.e., pull fuses, trip breakers) may allow the subject component to fall safe.

Additt 2nally, operation of some components may be possible from its b ckup control station (i.e. transfer switch in Aux).

B.

Strl'.t awareness of all plant parameters will have to be maintained during and after the fire until the equipment can be assured of not being damaged by the fire.

C.

Spurious operation of equipment could:

(1) Cause inadvertent operation of in-line series valves in required flow paths.

(1) Divert flow from a required flow path.

D.

Evaluate radiation hazards if applicable.

V.

_ INSTRUCTIONS (i -

sNOTE: If during a fire the reactor (RX)

Instructions (E's) and once out of them, return to thisis tripped, refer t instruction.

A.

Operations Supervisor (SOS) or the Fire Brigade Lea B.

determine applicable diagnostic section.Use plant elevation room name to get page number diagnostic section is on.Use room number an page number to find diagnostic section.

Go to C.

on plant equipment and actions to take if equipment affected.

(Numerical diagnostic steps go together.)

affect general plant systems. general diagnostic section for actions t Use O.

and excess letdown should be vertfled normal.If during a If Letdown and/or excess letdown is high and it appears air-operated valves in the letdown paths have ? ore OPEN and should not be OPEN then CLOSE 1

valves from the cont,31 Bd.

Then, if valves cannot be CLOSED, l

dispatch an Operator to alevation 714 Penetration Room and have W lsolate air to NON-LSSENTIAL Header (U-1)

(U-2) 2-FCV-32-Ill to alivw valves to fall CLOSED or locally to 1-FCV-32-110 or el. 690 Aux Bldg manual isolation valve U-1 (32-718 or 724), U-2 (32-725 or 731).

1 4

./-

S traenw.e r.i.

A27 822 J2 013 1

• 00 ?catnut.9treet "*evnr II Decceber 2, 1902

~~

Director of Nuciene Resetor Regulatten Attention: !!3 R. Adens:'.n, Chief 4

tA Loop #/tdentifier g0g _ Sheet __.--

Licensine Brn."Teh No. 4 I Attachrnent No--

g,gg _ og Sivision of Lierinsing U.3. Huelear Requlntory Comission VAshirgton, D.C.

20555 Dea.- ! Ls. Adonse.:11 In the F.stter of

)

Docket !!os. ?0 '!27 Tar.nessm Valle7 Authority

)

50- W In re.seense to item 4 of your letter to ti. G. P1rris <'at*d Nov

.h-1?,

1962, enelesed is additional infor::.tien en, iters es*'oeinta'i vitb. the Sceuoyoh fire protcotion progr e.

If you have any o,uastiens concerninq thic ratter, please get in touch with Charlie l' ills at FTS B58-26';4 Very tr017 yours, O

TD:t!ESSt? VAL 1J.Y AU'"eiORITY O

~

? tills, M L. !!..

f.,.. ;<

s,...7',

Mpnsr,er

.' y Sworn Nucicar f.icensing

• l 3 / Xhis [to nr.4 subscribed before no M.hy of tyhf/'<. 190 O )

tb E

6 9h s

. hytros

~~

a o

nBS:CL:i:LH3 Enclosu m U.S. Nucicar Re.gulatory Comission (Enclosure) cc:

Peeion II Atta:

Hr. Janan P. O'Reilly Adninintra tor-101 P.trietta Str tot, Sulto 3100 Atlanta, Georgin 3030?-

ec: See pas;e 2' N * *..

4 e e. '.'

s.

b.

.t

,g g,,,,.

8

.t

~2 Director of Nuclear React er Regulation December 2, 1o82

)

~ -

cc (Enclosure):

ARR9, 640 CST 2-C J. W. Andercon, 002 HDL-K

~

Se u.

hc~

Loop #/ldentifier _SO AJ - CSS - 02.4 Attachment No. 4 _ Sheet 1 of i H. J. Gr ren, l'A. CST 2-C R. L. Lumpkii, 401 U33-C J. A. Raulston, W10':125 C-K H. S. Sanger, Jr., E11B33 C-K F. A. Szer.epanski, 017 UBB-C C00RDI'IATED: IliHeatheriv/EN DES, BErickson/NUC PR A..

~

-M_ <. LN. g, _.-e::st:.:nm.

1. wesw.w..ww _,,&. ?g.-;'qyf[..y.k5g.zpig <..,

3..-

..,,... a a..

~ --

u.xm w:tz.:_n.em %.u,,,,,g, 4g._ _.

.,__.n.,,

a.*.'

ENCLOStlRE Attechrnent N -

4-Sheet 3 of 6 39g. c.ss - 02.4 t.oop #/!dentifier 2-i 13 i

,g/

In many instances, one control / actuation signal will cause the actuation or several functional components. Verify that the

- - )

depressuri:stion of the primary side via interfacing system will not occur due to the actuation of system components resulting from the fire cliscussion should include the means of preventing RHR is Your actuation, uncontrolidd letdown a on valve pressuriser PORV actuation, or oneration,of any valve or co soon,ent which weald prevent the system (s) from performins: its functional objectives.

TV4 R*=eonsa The following citocunalena Isle *ntify potent.lal $lepre nnurh*.ntion pathn an't address how each path is protected from fire generated spurious signals.

I.

_ Reactor Vessel Head Vent 9vst.km Letdown The reac'or vessel head vent systems (RVHVS) may become a RCS leakage path in the event of undesirable actuations of system signals from associated circuitry. components resulting from the fire-ind This path is blecked by normally-closed solenoid valves. However, if the valves were to spuricusly open, due to the postulated fire, a 3/8-inch flow

• charging capability of the chemical volume centrol sy trestricte see FSAR Section 15 3.1.1.

In che long ters, ricw may be s em (CVCS) r terminated through the RVHVS by manually removing cower from the

~

3 valve solenoids.

containment.

This ac.tien can be accomplish. d.* rem outside CVCS charging 'is assured t'r either thn positive itsplacerwnt charging pump or one of the redundant centrifugal charging pumps and the associated charging fl.cw control valve,' FCV-62-93 is available to allew ficw to the RCS.

these functions in the event or fire are discussed in TVA'sPr i

-.J response to NRC ASB questico 1 (see RCS inventory centrol l

discussien) suWtted to the NRC by letter from L. M. Mills to f S. Rubenstein dated October 23, 1979 s

Hence, TVA is taking credit.for the CVC3 charging units to be I

. Thus, depressuri:ation of the RCS would not cecur.available II.

RuR Letdewn Path 5

I I

i The RHR letdown line has meter-onerated flow centrol valves F and FCV-7u-2 arranged in sectes.

-1 were to spuriously open due to signals produced by the postulatedIf b fire at power operations, the RCS,cou,ld d*pressurt?.c throu:;h the RH9

nystem, l

j l

O j

=

}

11 Attechment Nos 4'

. Sheet 4 of 6 Loop #/ identifier SM'C SS - 024 r-2 h

'ENCLOSITRE l

(Continued)

TVA's operating instructions and 20-foot separation criteria for the circuits of these isolation' valves will prevent this path frem dep essurizing the RC3. When the p1hnt starts up frem a shutdown condition, existing procedures call t'or the operator to cle a FCV-74-1 and FCV-74-2.

The operator will then open the circuit breaker located between the cotor starter and the valve rotor 480-volt circuit. This breaker will be locked in the open positten with a pad lock at any ti=e the unit is operating at power. The circuit breaker will not be reclosed until the RHR system is required for use. Therefore, during times when the RHR systes is not to be used, the valves will be protected against spurious actuatiens in the l

control circuit, r.oter centrol staticn, juncticn box 480V supply and the canual control switches in the MCR or ACR.

Also the power cables to the isolatien valves =eet the 2.0 feet i

separatien criteria for their routing between the locked-out circuit breakars and the valve motnrs. Consequently, both valves cannot be arroeted by any single rire event.

Therefore, it is not credible to assu=e depressuri:itien of the RCS by this path.

~ ~.

1 III. RCS Letdown Paths 1

The RCS normal and excess letdown paths potentially could ecce=e depressuri:stien paths due to undesirable openings of varicus cc:binaticas of letdown valves resulting frem fire-induced generation of spuricus signals in associated circuitry. Flcw within eacn

~~

~

letdown path is regulated by a series of air-operated flew centrol valves. An investigatien was i=plemented to determine if RCS depressurizatien could cccur within either er both letdown paths by a single fire. The investigatien indicated areas do exist where cc binations of letdown valves cay be affected by the postulated fire

~

resulting in reacter ecolant loss thecugh one letdcwn path.

TVA cenaiders that it is very unlikely for =ultiple spuricus valve openina.s to necur in those pathn an a renut t or fire-induced shorts.

In the circuit (nr any particular valve thero are two or three possible single shorts that would cause the valve to open, whereas there are at least twice as many possible single shorts that would dinable the circult reg.ardless af any other shorta and very many other single shorts that do nothing. Ccnsidering the relatively small nu=ber of single shorts and ceabinations of shorts that cause valve opening in relation to the relatively large nu=bor of single shorts and combinations of shorts that prevent valve opening, it is unlikely that any particular valve will spuriously open and even less likely for a particular group of fail-closed type of valves to all spuriously open due to a common fire.

In reference to particular

.w

t....<.4

• ~

4 Sheet T ofi Attechment No Loep g/ identifier SM-C.55-o24 4

~

~ * - ' '

1

(_ ')

ENCLOSURE

..:.J' (Continued)

~.

possible depressuri:stien paths, either the normal RCS or excess letdown path cust have at'least three separate valves to be opened simultanecurly. It is therefore very unlikely that either of these RCS letdown paths will become open due to fire-caused spurious actuations.

However, should this unlikely event occur', adequate RCS makeup will be available. A single fire cannot cause the loss of RCS makeup (using the CVCS centrifugal charging rumps) and spuriously open a RCS letdown path. The charging of one centrifugal charging pump (CCP) is caeable of limiting RCS depressurization for one open letdown path. (lleither letdown path, in the worst case, will pass more than about 200 gpm; from FSAR Figure 15.2 41, one CCP will maintain the RCS near r.ormal pressure for this flow rate. )

Arirlittenal makeup capabij ity will be penvisfrvi hy 1.hn earlun. tant.

centrifugal charging puep or the CVCS pouttivo dicplacement pump.

A discussion with regard to RCS makeup, RWST suction, and ECCS charging paths has been provided in the SC:1 safe shutdown submittal dated October 1, 1981. In the lenger term, flow may be terminated in the letdown paths folicwing manual actions by the operators.

Therefore, it is not credible for significant RCS deoressurization to occur through the letdown paths.

. IV.

RCP Seal Integrity In the event of less of RCP seal cooling, rupture of the seals could occur and result in depressuri:stien of the RCS through the seals.

Maintainina the RCP seal's integrity is identified as a necessary functinn en the fire shutdown logiu diagram (FSLD). Therefore. TVA lo a33uring that the RCP neal's integrity'wlli be maini.atned by way of thn chemical voluma enntent nyst em (CVC.") nr tha enmponent ennline, wa tcr flyM an (CCll) na riri:mr ibt'.I hal nw.

RCP seal integrity is maintained by the CVCS if either the positive displacement charging pump or one of the redundant centrifugal charging pumps and the associated charging flow control valve, FCV-6.S-o1 is available to provide coolant to the seals. This arrangement will assure adequate enolant to the seals durine, normal operations..*. discussica of CVCS eal cooling is provided in TVA respcnse to NRC ASB Cuestion 1 - submitted to the !!RC by letter feca L. M. Mills to P. S. Rubenstein dated October 23, 147n.

M.

=..

.~)

'9

== **.............,...

......o.

6

• 4 '..' _ e e

g Attachment No. - 4 Sheet _h_off*.

Leop #/tdentifier SG^l' CSS - 02 4 4

DiCLOSURE h'un t. i rium t )

s An alternate method of maintaining the RCP seal's integrity can be acce=plished by providing coolant 'to the RCP thermal ba riers eith the CC3.

The-CCS supplies coolant to the RCP's ther=al barriers during nor=al operation with the redundant set of thermal barrier beester pum.ps. Each booster pu=p is capable of supplying adequa'te ficw to the RCP ther=al barriers to maintain the integrity of the seals. A discussien of RCP ther=al barrier cooling is provided in TVA's response to !!RC ASB Question 1.

The co penents and their associated circu'itry fer the CVCS and CC3 seal cooling paths discussed above, ara located in the plant in a canner which will prevent one fire from ter=inating the function of both RCP seal cooling paths. Consequently, it is not credible to lose RCP seal cooling due to the postulated' fire, thus preventing RCS depressuri:stien by this path.

flote:

The CVCe's and CCS's RCP seal cooling suboystems both function during.

.ral operations of the plant.

V.

_Pressuriser Relief Paths The pressuri:er power-operated relief valves (PORVs) potentially

'- )

could open RC3 depressurization paths in the event of undesirabl.

opening of these ecmpenents resulting fres fire-induced generatica of spuricus signals in associated circuitry.

l The pressuri er has two parallel, power-operated relief paths. Each path has a normally

}

closed, PORV and an upstream, normally open ficw contro." valve (FCV).

i Sheuld a PORV open due to the effects,of a fire, the operator can '"

ter=inate the event if either valve in the path is capable of being closed.

An investigation was i=plemented to determine if the centrols and wiring for the valves in each relief path co=oly with the 20-fcot

{

fire separation critert'a.

e.rist between thn PORV and FCV in enchUnacceptable interactions were found to letdown path. TVA will correct thin candition by encouting ttm onettona of wirina. that do not comply to the 70-foot separatten criterta, so no firo affecting this path will be encable of causing a RC.1 depressuri:stion which cannot be isolated.

u g

E-G. mSGSemem-e 2

9

ar t

1

\\

(

( M $ $: w$ @ 25! $ M d.i ' @ " h.5 %r"a

~

1 y;

.w L*.a.- : & 3-

?~

'---N m

ggE..yeg.,.,;e:

m.kM,::.

i

.~

ea m

ffgqupg.sg,....dt;

',:Mi.

Wi%..~ 4::: :.G.,,,.

...M

~

tj

.'9$gNimw,'.af ).% ' O".V{.'R.U' c - ~54 1578 Lookout Place

i :.:.%w 5

T.qytq :.'l :

. q'.x,9

.. r q-Y,., T *j;Md, 'y c

r:

p u

_ pg 131988 s,p.

E

..?

... g.

,. ~

~ ' U.S. helear tegulatory Comisston U.e

'~~

... =

ATTX: Docuent Control Oest Mashington, D.C.

20555 Attachrnent No.

6 i

_ Sheet I afl Gentlemen:

Loop }/ identifier SG AJ-C.sS-02.4 i

...c

.In the Matter of f-

.w

y

- c Tennessee Yalley Authortty

)

)

=

Docket Mos. 50-327.w..;.4'N

>v

-i.'*M'Q g

50-328 SEQUOYAH IE.lCLEAR PLANT (SCN) - APPEMDIX R - R 9,

Q

.. ~-4 a

TVA documents requested by the NRC staff during the March 9 MATION

. '. - ::ty,:..M meeting, except for reviston 9 to the shutdown logic calculation which

, 1988 pubite forwarded to you by April will be

' ' '.y E.

25, 1988, are provided in enclosure 1

. A; contains additional documents requested by the NRC Appendix R inspec g@#

)

during the inspection conducted March 14-18, 1988.

eam additional information on question No.18. response to NRC question N These questions were con.12, and

-.g'A'}

m%.

TVA by XRC letter dated Feoruary 26, 1988.

veyed to y.)se Provided in acciosure 3 are the comaltments contained in

,.,js 7.,q.i If you have any questions, please telephone H. R. Harding at (615) 87

.g a

a.

I 22.

M A

a Very truly yours.

E

_.., d.

~

n TEMMESSEE VALLEY AUTHCRITY

...:n.

w a o.d ay s

c m, u ms.y

.O h

o.

R. Crldley, Otractor

.b Muclear Licanstnq and Regulatory Affairs h.?

Enclosures cc: 54e page 2

?

3, y

y

.gg= y y

u m

'. ~

.Y,

. i..'.': }

1

$3 r

. 't :

m g

i

, i

!M M

E.

T,'~h%7& W c m_

s m,,.._ -

x.y..

11.

.==.*-.d'~-

_w, N1 g[ =... _m e 6m hm M

. _ -m _ _ _,

• P.

W d *h

^

. hh

@dY4MNENNM N" " "

N

=

-~

=

N

=

~

d Attochment No-S Sheet..E nf '3

{

Loop #/ldentifier %d-CSS- 024

~

4..

ENCLOSURE 2 Maximum normal letdown that a si 1'

mus fire (interaction 86) veycome.for a 4 6 0

e e

4 o

0 0 4 e

4 4

j h*a O'

O 1

9 a

i

.g

• 4 s

• e 4

e e

e MAXIMUM NORMAL

• LETp0WN THAT A SINGLE 00P a

MUST OVERCOME FOR A TIRE (INTERACTION 86)

Attachment No-S Sheet 3 of 3

1. cop #/ldentifier S/M-CSS- 024 ISSUE:

Capability of a single CCP :o ove come the maximum letdown because of a fire.

DISCUSSION:

Tae orifice in the excess letdown path will limi: maximum flow to be well within the capacity.of a CCP.

Restricting orifices at the three paralici le:down flow control valves serve to reduce the pressure of the letdown stream and thus restrict maximum flow.

One of the orifices is used fer normal operation and limi:s maximum flow to 75 gal / min..The other two orifices are 75 and 45 gal / min, if used individually, and are' used to increase le:down flow (such as during reactor heatup opera: ions or increased purification).

NRO guidance documents state that only the redundant valves in a single high-low pressure line need to be considered to spuriously operate.

If we

. consider that one flow control valve is nor= ally open at 75 gal /=in and assume that the fire spuriously opens the other parallel flow control valve with a 75-gal / min orifice, this would lead :o a maximum theore:ical le:down of 150 gal / min, ignoring line losses.

This is approxi=ately equivalen: to the charging capability of 150-160 gal /=in for a single charging pump.

If we consider seal injection versus seal water return, at 7(

cost a 12-gal / min loss from the RCS could occur, in addition to the 1e:down. Nor=al pressuricer level at full power is 60 percent. A: the 17-percent level, the opera: ors are required by procedure to isolate 1e:down. A: the 60-percen: pressurizer level, over 7 hours8.101852e-5 days <br />0.00194 hours <br />1.157407e-5 weeks <br />2.6635e-6 months <br /> would be

.available for operator action.

This letdown would be diverted to the 120,000-gallon holdup tank or to the pressurizer relief tank via a relief valve, should pressure / temperature e,onsidera: ions warrant.

If one vere to assume the ex:remely low likelihood case that a fire caused all three orifice lines to be open and line losses were neglected, tnis gives a maxi =um le:down flow cf 195 gal /cin.

In addition, a 12-gal /cin debi on :he charging flow was considered to account for reactor coolant pt=p seal leakc. ' flow. The charging flow is 150 gal / min.

This results in a ne: loss from the system of 57 gal /cin. Wi:h the 60-percent pressuri:er level inven:ery, in excess of 1-1/2 hours would be required for the pressuri:er level to drop frem 60 percen: to 17 percent using the 57-gal /=in flow mis =atch.

This conserva:ive assessment shows the operators have a significan:* period of time to is~olate letdown, assuming i

automatic i' 11ation f eatures did not f unc: ion and normal control is lost.

CONCLUSION:

Letdown because of spurious flow control valve opening can be terminated by operator action well within the time available to maintain pressuriser level within the instrumen:ed range.

Isolation of control air to containment can be utilized as the divet se isolation mechanism.

i e

9 4

b 9

g 49

J,,;\\

S13

.8 e

sog' 3

• n'IMS ACCESSIOfJ NUMUER w PART A j -ocO8 CAOR NO.[SlNH9Noj3{9%[)

DESCRIPTION OF THE CAO f.

PL AN T/PnOJ ECT SEduoV44/ NP

_ //tlA d., COUWCC MJEE., RCS g

SYSTEM

_ UNIT I d Z-VENDOR-M/A COMPONENT J k M

[ VENDOR'S ADDRESS _ A//4 dM'O ASME7 YES O NO %

REFERENCES 3 d M A 0 N ECON TR ACT NO _ A//A-REOulnEMENT VLOCATEO l_. EA S THAM 80#7" SEPjt124nDA/ e/2 Ot>A L IW/Elh 8

_F~0A.

RCbr3 A1DAAJT-c,p-pE SOURCE OF RECUInEMENT VIOLATED

/OA N. FCG fil1TDomAl C//d0017 R A BLE A-12A 19.4 st AMEAJ D IX M _

DESCRIPTION OF CONDITION S Ee, d A Ql"2. d.O alt /MllAT10A/

S/-/55ts

. Attachment Ng 6

__ Sheet l.of 5L Loop #/ identifier MM - C S S - 024-RECOMMENDED CORRECTIVE ACTION (OPTIONAL) l AEW6C

-co.C-2 6, 2 7o* /it/C A U D E $/'f A Acr/cd6 f / A E d o tt/ p t? N #.i%pui,ea yo,4egeug sp;p;t7M,bMAW)TA~ /Al t i

a spu; cow,/ m u m.

2.uylg3 gggy,7-8 AAA/E4,,i,o,e ?SOA w W,. A /-HOOA? AML7BD L

AAG 70 Mggy

/94'pAgo f?i fg,4@/g g,tfgpyjggygg o

CAOR INiilATED DY -

DATE _ Y d'/U s

INITIATOR'S CRGANIZ ATION 3M / 8@#

' MANAGEMENT REVIEWEa@EN NmNM DATE/ TIME TEL. NO.

OW

' s ISCOVERED

1. ! M

'~EMN RESPONSIDLE ORGANIZATIONb'OM/#-h75' (SdQ6M l

- DATE A'~ TITLE M8 POTENTIAL AFFECT OR OPERABILITY

~

OPERABILITY OF NUCLEAR UNIT IS OFN IF 'YES*. INDICATE AFFECTED UNIT IS neTOAFFECTED.

10 20 30 ig2gCOMMONO couuCNO SON CAO COORDINATOR WON 10 20 couuCN O oLN to 20 couuGNO DATE RECEIVED ~

d Division Manager _

1 PROCESSED BY

, % c

• M ATE -

!U Q

4 O

TRENDING CODES

~

vt*

LLJ

.,itLJ

.c,,,,,,

.t iei ese LLLJ DISTR 10UTION vians cesea,.,o ii LLJ

.si L.LJ.oor cause LLJ OnG ANIZ ATION/MGR.

b p

LIS I

• * *

• 11ilI DNQA._ Din O site oin.

yQ{O Wi\\

cause oao e,* LL.LJ at' LL13 DNE., O(n O PMO y

i..

,o c. o

..m-DNC Din O SITE OA_

Q Q O O

.= n e.,

ee=

L

) - Li - 1 I 1 ! I ~ LLid *,,'r,,,w'"J' ' oNS. o!R O oNE-PE O O O O e.. e s

ites secv cow.c.e=t sie ONSL. OIR n O n O L L 1,J. t t s oc"' 8 8,8,,,, i h

O DNC-CE t t if-t I ! !l1 '

NSHU O QLQ

..,ci C ONC-MOD l

o ii,iii+'''''''

ONP.uGn a O O O

• • • • • "va

'Q ONSL i.a t i O R Q

nm O unC RES ri n_.G w..u..%

-g,,,,.,,,,,t1 an 1

m' '**'"' W ORIGINATOn-

_OTHER_

TVA 19504 (ONP t-6 7) nia4S ACCESSION NUMBE H u

~~~

s;f'. NW E

RIMS ACCESSICN NUMBER ?CA-QR Rev. _L L

C/.QR NO.{3I5JP[gf@dWW l e

(

nnetnuneton ME&r /

~

~~

PART A

~

DSScR.IPTIOM of CodDsTIChi,

Attachn'.ent No.

6 0*** EI'd**'III'f SON ' OSS ' 024 S

-c-y poa Re.V) eu)

CF sitoDificArtoas mADE Ps2 7 g g p o t.,,t.o w t N C A PPEAb>x = P~. vt obnmMS E6V l-68M* (C^eha AMP 4Coty,

~

toERa io earif!E M '

/. 6A at.c /At./;4S~ooA (CoMTRol Rcom A/td A-A) H4S AND /NT52.AsT5 UJ ITH QABS-6..

BEEM A6RodTab

/t L //S/2 6 /W d.9XV SD CN ELEV '731),

ff/3 CoukD SD RM A CGA) TROL RM coobtAid. 6Ap46tLgry,.T.A17Ep A<71DAl foA 0^3L 6S 2)t/ST6.D f?Ai&A 70 7/ E

'DoaomE.4 Tab in 3 es ner)s D /

YME S E.

/ - C AS LE, R& ROUTS AND wA,S F u ^) L it o M p o.s m o,]

,, g rip g, f. pf sqnp 60l 850717 8yg), sgyg,ggn7 (,gpg,,, gypg _ yggfery 7pis gypg g,7,, pyg g.

P A *

• D U R E-

/W gyg7gg p

/7) AN'uAl. f C^1D IrIONSmZ-O -317 -/8 8xis T3-gg5 g,L,3, M ED Bu y goy _,g 7,,

foa THE ABovE

- \\

DO6S NOY IDEA)TIFy &g gg., p/A5.ZNTEP. GRCQ l '

TN#* A',#Y

/str 7*H,s Reptisqe D A A6

,f L R.C9gt(2.e3 fog.. A J

\\

%' dus t.C fiAJ5. }A3 7Nis AeaA 1PL ySECA (coa 1TRcA. AM d

i I2~#^* v' *d G A 8 L e. p L y s/ 2 8,4HU A-A) NAs.8GGV REMWb AND Le ss OF MA/W 00A/7Ack RM doet /NG ygis couso Resul-Y /N 70^ #

\\

IN 4 9 Xt!

doe'S.607" /NCLuD5 Refute.CDsD SD A.com A, EL 7 BLD:,.. ;5'er-26.2.

jd ph der.-

7b PEAth tr CP46+nOA o P opge A: rop.,,/ npiNT2D1/ANcc. A c7(c

/

g rRA-IN p)CA c,ccLtMd..

g c A BA.ri.

2 PL,419/ FIB ( //BoV S/,0 SD 282-S Tot.oeR.

\\

W8oV de % tat-TAANSFeR, 5v3 Tcil.1V ) HAS B To 7M" AodC. A f

OF THC A),f$0V SlD 7~AAVSFOA/hEA. a!

sRouwb X BLDc..,4At M ZA GW 5 sn/

NY

/4 7His AA5A 7H'S /NTE 72,4Ac77 d is cad %

t 7~E hoss H

.DZ~ CnA>D vop 7ps. 4901) virnsreM Wss/ 000Lb EA'*"'~7~'N Loss of ms;. BnivensDE,) coxicus.rA ANSfER..s lire H a

oPeg4roA, i4c71cNin raniN (WOV yfmt powes

,2 arLy <u/rN Pbb A FAs /N 7His AREA.Bsen i.oaNrifisDND A i M' u

id snr-a6,.2,

,m acca neasur.aa id 7He u

mri

• (CcN geov xana Am A.

o.

e e

eq&E;P

^

SIMS ACCESS!CN NUMBER D

'AQR

{

~

- aev 0

CAOR NO.l54fPfiltTeal.olc,1 cnnetnuation S//86~7' E rHE ;Vcio /Ats TAM-kYtoM C -Pc V 33 6 PRE.ss uns t eR P eV) is&EA/V-Y6 t

to1 YA O AOl'EO A ND IV'SS Y 8 % * *

( l-FdV-6 8-3S2. ('9REh o

5v4/2E4 Blod/d

/V 2 4L/SS, Ano i V24'I Cor)bu N" JPP 7 son t/ALVE). T/o TERAc, rtok/ Od t.o kl4 f 76 '_

THE M:

CRossiblC B T12 h W MIL AM

JV5AR, THE TAky/.S

/AIS IDL JAl M ts A IL G A A.3 biNE PoassL 70 600LD a.Auss 60 A L c..

,a Fi/2 E c /~0sE

/ oss of B 7 Ant /U BLeaM VALVE yfGY Ac r.,64/s/4 Bt.ocM vat.t/c /-i cy-4g3 5 gi-peis~&8 -2 as A A g 4% t-E,

,,tpy syp' Ass Q/idy % jeg eAstg 7o

/S $c) 2D,/fyt/D 0

Si # A /'O N SupyssSogg /A/77.AP MS PoAV

/ 6 6.S/84E'

/- Pa v-68.s 3 <J AC TE/k77C )

A 6 /*

Ras St.ac0DoeuM couM CAU'E

^4 c G h/Ds n o d.

U^/cor>iao m

\\

Attochment No.

b

~

Loop #/ldentifier S9M" CSS -

...s-e s

0' e

e e

9 e

l I

N N

a e

J

. ? pp.. -

Q e

..n-SHEET 2 OF..

\\

RIME ACCESSION NUMBER 2m-REV._ O PART8

~

CAOR NO[$lcjPWelojajzld { {

EVALUATION AFFECT ON OPERABILITY DCES THIS CAO IMPACT UNIT OPERABILITY 7 YES O NO O IF 'YES* NOTIFIED PLT. MGR. AND/OR OPERATIONS AT f0N-TIME SIGNIFlpANCE/RE ORTABILITY DATE t

jpg/4, hffill.3

.p @

SIGNIFICANT CAO REPORTADILITY

-(

REVIEWED BY DATE PORS YES O NO O YES O NO O QP RESPONSIBLE ORGANIZATION YES I NO O YES O NOT Alf//MNM _ 8'f/M _

IF REPORTABILITY BLOCK IS CHECKED *YES' IN ITEM 38 RESPONSIBLE FOR DETERMINING REPORTABILITY IMMEDIATELY:. GIVE A C GENERIC REVIEW SENT TO

_ DATE TIMr A REVIEW FOR POTENTIAL GENERIC IMPLICATIONS IS t

(ALWAYS REQUIRED FOR SIGNIFICANT CAO'S AND CAO S AFFE TIS'NO EVALUATED BY C ING OPERABILITY) bO' Y OF CAOR SENT TO P

ON-

'FC PERFORMANCE OF A GENERIC REVIEW.

NAME

1. DATE ROOT CAUSE AN ALYSIS/ RECURRENCE CONTROL

_,[

Jg,

,, (/9 ROOT CAUSE ANAL.YSIS RECUIRED7 YESI NO O

/F f(

ORG ANiZ ATION RECURRENCE CONTROL REQUIRED 7 YESk NO O APPROVED BY

( ALWAYS REQUIRED FOR SIGNIFICANT CAO'S NRC VIOLAT P. As, W1 f-S S6 AFFECTING OPERABILITY.)

IONS, AUDIT FINDINGS. CAO'S NAME /

DATE _

IF EITHER ARE REOUIRED. FILL OUT PART D OF THIS CAOR f41# FL R E/ f,*A,

/

PART C IIILE REMEDIAL CORRECTIVE ACTION r

q DISPOSITION METHOD DESCRIPTION OF PROPOSED DISPOSITION JETURN TO VENDOR L)

REwORx 0 REPAIR O gg AgQ gpggqg A_CCEPT-AS-IS O SCRAP O~~

e OTHER (DESCRIBE) O

_ _ _ OTHER INFORM AT10N NO TAGS PLACED N/M Attachment No, fo Sheet 4 of.fL Loop #/ldentificr SON-C.SS - 02.4 RE;AlH/ reg PROCEDURE _

ws.s eNamassFNG REOM[

V.gtgED YEsr] No 0 beOstIt04 kb2bd n ORGAN RESPDNSiBLE F0R C/A SCHEDULED COMPLETION DATE ft* r'; /-M,trfyAs_rr,r),cev/gg M sr.2 VERIFICATION

, w/ J -RWA 77 REQUIREMENTS

,RETECT Ol REINS 7ECT i OTHER IDESCRIDEI O OleziDITOR FOLLC)v-uP O lOA REvle d't.'el?/n//7B -escro Amn e A = </e/y.M cy APPROVALS NAME DATE NAME F90POSEO bY ll} ff;,gj h, \\fhp/h4 \\ DATE ' APPROVAL SUPV. APPROVAL l9. h. #wM lS**1h. g l DHEIDNS APnOVAL (t%~A /d}M'lrf,,ty:M c/ZGAi \\ PORG REVIEW - ~ DATE~ AIA ACCEPTANCE I'/ '//T l' j O OA APPAOv4L s i ( PLANT MANAGER ~* 'STHER APPROVAL DATE ~ h/.f,ffa r, /s,/ k.-/-f( l(/l f V ERIF.lC ATION O F REMED1 AL"/C/ A l PPROVED CORHECTIVE ACTION HAS DEEN RIMS ACCESSION NO. ' i' A OMPLETED AND IS READY FOR VERIFICATION NAME C DATE M1 CATION COMPLETE ~ ALL TAGS AEMOVED LCAon SHEET 2 CLOSED I. -)( CC#//Z 6 T/v,d M TC. E M TVA 19584 //E1/ g. ~ (ONP-1-ST) RiuS ACCESSION NUMBER U /g cep:Mip @ im 'N # L ' -

g., j'-. ' %N SHEET 3 OF 3 RIMS ACUESSION NUMBER :::n. CAQR "e v^ ROOT CAUSE ANALYSIS / RECURRENCE CONTROLCA PART D ( ROOT CAUSE OF THE CAO y,g,,3 g.5 - CHM'GEG #1/ME P&L ECA/ ). 6836~ l'U562. H w !E W.O Pria we. AsquitEsitcs/7% pf sqsP-67 Bur PArf&l 44nfie;ma.x) u.)/A A 6~ ln#DE. 70 f h' M W ~ D F G A A ' 1 (72ofspttp.g cgnivGq.A.. Acd Opusc. r/W5' 'THE3L ' " *&t7r Rcqui 70 /Mf/2ft fob M* GPAcR.i sescost. SQEP-6 7, ArmcHm:ewrl M 9 0' M W ^ @ AJ E- ~ SWAhl QCGA.DIAlhTTr A-LI.. REV)6tos/5 70 acD,/s,4.- 4DbiT)eAhof MENotXx WM WJ W TNE Afj%Cffril-YC DtVE gn/D $,W SA4470/24 T D Cuf y '7p'4S /#TEAA GTIBAI peas SEIDC. /M&sE.D kT SGqu9fAU REdMDi& 7//E/iVt/o .~i45st/ Sit l & CABLE. 7D d.488. //tuk77/'LE br _ SYOJAP'3 cps 6/ DEA,+r/9 t) f)'ES60AE. Ifrd/AACE D5VidA diAduir5 FC/L N/$hl 7D ULO 7 Au/ED r Attochment No. 6 LLoop f/ldentifier 3Okl~QSS ~_ S ~ 2 PROPOSED RECURRENCE CONTROL ACTIONS 1A' A/// AM., ///VB4VED DA'fhEB ;0EAsosx>ex

Peo J S d 7 ?A 9 d C h !/. M S y

oA/ 6P50--63 A s D 7'ME. Affd/Xjf. ~ fo* k #1t./L773 4E >67' SACA7 7;ys,&py/gge1gu;rs Lv 6Q&P-6 7. 7WiS 0 I Hi w ro u w ps a cu t s M a r-w a c v a i e m S FCA ORGANIZ ATION RESPONSIOLE FOR RECUR CE CONTROL J3/ F/A. 6 SCHEDULED COMPLET!ON OATE - -f~ N'II '# I N N w.< VERIFICATION ' SUPERVISOR REVIEW OlOC INSPECTION OITesT O f REQUIREMENTS OTHER (DESCRIDE) O APPROVALS OA nEviEw M NAME DATE l NAME PROPOSED BY f).}} A }}s s frf) 47-3r$M DATE APFHOVAL I SUPV. APPROVAL 47 I; lbfd p 21-b'S DHEIDNS APPROVAth&b /(f //%d'/,jh'effi/f? PORC REVIEW OA APPROVAL /S, /, h t' DATE / THER APPROVAL '.' f f J/ /' O p VERIFICATION OF RECURRENCE CONTROL ~ Ris.e s ACCESSION NO. A PP"OVED RECURRENCE CONTROL N A 8.t E COMPLETE-READY FOR VERIFICATION CATE VERIFICATION TCAOR SHEET 3 CLOSED TVA 10S84 (ONP-t-87) RIMS ACCESSION NUMOER

.. /. ' i. ['.- Rius AccessicN NUMBER ::> CAQR nev. o ( CAQR NO.[S!r;lPl83]oisizy,l t'o n e i tu ta e i en lj ppe.r a DGSCAtPnod o; pgpp, 3, g a. ' :- ZIEMS /$7.'. - Revue her-24.z. ro /A/d4uDE OPA447CA/**M4 AST/9/S 57'stJ9 82 #1puipco,@A A f/AE /A/ 7d'4 M ADW f/A& 20D& /A VOLVED (f/ 73y, A2), 7?/66E./ 6770WS NI'$ 06 l 4 REqu/AED 70 i$d///2(/S jyjn./Af c,pivr; tot ,9COM C.00l-./Al$ /UN/W /S /.DSA/77F/EO As AE*f u/AED /~0/G' A A) Af0$dlSIIS A** ? SA-F's. 3)Vt.sr:Deu.)Al. / ZYE/M 3 - 7//G 27t s77A.ht,4CZ-z/. 8 Arua S0Z-2S'O PAovi0gs i4.bspupr s /A/37%e.>crroA)3 fcre i A' Ac/A/6' 61%d6 BA-77EA.y C//4AdGA. 2-M Reh-act an ey e.oaan.f /Al $EdVICL Y d~ e iv SCPA-ALrios] spisrs fog ,4Depuhre y,Ag f0A A f/AG'/At gAags epasgez 77%E n-AC% i}{l/04 U2D, A/8 PubkL cotecenut. A-c.noa Rspo/AED i j p. /p p,f A A -7 7 ) N A E S A 7 2 A / G A O W <w i COA lOut 7'~~ 7a,vesrre:r CABLE /PP780A. BAA.2/E;Q 6 %fM AQ< TEA /D y 2.0,57- / FA-9/* '7?VE /Al7?A4c: 77D v ALA.EA. i 1 N

a o QUALITY INFORMATION REQUEST / RELE ASE (QIR) h h0Wg OlVISION OF NUCLt:AR ENGINEERING (INTERNAL USE oNLY ) "'*5^fff5 880628 OTB' COCU M E N T'NU M B E R TO V. A. Bianco. DSC-A, Sequoyah CIR SQP-SQN-88-532 R0 FRC# R. Sedlacik DSC-P, Sequoyah PAGE 1 OF 16 TYPE OF COCUMENT OAT [ tREQUEST NEED OATE

---

~~~~~----------------

PLANT ANo UNIT l XlRELEASE REF.QlR SOP-SQM 66-455 Ro g,,,,,,...m n., 4 e, REFERENCE 0 00CUMENTS AVAILASLE IN oNE oF THE RIMS SYSTEMS ATTACHMENT TO THl3 CIR oCCUMENT loENTIFYING NUMBER oCCUMENT ATTACHMENT NUMEER CALC SQN-00-0052-At'techmerit No ~7 ' Sheet 1 d 'b EMP-MHS-052588 R0 (B25 880616 806) - SQM - CS$ - 0 24 -QIR-SQP-SQN-88-492 R0 (B25 880524 017) bC P #IId'"' fl # QIR-SQP-SQN-88-507 R0 (B25 880603 001) OIR-SOP-SON R8-552 00 ( m 0 0 0 0 '. n! !A 8 # 8C# 10CFR50, APPENDIX R. ANALYSIS FOR WATER SOLID LETDOWN FROM THE RCS SYSTEMS AFFECTED UNID / SYSTEM 80 Reactor Coolant Svstem 68 C'JALITY1NFORMATION RECUESTEO / RELEASEO e The following quality information is provided in response to your s QIR-SQP-SQN-88-455 RO request to document that no adverse interactions could preclude satisfying the SLD requirements as defined in the SQN-SQ54-127 R9 calculation. Specifically, this QIR is the analysis performed to address a guaranteed RCS letdown capability for unit 1 (item 2 of your QIR) as well as spurious opening of a PORV. QIR SQP-SQN-88-494 R2 (B25 880602 001) addresses the remaining information requested in your QIR. .The interactions identified in this QIR release are not violations to the criteria or ground rules used in the previous. NRC accepted, Appendix R analysis for SQN. This new analysis was performed to address the recently ident.fied concern of a guaranteed RCS letdown capability through either the pressurizer PORV and block valves or the head vent valves or the normal letdown valves or the excess letdown valves. (See pages 2 through 9). i This QIR also addresses the previously reanalyzed condition of cable-to-cable flee. induced hot shorts and shorts to ground in the Aux Bldg. Reactor Building annulus, and primary containment causing spurious opening of a PORVs and the same fire causing ccble damage to inhibit closure of the i (See page 10 throuch 16) I block valves. R E VIEYvE O LA N'. & AbRE)f,$ES ONLY)4;cpe \\ d450n &/t,/es e APPROVED (BRANCH CHIEF / PROJECT ENGINEER) w i TVA tcan (cNE 4463 V*l/4# ' cc (AnacArmah nius,s1. M cJC { I

I QIR SQP-SQN-88-532 RO Page 2 of 16 C AN EVALUATION OF T'Ji LETDOWN DEPRESSURIZATION OF THE 5.sACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM-SCOPE: This evaluation is performed on a general location approach, utilizing recently prepared ARSKs for letdown paths (9 drawings) and ARSK 90 series drawings for auxiliary power, to address the ability to establish a letdown path for depressurization of the RCS to Hot St.andby, and identify for selected locations where one.of these paths may not be,available. The four areas which were reviewed for a qualifiedsletdown path are listed below: (1) Control Building AttochnWnT Nd-- 7 Sheet L f_L__ (2) Auxiliary Building 1.cep y/ldehtifiekSW-CSS - 02A-4 (3) Annulus (4) Reactor Building 4 / The possible letdown paths were reviewed in each area to verify i, 5 SQN has an Appendix R qualified RCS letdown path in modes 1, 2, and 3. The possible letdown paths are listed below. It should be noted that normal and excess letdown paths were only evaluated where PORY paths or reactor head vent paths were not available. (1) PCV-68-340A and FCV-68-332 (PORV Path #1) (2) PCV-68-334 and FCV-68-333 (PORV Path #2) ~ (3) FSV-68-394 and FSV-68-397 (Rx Head Vent Path394/397) (4) FSV-58-395 and FSV-68-396 (Rx Head Vent Path395/396) (5) FCV-62-69 and -70. -72, -73. -74, normal charging (key 1, 2, 4, 5, and 34), CCS pump A or B and other manual actions as identified in calculation SQN-SQS4-127, R9 key 48 (normal i l letdown) (6) FCV-62-54, -55, -56, -59, -61, CCd pump A or B and other manual actions as identified in calculation SQN-SQSA-127. R9 key 48 (excess letdown) CONTROL BUILDING _ For a fire in the Control Building, RCS letdown can be accomplished in tho l Auxiliary Control room via normal letdown or pressurizer PORVs. 1761E

QIR SQP-SQU-88-532 RO Page 3 of 16 ( AUXILIARY BUILDING 1. Elevation 759. 749 (except for items 2 and 3 below). 690. 669. and 653 A. No reactor head vent path's cables are routed on these elevations; therefore, both reactor head vent paths are available for letdown. B. Auxiliary power integration - adequate separation exists between Train A and B auxiliary power, such that for any Appendix R fire either reactor head vent path 394/397 or 395/396, will be available for letdown (i.e., elevation 149, vital battery room I lose reactor head vent path. 394/397; still have path 395/396. Similar for vital battery room II lose reactor head path 395/396; still have path 394/397. 2. R1evation 749, 480V Board Room 1A / Elevation 734 6,9K Shutdown Boar,d Room A - Unprotected Opening A. Due to an unprotected opening through elevation 749, in the northwest corner of 480V board room 1A. the loss of both ?ORV paths and reactor head vent path 395/396 could occur. This leaves reactor head vent path 394/397 available for letdown. B. Auxiliary power integration - lose reactor HOV boards 1Al-A on elevation 749; however, PORV path No.2 has already been identified as being lost. Lose normal supply (1PL4900A) to 480V vital transfer switch, for battery charger I and 120V AC vital inverter I, on elevation 734. Operator can restore power to battery board I per A01-21.1, which is required for reactor head vent path 394/397 and must be utilized for letdown as the other paths are unavailable. 3. Elg_vation 759. Control Rod Drive Equipment Raom / Elevation 734 Room A10 - Unprotected Opening A. Due to an unprotected opening through elevatlon 759 in the southwest corner of this room, the loss of both PORV paths and reactor head vent path 394/397 could occur. This would leave reactor head vent path 395/396 available for letdown. B. Auxiliary power integration - Train B auxlliary power is wrapped on clovation 159 in this room, and there are no auxiliary power cables routed on elevation 734 in thls arna; therefore, reactor i ) head vent path 395/396 is unef fected and available for letdown. Attechmcht Nd 7 Sheet # nLL_ Loop 9/licntific? SQA~ CSS ~O24 \\ 1 s. 0 1761E 1

s - o 4 QIR SQP-SQN-83-332 R0 Page 4 of 16 ( 4 Elevation 734 Columns A3 to A4 and 0 to R A. Cables for both PORV paths and both reactor head vent paths are Present. However, because an open head water suppression system Protects Train A cable trays, PORV path No. 2 and reactor head vent path 394/397 is available for letdown. B. Auxiliary power integration - lose normal supply-(IPL4900A), alternate supply (IPL4901B) foe battery charger I and normal supply (1PL49143) for battery charger II. This represents the loss of PORY path No. 2 and reactor head vent path 394/397. Due ^ to the loss of the other two paths by their. required cables being routed'in this area and not being protected by an open-head water spray, all paths are lost. Operator action can restore power to battery charger I per AOI-21.1 and/or battery charger II pee A01-tl.2. This action provides PORV path No. 2 and/or reactor head vent path 394/397 available for letdown. S. Elevation 734 Auxiliary Control Instrument Room 1A A. Lose PORY path No. 1, scill have PORV path No. 2 and both reactor head vent paths available for letdown. B. Auxiliary power Integration - lose PORV path No. 2 and reactor head vent path 395/396, still have reactor head vent path 394/397 ,e available for letdown. ,y s 6. Elevation 734 Auxiliary Control Instrument Room IB A. Lose PORY path No. 2, still have PORY path No.1 and both reactor head vent paths available for letdown. B. Auxiliary power integration - lose PORV path No.1 and No. 2 and reactor head vent path 395/396, still have reactor head vent path 394/397 available for letdown. 7. Elevation 734 Auxiliary Control Room i A. Lose both PORV paths, still have both reactor head vent paths available for letdown. c ' AttachmcJ' Nd.____1.. Sheetig Loop ' /ldo.tlficLSQid - CSS -02.4

~-

l 1761E A

t I .o; a Q1R SQP-SQN-88-532 RO Page 5 of 16 (- 7. Elevation 734 Auxiliary Control Room (Continued)- B. Auxiliary power integration - lose reactor head vent path 395/396, still have reactor head vent path 394/397 availabi'e for letdown. NOTE: Loss of cable IPP477A (ACB 1912 indicating lights, in auxiliary control room, for 6.9 kV shutdown board 1A-A) is acceptable since this cable is.normally isolated from the control circuit by the transfer switch. These indicating I lights would only be required for a fire in the control building. Thus, for a fire,in the auxiliary control room, ,.this cable is isolated from the conte,o1 circuit, and fire would not effect Train A power. 8. Elevation 734 Auxiliary Control Instrument Room 2B A. Lose PORY path No. 2, still have PORV path No.1 and both ecactor head vent paths available for letdown. B. Auxiliary power integration - numerous auxiliary power cables are in this room, but none that are required for auxiliary power to PORV path No. L cc reactor head vent paths 394/397 and 395/396. 9 Elevation 134 6.9 kV Shutdown Board Room A f A. Columns A3 to A4 and R to T - cables for all available paths are

\\

located in thit area. However, the only cable for PORV path No. 1 located in this area is IV2449B. Cable IV2449B is MCR control for block valve 1-FCV-68-332. If fire effects on this cable c:used the block valve to close, the operator can go to reactor MOV board 181-B and place the transfer switch in auxiliary (isolating cables IV2445B and IV2247B) and open the block valve, then PORV 1-PCV-68-340A can be controlled from the MCR for letdown (see item 2 for evaluation considering the unprotected opening through elevation 149 in this area). Columns A3 te A4 and T to U - lose reactor head vent path 395/396, still have Fath PORV paths and reactor head vent for letdown. 394/397 availablo Remaining area of this room - cables for both PORV paths and reactor head vent path 394/397 are routed in this area; howevne, reactor head vent path 395/396 is unoffected and available; and depending on exact fire location, PORV path No. I and/or PORV path No. 2 could as well be available for lotdown. B. Auxiliary Powcr integration - all Train B auxiliary power cables except cable B161I (spare battery chartoe tie to 125V vital battery board II) are wrapped in this room; therefore, reactor head vent path 395/396 is available. MiochiiYehl N5-7 _ Sheet f of N loop f/ldehtifici SM-C SS - 02.4 -_i 1761E

1 QIR SQP-SQN-88-532 RO Page 6 of 16 ( 10. Elevation 734, 6.9 kV Shutdown Board Room B A. Cable IV55988 for PORV path No. 2 is located ln this area. PORV path No. 1 and both reactor head vent paths are availabio for letdown. B. Auxiliary power integra'tlon - lose Train B auxiliary power; therefore, lose PORV path No I and reactor head vent path .p 395/396, -[ still have reactor head vent path 394/397., c 11. _ Elevation 734 Personnel and Eo ipment Access (Room A9) Lose ce' actor head vent path 394/397, still have'both PORV paths A. and reactor head vent path 395/396 available for letdown. B. Auxiliary power integration - no auxillary power cables are located in this room. 12. Elevation 734 Room A10 A. Cables for all available paths are located in this room and would be effected by an Appendix R fire. Upon implementation of modifications (reference DCN 430) to reroute cable IV5598B to maintain adequate separatlon from reactor head vent path 344/397 (cables) in this area, PORY path No. 2 or reactor head vent path { 394/397 will be available for letdown. NOTE: This cable (1V55988) is and will be more than 20 feet from unprotected opening in elevation 159. Refer to item 3 for evaluation considering this unprotected opening. B. Auxiliary power integration - no auxiliary power cables are located in this area. unprotected opening in this room).(Refer to item 3 for evaluation considering 13. _ Elevation 714 From Colurn A10 South A. No cables are located in this area for the PORY paths or the reactor head vent paths; therefore, these paths are availablo for letdown. B. Auxiliary power integration - lose auxiliary power for block valvo I 1-FCV-68-332 (PORV path No.1); however, the valvo is still open and availabic for letdown as well as PORV path No. 2 and both reactor head vent pathn. { Attochmo'nf Nd-7 Sheet 1 _ct_IG, Loop #/IdehtlfleiSM - C SS - 0 2.4 s-4 I 17612

4 QIR SQP-SQN-88-532 RO Page 7 of 16 ( 14. Elevation 714 Colurms Al to AS and 0 to S A. Cables for all available letdown paths are located in this area. The only cables for PORV paths No.1 and 2 are IV2449B and IV2455A. Cable IV2449B and IV2455A is for HCR control for block valves 1-FCV-68-332 and 1-FCV-68-333, respectively. If fire effects on these cables'cause both block valves,to closo, the operator can go to reactor MOV board IB1-B and place the transfer switch in auxiliary (isolating cables IV2445B and IV24478) and open block valve 1-FCV-68-332, No.1) can be controlled from the MC,R for letdown.then PORV l-PCV-68-34 B. Auxiliary power integration - Train B auxilia'ry'is not located in this area; therefore, auxiliary power is available to reopen 1-FCV-68-332, if it should spuriously close, and utilize FORV path No. I for letdown. 15. Elevation 714. Colurms A5 to A10 and 0 to S A. The only cables for the PORV paths located'in' this area are IV5596B and IV5610A for PORV 1-PCV-68-334 (PORV path No. 2) and 1-PCV-68-340A (PORV path No. 1), respectively. Cable IV5596B is wrapped entirely on this elevation making PORV path No. 2 available for letdown. C Auxiliary power integration - lose Train A auxiliary power in area B. of columns A5 to A8 and Q to S but block valvo 1-FCV-f8-333 is still open; therefore PORV path No. 2 is availablo for letdown. 16. Elevation 714. Colurms .*.1 to A10 and East of S Lino A. No PORV path's cables are located in this area, making both PORV l paths available for letdown. B. Auxiliary power integration - loso Train A auxiliary power, but still have PORV path No.1 available for letdown. _ ANNULUS The following evaluation is based on taking credit for existing fire modifying existing fire suppression, as required. suppression covera SQP-SQH-88-492 and Calculation SQN-00-D052-EMP-MitS-052S88)(Re Attachment Nd. 7 . Sheet _7_nf /6 l.oop #/ldentificr SGM ~ 055

• O24 h

1 i i 1161E

J QIR SQp-SQN-88-532 R0 Page 8 of 16 ( ANNULUS (continundl An auxiliary power integratLon evaluation is not required, as auxiliary power cables (onsite electrical supply) are not located in the reactor building. 1. A2 30* to 205* Cables required for reactoe head vent path 394/397 are not located in this area; therefore, this path is available for letdown. 2. A2 205* to 280* Existing suppression and additional suppression and detection will be added (reference DCN 418 and 439) to.provida separation'such that: A. For a fire effectlng cables IV5691A and IV5696A in conduit IV5687A (for reactor head vent path 394/394) located at approximately elevation 728', the cables in cable trays PF-B and EU-B located at elevation 156' and 758' will not be effected making both PORV paths available for letdown, and B. For a fire effecting cables in cable trays PF-B and HU-B at elevation 156' and 758', the cables in conduit IV5687A located approximately elevation 728' will not be effected making reactor head vent path 394/397 available for letdown. ( 3. %2 280* to 315' Cables required for reactor head vent path 394/397 this area making this path available for letdown. are not located in 4. A2 315' to 30' Existing supercscion and additional suppression and detection will be added (reference DCN 418 and 439) to provide separation / protection such that: A. For a fire effecting cables IV5681A and IV5685A for reactor head vent path 394/397, the cables for reactor head vent path ?95/396 and both PORV paths would not be effected and available for i letdown, and B.' For a fire effecting the cables for reactor head vent path 395/396, PORV path No.1 and No. 2, cables IV5681A and IV5685A for reactor head vent path 394/397 for letdown. would not be effected and available Attochmoht Nd-7 _ Shect_8_nd loop y/ldentifleLSQld-C.SS- 024 _i. M 0 1761E

4 QIR SQP-SQN-88-532 RO Page 9 of 16 ( REACTOR BUla. DING The RCS letdown paths inside primary containment of the reactor bul'dinL were evaluated, and the following intercetions woro identified. 1. For a fire in the pressurlaer doghouse, both PORV lotdown raths would be lost; however, both reactor vent litdown paths would still be available. 2. For a fire in the lower compartment inside the polar crane wall, ~ between AZ O' and 180*, both head vont paths, and normal and excesa letdown paths could be lost; however, both PORV letdown paths would be available. 3. Penetration 28/30 The loss of reactor head vent paths, PORV paths (AZ 22*) and normal letdown path would occur. However, the excess letdown path is unaffected and will be available for letdown. 4 Penetration 15 The loss of PORV path No. 2 and normal letdown would (AZ 101*) occur; however, reactor head vents, excess lotdown, and PORV path No. I are availabic. 5. Pencteation 16 The loss of PORV Path No. 1. normal and excess (AZ 114*) letdown paths could occur; however, both reactor r head vent paths and PORV path No. 2 are availablo. ( 6. Penct.ation 37 Loss of both PCRV letdown paths, reactor head vent (AZ 155*) path 395/396 and both normal and excess lotdown paths; however, reactor head vent path 394/397 is unaffected and remains available for lotdown. 7. Penetration 50 Loss of reactor head vent path 394/397 and normal (AZ 209*) letdown path would occur; however, reactor head vent path 395/396, both PORV paths,, and excess j letdown would be available. From the above analysis, SQN will have at least one qualified letdown path in the reactor building in the event of an Appendix R fire. Attochmeht N6-7 Sheet 3 4@ 1.6op y/idehttflep SM - CSS - 024 1761E

4 QIR SQP-SQN-88-532 R0 Page 10 of 16 ( AN EVALUATION OF THE SPURIOUS ACTUATION 0F PRESSURIZER POWER-OPERATED RELIEF VALVES SCOPE: This evaluatlon is performed on a general location approach utilizing recently prepared ARSKs for the letdown paths (9 drawings) and ARSK 90 series drawings for auxiliary power, to address to areas in which an uncontrolled depressurization of the RCS from spurious PORV operation could occur. The four areas which were reviSwed are listed below: (1) Control Building (2) Auxiliary Building (3) Annulus (4) Reactor Building In each area the evaluation will be made on whether the associated block valve of a spuriously-opened PORV can be closed by operator action. 'C If PORV PCV-68-340A spuriously opens, the block valve FCV-68-332 cust be closed. If PORV PCV-68-334 spuriously opens, the block valvo FCV-68-333 nust be closed. CONTROL BUILDING A fire in the main control room would result in alternate shutdown from the '1 auxiliary control room. The PORVs and block valves can be controlled from auxiliary control room and motor control conters. AUXILt/RY BUILDING 1. Elevation 759. Control Rod Drivo Ec;uipment Room Cable IV5612A for 1-PCV-68-340A is routed through this room. If fire effects should spuriously open this valvo, its associated block valvo, 1-FCV-68-332, is available to close, since its required cables are not located here and Train B auxiliary power is wrapped in this room. L Attochmeist No ~7 Sheet to af

• LEop )/ldentificiM~O' 9

%mp 17 6' E

0 QIR SQP-SQN-88-532 R0 Page 11 of 16 ( AUXILIARY BUILDING (Continued). 2. Elevation 749, 480V Board Room 1A Cable IV5612A for 1-PCV-68-340A is routed through this room. For a fire causing spurious opening of this valve, its associated block valve 1-FCV-68-332 is uneffected and Train B auxiliary power is available for closure. 3. Elevation 749 Mechanical toulpment Room A8 Cable IV5612A for 1-PCV-68-340A ls locate'd in this room, but its associated block valve and Train B auxiliary power is uneffected and available for closure. 4. Elevation 749 480V Transformer Room 1A Cable IV5398B for 1-PCV-68-334 is routed through this room, and a fire here may cause this valve to spuriously open. Train A auxiliary power, which is required for closing its block valve 1-FCV-68-333, would not be available. Upon implementation of corrective action for CAQR SQP880326 per DCN 429 Train A auxiliary power will be available for closing block valve 1-FCV-68-333. 5. Elevation 749. 480V Transformer Room IB C. Cable IV5598B for 1-PCV-68-334 is routed through this room, far a fire causing it to spuriously open, its block valve 1-FCV-68-333 and Train A auxiliary power is uneffected and available for closure, t 6. Elevation 149, 480V Board Room IB A fire in this room effecting cablo IV55983 could cause 1-PCV-68-334 to i spuriously open, but its block valvo 1-FCV-68-333 and Train A auxiliary power is available for closure. i 7. Elevation 749, 480V Board Room 2B Cablo IV5598B is located in this room, but for a fire causing 1-PCV-68-334 to spuriously open, block valvo 1-FCV-68-333 is unoffected and Train A auxiliary power is availablo for closing it. AttachmeM N6. -7 _ _ Sheet il ni Loop #/ identifier SGM-CSS- 024 i . s. I 1761E I

1 -4 QIR SQP-SQN-88-532 R0 Page 12 of 16 (, AUXILIARY BUILDING (Continued) 8. Elevation 759 Control Rod Drive Equipment Room / Elevation 734 Room A10 - Unprotected Opening on elevation 759, cables IV5612A for 1-PCV-68-340A and cables IV2451A, IV2453A for block valve 1-FCV-68-333 are located 11'8" and 9'8" respectively from the unprotected opening through elevation 159 in the southwest corner of this room. Cables for their associated valves, block valve 1-FCV-68,332 and PORV-1-PCV-68-334, are located more than 29 feet from this opening on elevation 73,4. Therefore, for a fire on elevation 759 causing 1-PCV-68-340A to spuriously open, its block valve (1-FCV-68-332) cables on elevation 734 are uneffec'ted and Train B auxiliary power is wrapped on elevation 159 and there isn't any auxiliary power cables on elevation 734 making it available for closure. For a fire on elevation 734 causing 1-PCV-68-334 to spuriously open, its block valve 1-FCV-68-333 and Train A auxiliary power is unaffected ) i on elevation 759 and available for closure. 9. Elevation 749, 480V Board Room 1A/ Elevation 734, 6.9kV Shutdown Board Room A - Unprotected opening l Cable IV5612A for 1-!sV-68-340A is located about 9'9" from an unprotected opent.6 through elevation 749 in the northwest corner of ( this room. For fire effects in this area causing spurious opening of \\ this valve, its block valve 1-FCV-68-332 is available for closure since j the closest cable IV2449B, required for this valvo, is on elevation 134 and more than 15 feet from opening and Train B auxiliary power is j uneffected. 10. Elevation 734 Vital BSttery Board RLom I Cables IV.5607A and IV5608A for 1-PCV-68-340A aro in this room. If a fire causes this valve to spuriously open, its block valve 1-FCV-68-332 is uneffected and Train B auxiliary power (cables are wrapped) is available for closing it. 11. Elevation 734. Vital Battery Board Room II Cables IV5607A, IV5608A for 1-PCV-68-340A and IV5593B, IV5594B for 1-PCV-68-334 are located in this room. If fire effects cause valve 1-PCV-68-334 to spuriously open its associated block valvo 1-FCV-68-333 is unoffected and auxiliary power is available for closuro. If 1-PCV-68-340A should spuriously open, block valve 1-FCV-68-332 is uneffected (no cables in area) and the operator can ecstore control power to 6.9kV shutdown board IB-B and 480V shutdown board IB1-B por AOT-21.2 making Train B auxiliary power availablo for closure. Attochmelit No 7 Sheet A rd M l.cep #/fdentifier SM - CSS-024 s 1761E

l ,o I i QIR SQP-SQN-88-532 R0 l Page 13 of 16 ( AUXILIARY BUILDING (Continued) 12. Elevation 734 Auxiliary control Instrument Room 1 A Cables IV5607A, IV5608A, IV5609A, IV5610A, and IV5612A for 1-PCV-68-340A are located here, and fire effects could cause this valve to spuciously open. Since there ivn't any of its associated. block valve (1-FCV-68-332) cables located here and Train B auxiliary power is availabla, 1-FCV-68-332 can be e.losed. 13. Elevation 734. Auxill'ary Con _t.o1' Instrument Room 18 - j Cables IV55938, IV55948, IV35958. IV55968, and 1*' s9CB for 1-PCV-68-334 are in this room and a fire hece could cause this valve'to spuriously However, since its associated block valve isn't effected and open. Train A auxiliary power is available,1-FCV-68-333 can be closed. 14. Elevation 734 Auxiliary Control Room I PORY 1-PCV-68-340A and -334 could spuriously open because both have i cables located in this room. However, their associated block valves, 1-FCV-68-332 and -333, are unaffected and Train A and B auxiliary power for these valves is avs.ilabis for closure. NoiE: Numerous auxiliary power cables are located in this room. + /" The cables with potential to effect auxiliary power required \\- for the block valves are as follows. i IPP477A - For ACB 1912 indicating lights, in cux111acy control room, for 6.9kV shutdorn board 1A-A. This cable is normally isolated f 'a the control circuit by the transfer switch. The indicating a. j lights would only be required for a fire in the control build',"g. Thus, for a fire in the auxiliary control room, this cable is isolated 1 j from the control circuit and fire would not effect Train A auxiliary power. j IPP482B - For ACB 1914 indicating lights, in auxiliary control room, for 6.9kV shutdown board 18-B. i similar as cable IPP47?A above. B76B For diesel generator IB-B emergency stop. Loss of this cable would start the diesel generator, which is desirable for loss of offsite power.

Howevor, if loss of offsite power has not occurred, the dicsci can be stopped at the local control station in the diesel generator building.

{~ Attochmenf No-7 _ Sheet.!.l ct !.le.- 1.oop f/ldentiller SON' CSS - 02 4 i i 1761E

i QIR SQP-SQN-88-532 RO Page 14 of 16 ( AUXII.IARY BUILDING (Continued) 15. Elevation 734 Auxiliary Control Instrument Room 2B Cable IV5598B for 1-PCV-68-334 is located in this room. A flee here could cause this valve to spuriously open, but its associated block valve 1-FCV-68-333 isn't effected and Train A auxiliary powee is available to close it. 16. Elevation 734 6.9 kV Shutdown Board Room A Cable IV5612A for 1-PCV-68-340A ls locate'd in the area of columns AS to ~ A8 and R to'S, but cables required for block valve' 1-FCV-68-332 are not in this area and Train B auxiliary power is available to close it. should the PORY valve spuriously open. (See item 9 for evaluation considering unprotected opening in this area). 17. Elevation 734, 6.9kV Shutdown Board Room B If fire effects on IV5598B (only PORV path cable in this room) should cause spurious opening of 1-PCV-68-334, its associated block valve (1-FCV-68-333) is uneffected and Train A auxiliary power is available for closing it. 18. Elevation 734. Room A10 e , Cable IV5598B for 1-PCV-68-334 is located in this room. s However, its block valve's (1-FCV-68-333) cables are not hero and Train A auxiliary power is available to close it. (Refer to item 8 for evaluation considering unprotected opening in this room). 19. Elevation 714 Cplumns A6 to A8 and Q to R Cable IV3610A for 1-PCV-68-340A is located in this area. If fire effects should spuricasly open this valve, its block valvo 1-FCV-68-332 is uneffected and Train B auxiliary power is available for closing it. Additionally, cable 155596B for 1-PCV-68-334 is located in this area, 1 but is entirely wrapped on this elevation and thereforo is uneffected by a fire in this area. 1 Attachmon1 Nd % sheet l' n(i Loop W/ldentificiS(DJ-CSS-02 4 j h a 1761E

QIR SQP-SQN-88-532 RO Page 15 of 16 ( ANNULUS 1. AZ 30' to 150' Cables for PORY 1-PCV-68-334 or 1-PCV-68-340A aro not located in this areat therefore, spurious opening of PORV path No.1 or No. 2, due to fire effects, is not creditable. 2. A2 150' to 305' Cable IV5598B for PORY 1-PCV-68-334 is located in this are'a, but the cables required for its.associat'd block' valve 1-FCV-68-333 are not e here, making it available for closure should 1-PCV-68-334 spuriously open. 3. A2 305* to 340* 1. Cable IV5598B for 1-PCV-68-334 and cables IV2451A, IV2453A for its associated block valve 1-FCV-68-333 are located in this area. Existing suppression and additional suppression and detection will be added (reference DCN 418 and 439) to provide separation / protection such that for a fire effecting cable IV55988 causing spurious opening of 1-PCV-68-334, cable IV2451A and IV2453A would not be effected making block valve 1-FCV-68-333 available for closuro, e ( 2. Cable IV5612A for 1-PCV-68-340A and cables IV2445B and IV2447B for its associated block valve 1-FCV-68-332 are located in this area. Existing suppression and addillonal suppression and detection will be added (reference DCN 418 and 439) to provide separation / protection such that for a fire effecting cable IV5612A and causing 1-PCV-68-340A to spuriously open, cabics IV2445B and IV2447B for block valvo 1-FCV-68-332 would not be effected making it available for closure. 4. A2 340' to 30' t Cable IV5612A for 'l-PCV-68-340A is located in this area, but the cables required for block valve 1-FCV-68-332 are not here, making it available t for closure should 1-PCV-68-340A spuriously open. 4 Attachm'eHf N6-7 _ sheet L_.o M r

l. cop i7/ldchtiflef SQAl-C.S$ - 024 l

l lr_ l l I 1761E i

O QIR SQP-SQtl-88-532 RO Page 16 of 16 FWACTOR BUILDING PRIMARY CONTAINMENT There is no possible spurious operation of the PORVs due to flees in primary containmen6 because: Each train's (A or B) PORV control circuit is routed in conduit with Its train associated block valve control cable. Neither cable contains energy circuit failures. sources-capable of enersizing the PORV solenoid valves due to' fire-induced Power to the valves is nomally blocked by the control circuitry; other power is current / volt. age limi'ted due to the upstream indicator lights:- The 120 Vac block valve control circ ~uit cannot interact with the 125 Vdc circuit since only one side of the ungrounded control transfomer circuit is available (i.e., no return path is available). (Reference FCR 7533). AttachmcHf No - ~7 Sheet /6 of //o L. cop #/Identiller SOM-CSS-02.4 r \\ s e %sa 1761g

= i Attochment Na-8 Sheet._L_of__1 (. Loop #/fdentifier _SOrd - CS S -02 4 ( 1 l b i l tt) eu 7 q i s e aX ' /_ W G g W .y 1-- ? ^f P W p i s 3 E Y "/- 1 0 e e e e v D [-; 3 TY 2 \\ '- - ~h fl a,g b-5 G 'Z$F O 2i es H C '.Jo O o$; l

e. 1 W 12,/73 St-Attachment No 3 Sheet I nt I5

1. bop W/fdentifier SOM-CS S -624 g7 SQN AI-19 (Part IV)

Page 119 Revtston 27 [ ATTACHMENT 8A L FCR No. _ @ Units Affectec / CHIL __ l LC.I 13H.Q FIELD CHANGE REQUEST REPLY MEMORANDUM Unit _ Sys Seq .I TO: Project Manager, Sequoyah Engineering Project FRCH: Modification Manager, DCN, Sequoyah Nuclear Plant, A8 Sequoya 4 OATE: r SECTION I - REQUEST FOR FCR CATEGORY: [ ! _B REASON FOR FCR: _C 1 1. Change needed because of interfering equ 2. _V _ Change needed to correct a design error.ipment. 3. / E Change needed to add additional design inf 4 5. on. Change needed to correct drawing discrepancies 1 Cog Engineer 52co [ M o e Sign: M ud I,Date i Phone b /mk6 Sign:fcl /L Date N d 8 k Phone p % sor E Engi$eer lhti,% F r ~ Sign:fLdn/db]flhate _ Du-M Phone S 5'T/ (. Related Documents: ECN M( OCR _ _ DCtl. WP /2/780ther_ Change

Description:

lAl.37%l. $USMlhf_Lwk $NWMtre 4fa0 .-.1/J fnti^/ 9 7Et2/h PCRL k ~ -/ / J M@ W A % n G 12 t:2AlY 7b CAcl/ trnTe R Ci? i 7P21A A(34P wn Triewm s m rac n rou/'shk'P - AprD Nih2Lt> lilL Ti/A Als j t< tal Strr~ (See Para 4.5.2.3 In instructions)FCR could effect plant inst v'ALV2 A'orsin / No _,L_,,,Ye s ,_,,,,,__(I f ye s OPS to re v i ew) FCR could affect PMT/ Functional Test: No.k./es __,,bf yes Sys Eng to review ._Y The affected drawings / sketches are attached /Ref revision (if requ red) are: Drawin 417LQll ~l-l 47N60D 87. V7 MAID -l > 4?N6/oP 2 numbers and for revisea FCR Dwy7o 2, DwDt '1% </% nt-/k ~ V_ revision corrects / adds additional infoRevision superse ~ revisions remain effective. rmation; all previ g / g ',g for FCRs issued af ter the workplan is approved (l gg This FCR changes / drawings 0%% drawing list _Affected workplan pagesNIM U 27,78 i ~f instructlon Cog Engr JJ6 /r(M. [ /./eJg.A' i

Attochitcnt N; 3 __ Sheet 3: of I T IEop ip/ldehtlfier &:W- 0.55 - o *2 4 SQ'l Al-19 (Part IV) -(I Page 120 Reviston 27 ATTACHMENT 8A Page 2 of 3 i. Safety Related. CSSC. or I.imited QA 5 0 No Safety Evaluation Covered By bCN bb'N 10CN tio./ Screening Review /USCO r Reviewers Section_ Review Reo'd Slanature/0 ate Operations a yes d / System Engineering u Yes / Electrical Maintenance a yes I / Instrument Halntenance a Yes q / Hechanical Maintenance U Yes / Modifications s a no / 'QE s D No ( / Other a ....................................yes s FCR is ready for PORC review (if required)................................./ t and Plant Manager approval: / Section Supervisor Date PORC review (N/A if not required): / PORC Chairman Oate Plant Manager authorizatloa to wcrk: / .0 ate L FCR and associated drawings sent to the ONE: / Document Cooralnator Date e Review of ASME Section XI Requirements: ~ M A If(4 ?8t8/ cc: R!MS Atil/Atill Oate

• Required for CSSC Safety Related, and t.imited QA FCRs.

t i

(

00172/cdb FCR!f 6868 'RT 0F-/s} Pv4._3 6 m

,[, 1 Attochment No-- 9 _ 5heet 1 f 3S' 7 LiiBp iP/fdenHfles-30Al~ C S S - 024 i SQN \\ i Al-19 (Part IV) (l Page 121 Revision ?7 i ATTACHMENT 8A r Page 3 of 3

=================================c

TO: t FROM: esammes DA TE: SECTION II ONE REPLY / RESOLUTION............................................................ Drawings and Revisions !ssued u t Oate Issued Change Cc?.pleted DNE Engineer Project Engineer Date Olvision Nuclear Engineering \\ i. f i FCR# 6AG9 IE PAGE 3 0F 15 00172/cdb e e

o \\ s Attachment No-9 Sheet 4 of 16 Lbop if/tdentiflei SOM-CSS - Oi4 .C'- A4 (t/f. ~ I nw t et

• a M-k.

... hDNS 7*C GYALUA 7T fck. / 7 n ACGQ.M.'d FistAcas 7y.. 12VG ...s. AFT.;'.e. Iqiza.L47tcM, 3 m .l . s ^ i $4ffv! P1x. S'4'. bY,fV/,, hij.CQ h\\ e[ ~ t d'61 W " " I__ n r- - - -- - .m I m Tg i 'I l t.s t Y,* sv ~ Idu 'UlX OCdW OT.lDU' 'D," d m e N MM CE IM. MEL y say h l -f A ~ wa .rh M' dr#.4ss Soc 4 9-a qj _[3 [K e Pm ncV P2 slowat. fC f*6 tupor ro pasuriessig P3 A//C SuNAL Y 70 bilftcNfg PV festrmit cvrnr i /WL /-L* 4'2 3 nxn ser Ar GOsia y O hk 'NY SQ Hl%D. SkircH "/ s WORKPLAN /'2/72 FCR# ; GR 68 W PAGE 4-0F /S g,, __ _y,, O ,,m

e Attachment No-9 _ Sheet- $I_.of 6 Loop #/ldehtlflir_SOM-CSS - a2.9 1-Fcy 130 BR if4.. \\ 4%e 1 l

---

c%n

& 0/VS 7O' AVALVA Tl fort \\ u ~ A00CUATE FWAQ.'UTk cwas ,V _k . ) ..... A f70A W.5 7ALL A 7*gQN.,,,,, b 4 7 .f $ LIM.m *l6/1, ~lC [liA.A. FAL.tu WB nAl W 7 '.,,k

• ifC 4 2645 I

y c , -.u. a"s. .a,L,' 13 _) i e .n l ~ ~ ~ ' ~~~ n '"l

• [e$hk hhbb'

--olm t- . n. Mum. cs Pl%EL = s -.I g,y. A h '{ f . L. m a, L, f M' armss scu q _As ~, (pm

g. 3t gy

~..... =

p. 3, PR siama war 7: ecsiric.vu P3. AIR fuht Y Te A~$17/CMfg P4 P oso n e.v M c v r n ' T pm p.g.y;

.s m strara r.t:a X X W. f/N<l4l llE/d \\ RER 4'7W6co ~8 p SKs7c'/2 - l ,WORKPLAN ___ /2/y:.. FCRH (o%8 Y ~ ~ PAGs 5 0F /5 ~

a. e. Attochtsent N6- [ Sheet 6 af W 4 Lbbp k1/ldentifler SQAl-CSS ~ 02A - ed l P.cV-l 12. . pex tt{f..L. .A'r** f. 93

J"t

. [.) ~ 5 c-m } -G 1 ** 1 .. G9CNE 1*o avAWMC fett..... / i n s 40fGWA ~0 FLGXAGILI W.... 2002 A AP 7' A. INS TA L LA TION' '(e] g (* .~ \\n A SL:fvts tu ilt' 2.7 4 / 7 Alf E5 Q$ .pcg Soeg S S gp A 2.2ft. [ l mn n, g yJT b(AoWTAHI 1 g 1j' O.sARAW. / gg g k4 (' .a yys. . $h k " gi__ $lEM D ~Tth L 3 mL. M 1 ~ am~w r1 dT nss ' @/c{%(% t:o w e swa &rrea er(7an s FM J/ l*l) L_ HCV 4 93 P2 ssG M M INPur to fostri:.vu P3 AIR SuPP4 t* To RJtrwwfX s 4 ,P H Pestirowct< cu rs%7 FWL I L +'2/ w ser Ar G Mc X A /'lK <l'7iv dlH j % ME WMic o-87 S k f w w '3 m-FCRII O RI WORKPLAN _ /2/72 osae- .vz-a_ _ PAGE 6 0F M 8

_ _ ~ _ 0 ": '.;l Attochment Nr._ 9 _ Sheet 7 af I S' .-Loop iF/Identifler SGA-CSS - O'L4 .I'Kti23 l . ra. taf.... / /*

• 1
• J
• t e

,g 3c-,. u L-1 ** ..... S&Vi 7b AV / ~ ecm.. b 4 2L w, ..a na ~.., L- . xm mrsu.aw ; g s cb4 i g g W l f "Jer.*rr3 M /tY /28 _,._,,g (*J s W ' tr' b EF N W u--- vI .FcB5088 A. \\ i ~ ;= m e a I L__ % g mosr inwmit VN q s Q. rjg> cwgAnct ' ~ ~ ~ ~ - ' / gy fi$5 $lgreg-i-

• "'I

[ S t 6t.ec.VE. Ci at M m' 'n 21' a m. . k k' A '%~ l'It"MWlica;w M U. a'.EN li t(;(1;(,,~ m W /m em nTc J/_ n.2y

n. n P2.

SrMn ixmiv' 7v 10sii;c.vsk P3 en surPW rs nsitic,vsa p Psf posincN0/i' Cu YNT* PNI. /~P '/20 O x str <r cs era

7.,A Mk P7W4Ql-ll%

^'df </7wteo-87 .sw:eru "y W JRKPLAN /2/72 . Paso _ 777~} ' FCRll SEM5 RI \\ I PA,GE ~7 0F /5 = = - - 1

\\ .. w y i $a bi d i O.kc47 t l ll @W hl bRAMIN& W l Attochme t N6_ 9 n _ Sheet 1 d \\ e 41N(>l0-H

l. cop #/ldentifIcr MM -CS S - 0 24 k

FCR.4 - (oW8 Rf r-n PAGE R OF / s-4 gl l 7 ( 8 I 9 ,o 3. gm a ;} Qg** .s c------ ,c r ', ( ',- g u su*~ -." ~ ' pp h ~~34 h i e ,f, ' E'i",'!!," k 11 ',' d. b 'p % j, M .... s...... (""" > -"" " ~^ g"E b,rdg.,',M.. ,/' J. M (f;;y;; f*c,-:'3.g o\\ 3 i. @f-r' @ h p.,4,,ni /,' l -@8 L1 @ - - -<'a..,...... maa ~nyt a i~ "" " ' '2 kilkh % [q e sm e '5NHr/ qp. ,D i f k! h 1, W t ~" 5 J a 3---Gh r: -@--

u u 3

9n u = t r 1.i : 1 I e@.r ' n .M if s j, , s @.e a. b,' 4 f(c

m__9, 9

-gg.e- ^Sg X--c@g 7-g %.g. GybQ.,e.-t b @R -_.-4.-1 -L.,.n. w .e.~..,~- , s. < t._ _ g i t e.9 ,.._ i_ _ ftrga ,,u. re, acl-Nqtm2'ry.-

_ _. gNgt r

3..

'? .3 t 9 -+ q'$.- g'., ')'- - m 'y Q..'

• v(.b.m,,3

-4P, id )iCIJu - - - - * ' ' 'f - '<m's - J;.. e,,.., b.T.) 9 ,,,, J f lrTr ] ...... t ..- q3 g,x @.e 4---@f... L':, . J.,5.'m . ~ggeq e. _- _,,. n , _ _, _ g.... 9x y2 @. *@M gc E'-+T~@~*:uh*i'T***Mdl$,c: ~.,,, g~..,7 ee =2-W t g,.. () b - - ' w -,,.,,cw -.~ t r3 w 6.i F~ o t---

%.y

~ ..........,n.. "g. _ _ x' gr,,a,.,, d.) 41 T i.._.g... a., = v, -4 + 1 <. m .t..,..---, ~p e .u 'O' ,N**t ,. 37 l g " c -, tY 3 6 u, a ~ ~ * ,-l,J, a?A - R., y-y.h k, kc

sd s>o x-n g,,).n$ '

' ~ ?:Q,, J e.

to 0.y...u. a f, Q; ;.w.

, gn 2 l

c. r s

A t .,w -

l ?~k-O:2 L %s, \\ ,c X Attechment No_ 9 Sheet B f I r,............., n,. a,s. n., e.,,,.___;,... e,, Loop #/ldentifier SoM-c.SS_ O24 ...z. n. c..., s. s 3 'r (.,,......., s..,.........., n., a.., n j Gm".... _._.9_Q 1 4,Co t c r..,.... r t i e,...., .i;r u., c_...u.c c m o.....,....... n.: a '>. _ .t t

.k

,,..... e...... a. ..., m.,.,,,_9 <n m.,s..:.. :,..,, ' , @Q, h m~ .e.n Q 5'dl s U, 4j l'4*:. : u p .n I ? , (% g tr s w .s, _. 3 p l g

..,.......,a, n

s g ,b.c... c,.. o. wY; y& 4lq '< 's > - :) )* c 6 ,,s.,.. u s

• • l' *;"',.*.**f).'. nO

    ,,,,,. n., c.,.a,. - _.r,. - -.._e -.; - r. 2. _ -.%},

,.3,,.g. qe r.u Ae y .\\ v,j a [ i p _.4. _'.,._ g.e.p ._ _ _ _ __ _ _ __.,._ 4' "f Q,, g _ _',, -('-[ .- J dor, b e r.:,wn u %-i.>..m 4,---- ', ],-- - .,n ~'9 ,m: f@ Q[6 ~< ~ r) .,.,,...,>r.... r;\\ ., m >c "%my*&Q~ g W...E ,,, :.,, ex rA&ac- -O n Ge ,3' / OL is'

• gag, W Q,,.,

1 ---.- m'"' 7 - h.a fC j J $ DRAW lN 6i O 2gY g u r nare s %ik,W,,. 9.m? 9 - Ma, 'd a i l tr7W@ -/-2. F. W. ei [ g_ _ i.Q;m, u.m e..,,... db, __Le 3">a u .s c...+> ,x- ,4 a 2 ; E l 4,j8vu~f _+k a4 b-).;v4, 7y,,, 6r, ,o i ,i /d ,e "l?;-- g O' m ..;,- -- ;.. -) m, G. - --- r::2m v.,. ,. < iu (.y n g j...,, i. ,. y y, g y m.. w,,.e....... w,.... F >... 4 - "2 3 g g..- l 1, .we ,... m . < r. -n e u.a. %e.n,e t.f a.u, ",..e,s 4 as, .w v. , w 7.uc .a.. ..n n m.. m,a, d p' kv,$C Ca,A,*,.b. n., ~ m --ce;:r.-- l '\\ L g_.o- <<e.m,, c,. e,,- ', l,..Q,L.._,,, - g Hwn m.nw

s., i..a,

. r. u,,".4.,.'. u,~,n ~a*.."w'n_;gst_ ..<o** ' ~,.."m.n,"~ c~ ' s = g ,, s. ". &...,. t,,,. .m. v. m,........... _ i.. t . r. ~ -.....o-- g s.... o n.u , ~. _. g (n,, ...,. n...a.,.. w. a... y , ~... t". 1 3 m, i.... . u, w. a ) 1.e s qB. no,3,3,,$ on,.yne.c.,ea.o... 1 ,..i.n i. .e., ...... -.. ~....r_ 1. _3.. w.%, v.............,, e_.. m... t. e e .,;._.s, g', g g,,. p__ s s ,, L-g,g j G[ ti e., ,, p - -. a @2 &y, y,.S 4,,, ,%_ "'4"/ W.@ W di~ _. m_"v ~ "~ "..,c--w.s.~ s z o .a ,, e i 1,.i. !. 4 m 3y,,,, fi y -, a y...,. e. _ g g i_ i n - - -.4. p - - - - . _ g<g, N Q; O"i F-$- H----O D G ' w,,..,c,,,, ,, i i 3 e T-rowcasous c - i g mik.u aj,y,, i "S2-I j p,r-g ,4 MECHANICAL '~~~~ - h, 2 , t - - -q?.f. - - ~ ' IP, -. I a c r ... C_O N T.R O L D. I A G R A e ih M A IN STF A U '";v9TW i f ~

,..<3;*a /,AUf ..a crec, nun -,;, = g;, n.r* r.ies ... c..s o l o ra...,...... e "u>-- s Attochment No-3 "\\ j - Sheet 10 af I'3 eggy Sord - Css -024 ,.....,c-e m..,m.,,,.,n... g u s y-) It e-e g....r,,...... = n na n ~l

n t

be g-g, aa 'g M. 'p N } \\ j j j j y) M RI p' q-L_.g'3 FCR!I a ~ J H j i n H % 2# S - PAGE lo 0F /s _s o p n %t@as kD @/ .w. d o as m.g p *, r_j ..q J A .*=*d{g,,,,, n ), g g,, g pp g ;g gg q q pgg gy. g 4 >J+.~.....nrie d w.1. 4.--$ .T ""i T s:!4 :t.. ((=I l* 840 tt.,. d.;w..rt'5 et '**. 8:.t=*1F.4m tu*O f 'ti d(Alvt3 af I Z@ M .,e,, 01 F 44 a .y - -p.s j . :,...s f 2... u t tee.s a r e. -g.-- Sasert t.ss c r. 24 <s .n. ;, i :m s a :.saa.co soo= r c<t c u.uts gg l g,4 slist.af st ati .g f

1. o' g

J. *.4 ga s ;

• t a,cs.

'8 r5 e t tb tfl 's Taut $ (7 CV*.* 4. FCV= 4 4Nt, 8 0.el ll) a 4 84 !.4l(0 o f 9t

• Mt C04f ItM91 e

y. ' W 2

/*7TE.$ 11(t t.tas. 4 =as g, a.4..e ( tie t, g r e g g g.AL L..t. =c u

.g a (e.

s.g, .*V. l e t t, 80 a3CO w~ s ,4., m. .,1,),, n.... t e.n. ( s, !,

• r.= *,.t,
• 4ai. it t f f t ve Ad e ;*

J M . i ~g 'o.s. 4 (sev e.. %) f.4 * *. I.f.. # * * *

• 4

...necicu,o

• 6

' ' 3. 't.f * *

• I *. 8 f * ' * )

c'k_'g 4 4 ti. e..a .g.8: ( :. 't.. f.3..e av *,M e=I 4

ue.....

4. :

.4-

4. s

• et, &1.44 a.3 *. i V ' A s.(.4 ! 4
• t t s.a f.

t .e s t e

• ".t.

3 16:- i 23 - i. ,u e. r.' t :.. .n m'i3..,& -. s e c"., r = t

• 4 8 9
• 1 e it :M f.,y i

1f

.> t ' r

- ci. ~

.. ? t. u, s ( * ).... st ;;; art; :n f at tree;*4 art ..u s. y 1 .(e,3s - <-:;v.

n..., :: e.w...t.,.tu....

s,3r.o m, rs.u us i u 1 ..<:. ne s.u.uu ITc'~t W,' r '. \\,'* an* s*4 .saaag n A. IIVI.'i. sew"*.'.5 y L. g.'., - I ^I

• • ****A' U'' 2 ~;9 4 t * -J
• 48 t-y-

,{. 's,. .s. ..t -t an = = *, r:v - . v,.. n,,. s.we.. s T a u w wo e. e arts,a.: ru

n. ev e

., y. ,,,..,, r..;.m is .s o.. :-s : n - 's e de, mt se &,t * %. e.. a. m >. r e.

• E' d )f.a Q" ~ ~6 W

f U.;' ,3 All o*J.9f.f ?Ms'.ft s) i 1 d(A ff AI +*.O *r YE.f # #'!

• E 'd A.gef) Cit

// V'JMIf * 'f 3 f F - p.*. s y k._. 6 n cy '. .,,,.O >.J r/ y neoc.s.v:s xJ1 /bitv:.st /t 0 uv. g. M. } 8:p....., m. i

u..:.

-,, ~ .g: .g,..J>** ..,..;. e.u. .;~..c.n n.c5. .,.f,l,,,& 'A "* ; i'"" ~~, 2 .: r w - ,..?. :. n e a > cm g,fg.4 }, 9MWid/.i # P':" '"d """ s rh g;g-y .i r t.rt e. %na ,w,.. 1.t7W6,(o -f.I nw...u. r> s., e. .e-iTo m s...4 l-3 4 . _ ' 4 (n'i/J /*) .,Ia < r.m. t.4 Tv4Mf. 22 u:.. - m.> a m a,

1. ~

(* 4/l 485 s \\ ?_.._...., u...,,. n., 4,..f a., s-.,/.. 47 f.t3T.1PstdOfT "WLA.4TW**r m. ,,j g 4,T.*.%.6 t,. 5,. 4_& c. O 2 2 >< a ,%. _htSTT.Md L_4Gd: C tliJIJ. .s.. 4 44~ @,.c n,.p..M:#4..dn.n n -_r_L~_ .c s..; - r,- Q, g,.i ~ _ _,,,, _ _ _ ; n x ci y9 i y s ,m ,t..cas wa t,, _- n.. ~... -,- m{m} $, ge//2 c n a a, w;6- ,e t.c a e. y,

n. r%* s o.

.. n,....>.,. .~ ~t wwe s *. r-.... . w. r i_ / e W.: ya s 6 i .;M,B (, -..- ~.. ,, pcu.m.av... e mm m n u m.a. m a oscw..eo,u.,-.n .ac n as a r ,.~....a.. ,..a.~ ~.n.o > e s s,a.e .'y .e ,a ---~< a.v.>r :.:... j rr. g.v,ouo u*e>; .r-4r,. m. r-I :.4.r ; e: c----:.*-'1 m$, .. 1. nm :...,.., p m :.:. {. w# Ir.: :.y ;.e r,.. v,a, r = ~,4 ,t ,Vs o- &, m m, a' L:i'IM.t,.; * ". . u. ; 4 A .: ;, o. b,~, ",' ~.. .,1. - <- w '.' %. u.. '. . ): 4_ 3 r** ~. ^'*** k,,, 'v. .?,l e d (,

i. c,

.c -v.-~- .: g. 6.m, >p-- y:i ,j7 ,c a, .... ~... m...... m... m.- .s. j m.... r:.. o a., ,.>i e r,i 3 n,,, m.s. 7.y, 3 y k*q b4 ) +k t 4 y 3rj i kl

e. r.,.-.,n. w )a p._ _,, _ _- _ _-

,_ _ 1 r- - - .m ~ h w %.mbw.. E A i r a.m. @w,:g...@ a o n %, _,i U,. <ne ya 1 i .o a s g .-.. m., %,. y=,m.. q ,._ Lg~ga p _. _ _ '- - qm u - 3 ~ v, i ai p _ _. me3c i

~ c o _... c UNlrS I& 2 O5I M

E f L @ l I ~ ~~. "t-le l F- [-- 45!E CONTROL DI AG R W,M EC_HANIC A L 1

r n.tq, i i i i i=g- .s a 4 nr $j..t. .i' ! ! ;[ l i l i s 2 O -CMfk-k n

.s s

u y ) : %u j h {f Ih .M I.! ~ ( N 9 h }j- , g y 2, g.v ~ g... - k N,,' l SIi l! x @C3 ' Attochment NA i ,.9.h..Qg@$>r;f{l. k,' d M 9 sh t_J.L.cf 6 ? 3 3 uxo wantmC SoM - css-o24 .l (3:,e,3;t.i.g.p.$i %edj$G .[ g'

v.

e ,o 8 5. c ! ? ?9',4P';.4'im?/4t*hy.! d'u-o@- i, a a! i ; %..it c $ $n^ w 3 a a l~t p' a -h,l"s,s

s

,,e H. i i )*Q 9,kk, f. L-A. 4 h 3 t 4 ., s. s .f' 5 3 ^ $ s = 9 (ic e3 ,g ,a 1;js

,..Lg;

h q 3 e. g,._ 9 x, ... e.,m n-a y e-t.. ~.fi' e'y.v:

. r.,,

.w r r P eu 't ! 9,. Sp,r, :g._i__ g.. i e L h@m = k&-E*thupflh,hhb va "] = a c E,i A 4:4 :c. i J-(-.j 3[o = ~, M, ) f h @ 5* ~ a 4 7 e :9 &-9.! i j ., 2 .i3

ti G i

}I J ?'!i$, dilr-- k," i s.2, t tu x C if8M_ C U II Ij; i y ud t e $q 1 d; Ni fi;i,~~t s j-1d ft B, t g u ~

@y....t[*@f';-w m,

.,L ,A. 'i!dkl.s! v!f l +. 2 g I a ...., o t, 6,,)2 -m,,b n($a, + . s. i D h. ao-h U [g g i u, s. g:, 4 i a .k ; I p e k(

h. y,

a. ~ 'h 5. i .s!,, '...,...u _.,..gG in l L js l qt N}J :g.J . j ti i 4 ?s I, i i c: ~ g' n ,. m .a p- - -a. i ] I,hj!4 "t'~. l" g.i r I jw a W

4'.

i *

a. y, i

eg -4 5 T 4

Q - 1 I f I

g i,-- I j ') a .g3 i I Y it g !h. ,,,fh y , _ i _. _ i. _ _ _.a I4 ...)

4. L I

..J ;.g h [ j f _I l i i '^ I a o j i i._ r t a,, ',l g ,t, ,r -4 g s. u " &[g $,O.,--b,h I I k+-

A M,f Th l d%g-..e

. ff) l T L i 4 4>," 1 ll 'e i n! 'L u=.. u n b. i t. e 1 i g i i t gd,L~~~J'~~'-L.L f, i l lj y l l@y,i i o 1 y*' r -- 'i i i "8

• 5I 7

.J.-. J l g,- n @- -,-t? ' U1)..... 7,. .2y E((---,j t -.. - -.sl eh A I i n 4 ., J aa u c...- ~r. ;- I .m.3'a =* ,L.------o EQ !,,.,, I I

j.. t Attachment No-9 sheet.1 % p g..,- .i. ..gP%,..n. e c,... Loop #/ldentifler M^l-CSS- 024. ' L* ,.m. ..,. 3 e FCR# M 0: O d '- . s.<...: PAGE I? OF 6 ~ .p.. . ~..,.. h4(A.) { bl(.^g k -. hh{ I--k-l.. Y '.: ~ r;.. I t 2 e 3 4 '*5 l-l-119M t.t-a 5' ,. scil.7'.Ti.Q.

':.v c..

.t. M.yy; %g J cf.1ru rg ..."., t., ' '..c

?

-

.. J 1.;.,s t,'herxt s 1. .)

d. 2., a-...

..,..',t.. . s. e... \\,,..... < a. .1ersa $a onn .r.. .s.- ot.,

v.. y.

f..*

• 4.t.

G. J FT 3 rg., i. r. .f

• a,;

1,. ) per ns.t.3 rg) yy s-o. D > coo h.duro us m

.\\-

\\ .g. :.v. rs. 3 7. - A: w. v..

9...:.

..r.. s. .r:,,.n.,. 2

r.. aue e,n,

n. w .a ,0- [ .n wn .mun ti,.;a\\ <ir. \\ 8 n i p J .7?

.+ -.

s m,... s :.. - t . ]J er m, w ~ y~ ~ u .c e n T** ~ /.' . h... ' I n . ~ ~,.. 'a ..~ ' \\t yt tm.,,, 3 i.'i.';.9 3, a s . o,,_ o .~-_ y.. s o .,a .,c ,..+ M., ,,,T .. n e. ?.. <...... ,m. s '.......a.

3. :..x., I.

.w. . ',.;.. ~..g,. y . '.s.,..; t'w?.ligl:.. n r. mm unn mux...n 6 .g C - "c W> %> %> %> %>' J s

• 2:'. r '

e. ;.' c y 3... ; :' ~ m74 \\, y = ~,~.~e . O da...w~.y. s 6 .'g:. Q' 7- - c L. i.% :. '- j_ l bh {

• ' 3 I*h ',.;.2 o

. l c. i 1 ' y f..' ' '.9.... s i. 0 1

• 1 l

-a 1,5i m= I u= > ' .. l,.% '.). 'c.,'! :.' '

u..u

=

.u

p.'.;,. -

l, 5- ,.4,, o s c,,, i k,e r--- S .3 g ... I a m ...4 y y ,, (,, i. u ,e m 3 ) c,o /. t p< v. c ~ s, mm,,

v. n....

w i t u ....a i

• p u.n

[ t; c' r- ' I h tj v

e.,

Q -~~ w 1 r-- c, f ~1 ,.. :'5k: h:1*.i"-Qp.y.-Q'i>it:. Q,'l M w '1< hs .v ".. ' ~ ' . r> m.,, p

AttochmeHf Nd 9 ._ Sheet i 3 af f S Lb6p '#/ldentifier 59Al-C SS - 024 ( ' 2" //lR //ejten / / ~ ~ j-g i ~ ) / l Tusing - o l VALLIG S ( (.- a v _l - 2. G.w a it2, / ANO ( t-ecu -t-2s / / (mmtiI4 i " l \\ ] l/dquitejii4" \\}m 'f 3-j t ELEEVE DETAIL. i Full %w ~ ^ Rw. Dan % S 4 g 490_z NUE '. '/[ IAIN. CLEACANCE. pgElg -- {,S b 9.__.7_ ARcurlo 7vae3 PAGE l'3 OE /.r e e a ,-o w-w -o --v-e - r--

+ .o . e.a > =

• O b'

b) ,,s 3 r ouir u c < s i s -c' ,g.,, . ~ m g g ng 4-g- ~__r.O' stRT

4rni,

+

• e r =

gg g g {t_79 6 d' f l'+ t') ' i$$*O' 4r,49, gc 'd94 g a e.it a a 17 9 ? W A_iN T at 4 h g e ~ d* 2'* 4 L97 4 rm 49,~ q{ WVO a .it99 w &i%f y _, 2*. o* r7t% e' _t 63 e im 4' 4-

== s 61 3. *; 64 9., o r.- ~ [ 6 r-s- .r. .3 .r.333 k,' e 90t 2" 4* Y 6' 493'-5" .,,ss m ( ho? O i e 7* 4* 1 ias* 7 C'< < S "scs w r 2*- 9

• 8 8 T-3' 47. % S e

eTeo t Cs d 35 a- . o-72 F-c [do4 M e d r e sgs Is,00 ( i 36 t-Y 6'a - r l FAO 15-e itC S 1%' 4* Ovts o1 2 0* 138'-80* ~ _ 47 555 Y e r 6Cr6 t%'

1. o t

A I

• e ac 15]
• T50F ZaO' Fo a % c' 47 9to e

h), e M l eV 4' ") ,5 ,,C. r.o. ,er.< 4 ? vr910 2 '- 0 107-4' v&C e' M O WAC 36 t < *. ' *

• l

.b if' '6C9 s ..c 3 6}_ i ho .,.,,o l hh* a* I. r 2-e rer. r ~m ~o .t ze vrvio a u 7p3-wm ar,w air r s-a- 7 3r.c. - o...o to m 44 Ss "M .is 4-s. wa g q.,2 c.neo G3 $4 rs.c is. e 81 Vt.A.fi frCtf. kA sa ta = u u_ . fs 746-9 tr4' l v.., as won out wa 6&c w ttirr E t 4. 4 N8'.TU fM e +s g 5=r wtti .sc 77.Eo arry sa (%r. r ; n i eac ,stt sa ]. iac_ 47.wo w%a @ y d' a r.mo n et s 3_ I r u p 4 f g;Q -2/ {' cru Yg gG8 Y s o_ p.A G &f-0 L u_. O 15

i. s 3s

• • .e

[*1 Attochment No_ 3

• r

__ Sheet ld.cf L lb5p ip/identiflef _SGM' CSS - 024 4 .4, 9 35 ll O C Ml e) M

• • 3t t S

===--- tawwww ? :4s a' =.).* (tsti C#rCl4 Attf i'.4f.ttt0 rom Ettt , CC FC4 n,8(4&fC4 ;&T 5tt 3e4 47844 2 N011%5 N i }[ $MD E M .g s, M ikAg a $$a we n i _E t M \\ M 12.gt_t. S4. L f MW 1 Y V'. // \\ l l Mh Wf** !(44f9 (4J4 l 's h 4(MW.,re stL DE' C a]Sig (,.M 16

• >W
• D*]. T h

e'4 *=Lt(% C 'd. #t 9 FC A **g dcw t l [. ...-.-i i C 7 %.s cr u Me u) { icistl l,. y i [j @. ute stets.io,e..,sa(s Jm - '. =., " " u -. j Ji s U.., s o is t 1

• ) h,4

n. <4 3 e

== Na tic 8 ptA #CR %%3 FT4 LC 4 Lt.20 CHA%Qt SLtest Ettvat,o's law 9 A40 Vv 40. 'a i S4 84 4CM SL L O 3 45vT14 w neusmqpieFCm W SFN 1 FCN (ngi,3 e*4ft412e _Q" 3 v vy 15 I 4. e.1 I "DT r1 s;nr./$ s. ?

• ...n et
• 4 f *T M t <W ! A FJ 'f),g ( J

'Tf (- (tm e t t s 4 y iten I(.30l Str t W t ask cait , l$, $*aa.9tYe* OV. 'a=a w e edT.'-L. 8 e = = =.....=....f........

1. e k

e. 4 t esut"....

f6 J C.h tfAf3.W........ sw ee...... M* M & ss "!C scat a. .erJ-3 c. PCveEMCv%E. E-AUXILIARY OUILOING UNIT TJ MECHANICA L i

* -@:.. pl..

~ + ,i .,^ l i ~-' [ _ / "' W ,.;1 .- ) -~..,.'l i b s-I ja'{ /.~f, p'./ ~ i Attochment No~w n s ~~ LDOP N/ldentificrQett Sh 5--c . - cy . r._. # %.r I?:J y .

• c'

- l.:.y o ..a -- ,t t j ..e a. r a 1 -, M., w. me tinni;t .r . un. gf q 3 a. O . ~ Y^ ,;i-T.,Y.r.%4=ys%Yy.,....

• ~.O M'. 8b'. r*C_ -)(_/fL d

ea .. som, msw - f+ sl.--'. **' y .a e l

j.c t

l } "..,~ a a.im %: - .<.. u,

p....,

r.

• 8,4

/,1K-stri o.x. f' i~sh _ d a r a. g.. tar. 3J p ..y - ' .vg.p 7'pt.y p ---}- ~ ",,* .,. [ g-y$r.&g / R - }>L ,m 4 g.-. -J{ SifMMM j Asp.; qa y'.,,, y:.... M*9tJJSM,42d4 .r- .m e. _e .~," \\ r,,w.; r". FOR WORKPLAN --) s ,.t .m .--., 7 U.,,_ _h,LY cv s

Nso

+ ,.. I _..._..>i -w-- .s s \\ ull? . t... 6 u ~' ,.:.c a a e, <,,,... m sse c a e,< n.,.. tss ~. a .t, n...,u me,t,,s n..1 Y6 - -I 'l. .,... n ~ p. ..,....e .n s s-.,r.. L,i..,... ha ma to two currms vnwestwo-soewer.v rwn a.ar J 3 ~,. J ? i'. y ,t '.;... a.. Gfs , f. '. tu,t'.s stma,5 s 3 e .::'.'?" \\, e r.* -~ 4=- ~% a...usw. murowEf cr T.s$.g m w ire w x x a ua,es a n a u^ *7som h \\ a l hJvenwere sa,3*rs n3 ccqyjyrs eu , w J.;. f .. -L.. 40'f$-NS'/}sH_h&A ' ' [~ < 44)$ ' . su e, 1 ,i ap Ll *U 9 i)* j, . *p .: J:s ge?/g;,w., ,~n m-~~~5*'~er 9t'r.h 4 t .< t e A. l __ j T.ar,.o eL ' -a <o y - t u. w. eC [ i >-na -..n i I ; n.. 6 t i

• ,f

.. m ~,... D,- W X l.;4 -Y* o w r. *. s c u s e .y $. % 4'* +8a J _. d '... ,.,,,, d ' M 9 UI.'ING 4., Ni T 5 i A 2 M * ",,. e p. 3.' 'C C H i Hi C A L /5 :h - g h 2'i*!.. g-

g. 8=

w SEGUC Y,S 'l NUCLCAR PL 4,NT "8 f' q Z W;... <i,I TCNNF. ?.(,C VAL.LCY AUTHOR T !f g f.# l r ee*W... st a g # e.e, I Y 8L ?J.;~.. %.al.t __ i_ r.:"T!.":....b;;;.7.';. et34s

• N

{ .i mee (

W#h ,,f 88ep NN

g. t q

'. > 4W98IT14 STATELY. h 5s.r g g NUCLEAR REQUI.ATORY COMMitsl0N Je //M/M6 .f.. Meol0 Nil g ~ C ) 101 N AMieTTA eTREeT.N g ATt.ANTA.testmotA soaos Attachment No, ig _ Sheet._1 o i AUG 1 o g Loep g/ identifier ME M y Tennessee '/ alley Authority J ATTH: Mr. H. G. Parris RECEIVED Manager of Power and En {i 500A Chestnut Street Tower !! gineering AUG 20 1984 Chattanooga, TN 37401 Gentlemen: HUCLEAR UCENSING SWF /-

SUBJECT:

CONFIRMATION OF ACTION - SEQUOYAH UNITS 1 MD 2 00CKET N05. 50e327 AND 50-328 ) I This letter refers to the Mr. R. C. I.ewis of this office and Mr. L. M. M111s of yourtelephone 1984, between concerning inadequate implementation of 10 CFR 50, Append ** Rlicensing office !!!.J.111.L. and 111.0 requirements at Sequoyah Nuclear power. Sections !!!.G Station. J W1th regard to the matters discussed, 1t Appendix R programundertaken or will undertake the following actions to t have at Sequoyah rective actions for defielencies identified by the review:and to develop and imp ew of the appropriate cor-j 1. Cable interaction deftetencies identtfted in the fire protection safe 3 shutdown inspection conducted on f acility have been field vert fled at Sequoyah. July 16 20, 1984, at your Vatts Bar (' 9 2. For those safety related plant O exist, but have not been specifically areas where Appendia R deficiencies may identified, established consistent with sequoyah Technical Spect f tcation 3 712 fire 9 3 watches will be sa in ta ined in an area until all Fire Appendt R review for that area are resolved. issues raised by the 3 the appropriate Technical $oer.lf tcation Actior Statementidentified de f te tencies, For l ' ) s will be followed. 3. A reytew of the shutdown logte diagram and development of an be completed prior to August 16, 1984. y new legte will 3 w111 be subet tied to this of fice. 'A copy of the revised logic diagram i 4. An evaluation of Sequoyah's comp 1tance with Appendix R se will be conducted such tha t all document re v i ews are complet paration criteria October 15, 1984, and plant valtdowns to confirm f completed by October 29, 1984 A final report detalling the evaluatto.. separation criteria are findings and identifying plant into compilance with Appendix R modt f tcat ions neces sa ry to bring Sequoyah i' of fice by Hovember 5,1984 requirement s will be suraitted to this 5. An evaluation of Sequoyah spurious operation type associated circ Y analysis, including identification of necessary plant modifications subtiltted to this office by December 21, 1984 , will be ~

6. - A comprehensive review of Sequoyah comp 11ance with Appendia will be completed on a schedule to allow submlttal to thIs of FIR requirements j

January 1,1985, of a report identifying ali necessary Appendix ce orior to R t,lant and i w. l l e e 1

( 2 Af tochment No_ id _ Sheet.1__off - Loop #/ldentifier SON-CSS-024 i' fire protection modifications and containing an implementation schedule for these modt fications. 7. Starting September 15 of Appendix R noncomp. lii84,'a monthly status report documenting known areas liance and proposed corrective actions will be sub-( mitted to this office. requirements. This is in addition to any other NRC reporting We completing the actions d6 scribed above without prior approv please inform this office immediately.If your understanding of our discu [ $1nce rely, vr

f. C

.0 m s P. O'Reilly m Re tonal Administrator 1 CAL 50-327, 50-328/84-01 ( T. G. Campbell, Sequoyah Nuclear cc: y Plant $tte Otrector o P. R. Wallace, Plant Manager J. W. Anderson, Kanager 'O Office of Quality Assurance H. H. Culver, Chief, Nuclear Safety ,3 4 St4 f f 3

0. L. W111 t ans, Jr., Supervi sor Licensing Section 6

o J. E. Wills, Project Engineer I ? 1. 4 -s I \\c-i N*h' M %2$Itl%$$ht$ M M W $ & M.'W M W sSEitis?

Attachnient No II __ sheet I nf L_ 1.oop

1. /ldentifier3GM -CSS- 024 DISTRIBUTION 1

Operations Manager (- 1 Master Files SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT _1 NCLR Pwr Pit Supt 1 QA Manager 1 POTC O'ERATIONS 1 Control Room SECTIO.. INSTRUCTION LETTER 1 Turbine Building ASE 1 Auxiliary Building AUO 1 Op Procedures Group 1 Supervisor. Industrial Safety Section SB-1 1 Supervisor, Fire Protection Section, SB-1 OPERATIONS FIREVATCHES i 1 OSLA-73 1 1 Prepared By: J. R. Walker l / Revised By: W. H. Eaker Approved By: i M ager, Operations Group Date Approved: d~d b O8 l. Rev No. Date Revised Pages Rev No. Date Revised Pages 1 All. 2 9/18/87 6 7 8 i ~ 3 2/24/88 All 4 3/16/88 4-12_ _, The last page of this instruction is number _12 0073L/eeo e t s o. ..... ~. s _. .v . ' '. a

1 Attachment No-H .. _. Loop #/fdentifier SON -CSS - 024_ Sheet.3.nf f Page 1 of 3 a ostA-73 i Rev 3 C SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT OPERATIONS GROUP OPERATIONS FIREVATCHES

References:

1. SQO-37, Fire Protection Manual N82FP-1, FP-3 2. Memorandum from C. R. Brimer to P. R. Wallace dated June 14, 1985 (SOI 850614 957) 3. CATS 85-409 4. Memorandum from C. R. Brimer to P. R. Wallace dated February 18, 1986 (SOI 860218 818) 5. MATS 9284 6. CATS 87-121 Firewatch parsonnel are under the administrative supervision of the l Operations Supervisor and his subordinates. Responsibilities include: ensuring that the required positions are manned; scheduling of workdays; compensation and time keeping; and review of documentation as result of the firewatch work activities. Firewatch personnel on shift are under the functional supeevision of the Fire Protection Engineering Supervisor or designee. Responsibilities include: ensuring that assigned rounds are made according to established routes and times; journals are maintained; evaluation of any conditions reported by firewatch personhel. This includes initiating corrective action and prompt notification of the Operation Shift Supervisor on any conditions affecting Technical Specifications. There are two (2) designated firewatch patrol routes. Each route should be completed within forty-five minutes and shall be completed each hour. The designated routes are: A. Control Building - all elevations Auxiliary Building - elevations 759, 749, and 734 East Main Steam Valve Rooms - elevations 763 roof B. Auxiliary Building - elevations 714, 690, 669, and 653 Additional Equipment Buildings - elevations 706 West Main Steam Valve Rooms - elevations 714 t 0073L/eeo

Attochment Ni H Sheet.l of 13 1.oop g/fdentifier SOAl-CSS- 02 4 Page 2 of 3 a OSLA-73 Rev 3 ( SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT OPERATIONS GROUP OPERATIONS FIREWATCHES (continued) Firewatch responsibilities inciude-the following: A. During their shift they shall make hourly rounds using information contained in their log books (active breaching.ormits, t'ransient fire loads, fire protection out of service). These log books shall_ be carried by the firewatch during the rounds. B. Observe and eliminate conditions within their assigned areas which could lead to a fire starting or spreading. Any conditions which cannot be corrected shall be immediately reported to the Operations Shift Supervisor and the Fire Prot 3ction Engineering Supervisor or designee. C. Complete each assigned route within 45 minutes (Routes shall be performed on an hourly basis thecughout the shift).

1. Using the supplied checklists, enter the time the route was started and the time each area was checked.

2. While making the round, check the area's where Fire Barrier Breaching Permits are in effect.

3. Make log entries for any unusual conditions such as fire barrier breaches without prop welding operations, e,ee authorization, improperly controlled tc.

4. At the completion of the route, enter the time the route was completed in the appropriate space on the checklist.

~

5. If during the round, an area listed on the route sheet is not accessible due to Rad Con restrictions, the firewatch shall immediately notify the Operations Shift Supervisor and Fire

?cotection Engineering so that the situation can be ovaluated and appropriate actions taken. the firewatch log book. This notification shall bo ontored in

6. Any corrections to log entries or routo shoots shall be mado by

~ drawing a single line through the error, initialling, dating and writing in the correction. = f = '] .____-.___-m.

a Attachment No H Sheet 4 af 8 i 1Eop g/ldentifier M 'US ~ N Page 3 of 3 OSLA-73 Rev 3 SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT OPERATIONS GROUP OPERATIONS FIREVATCHES (continu,ed) Firewatch responsibilities include the following: (continued)

7. If the door into an area for which tiie firewatch is re'sponsible cannot be opened, the firewatch should attempt to touch the door to determine fire presence inside the area, then immediately inform the U-1 Ast SS/SRO of door inoperability.

The U-1 Asst SS/SRO must ensure the fire detection system is operable and no alarms are present for the area in question. He will then inform the firewatch that the area is covered. The firewatch will make a log entry of this condition and continue the route. D. Immediately notify the Operations Shift Supervisor, Assistant Shift Supervisor, or Unit Operator, if there is a rapid rise in temperature or a temperature above 130"F in the Unit 1 or Unit 2 690 pipechase or Unit 1 ERCW pipe tunnel. E. Once each shif t, the firewatch performing the "A" route, shall visually inspect each damper in the rooms listed to ensure the closing path of each damper is not obstructed (see NOTE 2 on route i sheet). i F. Firewatch personnel shall not leave coutes unmanned. All relief shall be by direct face-to-face communication with the person assuming responsibility for the route. follows: Shift relief stations are as

1. Route A - Control Building at AUO sign-in deak'.

2. Route B - Auxiliary Building, elevation 669 at AUO station, j

G. The "A" route firewatch shall check the "drop box", located near the powerblock on elevation 685 of the Turbine Building, once each hour. Copies of new PFBBP and (TFL) permits shall be placed in the ~ route book for monitoring during the next and succeeding routes, H. Firewatch logs and route sheets shall be turned in to the Operations Shift Supervisor for review at the end of the shift. Completed logs and route sheets shall be forwarded through the morning mail to the Operations Supervisor and then to Fire Protection Engineering. 0073L/eoo B 6

e Attachment No Il Sheet F af I 3 loop #/ldentifier SG AI-O SC' - 024 4 j A Rev 4 (- TURBINE BUILDING EL 635 DATE: APPENDIX A CONTROL BUILDING SHIFT: ELEV 732/706/635/669 FIREWATCH: AUXILIARY BUILDING Signature ELEV.734/749/759 Page 1 of 5 / ROVING FIREVATCH CHECXLIST: ROUTE A Ast SS Review: Signature NOTE: Check all breaches for expiration date: if breach is 5 days old. notify Asst Shift Supervisor (11-7 shift only) (1) NOTE: Visually inspect fire damper in wall to ensure that damper will close if released and not be held open by latching device. Inspect each shift and indicate if acceptable by check. If not acceptable, notify SS (2) NOTE: Observe All Areas In Access Routes / To The Listed Areas Below l ( Time Route Started: l l l 1 I I I I i 1~ l LOCATION ELEVATION i Main Control Room 17321 l l l l l [ l l OPS Kitchen 17321 l l l l, l l l _{ ~ OPS Locker Room 17321 l l l l l l l l OPS Clerks Office 17321 l l l l l [ l l OPS Womens Bathroom 17321 l l l l l l [ ] ~ Vital Batt Bd Room I (2) l 17341 l l l l l l l l Vital Batt Bd Room II (2) l 17341 l l l l l l l l Aurillary Control Room (2) I 1734l l l l l l l l J Aurillary Cont Rm 1A (2) l l7341 l l l l l l l l Aurillary Cont Rm IB (2) l 17341 l l l l l l l~ l [ Aurillary Cont Rm 2A (2 l 17341 1 I l l l l l l -{ (1) Reference to CATS 85-409

Attechment No. Il Sheet 6 of 13 Loop 7/ldentifier SCM. css -02& Page 5 OSLA 73 Rev 4 ( APPENDIX A Page 2 of 5 DATE: SHIFT: I I LOCATION ELEVATION l Aurillary Cor.t Rm 2B (2) l 17341 l l-l l l l l l Vital Batt Bd Room III (2) l 1734l I l l I I l l l Vital Batt Bd Room IV (2) l 17341 l l l l l 1 l l l U2 480-V Shutdown Bd Rm 2A1 1734l l l l l l l l l U2 480-V Shutdown Bd Rm 2A2 17341 l l l l l l l l U2 480-V Shutdown Bd Rm 2B1 17341 l l [ t l l 1 l U2 480-V Shutdown Bd R1n 2B2 1734l I l l l l l l l U2 Mechanical Equipment Rm 1734l l l l l l l l l _6.9-kV Shutdown Bd Rm B 17341 l l l l l l ] l U2 Mochanical Equipment Rm 17491 l l l l l l l l U2 480-V Transformer Rm 2A 17491 l l l 1 l I l l U2 480-V Transformer Rm 2B 17491 l l l l l l l l j U2 480-V Board Room 2A 17491 l l l l l l 1 l l U2 480-V Board Room 2B 17491 l l I l l l l _l 125-Vital Batt Room IV 17491 l l l l l l l g _125-Vital Batt Room III 17491 l l l l l l l l 0073L/ coo lf S n

+ 4 Attachme,g N2-U Sh:ct '7 af 13 I b6p #' /ldentifici_SOM-c s s - o 24 ng(g 3 Rev 4 (- APPENDIX A Page 2 of 5 DATE: SHIFT: 4 I LOCATION ELEVATION I l Auxiliary Cont Rm 2B (2) 17341 l I" l l I l I l yltal Batt Bd Room III (2) l 17341 l l l I I I I l yltal Batt Bd Room IV (2) I 17341 l l I I_ l I I l U2 480-V Shutdown Bd Rm 2A1 1 1734l l l I I I I I l U2 480-V Shutdown Bd Rm 2A2 17341 1 1 1 1 1 I l l U2 480-V Shutdown Bd Rm _2,B1 17341 l l I I I I I l U2 480-V Shutdown _Bd Rm 2B2 17341 l l I l l I l l U2 Mechanical Equipment Rm 17341 l l I I l I l j i _6.9-kV Shutdown Bd Rm B 17341 l l l l l I I l U2 Mechanical Equipment _Rm 17491 l l l l l 1 I l U2 480-V Transformer Rm 2A 17491 1 I I I I I l __ l U2 480-V Transformer Rm 2B 17491 l l I I I I I _l U2 480-V Board Room 2A 17491 l l 1 I l l 1 l j U2 480-V Board Room 2B 17491 l l l _ l l 1 l l 125-Vital Batt Room IV 17491 l I l l l I l l 125-Vital Batt Room III 17491 1 I I 1 1 I l l 0073L/ceo i L 4 We

) Attachment N; Il Sheet _ 8 nf B Page 7 Loop #/ldentifier SM -CSS - 024 OSLA 73 i Rev 4 (- Date: i Shift: APPENDIX A Page 3 of 5 ROVING FIREWATCH CHECXLIST: ROUTE A NOTE: Observe All Areas In Access Routes To The Listed Areas Below ~ LOCATION ELEVATION _l 125-Vital Batt Room II 17491 I l 1 ] 1 l l _l 125-Vital Batt Room I 17491 l l l l l l l l U1 480-V Board Room IB 17491 l l l l l l l l U1 480-V Board Room 1A 17491 l l l l l l l l U1 480-V Transformer Room 1A 17491 l I I I i l i l U1 480-V Transformer Room 1B 17491 l l l 1 l 1 l l U1 Mechanical Eaulpment Room 17491 l l l l l l 1 { ~ 125-Vital Batt Room V 1749"l l l l l l l l [ 6.9-kV Shutdown Bd Rm A 17341 ] I ] I l l l l { U1 480-V Shutdown Bd Rm 1B2 17341 l l l l l l l j U1 480-V Shutdown Bd Rm 181 'l7341 l l l l l l l l U1 480-V Shutdown Bd Rm 1A2 17341 l l l l l l l l U1 480-V Shutdown Bd Rm 1A2 17341 l l l l l l l l U1 Mechanical Equipment Room 17341 l l l l l l l l i Refuel Floor: CCS Surge Tanks l7341 l l 1 ] l l l j i Refuel Floor: Note Colling 17341 l l l l l l l l Feverso Osmosis Room 1734l l l I i 1 'l l l

e i a Attachment N!- Ii Sheet 9 of I3 L66p ' /ldeht!fler SOAl-CSS -024 Page 8 OSLA 73 Rev 4 ( Date: Shift: APPENDIX A Page 4 of 5 ROVING FIREWATCH CHECKLIST: ROUTE A NOTE: Observe All Areas In Access Routes To The Listed Areas Below LOCATION ELEVATION l U1 Contcol Rod Drive Equip Rm 17591 l I I l I l l U1 Pze Htr Transformer Rm 17591 l l l l l l l l U1 Upper Cntmt Airlock Pen Rm 17341 l l l l l l l l U2 Upper Cntmt Airlock Pen Rm 1734l l l l l l l l l Emer Gas Treatment F1te Rm 17341 l l l l l l l l Nm U2 Control Rod Drive Eauip Rm 17591 l l l l l l l l U? Pzr Hte Transformer Rm 17591 l l l l l l l l ~ U1 Upper Containment

• 173'41 l

l l l l l l [ U2 Upper Containment

• 1734l l

l l l l l l l '* Applicable only if missile shields are not in place. Otherwise "N/A" and initial and date 0073L/ coo e f 8hED ,y.. ..,.,r

r c Attachment NS-Il Sheet.J.O of l3.,,,

1. cop #/ldentifier SOM - CSS - 024 p g, 9 d

OSLA 73 Rev 4 C - Dato: Shift: APPENDIX A Page 5 of 5 ROVING FIREWATCH CHECKLIST: ROUTE A NOTE: Observe All Areas In Accoss Routes To The Listed Areas Below LOCATION ELEVATION l U1 Mech Eauipment Rm C9-P 16691 I l I l I l l l U1 Mech Eculement Rm C2-P 16691 l l l l l l l l 250-V Battery Room //1 16691 l l l l l l l l 250-V Battery Bd Rm //1 16691 l l l l I l l l l 250-V Battery Bd Rm //2 16691 l 1 l l l l l l i 250-V Battery Room //2 16691 l 1 I l I l l l 24-V & 48-V Battery Rm 16691 l l l l l l l l 24-V & 48-V Batt Bd & Charger Rml6691 l l l l l l 1 l Communications Room 16691 l l 1 l l l l l U2 Auxiliary Instrument Room 16851 l l l l l l l l Computer Room 16851 l l l l 1 l l J U1 Aurillary Instrument Room 16851 l l l l l l l l Control Bldg. Inst. Shop 17061 l l l l 1 1 l l Spreading Room 17061 l 1 l l l l l l Technical Support Centor 17321 l l l l l l l l Relay Room 17321 I l l l 1 l l l Mochanical Equipment Room 17321 l l 1 l l l l l Turbine Blds - Control land _ Station Air Compressors TB 16851 l l l 1 l l l l r ~ U1E Main Steam Valvo Rm Roor 17631 l l l l l l 1 l U2E Main Stoam Valve Rm Roor 17631 l l l 1 l l l Timo Routo Completed 1 I l l I l l l 0073L/eco ~

+ i Attachment No-Il __ Sheet il ^f 13 Loop #/ identifier SG)-Css- 024 Page 10 OSLA 73 Rev 4 APPENDIX B (- ELEV 653/669/690/714 SHIFT: AUX 1LIARY BUILDING DATE: Page 1 of 3 FIREWEATCH: ROVING FIREVATCH CHECKLIST: Signature ROUTE B NOTE: Check all breaches for expiration Ast SS Review: date; if breach is 5 days old, notify Shift Supervisor (11-7 Signature shift only) (1) Reference to CATS 85-409 NOTE: Observe All Areas In Access Routes To The Listed Areas Below Time Route Started: l l l 1 l l l I I LOCATION ELEVATION l U2 Aux Bldg Supply Air Fan Rm l 714l l I l I l l l l U2 AB Supply Air Intake Filter Rml 714l l l l l i 1 1 l U2 West Main Steam Valve Rm l 7141 I l l I l l l l U2 Ventilation & Purge Rm l 714l l l l l l l l l ) Aux Bldg Gas Trtmt Rm B-B l 714l l l l l l l l k U2 Additional Equipment Bldg l 7061 l l l l l 1 l l U1 Additional Equipment Bldg l 7061 l l l l l 1 l l Aur Blda Gas Tetmt Rm A-A I 7141 l l l l l l l l Ul West Main Steam Valve Rm l 714l l l l l 1 l l l U1 Ventilation & Purge Rm l 7141 l l l l l l l l U1 Aux Bldg Supply Air Fan Rm I 7141 l l [ l l _l 1 l U1 AB Supply Air Intake Filter Rml 7141 l l l l l l l _g Conoral Corridors (All) ! 7141 l l l l l l l Aux Bldg-Cntl. Bldg Wall (0-11ne)l 7141 l l l l l l l l U2 Penetration Rm l 6901 l l l l l l l g U2 VCT Rm Entrance 1 6901 l l l l l l l j _U2 CVCS Valve Gallery (A12/T) 1 6901 l l l l l l l j U2 AFW Pump Area l 6901 l l l l l l l l

e I Attochment No 11 ___ sheet iZ nf 13 1.oop W/ldentifierDAl-C SS - 014 i Page 11 OSLA 73 Rev 4 APPENDIX B Page 2 of 3 DATE: SHIFT: ROVING FIREWATCH CHECKLIST: ROUTE B ~ NOTE: Observe All Areas In Access Routes To The Listed Areas Below l LOCATION ELEVATION I l U2 RHR HTX Rm 2B l 6901 l l l l 1 l l l U2 RHR HTX Rm 2A l 6901 l l l l l l l U2 Pipe Chase _l 1 6901 1 l l l l U1 Pipe Chase l l l I 1 6901_ l l I l l l U1 RHR HTX Rm 1A I 6901 1 I l l i l l l U1 RHR HTX Rm 18 l 6901 l l l l l l l l -(!1AFWPumpAre's 1 6901 1 l l l l l l J U1_CVCS Valve Gallery (A4/T) l 6901 1 l l l l l l } _U1 Penetration Room l 690'l l l l l l l l l _U1 VCT Room Entrance 1 6901 l l l l l l l j Component Cooling Wtr Pmp Area 1 6901 1 l l 1 1 l ] l b dio Chem Lab-Counting Rm l'6901 l l l 1 l 1 l l .r..n General Corridor Area (All) l 6901 l i 1 I l l l l Gtneral Corridor Area (West of W)l 6691 I l l l l l l [ AFW Terry Turbine 2A-S l 6691 l 1 1 I l l l l _U2 Penetration Room / Pipe Chase 1 6691 l l l 1 l l 1 j Centrifugal Charging Pump 2A l 6691 l l l l l l l _l Centrifur.a1 Charr.ing Pump 2B l 6691 _l l 1 l 1 l _g Positive Displacement Pump 2C l 6691 _ l l l l l l l d Hot Tool Rm A31 Near AUO Sta f 6691 I l l l 1 l l J PM e Displacement Pump IC l 6691 l I l l I I I l l C1Itt.titur.a1 CharrInr Pump 1B 1 6691 1 l 1 1 I l l l \\

~ Attrehment N: Il sheet 13 mf 13 Coop #/fdentifier_SGAl -CSS - 02A Page 12 OSLA 73 Rev 4 ( APPENDIX B ~ Page 3 of 3 DATE: SHIFT: ^ ROVING FIREVATCH CHECKLIST: ROUTE B NOTE: Observe All Areas In Access Routes To The Listed Areas Below l --e., l LOCATION ELEVATIO!! l Centrifugal Charging Pump 1A l 6691 1 I l l l l l l U1 Penetration Room / Pipe Chese l 6691 l l l l l l l l AFV Terry Turbine IA-S l 6691 l l l l l l l l U2 Pipe Chase ! 6531 l l l l l l l l l U1 Pipe Chase 1 6531 l l I l l l l l RHR Pump Room IB l 6531 l l l l l l l l RHR Pump Room 1A l 6531 l l l l l l l l ~ RHR Pump Room 2A l'6531 l l 1 l l l l l RHR Pump Room 2B l 6531 l l l l l l l l General Corridor Area l 6531 l l l l l __ l 'l U1 ERCV Pipe Tunnel Temp

• l 6691 l

l l l l l l l U1 690 Pipe Chase Temp

• l 6691 l

l l l l l l l ~ U2 690 Pipe Chase Temp I 6691 l l l l l l l l Time Route Completed l I l l l l l l l NOTE:

• Iem.odiatoly notify Shift Supervisor Ast SS, or UO upon indication of rapid rise in temperature or of temporature in excess of 1300F Instrument failure also requires immediate notification.

0073L/eeo t %}}