ML20150C224
| ML20150C224 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Hatch  |
| Issue date: | 03/12/1988 |
| From: | Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20150C217 | List: |
| References | |
| TAC-66947, NUDOCS 8803180076 | |
| Download: ML20150C224 (4) | |
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4r UNITED STATES
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'*I NUCLE AR REGULATORY COMMISSION j
.i WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555 e
SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION SUPPORTING APENDMENT NO. 91 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NPF-5 GEORGIA POWER COPPANY OGLETHORPE POWER CORPORATION MUNICIPAL ELECTRIC AUTHORITY OF TEORGIA CITY OF DALTON, GEORGIA EDWIN I. HATCH NUCLEAR PLANT. UNIT ?
DOCKET NO. 50-366 INTRODUCTION By letter dated January 4,1988 (Reference 1), Georgia Power Company (the licensee) requested changes to the Technical Specifications (TS) for the Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant, Unit 2, to pennit hydrostatic and system leak testing using non-nuclear heat.
Until the start-up of the Edwic. I. Hatch, Unit 1, reactor in June 1987 at the end of that plant's tenth refueling outace, the licensee historicclly had used nuclear heat for performing the required hydrostatic and leak testing at both Units 1 and 2.
However, the staff informed the licensee on April 10, 1987 (Reference 2) that the required ASPE,Section XI system hydrostatic and leakage tests must be performed with the reactor non-critical, i.e., using non-nuclear heat.
In order to accom-modate this requirement for the hydrostatic and leak testing of Unit 1, the Coninission issued Amendment No.137 to the Hatch, Unit 1, license on May 26, 1987 (Reference 3) revising certain TS requirements. The changes to the Hatch, Unit 2. TS now proposed by the licensee (Reference 11 would make changes to the Unit ? TS comparable to those TS changes previously approved for Unit 1.
The changes requested by the licensee are as follows:
1.
A footnote would be:.added to TS Table 1.2 to allow the reactor to be considered as being in a COLD SHUTDOWN condition during tht perfontance of hydrostatic and leak testing even though the reactor coolant temperature is above 212'F. This proposed change effectively provides an exception to operability recuirements for the High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) syste.n the Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) system, the Automatic Depressurization System (ADS), and the Safety / Relief Valve (5/RV) system.
as well as to the requirement for primary containment integrity, during the conduct of the hydrostatic and leak tests when the reactor coolant temper-ature is greater than 212*F.
2.
Footnotes would be added to TS Table 3.3.2-1 and to Sections 3.6.5.1, 3.6.5.2 and 3.6.6.1 requirir.g the integrity of secondary containment and the operability of the Standby Gas Treatment (SBGT) system during the performance of hydrostatic and leak testing when the reactor coolant temperature is above 212'F.
8803180076 800312 PDR ADOCK 05000366 P
. 3.
TS Section 3.7.1.1 would be modified to reouire operability of the Pesidual Heat Removal Service Water (RHRSW) system during the hydrostatic and leak testing when the reactor coolant is abeve 212*F. An Action Statement also would be added to cover the RHPSW system during the per-formance of the testing.
EVALUATION Each of the requested changes is evaluated separately below.
1.
Exception to operability requirements for HPCI, RCIC, ADS and S/RV systems and to the recuirement to maintain primary system integrity.
When performing the hydrostatic and leak tests using non-nuclear heat, the primarv system will be water-solid with no steam available to drive the HPCI and RCIC turbines.
These systems, therefore, cannot physically be operable during the conduct of the tests.
In addition, performance of the hydrostatic testing reouires test pressures greater than the lift pressures of the S/RVs and ADS so that these valves must be gage d to prevent their opening during the test.
Finally, to allow frequent and unimpeded access to potential leakage points inside containment during the tests, relief is necessary to the equire-ment to maintain primary containment integrity.
The present TS requirements for operability of the HPCI, RCIC, ADS and S/RV systems are to ensure the capability for makeup of reactor vessel water in-ventory for decay heat removal in the event of a small leak with concurrent loss nf feedwater capability and the main condenser unavailable.
During hydrostatic and leak testing, control rods are fully inserted, the decay heat level is low following a refueling outage, and the reactor is maintained at or near cold shutdown conditions. Therefore, the intended function of the systems is not required when the hydrostatic and leak tests are being performed.
On this basis, the staff concludes that the proposed change to the TS which will eliminate the requirements for system operability during testing when the reactor ecolant temperature is in excess of 212*F is acceptable.
The use of non-nuclear heating to perform the hydrostatic and leak tests in-volves a non-critical core, water-solid conditions, low temperatures and low fuel decay heat uluesc Under these conditions, primary containment integrity is not required since the secondary containment will be operable (in accordance with proposed change 2) and capable of handling any airborne radiation or steam leaks that could occur. Under the test conditions, the potential for failed fuel and subsequent increase in coolant activity levels is mitigated and the amount of stored energy in the primary system is small. Under these conditions, the secondary containment and use of the SBGT system are sufficient to adequately limit radioactive releases to the environment. On the basis of the expected minimal consequences of a potential release under the proposed test conditions, the staff concludes that primary containment integrity need not be maintained during the tests.
. 2.
Added recuirement that secondary containment integrity and operability of the SBGT system be maintained during the hydrostatic and leak tests.
Proposed change I would allow primary containment integrity to be violated during the tests in order to provide for unimpeded access to observe potential leakage points inside containment. As discussed above, maintenance of secondary containnv!nt irtegrity and operability of the SBGT system are both necessary and sufficient to adeouately limit radioactive releases to the environment resulting from reactor coolant system leaks that could potentially occur during the hydrostatic and leak tests.
On this basis, the staff con-cludes that the proposed changes requiring maintenance of secondary containment integrity and operability of the SBGT system are acceptable.
3.
Requirement that the RHRSW system be operable during the hydrostatic and leak tests.
The modifications to the definitions of HOT SHUTDOWN and COLD SHUTDOWN as the result of proposed change 1, above, would result in the RHRSW system not being required to be operable when performing the hydrostatic and leak tests at reactor coolant temperaturn gra ter than 212*F.
However, operability of at least one train of the RhdSW systs with one pump is necessary to ensure sufficient cooling capacity for cor.Pinued operation of the low pressure cooling systems. The changes proposed by th' licensee ensure that at least a minimum RPRSW capability will be maintained a cing conduct of the hydrostatic and leak tests. The staff therefore concludes that this proposed change is acceptable.
ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATIONS The amendment involves a change in use of facility components within the restricted area as defined in 10 CFR Part 20.
The staff has determined that the amendment involves no significant increase in the amounts, and no significant change in the types, of any effluents that may be released offsite, and that there is no significant increase in individual or i
cumulative occuoational radiatiun exposure.
The Commission has previously issued a propoled finding that the amendment involves no significant hazards consideration and there has been no public coment on such dinding.
Accordingly, the amendment meets the eligibility criteria for categorical exclusion set fotth in ;10 CFR 51,22(c)(9).
Pursuant to 10 CFo 51.22(b), no environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be prepared in connection with the issuance n' the amendment.
CONCLUSION The Conanission made a proposed determination that the amendment involves no sionificant hazards consideration which was published in the Federal Register (53 FR 3955) on February 10, 1988, and consulted with the state of Georgia.
No public cocments were received, and the state of Georgia did not have any cocrents.
P
. We have concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that: (1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, and (2) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations, and the issuance of the amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.
REFERENCES 1.
Letter from J. P. O'Reilly, Georgia Power Company, to V. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, dated January 4,1988.
2.
Letter from J. H. Sniezek, USNRC, to J. P. O'Reilly, Georgia Power Comoany, dated April 10, 1987 3.
Letter from L. P. Crocker, USNRC, to J. P. O'Reilly, Georgia Power Company, dated May 26, 1987.
Principal Contributor: Lawrence P. Crocker, PDII-3/DRPI/11 Dated:
March 12, 1988 i
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