ML20148Q372
| ML20148Q372 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 03/31/1988 |
| From: | NRC |
| To: | |
| References | |
| REF-10CFR9.7 NUDOCS 8804120430 | |
| Download: ML20148Q372 (87) | |
Text
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?-
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA -
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
Title:
BRIEFING ON HIGH PRIORITY AEOD ISSUES
--PUBLIC MEETING--
LocatlOn: Washington, D.C.
Date: Thursday, March 31, 1988
(
Pages: 1 - 57 Ann Riley & Associates Court Reporters 1625 l Street, N.W., Suite 921 Washington, D.C. 20006 (202) 293-3950 8804120430 080331 PDR 10CFR PT9,7 PDR
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1 D 1 SCLA 1 MER 2
3 4 .
5 6 This is an unofficial transcript of a meeting of the 7 United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission held on e March 3.1, 1988 in the Commission's office at 17 r7 H S t r ee t ,
9 'N . tJ . , LJa s h i ng t on , D.C. The meeting was open to public 10 attendance and observation. This transcript has not been 11 reviewed, corrected, or edited, and it may contain
'f '
g 12 jnaccuracles.
13 The transcript is intended solely for general 14 informational purposes. As provided by 10 CFR 9.103, it is 15 not part of the formal or informal record of decision of the 16 matters discussed. Expressions of opinion in this transcript 17 do not necessarily reflect final determination or beliefs. No 18 pleading or other paper may be filed with the Commission in 19 any proceeding as the result of or addressed to any statement 20 or argument contained herein, except as the Ccemission may .
21 authorize.
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t 1 Staff and presenters seated at table:
2 3 S. CHILK -
SECY 4 G. SJOBLOM 5 T. !!OVAK 6 E. JORDAll 7 V. STELLO -
EDO 8 W. M I ll!iE R S 9 E. ROSSI 10 W. PARLER - OGC 11 12 Audience bgeakers:
13 14 E. BROWii 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25
. _ _ _ . . - ~ - - -- .- . . .- -. . . . = ._ -.
s .
, 3 !
t 3 1 P R O C EED I NG S i
- 2. CHAIRMAN ZECH: Good afternoon, ladies and i 3 gentlemen. On the 10th of September last year, we were f i
j 4 briefed by the Office of Analysis and Evaluation of 5 Operational Data, AEOD, concerning their activities and "r
{
i 6 how the results of their studies are integrated. into the 7 regulatlry precets. i s
8 We alvo heard about actions that AEOD was taking
, I 9 to en*;anca the integration of AEOD preducts into the !
?O regulatori process. t
. -t la Tod3y's information briefing by the Executive 12 Director for Oparatior.s of AEOD is intended to update the
, l i
13 C.).smission concerfing the AEOD activities since our last !
14 briefing, sud to 3.nform the Commission of agency actions t
i 15 and high pri9?ity AEOD recommendations.
16 Jurir,p the briefing today, I'd like the staff to !
i 17 include some discussior, of *he results of their. efforts to l
l enhance t'n e f3tegration of AEOD products into the 18 l l
19 regulctory procesci This iz what we emphasized the last '
20 time, and we want to talk abbut that today, not just tha 21 status report of what AEOD 14 doins, 1
l 22 l'd also dpptseiate a briet description of how l l
l 23 the staff is nandling what we discussed last time an i i
.l 24 lower priority AEOD suqCustions as opposed ta i !
) 25 recommendations, u
I
_ ~ - --- _ _ __ _ __ ,__ . . . , _ , , - . .. . . . . . .__ , _ , - _. _ _ , _ _i
s e 4 1 I understand the copies of the slides that we are 2 going to use today are available in the back of the room.
3 Do any of my fellow Commissioners have any 4 comments before we begin?
5 (No response.]
6 CHAIRMAN ZECH: If not, then Mr. Stello would you 7 proceed, please.
8 MR. STELLO: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. We're 9 prepared to give you both the status report as well as to 10 answer the specific question following the recommendations 11 of AEOD through the process.
12 There's one additional issue that's going to be 13 in the briefing that I think is first time that I believe 14 is an important part of our responsibilities and that's to 15 examine data to determine to what extent and to what 16 degree we are accomylishing the very purpose for which we 17 exist, which is the safety of operating plants.
18 We have been looking at the data and have pulled 19 together some data wh:.ch in my view start to demonstrate l l
20 that the process is working, and based on performance, we 21 see trends that in our view clearly suggest the plants 1 1
22 indeed are safer. I think we would be disappointed if i
23 that were not the case. ,
l 24 I think this is a particular area we've not spent i
25 enough time looking at and one through which I believe is l l
I I
s .
5 4 4 f
1 perhaps the most important performance 'ndicator in that i r
j 2 it gives, if you will, a report' card on the-agency, how ,
I 3 well we're doing and are not, and we are going to be 4 prepared to answer all the questions that relate to that.
! 5 I think.we want to present you at least with some 6 data that starts to show that the process is working and 7 plants indeed are getting safer. And with that I hope we 8 will be able to some day be able to present.the data in a 9 comprehensive way that shows the overall performance of 10 plants that are improving becanIs I think the link between 11 safety, reliability, availability and capacity are very, 12 very strongly coupled and tied together, and in that j 13 context. I think as we develop more and more data and
] 14 understanding, hopefully we'll develop the kind of 15 indicators that show that. '
16 I'll ask Mr. Jordan to start the briefing and to l
.; 17 begin with introducing the others at the table with your 18 permission.
i 19 CHAIRMAN ZECH: All right. Thank you very much.
20 Mr. Jordan, you may proceed.
21 HR. JORDAN: Thank you. Tom Novak is here as 22 Director of the Division of Safety Studies from AEOD and ;
I l i 23 he'll be giving a large part of the presentation for AEOD. l
- 24 Ernie Rossi is here as Director of the Division 25 of Operational Events Assessment to respond to issues I
6 s
1 regarding NRR and to explain the NRR activities related to 2 those most significant of our recommendations; and Warren 3 Minners from Research is here, Deputy Director, Division 4 of Reactor and Plant Systems.
5 Glen Sjoblem is the Deputy Director of Division 6 of Fuel Cycle / Medical, Academic and Commercial Use and 7 he's sitting back here. So the questions related to MMSS, 8 he'll be prepared to answer those and we have staff 9 support if we get into details that these people can't 10 handle.
11 In the previous meeting in September, the 12 Commission asked AEOD how we handle suggestions and also 13 asked the Program Offices how suggestions were handled.
14 Those questions were responded to in the SECY 88-12 for 15 AEOD and 88-13 for the Program Offices respectively all on i
16 January 13 of this year, 17 And I would just briefly summarize and say with 18 regards to AEOD, the suggestions that are contained in 19 engineering studies or other documents are reviewed by the 20 Division Director, the Director of Safety Studies, and so 1
21 he then may upgrade or downgrade the suggestions and those 1 22 documents are issued under his signature.
23 There is a process of review within the office so 24 that as the study is maturing, presentations are given by 25 the staff and t h e ?'e ' s an interaction along the way. But I
s 7
I wanted to clarify how suggestions within the office are 2 handled.
3 Recommendations are issued under my signature to 4 the other program offices. And not trying to speak for 5 the other offices, but to summarize the responses, the 6 other offices each have procedures for responding to 7 recommendations that AEOD provides, and those procedures 8 we feel are coherent and functional.
9 NRR has within their procedures a process for 10 reviewing suggestions. They did not respond to AEOD but 11 they track suggestions, assign them to individuals and 12 follow-up on them. And that's a relatively recent 13 procedural change, a formalization.
14 And so there is a second chance on suggestions 15 that AEOD provides. There was also a question asked about i
16 priorization of generic issues'and we deferred that to the '
1 17 subsequent meeting to the Commission by Research, so I l 18 think that issue was covered.
19 In terms of the enhancements that we discussed in 20 September, we will mention examples within the priority 1 21 issues as we go along, but I would like to make a few l
22 comments about that, j
l 23 AEOD has assumed an advocacy role in the 24 follow-up of these higher priority issues, and I think 25 probably one of our strongest methods is by sending the .
l l
8 ;
f i
I 1 AEOD expert in the given area such as an air system ,
2 problem to assist the region in an inspection where they 3 have a plant with an air system problem to work with NRR 4 when there is an air system problem.
l 5 So that when the study has been developed, we 3
6 don't just terminate our interest, we provide the expert 7 and then he feeds it back into the system.
8 We've also had those SARC feedback efforts with !
i 9 industry as well so that we communicate through INPO or !
4 10 other organizations through meetings with the industry
.l ,
j 11 directly and by transmitting the studies themselves ;
l i 12 targeted to the utilities within a given population group, '
[
I 13 such as new plants. !
14 And certainly it's because of our view that until I l
15 the plant has physically changed, that is the training is l
\
16 changed for the people, the procedures are changed, or the '
17 equipment is in some way altered, that is modified,
- 18 replaced, there's not really a change in the plant safety.
4 j 19 So our goal is to get it all the way to the plant.
1 20 The areas that I plan to cover -- could I.have l 21 the first slide, please.
! 22 (Slide.]
1 23 MR. JORDAN: --
will briefly touch on the
- 24 organization of resources and the sources of experience.
T l l 25 The trends in operating experience, that's the good news l 4
o 4
1 slides in this package, Tom will go through the reports 2 that we have issued recently and then discuss I think the 3 mesty part which is the priority issues, the status of 4 those and interact with both Warren and with Ernie. And 5 then we'll describe to you ongoing studies that we have.
.6 Could I have the next slide, please.
7 [ Slide.)
8 MR. JORDAN: The only point with the 9 organizational slide is to identify the recommendations, 10 and suggestions that may generally come out of four 11 branches: The Diagnostic Evaluation Branch, the 12 Operations Analysis Branch. Trends in Patterns, and the 13 non-Reactor Assessment staff.
14 So that constitutes the portion of AEOD that's 15 involved in analysis / evaluation of operational data. Next 16 slide, please.
17 (Slide.)
i 18 HR. JORDAN: The programs within each of those I l
19 branches that then contributes those recommendations and 20 suggestions are first in the Diagnostic Branch, the i
21 diagnostic evaluations themselves and the incident 22 investigation team inspections.
23 And the example for the diagnostic evaluation 24 would be the Dresden diagnostic review that was done and 25 the recommendations that were then transmitted to the
10 1 Program Office and for the Region to use in further review 2 of the Dresden Station.
3 In the Trends in Patterns Analysis Branch, the 4 products there are lessons learned from trends in pattern 5 for instance, like the new plant studies.
6 The Operations Analysis Branch, that's generally 7 where the case studies, engineering evaluations and 8 special reports are performed. And I would identify the 9 air systems study, the decay heat removal study as being 10 typical examples.
11 In the non-Reactor Assessment, case studies and 12 engineering evaluations such as in misadministrations and 13 the radiography review.
14 (Slide.]
15 MR. JORDA!!: The resources that are applied to 16 these areas, a staff of about 44 are applied, distributed 17 about half of those -- half of the total resource I should 18 say, contractor and staff in the operational data 19 analysis, about a quarter in the data collection and 20 dissemination, and the next large fraction is the 21 dianostic with the performance indicators and incident 22 investigation following behind. i 1
l 23 !!ex t slide, please.
24 (Slide.)
25 MR. JORDAll: The sources of operating experience, 1
l 11 1 you've seen a similar presentation. The object is that 2 there is an awful lot of material and material that is 3 sifted carefully and resifted.
1 i 4- For instance, the telephone notifications, 5 licensee event reports, and Regional data reports, many of 6 those are on the same event. They're not additive but 7 those are different events.
8 The foreign events of course are unique and we 9 examine those, have a responsibility for the Agency, for 10 reviewing those.
11 We're doing more in the way of reviewing i 12 inspection reports to try to pull out of those issues that 13 we may not get from the normal events. And we're also 14 doing more in the way of AIT reports and the NPRDS data.
15 And I probably should have added that there is 16 direct on-site follow-up through participation in AITs o r-17 in special studies. Next slide, please.
18 (Slide.)
19 HR. JORDAN: And tr.is is the good news section.
20 We're looking at in addition to individual plant 21 performance through the performance indicators the same 22 sorts of data but on an overall, an average basis for 23 industry. l l
24 We look at it by functional areas and ue do see l
25 some positive trends that we would like to communicate to l
t
b 12 1 you. These trer.ds we believe are in fact indicating 2 improvements in overall plant safety and we feel that the 3 basis for these improvements is the combination of the 4 industry programs, the trip reduction program, the INPO 5 monitoring reviews, and the NRC inspection and monitoring 6 programs. The next slide, please.
7 (Slide.)
8 MR. JORDAN: We have two sets of trend slides and 9 I'll only talk about the first set. And the point between 10 the two sets is the first set is all plants for the years 11 1984 through '87. That is what we termed as new plants, 12 and the shutdown plants are grouped within this all plants 13 list.
J 14 The next set excludes the shutdown plants and the 15 point is that it does not affect the trend itself, it 16 affects the slopes a bit but not significantly. So it's 17 sufficient to merely look at all plants.
18 We clearly see that the automatic scrams are i 19 declining; safety system actuations are declining, that is 20 the rates of those which is an improvement; significant 21 events have reduced; safety system failures, there is a 22 change in our screening criteria for 1987 and a change in 23 the systems involved so that this one is not as clear but 24 we've extracted the change --
the larger part of the 25 change in 1987 and it does appear there is an improvement. ,
i
13 1 (Slide.)
2 MR. JORDAN: Perhaps the point disappointment is 3 for forced outage rate, there is not a positive change.
4 That's one that I caused you to switch a couple of pages, i 5 to your Page 10. And that one is affected by taking out 6 the shutdown plants so that it's flat. Not an improving 7 trend, but a flat trend.
8 The equipment forced outages is essentially flat, i
9 radiation exposure is clearly improving, and then the last 10 one which is not one of our performance indicators is the i
11 accident sequence precursor. This is a relative measure 12 and it is looking at the set of precursor data that was l 1
13 extracted by a contractor, and over a consistent basis 14 does show an improvement. i i
l 15 COMMISSIONER CARR: Well, that explains the '
16 language, that would be what it is if we hadn't changed i
l 17 the recording of the requirements? '
18 MR. JORDAN: The black is if we hadn't changed I
19 the reporting requirement and the hatch is the result of i
20 having added requirements.
21 Now I'd have to say that one is fussier though.
22 We have done some changes th the data system, and I 23 showed an article out of the East to Vic Stello just 24 before the meeting that was critical of the FAA's 25 statistics on safety, and I certainly would not want this
. f
14 1 agency to get in the same kind of flap.
2 So we have a consistent basis for all of these 3 characteristics except for the safety system failures 4 during these years, and in order to track this data we 5 will have to continue with the same basis, the same 6 definitions to see how the trends continue.
7 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL: I just point out that 8 since 1984, the number of operating plants in this country 9 has oh probably gone up from around 70 to 105 or so today.
10 Of course the general public doesn't realize that, so 11 unless you've improved proportionally at least, you still 12 don't look any better than you did four years ago, i 13 In other words, you've got to keep improving as 14 the number of plants goes up because I don't think the i 15 public pays much attention.
16 COMMISSIONER ROBERTS: These are averages?
17 MR. JORDAN: Yes, sir, these are average. These 18 are average numbers.
I i 19 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL: Oh, these are all per 1
20 plant.
21 MR. STELLO: Per plant.
l l
22 MR. JORDAN: Average per plant. l 23 COH!!I S S IONER BERNTHAL: I know it, but that's
, 24 okay. I'm saying if you add up every plant you're still 25 ending up with the same picture to the public: You have
15 ;
- 1 the same number of significant events because you've got ;
2 more plants. ,
3 CHAIRMAN ZECH: No, that isn't the way I read it.-
i 4 But perhaps it should be explained.
[ 5 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL: That's the average per 1
6 plant because you've got more plants.
7 MR. JORDAN: I understand.
8 CHAIRMAN ZECH: But the trend is what we're ,
9 looking at I think, and the trend shows that significant 10 events for example have decreased.
11 MR. JORDAN: Per plant. :
- 12 CHAIRMAN ZECH
- Per plant. ;
I i 13 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL: Per plant, but we've got 14 more plants.
[
15 MR. NOVAK I think Commissioner Bernthal's point 16 is, for example in 1984 you may have had 500 reactor 17 trips, in 1987 you had 500 reactor trips. We see that as
.; 18 a declining trend per plant but the public would say you 19 still have as many trips out there today as you had in 20 1984. That's a perception problem, I agree.
)
j 21 COMMISSIONER BER'NTHAL: Because t h e, don't know I
j 22 how many plants we got, j i 23 CHAIRMAN ZECH: Well, it certainly needs some 1
j 24 more explaination, perhaps, but the conclusion you draw is I l 25 that it's an improving condition of operation.'
1
16 1 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL: On a plant by plant 2 basis.
3 CHAIRMAN ZECH: On a plant by plant basis.
4 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL: That's right.
5 HR. JORDAN: And the staff has been cautious not 6 to come to you with questionable trends. We feel this is 7 a real trend.
i 8 CHAIRMAN ZECH: Sure.
9 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL: No, it's commendable. I 10 draw tae analogy to the airline industry. If we had the 11 same accident rate today as we did in the 60s, nobody 12 would fly airplanes because we got so many more flights.
13 That's really what the analogy is.
14 HR. JORDAN: All right, sir. Then with that, I 15 would go into the next portion of the presentation and ask 16 Tom Novak to pick up on your Slide 11.
17 HR. NOVAK: Okay. Hay I have Slide 11.
18 (Slide.)
19 HR. NOVAK: Thank you. The first four items I'm 20 going to' discuss separately later on in the presentation, 21 they are the priority issues.
22 What I thought I would do is just pick two more 23 and give you a feeling for the breath and the type of 24 studies that we are doing, 25 For example, there is one midway down, s
. - . , . _ . . _ . . - - _ _ , . - - , _. . _ _ , . . , _ _ , _. _ . . , _ , .~
17 1 operational experience feedback on main feedwater flov 2 control and bypass valves and valve operators.
3 I bring this one up because we did this study '
4 using NPRDS data. It was the first comprehensive review 5 of trying to understand balance of plant performancu, 6 what's contributing to the initiating transients coming 7 from balance of plant.
8 We looked and we say that feedwater control l 9 valves and bypass valves were major contributors. Now 10 that kind of background we got from the LEX database, but i
11 what was going on with those components we felt we could 12 better learn by going into ALIDS.
13 We've spent quite a bit of time developing that 14 study. It's going to end up as being what I would call a 15 good practice document. It's going to show that 16 maintenance and not necessarily model design of flow 1
17 control valves is the predominent cause for failures.
18 It also told us a lot about the NPRD database 19 where it needs to be improved, the weaknesses. It's 20 really the only way you can use it. And so this kind of 21 study now we plan to share with all licensees, provide 22 this so that they can see what we consider to be good l
23 practices with regard to maintenance that motor operate )
24 valves and bypass valves, l
i 25 We have a similar study underway on feedwater l l
)
18 1 pumps just so that we can put that whole balance of plant 2 study together under NPRDS.
3 COMMISSIONER SERNTHAL: I'm sorry. Did somebody 4 comment on the forced outage rate? I thought I did hear a 5 comment. '
6 HR. JORDAN: Yes, sir. That there is not a 7 perceptible change.
8 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL: Yes, it certainly hasn't 9 gotten any better. In that because of DQ work ana other I 10 things that --
no, that's forced outage.
11 HR. JORDAN: I don't have an explanation.
12 COMMISSIONER CARRt Poor maintenance.
13 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL: It's catching up.
14 HR. STELLO: No, I think the overall maintenance 15 of the plants has not been done as well and you are not i
16 seeing the improvement in doing better maintenance, 17 although the numbers do show a very, very small downward i
18 trend, not enough to make a difference.
1 19 CHAIRMAN ZECH: Well, it certainly shows we 20 se:ald emphasize maintenance. i 21 HR. STELLO: Yes.
l 22 HR. JORDAN: Yes.
23 CHAIRMAN SECH: Yes. '
l 24 HR. JORDAN: I think that's the right thing. The 25 equipment forced outages and the forced outage rate which 1 I
19 1 is slightly different, neither show a positive improvement 2 and the equipment forced outages for per 1000 critical
! 3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> is a maintenance indicator so to speak.
I
- 4 And so I guess I must say I'm a bit surprised l
5 that with the other indicators showing improvements which ;
6 are related to maintenance, that the actual availability 7 or forced outage rate hasn't also responded as yet.
8 CHAIRMAN ZECH: dell, it tells you one other 9 thing, that there's room for more improvement.
1 i
j 10 MR. JORDAN: Yes, sir.
11 MR. STELLO: And I would think that there might 12 be one other point that most of the indicators that show 13 the trends are the important safety systems f)r which we 14 pay a great deal of attention to, and you can sea the 15 improvement there where a great deal of ;he outages are a 16 balance of plan for which we have not -- '
l 17 CHAIRMAN ZECH: That's a good point.
18 HR. STELLO: I think we are beginning to and it 19 will just take time.
20 CHAIRMAN ZECH: To focus more on balance of plan.
21 HR. STELLO: That's right.
22 CHAIRMAN ZECH: Which is the maintenance and i 23 other things, but certainly as you point out that the 24 trends are generally an improving condition, but there are 25 a couple, forced outages is one of them, which indicates
20' e
1 there's more room for improvement and certainly 2 maintenance perhaps is a contributing factor there.
3 MR. STELLO: I think it's a key.
4 CHAIRMAN ZECH: Yes.
5 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL: What would the Japanese 6 numbers be there?
7 MR. JORDAN: Their forced outage rate --
8 MR. STELLO: One indicator is the average plant 9 availability capacity. Japan this year I think is 76 10 percent and ours is about 56.
11 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL: Well, I think by capacity 12 it's 76, availability for that --
well, okay. You got to 13 be careful with those.
14 MR. STELLO: Same either way. About 20 15 percentage points different.
16 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL: Outside the mandatory 17 shutdown would really be the question.
18 COMMISSIONER CARR: I'd predict their force 19 outage rate is flat, too.
20 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL: Yes, but I think it's 21 probably flatter by 2 percent.
22 COMMISSIONER CARR: It's flat at a higher place.
23 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL: It's probably flat at 24 about 2 percent.
25 MR. STELLO: I don't know what the number is, but
21 1 I suspect it's substantially lower.
2 -CHAIRMAN ZECH: All right. Let's proceed.
3 MR. NOVAK: Okay. Let me just point out one more 4 before I move off this slide. The fourth one, which is 5 the depressurization of reactor coolant systems at PWR.
6 What prompted us to look at this was an event at 7 Salem in August of 1986 which was predominantly an event 8 having to do with the electrical system; however, our 9 staff, when they looked at it, saw some configurations 1 i
10 with regard to the ability to depressurize. :
1 11 What we did then was look very carefully at the i
12 circumstances involved with the operation of that plant '
13 because had the event been triggered from a loss of i
14 off-site power or a steam generator tube and the ability 1
15 to depressurize which is necessary following those events, 16 we saw a configuration at the plant at that time which 17 would have made it very difficult for the operators to 18 depressurize non-safety related equipment out of service.
19 So that study then came up with suggestions to 20 NRR and I'll ask Dr. Ross'i to follow-up on that. '
21 But our bottom line was we felt that there was a 22 message there for better operations of the Salem plant 23 with regard to systems necessary for pressure control and 24 so forth.
25 MR. ROSSI: Yes, we took that suggestion from the
22 !
l l
1 AEOD engineering evaluation and we combined it with 2 another event that demonstrated the importance of 3 maintaining the capability to control or depressurize the 4 reactor coolant system in emergencies, and we issued 5 Information Notice No. 8760 on depressurization of reactor 6 coolant systems in p?.essurized water reactors, and that 7 was issued in December of 1987 and is indeed an example of 8 where we took an AEOD suggestion and then worked with AEOD 9 to expand it into a lesson that could be sent to the 10 industry via an information notice.
1 11 MR. NOVAK: Hey I have the~next slide, please.
12 (Slide.]
13 CHAIRMAN ZECH: Let me make just one comment 1
14 before you go off this slide on your NUREG 1275, Volume II i i
l 15 which I think was a very excellent effort on the part of l
16 AEOD on operating experience feedback report air systems {
17 problems, and we all know that air systems is something 18 that has caused problems in the past but probably has not 19 had the emphasis that it should have had. I think this is 20 a valuable report and I hope it too is being worked into 21 the regulatory system.
22 Could anybody comment on that?
23 MR. NOVAK: And we will.when we get to it.
24 MR. JORDAN: At length.
25 CHAIRMAN ZECH: All right. Good.
33 1 MR. NOVAK: Let me have the fourth study slide.
2 (Slide.]
3 MR. NOVAK: Again 'here is a variety of studies.
4 Let me just pick one again and talk about it briefly. The 5 fifth item down, pressurizer code safety valve 6 reliability.
7 I bring this up only to show the kind of spread.
8 We look at all of the licensing event reports and what we 9 see is that pressurizer code safeties are lifting both 10 above and below their nominal set points, but outside of 11 the. range.
12 That was a concern to us because some of them are 13 lifting as far as.20 percent above their set point. And 14 what we did then was continue to watch that recognizing 15 that there are things regarding set point drift and 16 leakage and misadjustment of ring _ settings.
17 The bottom line is this is a study from which we 18 expect now to grow. We think there's more work to be done 19 here. We've shared this information with Dresser and 20 Weily. We think it's a valuable piece of work.
l 21 It may be that the reality is that's the way 1
22 pressurizer safety valves are going to operate and so l 23 safety analysis and other documents have to recognize that i
24 the variability in the' ways these valves behave is 25 different than what was originally described in the final
, -r w-W --
- w y--, . , - - - + , -my, - g er
24 1 safety analysis reports.
2 So that was all I wanted to mention on that one.
3 Okay, may I have the next slide.
4 (Slide.]
5 MR. NOVAK: This is only intended to show the 6 variety of reports that we've issued since January ol '87.
7 I don't plan to bring anything specifically out on this 8 one. They're standard reports that come out. May I have 9 the next slide.
10 [ Slide.]
11 MR. NOVAK: What we want to talk about now are 12 our priority issues and there are four specific ones. And 13 I'd like to make one point that perhaps is worth just 14 touching on.
15 When we looked at operating trends, there was 'one 16 trend there which looked at accident sequence precursors.
17 Those are events that we have seen that we feel are 18 significant events.
19 I had our people go back and look at what 20 contributed to those events, what things failed. And it's 21 interesting that when you look at motor operated valves 1
22 and air systems and loss of decay heat, in ha3f of those 23 events these systems in one way or another didn't perform 24 their intended function. I I
25 So that sort of supports our view that these are 1
25 1 important priority issues because they go hand in hand 2 with what we have been studying under the accident 3 sequence precursor program.
4 May I have the next slide on newly licensed 5 plants. -
6 (Slide.]
7 MR. NOVAK: I'm going to move quickly through 8 this one. We were here, we did express what we've done on 9 new plants. There was a question to be sure that our 10 message got out to industry.
11 We did it in two ways. Actually , we sent on the 12 order of several hundreds copies of the NUREG report to 13 plant managers, to nuclear plant managers, vice presidents 14 of nuclear plant, to owners' groups, to vendors, to 15 architects, engineers.
16 So we gave it a very w'ide distribution and then 17 in addition to that, Mr. Jordan under his signature, 18 directed specific copies to each plant getting ready for 19 their start-up program, also plants that were in extended 20 shutdown.
21 So clearly everybody has that document and they 22 have it more than one time so we are very pleased with 23 that.
24 As we mentioned earlier, we did meet with INPO to 25 go through a workshop and we felt that was a good exchange
26 1 of information and we shared that with the Commission.
2 I have one back-up slide I'd just like to show 3 you for a minute. May I see back-up Slide 8, please.
4 (Slide.]
5 MR. NOVAK: What I wanted to show is just to give 6 you a quick feeling, I don't expect you to --
thanks 7 George, but it's the wrong way --
he works for me, but I 8 don't care.
9 If you looked at the solid lines, upper bound and l 10 lower bound, those were the bands that we talked about 11 when we did the initial study. l 12 So we've taken all of the older plants out and i 13 now here is the new population of plants coming through 14 since this study was done. A few of them were in there, 15 but they were just starting out.
16 And so you see, this is what all of the plants 17 since this report are doing in terms of start ups. I 18 think of interest is the ones that tend to come up. That 19 was plant Vogel. We supported NRR in Region II in some U
20 meetings on their start-up program, and we think those 21 types of events was what was responsible for turning that 22 curve over somewhere between one or 2,000 cumulative 23 critical hours.
24 The other plant right after Vogel was Beaver 25 Valley. We had the same sort of meetings there.
27 1 But generally I would say there are more plants-2 moving towards the pret tred mode of operation. We don't 3 have as many bumping up against the upper limit.
4 But that's just an idea of where we are in terms 5 of the new plants coming on line. South Texas 1 is on 6 there, we'll be watching it. Braidwood is on there, 7 Braidwood 2 will be coming on.
8 So we're going to be seeing just what they are.
9 That's just to give you the broadest feeling for the 10 performance of that --
11 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL: I'm sorry. What's does 12 the upper and lower bound representing? !
13 MR. NOVAK: What that was, when we did the i
14 original new plant study, the worse performer was 1 15 represented by the upper bound --
16 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL: Worse and best.
17 MR. NOVAK: --
and the best performer was on the 18 lower. And all that's saying, are we doing any better l
l 19 today. I would say, yes, but we've still got some work to '
20 do.
21 May I have the next slide on motor operated 22 valves.
F 23 (Slide.)
24 MR. NOVAK: What I'd like to just mention on this 25 of course, this is an area where back in 1982 we did a l
28 1 case study related to motor operated valves.
2 The bottom line of these studies are that these 3 things take a lot of attention, detail, and there's just 4 no shortcut and I think Dr. Brown who's in the audience 5 here has spent several years -- he's our expart on it and 6 every time I've had an opportunity to be briefed on it, I 7 get a clear impression that this -- it takes a lot of 8- teamwork to make these systems work properly. Engineers 9 and maintenance people have to do it together. You can't 10 put the responsibility on one side of the house.
11 CHAIRMAN ZECH: The engineers and who?
12 MR. NOVAK: Maintenance personnel.
13 CHAIRMAN ZECH: How about the designers?
l 14 MR. NOVAK: As well. And we're working with -- i 15 in fact right now EPRI is working on what they call an 16 applications guide which really is what'you're saying.
17 How do two pieces go together.
18 CHAIRMAN ZECH: You got to start from the 19 beginning.
20 MR. NOVAK: Yes.
21 ' CHAIRMAN ZECH: Do the designers get the feedback 22 from the engineers and the operators on the problems we've l l
23 had with these water operated valves?
24 MR. NOVAK: I'm not as confident of that. I'll i 25 ask Dr. Brown, but I think tha't's one of the problems we
29 l
. l l
l I
1 see. '
2 CHAIRMAN ZECH: Is Dr. Brown here?
3 MR. NOVAK: Earl, would you mind stepping up.
4 CHAIRMAN ZECH: And would you please identify 5 yourself for the reporter.
6 DR. BROWN: Yes. I'm Earl Brown with AOED.
7 CHAIRMAN ZECH: Thank you.
8 DR. BROWN: The operating experience does not get 9 back as much to the designer or the operator _of the 10 equipment as it should.
11 I think the groups that Tom mentioned, though, 12 with the effort going on now with NUMAR-EPRI, they are 13 working together. So I think there's room for progress.
14 CHAIRMAN ZECH: All right. Fine. Well, I'd like 15 you to follow through on that if you would, Tom, because 16 you know this is not just in this one area but .T*ve found 17 in some of our power plants even, the design people don't 18 necessarily always get the feedback from the engineers, <
19 the engineers don't always get the feedback from the 20 craftsmen, and the others who are putting the 21 modifications in the plant. And if you don't close the 22 loop, you're not going to make any improvements. You're 23 just going to keep Band-Aiding things. If we don't close 24 the loop, we're not going to improve in my judgment.
25 So there's got to be a feedback system. A
30 1 feedback system is important from water operated valves as 2 well as for many other evolutions we do in these power 3 plants.
4 The designers, the engineers, the 5 constructionists, the people who install the work, the 6 craftsmen, and others, there simply must be a feedback 7 system. So that's my point.
8 I think in this motor operated valve, it's kind 9 of obvious that perhaps that can be improved.
10 MR. JORDAN: Maybe I can step in there. Just 11 before we had this meeting, we attended a very quick 12 briefing by the NUMARC and the EPRI folks on the program 13 they're going through now, and after this meeting we're 14 going to go get a full briefing --
15 CHAIRMAN ZECH: Good.
16 MR. JORDAN: --
on their. activities. And I was 17 impressed. The representatives that are there include not 18 only the maintenance engineers from the plants, but 19 representatives from LIVITARK itself, from MOV1.TS, from 20 the industrial groups that are supporting very strongly 21 this overall activity.
22 So in this case the designers --
that count now 23 are involved -- the problem of course has been that the 24 designers were less interested than the 25 architect-engineering firms that in fact are no longer
. = . - ._
31 l
I 1 involved in this particular loop i,t n l e s s they're contracted 2 back to provide support.
3 But I think the important thing in the 4 applications guide will become then an instrument for 5 posterity that will be available~for any subsequent casign 6 efforts, that they can see what size valve, what type 7 operator, and what combinations in fact are viable.
8 So the efforts are ongoing in that direction.
9 CHAIRMAN ZECH: Okay. Well, I'd just frankly 10 like you to think of it as a closed circle --
11 MR. JORDAN: Yes, sir, we do.
12 CHAIRMAN ZECH: --
not as an open circle. And 13 even though the designers have finished their effort and 14 contractors finished and they're all gone and now it's up 15 to the engineers and the construction people and so forth, 16 in my view, somewhere or another we should keep them in 17 the loop so that if you need them to come back to 18 something you should do it. You shouldn't just throw it 19 back to the engineers and have them engineer around a 20 design that.maybe isn't the best.
21 So all I'm saying is in the logic process, I'd 22 like to think there's a closed loop in this design, 23 construction, craftsmen circle and we keep going back 24 again. Especially in areas like water operated valves, 25 air systems, other things where we know we have problems.
32 l
i 1 It's just a concept I think is worth keeping in mind.
2 MR. JORDAN: Yes, sir.
3 CHAIRMAN ZECH: And I would ask you to at least 4 keep that in mind. Okay.
5 MR. NOVAK: Let me just touch on a couple of more 1
6 points on this slide. You see a point there regarding 1
7 training courses that the staff is in part providing for j 8 NRC employees. I'd just like to give you some information l 9 on that.
10 There have been six courses offered. We've had a l
11 total of 71 NRC employees attend this course on !
1 12 maintenance training. It's a three day course, and it's 1
13 intended just to give us the best information we can on 14 motor operated valves.
15 Before the end of September, there'll still be 16 another six courses, so by the end of this fiscal year, 17 we'll have over 140 staff people trained in this area and 18 I think that's another positive feature.
19 One other point I'd like to make. There's a 1
20 point down here where the scope of this effort has been 21 extended to include hydraulic lockup of MOVs.
22 I think this is a just an indications of the 1
23 subtlety through which problems can come.
24 Here's a situation where the lubricant, the 25 grease migrates from gearbox into what's called the spring
33 1 package. And you've just got -- now when the valve is 2 caused to operate, the springs have got to compress and 3 the grease is there and it becomes a spring constant.
4 So those are the kinds of problems that you have 5 to recognize and they are subtle; that's why we have Dr.
6 Brown working on it just about full time. May I have the 7 next slide, please.
8 (Slide.]
9 MR. NOVAK: Now this is the discussion that we 10 wanted to have with regard to the air system study.
11 I think the bottom line that we have seen for 12 several years with regard to air system studies is the 13 vulnerability of safety related equipment to common mode 14 failures. The air system can go across the plant and can 15 take out a number of key systems.
16 We did a study back in the early 80s. It was 17 reviewed and really it has been an uphill fight I think in 18 terms of convincing ourselves that the air system study 19 deserves the priority that it now has.
20 I think the earlier look at air systems was that 21 it wasn't that significant a contributor. It was really 22 due to the perseverance of the individuals working on this 23 case study that continued to look at the data and put it 24 in front of our people to do risk assessments that said 25 there are more events. They are significant and it ought
3 L L 34 1 to be looked at.
2 So it has been a fight going up. It's there now.
3 Vic has initiated distribution of the case study to every 4 licensee, it's in their hands, and it's being now actively 5 worked on by NRR.
6 We've got a number of things that we've 7 recommended. Let me see --
back up slide -- I've got a i
8 slide here. Back up Slide No. 10, please.
9 (Slide.)
10 MR. NOVAK: And I'll ask Ernie again to walk us 11 through what NRR is doing. I'll just put the slide up to 12 show you the bottom line with regard to this particular 13 study.
14 MR. ROSSI: Well, as you probably know, air 15 systems are generally non-safety related systems that 16 serve safety related valves, and the design basis is for 17 the safety related valves to fail in the proper position 18 if you lose air unless an air accumulator is provided.
19 Now as a result of the AEOD study, NRR issued 20 Information Notice 8728 in June. That notified licensees 21 of the AEOD report and it also highlighted several 22 specific problems that came out of that report that air 23 system problems could end up causing.
24 In December, we issued an Information Notice 25 Supplement that transmitted NUREG 1275 which was an
35 1 updated version of the AEOD report on air systems to the-2 industry.
3 The concerns with instrument air systems has been 4 designated a high priority issue, and we currently have 5 short- and long-term actions underway.
6 In the short-term, we're in a process of 7 developing a generic letter incorporating the primary AEOD 8 recommendations on instrument air systems to send out to 9 the industry.
10 That letter will do such things as confirm -- ask 11 utilities to confirm the adequacy of their instrument air 12 quality, confirm the adequacy of any accumulator designs 13 that are used to operate safety related valves, confirm 14 the adequacy of maintenance practices and procedures, and 15 training for handling loss of instrument air; and verify l
16 the valve designs for what the failure position is if you I 17 should loose air. j l
18 We expect to have that generic letter to the CRGR 19 in April and issued in May.
20 In the long-term, Research is coordinating 21 further staff review of instrument air system design l 22 requirements under generic issue 43, and any necessary new 23 requirements that they develop would be recommended if the 24 supporting regulatory analysis showed the need for that.
25 And that resolution is scheduled for the end of 1988. i l
l 1
~.
36 1 CHAIRMAN ZECH: All right. Thank you.
2 MR. NOVAK: May I have the next slide on loss of 3 decay heat removal.
4 (Slide.]
5 MR. NOVAK: Now this study was done primarily to 6 look at situations in the shutdown mode. Decay heat 7 removal has been an unresolved safety issue, but the hard 8 -- what's been worked there is in the event of an 9 accident, what's the reliability and the ability of the 10 decay heat removal system to handle post-accident 11 situations, which is a valid problem.
12 What we looked at in this study was, if for some 13 reason you have to shutdown the plant other than an 14 accident situation, what's the likelihood that you might 15 run into problems while you're in a shutdown mode because 16 you've lost decay heat removal?
17 We've seen a number of events where plants have 18 gone into alignments where the only method of removing 19 decay heat is the one they're currently using and it 20 failed. So you get air binding or something in a pump, 21 and then you're sitting there without any other source of 22 decay heat removal until you can restore the availability 23 of that system. And we've seen events where actually the 24 cooling temperatures have reached boiling and you've had 25 actual boiling in the reactor while you're trying to
37 1 recover.the decay heat removal system. So we see this as 2 a significant area.
3 What also supports this is a recent study done by 4 the Nuclear Safety Analysis Center where they did a PRA 5 study looking at shutdown conditions for the Zion Station.
6 And roughly they come up with the same answers that we do, 7 that the potential for serious events can be as well in 8 the shutdown mode as well as in operation because there's i
9 just that tendency to put yourself in a less favorable 10 situation than you need.to, i 11 So this study is really aimed at making sure that 12 people look at containment integrity when they're in 13 refueling modes, look at the configurations that they ;
14 have, plan their shutdowns so that they have a back up for 15 any situation that occurs. Don't get yourself out 16 strictly where you're operating on a single trend without l 17 a back up.
18 !!ow this is another one where I'll ask Ernie now I
19 to follow through on what NRR is doing with respect to the 1 20 recommendations that we did in the case study.
21 MR. ROSSI: About 40 percent of the loss of l
22 residual all heat removal events occur while in mid-loop 23 operation.
24 Following an event in April of 1987, we issued an 25 information notice. That event occurred at Diablo canyon.
38 1 And then later after that information notice we 2 went out with a generic letter to obtain information from 3 the utilities on training and procedures and supporting 4 analyses for basically mid-loop operation.
5 Currently we are in a process of preparing a 6 bulletin to go out and that bulletin would dwell on things 7 like reducing event initiators during mid-loop operation, 8 improving mitigation of loss of RHR if it should occur by 9 making sure that everyone has adequate procedures, and it 10 would look at instrumentation available during mid-loop 11 operation.
12 COMMISSIONER CARR: I don't understand the term 13 "mid-loop". How about giving me a tutorial.
14 MR. NOVAK: When you want to do steam generator 15 tube inspections, you will drain down the primary system 16 to a certain le' vel. That's what we refer to as mid-loop 17 operation. Something less.than having the vessle 18 completely filled.
19 COMMISSIONER CARR: Okay.
20 MR. NOVAK: Are you finished, Ernie?
21 MR. ROSSI: I'm finished. {
22 MR. NOVAK: May I see the next slide now on 23 on going studies.
24 (Slide.]
25 MR. NOVAK: I'd like to spent a lot time on
I 1 service water system performance in light water. That's a 2 case study and I'd just like to walk you through that one 3 very quickly. May I see back up Slide D-12, please.
4 (Slide.]
5 MR. NOVAK: What I'd like to do is take a minute 6 and walk you through our process, how do these studies i
7 evolve.
i 8 Certainly what's key is a continuing review of 9 our operating data. What Ed Jordan mentioned, all of 10 those LERs, the bulletins, inspection reports and so 11 forth, that constitutes it.
12- We watch service water systems, we saw a high 13 repeat rate and i'll get to the numbers in a minute, but 14 also we look at what has been done, what have we said to i
15 industry with regard to taking care of service water l 1
16 systems.
)
17 So we went back and looked at all of the 18 bulletins, generic letters. We looked at MPRDS, what did 19 we see failing from that system. And then we looked at 20 what INPO has put out.
21 So we've had a lot of written material on taking 22 care of service water systems. It really hasn't done the 23 job that we think it has, so it prompted us to continue to 24 look, and we did a number of site visits.
25 Now when we went back into the licensing event I
40 1 reports, we did a search and we found it interesting here ,
1 2 that almost 1,000 events, with some degradation in service
-3 water system, occurred between that 7 year period. That's 4 a sutstantial number of events.
5 Well, then we took another cut and we looked more 6 closely at them to see which of those 1,000 actually had 7 failures or significant degradations and we found almost 8 300 there.
9 And then we narrowed them down to some 30 events 10 where we really poured over, what is going on with regard 11 to service water systems in plants today? And from that 12 is coming our case study. May I have the next slide on 13 D-13, please.
14 (Slide.] l 15 MR. IlOVAK: Okay. What did we find? Of those 16 276 situation where either the system was declared I
17 inoperable or there was significant degradation, you can l 18 see that more than 50 percent is due to fouling.
19 Something else is in that line other than water and it's 20 blocking the flow. And it's nothing that would be 21 surpriseing, sediment, vial fouling most recently in 22 Catawba, a number of clamps found their way into the l
23 system, and the other is just the corrosion and other I l
i 24 things that find their way into it.
25 We also found places in the design where a single i
l l
I
41 1 failure could fail the whole system. It isn't single 2 failure proof. That could be some of the older plants 3 with some of the configurations. ;
4 Flooding occurs. Pump rooms are flooded and it 5 takes out the electrical system. So it showed us that
- 6 there was a large number of things causing system 7 failures. May I have the next slide. Back up slide --
8 COMMISSIONER CARR: Before you leave that one, 1
9 what kind of failures did seismic deficiencies cause?
10 MR. NOVAK: Good question. They may have gone in 11 and said that system is not seismically qualified.
12 Something is wrong with a hanger they declared inoperable. i l
13 COMMISSIONER CARR: Oh, okay.
2 14 MR. NOVAK: They had to report it.
15 COMMISSIONER CARR: It wasn't an earthquake.
16 MR. NOVAK: No, it wasn't an earthquaka, Now, 17 may I have the next slide, please, George.
I 18 [ Slide.]
19 MR. NOVAK: This is kind of where I see us coming i 20 out. We're going to put this review out now for peer 21 review. We will take our case study and we will provide 4
22 it to NRR, we will proved it to EPRI, we will pre .de it 23 to industry groups for the factual correctness. Are those j 24 276 events and 30 events exactly the way we understand
- 25 them? We're not asking them to comment on our
42 1 recommendation, but make sure we have our facts correct, l
2 That will be done.
3 We see basica21y that there are numerous causes l l
4 of system failures. No surprises from the previous slide. l 5 We believe this thing is going to come as being a 6 situation where we would say the risks would put it into a l
7 high priority category. l l
8 We've done some preliminary work, and we tested l l
9 against NUREG 0933 or the severe accident policy, it would 10 say do something about it.
11 The bottom numbers are really-just our numbers.
12 1.5 times 10 to minus 2. If you go back to our data, we l 13 find ten events where the system has completely failed l
14 over 600 years and that's a number like 1.5 times 10 to 15 minus 2.
l 16 System degradation frequency is nothing more than 17 those 276 events over 600 reactor years again. 100 18 reactor years roughly over 6 years.
19 So the numbers aren't fancy, but it does say then 20 that you're talking about core melt frequencies roughly in 21 the range of 10 to minus 3 to 10 to minus 5.
22 We're going to stop here and we would forward our 23 work now over to Research and they will take the next cut l 24 at not just fine tuning but looking more carefully at what 25 we consider the risks.
43 1 But this is the kind of thing we think now 2 prompts us to say something should be done in the area of 3 service water systems.
4 MR. MINNERS: I'd note on that, Tom, that there 5 is a generic issue on service water system fouling which 6 is working its way through the resolution process.
7 MR. NOVAK: I planned on only bringing up one 8 more point here just to give you -- may I go back now to 9 Slide 20, please.
10 (Slide.]
11 MR. NOVAK: The other way around, please, George.
12 Thank you. Let me just touch base for a minute on some of 13 the trends in patterns studies, again give you a breath of 14 what we are doing.
15 We are just in the process again of completing it 16 but I'll call the case study on'our review of Tech Spec 17 violations and I wanted to spend a minute just to show you 18 what we think we're learning from the review of Tech 19 Specs. George, may I see the back up slide on Tech Spec 20 violations.
21 (Slide.)
22 MR. NOVAK: How what we've done is we've looked, 23 and since the licensing of that report system requires any 24 violation to be reported, we have gone back and looked at 25 1984, '85 and '86 to see the kinds of violations and the
44 1 frequency, to get an understanding of just how often are 2 operations violating Tech Specs and_how significant are 3 they.
4 I think this is an excellent study to support the 5 Tech Spec improvement program and as you'll see on the 6 bottom line there, our bottom line supports theirs in the 7 sense that fire protection and those things that were in 8 Tech Specs are low priority in terms of significance and 9 can be moved out of the Tech Specs.
10 But what we did see is basically that there was 11 an increase in the number of violations average per plant.
12 There are more violations per year, flo t a major change, 13 but what we see are individual plants kind of spiking.
14 They'll go through a period of six months to a year and 15 they have a rash of violations. That's when the Region i
16 and flRR will look more carefully at it. ;
l 17 But even if you take them out and take the new 18 plants out, the remaining plants, the mature plants still 19 have a slight increase. We'll be looking at that and 20 talking to fiRR with regard to what it means.
21 But I think this is again instructive in terms 22 of --
I also will look at this to see if we ought to be 23 looking at our reporting requirements.
24 In other words, in 1984 this rule on reporting 25 went into effect, and this is an appropriate way to look I
' e 45 1 at the need for any changes in the reporting requirements, 2 additions as . fell as deletions. We've seen things that we 3 don't need to be look'ng at as carefully.
4 So that was just again to give you the-breath of 5 the kind of work that we have. That completes my study 6- unless there is any specific questions.
7 MR. STELLO: We're through, Mr. Chairman.
8 CHAIRMAN ZECH: All right. Thank you. Questions 9 my fellow Commissioners? Commissioner Roberts?
10 COMMISSIONER ROBERTS: I'll ask a non-fact 11 question and one you can't answer. But, Vic said that 12 plants are operating more safely. Why?
13 MR. STELLO: I said --
14 COMMISSIONER ROBERTS: Is it the regulators or is 15 it the private sector or operator?
l l
l 16 MR. STELLO: You mean who is producing that l i
17 change?
18 COMMISSIONER ROBERTS: Yes, 19 MR. STELLO: Both. I think IMPO is having an 20 effect, I think the industry itself is changing, and I 21 believe that the regulatory process and the kinds of 22 things that we have done in the-last several years has j l 23 produced change. j l
24 So tog 9ther the regulatory process, the industry a
) 25 and what they are doing I think is getting overall
)
l
46 1 performance.
2 We emphasize, because that's our business, those 3 parameters that we think are more direct measures to 4 safety, and I think you can see that the efforts and 5 attention going into them suggest that the trends are 6 clearly there, and I think they are clearly there.
> 7 I think it's just more than that. I think 7 8 would observe that in meetings with licensees over --
9 well, that have expanded over the 22 years that I have 10 been in this business, I think I sense a significant 11 change in the attitudes.
[
12 At the top level management of the company they 13 are responsive, they are starting to develop the kinds of 14 attributes that culture and policy and phil7 sophy of 15 operation -- that is process producing change.
l A
16 I think I see it in everything. I see it in the 17 daily reports that we see. You don't see as many or as 18 significant issues being raised. I think it's an overall 19 change throughout the industry that's positive.
20 COMMISSIollER ROBERTS: Well, I read your brief 21 article, 'there. I don't know whether that's true or not.
22 I just saw that. Don't ever get this agency in a 23 situation that's alleged there from your FAA thing i
24 changing the rules of the game from year to year. I know !
25 that goes without saying.
. _ _ _ . . _ . _ . . _ ~. _ .
. . I 47 l l
1 MR. STELLO: Yes. '
2 COMMISSIONER ROBERTS: Okay. .That's all I-have.
1 3 CHAIRMAN ZECH: All right. Thank you.
4 Commissioner Bernthal.
5 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL: I rcally don't have any 6 questions. On the last point you raised, however, Tech :
7 Spec violations. Are you sure we aren't getting better 8 reporting over that period of time?
9 MR. NOVAK: I think Ed and I talked. We think ,
10 from both sides, I think we're doing a better job of ;
11 watching and I think the industry has also been more 12 sensitive to what constitutes a basis. !
i ,
4 13 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL: Yes, that's what I 14 wonder. I wouldn't want to suggest that n o e. everything :
15 got reported four or five years ago, but --
l l 16 HR. STELLO: I think there's just more care.
I t 17 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL: Yes. ;
J 18 MR. STELLO: There is more attention to the l 19 detail and I think that's tne key to the overall i
i 20 improvenent, I think that's a key to the overall j 21 reporting. They're finding more because they're looking l l
22 harder.
3 23 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL: Yes, that's what I'm 7
24 saying.
t i i
25 MR. JORDAN: There may be an analogy in looking 1
48 1 at individual p i. a n t performance. We see plants that go 2 into a very detailed improvement program and immediately 3 show more events and an apparent decline before they 4 actually show an improvement and it's because of caring in 5 reporting and finding ti..;ir own problems.
6 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL: Well, I just want to 7 commend you again for a job that you continued to do and 8 you and your people are I think making a real conttibution l
9 here.
10 It's not always as exciting to be working with l 11 statistics and numbers and figures, it depends on what you 12 do with them and I think some of the numbers you're 13 gathering are already leading to significant regulatory 1 1
I 14 action. '
15 And I might say in the same vein that I think 16 your people are doing an equally estimable job in the area 17 of medical misadministration. There has been some very l l
18 valuable data that have been coming to us in that area, l 19 too, that are now very important in fact in view of the 1
20 measures that we're considering. So keep it up.
21 MR. JORDAN: Thank you. We enjoy it.
22 CHAIRMAN ZECH: Commissioner Carr?
23 COMMISSIONER CARR: Yes, I'd like to add two 1
1 24 cents on that it sue. I think it's a very valuable and 25 required service : hat you're doing. We're the only outfit l
49 1 probably that can do it, we're the only ones that seize 2 reports all across the industry and no single utility 3 would be able to do that because they don't have enough 4 database. I'm not sure how good our database is, I wish 5 it were better, but I think the more we do this kind of 6 thing, the better the database gets because they see what 7 comes out of the reports.
8 So I thinkHit's vital, I think it's necessary, 9 and I think it's a very good adjunct to our regulatory 10 responsibilities, so keep up the good work.
11 CHAIRMAN ZECH: Thank you. Commissioner Rogers?
12 COMMISSIONER ROGERS: No, nothing to add.
13 CHAIRMAN ZECH: Just a couple of points. In a 14 letter that we received -- we received a policy issue 15 information letter on January 13 from AEOD, SECY 88-12, in 16 the last page of that, in the summary, I noticed that --
17 and the subject is AEOD decisien process on issuing 18 suggestions or recommendations following completion of-19 -
echnical studies.
20 Summarizing the last --
in the summary of the 21 last page, it says this: "Specifically, emphasis has been 22 y.- t a c e d o n identifying the root causes of deficiencies 23 observed in operational events. The adequacy of 1
24 corrective actions implemented or planned, the need for 25 actions, and more importantly, whether or not the
. -. .. , - - . - - - .-- - . . . . . . = . . -
50 1 perceived safety significance of the issue involved should 2 result in a suggestion of a recommendation for action.
3 only issues with high safety significance would warrant an 4 AEOD recommendation."
5 I would only comment that I hope that you're --
I L
! 6 agree with my colleagues, that AEOD is making a valuable 7 contribution. And I would hope that threshold is not too 8 high because I do think -- and I know you can'*. do 9 everything, but I do feel that some of the things you've 10 talked about here today, if they're only examples, air 11 systems and motor operated valves, there are areas --
i j 12 these are very important areas that do need, in my view, ;
13 our regulatory attention. And it seems to me there might j 14 be other areas. I hope your threshold ~ for making 15 recommendations is not too high.
16 How would you feel about it, Mr. Jordan?
t 17 MR. JORDAN: Well, my earlier experience with the '
i 18 NRC was as an inspector, and I sort of felt when I was l
, 19 dealing with the licensee that I had a silver bullet each ;
4 20 day and that if I used it wisely, I could effect a change. I 21 And I think that's the point, that I want to try ,
l 22 to effect a change. I don't want to just dig up a lot of 1
l j 23 dirt. And so it's the follow through that we feel is i 1
24 important. !
J 25 The threshold can indeed be set differently. I'm 4
h
51 1 pleased with the system that NRR has for examining our 2 auggestions in an organized manner and in fact pulling up 3 some of them and acting upon them where we couldn't find a 4 basis to make a recommendation that we would in fact 5 track.
6 So there is a feedback process that I think is 7 appropriate.
8 MR. STELLO: Mr. Chairman, I would like to make 9 sure it is clear --
10 CHAIRMAN ZECH: Yes, go ahead.
11 MR. STELLO: --
that whether it is a suggestion 12 or a recommendation, it's immaterial to the fact that NRR !
13 is obligated to look at each of them and determine whether 14 action is required from the plants, independent of our Reg 15 classified. And that's done, as you've heard.
16 CHAIRMAN ZECH: Right. I appreciate that and l l
17 that's a very important point. Last time we also talked 1
18 about enhancing integration in the regulatory process and l 19 you've given us a paper on that and I guess I'm interested l
l 20 again in closing the loop not only in the '
21 design-engineering-craftsm'en-type business in the plants, 22 but also in our own system. i i
23 AEOD, in my view, is indeed contributing a very 24 valuable service. I know you can't look at everything l 25 with the same degree of attention that you can at certain l
l l
52 1 things that maybe don't rise to the same threshold, but it :
2 is important, I think, that as the EDO points out, that 3 the NRR people do look at what you have and that we do 4 continue to integrate our system and close the loop, so to 5 speak, because I think that's the only way we can gain ~
6 from the valuable recommendstions that are coming out of 7 the AEOD.
s 8 I do think you are providing a very valuable 9 service and I know we're still kind of growing into this 10 organization, but it's my view in this day and age when we 11 are focusing more of our attention on operational plants, I 12 operational safety, that this is a very appropriate thing 13 to do, and I just want to make sure that the loop gets 14 closed and NRR does keep involved and it does continue to 15 get supported.
i 16 I would agree with EDO's comments, too, as far as I 17 an improving situation is concerned. Many of you heard my 18 comments yesterday at Congress along the same lines.
19 I do believe also that trends are all going in 20 the improving direction in the comn.ercial nuclear power 21 plants. That doesn't mean there isn't room for continued ,
i 22 improvement, we know that there is. We've mentioned it l i
23 here and we continue to be mindful of that. i i
l 24 But it should be encouraging, I think, to note !
\
1 j 25 that it does look like from the indications you've given l
l l l l
l
53 1 here today, too, that there'is an improving trend and I 2 agree with EDO, too, when he indicates that he thinks that i.
^
3 perhaps there_has been a change in attitude and I think a 4 maturing process as I see it in the utilities to recognize 1 4
- ! S that it is in their own best interes't to focus on safety, 6 as well as reliability, as well as economics, and I think 7 the IllPO organization as we've mentioned, too, has make a 8 contribution in that area.
9 So I'm encouraged by what's going on, but by the
- 10 same token we can see he things we've talked about here
- 11 today, there are areas that we can continue to make 4
12 improvement on and those are the things that I think AEOD
\
13 should be particularly supported in by all the other parts ,
14 of our agency.
15 It's not just gathering statistics and data l 16 that's important, it's.your analysis that's important, and l 17 it's your passing that to the other parts of our 18 organization that can be --
that can integrate it into 19 their regulatory process and work with the utilities and 20 with the industry to close the loop all the way around. ;
I 21 So I think it's very important that we recognize l l
1 l 22 that you're not just often one side of our organization, i l
, 23 you're an integral part of it, and I think you're 24 beginning to make an impact on regulatory safety and I 25 think that's exactly what we have in mind when AEOD was j s - .- - - , - -, ,- - - , - . - ,
54 k 1 really first started.
2 So I think your organization is meiuring now to ,
3 the point where I hope the rest of our staff and I would 4 commend the EDO for his continuing support of your '
5 organization and make sure that Research helps when 6 necessary as would NRR or the other branches of,our agency 7 that is also involved.
8 But I would just like to also commend you for 5 9 what you're doing with my colleagues and say that I think ;
10 we'll look forward to another report from you.
11 I think the next report, I would certainly 12 suggest that you focus perhaps even a little bit more ,
13 emphasis on how your recommendations are being integrated 14 into NRR and what specific regulatory actions your 15 recommending or we've taken to show that the AEOD work is 16 is being followed through and we're closing the loop. ,
17 So I would hope that we could perhaps in the next !
18 session with AEOD focus --
just take another step to see 19 where some of those recommendations perhaps are being i 20 placed in our regulatory program.
21 I think it's a very commendable effort and I i 22 commend EDO and you and all of you here today for the 1
23 effort that you're providing thi:n agency. Youre '
24 definitely in my judgment making a significant 25 contribution to improved operations and I think as we all
55 1 know, with our focus on operating plants these days. That 2 that's a proper emphasis for us to be taking.
3 Are there any other final comments, my fellow 4 Commissioners?
5 COMMISSIONER CARR: I might caution you, don't 6 overlook those plants that complacency might be their 7 problem.
8 MR. JORDAN: Yes, sir.
l 9 CHAIRMAN ZECH: That's a good point.
l 10 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL: Do you have a complacency 11 indicator?
12 MR. JORDAN: Perhaps.
13 CHAIRMAN 7.ECH : No, but it is a good point. It's ,
14 a very good point and just because we're improving, it has 15 got to be emphasized that in my judgment, there's plenty 16 of room to improve more, and we should definitely not be 17 complacent about even the fact that we're improving and !
l 18 the plants have been improving, the utilities are ;
l 19 improving.
20 I think it's extremely important for us to be 21 mindful of our responsibilities and there's plenty of room 22 for improvement and we should encourage that at every 23 opportunity.
' l 24 COMMISSIONER ROGERS: It really connected a l
25 little bit with that. Just to urge you to be looking at 1
i l
l I l
56 0
1 the human factors' aspects of these analyses, because it's 2 easy to get. Relatively easy to get data on hardware. j 3 It's a 'iittle harder to get data on. people performance, 4 and I think creative analysis there is very valuable as l t
5 well and it certainly does relate to some of these other 6 things that we are just touching upon, but it's easy to 7 focus more on the things that ar.e very directly measurable l 8 and quatifiable, but somehow we know that the problems 9 come from the people very often, and of course you can see 10 that in some ways through general trends, but any other 11 things that you can discover through the data that comes 12 to you, I think would be very helpful, and any new
]
13 indicators that might suggest.themselves.
14 CHAIRMAN ZECH: I think that's a very important 15 point. I also had that down in my notes. I didn't 16 mention it but I'm glad Commissioner Rogers brought it i 17 out, i 1
18 Human factors is something that we haven't 1 4
t l
19 perhaps talked about at the table for a little while. I :
20 think it's something we can emphasize more. I know it has 21 been an area that we've tried to integrate into our whole i 22 organization, but I really think that we should perhaps
! 23 take another look at the human factors emphasis we're l
24 placing on our agency and perhaps we want to enhance that A :
25 effort. l
57 b
1 And it might be something that AEOD could take a 2 look'at and perhaps the next session with us or before, if 3 you want to write us a paper on it, give us your views as 4 you see the events and the operational data unfolding, 5 perhaps you can make a recommendation with EDO as to 6 whether you think an enhanced human factors program with 7 :our emphasis on operational factors would be appropriate.
8 I think that's something that the commission would 9 appreciate receiving your recommendation on.
10 MR. JORDAN: All right, sir.
11 CHAIRMAN ZECH: All right. Is there anything 12 else?
13 (No response.]
14 CHAIRMAN ZECH: If not, thank you very much. We 15 stand adjourned.
l 16 (Whereupon, at 3:18 p.m., the briefing was 17 adjourned.]
18 19 20 l
21 '
22 i
2 23 I l 24 l l
25
CERTIFICATE OF TRANSCRIBER This is to certify that the attached events of a meeting of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission entitled:
TITLE OF MEETING: .HIGH PRIORITY AEOD ISSUES PLACE OF MEETING: Washington, D.C.
l DATE OF MEETING: Thursday, March 31, 1988 were transcribed by me. I further certify that said transcription is accurate and complete, to the best of my ability, and that the transcript is a true and accurate record of the foregoing events.
W . , ',
.s
(
MARIO A. RODRIGUEZ Ann Riley & Associates, Ltd.
l i
l
AEOD PERIODIC REPORT TO THE COMMISSION ANALYSIS
,1 a TRENDS MARCH 31, 1988 I
i 1
l l
OUTLINE IFTRODUCTION ORGANIZATION AND RESOURCES ;
SOURCES OF REACTOR-PLANT OPERATING EXPERIENCE OPERATING EXPERIENCE TRENDS AE0D REPORTS ISSUED IN 1987 1
AE0D PRIORITY ISSUES
)
STARTUP EXPERIENCE AT NEFLY LICENSED FLANTS STATUS OF MOTOR OPERATED VALVE PROGRAM KEY EVENTS RELATED TO AIR SYSTEM FAILURES
- LOSS OF DECAY HEAT REMOVAL WITH PARTIALLY DRAINED RCS ONGOING ISSUES t
4 1
1
OFFICE FOR ANALYSIS AND EVALUATION OF OPERATIONAL DATA Director Edward Jordon Deputy Director '
Jock Heltemes g, DIVISION DIVISION OF OF ~,
OPERATIONAL ASSESSMENT l SAFETY PROGRAMS Director R. Lee Spessord -
Director Thomas M. Novak I
N REACTOR N Cn%AAATION TRENos TECHNICAL OPERATION RESPONSE ANO INC900ff AND N TRAINtNO ANAt# SIS SRANON se84WTtGATION NTygggpeg m CENTER SRANCH SRANCH.. G R A N O pie gTM Oery Zeeh j' stu Ruben l Mea Reglen Jeck Recenthol 4 mm j mm o
ee
q l
MAJ0P AE0D REPORTS ON NUCLEAR OPERATIONS DIAGNOSTIC EVALUATION AtlD INCIDENT INVESTIGATION P.PANCH DI AGNOSTIC EVALUATIONS - EDO FOLLOWUP ACTIONS INCIDENT INVESTIGATION TEAMS - ED0 FOLLOWUP ACTIONS TRENDS AND PATTEPNS AFALYSIS BRANCH TRENDS AND PATTERNS PEPORTS - LESSONS LEARNED SPECI AL STUDIES - FOLLOWUP ACTIONS REACTOR OPERAT10t!S ANALYSIS BRAPCH CASE STUDIES - RECOMMENDATIONS ,
ENGINEERING EVALUATIONS - SUGGESTIONS l SPECIAL REPORTS - RECOMMENDATIONS NON REACTOR ASSESSMENT STAFF CASE STUDIES - RECOMMEt!DATIONS ENGINEERING EVALUATI0f! - SUGGESTI0ilS -
l l
l l
l l
3 ,
RESOURCES APPLIED TO OPERATING EXPERIENCE AND EVAlllATION TECHNICAL STAFF STAFF CONTRACTOR PERCENT OF TOTAL OPERATIONAL DATA AFALYSIS 25 $2.1M 52 DATA COLLECTION & DISSEMINATION 6 $1,8M 24 PERFORMANCE INDICATORS 4 $230K 8 IFCIDENT IflVESTIGATION ~2 ,5 $50K 4 DIAGNOSTIC INSPECTION 6,5 $300K 12 40 $4,5M 100
SOURCES OF OPERATING EXPERIENCE ROUTINE SOURCES TELEPHONE NOTIFICATIONS (50.72) 4000/YR LICENSE EVENT REPORTS (50.73) 3500/YP REGIONAL DAILY PEPORTS 3000/YR FOREIGN EVENTS (BILATERAL + IRS) 1500/YR INSPECTION REPORTS 500/YR ,
OTHER SOURCES l
- 50.55(E) AND PART 21 REPORTS ;
'I INP0 AND OTHEP INDllSTRY REPOPTS 4
I 5
'O ,
1 OVERVIEW OF INDUSTRY TPFNDS IN OPEPATIONAL EXPERIENCE TRENDS IN OPEPATIONAL EXPERIENCE PROVIDE AN ASPECT OF OVERA ASSESSPENT OF PLANT SAFETY INDUSTRY TRENDS BASED ON PEPFORMANCE INDICATOR PROGRAM AND ACCIDENT SEClfENCE PRECURSOR PROGPAM 1 SHOW OVEPALL IMPROVEMENT PROGRAMS IN PLACE TO MONITOR INDIVIDUAL PLANT PERFORMANCE INDllSTPY TRIP REDUCTION PROGRAMS, INP0 MONITORING AND G0ALS, .
AND NRC MONITORING ALL CONTRIBUTING
- 1 i
I l
l Industry Trends in Operating Experience All Plants G84 to $87 l
t Agtomatat $ctM WWe Clitd
- 2. Wety System Actuctons M6 3.
i lhi !Ilh G84 GB GS. $87 sb4 555 556 Gh7 3 5pficont Events
- 4. Scfety System Foues
' o e s.
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32, t
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! Industry Trends in Operating Experience All Plants 1984 to 1987 I
- 5. resced Outcne Rote (s) C tco Mcos
?
! 55.
30 3.
k I g 25. n 4
t T 20. 2 i l E
'6 k.
A <
[
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[ $84 $$5 Yew
$56 $57 Gb4 G85 556 SS7 Yea
- 7. Rcocten Ecosse (w-REu/YeJ)
' 8 ASP Rcgom Rektts i
. ex . 34 t
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f4 i tu e, M o
l G84 085 sh6 S3' 7 sb4 1 Yew sh5 Yew sb6 sS7 I
i 1
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i I
industry Trends in Operating Experience Excluding Pbnts Shutdown $84 to S87 1 %m:tc Sacrns the Crit ~cd ,
- 2. Sofety System Actuotcro h
f._ p.
t Il.lh. ,,
$l.l,.,ii. .
i 2 Spfcont twents 4 Safety System roues 1
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l Industry Trends in Operating Experience Excluding PK:nts Shutdown 1984 to 1987 5 fcrced Outcge Rate (t)
Cr taca Mcus f 3S .
30 . 3.
I S. I I
f _.- o 20 . 2.
- m. t k
- 4 o
j 434 S85 556 S87 US4 US5 SS6 US7 Ye:r i Yecr 7 a nate Ecosse (e-REu/Yecr) 8. ASP Pregrcrn Resats e
5 g 800 g it h b l T EX . CC-h b 4 00 ., ' !.
i A
200 4 0- .
SS4 USS BS6 087 Year
. 0 US4 SS$
SS6 SS7 I
Yecr i
I i
i i D ,
COMPREHENSIVE STUDIES SINCE JANUARY 1987 :
AIP SYSTEM PROBLEMS AT LWRS LOSS OF DECAY HEAT PEMOVAL FUNCTION AT PRESSURIZED WATER REACT 0PS WITH PARTIALLY DRAINED REACTOR C00LAFT SYSTEMS MOV FAILUT<E DUE TO HYDRAULIC LOCKUP FF0M EXCESSIVE GREASE IN SPRING PACK OPERATING EXPERIENCE FEEDBACK REPORT - NEW PLANTS RECENT NEW PLANT OPERATIONAL EXPERIENCE OPERATIONAL EXPERIENCE FEEDBACK OF PAIN FEEDWATER FLOW CONTPOL AND BYPASS VALVES AND VALVE OPERATORS POTENTIAL CONTAINMENT AIRLOCK WINDOW FAILURE 011E TO RADI ATION LOSS OF 0FFSITE POWER DUF. TO UNNEEDED ACTUATION OF STARTUP TRANSF0FMER PROTECTIVE DIFFEPENTI AL REl.AY t
DISCHAPGE OF PRIMARY COOLANT OUTSIDE CF CONTAINPEFT AT PWRF WHILE ON RHP COOLING
' l RWCU SYSTEM AUTOMATIC ISOLATION AND SAFETY CONSIDERATIONS INADEQUATE MECHANICAL BLOCKING OF VALVES l
DESIGN AND CONSTRUCTION PROBLEMS AT OPERATING NUCLEAR PLANTS i DEPRESSURIZATION OF REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEMS AT PWRS AUXILIARY FEEDWATER PUPP TRIPS CAUSES BY LOW SUCTION PRESSURE INADEQUATE NPSH IN LOW PRESSURE SAFETY SYSTEFS IN PWRS RADIATION OVEREXPOSUPE EVENTS INVOLVING INDUSTRIAL FIELD PADIOGRAPHY 11
BRIEF STUDIES SINCE JANUARY 1987 PERRY NUCLEAR POWER PLANT UPIT 1 - UNEXPECTED MSIV CLOSURE ;
AND RE0PEDING i COMPRESSION FITTING FAILURES 4
LEAKING PULSATION DAMPENEP LEADS TO LOSS OF CHARGIFO SYSTEM POTENTIAL FOR LOSS OF EMERGENCY FEEDWATER DUE TO PUMP RUN0VT DURING CERTAlf TPANSIENTS PRESSURIZER CODE SAFETY VALVE RELIABILITY OCCURRENCE OF EVENTS INVOLVING WRONG UNIT / WRONG TRAIN / WRONG COMPONENT - UPDATE THROUGH 1986 i RECENT EVENTS lhV0LVING TURDINE RUNBACKS AT PWPS UNDETECTED LOSS OF REACTOR WATER 3 PROBLEMS WITH lilGH PRESSURE SAFETY ikJECTIOP SYSTEMS IN WESTINGHOUSE PWRS i
HEATING, VENTILATING AND AIR CONDITIONING SYSTEM PP0BLENS I
REVIEW 0F DATA ON TELETHEPAPY MISADF.IFISTPATIONS REPORTED TO l THE STATE OF NEW YORK THAT WERE THE SUBJECT OF PNO-1-87-74A UNPLANNED CRITICALITY EVEFTS AT U.S. POVER REACT 0PS SIMILAR .
TO THAT AT OSKARSHAMN U'ilT 3 ON 07/30/87 1
MISPOSITIONING OF "PEVEPSE ACTING" VALVE CONTROLLERS I
i 12 l
80llTINE~PEPORTS SINCE JANUARY 1987 4 P! REPORTS 5 A0 OUAPTERLY REPORTS TO CONGRESS
-56 IRS REPORTS T0 flea ABOUT 45 LER QUALITY REPOPTS TO REGIONS AND NRR 6 POWER REACTOR EVENTS REPORTS 12 MONTl!LY LER COMPILATION REPOPTS ABOUT ]8 COMMISSIONEP SITE VISIT BRIEFING PACKAGES PEPORT OF MEDICAL MISADMINISTRATIONS REPORTED TO NRC DURIMC 1986 C0PM10S10N PAPEP ON NPRDS EVALUATION AEOD ANNUAL REPORT FOR ]986 REPORT ON NONREACTOP EVENTS DURING 1986 UPDATE REPORT THROUGH 1986 ># EVENTS INVOLVING WRONG UNIT / WRONG TRAIN / WRONG Cut.i_AENT 4
l 13
AEOD PRIORITY ISSUES ISSUES STARTl!P EXPERIENCE AT NEWLY LICENSED PLANTS MOTOR OPERATED VALVE PEPFORMANCE KEY EVENTS RELATED TO AIP. SYSTEM FAILURES LOSS OF DECAY HEAT REMOVAL WITH PARTIALLY DRAINED RCS 1
l l
1 14 :
l l
STAPTUP EXPERIENCE AT NEVLY LICENSED PLANTS LAPGE NUFFER OF SCRAMS NOTED DUPlFG AEOD REVIEWS FOR NEWL LICENSED PLANTS ENGIMEERING EVALUATION ON NEW PLANT PERF0PMANCE ISSUED JU 1986 ,
!
- i NUREG-1275 "0PERATING EXPERIENCE FEEDBACK PEPORT - NEW (
PLANTS * - JULY 1987 COMMISSION BRIEFED AUGUST 1987 ,
- i LESSONS COMMUNICATED TO INDUSTRY l
REPORT SENT TO ALL PLANTS APPROACHING STAPTUP AND PLl IN EXTENDED SHUTDOWN SEPTEMBER 1987 FOR INF0PPATION Al USE '
if3P0/NRC MEETillG YTTH SENIOP PLANT MANAGEPS DECEMPE NEW PLANTS GENERALLY CONTINUE WITHIN NUREG-1275 PERF0PMA ENVELOPE l
l l
l 15
i .
MOTOR OPERATEP VALVE PERFORMANCE -
r INITIAL AE0D CONCERNS DOCUMENTED IN INITI AL CASE STUDY - 1982 DAVIS-BESSE !!T - AUGUST 1985 BULLETIN 85-03 ISSUED ON TESTING OF CEPTAIN MOVS GENERIC MOV STUDY PEQUESTED BY EDO l
AE0D CASE STUDY ON MOV PEPF0FMANCE - DECEMBER 1986
)
l EDO REQUESTS NUMARC TO INITIATE MOV CORRECTIVE ACTION PROGRAM MEETING F0PMS BASIS F0F INDUSTRY INVOLVEMENT AND ACTION PLAN TO ADDRESS MOV PROBLEMS - SEPTEMBER 1987 SCOPE EXTENDED TO INCLUDE HYDRAULIC LOCKUP 0F MOVS - JAFUAPY 1988 i INP0 HOLDS INDUSTRY MOV WORKSHOPS AND INC00.P0 PATES MOV EVALUATION IN PLANT REVIEWS EPRI - NPAC ADVISORY GROUP TO DEVELOP MOTORIZED VALVE PEPAIR .
GUIDE (DUE APRIL 1988) AND APPLICATION GUIDE (DUE SEPTEMPEP l 1988)
NRC PARTICIPATION IN INP0 EVALUATION NEED FOR PEGULATOPY ACTION CONTINUES UNDEP PEVIEW
1
- 1 i
l KEY EVENTS PELATEP TO ATB S'iSTEM FAILURES I AE0D CONCERNS OVER ADEQUACY OF INSTRUPENT AIR DATA DEVELOPED U OVER TIME STARTING IN 1982 1
AEOD CASE STUDY ISSUED MARCH 1987 (C70])
INFORMATION NOTICE 87-28 ISSUED JUNE 1987 AE00 CASE STUDY UPDATED AND ISSUED TO ALL PLANTS - DECEMBER 1987 (NUREG-1275, VOL, 2)
NRR PREPARING GENERIC LETTER ADDRESSING 4 0F 5 AE0D RECOMMENDATIONS GENERIC ISSUE (GI-43) - DPAFT REG. GUIDE T0 INCLIIDE F!FTH RECOPP.ENDATION EXPECTED IN DECEMBER 1988 AE0D CONTINUES TO PONITOR OPERATING EXPEPIENCE .
1 1
17 j
, 1 1.0SS OF DECAY HEAT REMOVAL WITH PARTIALLY DRAINED RCS EPPI/NSAC ISSUES TECHNICAL STUDY ON LOSS OF DHR EVENTS AE0D INITIATES STUDY IN VIEW 0F CONTINUED HISTORY OF DHR EVENTS CASE STUDY ISSUED DECEMBER 1985 INFORMATION NOTICE 86-101 ISSUEL, "LOSS 0F DHR DUE TO LOSS OF FLUID LEVELS IN RCS" REC 0FMENDATIONS STUDIED BY NPR AND PEW GI INITIATED (GI 99)
SPECIAL AE00 STUDY ISSUED MAY 1987 WITH ADDITIONAL SPECIFIC RECOMMENDATIONS RENEWED EMPHASIS FOLLOWING DIABLO CANYON EVENT OF APRIL 30, 1987 INFORMATION NOTICE 87-23, ISSUED, "LOSS OF DHP DURING LOP FCS LEVEL OPEPAT!0N" EPPI-DHP WOPKSHOP JUNE 1987 GENERIC LETTER (87-12) ISSUED JULY 1987, "LOSS OF RHR WHILE RCS PARTIALLY FILLED," REQUESTED SPECIFICS ON DHR OPERATIONS
~
BROOKHAVEN NATIONAL LABORATORY STUDY (DRAFT MARCH 1988)
SUPPORTS AE0D STUDY RECOMMENDATIONS NRR COMPLETED REVIEW OF LICENSEE PESPONSES AND PREPARAT10F 0F EULLETIN IS IN PROGRESS AE0D CONTINUES TO MONITOR OPERATING EXPERIENCE FOR EFFECTIVENESS OF LICENSEE ACTION 18
ONG0ING STUDIES CASE STUDY SEPVICE WATEP SYSTEM PERFORMANCE AT LWRs ENGINEERING EVALUATIONS B0PIC ACID CORROSION OF FEPRITIC STEEL COMPONENTS AT THE PRIMAPY SYSTEM B0UNDAFY WATER DAMAGE TO SAFETY-PELATED EQUIPPENT AND ELECTRICAL CONDUITS l DESIGN AND OTHER DEFICIEt!CIES IN CONTROL P0OM EMEPGENCY VENillATION SYSTEMS IMPROPER APPLICATION OF GREASE, SOLVENTS, AND SEALANTS l FAlf!TENANCE PROBLEMS CAUSING EXTENDED UNAVAILABILITY OF l
EQUIPMENT SIGNIFICANT CONTAlf' PENT I.EAKAGE EVENTS PROBLEMS WITH SHARED SYSTEMS AT MULTI-llNIT SITES PPilDENCE OF OPERATIOP PITH EQUIPMENT OUT OF SEPVICE IM SHUTDOWN 10 DES PEACTOR SCRAMS CAUSED PY A LOSS OF FEEDWATER AND COMPLICATED BY A FAILURE OF THE HPCI OR PCIC SYSTEM SAFETY AND SAFETY /oEllEF VALVE RELI ABILITY PUMP CAVITATION AT LOW FLOW CONDITIONS TRENDS AND PATTERNS STUDIFJ OPERATIONAL EXPERIENCE FEEDBACK REPOPT - PROGRESS IN SCRAM REDUCTION OPERAT10f1AL EXPERIENCE FEEDBACK REPORT - TECHNICAL SPECIFICA-TIONS OPERATIONAL EXPERIENCE FEEDBACK REPORT - Uf! PLANNED ESF ACTUATI0f'S
- 1 INSIGHTS FROM ACCIDENT SECUENCE PRECIIRSORS TRENDS AND PATTERNS OF MAIN FEEDWATER PUMP FAILUPES !
TRENDS AFD PATTERNS OF MSIV FAllllPES 19
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SERVICE WATER SYSTEM FAILURES AND DEGRADATIONS SCOPE AND APPROACH REVIEW OPERATING DATA l
BULLETINS, ins, SENERIC LETTERS. A0s, NPRDS, INP0 SOERs, SERs, VENDOR REPORTS SITE VISITS: TURKEY POINT, DIABLO CANYON. CALVERT CLIFFS, AND CATAWBA JANUARY 1980 - DECEMBER 1987 -- 980 EVENTS INVOLVING SERVICE WATER SYSTEMS 276 EVENTS WITH SYSTEM FAILURES OR SIGNIFICANT DEGRADATIONS 30 EVENTS FOR IN-DEPTil DESCRIPTION AND ANALYSIS b~ -
CAUSES OF RYSTEM Fall.llRES AND SIGNIFICANT DEGRADATIONS CAUSE . AUMBER OF EVENTS PERCENTAGE F0llLING DUE T0 SEDIMENT DEPOSIT!0N 26 9 BI0 FOULING 28 10 0 tiler 80 39 SINGLE FAILURES AND DESIGN DEFICIENCIES 18 7 FLOODING 12 q MULTIPLE EQUIPMEtlT FAILURES 10 4 PERSONNEL & PROCEDURAL ERRORS 46 17 SEISMIC DEFICIENCIES 3 p TOTAL 276 100%
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t l QUALITATIVE DISCUSSION NUMEROUS CAllSES OF SYSTEM FAILURES AND DEGRADATIONS ADVERSE IMPACT ON MANY SAFETY-RELATED SYSTEMS AND COMPONENTS NUMEROUS NRC AND INDUSTRY ACTIONS llIGH PRIORITY QUANTITATIVE DISCUSSION 1.5 X 10-2 /RY SYSTEM FAILURE FREQUENCY 4.0 X 10-I /RY SYSTEM DEGRADATION FREQUENCY APPR0XIMATELY 10 10-5 /RY CORE MELT FREQUENCY DUE TO SERVICE' WATER SYS FAILURES
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TRENDS 8 PATTERNS ANALYSIS OF TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION (TS)-RELATED EVENTS MAJOR FINDINGS THE NUMBER OF TS-RELATED EVENTS, WHICH WAS DRIVEN BY TS VIOLATIONS, INCPEASED SIGNIFICANTLY FROM 1984 TO 1985, AND Ti!EN MODERATED SLIGHTLY FROM 1985 TO 1986, WE OBSERVED AN INCREASING TREND IN THE NUMBER OF TS VIOLATIONS ATTRIBUTABLE TO THREEE SOURCES:
(1) RELATIVELY HIGH VIOLATION RATES EXPERIENCED BY A SMALL GROUP OF MATURE PLANTS WITH I!EPETITIOUS EVENTS k (2) A SLOWLY INCREASING AVERAGE VIOLATION RATE FOR THE REST OF THE MATURE PLANTS
- (\ (3) A CLEAR CONTRIBUTION FROM NEWLY LICENSED PLANTS THE RESULTS OF OUR ANALYSIS OF 1985 AND 1986 TS VIOLATIONS SUPPORTED THE TSIP CONCLUSIONS REGARDING THE SIGNIFICANCE OF VIOLATIONS INVOLVING FIRE PROTECTION SYSTEMS, l
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