ML20148G815
| ML20148G815 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Hatch  |
| Issue date: | 03/22/1988 |
| From: | Gucwa L GEORGIA POWER CO. |
| To: | NRC OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATION & RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (ARM) |
| References | |
| 88-003, 88-3, SL-4355, NUDOCS 8803290232 | |
| Download: ML20148G815 (7) | |
Text
._
Georgia Po4er Company 333 Pedmont Asenue Atlanta. Georg a 30308 Telephone 404 526 6526 Malng Address Post Oftce Box 4545 Atlanta, Georg130302 Georgia Power L.T Guewa IN 5*" N'T 3M Manager Nuc: car Safety and Lcens.ng SL-4355 0177I X7GJ17-H540 March 22, 1988 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Document Control Desk Hashington, D. C.
20555 PLANT HATCH - UNIT 2 NRC DOCKET 50-566 OPERATING LICENSE NPF-5
{
i SPECIAL REPORT 88-003 EMERGENCY LIGHT INOPERABLE FOR LONGER THAN 24 HOURS RESULTS IN SPECIAL REPORT AS REQUIRED BY FIRE HAZARDS REPORT I
Gentlemen:
(
In accordance with the requirements of the Plant Hatch Unit 2 Technical Specifications Section 6.9.2, and the Fire Hazards Analysis report Appendix B,
Georgia Power Company is submitting the enclosed I
Special Report concerning an event where an emergency light was inoperable longer than 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.
This event occurred at Plant Hatch -
Unit 2.
Sincerely, f%
L. T. Gucwa 1
LGB/lc I
Enclosure:
SR 50-366/1988-003 c:
(see next page) 2$
8803290232 es0322
[0 DR ADOCK 0500 6
j
GeorgiaPower d U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission March 22, 1988 Page Two r
c: Georaia Power Comoany Mr. J. T. Beckham, Jr., Vice President - Plant Hatch GO-NORMS U. S. Nuclear Reaulatory Commission. Hashington. D. C.
Mr. L. P. Crocker, Licensing Project Manager - Hatch U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Reaion II Dr. J. N. Grace, Regional Administrator Mr. P. Holmes-Ray, Senior Resident Inspector - Hatch 0177I 70077$
GeorgiaPower d ENCLOSURE PLANT HATCH - UNIT 2 NRC DOCKET 50-366 OPERATING LICENSE NPF-5 SPECIAL REPORT 88-003 EMERGENCY LIGHT INOPERABLE FOR LONGER THAN 24 HOURS RESULTS IN SPECIAL REPORT AS REQUIRED BY FIRE HAZARDS REPORT A.
REQUIREMENT FOR REPORT This report is required per the Unit 2 Technical Specifications section 6.9.2.
This section of the Technical Specifications states that special reports for fire protection equipment operating and surveillance requirements shall be submitted, as required, by the Fire Hazards Analysis rcport (FHA) and its Appendix B requirements.
The FHA section 1.9.1 states that all self contained, battery powered emergency lighting units required to support unit shutdown in the event of a fire and coincident loss of off site power shall be operable at all times.
The action statement allows for the lights to be inoperable for up to 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.
If this time period is exceeded, a special report is required.
B.
UNIT (s) STATUS AT TIME OF EVENTS On 2/22/88, Unit 2 was in the refueling mode of operation for the unit's seventh refueling outage.
The Unit 2 reactor parameters were as follows:
thermal power was zero, pressure was atmospheric, and reactor coolant temperature was approximately 95 degrees Fahrenheit (OF).
Ol??I E-1 03/22/88 SL-4355 t
l OIII
l l
Georgia Power h j
l l
ENCLOSURE (Continued)
EMERGENCY LIGHT INOPERABLE FOR LONGER THAN 24 HOURS RESULTS IN SPECIAL REPORT AS REQUIRED fly FIRE HAZARDS REPORT C.
DESCRIPTION OF EVENT On 2/22/88 at approximately 2024 CST, plant operations personnel determined that an emergency lighting unit (2R42-E017) would not work.
The unit also was not "indicating or charging", in addition to having a broken test switch.
Deficiency Card 2-88-871 was written, as required by the plant's administrative control procedures, to document the condition.
This emergency lighting unit was functional during the last operational test on 2/8/88.
Plant fire protection personnel were notified.
They initiated an investigation to determine the reason the lighting unit was not working.
At 1315 CST on 2/24/d8, they generated another Deficiency Card (2-88-920).
This Deficiency Card documented the fact that the lighting unit had been inoperable longer than 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> (which is a condition prohibited by the FHA).
A Maintenance Hork Order (MHO 2-88-0996) was written to repair the test switch.
This emergency lighting unit, 2R42-E017, has two lamp heads and is located in an air lock in the Unit 2 reactor building.
This airlock forms part of the secondary containment structure and connects the reactor building to the turbine building at the 130 foot elevation.
Emergency lighting units are provided to illuminate the areas containing equipment needed for normal and remote shutdown, as well as the access and egress routes which must be taken to reach the necessary equipment.
0177I E-2 03/22/88 SL-4355 m
O GeorgiaPower A ENCLOSURE (Continued)
EMERGENCY LIGHT INOPERABLE FOR LONGER THAN 24 HOURS RESULTS IN SPECIAL REPORT AS REQUIRED BY FIRE HAZARDS REPORT The test switch was replaced on the emergency' lighting unit on 2/24/88 and the switch was verified as operable on 2/26/88 by the Shift Supervisor.
Plant personnel documented these actions 1
on the HH0, as required by the plant's administrative control procedures.
At this time, the Unit 2 emergency lighting unit (2R42-E017) was returned to an operable condition and the requirements of the FHA were met.
D.
CAUSE OF EVENT The event occurred as a result of a damaged test switch.
The broken switch allowed electrical current to flow into the emergency lights.
This drained the reserve battery and caused the light unit to become inoperable.
J It is not known, at this time, how the switch was broken.
It is possible that during outage related work activities (such as i
transporting construction materials into the airlock),
the J
switch was damaged, i
E.
ANALYSIS OF EVENT Emergency lighting unit 2R42-E017 is located in an airlock in the Unit 2 reactor building.
The airlock connects the reactor building and the turbine building.
This airlock contains two doors:
one is on the reactor building side of the airlock, while the other is on the turbine building side of the airlock.
i 0177I E-3 03/22/88 SL-4355 rwrrs
O GeorgiaPower A
)
l ENCLOSURE (Continued)
EMERGENCY LIGHT IN0PERABLE FOR LONGER THAN 24 HOURS RESULTS IN SPECIAL REPORT AS REQUIRED BY FIRE HAZARDS REPORT The airlock door on the reactor building side contains a square piece of safety glass (approximately one foot square) with enforcing wire in the glass.
This glass allows light to enter the airlock from the reactor building.
Plant Nuclear Safety and Compliance (NSC) personnel physically observed the location of other emergency light stations in the vicinity of the airlock to determine what other light sources were available should emergency lighting unit 2R42-E017 fail or during a loss of normal light sources.
NSC personnel found two emergency lighting units (2R42-E033 and 2R42-E098) that are located inside the Unit 2 reactor building with light heads that point in the direction of the airlock door.
The NSC investigation concluded that the emergency light from the lamp heads from emergency lights 2R42-E033 and 2R42-E098 would be sufficient to penetrate the one foot square safety glass in the airlock door.
These light sources would provide sufficient light to allow plant personnel to enter or leave the Unit 2 reactor building (via the airlock) in an emergency situation.
- Also, NSC personnel determined that emergency lighting unit 2R42-E001 (located on the turbine building side of the airlock),
would provide additional emergency lighting in an emergency situation.
Based on the above information, it is concluded that this event had no adverse impact on nuclear safety.
Additionally, since there were other emergency lighting units in sufficient proximity to unit 2R42-E019 (the unit that would not work on 2/22/88), that would have provided sufficient illumination, it is believed that the consequences of this event would not be more severe under other power conditions.
0177I E-4 03/22/88 SL-4355 rxns
GeorgiaPower b ENCLOSURE (Continued)
EMERGENCY LIGHT INOPERABLE FOR LONGER THAN 24 HOURS RESULTS IN SPECIAL REPORT AS REQUIRED BY FIRE HAZARDS REPORT F.
CORRECTIVE ACTIONS Corrective actions for this event included:
l 1.
On 2/24/88, plant engineering support fire protection personnel verified that emergency lighting unit 2R42-E017 was inoperable.
They determined that prompt corrective actions were necessary to return the lighting unit to an operable condition.
2.
On 2/24/88, plant maintenance personnel replaced the l
broken test switch and returned the emergency lighting unit to service.
The repair work was documented on MHO 2-88-996, as required by the plant's administrative control procedures.
3.
On 2/26/88, licensed plant operations personnel verified that emergency lighting unit 2R42-E017 was returned to service and was operable.
Following the verification of operability, they documented that the functional test requirements had been satisfactorily met.
1 l
0177I E-5 03/22/88 SL-4355 70077S