B16471, Proposed Tech Specs Modifying Definition 1.8 Re Containment Integrity

Proposed Tech Specs Modifying Definition 1.8 Re Containment Integrity

ML20148C977
Person / Time
Site:	Millstone
Issue date:	05/20/1997
From:	NORTHEAST NUCLEAR ENERGY CO.
To:
Shared Package
ML20148C968	List: B16471, Proposed Tech Specs Modifying Definition 1.8 Re Containment Integrity ML20148C962
References
B16471, NUDOCS 9705290320
Download: ML20148C977 (35)

Text

.

4e;;ue: 1, 1975

• DEFINITIONS fb cept L valeer G

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1. " ##'~ ""# "#'"'~d M^ r CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY CA~ / ne pc a,r4J 4 y 1.8 CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY shall exist when:

M"' #"" *** M 3 4

1. 8.1 All penetrations required to be closed during accident

)

conditions are either:

Capable of being closed by an OPERABLE containment a.

automatic isolation valve system, or b.

Closed by manual valves, blind flanges, or deactivated automatic valves secured in their closed positions, 1.8.2 The equipment hatch is closed and sealed, and 1.8.3 The airlock is OPERABLE pursuant to Specification 3.6.1.3.

t CHANNEL CALIBRATION 1.9 A CHANNEL CALIBRATION shall be the adjustment, as necessary, of the channel output such that it responds with the necessary range and accuracy to known values of the parameter which the channel monitors.

The CHANNEL CALIBRATION shall encompass the entire channel including the sensor and A%V alarm and/or trip functions, and shall include the CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL The CHANNEL CALIBRATION may be performed by any series of sequen-TEST.

tial, overlapping or total channel steps such that the entire channel is calibrated.

CHANNEL CHECK 1.10 A CHANNEL CHECK shall be the qualitative assessment of channel behavior during operation by observation. This determination shall include, where possible, comparison of the channel indication and/or status with other indications and/or status deMved from independent instrument channels measuring the same parameter.

CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST 1.11 A CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST shall be the injection of a simulated" signal into the channel as close to the primary sensor as practicable to

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verify OPERABILITY including alann and/or trip functions.

MILLSTONE - UNIT 2 1-2 9705290320 970520 PDR ADOCK 05000336 P

PDR

6

-September 20,199G 4 3/4.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS i -

l, 3/4.6.1 PRIMARY CONTAINMENT CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.6.1.1 Primary CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY shall be maintained.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3 and 4.

ACTION:

Without primary CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY *, restore CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY within one hour or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in COLD l

SHLriDOWN within the next 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />.

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f u,.Ju u d~is trdue eusreai as pemirr<Jdy SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENT 5

(&ndi<d e 3 6. 3 /

3 4.6.1.1 Primary CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY shall be demonstrated: H l

a.

At least once per 31 days by verifying that all penetrations not l

capable of being closed by OPERABLE containment automatic isola-tion valves and required to be closed during accident conditions I

are closed by valves, blind flanges, or deactivated automatic valvessecuredintheirpositions,exceptpspr:vid:dia.T.!,le

-3.G-2 vi 5peciTicaticr. 3.0.3.1, L

b.

At le'ast once per 31 days by verifying the equipment hatch is 1

closed and sealed.

c.

By verifying the containment air lock is OPERABLE per Specifica-tion 3.6.1.3.

d.

After each closing of a penetration subject to type B testing (except the containment air lock), if opened following a Type l

A or B test, by leak rate testing in accordance with the Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program.

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MJ u.,h,c.k a n loeded IN ode fru cadamed a~/ are loc Aeds

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frew s 'l2 a'ayr.

• 0peration within the time allowances of the ACTION statements of Specifica-i,@M l%

tion 3.6.1.3 does not constitute a loss of CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY.

l AmendmentNo.U,Q,/N MILLSTONE - UNIT 2 3/4 6-1 C238 j

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CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS 3/4.6.3 CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION Sach 3.6.3.1 -The containment isolation valvef specified in Table 3.6-fr'*~~

shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1,_2, 3 and 4.

ACTION:

With one or more of the isolation valve (s) specified 4 w a 6

'e inoperable, either:

a.

Restore the inoperable valve (s) to OPERABLE status within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />, or b.

Isolate the affected penetration (s) within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> by use of a deactivated automatic valve (s) secured in the isolation l

position (s), or Isolate the affected penetration (s) within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> by use of a c.

closed manual valve (s) or blind flange (s); or d.

Be in COLD SHUTDOWN within the next 36 hours4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br />.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4. 6. 3. l'.1 -The ation valvefspecifiedMble 3 h able during plant operation shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:

a.

At least once per 32 days by:

l 1.

Exercising each power operatdd valve through one complete l

cycle of full travel and measuring the isolation time, and 2.

Exercising each manual valve, except those that are closed, through one complete cycle of full travel.

b.

Imediately prior to returning the valve to service after e

maintenance r or replacement work is performed on the 6

4 Locked cv sedal clos <J +/ses.may de opme / on un ide,,,,,rt<,,,

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buas a.lu a./~,~,w,s twe ecs Mik v

MILLSTONE - UNIT 2 3/4 6-15 l

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• ardi 23,1977

.q CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS l

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (Continue'd) i valve or its associated actuator, control or power circuit by performance of the applicable cycling test, above.

4.6.3.1.2 Each isolation valve :pecified ir Teb1: 2.5 11 be demonstrated OPERABLE during the COLD SHUTDOWN or REFUELING MODE at 1 east once per 18 months by:

Verifying that on a containment isolation test signal, each a.

isolation va'Ive actuates to its isolation position, b.

Verifying that on a Containment Radiation-High signal, all containment purge valves actuate to their isolation position, j

Exercising each power operated valve not testable during plant c.

operation, through one complete cycle of full travel and l 20 measuring its isolation time, and d.

Exercising each manual valve not locked, sealed or otherwise I

secured in position through at least one complete cycle of l 20 full travel.

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l MILLSTONE - UNIT 2 3/4 6-16

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i 1_AULE 3.6-2 C0flTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES TESTABLE DURING MAXIMUM FUNCTION PLANT OPERATION ISOLATION TIME VALVE NUMBER

'k A.

CONTAINMENT ISOLAT VALVES Yes 5 seconds D

Primary Makeup Water 2-PMW-43 Reactor Coolant letdown Line No 5 seconds 2-C11-089 Reactor Coolant letdown Line No 5 seconds 2-011-516 ntainment Sump to Aerated Waste 2-SSP-16.1 Yes 5 seconds in Tank Y

l' Conta ent Sump to Aerated Waste 2-SSP-16.2 Yes 5 seconds Drain k

h Reactor Coo Sampling Yes 5 seconds Reactor Coolan(t S mpling Yes 5 seconds h g L, 2-RC-001 Reactor Coolant S ing /

5 seconds $ 8 Yes pw

?

2-RC-002 Yes 5 seconds G

2-RC-003 Reactor Coolant Sam ' g Yes 5 seconds gg 2-RC-45 Reactor Coolant Samplin 2-LRR-61.1 Yes 5 ser.eds w4 es Steam Generator Blowdown

@A Yes 5 seconds ' c%

2-MS-220A Steam Generator Blowdown 2-MS-220R O

Yes 5 seconds.

Nitrogen Supply 2-SI-312 Primary Drain Tank to Clean Radwaste Yes 5 seconds 2-LRR-43.1 System Primary Drain Tank to Clean Radwaste 5 seconds 2-LRR-43.2 Yes System Reactor Coolant Pump Seal Controlled 2-C11-506 No 5 seconds 5

Bleedoff 5

Reactor Coolant Pump Seal Controlled 2-CII-190 Ho

'N 5 seconds

[

Bleedoff '

Reactor Coolant Pump Seal Controlled

'N 2-C11-505 No

'S seconds Bleedoff x

w" Yes 5 s'econds Waste Gas lleader 2-Git-l i.1 5 seco'nds 2-GR-11.2 Waste Gas lleader Yes

i TABLE 3.6-2 (Continued)

CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES ai'i TESTABLE DURING MAXIMUM VALV M BER FUNCTION PLANT _0PERATION ISOLATION TIME 4

p d

s N

d

A.

CONTAINMERT ISOLATION VALVES Containment Air Sample Yes 5 seconds E

2-AC-12 Containment Air Sample Yes 5 seconds Containment Air Sample Yes 5 seconds f

Z 2-AC-15 2-AC-20 Containment Air Sample Yes 5 seconds m

2-AC-47 Containment f.!r Sample Yes 5 seconds HV-8150 Containment Air Sample Yes 5 seconds y

HV-8151 2-MS-191A team Generator Sample Yes 5 seconds 3

2-MS-1918 St)

Generator Sample Yes 5 seconds Np l

N, 2-EB-91 Hydrogen rge Yes 5 seconds N

g Yes 5 seconds g

1 2-EB-99 Hydrogen Purge Yes 5 seconds M-2-EB-92 Hydrogen Pu e gh, w

2-EB-100 Hydrogen Purge Yes 5 seconds k'

o, s

5 B.

MANUAL N

2-SI-709*

Shutdown Cooling Yes Not Applicable.

Safety Injection Tank Test L Yes Not Applicable l

2-SI-463*

2-SA-19*

Station Air Ys Not Applicable 2-RW-21*

Refueling Water Purification Yes kot Appitcable 2-RW-63*

Refueling Water Purification Yes Not Applicable 2-RW-154*

Refueling Water Purification Yes Not Applicable

- es 2-RW-232*

Refueling Water Purification Yes Not Appilcable yj o

2-AC-46*

Hydrogen MonitoH ng Yes Not Applicable Ef k

2-AC-51*

Hydrogen Monitoring Yes Nqt Appitcable 1

E a

2-MS-458*

AFW Condensate Drain Yes Not4pp1tcable g

2-MS-459*

AFW Condensate Drain Yes Not Ap Itcable k;

C.

OTilER - NOT APPLICABLE

'_._*May be opened on an Intermittent basis under administrative control.

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y 4ctecr C,1980 4

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1' CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS BASES 3/4.6.2 DEPRESSUR12AT10N AND COOLING SYSTEMS 3/4.6.2.1 CONTAINMENT SPRAY SYSTEM _

The OPERABILITY of the containment spray system ensures that contain-ment depressurization and cooling capability will be available in the event of a LOCA. The pressure reduction and resultant lower containment leakage rate are consistent with the assumptions used in the accident The leak rate surveillance requirements assure that the analyses.

1eakage assumed for the system outside containment during the recircula-47 tion phase will not be exceeded.

3/4.6.2.2 CONTAINMENT AIR REC 1RCULATION SYSTEM _

The OPERABILITY of the containment cooling system ensures that

1) the containment air temperature will be maintained within limits during normal operation, and 2) adequate heat removal capacity is available when operated in conjunction with the containment spray' systems during post-u0CA conditions.

( -

3/4.6.3 COUTAINt1ENT ISOLATION VALVES pygg 4_

The OPERABILITY of the containment isolation valves ensures that the containment atmosphere will be isolated from the outside environment in the event of a release of radioactive material to the continment atmos-

..ohere or pressurization of the containment.

Containment isolation within she time limits specified ensures that the release of radioactive material

. o the environment will be consistent with the assumptions used in the t

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The containment purge supply and exhaust '. solation valves are required ko be closed and electrically deactivated during plant operation since these l

valves have not been demonstrated capable of closing during a LOCA or steam Dine break accident.

Such a demonstration would require justification of -

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,:the mechanical operability of the surge valves 'and consideration of the i: appropriateness of the electrical override circuits.

Maintaining these iivalves closed during plant operaticns. ensures that excessive quantities of l

tradioactive materials will not be released via the containment purge system. (

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i B 3/2 6-3

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[CLLSTONE-UNIT 2

I INSERT A - PAGE 3/4 6-3 l.

1 The Technical Requirements Manual contains the list of containment isolation l

valves (except the containment air lock and equipment hatch). Any changes to this list l

will be reviewed under 10CFR50.59 and approved by the Plant Operations Review Committee (PORC).

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INSERT B - PAGE 3/4 6-3 (1 of 5)

The containment isolation valves are used to close all fluid (liquid and gas) penetrations not required for operation of the engineered safety feature systems, to prevent the leakage of radioactive materials to the environment. The fluid penetrations which may require isolation after an accident are categorized as Type P, O, or N. The penetration types are listed with the containment isolation valves in the Technical Requirements Manual.

Type P penetrations are lines that connect to the reactor coolant pressure boundary (Criterion 55 of 10CFR50, Appendix A). These lines are provided with two containment isolation valves, one inside containment, and one outsida containment.

Type O penetrations are lines that are open to the containment internal atmosphere (Criterion 56 of 10CFR50, Appendix A). These lines are provided with two containment isolation valves, one inside containment, and one outside containment.

Type N penetrations are lines that neither connect to the reactor coolant pressure boundary nor are open to the containment internal atmosphere, but do form a closed system within the containment structure (Criterion 57 of 10CFR50, Appendix A).

These lines are provided with single containment isolation valves outside containment.

These valves are either remotely operated or locked closed manual valves.

Locked or sealed closed containment isolation valves may be opened on an i

intermittent basis provided appropriate administrative controls are established. The position of the NRC concerning acceptable administrative controls is contained in l

Generic Letter 91-08, " Removal of Component Lists from Technical Specifications,"

and includes the following considerations:

l (1) stationing an operator, who is in constant communication with the control room, l

at the valve controls, l

l (2) instructing this operator to close these valves in an accident situation, and i

(3) assuring that environmental conditions will not preclude access to close the valve and that this action will prevent the release of radioactivity outside the containment.

INSERT B - PAGE 3/4 6-3 (2 of 5)

The appropriate administrative controls, based on the above considerations, to allow locked or sealed closed containment isolation valves to be opened are contained in the procedures that will be used to operate the valves. Entries should be placed in the Shift Manager Log when these valves are opened and closed. However, it is not necessary to log into any Technical Specification Action Statement for these valves, provided the appropriate administrative controls have been established.

If a locked or sealed closed containment isolation valve is opened while operating in accordance with Abnormal or Emergency Operating Procedures (AOPs and EOPs), it is not necessary to establish a dedicated operator. The AOPs and EOPs provide sufficient procedural control over the operation of the containment isolation valves.

Opening a locked or sealed closed containment isolation valve bypasses a plant design feature that prevents the release of radioactivity outside the containment.

Therefore, this should not be done frequently, and the time the valve is opened should be minimized. As a general guideline, a locked or sealed closed containment isolation valve should not be opened longer than the time allowed to restore the valve to OPERABLE status, as stated in the action statement for LCO 3.6.3.1 " Containment Isolation Valves."

A discussion of the appropriate administrative controls for the containment isolation valves, that are expected to be opened during operation in MODES 1 through 4, is presented below.

Manual containment isolation valve 2-SI-463, safety injection tank (SIT) recirculation header stop valve, is opened to fill or drain the SITS and for Shutdown l

Cooling System (SDC) boron equalization. While 2-SI-463 is open, a dedicated operator, in continuous communication with the control room, is required.

When SDC is initiated, SDC suction isolation remotely operated valves 2-SI-652 l

and 2-SI-651 (inside containment isolation valve) and manual valve 2-SI-709 (outside containment isolation valve) are opened. 2-SI-651 is normally toerated from the control room. It does not receive an automatic containment isolMion closure signal, but is interlocked to prevent opening if Reactor Coolant System (RCS) pressure is greater than approximately 275 psia. When 2-SI-651 is opened from the control room, either l

one of the two required licensed (Reactor Operator) control room operators can be credited as the dedicated operator required for administrative control. It is not necessary to use a separate dedicGted operator.

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INSERT B - PAGE 3/4 6-3 (3 of 5) 1 When valve 2-SI-709 is opened locally, a separate dedicated operator is not required to remain at the valve. 2-SI-709 is opened before 2-SI-651. Therefore, opening 2-SI-709 will not establish a connection between the RCS and the SDC System. Opening 2-SI-651 will connect the RCS and SDC System. If a problem then develops,2-SI-651 can be closed from the control room.

The administrative controls for valves 2-SI-651 and 2-SI-709 only apply during SDC operation. They are acceptable because RCS pressure and temperature are significantly below normal operating pressure and temperature (the RCS is administratively required to be < 300 F and < 265 psia before shutdown cooling flow is initiated), the penetration flowpath can be isolated from the control room by closing either 2-SI-652 or 2-SI-651, and the manipulation of these valves, during this evolution, is controlled by plant procedures.

The pressurizer auxiliary spray valve,2-CH-517, can be used as an alternate method to decrease pressurizer pressure, or for boron precipitation control following a loss of coolant accident. When this valve is opened from the control room, either one of the two required licensed (Reactor Operator) control room operators can be credited as the dedicated operator required for administrative control. It is not necessary to use a separate dedicated operator.

The exception for 2-CH-517 is acceptable because the fluid that passes through this valve will be collected in the Pressurizer (reverse flow from the Pressurizer to the charging system is prevented by check valve 2-CH-431), and the penetration associated with 2-CH-517 is open during accident conditions to allow flow from the charging pumps. Also, this valve is normally operated from the control room, under the supervision of the licensed control room operators, in accordance with plant procedures.

A dedicated operator is not required when opening remotely operated valves associated with Type N fluid penetrations (Criterion 57 of 10CFR50, Appendix A).

Operating these valves from the control room is sufficient. The main steam isolation valves (2-MS-64A and 64B), atmospheric steam dump valves (2-MS-190A and 190B),

and the containment air recirculation cooler RBCCW discharge valves (2-RB-28.2A-D) are examples of remotely operated containment isolation valves associated with Type N fluid penetrations.

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INSERT B - PAGE 3/4 6-3 (4 of 5) l Local operation of the atmospheric steam dump valves (2-MS-190A and 1908),

or other remotely operated valves associated with Type N fluid penetrations, will require a dedicated operator in constant communication with the control room. Even though these valves can not be classified as locked or sealed closed, the use of a dedicated operator will satisfy administrative control requirements. Local operation of these valves with a dedicated operator is equivalent to the operation of other manual (locked or sealed closed) containment isolation valves with a dedicated operator.

l The main steam supplies to the turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pump (2-MS-201 and 2-MS-202) are remotely operated valves associated with Type N fluid penetrations. These valves are maintained open during power operation. 2-MS-201 is maintained energized, so it can be closed from the control room, if necessar' for containment isolation. However,2-MS-202 is deenergized open by removing the valve closing coil to satisfy Appendix R requirements. Therefore,2-MS-202 cannot be closed immediately from the control room, if necessary, for containment isolation. The closing coil for 2-MS-202 is 31cred in the Unit 2 control room, and can be installed to close the valve from the control room. It is not necessary to maintain a dedicated operator at 2-l MS-202 because this valve is already in the required accident position. Also, the steam that passes through this valve should not contain any radioactivity. The steam generators provide the barrier between the containment and the atmosphere.

Therefore, it would take an additional structural failure for radioactivity to be released to I

the environment through this valve.

Steam generator chemical addition valves,2-FW-15A and 2-FW-158, are l

opened to add chemicals to the steam generators using the Auxiliary Feedwater l

System (AFW). When either 2-FW-15A or 2-FW-15B is creened, a dedicated operator, in continuous communication with the control room, is required. Operation of these i

l valves is expected during plant startup and shutdown.

l The bypasses around the main steam supplies to the turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pump (2-MS-201 and 2-MS-202),2-MS-458 and 2-MS-459, are opened to drain water from the steam supply lines. When either 2-MS-458 or 2-MS-459 is opened, a dedicated operator, in continuous communication with the control room, is required. Operation of these valves is expected during plant startup.

The containment station air header isolation,2-SA-19, is opened to supply l-station air to containment. When 2-SA-19 is opened, a dedicded operator, in l

continuous communication with the control room, is required. Operation of this valve is only expected for maintenance activities inside containment.

T l

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{

t INSERT B - PAGE 3/4 6-3 (5 of 5)

The backup air supply master stop,2-IA-566, is opened to supply backup air to 2-CH-517,2-CH-518,2-CH-519,2-EB-88, and 2-EB-89. When 2-IA-566 is opened, a dedicated operator, in continuous communication with the control room, is required.

Operation of this valve is only expected in response to a loss of the normal air supply to the valves listed.

The nitrogen header drain valve,2-SI-045, is opened to depressurize the containment side of the nitrogen supply header stop valve,2-SI-312. When 2-SI-045 is opened, a dedicated operator, in continuous communication with the control room, is I

required. Operation of this valve is only expected after using the high pressure nitrogen system to raise SIT nitrogen pressure.

The containment waste gas header test connection isolation valve, 2-GR-63, is opened to sample the primary drain tank for oxygen and nitrogen. When 2-GR-63 is opened, a dedicated operator, in continuous communication with the control room, is required. Operation of this valve is expected during plant startup and shutdown.

l The determination of the appropriate administrative controls for these containment isolation valves included an evaluation of the expected environmental conditions. This evaluation has concluded environmental conditions will not preclude access to close the valve, and this action will prevent the release of radioactivity outside of containment through the respective penetration.

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l Docket No. 50-336 B16471 Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Unit No. 2 Proposed Revision to Technical Specifications Containment isolation Valves Retyped Pages l

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i May 1997 l

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... -. _ _. ~. _ _ _. - _. _ _ _ - _. _ _ _. _. _.... _ _ _. _ _.. _ _. _.. _ _. _.,

DEFINITIONS 1

l CONTAINNENT INTEGRITY 1.8 CONTAINMENT INTEORITY shall exist when:

1.8.1 All penetrations required to be closed during accident condititns are either:

a.

Capable of being closed by an OPERABLE containment automatic isolation valve system, or l

b.

Closed by manual valves, blind flanges, or deactivated l

automatic valves secured in their closed positions, except for valves that are open under administrative control as permitted by Specification 3.6.3.1, 1.8.2 The equipment hatch is closed and sealed, and 1.8.3 The airlock is OPERABLE pursuant to Specification 3.6.1.3.

CHANNEL CALIBRATION 1.9 A CHANNEL CALIBRATION shall be the adjustment, as necessary, of the channel output such that it responds with the necessary range and accuracy to known values of the parameter which the channel monitors. The' CHANNEL CALIBRATION shall encompass the entire channel including the sensor and alarm and/or trip functions, and shall include the CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST. The CHANNEL CALIBRATION may be performed by any series of sequen-tial, overlapping or total channel steps such that the entire channel is calibrated.

CHANNEL CHECK 1.10 A CHANNEL CHECK shall be the qualitative assessment of channel behavior during operation by observation. This determination shall include, where possible, comparison of the channel indication and/or

- status with other indications and/or status derived from independent instrument channels measuring the same parameter.

CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST 1.11 A CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST shall be the injection of a simulated signal into the channel as close to the primary sensor as practicable to verify OPERABILITY including alarm and/or trip functions.

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NILLSTONE - UNIT 2 1-2 Amendment No.

one

3/4.6 CONTAINNENT SYSTENS 3/4.6.1 PRINARY CONTAINNENT CONTAIMENT INTEGRITY LIMITING C0lWITION FOR OPERATION 3.6.1.1 Primary CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY shall be maintained.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3 and 4.

ACTION:

i Without primary CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY *, restore CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY within one hour or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in COLD l

SHUTDOWN within the next 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIRENENTS 4.6.1.1 Primary CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY shall be demonstrated:

a.

At least once per 31 days by verifying that all penetrations ** not l l

capable of being closed by OPERABLE containment automatic isola-tion valves and required to be closed during accident conditions are closed by valves, blind flanges, or deactivated automatic l

valves secured in their positions, except for valves that are open l

under administrative control as permitted by Specification 3.6.3.1. l b.

At least once per 31 days by verifying the equipment hatch is closed and sealed.

c.

By verifying the containment air lock is OPERABLE per Specifica-tion 3.6.1.3.

l d.

After each closing of a penetrat. ion subject to type B testing l

(except the containment air lock), if opened following a Type A or B test, by leak rate testing in accordance with the Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program.

• 0peration within the time allowances of the ACTION statements of Specifica-l tion 3.6.1.3 does not constitute a loss of CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY.

• • Except valves, blind flanges, and deactivated automatic valves which are located inside the containment and are locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in l

the closed position.

These penetrations shall be verified closed prior to l

entering MODE 4 from MODE 5, if not performed within the previous 92 days.

NILLSTONE - UNIT 2 3/4 6-1 Amendment No. JJ, pp, 177, 0297

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CONTAINNENT SYSTEMS 3/4.6.3 CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES LINITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.6.3.1 Each containment isolation valve shall be OPERABLE.*

l APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3 and 4.

ACTION:

With one or more of the isolation valve (s) inoperable, either:

l a.

Restore the inoperable valve (s) to OPERABLE status within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />, or b.

Isolate the affected penetration (s) within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> by use of a deactivated automatic valve (s) secured in the isolation i

l position (s),or c.

Isolate the affected penetration (s) within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> by use of a l

closed manual valve (s) or blind flange (s); or l

d.

Be in COLD SHUTDOWN within the next 36 hours4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br />.

l SURVEILLANCE REQUIRENENTS l

4.6.3.1.1 Each isolation valve testable during plant operation shall be l demonstrated OPERABLE:

a.

At least once per 92 days by:

i 1.

Exercising each power operated valve through one complete cycle of full travel and measuring the isolation time, and 2.

Exercising each manual valve, except those that are closed, through one complete cycle of full travel, b.

Immediately prior to returning the valve to service after maintenance, repair or replacement work is performed on the l

l l

• Locked or sealed closed valves may be opened on an intermittent basis l

under administrative controls.

l NILLSTONE - UNIT 2 3/4 6-15 Amendment No.

0298

a CONTAliflENT SYSTEMS SURVEILLANCE REQUIRENENTS (Continued) c F

valve or its associated actuator, control or power circuit by performance of the applicable cycling test, above.

l 4.6.3.1.2 Each isolation valve shall be demonstrated OPERABLE during l the COLD SHUTDOWN or REFUELING N00E at least once per 18 months by:

a.

Verifying that on a containment isolation test signal, each j

isolation valve actuates to its isolation position, l

l b.

Verifying that on a Containment Radiation-High signal, all containment purge valves actuate to their isolation position, c.

Exercising each power operated valve not testable during plant operation, through one complete cycle of full travel and measuring its isolation time, and d.

Exercising each manual valve not locked, sealed or otherwise secured in position through at least one complete cycle of full travel.

l l

l NILLSTONE - UNIT 2 3/4 6-16 Amendment No.

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THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK l

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NILLSTONE - UNIT 2 3/4 6-17 Amendment No.

0288

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l MILLSTONE - UNIT 2 3/4 6-18 Amendment No.

0298

CONTAINNENT SYSTENS BASES 3/4.6.2 DEPRESSURIZATION AND COOLING SYSTEMS 3/4.6.2.1 CONTAINMENT SPRAY SYSTEM The OPERABILITY of the containment spray system ensures that contain-ment depressurization and cooling capability will be available in the event of a LOCA. The pressure reduction and resultant lower containment leakage rate are et,nsistent with the assumptions used in the accident analyses. The leak rate surveillance requirements assure that the leakage assumed for the system outside containment during the recircula-tion phase will not be exceeded.

3/4.6.2.2 CONTAINMENT AIR RECIRCULATION SYSTEM The OPERABILITY of the containment cooling system ensures that

1) the containment air temperature will be maintained within limits during normal operation, and 2) adequate heat removal capacity is available when operated in conjunction with the containment spray systems during post-LOCA conditions.

3/4.6.3 CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES The Technical Requirements Manual contains the list of containment isolation valves (except the containment air lock and equipment hatch). Any changes to this list wiil be reviewed under 10CFR50.59 and approved by the Plant Operations Review Committee (PORC).

The OPERABILITY of the containment isolation valves ensures that the containment atmosphere will be isolated from the outside environment in the event of a release of radioactive material to the containment atmos-phere or pressurization of the containment. Containment isolation within the time limits specified ensures that the release of radioactive material to the environment will be consistent with the assumptions used in the analyses for a LOCA.

The containment isolation valves are used to close all fluid (liquid and gas) penetrations not required for operation of the engineered safety feature systems, to prevent the leakage of radioactive materials to the environment.

The fluid penetrations which may require isolation after an accident are categorized as Type P, 0, or N.

The penetration types are listed with the containment isolation valves in the Technical Requirements Manual.

Type P penetrations are lines that connect to the reactor coolant pressure boundary (Criterion 55 of 10CFR50, Appendix A). These lines are ovided with two containment isolation valves, one inside containment, and one outside containment.

NILLSTONE - UNIT 2 B 3/4 6-3 Amendment No.

0300

l 4

l CONTAUGiENT SYSTEMS i

BA$b 3/4.6.3 CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES (continued)

Type O penetrations are lines that are open to the containment internal atmosphere (Criterion 56 of 10CFR50, Appendix A). These lines are provided with two containment isolation valves, one inside containment, and one outside f

containment.

1 Type N penetrations are lines that neither connect to the reactor coolant pressure boundary nor are open to the containment internal atmosphere, but do form a closed system within the containment structure (Criterion 57 of 10CFR50, Appendix A). These lines are provided with single containment isolation valves outside centainment. These valves are either remotely operated or locked closed manual valves.

A n

Locked or sealed closed containment isolation valves may be opened on an intermittent basis provided appropriate administrative controls are established. The position of the NRC concerning acceptable administrative controls is contained in Generic Letter 91-08, " Removal of Component Lists from Technical Specifications," and includes the following considerations:

4 (1) stationing an operator, who is in constant communication with the control room, at the valve controls, I

(2) instructing this operator to close these valves in an accident situation, and j

(3) assuring that environmental conditions will not preclude access to close j

3 the valve and that this action will prevent the release of radioactivity 3

outside the containment.

The appropriate administrative controls, based on the above considerations, to allow locked or sealed closed containment isolation valves to be opened are contained in the procedures that will be used to operate the valves. Entries should be placed in the Shift Manager Log when these valves are opened and closed. However, it is not necessary to log into any Technical Specification Action Statement for these valves, provided the appropriate administrative controls have been established.

If a locked or sealed closed containment isolation valve is opened while operating in accordance with Abnormal or Emergency Operating Procedures (A0Ps and E0Ps), it is not necessary to establish a dedicated operator. The A0Ps and E0Ps provide sufficient procedural control over the operation of the containment isolation valves.

[

Opening a locked or sealed closed containment isolation valve bypasses a plant design feature that prevents the release of radioactivity outside the containment. Therefore, this should not be done frequently, and the time the valve is opened should be minimized. As a general guideline, a locked or sealed closed containment isolation valve should not be opened longer than the time allowed to restore the valve to OPERABLE status, as stated in the action Wtement for LCO 3.6.3.1 " Containment Isolation Valves."

MILLSTONE - UNIT 2 B 3/4 6-3a Amendment No.

0300

l CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS BASES 3/4.6.3 CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES (continued)

A. discussion of the appropriate administrative controle for the containment isolation valves, that are expected to be opened during operation.

in MODES 1 through 4, is presented below.

Manual containment isolation valve 2-SI-463, safety injection tank (SIT) recirculation header stop valve, is opened to fill or drain the SITS and for Shutdown Cooling System (SDC) boron equalization. While 2-SI-463 is open, a dedicated operator, in continuous communication with the control room, is l

required.

When SDC is initiated, SDC suction isolation remotely operated valves 2-SI-652 and 2-SI-651 (inside containment isolation valve) and manual valve 2-SI-709 (outside containment isolation valve) are opened.

2-SI-651 is normally operated from the control room.

It does not receive an automatic containment isolation closure signal, but is interlocked to prevent opening if Reactor Coolant System (RCS) pressure is greater than approximately 275 psia.

When 2-SI-651 is opened from the control room, either one of the two required licensed (Reactor Operator) control room operators can be credited as the dedicated operator required for administrative control. It is not necessary to use a separate dedicated operator.

When valve 2-SI-709 is opened locally, a separate dedicated operator is not required to remain at the valve. 2-SI-709 is opened before 2-SI-651.

Therefore, opening 2-SI-709 will not establish a connection between the RCS and the SDC System. Opening 2-SI-651 will connect the RCS and SDC System.

If a problam then develops, 2-SI-651 can be closed from the control room.

The administrative controls for valves 2-SI-651 and 2-SI-709 only apply l

during SDC operation. They are acceptable because RCS pressure and temperature are significantly below normal operating pressure and temperature (the RCS is administrative 1y required to be < 300 *F and < 265 psia before shutdown cooling flow is initiated), the penetration flowpath can be isolated from the control room by closing either 2-SI-652 or 2-SI-651, and the manipulation of these valves, during this evolution, is controlled by plant procedures, i

The pressurizer auxiliary spray valve, 2-CH-517, can be used as an alternate method to decrease pressurizer pressure, or for boron precipitation control following a loss of coolant accident. When this valve is opened from the control room, either one of the two required licensed (Reactor Operator) control room operators can be credited as the dedicated operator required for administrative control. It is not necessary to use a separate dedicated operator.

MILLSTONE - UNIT 2 B 3/4 6-3b Amendment No.

0300

1 i

\\

CONTADelENT SYSTEMS BASES 3/4.6.3 CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES (continued)

The exception for 2-CH-517 is acceptable because the fluid that passes through this valve will be collected in the Pressurizer (reverse flow from the Pressurizer to the charging system is prevented by check valve 2-CH-431), and the penetration associated with 2-CH-517 is open during accident conditions to allow flow from the charging pumps. Also, this valve is normally operated from the control room, under the supervision of the licensed control room operators, in accordance with plant procedures.

A dedicated operator is not required when opening remotely operated valves associated with Type N fluid penetrations (Criterion 57 of 10CFR50, Appendix A). Operating these valves from the control room is sufficient. The main steam isolation valves (2-MS-64A and 64B), atmospheric steam dump valves (2-MS-190A and 1908), and the containment air recirculation cooler RBCCW discharge valves (2-RB-28.2A-D) are examples of remotely operated containment isolation valves associated with Type N fluid penetrations.

Local operation of the atmospheric steam dump valves (2-MS-190A and 190B), or other remotely operated valves associated with Type N fluid penetrations, will require a dedicated operator in constant communication with the control room.

Even though these valves can not be classified as locked or. sealed closed, the use of a dedicated operator will satisfy administrative control requirements.

Local operation of these valves with a dedicated operator is equivalent to the operation of other manual (locked or sealed closed) containment isolation valves with a dedicated operator.

The main steam supplies to the turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pump (2-MS-201 and 2-MS-202) are remotely operated valves associated with Type N fluid penetrations.

These valves are maintained open during power operation.

2-MS-201 is maintained energized, so it can be closed from the control room, if necessary, for containment isolation. However, 2-MS-202 is deenergized open by removing the valve closing coil to satisfy Appendix R requirements.

Therefore, 2-MS-202 cannot be closed immediately from the control room, if necessary, for containment isolation. The closing coil for 2-MS-202 is stored in the Unit 2 control room, and can be installed to close the valve from the control room.

It is not necessary to maintain a dedicated operator at 2-MS-202 because this valve is already in the required accident position.

Also, the steam that passes through this valve should not contain any radioactivity. The steam generators provide the barrier between the containment and the atmosphere. Therefore, it would take an additional structural failure for radioactivity to be released to the environment through this valve.

Steam generator chemical addition valves, 2-FW-15A and 2-FW-158, are opened to add chemicals to the steam generators using the Auxiliary Feedwater System (AFW). When either 2-FW-15A or 2-FW-158 is opened, a dedicated operator, in continuous communication with the control room, is required.

Operation of these valves is expected during plant startup and shutdown.

{

MILLSTONE UNIT 2 B 3/4 6-3c Amendment No.

0300

\\

CONTAlf9 TENT SYSTEMS BASES.

3/4.6.3 CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES (continued)

The bypasses around the main steam supplies to the turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pump (2-MS-201 and 2-MS-202), 2-MS-458 and 2-MS-459, are opened to drain water from the steam supply lines. When either 2-MS-458 or 2-MS-459 is opened, a dedicated operator, in continuous communication with the control room, is required. Operation of these valves is expected during plant startup.

The containment station air header isolation, 2-SA-19, is opened to supply station air to containment. When 2-SA-19 is opened, a dedicated l

operator, in continuous communication with the control room, is required.

Operation of this valve is only expected for maintenance activities inside, containment.

The backup air supply master stop,,2-IA-566, is opened to supply backup l

air to 2-CH-517, 2-CH-518, 2-CH-519, 2-EB-88, and 2-EB-89. When 2-IA-566 is i

opened, a dedicated operator, in continuous communication with the control room, is required. Operation of this valve is only expected in response to a loss of the normal air supply to the valves listed.

The nitrogen header drain valve, 2-SI-045, is opened to depressurize the containment side of the nitrogen supply header stop valve, 2-SI-312. When 2-SI-045 is opened, a dedicated operator, in continuous communication with the control room, is required. Operation of this valve is only expected after using the high pressure nitrogen system to raise SIT nitrogen pressure.

The containment waste gas header test connection isolation valve, 2-GR-63, is opened to sample the primary drain tank for oxygen and nitrogen.

l When 2-GR-63 is opened, a dedicated operator, in continuous communication with I

the control room, is required. Operation of this valve is expected during l

plant startup and shutdown.

t l

The determination of the appropriate administrative controls for these containment isolation valves included ar: evaluation of the expected l

environmental conditions. This evaluation has concluded environmental conditions will not preclude access to close the valve, and this action will prevent the release of radioactivity outside of containment through the respective penetration.

j The containment purge supply and exhaust isolation valves are required to be closed and electrically deactivated during plant operation since these valves have not been demonstrated capable of closing during a LOCA or steam line break accident.

Such a demonstration would require justification of the mechanical operability of the purge valves and consideration of the appropriateness of the electrical override circuits. Maintaining these valves closed during plant operations ensures that excessive quantities of radioactive materials will not be' released via the containment purge system.

MILLSTONE - UNIT 2 B 3/4 6-3d Amendment No.

0300

?

l l

i Docket No. 50-336 B16471 i

I Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Unit No. 2 Proposed Revision to Technical Specifications Containment Isolation Valves Old Marked Up Pages i

l 1

May 1997

J hM9 j

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CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY

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1.8. C0NTAIMMENT INTEGRITY shall exis 1.8.1 All penetrations required to be closed during accident conditions are either:

l a.

Capable of being closed by an OPERABLE containment auto 4 tic isolation valve system. or l

c b.

Closed by manual valves, blind flanges, or deactivated -

automatic valves secured in their closed positionsy 1.B.2 The equipment hatch is closed and sealed, and 1.8.3 The airlock is OPEPABLE pursuant to Specification 3.6.1.3..

t CHANNEL CALIBRATION 1.9 A CHANNEL CALIBRATION shall be the adjustment, as necessary. of the channel output such that it responds with the necessary range and accuracy to-kno.m values of the parameter which the channel monitors. The CHANNEL CALIBRATION shall encompass the entire channel including the sensor and alarm and/or tri9 functions, and shall in:1ude the CKANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST. The CHANNIL CALIBP.ATION.may be perfomed by any series of sequen-tial, overlappirg or total channel steps such that the entire channel is calibrated.

CHANNEL CHECK 1.10 A CHANNEL CHECK shall be the qualitative assessment of channel behavior during operation by observation. This determination shall include, where possible, comparison of the channel indication and/or j

status with other indications and/or status derived from independent instrument channels measuring the same parameter.

1 CHANNEL FUNCTIORAL TEST 1.11 A CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST shall be the injection of a simulated signal into the channel as close to the primary sensor as practicable to verify OPERABILITY including alarx and/or trip functions.

l

$N MILLSTONE - UNIT 2 1-2 l

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3/A.6 t0cAIM" INT SYSTETG

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C0KTAfkdiNT 1hTEGRITY i

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPIUTION Z-j j

3.6.1.1 Primry Coh7AINMIh7 INTI

.TY shall be mintained.

APPL 1CA31LTTY: EDES 1, 2, 3 en 4.

ACTION:

Without primary CONTAINMEh71,1GRITY', testore CDNTAIN" INT INTIGUTY within STACBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in COLD j

one hour er be in at leest H SM'JTDh*N within the fo11cwi 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />.

1 SURVI!LtAN:E Rt001REMihis-j Ih'i lh'iEGRITY shall be der:nstrated:

=

j

4. 6.1.1 Prkary CORTAI per 31 days by verifying that all penetratic t

a.

At least one 'ng closed by 0PIRA!LE containment auto:nstic isels-capable of i,',

tien valves and required to be closed during accident conditions are closed by valves, blind flanges e' detetivated autatie valvet se-en d b their eat 4*4ea u sttp Es pr m ot: in7 at ig (3.6-2 of 5pecification J.6.3.1. ~

r

_-At least once per 31 days by verifying the equipment hatch is i

l b.

• closed and sealed.

By verifying the containment air lock is OPERA!LE per Specifica.

l tien 3.6.1.3.

c.

4

'ef a penetration subje:t to type 8 testing After each closinfreent air lock)l_the seal with gas at P

. if etend fellewine a Tree d.

(except the conta (64' l

e a bet. by lean nie testing sig) and verifying that when the measured leakage rate for A

these seals is added to the leakaan rate 6eten:ined pursuant to Spe:ification 4.6.1.2.6 for a15 other Type 8 and C penetra-tiens, the coctined lentage rate is less than or equal to i

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0.60 La-a pvnccoacwte wr"7"r c o e n m e r " r W *

• c. r 2 " T t T W ' ' "'

PtosenM

• 0peration within the time allswan:es of the ACTION statements of spe:ifica-4 tion 3.6.1.3 does not constitute a less of CONTAIRMINT INTEGRITY.

i l

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MILL 570NE UNIT 2 3/4 6-1 Amendment No. 25, l

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I$ 0.(..Y_._

7*

Except valves, blind flanges, ard deletivated automatic valves which are located inside the containment <

are locked, sealed, 'er otherwise secured in the closed position.

ahese penetrations shall be verified closed during each COLD SWTDOW except that such verification need not be perforr.ed mere often than once per 92 days.

f l

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i CONTA1NMENT SYSTEMS i

3/4.6.3 CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES LIMITING CONDITION TOR OPEMTION r>

3.6.3.1 The containment isolation valveshecified in Table 3.6-2 ['

shall be OPEMBLEX d4 *isolo,Nm.fN s g h er 9 l 4 tQ I

hP3LICABILITY: MODES l, 2,' 3 and 4.-

' I'h"E iN

~

~

5-ACTION:

[

valve (s)hecified in Table 3.6-2)

With one or more of the isolation 6

inoperable, either:

a.

Restore the inoperable valve (s) to OPERABLE status within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />, or b.

Isolate the affected penetration (s)'within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> by use of a deactivated automatic valve (s) secured in the isolation

[ ye position (s),or c

c.

Isolate the affected penetration (s) within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> by use of a closed manual valve (s) or blind flange (s); or d.

Be in COLD SHUTDOWN within the next 35 hours4.050926e-4 days <br />0.00972 hours <br />5.787037e-5 weeks <br />1.33175e-5 months <br />.

SURVEILLANCE REOUIREMENTS Gack o-

~~

4.6.3.1.1 pfe isolation valve [(specified in Table 3.6-2 ai) testable during plant operation shall be cFemonstrated OPERABLE:

a.

At least once per 92 days by:

1.

Exercising each power operatdd valve through one complete cycle of full travel and measuring the isolation time, and 2.

Exercising each manual valve, except those that are closed, through one complete cytle of full travel.

b.

Irnediately prior to returning the valve to service after maintenance repair or replacement work is performed on the 6

MILLSTONE - UNIT 2 3/4 6-15

a 4_

4 g

L-~--4

-a 4

i reh 23,19

{0NTAINMENT SYSTEMS SURVEILLANCE REOUIREMENTS (Continue ~d) l _

valve or its associated actuator, centrol or power circuit by performance of the applicable cycling test, above.

L 4.6.3.1.2 Each isolation valve (specified in Table 3.6-2)shall be

{

demonstrated OPERABLE during.the. COLD SHUTDOWN or. REFUELING MDDE at.-.

least once per 18 months by:

a.

Verifying that on a containment isolation test signal, each isolation valve actuates to its isolation position,

^

b.

Verifying that on a Contain-t Radiation-High signal, all i

containment purge valves actuate to their isolation position, c.

Exercising each power operated valve not testable during plan operation, through one complete cycle of full travel and 1 20 measuring its isolation time, and d.

Exercising each manual valve not locked, sealed or otherwise

~

i secured in position through at least one complete cycle of 20 full travel.

MILLSTONE - UNIT 2 3/4 6-15

~

C.j

D 1AI!LE 3.6

_er i

j CONTAINMENT ISOLATIO ALVES TESThutEDURING Mf MUM E NUMBER FUNCTION PLAtli OPEnATION ISpCATION TIMC A.

CONTAI ENT ISOLATION VALVES 2-PMW-43 Primary Makeup Water Yes

'i seconds 2-C11-069 neactor Coolant Letdown Line Ho 5 seconds k

2-011-516 Reactor Coolant letdown Line il 5 seconds 2-SSP-16.1 Containment Sump to Aerated Waste T

l Drain Tank Yes 5 seconds 2-SSP-16.2 Containment Sump to Aerated Waste i

f Drain Tank Yes 5 seconds a ctor Coolant Samp1tng Yes 5 seconds

/

2-RC-001 ne(act Coolant Samp1tng Yes 5 seconds i

,j 2-nc-002 Yes 5 seconds T

2-RC-003 neact oolant Sampling i

2-nc-45 neactor ant Sampling Yes 5 seconds 7

Yes 5 seconds y

2-tnR-61.1 Reactor Cool (Sampi

{ }7, 2-MS-220A Steam Generator D1 own

Yes 5 seconds Yes 5 seconds 2-MS-22cn Steam Generatojr 2-51-312 Hitrogen Sup ry Yes 5 seconds I

P 2-tRR-43.1 primary aln Tank to Clean Ra ste l

Sys Yes i

5 second,s 2-LnR-43.2 Prl.ry Drain ~ Tank to Clean Radwaste

, F- {

j Yes l

5 seconds q

System 2-011-506 Reactor Coolant Pump Seal Controlled 1

01cedorr No 5 seconds EE 2-011-190 Reactor Conlant Pump Seal Controlled P

niccdorf -

No 5 seconds

~C 2-011-50 S Reactor Coolant Pump Seal Controlled nicedorr No seconds g

2-Gn-11 Waste Gas ifcader Yes 5 sec ds 2-G 1.2 Waste Gas IIcader Yes 5 seconds 2

TABLE 3.6 onlinued l

, ' "],

CONTAINMENT _

T10N VALYCS t

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en MAXIMUM y O

TESYAnt[ DURING h

g[ NUMDG l' UNCTION PLANT OPERATION 15_0tATION TIR 3

h A.

CONTAINMCHT ISOLATION VALVES Containment Air Sample Yes seconds m

Containment Air Sample Yes 5 seconds T,

k i

5

-12 P

Containment Air Sample Yes 5 seconds d

2 5

i 5 seconds i

Containment Air Sample Yes i

2-AC-2

- (I u

2-AC-47 ilY-8150 -

Containment f.!r Sample Yes

' 5 seconds Containment Air Sample Yes

• 5 seconds

+

1

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p IIV-0151 2-MS-191A Steam Cenerator Sample Ye

$ seconds hI Steam Generator Sample s

5 seconds 2-MS-1918 2-CD-91 tydrogen Purge Yes 5 seconds r

2-ED-92 flyll en Purge Yes 5 seconds d

1 2-tD-99 Ilydro Purge Yes

5 seconds

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w 2-tB-100 Ilydrogen u ge Yes i 5 seconds I

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I B.

MANUAL 2-51-709*

Shutd ooling Yes Not Appilcable.

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2-s1-463*

Sare Injection Tank Te I.Ine Yes Not App 1tcable l

r 2-SA-19*

tation Air Yes Not Appilcable h

f I

2-RW-21*

Refueling Water Purification Yes Not Appilcable t

2-RW-63*

Refueling Water Purification Yes Not Applicable e

i 2-RW-154*

Refucilng Water Purification Yes Not Appitcabia 2-RW-232*

Refueling Water Purification Yes Not Appilcable tt 2-AC-46*

llydrogen Monitoring Yes et Applicable Y

3 Ilydrogen Monitoring Yes No pplicable g

2-AC-g 2-

-458*

AfW Condensate Drain Yes Not Ilcable i

~

2

-MS-459*

ATW Condensate Drain Yes Not App able o

g 0

C.

0111CR - NOT APPllCAutt x

2

?

'May be opened on an intermittent basis under administrative control.

g g

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ctober 6,10

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1

CONTAINKENT SYSTEMS BASES

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3/4.6.2 DEPRES$UR12AT10N AND C00L1Hb SYSTDis

~

3 /4. 6. 2.1 CONTAINMENT SPRAY SYSTDi The OPEP. ABILITY of the containment spray system ensures that contilin-ment depressurization and cooling capability will be available in the 2 vent of a LOCA. The pressure reduction and resultant lower containment leakage rate are consistent with the assumptions used in the accident analyses.

The leak rate surveillance requirements assure that the

,leakage assumed for the system outside containment during the recircula-c7 tien phase will not be exceeded.

3/4.6.2.2 CONTAINMENT AIR REC 1RCULAT10N SYSTD1 9

The OPERABILITY of the containment cooling system ensures that

1) the containment air temperature will be maintained within limits during normal operation, and 2) adequate heat removal capacity is available when operated in conjunction with the containment spray systems during post-CA conditions.

,_ 4.6.3 COUT Alm 1ENT ISOLATION V AL'.'ES The OPEPASILITY of the containment isolation valves ensures that the containment atmsphere will be isolated from the outside environment in h.he event of a release of radioactive material to the coEainment atmos-bhere or pressurization of the cor..ainment.

Containment isolation within

'*he titt limits specified ensures that the release of radioactive material

..: o the environment will be consistent with the assumptions used in the

!aqalyses for a LOCA.

The containment purge supply and exhaust isolation valves are requirec' h.o be closed and electrically deactivated during plant operation since these halves have not been demonstrated capable of closing during a LOCA or steam 47f Iline break accident.

Such a demonstration would require justification of

• ?.he mechanical operability of the ourgt valves and Consideration of the

appropriateness of the electrical override circuits. Ma'.ntaining these livalves closed during plant operatiens. ensures that excessive quantities of tradioactive materials will not be raleased,via the containment purge system.

j, I!

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l'.:LL5 TONE - UN 7 2 E I!* 6-3

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l

% w s t.v 4-The Technical Requirements Manual lists the containment isolation valves. The addition, deletion, or modification of any containment isolation vatve or related inf6rmation is reviewed under 10 CFR 50.59 and is approved by the Plant Operations Review Committee.

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