ML20148C065

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Transcript of 800108 Public Meeting in Washington,Dc Re Organizational Aspects of Emergency Planning.Pp 1-16
ML20148C065
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Issue date: 01/08/1980
From: Ahearne J
NRC COMMISSION (OCM)
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ML20148C069 List:
References
REF-10CFR9.7 SECY-80-006, SECY-80-6, NUDOCS 8001250053
Download: ML20148C065 (18)


Text

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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION IN THE MATTER OF:

PUBLIC MEETING on Discussion of Organizational Aspe' cts of Emergency Planning j

Piece. Washington, D.

C'.

1 Date - Tuesday, January 8,'1980 Pages 1 - 16

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(202)347 3700 ACE. FEDERAL REPORTERS,INC.

i CfficialReponers 444 North Capitol Street Washington, D.C. 20001 8 0012 5o O S3 NATIONWIDE COVERAGE. DAILY f.

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DISCLAIMER This is an unofficial transcript of a meeting of the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission held on Tuesdav. Januarr 8.

1990 in the Commissions's offices at 1717 H Street, N.

W., Washington, D. C.

The This transcript meeting was open to public attendance and observation.

has not been reviewed, corrected, or edited, and it may contain

' inaccuracies.

The transcript is intended solely for general informational purposes.

As provided by 10 CFR 9.103, it is not part of the formal or informal record of decision of the matters discussed.

Expressions of opinion in this transcript do not necessarily reflect final determinations or beliefs.

No pleading or other paper may be filed with the Commission in any proceeding as the result of or addressed to any statement or argument contained herein, except as the Commission may authorize.

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la CR 9086 WRBloom/wb 1 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 2

NUC.I. EAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 3

4 PUBLIC MEETING S

on 6

Discussion of Orgasisational Aspects 7

of Emergency Planning 8

9 Commissioner's Conference Room, Room 1130, 1717 H Street, N.W.,

10 Washington, D.C.

11 Tuesday, 8 January 1980 N

12 13 The meeting was called to order at 9:30 a.m.,

14 pursuant to notice, The Honorable John F. Ahearne presiding.

15 PRESENT:

16 JOHN F. AHEARNE, Chairman 17 VICTOR GILINSKY, Commissioner 18 RICHARD T. KENNEDY, Commissioner 19 Also present:

l 20 Leonard Bickwit, General Counsel 21 22 23 l'

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_P _R O_ C_ E E D_ _I N G_ _S 2

CHAIRMAN AHEARNE:

This is not yet an official 3

Commission meeting, We do not yet have a quorum.

However, 4

if you can bear with that, Lee, 5

MR. GOSSICK:

I think we can bear with it.

6 Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

7 You'1f recall last summer we briefed you on the 8

results of the Task Force that was put together to determine t

9 what needed to be done in the emergency preparedness area 10 as a result of the Three Mile Island accident.

On September 11 the 14th, there s a memorandum rom idr. Chilk which, among 12 other things, requested a study on long-term organizational 13 approaches for the emergency preparedness function in NRC.

14 In the President's message on the Kemeny report 15 FEMA was directed to, one, take the lead in offsite emergency 16 planning and response and secondly, to complete reviews of 17 State emergency plans.

NRC was asked to assist FEMA in these 18 activities.

19 In response to the Chilk memorandum on November 27th 20 we forwarded a paper on long-term organizational approaches 21 for emergency preparedness.

At the same time the Staff has 22 also been working with FEMA to prepare and finalize a memov 23 randum of understanding dealing with the respective respone 24 sibilities of FEMA and NRC for emergency planning for State c.p.a.r.: n.coners, inc.

25 and local governments.

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The latest version of the memorandum of understand-2 ing was sent down to you on January 4th in a Commission paper.

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.That paper pointed out that other memoranda of understanding 4

dealing with public education needs and also handling an 5

actual emergency would be the subject of future MOUs, 6

We would like this morning to give you the current 7

status of this me'morandum of understanding with FEMA having 8

to do with emergency plans in that that has a rather direct 9

bearing on the organizational paper which we will then discuss 10 with you.

11 CHAIRMAN AHEARNE:

Has some bearing on it?

12 MR. GOSSICK:

It does affect it, as well as the 13 resources that are involved, 1d We had hoped to be able to seek from you an approval 15 of the memorandum of understanding that we sent down this 16 morning but as you know, there have been some problems that 17 have arisen with FEMA on it.

18 CHAIRMAN AHEARNE:

Yes.

J 19 MR. GOSSICK:

I will ask Ray Smith to address that 20 subject now.

21 MR. SMITH:

Well, I don't intend to go into the 22 details of the memorandum very much.

You have the details in 23 the paper.

What I would like to do is to tell you what 2d happened-since you got the paper.

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25 FEMA has been working, reviewing the thing in more t

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detail.

We thought we had agreement with them on Friday in 2

all areas exc'ept the independent assessment of the evacuation 3

times, and they were looking into that.

4 We got from them early this morning--

They worked 5

last night.

This morning we got a revised draft from them 6

which I passed around to you.

The changes are in the double-7 spaced wording at the bottom of the first page, and the pen 8

marks, and also on the third page about three-quarters of the 9

way down, they've inserted a paragraph.

You can tell from 10 the typing where they've done that.

II COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:

When we say weIre negotiat-12 ing or talking with FEMA, are we talking with FEMA or are we I3 talking with the NRC employees, or in detail?

Id MR. SMITH:

We're talking with FEMA.

The NRC 15 employees that are to be detailed are involved in the opera--

16 tion but Frank, Ken and Macy have agreed to this wording.

I7 MR. GOSSICK:

Their revised version?

18 MR. SMITH:

Yes, the revised version e The effect of what the changes they put in last 20 night--

The effect of the changes is to throw us back into 21 a joint concurrence mode which we had carefully worded out 22 of the agreement as we saw it.

We had it worded so that they 23 did the basic review and we used their review as a kind of a 24 Staff input.

We did our own review of it but we didn't

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25 duplicate the detailed review they did, t

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The wording they've got in here now throws us into 2

a joint concurrence mode and--

3 CHAIRMAN AHEARNE:

Although it is not well-defined?

4 MR. SMITH:

That's right.

There may be some 5

arguments that we could come up with some wording that we 6

could agree on, but as it looks to us now, we couldn't detail 7

the people because we still have to have the people to do the-*

8 CHAIRMAN AHEARNE:

Ray, if I can say, at least my 9

reading of this is it is not so much we can or cannot but as 10 of the moment it is not clear and we need more clarification 11 of what is needed because there may be an issue with respect 12 to the legal terms.

It may be an issue with respect to the 13 actual resource allocation, and we just need--

It turns out 14 it is premature at the moment.

15 MR. SMITH:

This is a status report.

This is just 16 wh'ere we are.

We intend to go back to FEMA and continue to 17 work on the words.

And we'll just have to be back to you 18 whenever the words do get clarified.

19 CHAIRMAN AHEARNE:

All right.

20 MR. SMITH:

I think that's about all I have to say, 21 unless there are questions about the MOU.

22 CHAIRMAN AHEARNE:

No.

I 23 MR. GOSSICK:

Okay.

24 I will ask Mr. Haller then to start off with the

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MR. HALLER:

All right, thank you, Lee.

2 We have prepared a briefing on long-term organiza-tional options for emergency preparedness at NRC.

Our brief-ing is based on the November 27th memorandum which Mr. Gossick 5

forwarded to you that had a paper in it.

We did make some 6

changes to the briefing in order to accommodate what we 7

thought would be 'the memorandum of understanding between NRC 8

and FEMA.

9 However, as Ray just mentioned to you, this has 10 changed somewhat so there may be certain areas in the briefing 11 which are now subject to this uncertainty.

With that, let me turn the briefing over to Beth I3 Hayden who has actually been the prime analyst who has worked 14 on the paper, and she is prepared to run through some details with you.

16 MS. HAYDEN:

What I plan to do is to give youre 17 What I plan to do is to quickly run through the background of 18 setting up a paper to cover some emergency preparedness 19 functions that we considered, basically taken from the Task 0

080 Force on Emergency Planning's analytical framework for critiquing NRC's emergency. preparedness process, go through 22 the organizational options, and explain a little bit more 23 about the evaluation factors we used in assessing each of the 24

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May I have Slide 1, please?

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(siide.)

2 I think Norm pretty much took us through the back-3 ground on the Task Force on Emergency Planning, the SECY 4

memo dated September 14th, asking the Staff to develop alter-5 native approaches to long-range solutions for organizing 6

emergency preparedness, and recent developments within FEMA, 7

However, it's evident that FEMA will take the lead in off-8 site planning and NRC will assist them in some way.

How 9

exactly we're going to do that, we don't know at this point.

10 In setting up the papers we used the following 11 emergency preparedness functions:

12 Planning, which we considered to cover the de-13 velopment of on-and offsite planning and appropriate guidance 14 rules and standards on emergency preparedness.

15 The licensing function we considered to be evalua-16 tion and approval of those plans.

17 Implementing and testing are the exercises and 18 drills, the training and field assistance, and the actual ine 19 spection to verify the licensee plans, and the actual res-20 ponse to an emergency which includes running the Incident 21 Response Center and also monitoring all the participants'

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22 activities during the emergency.

23 The four organizational options we considered are 24 option 1, which would entail an EDO coordinator overseeing cs Federal Reporters, tric.

25 the various options, the various offices that are involved 9

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in emergency preparedness, and also were at the time of the 2

Three Mile Island accident.

This comes directly from the Task

'3 Force Report SECY 79-99, 4

The other three options were specified in the SEC[

memo of September 14th, these being Option 2',

to 5

6 either create a new EDO office or to expand or augment the 7

present State Programs Office.

8 Option 3 would be to consolidate the three program 9

offices, being the Licensing Offices at I&E, and Option 4 would.

10 be to consolidate in a single program office, and we decided II I&E would be probably the most advantageous line office due 12 to their field operation and response capabilities and their 13 onsite interaction with licensees and State and local govern-14 ments.

15 The evaluation factors we used were based pri-16 marily on findings from the Emergency Planning Task Force 17 and the LL from the Three Mile Island accident.

They are 18 removal of fragmentation.

In other words, we feel we must 19 focus attention of all participants carrying out different 20 functions into an operational program.

21 The second one is union of planning and response 22 functions, and it stands to reason that responders will have 23 a better understanding of their job and what is expected of 24 them if they are the ones that write the plans.

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CHAIRMAN AHEARNE:

Are you saying you reached the 2

conclusion that it is very important to have those people j

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running the response be also those running the planning?

4 MS. HAYDEN:

Yes, that's right.

5 The last one is the use of line expertise and 6

authority, with the argument that the line offices have greater 7

technical and operational expertise, and to have the direct 8

authority and responsibility for protecting the public health 9

and safety which we feel emergency preparedness is part of, 10 Slide 2, please.

11 (Slide.)

12 Next I would quickly like to highlight the options 13 that we considered.

14 Option 1 basically involves an EDO-level coordina-15 tor to overlook the various activities of all the offices 16 that are involved in emergency preparedness.

17 CHAIRMAN AHEARNE:

This is basically what we are 18 now doing, is that correct?

19 MS. HAYDEN:

Yes.

20 I think the only real advantages of this option 21 are that it provides some amnunt of coordination overlay and 22 centralizes tracking, and also gives a single point of con-23 tact for dealing with outside agencies.

24 Slide 3, please.

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In Option 2, basically this puts all emergency 2

preparedness functions except for inspection and response 3

actions in either an expanded State Programs Office or a new 4

EDO Office.

I don't really think we want to go into review 5

of FEMA's evaluation since that again could be changed.

6 I&E --

7 CHAIRMAN AHEARNE:

To what extent does this differ 8

from what State Programs had been doing?

9 MS. EAYDEN:

This would give all the planning and 10 licensing to this new office, 11 CHAIRMAN AHEARNE:

It would give them licensing?

12 MS. EAYDEN:

Yes.

13 (Continuing) -- leaving basically the inspection 14 and the actual response, running an Incident Response Center 15 to I&E.

16 And as in all the other options, we felt that 17 Standards should remain separate, to write the regulations, 18 guidance and standards.

And also the Executive Management 19 Team in all the options would manage the actual response.

20 CHAIRMAN AHEARNE:

The main difference then between 21 this option and what had been occurring prior to Ray Smith's 22 function was that it would take the licensing out of NSS and 23 NRR?

24 MS. EAYDEN:

Yes.

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25 Without going through all the advantages and I k

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disadvantages, I think probably two of the biggest drawbacks 2

are that in putting the function primarily in a staff-office 3

it creates an operational responsibility without the line-4 expertise and the field capability, and without authority 5

over either of th,em.

And it fails to tie the planning 6

with response; in other words one group would be doing the 7

planning and another group would be carrying out the response.

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Slide 4, please.

9 (Slide.)

10 In Option 3, the basic division of functions is Il that NRR and NMSS would lead emergency response planning and 12 licensing, leaving I&E with most of the response functienc.

13 In other words there would.be a division between the functions Id of the planners and the responders.

15 This option offers some degree of improvement for 16 reducing fragmentation but it still separates some aspects of 17 planning from response within NRC.

18 CHAIRMAN AHEARNE:

What this ends up doing is I9 taking the functions that have been performed by State Programs 20 and puts them down into NRR and I&E.

Is that correct?

21 MS. EAYDEN:

Correct.

That's exactly it.

22 THis option does use line authority and expertise 23 and it also recognizes emergency preparedness as an operae 24 tional program, but it still splits the program amongst three

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Slide 5, please.

2 (Slide.)

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Under Option 4 I&E would have the lead for vir-4 tually all emergency preparedness.

And I think two of the 5

most important advantages of this option is that it gives all 6

the responsibility for emergency preparedness to a single 7

office, an office that has the authority, expertise and field 8

capability that we feel is needed for emergency preparedness, 9

And it also ties NRC's planning with their response.

1.190 10 CHAIRMAN AHEARNE:

I gathor there was a last minute Il thought about a disadvantage.

12 MS. RAYDEN:

Right.

It was brought up at the dry 13 run yesterday that it eliminates fragmentation in that there 14 are less offices involved.

But it also put an Inspection 15 office in the licensing process; which is not our normal way 16 of doing business.

So there would have to be some interface 17 between NRR and I&E, I suspect.

18 CHAIRMAN AHEARNE:

It's not an unthinkable process.

19 MR. EALLER:

That is not to suggest that there would 20 not have had to have been an interfact between them without 21 this interface.

22 MS. EAYDEN:

Slide 6, please.

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24 This chart summarizes the office preferences that e.r.cer : Reponen. Inc.

25 are based on a previous draft that we circulated for comment.

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As you can see, there is ri.ipport for each option.

However, 2

I think the mein point.to be made is that offices feel that 3

emergency preparedness should be organized in such a way 4

that a single party should be responsible for the program, 5

and that party will probably be a line office.

6 That is the presentation that has been requested, 7

MR. GOSSICK:

In forwarding this study down to 8

you, Mr. Chairman, my recommendation was, in effect, assuming 9

that the FEMA arrangement worked out, to go to Option 3 for 10 the time being and at some later date, either with a decision 11 now or reserved until a later date, move toward Option 4, 12 once the planning and the initial review of all of the plans 13 are carried out, to eventually move toward Option 4.

14 I think there's another factor that hasn't been 15 mentioned here that impinges on this and that of course is 16 whatever comes out of the Special Inquiry recommendations.

17 CHAIRMAN AHEARNE:

Norm, you had concluded that 18 Option 4 ought to be adopted.

It wasn't clear in this des.

19 cription whether you were suggesting Option 3 and then move 20 to Option 4, or go directly to Option 4.

21 MR. HALLER:

Let me go ahead and take that one.

22 My personal preference would be to decide now to 23

' move to Option 4 but recognize that one may have to go through 24 this transition which could last for the better part of l

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It's my feeling that it will take several months, 1

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even after we know where we're going in order to go through 2

the transitional arrangements, for the staffs to do the 3

coordination and any other internal organization's transfer 4

of personnel, et cetera, that will be necessary to get over 5

the hump.

6 I think we may be better ahead deciding now that 7

we're going to go to this type of a thing and then going.

8 there, rather than moving to an option 3, sort of settling 9

out of that one, finalizing it, and then going to another 10 transitional phase at the end of that, 11 So I think that was really the thought behind the 12 recommendation that we have.

13 CHAIRMAN AHEARNE:

In NRR's description of desiga 14 nating one lead office, leaving some functions-for other 15 offices, could that be interpreted as saying that they would 16 prefer either NRR or I&E as the lead office?

17 MR. HALLER:

That's my understanding.

I think it 18 might be appropriate to ask the NRR representative, i

19 MR. CASE:

Brian will respond.

20 MR. GRIMES:

That was the original intent.

Of 21 course there has been a good deal of activity in that area.

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But it would be correct that if l

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.we did go to Option 4 that would not be a great violation of 24 NRR's --

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25 MR. GRIMES:

I think Harold's primary concern in 4

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that area is the licensing process, especially for constructior, 2

permits and operating license reviews, that that function 3

should not stay in NRR.

But that's open to further con-4 sideration.

5 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:

I agree with Norm.

I 6

think we ought to decide now to move this function into one 7

office.

I think of the choices offered I think that I&E is 8

the right place, and this would make clear the direction we're 9

going in during this transition period.

10 I think to decide now to adopt a kind of interim 11 approach and reevaluate later is I think to let this problem 12 get away from us, 13 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:

I want to know what the 14 responsibilities are before I decide that.

And since I 15 gather we have a new proposal in this regard, I guess I'll 16 want to know what that means before I decide that.

17 CHAIRMAN AHEARNE:

I think that was Lee's point 18 at the beginning of this discussion.

19 And two of the other Commissioners also have to 20 have a chance to look at it.

21 I qather, Norm, that your last slide in this hand-22 out was a bit of lobbying for your points.

Is that correct?

23 MR. HALLER:

Well, we just thought it was a useful 24 thought that might be worthwhile appending to the paper.

.-eceral Reporters, Iric.

25 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:

I would say in any case,

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whatever we end up doing, this function ought to be in one 2

place.

3 COMMISSIONER KENNED'l:

I guess I agree with that.

4 CHAIRMAN AHEARNE:

I think that is a uniform agree-5 ment and the only question we've been trying to decide is 6

where.

And I think I share in a way both my colleagues' 7

opinions, and that is I think I&E is probably the right place 8

but I want to understand better what all of the responsi-t 9

bilities are going to be before I reach that conclusion, 10 Right?

11 All right.

With that, thank you very much, 12 gentlemen.

13 (Whereupon, at 10:00 a.m., the Commission

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14 meeting was concluded.)

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