ML20148A605
| ML20148A605 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Catawba  |
| Issue date: | 10/08/1996 |
| From: | Tam P NRC |
| To: | Collins T, Kopp L NRC |
| Shared Package | |
| ML082490708 | List: |
| References | |
| FOIA-97-99 NUDOCS 9705090095 | |
| Download: ML20148A605 (1) | |
Text
__ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
Eric
, i i; From Peter Tam,../ A,_
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To:
WNP6.TEC, WNP6. LIK, S'. r l l " r r ),,//
~~'S Date 10/8/96 10:18am
Subject:
Criticality Monitor for Onsite Transportation Route
/ Co M f ho Tim, Larry:
My licensee (Catawba) raised the following question.
I have consulted with NMSS (see attached e-mail) but am nowhere near an l
answer.
J All nuclear plants are licensed under Parts 30,-40, 50 and 70.
10 CFR 70.24 does not require criticality monitoring "when special nuclear matt' rial is being transported when packaged in accordance with requirements of Part 71..."
However, depending on the actual physical setup at a nuclear plant, upon arrival at I
the site, the nuclear fuel assemblies would be transported l
without packaging from the truck (or train) to the new fuel l
storage area.
While it is easy to see that moving assemblies one l
at a time in air has no physical possibility of attaining l
criticality, and therefore is of no safety concern, it is not clear if criticality monitors would be required on the route l
between the truck and the fresh fuel storage area.
In other words, because of the uniqae wording of 10 CFR 70.24, plants may need to have critical monitors (or an c:cemption from such) for the onsite transportation route, in addition to the l
storage location.
What do you think?
My licensee is anxious.
CC:
DXW, KNJ, HNB, DEL, JIZ, VXN From:
Laurence Kopp,_- /,* (
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To:
EWW, TEC Date:
10/8/96 2:28pm Subjects Cri'cicality Monitor for Onsite Transportation Route
-Forwarded -Reply l
l I was told by someone with higher authority than me (which could j
be just about anyone) that SRXB responsibility for criticality i
concerns begins (and NMSS's ends) as soon as the fuel is dropped l
on site.
Normally, procedures are in place which preclude placing 2 or more fuel assemblies within a certain distance of each other to preclude accidental criticality during inspection, etc.
Once stored in the fresh fuel racks, analyses are performed to show that criticality is precluded.
Therofore, we (NRR) base our criticality monitor exemption allowance on these 2 items, although I'm not sure if anyone ever really reviews the above-mentioned procedures.
t i
OC:
WNP3.PST 9705090095 970506 PDR FOIA WILLIAMS 97-99 PDR
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