ML20147J159
| ML20147J159 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 12/12/1978 |
| From: | Gilinsky V, Hendrie J, Kennedy R NRC COMMISSION (OCM) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20147J156 | List: |
| References | |
| REF-10CFR9.7 NUDOCS 7812270476 | |
| Download: ML20147J159 (149) | |
Text
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2 NU CLE A R' REGUI. ATO RY CO MMISSIO N -
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IN THE MATTER OF:
PUBLIC MEETING DISCUSSION OF SECY-78-616 - REPORTING THE PROGRESS OF RESOLUTION OF "UNRESOLVE0 SAFETY ISSUES" IN THE dRC ANNUAL REPORT Place -
Washington, D. c.
Date -
Tuesday, 12 December 1975 PCG**
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r DISCLAIMER -
This is. an unofficial transcript of a meeting of the Unf ted States Nuclear Regulatory Commission held on 12 December 1978 in the Commission's offices at.1717 H Street, H. W., Washington, D. C.
The meeting was open to public attenda'nce and observation.
Th'is transcript has not been reviewed, corrected, or edited, and it may contain inaccuracies.
. The transcript is intended solely for general infoma'tfonal purposes.
As provided by 10 CFR 9.103, it is not part of the formal or informal record of decision of the matters discussed.
Expressions of opinien in this transcript do not necessarily reflect final _ de~ terminations or beliefs.
No pleading or other paper may be' filed with the Commission in ainy proceeding as the result of or addressed to any statement or arg.mlent contained herein, except as the Commission may authorize.
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA DDamp
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION i
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4 PUBLIC MEETING 5
DISCUSSION OF SECY-78-616 - REPORTING THE PROGRESS
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OF RESOLUTION OF " UNRESOLVED SAFETY ISSUES" IN THE 7
NRC ANNUAL REPORT i
8 i 1 Room 1130 9
1717 H Street, N. W.
Washington, D. C.
i 10 Tuesday, 12 December'1978 f,
11 l
The Commission met, pursuant to notice, at 2410 p.m.
12 BEFORE:
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13 DR. JOSEPH M. HENDRIE, Chairman l
14 VICTOR GILINSKY, Commissioner i
15 i
RICHARD T. KENNEDY, Commissioner 16 PETER A. BRADFORD, Commissioner
'17 JOHN F. AHEARdE, Commissioner 18 PRESEAT:
19 Messrs. Aycock, Arnot, Baranewsky,* Bunch, Bivens, Case, 1
20 Denton, Hebdon, Gossick, Grimes, Hou, Kenneke, Kelley, Kovacs, Kreger, Murphy, deighbors,.O'Connor, Pawlicki, Ross, Mattson, 21 Rusell, Stello, Novac, Woods, and Wenzinger 4
22 23 24
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3 21 18 17-INNIS:1
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CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
Let us come to order.
We 2
meet againLfor the second time on the unresolved safety 3
issue chqMar. of the draf t annual report.
We had a good r
4 meeting on the subject' the other day and decided it was so 5
'much fun that we ought to carry on; so Harold, let me 6
invite you to pick up the thread where we left it.
7 MR. DENTON:
Thank you, Mr.. Chairman.
Today 8
we are prepared to discuss those dategory A items and those 9
items of research identified in dategories 1 and 2 that did 10 not make the unresolved safety issue list.
Il There were 40 original. category A's, 26 of. which 12 we ultimately put on the unresolved safety issue list, 13 leaving 24.
14 In the research categories 1 and 2, they had a 15 total of 25 items, 15 of which did make the unresolved i
16 safety issue.
There was double counting because they I
17 were in the same issue in some cases.
i I
18 In total, if you look at the ones that did not l
19 make it, there were a total of 29 3 ssues that did not make 3
20 it that were identified either as category A's by NRR or l
21 category 1 and 2 by RES.
Seven of these issues are l
t 22 discussed in the staff paper and in enclosure 2.
The 23 reasons are given as to why they were excluded.
Those 24
. discussions begin on page 9 and run through the next few a-Fears neoonen, sne, 25 pages, leaving a total of 22 issues that were not considered
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by the task force as generic -- as unresolved safety 2
issues.
We are prepared to go through those one by one.
3 We have a slide on each item.
We can promise not to spend t
4 more than three minutes on each item or it will take longer i
i 5
than an hour to get through the list.
6 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
There is constraint on 7
a hour?
8 MR. DENTON:
No.
Just picking a time in order 9
to make the whole list of 22 items.
We can spend as much 10 time as the Commission desires, of course, on any of them.
II Of the 22, one of them is resolved, so it is really 12 only 21 that we need to talk about.
13 Two other ones, also the staff has essentially 14 ccmpleted its review.
15 We have in the audience today individuals who can 16 provide detailed information on these if Mike's summary 17 is not sufficient.
18 Mike, why don't you begin with A-13?
I9 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
Could we start with A-12?
t 20 MR. DENTON:
Certainly. A-12 is discussed on I
21 page 9, fracture toughness.
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22 Mike, do you want to begin?
Then we will see 23 if we need assistance..
24 MR. CASE:
In other words, you would like to go Ace Federal Reporters, Inc.
25 back and forth even though it is discussed in the paper?
We i
1 5
I don't have a slide on those.
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2 COMMISSIONER'AHEARNE:
Perhaps I ought to first 3
ask the Chairman what he had in mind for this meeting.
I 4
CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
It is to give the staff a chance 5
to tell us about the ones that aren't on the list; a chance 6
to ask questions.
I think if you would like to --
7 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE: A412 just happens to be 8
the first of the A items that didn't make the list.
9 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
We could work our way, in fact,
~
10 through the A list.
From one to -- these days it is 44, I II think.
I could announce that A-1 through 11 are on the 12 lists.
I3 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
I was just going down Id the OPE.
They gave this fairly nice summary tha', enables 15 me to read.
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t 16 MR AYCOCK:
We are starting with A-12.
I don't II believe we have a summary statement of what the task is I
18 here, so I am going to try to provide that.
Fracture I9 toughness is steam generator reactor coolant pump supports.
20 is an issue dealing with whether or not support materials 21 have adequate fracture toughness. Sometof you may be 4
22 f amiliar with the north and in a fracture toughness support l
23 problem.
I'm not sure whether it was discussed with the 2#
Commission.
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25 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
What is that problem?
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jg-4 MR. DENTON:
Let me be sure it is not cne 2
that's exparte.
3 MR. CASE:
I think we can talk about the problem i
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without identifying the case involved.
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5 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
You already have.
You 6
just identified the case.
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7 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:
There are other such 8
problems, potentially?
9 MR. CASE:
That's the issue.
10 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:
Why don't you tell us what the problem is and why it is potentially an issue?
I2 MR. CASE:
Do you want to have Dick do it?
He's 13 sort of extemporizing on this one.
Id MR. STELLP The, issue deals with whither or not i
15 the reactor coolant and steam generator supports from l
16 a fracture toughness point of view are adequate or not.
The
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i I7 question deals with how were the supports manuf actured and.
18 principally what materials were used and what are their fracture toughness properties.
20 We have initiated a program or we have gone out 21 and asked the licensees for information regarding the J
l design of these supports in all of the operating plants l
22 23 and others.
The results are presently under review where 24 we az.c: looking at the question of whether or not they are or m-Federal Reporters, Inc.
25 are not a problem and trying to categorize the relative r
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problem with respect to the materials.-
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The -issue is an issue where if you had a load, I
loss of coolant accident generating loads on the supports, 3
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would they have adequate toughness.
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There are two conditions necessary:
one, you 6
have to have the load;- then, of course, the supports, t
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the material itself has to be relatively cold so that.it i
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doesn't have the toughness.
If tdue material is i
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elevated in temperature, it is about its' ductility 10 temperature and is tougher.
For both of those, you need i
11 both of them which we consider to be unlikely; that is, 12 that you have a loss of coolant: accident at a time when the 13 material is relatively cold or in the state where you may have 14 a problem.
i 15 Because it involves the coincidence of these things, t
16 we don't believe that it represents any major reduction I
i 17 in safety.
We are alread.y pursuing the issue.
That is, therej END-1 18 is action going on.
Make no mistake about it.
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COMMI.SSIONER AHEARNE:
Is part of the question 2
whether the -- is it a reevaluation of the potent.ial problem 3
that has led to this concern, or was it some incident that 4
led to the concern?
5 MR. STELLO:
Well, in a review in a particular 6
case, we found that there were materials that were being used 7
for which the toughness was not what we wanted it to be.
8 This caused a concern, and we decided at that point that 9
we needed to go out and find out more about how other 10 plants had built these same structures.
.11 That's what we are doing now, so it was.a concern 12 raised,during a review in a particuler case for.which we 13 asked ourselves*
did we have adequate information on other 14 plants on that same assue?
The answer was no, we didn't 15 think we had enough.
We wanted more.
We went out and 16 got that more information.
17 COMMISSIONER AHE^RNE:
Then at the present time 18 it's not a question of what ought that toughness to be?
l 19 What ought that material to be?
It is more a question of 20 have plants been built to the right specification?
l
,21 MR. STELLO:
Well, there are way in which even 22 if the toughness isn't.what ycu would like it to be, you 23 can compensate for it.
There are compensatory things one 24 can do.
So it isn't critical that you have particular 25 toughne ss level.
Even that would be acceptable.
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317.02.2 bw 1
COMMISSIONER AHE ARNE It's good to find out what the e isting toughne ss level is?
x 2
3 MR. STELLO3 That's truel and as to whether or you would want to add more margin in assuring yourself l
4 5
it is adequate by taking extra measurest either more 6
in-service inspection or possibly wrapping the structures 7
with strip heaters to make sure they do stay warm at all 8
times.
9 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
Now obviously the re has 10 been at least one plant in which you had a -- you were 11 concerned?
12 MR. STELLO2 That's a true statement.
13 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE2 It seems to me that going 14 b,ack to that great discussion of yesterday, was it, what is 15 a -- one of these unresolved issues, this seems to have been 16 in your. definition.
17 MR. STELLos W e ll --
18 MR. CASE 2 The point Dick is making, even though 19 the situation might exist on a given plant, we don't think 20 that situation is a major -- let me get the definition --
21 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE But it's something that 22 you may end up requiring them to make changes?
Changes would 23 be to provide an increased level?
l 24 MR. CASE:
Increased level of safety.
We are not 25 dealing with a major problem, is the v3y we look at it, based
817.02.3 10 bw I
on our judgment and the risk evaluation.
2 MR. KENNEKEJ The risk-is not in an upward 3
direction, regardless of the amount.
4 MR. STELLO2 No.
Not regardless of the amount.
5 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
Are you saying that it 6
would be acceptable not to make any change.s?
7 MR. STELLO:
No.
8 MR. CASE 2 If we found this situation existed on 9
other plants.
I am not saying that.
I am saying that the i
potential problem out there is not a.najor reduction in 1
11 the degree of protection provided for public health and 12 safety.
13 There is a reduction a.11 right, but it's not 14 a major one.
15 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE If there were a major 16 reduction, you would probably be asking f or more drastic 17 action?
If you knew there was a major reduction?
We are just trying to 19 distinguish relative importance to safety, and it's our 20 judgment that there is enough distinction here that it does 21 not qualify as an unresolved safety issue.
MR. DENTON:
I think there are several factors, in 22 23 my mind.
It's a judgment call as to the significance of the 24 reduced fracture toughness, to begin with, because it requires 25 a combination of events.
Only in certain times during 1
817.02.4 J1 bw I
start up and cool down are you vulnerable to having this 2
contribute to a course of an accident.
3 Secondly, as I.think Vic's original survey shows, 4
we are not finding a very widespread problem?
5 MR. STELLO:
The results of all of the analyses 6
that we asked from the vendors are in, but we haven't 7
completely analyzed all of them.
To try to put them 8
in broad bins at the moment might be a little bit difficult, 9
but as I recall, most of the results that we have seen, 10 I think that you would characterize the toughness as at least J1 moderate, not low.
12 The point I was trying to make with respect to 13 safety is you have to have two considerations before you 14 have a safety problem.
You have to have a load present, 15 a loss of coolant accidents and at the same time, those 16 supports must be decreased in temperature.
They must be 17 cold.
18 (Commissio'ner Kennedy left the room at 2:20 p.m.)
19 MR. STELLO:
Then they have to have a flaw.
20 There must be something wrong with them, in order for those 21 supports to come in question as to whether they are or 22 are not all rlght.
We are clearly taking action.
We 23 sent the letters out.
We are getting information back.
24 We haven't told licens.ees they have to do anything yet.
We 25 haven't caused them to correct anything yet.
If we need to,
- 817.02.5 12 bw I
we know what to do.
The purpose of this particular task, 2
this A-23 is to try to decide whether or not we need to 3
evolve new guidance for the reviews should we do our 4
reviews or set material requirements different from those 5
we now se.t?
That's a forward-looking concern.
6 In our reviews in the future, should we do them 7
different than we have done them in the past.
That's an 8
underlying basis heret but with respect to the issue itself, 9
lt's resolved ~if we need to take an action.
We know what 10 to do.
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COMMISSIONER AHEARNE2 At the moment you don't 12 know just how widespread or what type of action?
13 MR. DENTON:
And the tact we have.identifled 14 fixes that ameliorate the situation.
15 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
Which as I say again in 4
16 my mind leans towards leaving it on your Itst rather than 17 taking it off.
18 MR. CASE:
I guass where I resist, Commissioner 19 Ahearne, there are a number like this you are going to find 20 through this discussion.
21 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
I wouldn't be surprised.
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l CR 1817 DENNIS:3 13 jg-1 1
MR. CASE:
The issue is the degree of safety 2
significance.
3 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
I wouldn't be surprised.
4 The same as you are establishing your position, I am i
5 establishing my position.
6 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
What is it that caused you 7
to put it on?
8 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
There is a problem thah 9
was identified as a -- at least -- it is more than just a 10 theoretical problem.
It is a real. problem that has l
11 occurred.
It is if it does.get the double condition of the.
12
- reduced temperature plus the excess load and this is this 13 weakness that has at least been found in one place, then 14 that is a significant hazard; and that the low probability 15 is the low probability of both of them occurring at once, 16 as I understand it.
17 MR. CASE:
There is indeed more to it than that.
l 18 Let's assume they both dn occur at once.
Than you have to l
19 look at the consequences of the support failing.
Does that 20 completely vitiate the operability of the component in i
21 question?
There's judgment that has to be reached on that.
22 It is not a one to one probability that given the flaw, 23 given the low-temperature, given the extra load you get from 24 a LOCA that, A, the support will f aile. and B, if the tes Fooeral Rooorters, Inc.
25 support does fail, it will af fect the operability of the 1
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component.
That's yet another improbability that enters 2
into the risk evaluation.
3 (Commissioner Kennedy returned to the room at l
4 2:25 p.m.)
5 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
You are speaking to the '
6 question of how serious the problem is?
7 MR. CASE:
Yes.
8 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
Is it an unresolved 9
problem?
i 10 MR. CASE:
I could make an argument now, because 11 if we identify the problem we know what to do about it, and 12 it has been done in one plant.
13 MR. DENTON':
It is more in my mind the type whE~re 14 we are finding out in operating plants that something didn't i
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15 perform quite the way it was intended or we thought it 16 would.
We take action to get it to perform that way.
l 17 It is not that our knowledge of this area suddenly changed.
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18 We realized we had a problem here, i
i' 19 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:
An unresolved safety 20 question ought to be something you don't know what to do j
f 21 about.
Once you figure out what to do 6 bout it, it is no 22 longer a. question.
It is a matter, it seems to me, of f
23 engineering to get it done, 24 MR. CASE:
Identifying where it needs to be done.
' Ace-Federal Reporters, Inc, 25 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
We don' t know yet where.
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15 I
COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
We have this odd order jg-3 2
paradox in that we carry along a lot of unresolved safety j
3 issues which we are dealing with every day.
4 MR. DENTON:
One other point I should mention 5
is yesterday Al Kenneke raised the question of what would 1
6 we say in SER's about unresolved safety issue.
We read the 7
Board's order on generic safety issues to require that 8
we discuss both category A's and B's in every case.
That's i
9 being the system in which we operate under.
i What we would discuss in all new cases would be 10 I
three arcas.
We would discuss those things called unresolved I2 issues as defined for Congress.
We would probably discuss 13 the other A's that,we have started the tradition of doing.
Id Then we would also discuss the B 's.
In each case then we would discuss this issue as it applied to a particular
.5 16 but we wo(11d not categori: e it as an unresolved safety plant; I7 issue.
18 l
COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
Don't mirunderstand me.
l I
19 I am trying to work on the process that is reducing the 20 number of issues; but I think it has to be done in such a way 21 i
and is clear in t. hat reduction that we are, if anything, 22 leaning on the side of caution, conserve a time, on the 23 reductions.
24 Your proposal here --
Ace-Federsi Repo ters, Inc.
25 MR. CASE:
We think we are.
It just depends on
16 I
!g-4 where the level is.
2 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
I understand.
On the 1
3 proposed insert that was going to' go into, I guess, the I
4 annual report on this reduction, you have for this paI.ticular l
5 A-12 the NRR staff concluded that the likelihood of &n 6
initiating event was icw.
That's what you are talking about; 7
and based upon a preliminary survey, the support in May of
'76, the support materials are expected to have 8
i 9
I adequate toughness.
10 If I understand from one ef. the comments, some l
of the comments that were just made, that that 12 last portion at least was -- may have to be somewhat i
modified; that is that this could be read as concluding that 13 I
all the support materiale have adequate toughness and therefore!
Id 15 there's not going to be any need for any modifications any-16 where.
I think that that's probably -- would be a misreading I7 at the moment?
O MR.' CASE:
- Yes, l
COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
So at least there was i
20 some additional unresolution at the point in time this was 2I written to today.
22 MP. CASE:
That is true.
23 MR. DENTON:
I think when we go through these, 24 quite often when an issue is raised, the staff really doesn't a-Federal Reporters, Inc.
25 think there is a problem, we f ollow through and ask research
17 jg-5 1
to do something or decide to ask anybody anyway.
2 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
Harold, I am not trying i
3 to say that the staff isn't aggressively pursuing this.
4 I think you are.
I think you are taking the actions 5
that have to' be taken.
My concern is as we press this 6
list of issues, to make sure when we drop something off, 7
we drop it off in the sense that we recognize that it is 8
either no longer a problem because it never was or it is no i
l 9
longer a problem because all the steps have been completed; END-3 10 and this one didn't seem to me to meet that criteria.
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317.04.1 18 cmw 1
COMMISSIONER GILINSKY2 Let me ask you, are.any 2
of these in the category that they are so serious or so 3
unresolved that they would be a bar to llcensing a reactor?
4 MR. DENTON Not the ones that we are talking about 5
in this category.
Now, if you want to talk about the ones 6
that.we put in the unresolved safety issue, I think you find 7
dif fering views.
There probably would be some of those, if 8
we.were not able to say we expect to bring this to fruition 9
in the near future.
There would be concern.
10 ATWS is one where we think definite chen;es are
.11 needed and have f elt so for. the last five years.
We have not 12 been able to come-to grips with exactly what the proper change 13 is.
I think if we didn't call that one an unresolved saf ety 14 issue, we would find people thinking wh should not continue 15 licensing plants without something being done on that.
16 COMMISSIONER GILINSKYs Sti11, I mean, plants have 17 been lic'ensed during these five years even though we have 18 been carrying this as an issue.
In some sense we resolved 19 them all in individual cases.
20 MR. DENTON:
It's resolved in the sense of one more 21 plant doesn't add that much to soc'etal risk, but ultimately 22 the Staff thinks that it'.s an issue as the number of reactors 23 and numoer of reactor years increase.
You do need to do 24 something to compensate in this area.
25 COMMISSIONER GILINSKYi Whe r e I wa s head ed, I mean m
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in a sense we-resolved them in a way that we are not l
1 2
entirely happy with.
Otherwise we ~wouldn't be carrying them 3
along.
4
-MR. DENTON:
That's right.
I.think that's the 5
connotation that the unresolved safety issue has.
Ones that 6
would give the Staff real problems to deal with if we were E
7 not able to expect some improvement in those areas in the 8
near ter.m.
At least that's. the kind of. thinking that went 9
into the group when they. called them unresolved.
This one 10 doesn't give that sort of image to metallurgical and. mechanical i
J1 engineers on 'the Staff s but it gets into a problem --
12 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
Aren't.you approaching a 13 period of time?
In other words, these were temporary fixes,
'l4.
fixes acceptable for a time?
15 MR. DENTON Time is an element.
16 MR. CASE:
In most cases it's not specified exactly.
17 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY I understand, but in some 18
. intuitive way.
19 MR. CASES Yes.
That was a good example of that.
20 Where you continue the licensing, but you are ge.tting to the 21 point where --
~
22 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
You are getting increasingly u c mfortable?
no 23 24 MR. CASE Yes.
25 MR. DENTONs Because there are more and more plants,
20 317.04.3 cmw I
and on a societal basis there is an increasing risk.
In 2
f act, there needs to be something for all plants, even though e are willing to tolerate individual plants not having 3
w 4
that fix for some period of time.
5 MR. CASE 8 All I ask, Commissioner Ahearne, is you 6
reserve judgment until we get through them all.
7 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE Do you want to just put them 8
on all et once?
9 I think I have taken my -- it's obviously a 10 Commission decision.
My view will be to keep them on.
.11 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE2 Why don't you push ahead to the 12 next one?
13 MR. DENTON2
.A-13.
We will go down the numbers.
14 MR. AYCOCK: 'Let's discuss A-13.
15 (Slide.)
16 What we have provided in the slides is a v',ry 17 brief statement of.what the problem is aboutt some background i
18 information on what it was assigned to and what category the 19 draft risk report assigned to it.
Then a brief statement on 20 the steering committee judgment.
21 SnuL er. operability assurance is to evaluate industry practice associated with snubber qualification 22 23 testing, design and analysis procedures, selection and specif f.
24 criteria and preservice and in-service inspection programs.
25 To develop tech vrto tid reviewer and Regulatory Guide answers
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'317.04.4 21 cmw I
to assure a high level of snubber _ operability.
2 It was assinged to Group 18 that is, relate to plant 3
safety.
4 It was assigreed to Risk Category 3 in the draft 5
risk report.
That's a negligible risk potential.
On the 6
basis of a bounding calculation,that indicated that this 7
contributed le ss than 1 percent of the RSS risk.
8 COMMISSIONER AHE ARNEs The RSS risk being defined as?
9 10 MR. AYCOCK:
Being defined as tne total risk from
.11 cil accidents considered.in the study.
12 MR. CASE:
In the RSS study.
13 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
So the interpretation is it 14 contributed less than a percent to WASH-1400's estimate of 15 risk?
16 MR. CASES Correct.
~
17 COMMISSIONER AHE ARNE:
And the underlying a ssumption 10 is therefore that that is an adequate low risk?
19 MR. CASES No.
Their input to us was just to 20 characterize the risk.
The judgment was reached in the next 21 step, taking into account that advice.
~
22 MR. AYCOCK2 That's correct.
The steering committee 23 conclusion was that the task may result in some modifications 24 to tech specs, et cetera, but the potential for snubber f ailure 25 does not represent a major reduction in the degree of
.22 817.04.5 cmw 1
protection.
2 The Of fice of Inspection Enforcement bulletin l
3 and tech spec requirements already implemented provide 4
assurance that f aulty snubbers will be detected and corrective 5
action taken.
6-In other words, there are interim measures in place.
7 COMMISSIONER AHEARNEJ Is the question that there 8
. a re interim measures in place, do I conclude, therefore, that 9
you are not saying that f aulty. snubbers would be a problem?
10 Would not.be a problem but that faulty -- t..e procedures now
.11
. a.llow you to detect and the requirements are that they be --
12 corrective actions be taken?
13 MR. CASE 2 The present procedures require a periodic 14 testing and depending on how many are found f aulty in that 15 testing, the testing interval is either increased or decreased 16 for the next test.
17 So obylously they don't guarantee an all-time surety.
18 COMMI SSIONER AHE ARNE:
It's the inspection procedures 19 and the follow-up actions that lead you to have confidence that 7.0 this is no longer a problem?
Or not a problem?
21 MR., CASES Plus also the fact that even though it is 22 a problem, it doesn't have a high risk potential.
23 MR. DENTON:
It's an area we think needs improvement.
24 We got into it by the number of reports we were getting of 25
. inoperable snubbers being found.
Let me ask John Kovacs, if
23 817.04.6 cmw I
he's here, to maybe summarize your views.
He's a s pecialist 2
working in this area.
3 MR. KOVACS4 That's essentially correct.
The 4
original concerns with the large number of snubbers that were 5
reported -- the problem that caused that original concern was
~
6
. identified as being due to f aulty or. incompatible seal 4
7 materials within a certain type of hydraulic snubber.
This 8
problem was correctly.. identified.
9 The technical specifications involved today directly 10 address that problem.
As time has gone on, there are 11
. implications that that problem is gradually going away.
There 12 has been a sustained effort in the operating plants to replace 13 all of those seals.
They are no longer used in the newer 14 designed snubbers that are coming into use today.
15 So consequently, it appears that the technical 16 specifications have been quite effective in addressing that 17 problem.
18 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
That was the only main 19 problem, the seals?
?"
20 21 22 23 24 25 r
.,-n
24 317.05.1 bw 1
MR. KOVACS As a result of'that, the Staff looked 2
Into other methods of f ailure that snubbers may be 3
susceptible to.
Other problems that may arise in handling 4
and shipping and in Installation of snubbers.
The past 5
action plan, as evolved today -is.addre,ssing all of those 6
concerns, in addition to those that I mentioned earlier with 7
the faulty seal material.
8 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
As far as the actual 9
f ailures that showed up in the field inspection, they 10 were primarily as a result of the seal material?
.11 MR. KOVACS2 Primarily, yes, sir.
12 COMMI SSIONER.AHEARNE2 80 percent, 70 percent?
13 MR. KOVACS I would say probably 95 percent.
14 COMMISSIDNER AHEARNE When you say, things have 15 improved, that's th's f ailure rate in the field is now 16 drastically down?
17 MR. KOVACS2 Yes, sir.
18 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
Most of those things, when the 19 seals go, John, you can see the oil., as I recall?
20 MR. KOVACS2 Yes sir.
21 CHAIRMAN HENDR;Es I don't recall any cases where there was some kind of internal exchange.
It seemed you could 22 alw ys see the oi] drivning down the snubber off the 23 a
2-4 supports, the wr;4, on the floor, something like that.
25 MR. KOVACS:
That's right.
25 317.05.2 bw 1
It was clear that that was a problem when it did become one.
I 2
COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
I guess that kind of 3
explanation does a lot more for me than this, in a sense 4
that I..think that that is the kind of explanation that is 1
5 needed in the material that is sent forward to Congress on 6
why things are off the list.
7 MR. CASE 2 But it's -- it's not that John is 8
saying there is no safety problem out there.
9 CHAIRMAN AHEARNEs I know that.
f 10 MR. CASE 2 It's still a matter of degree.
.11 MR. DENTON2 I think no doubt we are being 12 forward-looking on things like that.
We are saying we 13 expect it to be all right.
Otherwise we say we expect a 14 problem.
Where.we don't have the knowledge on A-12 yet, 15 we expect it to. turn out like A-13.
We just don't know 16 yet.
17 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
I know.
That's right.
18 It's unresolved.
19 MR. DENTON:
A-14.
20 MR. AYCOCK8 Let' got to A+14 The purpose of 21 this task is to asse.ss flaw detection limits which can be achieved using current ASME code In-service inspection rules, 22 23 defining priority areas where improvements were needed.
24 following development of new and improved flaw detection 25 methods, and implementing procedures and inspection
~.
=-
i 817.05.3 26 bw 1
. inspection requirements ~ capable of proving the necessary 2
improvement.
3 This was assigned to NRR Group 3 which'is 4
confirmatory.
The risk categorization was Category 3 which i
5 is the - negligible - risk potential group.
The basis for that.
~
6 assignment in the draft report was that it may reduce 7
f ailure rates below those which have been assessed, based 8
on today's technology.
However, the degree of safety 9
improvement cannot be quantified.
10 The steering committee conclusion -- I might o
.11
. note that portions of this task related to UT reliability 12 will be included in the new task A-42 on pipe cracks in-13 BWRs, which is an unresolved safety Lssue.
14 This task does -- the judgment of the steering 15 commi.ttee was thatLthe task does'not solve a major 16 reduction in the degree of protection of the public health 17 and saf ety.
The current requirements are adequate, although 18 the task may provide some improvements.
19 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
The flaws that are being 20 discussed here, were they all metal flaws, no matter what 21 segment of the reactor they are in?
MR. DENTON Let me ask Steve Pawlicki to discuss 22 23 that.
'24 MR. PAWLICKI I didn't quite hear the question.
25 COMMISSIONER AHEARNEs-Well, the description here
317.05.4 27 bw 1
is flaw deduction limits.
Is this metal flaws, independent 2
of in what segment of the reactor it's in?
3 MR. PAWLICKI2 Well, jus t --
4 COMMISSIONER AHE ARNE:
Reactor vessels, supports.
~
5 pipes?
6 MR. PAWLICKI Task Plan A-14 is direc.ted to longer 7
range improvements in flaw detection characterization.
8 Of course, it will depend where the flaw is located, what 9
the stresses are that existed at this particular location',
10 the number of cycles that the component is sub je c.te d to,
11 and so on.
12 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
But it's flaw detection in 13 all elements of the primary system measure boundary.
It's 14 not just the vessel?
15 MR. PAWLICKI:
It's not only the reactor vessel 16 that's correct.
17 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
Piping is a gooa deal more 18 interesting at the moment.
19 COMMISSIONER ARE ARNE:
Originally it then 20 included the pipes?
21 MR. PAWLI CKI Originally the -- the reactor 22 vessel and piping we re included, and_ they are still included 23 In the. scope of.this task, except that the more pressing 24 task like boiling water reactor cracking wi.11 be part new 25 of A-42, as Mike has indicated.
So we will have results r*
wr N
gser+-we re-F-
m-vm t-g
==-r 1-M ea g
e--r9 7
e e-so-hit Wwhwt
-ah--
9
817.05.5 28 bw 1
sooner.
We are not going to have to wait two or thr.ee 2
years.before we get the results from A-14 3
In the same manner, the problems of cracking in 4
the boiling water reactor f eedwater nozzles will be 5
handledbyTaskkctionA-10,alsoonashortertermbasis, 4
6 and It wlAJ get the priority or the classification of 7
Category A.
8 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE Are both of those because 9
the problems have now shown up sufficiently frequentit, that 10 are sufficiently serious, that in both of those cases the
.11 program had to be accelerated?
12 MR. pAWLICKI s This is basically correct.
13 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
Why should we have
/ 14 confidence then that this is a lower priority task than M
15 those other areas where it hasn't yet shown up?
16 MR. CASES We are getting considerable experience 17 in looking, you know.
18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25
)
j
i
'CR 1817 29 DENNIS-6 jg-1 1
MR. PAWLICKI:
What we are basically doing is 2
to divide the scope of the task action.A-14 into two 3
major groups, one we are trying to deal with the immediate 4
problems, what can be done about it, how to lower the l
l 5
probabilities of it occurring and being detected, and increasing 6
the probability of it being dedected.
The second part is to improve the general methods 7
8 that are being used and recommedded by the ASME Code.
There's 9
room for improvement there; and there's connection between i
10 both of these parts, the boiling water reactor pipe crack,ing 11 or feed water nozzle cracking, with general improvements 12 of the methods.
However, the general part of it can 13 sort of wait.
14 We are dealing there with minor improvements t
15 of existing technology, like increasing the sensitivity of l
i 16 the detectors, improving the calibration methods that will l
l 17 be used in the day-to-day test, automating some of the i
i 18 inspection methods so the radiation exposure of the personnel I I
19 is lowered.
l.
l I
20 MR. DENTON:
Bear in mind all plants currently i
I 21 have requirements for in-service inspection.
Their ASME 22 Code improvements.
I guess my view of this is that for 23 as many years as I can recall, the Commission has been 24 trying to improve flaw detection methods.
I suspect it Ace Feder:4 Reporms, Inc.
25 will be an ongoing area that is -- that is developed in the i I a
30 I
jg-2 field to require the new impro.ved methods of finding.
2 flaws before the pipe cracks.
3 So except in these areas where we actually i
4 experience the crack, we are content to keep the technology l
5 being improved.
6 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
I don't know enough about 7
it really to make a comment other than it has the. character 8
of the ef fort is a lower priority until it turns out that 9
there's a serious problem in the cracking; and then it gets l
l 10 shifted into a higher priority.
II MR. DENTON:
That's right.
I2 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
In the best of all possible 13 worlds, you would say you want a machine that detects 14 everything. If you don't have that, I must say flaw detection 15 is a lot better than it was years ago.
Indeed, I think it l
is adequate for most purposes.
I wouldn't hesitate for 16 I
I7 a minute to continue to support improvements; and as 18 improvements get developed and so on, expect to see them I9 built in due time into the requirement process.
l 20 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
It is a different i4 21 character of activity.
It just strikes me as interesting 22 that the pieces.that are broken of f are those pieces we 23 do have obvious major problems were it would be a great 24 help to have improved ability to detect the flaws.
. wnomi neoon.n, inc.
l
.25 MR. DENTON:
In this case where we broke off,
\\
4
-0
--,e,,
31 g-3 1
there is a dif ference among experts as to the capability 2
of small restoration to detect flaws.
That's another 3
reason for trying to' decide that issue.
4 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
All right.
5 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
_ How much of a scan do you 6
want to give to 15?
I would recommend not much effort be 7
put' forth there.
'Anybody feel the need to scan on it?
8 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
Oh, yes.
Absolutely.
9 MR. AYCOCK:
Could we have the slide on A-15?
1 10 (Slide.)
II COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
Your purposes -- you have 12 two.
One is the occupational safety.
The other is 13 degradation of integrity of the boundary.
I gather from your 14
' steering committee that as far as the integrity of the 15 boundary issue, that that was a nonissue?
I 16 MR. CASE:
You have to be concerned with the 17 cleanii.g agents or you could get into a boundary integrity 18 ques tion.
19 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
You concluded that that was 1
20 not a major problem?
f1 i 21 MR. CASE: 'We have under evaluation systems i
22 for cleaning.
That's one of the considerations involved 23 in looking at what people plan to do.
t 24 MR. DENTON: _There is one in one plant that is
--emce nummm. ine, 25 being decontaminated.
That's what got us into the area in a l
v
l 32 jg-4 1
big way.
Then we said af ter that we ought to start looking 2
at all plants, start looking at their rad waste treatment 3
system in an early stage to make sure they are able to 4
cope with the type of decontamination fluids that might be i
5 generated 20, 30 years hence.
6 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
What are you doing on 7
this?
Assuming it is not on the priority list, what 8
program are you following?
I 9
MR. DENTON:
Pauli O'Connor will speak to that.
i 10 MR. O'CONNOR:
The bulk of the action is Il taking place on this task is presently associated. with the 12 ongoing decontamination of Dresden Unit No. 1.
The unit is 13 presently shut dcwn and will undergo chemical cleaning I4 in June of this year.
The primary concern has been to f
15 assure the capability of the chemical agents with all of the 16 components and portions of the primary coolant system which I7 are pressure boundaries.
We also have spent quite a bit I
I i
18 of time in assuring that the job will be carried out in a l
l I9 manner to assure that it will'cause the least exposure to l
I 20 operating personnel in that the exposure that is taken is l
I 21 out-weighed by the exposure that will be safe by future 22 operation of the plant after it is cleaned.
i
?
23 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
This is then -- is it 24 primarily a review of Commonwealth plants?
w.Few i Ruorms, lm.
25 MR. O'CONNOR:
It is a -- in the present case, it i
i r
33 jg-5 1
is a review of Commonwealth plants.
It is also, in the generic case, a determination of what the best manner in 3
which to carry out --
i I
4 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
Is the current effort 5
primarily a review of commonwealth plants?
TD-6 6
MR. O'CONNOR:
,Yes.
7 8
9 10 11 12
,I 13 1
14 15
~
j I
16 17 18 19 20 l
l 21 j
22 23 24
' %ce-Fooeral Reporters, Inc.
25
h i
S17.07'.1 34 cmw I
MR. DENTON:
I.think we expected this to result 2
in a provision of guidance for future such events.
3 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY Let's go back to the 4
. definition of unresolved safety issues.
It seems to me the 5
origin of all of this was that the Congrass was told we were 6
licensing reactors while leaving a lot of unresolved issues.
7 Important safety questions.
The safety flxes of one kind or 8
another that weren't entirely satisfactory.
Cen"we use that 9
as a kind of dividing line between the issues we put on this 10 list and the ones we wouldn't as being those that if 11 unresolved would lead us to feel that reactors which pose these 12 problems could not operate indefinitely without putting any 13 sort of specific limit on it in terms of a certain number of 14 years?
Is that what characterizes them?
15 MR. DENTON2 In my vlew, that's a fair 16 characterization.
17 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
Certainly there is no end 18 of thing o do.
Obviously we are expected to do that and 19 will continue to do that.
I think that's a pretty sharp 20 division of issues.
Some rise to the level where we don't 'get 21 them resolved or se.ttled and it really raises questions about 22 the continued operation of reactors or their running.
23 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
Along with that, if you can 24 separate them that way, with that set that you retain on, 25 wouldn't you at least have. implicitly the idea of some kind of l
6
i S17.07.2:
35 cmw.
1 a deadline by which the' issues would have to be resolved if 2
that was the way you were defining it?
3 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
You know, it's a li.ttle bit 4
like the waste issue.
I certainly.think we ought to have a 5
plan and we ought to get them settled.
6 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
You would have to pay.a lot 7
of attention to the plari.
8 CohWISSIONER GILINSKY:
I hate to name a figure at 9
this point.
10 COMMISSIONER AREARNE:
I wasn't asking you to.
.11 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
I think they have to be 12 settled in short order.
There is no question about it.
That 13 seems to me to be the point of all this.
14 COMMI.SSIONER AHEARNE:
Certainly that's I think, 15 the outside perception of what that list is.
16 MR. CASE:
That being so then you don't want to c
17 throw everything on that list because we don't feel that way 18 towards all of these issues.
19 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
But you have to be very 20 explicit with a very good explanation of why you are not taking 21 them of f.- The Lssues are on the llst.
You can't suddenly 22 say well, we are going to start all over again and set up a new 23 list.
You have for whatever reason they were on there to start 24 with, you have that list and now you have to be very careful.
25 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
But they weren't on that list in
817.07.3 36 cmw 1
order to meet the intent of congressional mandate 210.
They 2
are on there because there were 133 items the Sta.ff threw 3
together for a variety of reasons, some of which had to do 4
with safety and a whole variety of other things.
It seemed 5
to be a handy list.
It.got packaged and sont off to the 1
6 Congress.
7 MR. CASE:
There was fairly clear language.
After 8
our discussion yesterday. I read the forwarding letter to tbs 9
Congre ss again.
It was quite explicit tha.t the 133 went well i
10 bey.ond those lssues considered to be unresolved safety 11 questions and will parrot.for our next year's reports but this 12 is the best we have at the moment.
It, includes all of the 13 resolved safety issues, but is longer than that.
14 MR. DENTON In fact, I think there was a feeling 15 several years back before Congress ever asked that a good 16 running agency should have a list such as this.
That list kind 17 of turned into the 133.
18 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:
It's a continulng rolling over 19
]tst.. Things are dro pping o.f f one end and being added on the 20 other.
21 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE4 Well, let's come back to
~
22
. decontamination.
We have exercised that one amply.
Let's plunge ahead to A-16.
23 24 (Slide.)
25_
MR. AYCOCK2 A-16.
BWR core spray distribution.
v
5 37 317.07.4 emw 1
The _ purpose is to evaluate the e ff ect of the
^
I 2
presence' of steam and/or increased pressures in and above the 3
upper core region of a boiling water reactor on the 4
distribution of flow from certain types of core spray nozzles.
~
5 It was ' assigned-to NRR Group 1.
The risk category there is '
6 incorre ct.
It's an error.
It should have been Category 3 7
which was the negligible risk potential category.
It was on B
the basis of a bounding calculation which showed ' a low level 9
of risk when compared with the reactor safety study.
i 10 CO WWISSIOiGD AHEARNE:
Since one of the obvious
]
.11 major criteria that at least is being presented and was 12 followed In at least in your group discussion is the bounding i
f 13 risk estimates, to what extent if
- interpret.all of those la probabilities as being absolutely uncertain' and only having l
l 15 a relative sense of value, to what extent were absolute values j
16 used as the criteria to adjust the risk potentials?
i 17 MR. CASE I think they are all relative.
18 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
They are all relative, but
[
19 there, I think, has to be some sense of absolute value sitting 1
20 behind, because if you say that you have a -- have 40 items, l
t 21 or' 133 items, and you are going to do a relative ranking 22 probability of risk, that's fines but all 133 could be very l
23 significant unless you have underlying it some sense of what's 24 the absolute value.
Because the only way you are going to say l
25 something is negligible ls that in addition to oeing Icwer risk
-..~..
9 r
817.07.5 38 cmw-1-
than something else, it also has a low absolute vaiue.
So 2
I am asking --
3 MR. DENTON:
Let me ask the people who wrote that 4
to address how they categorize it as 1, 2, or 3.
We were very 5
careful to. take -in each issue their write-up and run it 6
throughf our technical branch that had responsibility for it and reflect those views back up to the steering committee, 7
8 to have the overlay --
9 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
But I notice that here it's 10 always --- the words are compared to RSS, or based on RSS t
.11 whereas as I recall from the -- one of the recent meetings 12 that' we had on the Lewis report, you and your Staff pointed 13 out you didn't really use RSS for your assessment, so that's 14 a separate evaluation.
15 MR. MURPHYa Joe Murphy.
Basically, in order to 16 do the relative comparison, we had to come up with absolute 17
. numbers for that purpose.
We arranged.them in order and had 18 essentially fuzzy lines in terms of risk significance which we 19 separated.
There were qualitative considerations that went' 20 into it also.
In. other words, if we were uncertain about the 21 decision that we thought was in the -- in terms of a numerical
~
22 ranking would-come out.in'
'igible risk, but at the upper 23 end of it, we'd mo+,e it low category.
Similarly, 24 if we knew the bound e ace was extremely conservat.1ve, we 25 might move it down.
So there is not a precise number per se.
i wgzw-mm i
l
~
39.
817.07.6 cmw 1
There were goals along -the line of' a i percent contributor.
2 fi.tting on our.Categor.ies l'or 2.-
That's very rough, ', hough.,
)
i 3
l 4
5
~'
i 6-7 8
l 9
10" l
.11 12 13 l
14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22
-23 24 25
.m
40 817.05.1 bw 1
CHAIRMAN HENDRIE When you say a 1 percent 2
contributor, what you are saying is that on some measure 3
lik e --- I don' t k now, iodine release or some consequent 4
measure, wh.stever -- that out of the sum total of an 5
accident sequence in the RSS, this one. is worth I percent?
~
6 MR. MURPHY Yes.. It was uslng a bounding 7
estimate.
S o --
quasl-bounding estimate I guess I should 8
say.
With a bounding estimate, anything would be one.
Using 9
conservative assumptions we calculated a risk, a probablility 10 relative -- a risk relative to the WASH-1400 RISK.
f J1 Roughly, those that were i perent or over made 12 the If st. That doesn't mean the reallstic assessment of those 1.3 risks would be 1 percent.
It would be far lower.
I would i4 not plar;e great credence qs to how things fall relative to 15 each o*.her in the list.
In other words, item 5 is not 16 necessarily larger than item 6.
You are missing the point 17 of uncertainties, if you came to that conclus io n.
Certainly,
-18 item 5 is more significant than item 30.
19 COMMI SSIONER.AHE ARNEJ When you say, if you made 20 a realistic assessment of the risk, it would be much j
21 lower, how do you go about making that realistic assessment?
22 MR. MURPHY 4 It would take a long time, a lot of 23 money.
You know, you are essentially asking me how to a 24 R SS update.
25 COMMISSIONER AHE ARNE:
Okay.
41 817.05.2 bw I
MR. MURPHYJ We did bounding estimate rather than 2
the realist.ic things you get out of a full-blown series.
3 MR. DENTONs I think this is a particularly good 4
one, too, to hear the other side on.
Let me ast Roy Woods 5
to give his perspective on the subject.
6' MR. KOODS:
I guess I wrote it down a couple of I can read it to you.
I can add to that.
Why 7
hours ago.
8 don't you read it first?
9 MR. DENTON:
Why don't you tell us about the 10 test, is what I had in mind?
J1 MR. WOODS:
Tell you about the tests?
There 12 wre some preliminary tests which consisted of single-nozzle 13 tests of various types in steam whic shows you what one 14 nozzle will do in steam.* Then you essentially develop a 15 nozzle that will produce the same spray flow pattern in 16 air.
It's called the simulator nozzle.
Then you put a 17 full-scale system together out in Velavitos, which is an 18 Air Force f acility, using those simulator nozzles.
19 Your argument is, since each nozzle simulazes l
20 what the real nozzle would do in steam, and you have all
~
21 of them installed in the actual geometry in a.ir, you are i
!~
22 finding out what could happen if you tested all the t
23 nozzles in steam.
You can't do that, obviously, because 24 you don't have enough steam available anywhere.
.25 Those test results showed there is no a
l l
l
~
42 S17.05.3 bw I
tremendous degradation, less than a factor of 2.
It 2
turns out we have more than a factor of 2 margin available 3
above what you really need to justify the spray coefficients 4
they are currently taking credit for.
5 So if the further tests that are being run now 6
verify these preliminary tests, then we have no problem.
7 That's a big "if."
8 It has to come out that way.
9 CONNISSIONER AHEARNE:
So thot if the tests 10 don't verify that, then you would be back in having a J1 problem?
12 MR. WOODS:
If the tests don't verify, then you 13 do, indeed, have a safety problem with.no jet pump BWRs.
14 With the jet pump BWRs, where you have the diverse flooding 15 capacity, it would be -- I don't know how to characterize 16 it.
Maybe a couple hundred degrees in peak clad temperature 17 increase.
You can characterize that any way you would 18 choose.
You can get various opinions.
I don /t think it 19 would be a major saf ety issue.
20 COMMISSIONER AREARNE:
The resolution, in a sense.
21 depends upon the favorable results form the test?
MR. DENTON:
Yes.
22 23 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE3 Which is another way of 24 saying it's still unresolved?
7 25 MR. CASE:
Yes.
I
43 317.05.4 bw 1
MR. DENTON:
Judgment.
It's likely to work right 2
rather than unlikely.
3 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE There aren't all that many 4
plants that fall into that category.
5 MR. WDODS Big Rock Point, Dresden 1, Humboldt 6
Bay, Lacrosse, but Lacrosse is quite different.
You r,eally 7
have five, two of which are currently shut down, Dresden 8
and Humboldt.
9 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
Dresden I is shut down clean?
10 MR. WOODS:
Yes, but it's down.
J1 CHAIRMAN HENDRIEs I think really realistically 12 there are about four.
You have about four plants that are 12 in the category, which is getting kind of thin for a great 14 generic issue.
15 Onward.
16 MR. DENTON The next is A-17 systen interactions.
17 This is discussed on page 10 of the enclosure.
Why don't 18 I ask Denny Ross, since it's such a'short writeuup, to l
19 discuss it?
l 20 MR. RaSS*
I don't. think thern's any disagr.eement 21 between the NRR thoughts and the research categorization.
22 The research categorization had two main points. First they 23 had studied only the reactor safety study plant, so they 24 hadn't quantified the eff ect of system interaction on all i
25 plants.
1 t
l
44 817.05.5 bw 1
Secondly, what they did study on the reactor 2
safety study showeo that system interaction was important, 3
so this could be a fertile field.
4 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE2 Category 1, wasn't it?
5 MR. ROSS2 On the high risk.
6 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE2 -Yes.
t 7
The way we read the research catego ization, it indicated simply it was a fertile S
r 9
ground to investigate.
The issue is -
10 11 12 13 14 15 b'
16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25
l I
CR 1817 45 DENNIS-9 jg-1 1
COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
Are you saying that your 2
interpretation was'diat high risk was equivalent to 3
fertile ground to investigate?
I i
4 MR. ROSS:
Yes.
That is in an area where they I
5 had found system interac. tion, the thoughts that we had was 6
tnat the important system interactions are already 0
7 covered in our judgment by the procedures we have for review 8
between the five system branches within DSS.
Each of the 9
system branches has a primary area to review and secondary l
i 10 areas of responsibility with the other system branches?
II and we did not think in our judgment that there was any l
I2 important system interaction left unreviewed.
This is a 13 judgmental matter.
I4 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
Could that be interpreted f
15 as saying that you are confident that the current process, i
l 16 the way the staff is working, is working correctly, so therefore I7 there's no potential problem?
i 18 MR. ROSS:
Yes.
I think that's a fair i
I9 characterization.
20 The important thing about the study process, I l
\\
l 21 think that distinguishes it, merits further study, is that 22 we have an outside group at Sandia studying the 23 system interaction problem under contract.
This means that 24 they are acre ob jective.
Thev didn't write the standard
^
i Ace Fscerst Reporters, Inc.
25 l
review plan.
They are mor objective about looking at what l
l l
46 I
we do.
Secondly, they are single-minded.
They are devoted jg-2 2
to this-task as contrasted with perhaps the NRR staff being 3
occupied also with currently sensing problems.
4 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
By systems interaction, 5
is it:primarily the issue of the synergistic affects of 6
problems spreading from one-into another into another?
7 MR. ROSS:
Yes.
I'think that's right.
There-is 8
affootnote in the research report that gives some examples t
9 of system interaction.
Yes.
Failure in one system spreading {
i to others.
II COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
In what way is it related I2 to common case failure?
13 MR. ROSS:
Well, the -- you have to include, of Id course, on common cases tests, maintenance, operator 15 errcr wilich could become important.
If you look on that l
I f
j 16 as a common case.
t l
I7 MR. DENTON:
An easy way to think of systems l
18 interaction for me at least is it is a steamline pipe break l
which by whipping hits the component cooling water which is I9 20 vital back to a component to cool the core.
It is more of I
i 21
' that kind as opposed to a plastics problem in the RWR j
i i
22 scram valves which would be a common mode f ailure potential i
I 23 for a system.
2#
MR. ROSS:
For some safety actions like shutting l._
25 Feo.c m.oonm; inc.
down, many systems are involved; so system interaction.will be '
L a
L 47 jg-3 I
looking at how. these various systems work during an 2
important safety action of the plant.
3 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
It almost seems this is the 4
type of item that should not have ever been included on I
5 the list?
6 MR. CASE:
It is fair to say for whatever it is 7
worth, that it is high on the ACRS list.
8 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
The point is isn' t it saying 9
that until -- in any plant, you have got a number of things i
10 that might go wrong if they were to go wrong something else l
l Il could happen, so it is a compounding problem?
AL. that you 12 also have to be very aware of that and alert to it and 13 that your answer is -- or research's answer, point is that I4 that has the potential of great risk because you don't --
15 you are not really talking about any exact explicit items?
i 16 MR. ROSSN:
That's right.
The best one word 17 characterization is oversight.
Have we overlooked any thing.
18 That's what we expect to find out through Sandia.
i I9 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
You are really hoping 20 the Sandia effort will be a confirmation of your I-21 conclusions?
22 MR. ROSS:
Well, we are expecting.
I don't know 23 that I hope one way or the other.
2#
COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
When will that Sandia Ace Federal Reporters, Inc.
25 effort be over?
l J
I 48 I
MR. ROSS:
The contract expires next summer.
jg-4 2
.That's a phase 1.
3 (Laughter.)
{.
4 We have to make a decision based on the 5
results then.
Do we want to do some more or.not.
We get 6
some short-term results this physical year.
1 7
COMMISSIONER AREARNE:
I see.
If they conclude t
8 that NRR is not doing its job, you will continue the-9 contract?
ti>
10 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
renny, have they turned II anything of interest up thus far?
I2 MR. ROSS:
No, the project is just getting 13 underway.
We met out there a couple'of weeks ago to Id define some basic ground rules.
The program is being f>
l 15 governed by sort of a troika between NRR, standards, lf 16 and the probabiliatic. assessment staff.
We are still giving 17 some conceptual design ground rules.
I think by February t
18 we will have some -- a good start on are they going the l
1 I9 right direction [ but no, there is nothing to report as l:,
20
~ END-9 yet.-
t 21 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
I take it this is an out-l begin 10 22 growth of Jessieh pursuing the matter in these terms over 4
.23 the last couple of years?
2#
MR.'ROSS:
That's correct. We are keeping a very Am.Fews moorwn,1=.
i 25 close connection with the ACRS subcommittee.
l
49 I
jg-5 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
Roger?
2 MR. MATTSON:
I would just point out the main 3
thrust of his argument is that the licensing process is l
4 designed to turn these things up if they exist.
In the S
4 time that I have been connected with system uteraction, 6
we found more in the licensing process than they found in 7
all the studies they are doing of license interaction.
8 I think that says to me the process is doing its job.
9 MR. DENTON:
A-18, pipe rupture design criteria.
i 10 Mike?
MR. AYCOCK:
Yes.
The purpose of this task is l
12 to develop consistent criteria regarding pipe break 13 protection inside and outside of containment.
Also to Id develop criteria for optimizing piping. design for normal i
15 and abnormal situations.
16 It was assigned to Group 3 as confirmatory.
l' I
I7 In the risk category, risk categorization was category 3, i
i 18 negligible risk potential on the basis that the task could l
l M
possibly improve piping reliability; however, if the task 20 were not undertaken, risks from piping ruptures should l
21 remain about the same as presented in the reactor safety 22 study.
23 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
Is that saying that it is 24 concluded that pipe breaks are not serious?
AcsJederal Reporters, Inc.
25 MR. AYCOCK:
No.
It is saying this task should not 1
m,.._
.... ~
50
-jg-6 I
affect the current pipe failure.
2 COMMISSIONER"AHEARNE:.
It is saying risks of Il-3 piping ruptures should remain about the same as RSS.
Is 4
there latent there or implicit there "and diat's not very i
4 5
serious"?
e 6
MR. AYCOCK:
I don't think so.
7 MR. CASE:
Is there an implication in what you say-8 that you think the probability of pipe f ailure is low 9
enough now?
10 MR. MURPHY:
Based upon the analyses in the Il safety study, pipe f ailures did not contribute greatly, to 12 risk.
I don't want to say it was negligible, but other 13 events dominated risk calculated in the safety study other ld than pipe rupture.
By maintaining it at the present level, l
i 15 we are having contributors larger than pipe rupture.
j i
16 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
Pipe rupture per se is l
17 not a major high risk item?
18 MR. MURPHY:
That's correct.
l 19 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
So the pipe cracking --
20 is pipe cracking pipe rupture?
Or is this catastrophic?
21 MR. CAfiE:
It is catastrophic.
r i
22 MR. AYCOCK:
The steering committee conclusion was F
23 although development of' criteria to optimize piping design fe
- I 24 is desirable, it is not necesstry to assure adequate protection j
~
- ,m Fooeral Aecorters, Inc.
25 from pipe breaks;. that is current '
requirements generally
-.. -. -. -.- -. -.-.. - -..... -.. -.-.,... _.. -.. -. -.. -.,.- - -. n.
i 51 I
.jg provide the adequate protection.
2 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
To make sure I understand, 3
you are talking about catastrophic breaks', not cracks?
4 MR..AYCOCK:
Correct.
]
5 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
The conclusion is that.
6 the RSS estimate..shows that it is of significantly 7
low-contribution to overall risk that even were the criteria 8
such that to reduce that that would not be a. significant 9
improvement?
10 MR. CASE:
That's essentially the argument.. We, i
II too, think they are generally okay although we may need 12 improvement.
There are particular areas where we think 13 more work should be done than others in pipe crack Id criteria.
In general we think we are about okay.
15 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
It would always be nice to have -
16 better designed methods of criteria and so on; but I must 17 say things like section 3 --
18 VOICE:
I think I have something to say.
]
f l9 MR. CASE:
This is'Mr. Hon.
l, 20 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:-represent a pretty high f
i 21 development of the art.
l 22 MR. HOU:
For the plan against a pipe rupture, 23 we have a long-term program and a short-term program, i
24 This A-18 is actually a short-term program.
So it will not
[
Aos Federal Reporters, Inc, 25
- significantly affect the planned current design.
So the
52 1
i I
conclusion in there is about right.
jg-8 2
COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
Is the long-term program 3
on one of these tests?
4 MR. HOU:
We already have a request to.the 5
reactor safety research that involves various aspects 6
like jet forces, pipe waste mechanisms, break mechanisms, t
7
.~and break probabilities.
That will have more effects.
j 8
MR. MATTSON:
The long-term mechanism 1.is looking i
9 to the kinetics of pipe breaks to take account if possible l l t
10 some day it breaks.
Il COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:
What kind of a program --
12 what am I doing wrong when I read through last year's report i
t 13 and there's no task action plan at all associated with r
ld this item?
What is it you are' talking about that isn' t l
15 attached to the task action plan but is a program?
j
.i 16 MR. MATTSON: ' Harold, let me jump in.
I think 17 this one did not have a task action plan written by the time i
18 that one went to Congress.
I think we were in the process I'
of writing some.
This one was written subsequently.
It END10 20 does exist in'this' report.
i ;
- t s i r ;
21 22 r
23 24 Ace-Feoerse Reporms, Inc.
I
- 25 t
.__.._.___,..m.,,,,_,.
53 317.J1.1 bw~
l CHAIRMAN HENDRIE3 There is a later edition 2
of.the list with the task action plan.
I have the same j
3 book you have.
4 MR. DENTON2 All the A's now have
--- I believe,
5 Mike detailed implementation plans and schedules?
6 MR. AYCOCK:
With the exception of the recently 7
evaluated A's.
8 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
Onward.
9 MR. AYCOCK2 Let's go to A-19, entitled " Digital 10 Computer Protection Systems."
The purpose of this task is
.11 to consolidate and develop standard review procedures for 12 the review o.f digital computer protection systems.
It was 13 grouped in Group 6 as guidance.
It was assigned to Risk
~
14 Category 4.
That is not directly relevant to risk. The 15 Steering Committ ee conclusion was based.on the f act that 16 digital computer protection systems s're being discussed on-
't 17 a case-by-case basis.
We will provide licensing efficiency.
18 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE Next.
19 MR. AYCOCK4 Next is A-20, " Impacts of the 20 Coal Fuel Cycle."
21 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE2 Any further question?
22 CONNISSIONER AHEARNE2 How did it get on there?
23 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
I told you this was the 24 confoundest grab bag of odds and ends.
25 MR. CASEJ It's fair to say at the time this was l
4
--+-,...,m m
g
{
54 -
317.11.2 bw I
something that had to be done in each application.
It was 2
a Board order to do this.
It affected the efficiency of the l
3 licensing process.
4 CHAIRMAN HENDRIEs It was part of that broader i
5 description of the thing that came in the licensing process.
6 MR. AYCOCK:
A-21 is main steam line break, 7
evaluation of environmental conditions for equipment 8
qualification.
It involves a review and evaluation of 9
analytical methods, assumptions and related experimental c nditions for the qualification of' safety-related equipment 10 o
.11 located inside containment during or following a main steam 12 line break.
13 It was assigned to Group 2.
The risk category r
14 was Category 3, negliglble risk potential, oh the basis thst 15 main steam line break results in a small release,-compared 16 to core meltdown accidents and further considering heat 17 capacity of the equipment, it is unlikely that it will 18 exceed qualification values during relatively. short duration 19 high temperature excursions following a large main steam 20 line break.
21 The Steering Committee conclusion was bssed on 22 a NRR Staff best estimate evaluation that indic6ted that 4
23 the thermal response of essential equipment will remain 24 within the qualification temperature of the equipment.
25 Therefore, the 1.ssue did not involve a major
~.
t
.55 817.Jl.3 bw 1
reduction in the degree of protection.
2 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
This best estimate, was 3
that a written calculation?
4 MR. AYCOCK2
.Yes, it was.
We will ask Pat 5
Baranewsky.
6 MR. BARANEWSKY:.That was a calculation performed 7
by the Staff s that's correct.
8 CHAIRMAN HENDRIEs Let me ask for safety-related 9
electrical equipment, at least that located within contain-10 ment, there continues to be en item on the unresolved. safety 11 issues list entitled, " Environmental Qualification of Saf ety-12 Related Electr.ical Equipments A-24 items so it would seem to 13 me that at least the electrical gear that would be of 14 interest in the case of the main steam line break is pulled 15 in and is covered elsewhere?
~
16 MR. CASES Right.
This test provides an input 17 to the other test.
This provides a temperature input to 18 A-24.
19 MR. MATTSON:
This provides the input to A-24, 20 The judgment here is that we already expect what the 2Il temperature input is going to be on the basis of previous 22 best estimate calculations.
Pat can describe -- this is a
~
23 task that's almost done, also.
This A-21.
24 MR. BARANEWSKY:
Yes.
25 CHAIRMAN'HENDRIE:
Maybe you better leave it on t
i 56 817.11.4 bw I
and complete one.
I am looking desperately for generic j
2 safety issues we have completed.
3 MR. BARANEWSKY:
The final results are expected 4
.to be either equivalent to or lower than this best estimate 5
prediction that we.made about a year ago.
6 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
Is it coming out much different 7
than the -- is it coming out any higher than the LOCA 8
environmewntal conditions?
9 MR. BARANEWSKY2 The task action plan is going 10 to develop the methods and assumptions for making
.11 calculations.
I can't give you a spectrum of analyses f or 12 all the plants on the final models that we think are 13 going to be acceptable.
I can tell you from the preliminary 14 results that it's very close to the LOCA, maybe a few 15 degrees higher. in temperature, but the effect on the component
~
'16 would be essentially the same,through heat transfer 17 arguments which we f. eel we have pretty strongly come on now, i
18 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
A1, you had thought that 19 would be limit?
20 MR. KENNEKE:
As a general matter in connection 21 with the environmental qualifications.
l 22 MR. MATTSON:
We have discussed whether that 23 connections'should put this-on the list also.
Maybe this 24 serves to illustrate the way we are using our definition.
25 The definition says you are likely to have to take an action l
l I
57
~817.I1.5 bw I
as a result of the outcome.- the expected outcome of this.
2' task.
The. expected outcome of this task is to demonstrate 3
conclusively that the postion - we have taken for over a 4
' year is adequate.
5 6
4 7-8-
I E
10
.11 12 13 14 15 6I 16 17 18
~
19 20 21 22 23
-24 25
55
_817.12.1-cmw 1-MR._AYCOCK:
The steer.ing committee conclusion 1-s 2
- that the' issue involved confirming credit given at this time.
3 That is, the Staff believes current positions to be adequate.
4 Therefore, the actions are not likely.
5 COMMISSIONER AHEARNEs The purpose had two pieces.
6 The equipment and operator actions..Your risk category-7 analysis and conclusion speaks only to the.first.
S' MR. AYCOCK:
Yes.
Denny?
Tom?
9 VOICES On the risk, perhaps we can get the people 10
'from reactor safety study.
As we review plans for mitigating
.11 the consequences of the steam line break, we assume no 12 corrective operator action is taken any sooner than 10 minutes
!3 after the event and he must have sufficient information.
Our 14 judgment is - that that's an acceptable criterion.
15 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE: - You are saying even given the
~
16 10-minute time period, that the-' data has indicated that as f ar 17 as the valves are concerned, that they are sufficient?
18 MR. NOVAKs Yes.
Not to belabor the point, these 19 valves are only called on af ter engineered saf ety equipment is 20 assumed to have a single f ailure.
This equipment is used as 21 a backup only in - that event.
We understand that equipment and 22.
we think it's reliable for the f unction It's going to ' perform.
23 MR. AYCOCK A-23 regarding containment leak testing l
L 24 is to clarify application of Appendix J to 10 CFR --
l 25 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
That's a current regulation?
l o
U~-
i 65'62Sle'L
~
59 317.12.2 cmw 1
MR. AYCOCK2 Regarding containment leak testing, 2
and to resolve any conflicting or impractical reauirements.
3 This task is in fact complete.
4 It was assigned to Group 6, whien is improving 5-guidances Risk Category 4, not directly relevant to risk.
6 it's viewed as licensing efficiency.
7 MR. DENTON:
This one has caused.the need-for 8
exemptions in some areas.
It's one in.which we have given 9
- tandards our proposed rewrite of Appendix J to eliminate i
10 that kind of problem.
It should be moving back down to you
.11 as a proposed change.
12 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
It's a cleanup.
13 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE2 When you say " complete," you 14
.mean as f ar as NRR is concerned it's complete?
15 MR. DENTON:
Yes.
16 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
It's now transferred to 17 standards?
18 MR. DENTON:
Yes.
19 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
And was originally on there 20 to improve the. efficiency of licensing?
21 MR. DENTON:
Yes.
~
22 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE 24 is on the Staff 1.ist.
So far 23' we haven't debated whether they improperly put any of these
- 24 things on the list.
I would just as soon go through it the 25 other way first and then we could see if we want to go back.
f
60 317.12.3 cmw 1
COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
That's f ine.
2 MR. AYCOCK8 A-25, nonsafety loads on Class 1-E 3
power sources.
.The purpose of the task is to assess whether 4
or not the reliability of Class I-E power sources-is 5
significantly aff ected by allowing the sharing of these 6
sources by loads that perform safety functions and loads that 7
perform normal plant functions.
8 MR. DENTONs Why don't we ask Mr. Calvo to explain 9
'this?
10 MR. MATTSON:
. Jose Calvo had to go to the doctor 11 this afternoon.
1-E is the safety grade.
It's a nomenclature 12 that derives from the national standard on electrical 13 equipment..For this discussion it's equipment you rely on 14 for safety systems.
15 MR. AYCOCKs It was assigned to Group 4 as a possible
~
16 relaxation of requirements.
There's also a portlon of it 17 that.could be character.ized as confirmatory.
Risk category 18 was Category 4, not directly relevant to risk.
19 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
Could I have an explanation 20 of that?
Let us suppose that the. -- having the loads running i
21 other systems, that those loads would cause these power soure.es 22 to fail, that would not be a relevant risk?
23 MR. MURPHY 2 Basically, the categorization was not 24 directly relevant to riss
.0bviously, almost everything on 25 this-list, if you stretch it far enough, is risk related to
~
317.12.4 61 cmw
-1 some extent.
This task action' plan was developed -- was 2
to develop acceptance criterist ? and those in and of themselves 3
are not directly related to risk.
What we. said in our 4
write-up was depending on what comes out of that criteria, 5
that there may be an improvement in the reliability of the syste s and therefore have an eff ect on risk t but you can't m
6 7
quantif y that until you know what improvements are coming out.
S 9
10 4
J1 12.
13 14
. O.T[
15 16 17 18 i
19 i
20 21 22 l
23 24 4
25 E
CR 1817 62 DENNIS-13 jg-1 1
COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
So the particular task is 2
to establish acceptance criteria for these power sources; 3
is that correct?
l f
4 MR. MATTSON:
We already have that.
It is to 5
make sure they are the right acceptance criteria as we see 6
more and more safety londs being necessary to be driven by some of the power sources; and to do a reliability study 7
8 to underpin, if you will, criteria that grew up without i
i 9
reliability studies in the past.
It 's a fine tuning of i
10 what we already have with the expectation that there will f
i 11 be a relaxation in requirements, those requirements being 12 for isolation devices and that sort of thing.
13 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE Except Roger, you said 14 with the expectation of a relaxation?
15 MR. MATTSON:
Yes.
i 16 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
The steering committee 17 conclusion is that current practice is adequate?
I l
18 MR. MATTSON:
Current practice is.dequate for 19 s afe ty'.
It may be overkill.
Thi; is one that's being 20 done under contract at Oakridge, about a year for l
21 completion.
We f airly well have it in hand at this point.
22 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
You don' t have a concern 23 that at the moment you may be placing too many nonsafety 24 loads on these power sources?
AmFew3 Repomn, N, 25 MR. MATTSON:
No.
i s
l u
i 63 l !
jg-2 1
MR. AYCOCK:
There may be a fine point here.
I 2
The current practice we are referring to is the practice 3
of allowing connecting nonsafety loads on Class 1-E-l l
4 safety pcwer sources with current requirements for proper 5
isolation and so on.
This test is expected to confirm the 6
accuracies of that practice.
7 There is another aspect:
it is which particular 8
isolation devices do you allow?
Such isolation devices l
9 as fuses and circuit breakers are not allowed by the j
l 10 current regulatory guidance.
This is the relaxation area.
I 11 Is it possible to go-back and allow fuses and circuit l
12 breakers as isolation devices?
t 13 MR. MATTSON:
Part of the thing we shouldn't-14 lose track of is that there are four or five electrically 15 oriented task action plans.
One has'been elevated to the 16 A list and put in the safety issue related category.
l 17 All of these are mered together in a rather 18 broad ranging program speaking to electrical reliability 19 in general.
This is just one aspect of it.
{
L
~
20 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
Further?
21 MR. AYCOCK: -Move to --
22 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
A-26 is on the list.
I 23 recommend we move to A-27.
24 MR. AYCOCK:
A-27 reload application guide is Ace-Facerol Reporwes, Inc.
25 to update and formalize review procedures for licensee
1
}
64 I
jg-3 1
reload submittals.
2 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
If he doesn't come in and l
l f
3 drop his application on your foot, there's not much of a 4
safety problem associated with spreading out the papers.
i l
I am prepared to pass or. that one.
6 MR. AYCOCK:
A-28 increase in spent fuel storage O
7 capacity.
This task is-intended to develop consistent i
8 acceptance criteria regarding the use of high density i
9 storage racks in existing spent fuel storage pools.
It
'i 10 is viewed as improving guidance.
It was assigned to II category 3, negligible risk potential, on the basis that j
12 risk associated with accidents occurring in the' spent fuel f
f 13 storage pool were conservatively estimated in the RSS I.
Id to be less than.1 percent relative to those overall 15 risks predicted in the study.
~
16 The steering committee conclusion is this task l
I7 involves the revision of existing guidelines to incorporate 18 insights gained in the case by case reviews of applications t
I9 for increased spent fuel storage pool capacity.
l CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
Haven't we don't enough of 20 21 these by now that the task must be near done?
22 i
MR. AYCOCK:
It is near done, t
23 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
Maybe.we could have a class 2#
of these that we declare ' to be the really central issues w.o.rw n n m.ine..
25 and along about January 20, just before we got to testify,
i 65 I
we can announce they have been deleted.
jg-4 2
COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
I think the record ought 3
to show the Chairman made that as a facetious comment.
l 4
(Laughter. )
5 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
True.
Further discussion 6
on this one?
I think it is a different category.
7 Okay.
A-29.
8 MR. DENTON:
This is back on page ll.
9 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
Back on the enclosure, i
10 MR. STELLO:
This is looking at ways to provide
{
high assurance other than protecting against agents ll 12 of sabotage in nuclear facilities.
We currently believe 13 that the program we have in place derived principally Id from 7355 and a bunch of other regulations.
It provides 15 that high assurance, but clearly there could be others l
16 and more efficient ways in which to accomplish that same I.
objective.
f
'7 1
18 This is an item that has been around for some time. !
U It is an item which the ACRS brings up from time to time l<
20 and we believe is worth looking into, but clearly is not 21 what I would consider to be an unresolved safety issue.
22 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
So then, Vick, would it 23 be correct to say that you believe that the 7355 meets the 24 needs as f ar as can be seen?
It is always worthwhile to nos Fooeral Reporters, Inc.
25 continue doing scxne level of investigation, but as f ar as any x
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major requirement, the current regulation meets it?
2 MR. S TELLO:
That's my view, yes.
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MR. CASE:
There may be better ways.
More cost
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COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
I am trying to draw the 6
' distinction, though,- between an issue that was never 7
important and one that is important but we think we have got i
8 adequate means of meeting it although obviously there may be j
9 better ways.
But the ways of meeting it are now adequate, f
10 MR. CASE:
Yes.
II MR. KENNEKE:
Shouldn't there be a category j
12 eliminated from the discussion and framed broadly enough I i I3 to cover the whole category?
It seems like th$t is not l
14 really an issue as such.
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CHAIRMAN HE!;DRIE:
It's like the flaw detection.
2 the long-range improvement of flaw detection.
l 3
COMMISSIONER AHEARNEJ It's sort of geared to 4
the research program.
5 MR. CASES Gentlemen, it's very impor. tant to 6
the ACRS.this program be identified and have visibility as 7
being pursued.
They believe that what we are doing here
~
8 satisfies thelr labeling this thing as a generic issue in 9
each one of their letters.
So it is important from that 10 standpoint to have this identified the way it is.
11 MR. KENNEKE2-Are n't you t' hen lett ing the 12 ACRS demand drive your response to the 210 question?
I 13 think that's the distinction.
14 MR. CASE:
This is not included in my response 15 to the 210 question.
~
16 MR. DENTON:
It drives the category A's.
17 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE It was.
18 MR. CASES It was because of their insistence on 19 the importance of ge.tting something going.
It',s another 20 factor we took into effect.
21 CHAIRMAN HENDRIEJ That's another area.
That is 22 a point.
There are a number of items of this character 23 tht the ACRS has always labeled as generic issue to be 24 dealt with and has urged the Staff to get on with it.
A 25 number of improvments sorts of propositions.
They will Nf-F9 WJPM/-E70@
817.14.2 68 bw I
classify them as generic. issues.
They are not in my view 2
necessarily section 2108 items.
3 COMMISSIONER AREARNs4 Are you saying that the 4
ACRS doesn't accept 7355 as meeting their concerns?
5 MR. CASE:
No, I wouldn't say that.
It's sort of i
6 like their f eeling on 5046 ' the ECCS criteria.
They have 7
written. letters saying they think that's adequate, yet they 8
also write letters saying they think we ought to consider 9
doing more.
10 MR. DENTON:
Improve it.
11 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY Well, I think it would 12 be more satisfactory if the protection was inherent in this 9
13 design.
14 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
Next item?
15 MR. DENTON:
Next is A-30 on page 12 of the 16 enclosure.
17 MR. MATTSON2 This is a Task Action Plan tht is 18 In response to an issue raised by an ACRS concultant, 19 Mr. Epler from Oak Ridge National Laboratory, having to do 20 with the validty of the single-failure criterion as an 21 adequate assurance of reliability of the DC power system.
22 Basically, what we have got is redundant separated DC power 23 systems.
We apply single-fallure criterion to those 24 redundant systems and say one is there when you need it.
25 Mr. Epler and others in reading licens.ee event t
F w
rv
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817.14.3 69 bw 1
reports and studying consequences and events scenarios, 2
say, 8'But what if you f ailed them both, shouldn't you move 3
to a reliability-based or a probability-based. assessment of 4
reliability for DC power systems, rather than the single-5 failure criterion?"
6 You may recall about a year and a half ago we 7
sent a paper up here as to the status of the use of the 8
single-f ailure criterion in a number of places throughout 9
the regulations and in our review process.. This was one 10 area where examination continues.
Khat is being done under
.11 the Task Action Plan is a reliability study of DC power 12 systems to look at event reports, to look at mean time 13 between f ailure of components, and that sort of thing, to 14
. determine in a probabilistic sense from operating experience 15 exactly what is the reliability of these systems and does 16 the single-failure criterion as a licensing tool assure the 17 kind of reliability that you need for accident situation?
18 C0kNISSIONER.AHEARNE:
How long has that review l
19 been ongoing?
l 20 MR. MA.TTSON:
That's a sticky point, Commissioner.
21 The ACRS put a lot of pressure on this one.
I believe ab.out
~
22 a year ago we said we'd finish it in about a year. We're 23 not finished yet.
I would hope in this fiscal year it's going 24 to finish.
I don't know the current status today.
It's 25 moving along.
It's in the power systems which is a highly-h a AT n92-R3r@
817.14.4 70 bw 1
Impacted branch in the OL review process.
They have too 2
few. people to do the work.
This is one that's slipping.
3 f rankly.
4 You see today that in our judgment it didn't belong 5'
on the unresolved saf ety issue list.
We are satisfied 6
with-our current criteria.
We are satisfied that these 7
systems are acceptably reliable, but we wlli continue to 8
press for an answer for the ACRS.
We are breaking new 9
ground.
We are moving to that reliability-based licensing 10 process in pieces here and there.
We have other priorities J1 to get on with first.
12 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE In the preliminary review 13 of 11censee reports of f ailures, what does that tend to 14 show?
(~0!
15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25
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1 71
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- 817.15.1 rc 1
.MR. MATTSON:
Well when we went to the ACRS the 2
first time, we had e. probabilistic study that mede us look very i
3 good.
Since then, we have done more probabilistic studies and 4
my recollection is that research has said we are on the fringe 5
between negligible and an importent potentiel contributor
~
6 to risk, that is something between 1/10 of a percant and I 7
percent.
8 Joe, is that correct?
9 VOICE That's correct.
10 MR. MATTSON While our first analysis a year ago
.11 gave us more comfort than the one today, I think there's still 12 from the risk type analysis a fair support for the present 13 pos it ion.
We are making the judgment at this point that it is 14 not -- we.are not likely to change our criteria.
15 of course, part of that judgment has to be colored by 16 the fact of are we capable today of. m'oving to unre]iability 17 based licensing criteria and implementing them in the licensing 18 proc e sses.
19 MR. KE NNEKE :
Roger, what's the connection between 20 your statements here and your review that you are carrying on 21 now of the use of WASH-1400?
Isn't this particular issue one 22 of the ones that's giving you some indigestion?
Is there 23 any connection with the decision as to whether it is an 24 tnresolved safety issue or not?
25 MR. MATTSON:
I don't think so, but I am not sure I t
r
.,,yvw-
72 317.15.2 rc 1
understand your question A1.
2 MR. DENTON:
I think Al is referring to the f act that 3
in our dragnet of the uses of 14DO,.this was one of the places 4
where 1400 was possibly misused in one of the earlier reports..
5 MR. MAITSON:
I don't remember my definition did 6
that, but maybe one of the others did.
7
( La ughte r. )
8 MR. DENTON:
The conclusion was, nonetheless, even 9
though the absolute values have been cited, that the staff's 10 conclusions on the.first principle remain the same about the
.11 iss ue.
12 COMMISSIONER AHEARNC:
What I was trying to get at, 13 though, was you have now gone througn a bunch of accident 14 reports or, at least, begun to collect accident or failure 15 reports and are you finding that the single f ailure criteria 16 was not ar.ywhere near as adequate a protection as you thought
~
i 17 it was?
That's really the question.
18 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
Let's ask it another ways How i
19 much DC blackout have we had?
20 MR. STELLOJ I can't recal? any instance where both 21 batteries were lost.
Give me a few moments.
I will be
~
22 leafing through this.
I might want to change it later.
I 23 don't remember seeing it.
24 CHAIRMAN h6NDRI2:
It sounds like zero or some small 25 number of hours against several hundred plant years of
73 817.15.3 rc 1
operation.
2 MR. MATT 30N2 Yes.
3 CHAIRVAN HENDRIE:
That suggests to me that it is --
you kno, that whatever data is available suggests a f airly 4
w 5
small increment.
Wag your hand there if you find an instance.
6 Why don't we move ahead.
7 John?
8 MR. AYCOCK2 A-32 is evaltation of overall eff ects of 9
missiles.
The purpose is to improve and enhance the current 10 li:ensing review process by assessing the overall and J1 structurel local response from impacts of missiles generated by 12 tornadoes, turbine f ailures, aircraf t impact or by other 13 accidents external to the nuclear f acility.
14 It was assigned to Group 3 which was confirmatory.
15 The rlsk category assigned it to a category 3, the negligible 16 risk potential on the bas!.s of a bounding calculation.
They 17 showed it was less than ! parcent of the reactor refety study 18 risks.
19 The steering commi.ttee conclusion is that current 20 criteria are believed to provide substantial saf ety margins 21 against a broad spectrum of mLssile nazards.
This task is 22 expected to confirm that existing conservatism.
23 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
If we -- we might back off a 24 little bit from things like -- some of the things like 25 tornado missiles.
/YEihf657fD%
REP QRVE0iS o INC. (202)347-3700
74 317.15.4 rc 1
MR. CASE:
This is the structural effects of missiles 2
given a strike.
There's another task that deals with the 3
probability of a strike, from tornadoes in particular.
It is 4
just the structural part.
5 CHAIRMAN HENRIE2 I know.
6 MR. DENTON:
This.was one where we were reprogramming 7
manpower.
We did give the responsibility to this one to 8
Standards.
Gunner Arnot is here.
9 MR. ARNOT:
Good af ternoon.
I am Gunner Arnot from 10 Standards.
.11 Task action A-32 uses as its inputs at various points 12 the two task acti,on plans related to turbin2 missiles and 13 tornadoe missiles.
This particular task, A-32, addresses 14 itself to the structural eff ects only, not to the missiles, 15 the probability of occurrance.
16 It takes a given lesd on what we would estimate to be 17 the structural barrier and then the objective at that point is 18 to take our analytical techniaues that we currently use, 19 asse.ss them against some test programs which have recently 20 been run and are currently being run, and find out how 21 conservative are we in our calculations of the response of this
.22 barrier.
23 We f eel we have quite a bit of conservatism in thist 24 and, as a matter of fact, we can probably shave it when we do 25 some more comparison of test results with the current ACE-TEDEROL REPORT
l 1
1 75
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317.15.5.
rc 1
analytical approaches being used.
l 2
Fundamentally, this program is to advance the state 3
of the art, refinement of structural analysis techniques on 4
. barrier behavior when struck by a missile.
We consider we 5
don't have an immediate safety concern in this area because we 6
.f eel we have.suf ficient margin.
The question is quantifying 7
that margin to some degree.
8 CHAIRMAN HENRIES The missile spectrum against which 9
one designs for the class-one tornado includes a 4000-pound 10 automobilo at what velocity?
.11 MR. ARNOT:
There's a variety of tornado missiles 12 wh.ich are being reviewd at this time.
13 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
What is the aircraft impact?-
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817.16.i 76 cmw 1
MR. ARNOT:
Currently we were not including it in 2
this action plan.
We can't call it a generic --
3 COMMISSIONER.AHEARNE:
What is your criteria of the 4
number of plants that are required to be generic?
5 MR. ARNOT:
Personally, I don't have one.
I think 6
this is well within any criteria one would establish, not to 7
Worry about it.
But as drafted, the plan does not include it 8
because.we don't, in the foreseeable future, have any that I 9
understand are going to use an airplane crash as a design 10 criteria.
Being from standards, I may not have the latest Ji word on that, but that's my understanding.
12 (Si.multaneous discussion.)
13 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
The point about when you get a plant. which hds managed to locate itself closest.to an airport, 14 15 so that you want -- look at the aircraft impact, they 16 immediately get f airly plant specific in the sense that you 17 immediately want to find out what the traf ric at the airport is l
18 and what fraction of it is big, medium', small, general.
19 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
That's going to the 20 probability of it.
~
21 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE2 No.
That's going to the effects 22 of the impact as well.
That is, you want to examine' on a
~
23 plant-specific basis and I don't see that a generic set of 24 criteria fpr structural response to aircraf t are going to be 7
25 of much use to anybody.
So it really doesn't fall in the 1
Tit 9JdW2-SD7sfol
1817.16.2
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generic.
It may be a safety problem for a given plant, but 2
In that case you will want to look at the kinds of aircraf t 3
and.where they are coming from.
4 COW 4ISSIONER AHEARNE2 My only point, Joe, and it 5
doesn't take exception to this, but if I understand correctly, 6
you have two categories of tasks.
One is determining what is 7
the probabillty that there will be a hit and the second, which 8
is that task, given that there is a hit, what is the 9
structural effect of that hit.
10 If those tasks are useful, then the question of how J1 c1ose the plant is to the airport comes into the first 12 category and has.nothing to do with given that it's hit by 13 an airplane.
'4 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE*
Sure it does.
Diff erer.t airport s 15 will have different kinds of track.
The specific missile that 16 you have to consider in terms of structural effects may be 17 different from -- for plant to plant.
18 COMMI.SSIONER AHEARNE:
Sure, but that has to do with 19 any a.ircraf.t impact.
There.will always be a specific airplane.
20 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE2 No.
It won't be specific.
The 21 missile which the aircraf t represents will be j
~
22 characteristically dlfferent from plant to plant.
23 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE2 I was just speaking -- if 24 there's an envelope of parameters that the strutural eff ect J
25 will examine, a missile is -- I imagine that's a generic word
)
)
817.16.3 78 cmw I
which ends up bejng a set of charer teristics applied to it 2
for the transfer of the impact.
It's. jus t a combinat ion.
3 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
In fact, we had a set of planes 4
full of antisubmarine weapons as I remember it.
Onward.
5 MR. DENTONJ A.33.
That is the treatment in the 6
environmental statement of accident risks 7
MR. CASE 2 I had a lot of volunteers this morning 8
to cover the NEPA ones.
COMMLSSIONER AHEARNE:
Could you say -- you say 9
10 it's an environmental Lssue.
Was this for the improvement J1 In the lic.ensing review?
Was that the origin?
12 MR. DENTONJ Let me ask Dele Bunch to describe that 13 task.
14 MR. BUNCH:
Basically, that has two purposes.
One 15 is to take. a look at.what we have learned in the last 100 or 16 so statements for LWRs and see what additions we should make 17 to that proposed annex issued in 1971 regarding the treatment 18 of accidents in NEPA statements.
The second is to develop
-19 some sort of --
20 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE I think we are going to overtake 21 the Staff.
On converging paths we will see you down the
~
22 trail a ways.
23 MR. BUNCH The second was to develop a document we 24 could use given some sort of generic document that was 25 providing a base for the commonly asked questions.
817.16.4 79 1
cmw 1.
CHAIRMAN HENDRIEs A-34.
2 MR. AYCOCK This is instruments for monitoring 3
radiation and process variables during accidents.
The purpose 4
is to develop acceptance criteria to support.imple. mentation 5
of Revision.1 to Regulatory. Guide 1.97 dealing with 4
6 instrumentation for light water cooled nucle.ar power plants I
~
7.
to assess plant conditions during and following an accident.
8 It's viewed as improving guidance.
The risk category 9
was Category 4, not directly relevant to risk, in that it was 10 procedural.
J1 The basis for the risk categorization was that the 12 task action plan dealt with the development of criteria and 13 procedures which, if subsequent action is taken, might result 14 in* some unquantifiable improvement in safety.
15 The steering committee conclusion was that this task
- 6 is. intended to increase the efficency and consistency of the 17 licensing process by developing implementation criteria for 18 a Regulatory Guide that is already in effect.
19 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
Do you mean the Guide is 20 already in effect?
So you are using these kinds of a cceptance 21 criteria and you are no.w trying to -
.this task is to codify 22 those acceptance criteria?
23 MR. CASE Let me see if I can explain.
In its 24 review of this Guide by the ROC, it recommended an 25 implementation schedule which was in effect, all of it for new
~ ~*
817.16.5 80 cmw I
plants and some portions of it for existing plants.
2 Now, in order to implement this schedule, one of 3
the better ways to do it was to take individual lead plants i
4 and work it out with those plants, the details, and then 5
have a.11 the rest of the plants fo.11ow that guidance.
That 6
was the purpose of thi.s task action plan, was to take some 7
lead plants, work out the implementation on those plants, 8
and then have others follow it.
9 Now, it's fair to say that this guide has met with 10 considerable resistance from the industry.
.11 On the other hand, it has had a considerable l
12 Impetus behind it.from the ACRS.
Our efforts to implement it 13 haven't been completely successful, but we are still working
'14 on it.
15 Fred, do you want to add to that?
16 VOI CE:
No, sir, I don't have any other specific 17 c omme nt s.
18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25
I 81 jon1 17 I
COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
Why nas the ACRS been pushing 1817 2
on it?
VOICE:
The ACRS feels there is a need for this instrumentation to follow an accident if the accident were to occur.
They were pushing very hard for the regulatory guide.
6 They had that on one of their lists of issues that needed to-7 he addressed.
8 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
In the absence of the I
instrumentation, what happens?
f MR. HEBDON:
Hell, the plants are already reviewed 11 and the plants are assessed.
COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
The ACRS's concern is you need the instrumentation for some reason.
14 MR. CASE:
You need the instrumentation because you 15 have expectations en how an accident sequence might happen in 16 the real world.
We have an ECCS system coming on.
He have 17 the containment pressure reducing and those sorts of things.
18 The purpose of this guide is to provide 19 instrumentation that would detect whether or not that is
~
happening.
21 That is, you ought to have a pressure gauge inside g
22 containment that would not simply go off scale if it vent 23 above the containment pressure, but could read two or three 24 times above design pressure.
%.p.,i nm inc, 25 COMMISIONER AHEARNE:
The purpose of that is for after
82 on2 I
the accident, reconstruction of accident e.nalysis, or is it 2
for control of other equipment?
3
.MR. CASE:
It is for control of other equipment for emergency planning, things like that.
5 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
So it could be critical to 6
reducing the hazards associated with'the accident?
7 MR. CASE:
Yes.
It didn't follow what you would 8
normally expect an accident as severe as this to follow.
9 CO22tISSIONER AHEARNE:
The issue is not that we don't 10 know what ought to be done? The regulatory guide lays that out?'
It is getting the plants to follow that?
MR. CASE:
Well, it is a little bit of both, I think.
I Primarily the latter; but I don't think the regulatory cjuide was completely specific as to what kind of instruments, where to place them?
MR. HEBDON:
There are both technical issues and
'7 philosophical issues that need to be resolv-d as to how to 0
1mple nent the reg guide.
So there is really both aspects 19 involved.
COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
Are there major technical 2I issues?
MR. HEBDON:
No.
It is not any major technical issue.'
24 soe Foo;,al Reporters, Inc.
I 25 the plants to do it?
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MR. HEBDON:
That's correct.
I don't think the 2
technical issues are any more complicated than any of the 3
technical issues.
4 2dustry?
MR. DENTON:
I just received a letter from industry 5
this week once again reiterating the high cost and low value 6
they attach to this effort.
7 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
There are questions like should it.
8 be seismically qualified instrumentation; should it be -- that 9
I
?
is full cap One instrumentation -- should it be redundant; how l
10 redundant?
I MR. CASE:
I don't think we have gone that far, have 12 we?
I3 MR. HEBDON:
The reg guide has positions on whether I#
it should be redundant, whether or not it should be Category 1; i
I those types of things.
I 16 Their positions are there.
I7 There are some additional amplification that I think '
18 is needed on the specifics of how we are going to apply those various positions.
20 CO!E4ISSIONER AHEARNE:
I guess I wouldn't call it an l
21 unresolved safety issue.
It may be an issue that ought to be l
22 addressed at some time.
I 23 MR. CASE:
If we had a category called unresolved 24 Ace.Feoeral Reporters, Inc.
CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
Along with seismic scram.
t
84 jon4 I
MR. CASE:
Yes.
2 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
My point is it might be an 3
issue that more leverage ought to be applied to.
4 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
It just dones't fit the right I
5 mode for unresolved safety issues.
We may not be doing it 6
all,.but we know what we do.
7 MR. DENTON:
A-35.
8 MR. AYCOCK:
The adequacy of off-site power systems.
9 The purpose of the task briefly is to assess the need, ifany,l 10 for upgrading the off-site power sources and its interface II with the on-site power system at nuclear power stations.
12 It was in Group 1.
It was in Risk Category 4.
13 A statement in there is -- or in the risk report was that if results of the task are applied in such a way that improvements; 15 in the reliability of off-site and on-site power result, then i
16 significant but presently unquantifiable safety improvements I7 are possible.
18 COI2iISSIONER AHEARNE:
Do we rely on off-site power l
to meet any of the safety loads?
20 MR. CASE:
No.
But we think probably that off-site 21 power is more reliable than on-site power.
We wish it to be l
22 as reliable as possible.
23 COMMISSIONER.sHEARNE:
But it is not the --
MR. CASE:
Dut you take into account the fact it Ace Foceral Reporters, Inc.
might fail by having diesels.
i jon5 85 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
Take the last ditch.
It also 2
has the feature that it is capable of providing more bump to 3
the thump and you can run things like boiler feed pumps and 4
things like that that are great to have if you need a lot of 5
water to keep things cool and so on; but if you take the 6
off-site powgr and wipe it out in toto, you are still in 7
principle at least -- you have two separate and independent 8
on-site emergency systems.
COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
When you say in principle?
10 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
Well, those are the Commission's 1
11 regulations.
)
i NOw you know if you take me out to a given plent and 13 try to point out complications in that principle, why, I'd j
14 say there weren't some, but that's a detailed review, an 1
15 implementation matter, not in the nature of an unresolved 16 safety issue.
17 There's always been a lot of argument in fact about 18 whether the Staff, in reveiwing a plant, should have anything 19 to say at all about the off-site power system; and there are a number of people -- I think I have more than half of my weight 21 on that side of the fence that would say we require emergency 22 power systems to protect the safety of the public.
We require 23 them to be redundant.
24 go to some MUCMy to separate some -- Wod O
ice Federet Reporters, Inc.
25 j
hard to separate the independent systems, avoid them from i
1 1
'jon6 86 I
channeling disturbances from one to the other and so on.
2 Having done that, I think.there is a reasonable basis 3
to say keep your hands off the commercial power; but --
4 MR. CASE:
The other side of the argument is given 5
that off-site link being very unre. liable, you may want to 6
augment the on-site power system more than two.
7 CHAIRMAN IIENDRIE:
Yes.
But then there come back 8
these comments which.say yes, but you do have to have the 9
off-site link because you are making power and you have to 10 get it off the site somehow.
11 You can indeed bring power in; and all of these big 12 stations are connected in multiple ways to the grid.
As 13 long as you have that there, why not do what is reasonable to 14 make sure that it is -- without being safety grade all the way 15 down the line -- is as available as good engineering practice 16 and commercial power engineering would make it; and then the 17 argument comes now what does ' that mean, how far shall we push idl7 18 on that.
19 20 21 22
)
23 i
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24 i '
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6 817.18.1 87 rc 1
MR. KENNEKEs Couldn't this come under the type.two 2
limit of the definition, though?
Or is it not quite that 3
significant?
It says that it would be significant but 4
unquantif iable.
5 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE2 It is going to.be unquantifiable 6
because you are going to have a tough time making an off-site 7
power system that the staff will give you tinker's damn worth 8
of credit on on any LOCA calculations or accidential-9 calculations.
10 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE4 I am puzzled by how that
.11 statement Allen has. picked up, significant saf ety calculations 12 are poss ible, if we don't really require it for the safety 13 system to run the safety loads.
If you made.the 1.00 percent 14 reliable of off-site power?
15 MR. CASES Then you'd never need.on-site power.
~
16 MR. DENTON: LLet me ask Roger or Mr. Wenzinger to 17 elaborate on this?
18 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
Why is it not directly 19 relevant to risk?
20 MR. MURPHYs Basically, I will try to respond to both 21 quesions at the same time.
The reason we have a statement that 22 unquantifiable safety improvements could result is because when 23 you are doing a probabilistic analysis for the risk, you have 24:
to consider the probability of losing both the off-site and 25 the on-site to get into an accident sequence where there's a i
1817 18.2 E8 0
rc
'l problem.
2 If you can improve -- let me digress f or a moment to 3-say that the loss of all AC power coupled with the lass of an 4
auxiliary feed water system for the use of a pressurized water 5
reactor in the safety study was the dominant contributor to 6
the risk.
Obviously, if you can lower that contribution, it 7
has a significant effect on risks.
This is the reason why we 8
say that it could be significant.
9 The reason we say it is not directly relevant to 10 risk at the persent time is because the Task Action Plan is not
.11 aimed-at changes in the plant but rather changes in procedures 12 in house, changes in papers and you can't quantify it this 13 time what the results -- you need tne results of this Task 14 Action Plan to see how they are implemented.
Then you can go 15 back and find out this contribution to risks but, at the 16 present time, it is more proper and vou have to wait to see the 17 implementation of those procedures before you can have it 18 directly relevant to risk.
19 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
It sounds like you are saying 20 that the approach is not directly relevant to dealing with the 21 reduction of risk but the problem -- but there is a safety
~
22 problem?
23 COMMISSIONER AHE ARNE:
It almost sounds like he's s ying this isn't the right task, but the right task would be a 24 a
25 higher priority?
Man RMk JL%%%%%-55 BBL
817.18.3 89 rc 1
MR. CASE 2 I don't think he's saying that.
2 MR. DENTON:
I think he's saying.if you could 3
significantly find a way to reduce off-site power, it would 4
reduce the risks.
'5 MR. MATTSON:
A-44 is the new B item that got raised 6
up to the list that is in the new list.
That is the lo.ss of-7 all AC power, station blackout.
It is an unresolved safety 8
i ss ue.
This particular one, the adequacy of off-site power 9
systems in that larger program I described earlier, research 10 said that is paper procedure oriented and doesn't come straight 11 to the question.
12 On the question of station blackout being the 13 major -- or the dominant contributor to PWR risk, there is an 14 unresolved safety issue identified for that topic.
15 MR. KENNEKE2 Why didn't you pull 35 into -44?
~
16 MR. MATTSON:
Ed Wenzinger 1s here.
He can describe 17 the kinds of things we hoped to polish o.f t in A-35.
We don't 18 propose to stop work on everything but what's in the unres'olved 19 safety list.
There are things that have to be done here that 20 are important.
They are just not of the safety significance 21 as A-44.
~
22 MR. CASE 2 If you pull everything together, it bec me s unmanageable.
23 o
24 Ed, why don't you tell them what's in this task?
25 MR. WENZINGER:
There are basically two parts to this m-
~
817.18.4 90 i
rc 1
program.
One looks at off-site power and its availability.
2 Basically, it looks at whether or not the power is going to be 3
there or not, given such a thing, for example, as turbine trip 4
or some other disturbance out on the grid.
Basically, looking 5
at the reliability, how likely is it that o.ff-site power will 6
be available?
~
7 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
It is a system stability?
8 MR. WENZINGER Off-site power systems stability 9
that is correct.
This task also looks at a couple of items 10 that are more hardware oriented, however.
When power goes
.11 away,itdoesn'talwaksgoawayalltogether.
It doesn't 12 simply go to zero.
13 There are conditions known as degraded voltage 14 conditions.
The voltage could, perhaps due to some off-site 15 deficiency, degrade not to zero, but to some greater such as 16 60 or 70 percent, in which case, it is conceivable that safety 17 related equipment might not operate correctly.
18 Part of.this task is to complete work on providing 19 under-voltage sensors in the various-saf ety buses so that if 20 such an under-voltage occurs, a switch can be made to on-site 21 power sources.
22 Another aspect of off-site power, of course, is the
~
i 23 frequency.
The frequency conceivably can decay at a fairly 24 rapid rate if there is an extreme lack of generation in the 25 grid.
That could a ff ec t, in PWRs, the primary pumps in such a 1
817.18.5 91 1
manner that you conceivably could slow them down f aster than if 2
they were disconnected from the grid.
That's not a 3
particularly serious safety concern.
However, it could result 4
in going below a 1.5 DMB for a few seconds or so.
Since it 5
isn't such an extreme' item, it isn't considered particularly
~
l 6
of concern to safety.
j 7-The other is developing test procedures for on-site.
8 Diesel generators in particular.
That's the implementation of 9
Reg Guide 108.
Those latter three are all under way.
10
.11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 l
20 21 22 23 24 25
. CPL 1817 92 DENNIS 19
.- j g-1 1
MR. CASE:
Part of it is to provide an input for 2
the station blackout.
There are.other parts of the task 3
that for convenience are put here.
4 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
I really think in terms of' t
5 power supply questions, that the station blackout comes.
6 squarely to the issue and'that questions of whether you can 7
improve the off-site power system again falls into that-8 category of things that are nice but not necessary..
9 It just doesn' t have to be, 'again, the right ~ dimensions.
10 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
Joe, was that an accurate --
II MR. MURPHY:
Yes.
Part of the problem is' there 12 are several task cetion plans that sound almost alike.-
13 They deal with interrelated and entwined items.
I think the 14 blackout fits the number of the problem.
15 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
Why don ' t we try 36 ?
f i
16 MR. AYCOCK:
Control of heavy loads near spent 17 fuel.
18 This one principally involves evaluating l
I9 provisions for handling heavy loads near spent fuel pools 20
-inside or outside containment of operating reactors.
[
21 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
You notice. this is without b
22 regard.to the unit of-origin of the spent fueld.
- i 23 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
Yes.
4 24 MR. AYCOCK:
This will be done by determining
)
j W Federal Reporters, Inc, 25 what' specific measures are' being employed at' operating a
_ _j '
93-jg-2
. facilities and whether any additional measures are needed.
1 2
It was' assigned to group 2.
It was a risk.
3 category 3, negligible risk potential on the basis that 4
dropping of heavy leads in spent fue3. pools presented a negligible risk impact compared to other risks or 5
6 risks associated with core melt down accidents.
'7 The steering cohimittee conclusion was that.some 8
design provisions and procedures for handling-heavy loads 9
are in place at operating plants although not necessarily 10 documented in submittals to the staff.
II In addition, specific interim measures such as 12 tech spec lb.mitations are in place at some plants.
13 Therefore, it is unlikely that a heavy load handling l
Id accident that significantly damages spent fuel' will' occur.
15 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
Could I ask it in several 16 p,ieces?
17 First, let us assume just for the purpose of 18 the incident in question that a heavy load handling.
l9 accident that both significantly damaged spent fuel;.. may 20 occur?
If that were the case, would this be 'a high priority 21 issue?
22 MR. CASE:
On a given plant?
23 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
Just a high priority issue?
i 2d On all plants?
Let's just assume --
lj)
Ace-Feoeres neoorms. Inc.
25 MR.'AYCOCK:
If you had no protection now?
!)
1"
I 94 l'l jg-3
.1 COMMISSIONER'AHEARNE:
Yes.
In other words, t-2 let me assume that bodi your first two statementE were -
l 1
3 not correct.
4 MR..DENTON:- 14t me answer it this way:
we would j
5 be concerned ' about heavy load accidents and it 'is more like 6
A-12 in which we have' not looked at the paper to see how d
7
.it all comes together, although in our judgment. it was 8
unlikely'to present. problems.
9 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
All right.- Then your' 10 first part is that in some plants these procedures are in 11 place, but they aren't documented?
12 MR. DENTON:
Let me ask Nr. Neighbors to 13 address the details.
14 MR. NEIGHBORS :
I think it would be. fair to say 15 that probably all the plants have procedures for-handling i
16 heavy loads.
Now, we don't have the documentation j
j
~
17 for all the plants, but' there are many plants where we have 18
. reviewed limitations on them, tech spec restrictions.
t 19 There are some plants we know dhat -- for instance in the 20 spent fuel pool, that appear to be a problem because they
{
21 are' set down in certain areas that would' not be affected
- 22 by' fuel.- However, what we are trying to do herr. is ~ to review i
23 current procedures which is a standard review plan and 2d revise that as necessary to incorporate all the criteria Anveesnoemn.w.
1 25
. that we have in-house.
Then we plant to look at the' operating l'
J
i 95 I
plants and we have some submittals from each of the plants l
jg-4 l
2 cjiving us the details of their load handling facilities l
i 3
and their design features.
At this time we have not 4
reviewed all of these things.
We have a lot of documentation i 5
that has not yet been reviewed.
6 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
Are there any -- do the 7
tech specs that are in place regarding this -- the heavy 8
load handling capacity, do they provide the protection that 9
you feel is adequate; and so are you reviewing it from I
10 the standpoint of seeing whether those should be relaxed?
l ll MR. NEIGHBORS:
The tech specs that we required, 12 for instance, may prevent the use of heavy loads over the 13 spent fuel which means at some time in the future they got I4 to provide us with an analysis which shows that they can 15 adequately handle the heavy loads.
Some of the tech spec I
16 requirements may relate to the decay of the f uel, where you i
17 have enough decay and you could drop a heavy load onto the l
18 f uel without significant consequences.
I9 MR. DENTON:
Let me ask on this:
are the plants 20 at which we are concerned about this problem, do they have 21 tech spec limitations presently that prohibit the i
22 transfer of fuel or is that only some of the plants?
23 MR. STELLO:
Some of them.
24 MR. NEIGHBORS:
I can' t say all the plants have sco-Feder3 Reporters, Inc.
25 tech spec prohibitions.
l-i 96 l
cod 1MISSIONER AHEARNE:
If you are concerned about jg-5 2
them, why don't you have it?- There may be some plants
.3 where the configuration is such that you can't get from A
EN u here to there.
5 6
7 8
8 9
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- 22 23 24 AeFederal Reporters, Inc.
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i 97 817.20.1 bw 1
CHAIRMAN HENDRIE At some place down the chain of-2 plants, those problems begin to get -- or potent.ial problems 3
begin to get some attention.
It seems to me there's some --
4 some of the earl.ier layouts you may have to go over the 5
pool.
6 MR. DENTON:
Then you look at the capability of 7
the crane-handling equipment.
8 MR. KENNEKE:
Is it always a case-by-case specific 9
combination of controls?
10 MR. NEIGHBORS:
We may have a generic criteria, 11 but I think in the end it will be on a case-by-case basis 12
.for each plant, because each plant ls different.
13 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
The generic criteria may 14 be for the future?
15 MR. NEIGHBORS:
For the current, t.co, but we wi.11 16 have to go back and see how they match?
17 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE But not implementable nece.ssarily 18 on all present plants.
19 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
Does this come under your 20 second category, changes most likely to be nede?
21 MR. CASE:
I think.it's a little bit of both.
22 I would look at it more in the first category.
There'.s 23 a reduction of risk -- reduction in protection out there, but 24
. we don't think it's major. The same discussion we had on 25' A-12, I think.
That started out the discussion this
817.20.2 98 bw I
afternoon.
It's the came --
2 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
Gee, if it's that--
3 (Laughter.)
4 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
I don't.think that was a good 5
thing to say.
6 MR. DENTON:
I think it was more like -14.
.7 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
Are you sure it isn't an 8
environmental issue?
9 MR. KENNEKEs Have we come up with any so f ar 10 that come under step 2 of the definition?
.11 MR. CASE:
My answer would be station blackout 12 and ATWS.
You might get different answers from different 13 people.
Which came under step 2 station blackout and AWS.
14 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE2 Shall we go to 37?
15 MR. AYCOCK2 A-37 1s turbine missiles.
16 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE2 37 and 38 are the two 17 probability events that go along with the previous 18 descriptions?
19 MR. AYCOCK2 Co rre c t.
J 20 The purpose of A-37 is to assess the methods
]
21 currently used to estimate the probabilit'y of damag2 to the 1
esse tial systems of a nuclear power plant by missiles from 22 n
23 the maln turbine, to quantify the effect of the various 24 steps that might be taken to reduce this probability.
Also 25 to recommend. specific requirements for the f abrication and-J l
1
-m
317.20.3
.99 bw 1
operation of the main turbine which will assure that this 2
probability.is sufficiently small.
3 It was assigned to Risk Category 3, negligible 4
risk potential on the basis of a calculation that indicated 5
that it was less than 1 percent of the reactor safety study 6
r is k.
7 The Steering ' Committee conclusions was that 8
reviews are currently handled on a case-by-case basis to 9
determine that the probability of damage due to turbine 10 failure is acceptably low.
The task will provide more
- 11 uniform and. specific guidance for evaluating turbine designs.
12 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
You are saying it is 13 handled on a case-by-case basis.
Do you mean a. plant 14 by plant?
15 MR. AYCOCK:
Exactly.
J 16 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE I thought that was one of 17 the issues in the VEPCO case.
I thought the issue was that 18 it wasn't.
19 MR. CASES I don't think we can talk about it.
20 MR. KELLEY:
The VEPCO decision you are ref erring 21 to, I think that was uncontested.
j 22 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
This was the issue where 23 the Appeal Board --
24 MR. KELLEY:
Go and ds velop the reco.rd a little 25 more.
B17.20.4 100 bw 1
COMMISSIONER AHEARNE2 I thought the Appeal Board 2
said that it wasn't handled in that particular case.
3 MR. KELLEY2 I am a little uncomfortable.
I 4
don't have it in front of me.
5 MR. CASE I know what it said and what we said 6
in response.
My question is, can I talk about it here?
7 MR. KELLEY:
Well, at this stage of the game, is 8
there still a live contested proceeding or is that 9
proceeding terminated?.
10 MR. CASE I --
.11 COMMI SSIONER AHEARNE2 If this is North Anna, 12 the Appeal Board took jurisdiction unto itself.
13 MR. KELLEY2 The Appeal Board did?
~
CHAIRMAN HENDRIE Does the question have to be 14 15 discussed in the context of a specific case?
~
16 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
I really --
17 MR. CASES Based on the specific case as to what
~
18 this says.
I wL11 say this:
I.think those words are 19 correct.
20 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE2 Well, I would assume they 21 wouldn't be there,.if you dldn't think they were correct.
22 CHAIRMAN AREARNE:
Well, we have a basis for
~
23 handling -- for. believing we understand how to handle the 24 turbine missile problem in case reviews 6 and the proposition 25 here was to improve the background and knowledge on
817.20.5 toI bw 1
probability estimates and all kinds of things, which.is fine, 2
but I don't perceive it to be.the Staf f's position that 3
they don't. feel perfectly able to deal with turbine safety 4
problems connected with turbines on any case that comes 5-along.
6 Is that a fair characterization?
7 MR. DENTON2 Fair characterizat ion.
8 9
t 10
.11 12 13 14 15 F
16 17 l
18 19 20 l
21 22 23 24 25
)
Acccum.
I joni 102
- 21 1
CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
'J 0.
1817 2
MR. AYCOCK:
38 is tornado missiles.
The purpose is 3
to assess the spectrum of possible tornado-generated missiles 4
which should be considered in the design of a nuclear power 5
plant.
It was grouped in Group 4, categorized as relaxing 6
requirements.
Category 3 in the risk study, negligible risk 7
potential.
The basis being the probability of a tornado-caused 8
core melt sequence is very small compared to other potential 9
' core melt sequences.
10 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
39 and 40 are on the list, so we I
11 have now completed the original A's.
12 There are some'more A's now, but they have become 13 A's by vrtue of this ex*ercise, virtue of being promoted.
14 What happened to A-41?
i
^
15 MR. AYCOCK:
A-41 no longer exists.
16 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
TEere must be another method of 17 dealing with these problems.
18 (Laughter. )
~
19
' COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:
Itmay be the one we should 20 have been spending more time with.
21 MR.-AYCOCK:. A-41 was a long-term consideration of 4
22 seismic design criteria.
It'became a user request to research i
23 for long-term research in that area.
24 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
Why -- what was it again?
W FWwW Reorwa, lm.
{
25 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
Why did it disappear?
i u
jon2 103 I
CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
Is it in there?
2 Tell me what it is again.
3 MR. DENTON:
We have a seismic-related one that's in 1 4
here as a USI.
Now, that's a more short-term program.
A 5
longer-term look is the research one.
6 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
I think the Chairman's pol.'.,
7 if it was once there, or ought to be in there, there ought to
~
8 be an explanation.
9 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
Apparently it came in after the 10 report to Congress last year and is disappearing before the II next report.
I2 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
It is like a shooting star.
13 Flashes briefly.
I#
CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
Came out and never got a chance 15 to be duly recognized and accorded the dignity which it might otherwise have had.
16 I7 MR. DENTON:
I think you are correct, we should drop 18 the letters and you and the ACRS end everyone should get I9 together and have a common list.
20 a.4 2?
CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
There is A-42.
2I COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:
Perhaps ue could give that 22 one a number.
ll 23 MR. DENTON:
Having gone through these, there were aj 24 total of 10 that were in Research Categrey 1 or 2 that i
Ace Federal Reporters, Inc.
25 didn't make the-list.
Five.of then we discussed already
- 1
- I
jon3 104 1
because they are the same as some of the A's.
2 Now we are prepared to go through the five that are 3
on the research list as a 1 or 2, but not on our list as an A.
4 I think these five will complete the presentation.
?.
5 CEAIRMAN HENDRIE:
They are B30, B-34, B-65, B-63 3
6 and B-64.
7 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
Let us hasten forward.
8 MR, AYCOCK:
B-?
on design basis floods and 9
probability.
10 The purpose of this task was to prepare a paper for 11 presentation to the ACRS which they had requested detailing the' 12 bases for design bases flood events used by the NRC Staff in 13 cece reviews.
14 The risk categorization was Category 1, potential.
15 high risk on the basis that detailed probabilistic analyses 16 have not be'en performed, but preliminary analyscs indicate thad 17 risk associated with flooding'may be significant at some sites.
18 MR. DENTON:
Maybe on these we should let research 19 have its --
20 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
In the interests of time, let's 21 see if substantial discussion is in fact needed.
22 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
This was driven by the ACRS i
23 asking you to --
f 1
24 MR. CASE:
Tell us how you do it,.Ted.
Am-FewW Reorwes, im.
j 25 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
What was the ACR's response I
w
jon4 105 I
after you told them?
2 MR. DENTON:
Let me ask Bill Bivens.
3 MR. BIVENS:
I am Bill Bivens.
4 We prepared the briefing for the ACRS at principally i
O Dr. Okrent's request.
It described both in a paper and in 6
rconnal?
a personal presentation to them our bases; and to the best of 7
my knowledge, there was no formal documentation of their 8
response.
9 They quit asking questions and we quit answering I
10 them.
I (Laughter. )
I2 MR. DENTON:
We used the same approach as EPA uses, I3 where the deterministic method, but because of the ACRS Id interer,t we did send a user request to Research to see if there 15 could be developed any statistical techniques that might I0 improve our presentation.
I7 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
Why is this not classed'as 18 a complete task?
l9 MR. AYCOCH:
It is complete.
20 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
Oh, it is?
2I CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
Howard?
22 MR. DENTON:
Thenext one in the B's is E-34, which is 23 back on page 13 of Enclosure 2, occupational exposure.
Bill Kreger, I guess, will discuss that.
ice Federal Reporters, Inc.
20 MR. KREGER:
B-34 was a task we put on a long time
'l jon5 106 I
ago when it was recognized.that occupational radiation exposure 2
in nuclear plants was rising steady year by year, and we put it 3
on to identify those items that the Staff was concentrating j
onintryingtogiveguidancetotheapplicantsforthingsthat]
4 1
5 would reduce exposure in -- generally speaking, in small j
6 increments; but the task essentially listed each of those 7
areas that the Staff'either had technical assistance contracts j
8 out on or had requested research from the Office of 9
Research.
10 Right now the B-34 shows the item that we have out
?
in research and technical assistance contract.for identifying
~
2 i
the exposure related to inspection items that are required by 13 the Commission, but in the interests of safety, but may Id potentially create more occupational exposure than potentially 15 they save public exposure, if an accident were to occur; so 16 we are identifying those items, we are getting a measure of I7 the exposure related to them and then working with 18 probabilistic analysis fafter that data is in.
19 We are going to try to see whether safety risk and 20 occupational' risk are public risk through safety.and-
~
^
21 occupational risk caused by safety items can be balanced.
MR. DENTON:
So we think this is an important issue 23 ad21 to continue to work on, but not an unresolved safety issue.
I i
i
'24 WFederal Reponen, inc, 25 f
I i'
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1917.22.l' 107 LT 1
COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
Well, this is related to 2
the discussions we have been naving over the last several 3
months, isn't it?
4 MR. DENTON:
Yes.
5 CONNISSIONER AHEARNE:
And will continue.
It's the I
6 BEIR report, issue, et cetera.
This at least to me would 7
have the character of A. being quite importants S. definitely 3
having the potential of being a safety issues C, we don't 9
know whether we are going to change it or not.
10 There are a number of people who have raised JI issues regarding its and I therefore in my own working 12
. definition would definitely class it as an unresolved 13 safety issue.
14 MR. CASE:
The unresolved. saf ety issue is more i
15 whether the limits should be changed?
16 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
Yes.'
If the limits are 17 changed in one direction, it could then have -- lead to 18 changes being required on a number of plant.
19 MR. CASES But the purpose of this task is to 20 develope procedure, designs, what have you, to make exposures 21 as low as reasonabily achiev.aole.
So this task, I think, 22 is independent of wnat the limits should be.
Ar I saying 23 that right?
24 MR. KREGER:
Yes.
I think so.
We characterized 25 it as a 3 because it wasn't due to affect large arounts r
h A 9YAQ A W h S DB M L
l 4
l 317.22.2 103 LT 1
of exposure.
These items were already pretty much.in line 2
at most plants.
We feel these items we are addressing will 3
essentially in small increments enable the plants to lower 4
exposure.
5 Now, the ACRS had it as a generic safety issue under 6
their item 2-C-6 of maintenance and inspection.
They just 7
decided because of most of the things in maintenance inspection 8
that were being looked at, the guidance was pretty good. they 9
just decided in the last couple of weeks to -- the quote I 10 have is that it would be agreeable to recommend that this
.11 item is resolved from their standpoint.
12 We still f eel it should.be a category B item 13 because it -- while it doesn't a f fect large increments of 14 exposure, it does affect exposure in finite increments 15 po tent ially.
16 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE You'are saying then that 17 tnis is not the issue of what should the levels be?
18 MR. KREGER2 That's correct.
19 MR. DENTON:
That kind of question, of changing 20 the regulations, does not really appear on these.
21 MR. KENNEKE s What if SEIR said the estimates were 22 all wet and Mancuso was right and the risks are 10 times 23 higher?
24 MR. CASE:
This one should say you should put 10 25 people to doing the task one person does.
9
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317.22.3 109 LT 1
COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
Is another way of answering 2.
always yes, that you have to wait until a resolution of 3
that --- of what should the levels be before you can 4
implement anything under this task?
5 MR. KREGER:
I would say not.
The reason I would 6
say not is because at 500 man rem per plant even if BEIR 7
or anything else were to come out with a factor of 10 8
change in the risk estimators, we still might have to conclude 9
that the plants at 500 man rem are ALARA on a cost / benefit 10 basis.
11 MR. KENNEKE:
The concern would be then for the 12 acceptability of the risk to individuals as opposed.to the 13 group?
14-MR. DENTON2 What Bill is trying to say apart from 15 whatever the limit is, he's doing what he con to provent 16 hideout in crevaces, design, this sort of thing, regardless-17 of the regulatory level.
18 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
Or indeed the risk.
19 MR. - KE NNEKE :
This is a man rem-oriented task.
If f
20 later someone should decide that the whole estimates of risk 21 per unit it does are-a factor of 10 off, you would then 22 invent a new generic issue you would deal with as of that 23 t ime.
24 As of now --
25 MR. KREGER:
I think the staff pointed out in paper b
'l 817.22.4
.110 LT l'
415 on additional measures to reduce risk that even with 2
a factor of 10, change in. the risk estimators, work in a 3
nuclear plant up to 5 rem a year is still a relatively 4
safe occupation.
~
5 MR. KENNEKE8 Assuming the numbers are right.
6 MR. KREGER:
I say even with a factor of 10 change 7
in the risk estimators.
That was in SEKI-415.
We ;said what 8
would it mean if.the risk estimators changed by 10 in terms 9
of the rsik to the most exposed worker, those people in the 10 category of at 5 rem per year.
J1 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
I think I am satisfied on 12 the basis of at least -- if my understanding is correct.
13 that you are not addressing the levels in this task but 14 rather whatever levels are, you are trying to im' prove the 15 procedures that the operators use.
16 MR. KRE0ER Yes.
~
17 MR. DENroN:
The next Lssue is B-55 on page 14.
18 Mr. Stello?
19 MR. STELLO:
The saf ety concern is the -- let 20 me state -- perhaps I ought to state the safety concern 21 two ways.
22 Our concern over the operation of the valves with
~
23 respect to inadvertent blowdowns of BWRs had led us to take 24 a real good hard look at the operability of these valves and 25 decide whether something need be done.
There is 's related m
817.22.5 1.11 LT-1 concern that research had related to these valves regarding 2
the potential for simmering and heating up the pcol temperature 3
to high levels.
4 I will speak to both issues in that the solution, 5-I think, will handle both problems.
~
6 We have been discussing with the General Electric 7
Company for some time what can be done to improve the-8 reliability of the valves.
We have;been considering whether 9
or not we might want to impose additional tech spec 10 requirements to have the valves checked periodically depending J1 on their failure rates and what have you and have been 12 looking at that question for some time.
l.3 The General Electric Company has had a rather 14 comprehensive program under way at the same time to 1cok at 15 what they could do to. improve the reliability of the valves 16 and have -- included fixes which will considerably improve 17 valve rel.iability with regard both to inadvertent blowdown 18 and simmering.
19 They will be changing the throat design, putting 20 literally kits in the valves which will improve the 21 reliability of the valve, raise.the set points which will 22.
avoid inadvertent blowdowns, and assure receding.
23-We at the momont are still. looking at the 24
. question as to whether we need really to do anything at all, 25 whether the results of what's going on has already improved i
'b
817.22.6
.112 LT 1
the reliability of the valves or whether we need do more; and 2
if do more, what is it.
3 Our concern over the relative magnitude of the 4
safety problem is not very severe.
There obviously have 5-
-been a great number of inadvertent blowdowns in BWRs what.
6 the valves malfunction.
Clearly, the plants with respect to 7
a malfunctioning valve are. safe.
8 I.think they have had a total of about 50 such 9
blowdowns dince they have been in operation, and in a.11 cases, 10 we have not had any major problems.
We don't put this in J1 the category of a major problem.
12 The RES problem perhaps Joe might want to get into-13-it in more detail with respect to the potential f or simmering, 14 receding the program that is under way will handle that 15 problem as well.
16 While I have the microphone. I was looking through 17 this report and wanted to gr back to that Lssue.
I said 18 I didn't.think and couldn't recall there were any situations 19 where both DC power supplies were-lost.
There are none, j
20 but I f eel obligated in reading Epler's le.tter again ---
21 because that's where I thought something was read about j
I
-j 22
- - I will read a sentence out of context in his letter.
~
23 It says, "However, two events 'could be categorized 24 as incipient."
Two battery failures.
25 The events he's ref erring to, one of them was a
.m. z. -.
1817.22.7 J13 LT 1
situation where several bas cells were found in both ba.tteries 2
and questioned how well they would have done their job.
3 In one other case, during a testing sequence, someone had --
4 no, excuse me.
The other one I believe related to a plant 5
. design.which had two batteries which were being charged and 6
on test together.
That was allowed because it was a i
7 three-ba.ttery system.
Those batteries, I.think, went out 8
s imultaneously.
I don't believe they failed as such.
9 (The reporter changed paper while the meeting 10 continued in progress.)
.11 VOICE Following the publication of the reactor 12 saf ety study and the suggestion that this was a high-risk 13 contributor, the-staff went to each of the operating 14 reactors, examined
- the method of testing and. the frequency 15 of testing.
One of the concerns was that the methods of 16 testing did not check each check valve.
17 In other words, there was a test that said.the 18 line is not leaking but it didn't necessarily mean that you 19 dldn't have.a f ailed check valve.
It just said one of them 20 was working properly.
21 Through our review, we were able to identify 22 changes in these test procedures which would result in j
23 checking each individual valve to assure its isolation i
24 capabilities and then to review the f requency of this testing.
25 We considered that resolved in this response.
j
1 817.22.8-J14 LT.
1 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
You identified ways of I
2 making sure both were checked.
Has that been implemented?
3 VOICE Yes, it has.
4 MR. CASES Research has raised a question.
Co uldn't 5'
we further reduce risk by optimising the test frequency?
We 6
are looking at,that.-
If it can be done, it will be done.
l t
7 We don't think it rises to the dignity of an 8
unresolved safety issue.
9 CHAIRMAN HENDRIEs The last?
10 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE2 B -64.
The final one on
[
.11 decommissioning of reactors.
The purpose of the task uis to-12 improve guidance 'for decommissioning recators and replacement 13 of major pieces of equipmenti develop expected cost and l
14 funding alternatives for equipment and f acility 15 decommissionings and some tasks include consideration of 16 occupation radiation safety.
~
f 17 It was assigned to category two, that is potential l
18' low risk in the draf t risk report on the basis of the potential i
19 for reduction of occupational exposure during decommissioning.
20 CONNISSIONER GILINSKY:
Why are we talking about 21 improving guidance?
Is there a guidance for decommissioning?.
22 MR. CASE 2 Not as such, as I understand.
23 You talked about it et the meeting this morning.
~24-Roger.
25 MR. MATTSON - There is some guidance but it's
317.22.9 J15 LT 1
limited.-
2 COMNISSIONER GILLINSKYs de are talking about a 3
rulemaking.
4 XR.' CASE 2 I supoose it could include ALARA.
5 The issue you ' are going to consider in rulemaking c
6 is the -- should the detailed procedures for decommissioning C
7 be available at the time of licensing?
Should the costs'be r
S
.s e t aside in a fund?
9 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE2 I thought it was going to cover 10 all of this.
.11 CHAIRMAN.GILLINSKY:
It seems to me that is an 12 unresolved issue.
.It's certainly a safety Lssue.
It.certainly 13 rises to the level ~ that gives you concern in the licensing 14 of reactors.
15 MR. CASE:
That may be so.
Without arguing that 16 point, it's not an NRR responsibility to do.
It shouldn't 17 be on our list in any event.
IS CONMISSIONER GILLINSKY:
This isn't an NRR list.
19 MR. CASES That is true.
20 COMMISSIONER GILLINSKY:
It's an NRC list.
21 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE I think he said it's on our list but not necessarily on his.
22 23 -
COMMISSIONER GILLINSKY2 Maybe he's right.
24 MR. DENTON:
I think we had a cuestion of should we 25 be looking to making d ecommissioning easier.
i 817.22.10
.116 LT 1
COMMISSIONER GILINSKY Maybe the purpose is too 2
narrowly laid out here.
Maybe the purpose ought to be to 3
figure out how to handle the Commission.
(
4 MR. CASES To me that doesn't ring as an unresolved 5
safety 1.ssue.
Maybe it does.to others.
6 COMMISSIONER GILINSKYs It rings like that to me.
7 MR. DENTON:
'Isn't it more in the sence of high 8
level waste?
9 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY It's in that direction.
10 COMMISSIDNER AHEARNE2 I guess my concern is mixed.
J1 It's on the NRC list.
12 MR. KENNEKE:
But 210 relates only to reactors.
13 MR. CASE:
Thank you, A1.
14 COMMISSIONER GILINSKYs This is decommissioning 4
15 a reactor.
It certainly relates to reactors.
16 MR. KENNEKE:
That's why I ' asked.
They say it's 1
17 covered under this.
It doesn't sound like a description --
18 that it ought to be.
It only seems to hint.
19 MR. CASE:
The only action plan we have --
20 COMMISSIONER GILINOKY Maybe you haven't been 21 creative enough.
You know if you look upon this list as mortgages have been taken out in. licensing reactors, then 22 23 I would think that that would be on it.
24 MR. DENTON:
I am not sure I would because reactors 25 have been decommissioned.
There have been half a dozen 1
fl 8.17. 22..l l '
.117 LT 1
decommissioned.
2 They may not' have been the optimum way' of doing 3
it.
Certainly it's not in the societal risk of accidents --
4 reactor accidents are usually thougnt of.
It's more the 5
occupational. exposure aspects.
6 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
Were they decommissioned 7
under the NRC?
8 MR. DENTON:
I don't think the re has been one under 9
the NRC.
10 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
Also, they were sma.11'
.11 reactors that operated for variable periods of' time.
MR. CASE The problem is' the decommissioning of 12 i
13 reactors is a part of the standards program for developing 14 decommissioning guidance for everything.
15 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY ' You are saying it's so 16 big it ought not to be on the list? ~
17 MR. CASE:
I will take a real broad view.
If the 18 purpose of Congress.is to make sure important things are 19 being looked at, that purpose has been satisfied for 20 decommissioning even though it is not on this list.
21 MR. KE NNEKE :
What is the unresolved saf ety issue 22 vis-a-vis decommissioning?
- 23
.MR. DENTON:
That's it. That the principla issue 24 e
you would look at cost and ways to design.
25 MR. KENNEXE That's not en unresolved safety issue.
m
817.22.'12
.118 3
LT>
1 COMMISSIONER GILINSKYs There may be more than l
2-occupational issues.
r 3
MR. DENTON:
Could be transportation related.
4 We don't see in decommissioning the types of public safety
~i 5
issues involved in reactor accidents.
1 6
7 8
9 10 J1 12 13 14 15 i
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119
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MR. KENNEKE:
This has major pieces of equipment.
DD Wouldyouexpectittocoverthingslikesteamgeneratorreplaceh 024 2
mp 1 l
3 ment?
4 MR. DENTON:
Who knows the plan?
5 VOICE:
We are addressing the steam generator replace-6 ment issue.
We currently have one replacement program under
~
review now.
You are taking a major piece of equipment out.
7 8
We are considering that sort of like a mini-decommissioning.
I 9
It was initially written to address that, but the need came i
10 much sooner than we anticipated and we are now addressing that.
11 We are addressing that for the Westinghouse ptants.
12 MR. KENNEKE:
I guess I am not seeing at all what's 13 left in this one.
14 COMISSIONER KENNEDY: 'Ihey are proposing dropping it, aren't 15 dMG7 16 MR. KENNEKE:
But it would still be B-64 somewhwere onl 17 their eventual menu.
It looks like this ought to be reexamined.
i 18 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
Are we saying this is not an l
19 important issue that is unresolved?
20 MR. DENTON:
In my view it is not an unresolved safety; 21 issue.
22 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
Is there someone here to speak 23 to the task?
24 MR. CASE:
Kreger thought he was done.
He went home, tes Feowel Roomrs, inc.
25 MR. KENNEKE:
That proves the point.
r
-x e,--
- ~
r
l 120 2P2 COMMISSIONER'AHEARNE:
It'is decommissioning.
1 2
MR. STELLO:
Maybe_I can speak to it., I'probably 3
was one of the principal proponents in getting it started.
T 4
'Some time'ago it became fairly obvious to me in 5
congressional hearings that the way we were going about; e
6 decommissioning required'an awful lot'more' effort in answering 7
some of the questions that were:before us, including those that i
8 Ed's already mentioned; Should we have a program in place to
[
9 require licensees to put bonds o'r whatever, which was a big 10 issue with Congress.
l' 11 We started the genesis of taking the real good hard
{c I
)2
'look at decommissioning through the ~ origin of this task action 13 plan.
Events have now pretty much overtaken what our' original 1
14 purpose has'been.
The major program that is'under way up at 15 Standards, which you were briefed on,'and we have a very large j i
4' 16 program at Battelle looking at costs, looking at ALARA, looking-i 17 at residual activity levels after you decommission a site, the 18 standards that have to be developed from EPA and everything l
I 19 else.
i.:
~
I think all of those, if you remember it was a multi-I -
20 21 faceted program.
All of the elements were pulled together.
22 under the direction of Banner Row.
23 I think it is fair to say that right now we ought 24 to be in a-position to just drop'B-64 completely,'because I t
a+mes noomn, su.
25 believe the program under-way at Standards will do everything I
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121 mp3 1
that this would have ever done plus much more.
1 2
COMMISSIONER ~AHEARNE.
Vic, wouldn't that be an 3
argument for saying that that category of task is really being l 4
done by Standards?
f' f
5 MR. STELLO:
That is where it's being done.
That i
6 was an explanation of all the events that took place.
All of 7
the concerns raised were not concerns related to unresolved B
safety issues.
The basic fundamental reason for starting the l
9 task, in my mind, when I began it, was dealing with the i
10 question of how do you put up the dollars for the plants that i
11 are now in operation and those that are going in operation.
l 12 It does not deal with an unresolve:S safety issue' 13 in my view.
14 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
The first thing I am going to do 1
15 is get up and see if I can still stand.
i 16 We have been through the -- now been through all of 17 the A's and in the cross-correlation, all of the risk 18 Category Is and IIs.
We haven't looked at the ones that are i
19 on the list, caking the point of view, I guess, if the Staff 20 wanted to put them on we wouldn't have pulled them off.
We 21 have looked at all the ones the Staff didn't put on.
22 There is a certain problem in connection with 23 shaping up this chapter for the annual report is the reason 24 that I have kept us so long at it this afternoon.
Could we Ace Federet Reporters, Inc.
25 have an expression of opinion on the on-and-off-the-list i
2
122 i.
I
- E 1
characteristic of the ones we have been across?
Do you want to 2
ask a few questions, John?
Why don't I ask you which ones you ;
3 would ask the Staff to put on the list in spite of their argu-4 ments against it?
i 5
COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
First I would like to thank l
6 all the members of the Staff for sticking here.
~
i 7
CHAIRMAN HENDIRE:
I asked them to lock the doors ani 8
hour and'a half ago.
Have you noticed them clustering, trying 9
to get out back there?
10 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
I also think the discussions, II 3
if you are having trouble finding the material, I would just 12 think that taking the transcript and taking sections out, as 13 the answers were provided, would go a long way certainly, as Id far as I am concerned, at providing a much better explanation 15 as to why items were dropped out.
It is that kind of inform-16 ation that I felt -- still feel, believe is needed to be some-17 where.
I don't know whether the annual report to the Congress 18 is the right place or an addendum that goes to the Congress.
I9 I think that kind of explanation readily available as to why 20 an item is no longer in this high priority list is the kind of 21 information that ought to be more widely available.
22 Having said that, the items that I think should 23 still be listed,I would still go with A-12, A-17.
I would 24 probably have the A-12 reason is there is still the review.
Ace Federal Reporters, Inc.
25 When the review is completed that would be an appropriate time
l l
4 123,
l mp5 to' drop;it.
On the A-17, the Sandia effort, at least.in an j
12terim report, would be an_ appropriate time to drop it.
2 I have a question on A-16.
You might want to keep j
3 it untii the. test is finished.
That might be an appropriate 4
time then if the test turns out to be as expected, to drop it.
5 6
I am a little dubious about.
.It still has A-36 j
the. characteristics of there are a number of cases that we
~
7 e24 still have to examine more carefully.
t g
9 10 t
11 6
12 13 14 i>
15 16 f
4 17 18 i
19 l
20 j
21 l
22 23 24 Ace Federal Reporters, Inc.
-25 I
DENNIS I
CR 1817 124
- 25
-ldd 1
And then finally on B-34, what.you are doing I 2
have no problem on not having on your high priority.
3 Someplace we have to, I think, recognize that as far as 4
the Comaission is concerned -- as far as I am concerned -- the
'5 issue of what is the appropriate occupational dose is still 6
to some extent unresolved.
7 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
That has some of the 8
aspects of the decommissioning task he's been talking about.
9 That is, nobody is saying decommissioning is not an important i=
10 subject; but what was said here is it doesn't fit well 11 the mold for the unresolved safety issue category.
12 COMMISSIONER AHE"RNE:
That's right.
13 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
We contemplate rulemaking.
14 There are decisions to be made.
It's be'ing worked on.
15 It doesn't quit fit the --
16 CCtHISSIONER AHEARNE: It's just since we have a listed 17 item that has sort of the unfortunate short title --
t 18 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
Yes.
19 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
-- I*wouldn!t want to 20 dismiss it out of hand without that kind of an explanation.
l 21 That's myfreaction.
I 22 CEAIRMAN HENDRIE:
Okay.
Let's see.
Let me go 23 back and check off.
A-12; 16 you weren't sure about whether 24 you wanted counted in or out.
~
l _
m Fw wJ m oorms,lem.
25 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
I'll probably not push for it'.!
i
.l l
I-125 2 dd I
CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
Twelve; 17; 36 you had some --
2 you wish that one put in?
3 COMMISSIONER. KENNEDY:
What was your reason'for 4
36?
5 COMMISSI'ONER AHEARNE:
Thirty-six has the 6
character of there are a number of plants that still have to --
7 we should find out what can be_done about it.
We think we have 8
all the information.
It's all been submitted to us.
We l
9 are going through that data that has been provided.
i 10 MR. CASE:
I think that's a fair characterization.
Il MR. STELLO:
But heavy loads over fuel pools, they 12 just aren't -- you know -- big safety stuff.
13 MR. GRIMES:
From the standpoint -- Brian Grimes, 14 DOR -- from the standpoint of perspective of class nine versus 15 class eight accidents, while you can' conceive of spent fuel 16 pool accidents that could exceed, say, part 100 dose criteria, 17 there still -- they don't present the potential for a very large 18 risk.
19 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
They are not class nine, but at some stage I think we ought to be considering -- concerne'd.
20 21 with safety hazards that aren't quite class nine still being 22 a significant hazard.
23 MR. CASE:
I agree.
If the probability occurs.
24 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
I think John's concern with the Aes Federet Reporters, Inc.
25 item is that it sounded as thought it were in transition and
l l
126 I
3dd' I
hadn't quite become a moth yet.
It was still in the cocoon.
2 MR. KENNEKE:
The probability you are talking about p l t
3 is not a chain of events which defense is generally applied.
ll 4
It's much more of a direct one -- direct accident.
5 MR. GRIMES:
I think we are more likely to go 6
away from technical specifications than toward more' technical t
7 specifications is my own view, once we get the task done and 8
get' satisfied.
Everybody's got adequate procedures.
We may i
i 9
go away from --
l-i 10 MR.fKENNEKE:
Well, that's design changes.rather 1
i 11 than procedures?
12 MR. GRIMES:
No.
That would get satisfied with 13 the analyses and the general level of procedures and decide it 14 was a low enough probability event that we don't even need 15 tech specs on the heavy loads.
~
I 16 You have to have a combination of fresh fuel and larhe; i
17 load, et cetera, to make it --
l 18 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
Well, let 12 probe up and down l
19 the line.
At the moment, John, I will read you yours: 12, 17, 20 36 ought.to go back on the list.
For such things in j
l 21 particular as occupational exposure, decommissioning, and so j
1
~
22 on, there needs to be better explanation -- in terms of some-
.^
23 thing written down and readily apparent to all, an explanation 24 of why these don't fit the mold of the unresolved --- of the Fees neemn. inc 25 section 210 item.
127 4dd 1
Let me probe up and down the table.
2 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:
I would support John's 3
view except that I would put 36 in the same class as de-4 commissioning and the others.
There's a little bit of 5
explanation that satisfies me that it's not -- it ought not 6
to be included in a significant safety hazard list.
7 I would go along with adding back in 12 and 17.
8 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
Vic, do you have anything?
9 MR, STELLO:
I am very happy with the original l
10 definition.
l 11 COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:
I agree with that.
I 12' wouldn't send that definition to Congress for no other 13 reason than it's incomprehensible.
14 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
I didn't think we had gotten 1
1 15 to that issue yet.
l l
16 COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:
Okay.
i l
l l'7 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
There was an elaboration l
l 18 which was proposed in the OPE paper.
19 COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:
That didn't help me.
l l
20 MR. DENTON:
You liked the one on the first slide 21 as I recall.
i 22 COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:
Not coupled with the --
t 23 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:
Put it back on.
Can you 24 put the first slide back on.
l too Federst Reporters, Inc.
25 COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:
-- line that you weren't l
I
128 Sdd I
too uncomfortable with midway through the afternoon, to the 2
effect that --
3 MR. DENTON:
-- if not resolved it would lead to 4
difficulty --
5 COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:
Yeah.
That one doesn't --
6 one is not comfortable with having --
7 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
Peter, just for the 8
purposes -- I agree with you.
That's still a question.
But 9
for the purposes of completing this one lengthy session, let j
10 us assrme that we get a definition that is satisfactory.
Il COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:
And that 12, 17, and 36 12 are still the only ones --
13 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
Oh, yes.
14 (Laughter.)
~
15 COMMISSIOFER AHEARNE:
I think the issue as far l
16 as the list is concerned, you either have to go through the 17 whole list again or else you take a position on the items I
18 and then work on a definition.
l l
19 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:
That's the one I don't 20 understand.
I didn't understand it yesterday.
21 COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:
Let's take that one, though.
I 22 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:
I didn't understand it 23 yesterday.
I don't understand it today either.
24 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
I think we have at least Am-Few3 Remnen, inc.
i 25 four of us who don't like the definition.
129 6dd 1
COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:
But like the list?
1 2
COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
This was just a magnificent 3
opportunity to review the items.
Having reviewed the items,
}
i I feel those ones out to be added to whatever the right working l 4
definition is for that set.
5 6
COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:
This is probably about how 7
the Supreme Court decides obscenity cases.
l 8
(Laughter.)
9 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
Decides what is or what isn't, I
10 and then looks for the underlying principle.
l II COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:
Right.
12 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
I know what I like.
13 (Laughter.)
14 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE::
An unresolved safety 15 issue is something -- an issue affecting several plants which i
16 poses substantive questions about the adequacy of current 17 safety requirements or plant design?
18 COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:
Suppose you added to i
19 that that it involves conditions the Commission does not feel 20 are acceptable over the full lifetime of the affected plant?
l 21 MR. DENTON:
That's true.
I 22 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
Or may not be.
Did you hear 23 that addition?
24 COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:
Probably all right.
Ace Federst Reporters, Inc.
25 (Laughter.)
130
'dd CHA7RMN HENDRIE:
Stay away from that sort of 2
thing these days.
COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
-- are not acceptable over l
i l
the lifetime of the plant.
5 MR. CASE:
It's the same as actions are likely 6
to be taken.
l 7
COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
So that if it's the same 0
you wouldn't have any problem with it.
9 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
You may think so.
10 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:
If you think so, I am glad.
{
CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
Say it again.
COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:
And that it's basically r
13 the same one that's up there.
I don't know whether I am 14 happier with adequacy than I would be with reasonableness, 15 6
MR. CASE:
I like adequacy.
COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:
You like adequacy better?
t l
18 Okay.
It just then goes on to say that it involves conditions j 19 that the Commission does not feel are acceptable over l
l 20 the full lifetime of the affected plants, j
i COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
Would that say that we have i 21 22 already reached a conclusion that those conditions aren't 23 acceptable?
l 24 COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:
Over the full lifetime of w.fooeret Reporters, Inc, the plants?
1
131 l'
t 8dd 1
COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:~ Yes.
You sentence -- vour 2
phrase would say that we have already reached the conclusion 3
that the condition is not acceptable.
f 4
MR. CASE:
Yes.
I think you need a little 1
l i
5 subjective or subjunctive.
i 6
MR. MATTSON:
The actions that we had in mind might 7
have been 'only actions for new plants!n.We :we; e..not.necessarily
[
8 prejudicing the backfit decision in'our definition.
l 9
COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:
Even as far as you-l k
10 !
decision is concerned, Roger, weren't you assuming that l
^
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~
11 in the older plants, some other action was being taken?
l i
12 MR. CASE:
Some compensation but not necessarily i
{i 13 full restoration.
f Id COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:
But you weren't allowing e
15 the originally troublesome condition to exist' unmitigated?
i 16 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
Possibly.
I think some of I
l f
17 the generic items might very well have come forth with resolu-
[
18 tions which say new plants do this.
This set of plants in j
s t
19 construction do the other thing.
These fellows over here put i
i 20
, on two more guards and a waterboy and those old wrecks on t a 21 the end will do anything.
22 COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:
You think it's conceivable I
l that
[
there would be.a category in which you said do not 23 24 (Simultaneous discussion.)
3 w.o rw moonen, anc.
[
25 VOICE:
Your criteria is a much higher threshold.
I k
.. s
I i 132 l
i i
9dd 1
CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
You might find that that's 2
right.
You might find it necessary to give exemptions.
g' i
3 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
There's an issue that's l;
4 raised that there may be a significant hazard.. Your l l l
5 criteria -- it won't come into that.
This criteria, it will 4
6 It will fall in.
7 COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:
Mine has that one in it.
i 8
Mine goes on from the end of that.
1 9
COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
Yours raises a higher i
i 10 threshold.
F?cause to meet yours, not only does it raise a l
11
-""*antive questions, the Cnnmission must have already j
12 decided that yes, it in fact is a case that must be 13 corrected.
14 MR. CASE:
Your list would be smaller because i
.c 15 of that "and."
It has to meet this condition and the "and" l
16 condition.
I t
17 COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:
In the Staff's definition, 4
1 18 you said actions will be taken.
l 1
e 4
19 MR. CASE:
Said are likely to be taken.
l i
2 20 COMMISSIONER Aum NE:
It's that qualifier.
t I
21 MR. DENTON:
I thinA we could put the same "are 22 likely" back in yours.
23 l COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:
Yes.
You could.
24 COMMISSIONER AHEAFSE:
With that qualifier, I'd have 3
A=-F oww n.corws. iae.
25
- no problems.
5
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MR. DENTON:
Are unlikely to be acceptable.
2 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:
No.
That disagrees with 3
what Roger was just saying.
4 CHAIPMAN HENDRIE:
Provisions which the Commission 5
feels may not be acceptable but is that --
6 MR. MATTSON:
You still want an "or."
7 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
Some of these have 8
the character that you wouldn't want to continue to fix for I
9 the lifetime of the plant.
In other cases, I think the i
t' 10 Staff takes the view that it's okay for a limited number of l
11 plants but we wouldn't want to extend this type of approach h
12 to a larger number.of plants.
13 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:
.We can tolerate it for the 14 number of plants we now have, but we can't tolerate it 17 for the number -- if we were to add theonesnowinconstruction!
l I
I 16 and those under plan, we couldn' t do it.
17 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
There are some judgments i
18 involved there that would not -- is the total risk close I9 to the individuals near the plant, but --
I 20 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
Putting "it may not be t
21 adequate" probably gets to the life, but there's another j
22 difficulty that Dick and I are having with the substantive i
23 question -- what constitutes a substantive question.
In 24 the earlier definition it was either a risk or a reduction.
teFeoeres Reporteer, Inc.
i 25 We thought the issue was there.
134 lldd 1
COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
For example, what if 2
you were putting 2000 backlog safety amendments in DOR?
3 How would you reach a decision that those were substantive l
4 questions about the adequacy?
Substantive is very subject 5
to interpretation.
6 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
All of the actions that 7
I have in mind affect more than one plant.
They clearly are 8
questions, safety questions, substantive questions.
They 9
clearly meet the question regarding plant design.
I 10 (The Reporter took a recess while the meeting i
II continued in progress.)
12 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
We are clearly making people 13 do something now.
We sent out letters saying, " Pick something."
14 So I could interpret the definition the way we are proposing
)i 15 it to include just about everything that is outstanding and i
16 ongoing at the moment on plants.
l l
17 COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:
Well, you want something l I l
18 major, of course.
l l
I9 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
Why interpret it that way and 20 not the previous definition.
2I COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:
Well, this definition f
i 22 seemed to say to me it worked toward the
.e thing that yours 23 did.
I am not sure.
24 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
Why do you say difference?
' Ace Federet Reporters, Inc.
25 I am curious.
i
135 t
12dd 1
CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
Because it says there are
~
a tions we are likely to take to compensate for a possible 2
3 l
maj r reduction in protection, unresolved.
I don't know where i
I to go.
That's the way I read this definition.
o,
COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
With respect to plant
-l 5
l, design, there are plant designs which don't meet criteria, 6
safety requirements which are basic.
Retrofitting, going 7
back, making things up.
8 This seems to me to be -- I haven't made up my 9
mind what more I need to do on this issue on the plants.
g That's the way I read the definition.
l!
11 l#
Y u get one more test, where I think that when I e
12 f
do make up my mind what action will be taken -- it will be
{
e g
i likely I will take action.
j, COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:
Should it be "or plant j -,
is a
design"?
16 If you take o_ut your "or DJ. ant desien" 1 MR. STELLP:
j7
% think you start to'come a lot closer.
18 4
COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:
Remember, Vic, that this 39 i
set of words up here was presented yesterday as being i
20 i
the criteria through which you came up with the addition.
21 MR. STELLO:
No.
g i
OMISSIONER ENORD:
Yes.
23 u COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:
The one we used vasterday 24 is exactly the one we used.
25
.m
-~
136 f
13dd
-l MR. STELLO':
The one we had on the first slide
.i 2
'which they still have.in'there ---let's get the slide for 3
that.
,1 i
4 (Laughter.)
5 COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:
What purpose was the;first 6
'line on the slide you had up a moment a,go?
7 MR. STELLO:
It was Mike Aycock's paraphrase 8
of this, which they apparently don't agree with.
Mike' 9
prepared the slide.
I 10 (Laughter.)
11 (Slides. )
l 12 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
Almost had a majority of the 13 Commission voting.
i 14 MR. AYCOCK:
I think what we are trying to do is 15 characterize what we believe Congress interests were.
That j
16 is substantive questions.
i 17 COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:
What we are trying to do j
18 in this definition --
j 19 MR. DENTON:
A lot of people have had-difficulty 20 with this definition.
21 COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:
Well, I have no difficulty 22 with taking "or plant designs" out.
Mike, you put it in; what 23 do you think it would do if we took it out?
l 24 VOICE:
I don't want to'take it out because Ace Fooersi Repomn, Inc.
l, 25
- of. the form which is the application of the requirements-that
(,
- t l-i cf 4
l 137-14dd 1
fall out from'this to invidivual plants as opposed to what 2
the requirements really should be.
3 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
You are going in the 4
direction here of unanswered questions rather than emphasis 5
en the answered.
6 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
What about substantive unresolved 7
questions?
You start out unresolved safety issues it light 8
of affecting several nuclear power plants.
9 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:
That poses substantive i
10 questions on the adequacy.
t l
11 COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:
Does that affect your 12 step 2 up there on the definition since step one is the P ace where it's not adequate according to current standards; l
13 14 but step 2 presumes it's adequate because you are going to 15 push beyond that?
i 16 VOICE:
ATWS is an issue that poses a quastion in 17 my mind about the adequaev of current requirements which 1
18 is designing it.
i 19 COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:
I would expect you to say 20 that that was a cost / benefit' decision.
{
f 21 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
May I since the -- since l
22 time runneth on, supper is burned, wives fume, God knows what 23 terrors await us when we get out of here, let me go back
~ 24 over and see about the definition.
m.Fawwnummn.w.
i 25 (The Reporter returned to the meeting room.)
1
138
/W 13dd I
Would the Staff mull a couple of hours?
Then you 2
better come back down and start visiting Commission offices.
3 I would hope we could come to some agreement on definition 4
that improves the cheerful feeling about it over here but pre-5 serves the decision bases which went into the list; and a
6 we need to work that wording out practically immediately because 7
the deadlines on this chapter are upon us.
8 I will ask you to mull that for a bit and start 9
visiting offices.
I hope I won't have to convene a meeting 10 to gather group thinking.
11 Secondly, with regard to the list, we have 12 Staff's proposed list to which John would propose to add 13 12, 17, and 36 and Dick would join him in 12 and 17.
14 Let me see how you feel about the list 15 because we can get that settled and that dictates certain 16 actions again with regard to preparation.
17 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:
With the rewriting sorts 18 of notions that John suggested.
!l 19 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
I want to deal with that in 20 a second.
I want to see what the feeling is on this side of 21 the table on the list.
You said it seemed pretty decent to 22 you.
Would you take it as it is, add John's or Dick's?.
i i
I 23 You'd go along with those?
Peter?
24 COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:
I'd go along with John's.
l w Fewa neomn, w.
25 I want to chew on 30 for a bit, but I don't want to do it here.'
! J l
139 iub.
Mdd 1
CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
Thirty?
2 Power supplies?
Could somebody drop in and try 3
to chat with you in the next day or two and help' that along?
4 COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:
I can call'somebody.
5 I can certainly do that.
6 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
You've got a list.
It gets 7
added to it 12, 17, and 36.
You need to square the definition.
8 Talk to Peter about A-30.
9 The final thing now is that I think we are going s
10
.to need some improved disussion of each of the admitted 11 items in categories A and one and two.
Now we have had 12 extensive -- as John notes, we have had extensive 13 discussion this afternoon, and the transcript itself may hglp 14 considerably in terms of the sort of things that are useful.
15 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
It'would probably in fact 16 be excellent.
It's that kind of explanation that was 17 presented here that is much more useful, communicates much
- )
18 better, than a very formal style that sometimes comes l
19 through.
20 MR. DENTON:
Now do you want to give that in ll 21 the report to Congress or have it available?
I' 1 22 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
It seems to me it may be 23 very difficult to meet the statutory dates if it's in the
!I
~I 24 report to Congress.
Is that true?
On FWwat Rgenes, Inc.
l 25 MR. KENNEKE:
It's not required.
All that's
!l l
l1
. =...
i 140 15dd 1
being provided are.the issues that the Staff'had intended.
2 to include.-
l 3
' MR. DEh"PON:
We should add the point that it's t
4 been~ discussed with the Commission and somehow characterize l
5 and put in the report to the Congress some sort of -- you 6
.could say it's documented somewhere.
7 CHAIRMAN EENDRIE:
What I was thinking was a 8
specific backup document.
)
i 9
MR. DENTON:
By when?
10 I CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
Well, that's the next question.
h4 t
11 If it's a separate document which would free the report to
(
12 Congress, how much is it going to lag?
I lI 13 MR. KENNEKE:
Obviously the pattern is --
i 14 (Simultaneous discussion.)
i i
15 MR. KENNEKE:
You document the approval of those j
16 that are to be left off.
i 17
~ COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
I want a document that we 18 can send up to Congress that we can have available 19 to those people who are going to scream with a combination
!~
20 of indignation and con.sternation at this imbstantially I
21 squeezed list.
1 22 MR. KENNEKE:
It need not go over with the 210 23 package.
It can be prepared in parallel.
l 24 CCW.ISSIONER AEEARNE:
No, but when that w awsnewwn,nac.
25 [ package-goes is when.those concerns are going to be raised.
.l k
^
4
141
.16dd i
At that-stage we ought to have something available.
2 MR. DENTON:
The easiest would be just to take 3
. the transcript, take the slides, put it together and say, 4
"This is a record of the decisionmaking process.
5, That's not very polished.
l 6
COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
That's telling -- that's O
7 a --
8 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
-- hanging.out of it.
9 MR. DENTON:
I imagine it would fall to Mike 10 to pull this together.,
11 MR. CASE:
If I say too much, you just reach out 12 and grab me.
13 VOICE:
The date of the report has to be the 14 30th of January.
That's what they're shooting the transmittal 15 to.
~
16 VOICE:
I understand late January.
17 UOICE:
Late January?
18 MR. CASE:
A good part of that is report i
19 reproduction time.
Two or three weeks.
20 CHAIRMAN SENDRIE:
One of the reasons for that is 21 that the annual report is getting to be a real printer's 22 nightmare, isn't it?
Now what I am thinking is if we 23 separate these explanatory matters into a separate NUREG 24 document which can go to your lightening --
nFMwM F,wotwn,lts l
25 MR. CASE:
Well, I have a system -- I couldn't put !
..-m
... +..
..-,,,m..
.,m.
,,m.
142
'17dd 1
it in a transmittal letter.
Attach it to the transmittal o
2 letter.
Depending on when that goes.
I think -- what?
Mid-3 January, Mike?- You could get --
4 MR. AYCOCK:
Well, I have one problem.
5 MR. DENTON:
It's probably reasonable to expect we-
-6 can get a NUREG out.
7 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
By latter January that could~go 8
either with the package to Congress or close enough thereafter 9
that -- that clearly is the objective.
10 MR. AYCOCK:
Yes.
11 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
Now if indeed the printing and 12 editing and so on affairs worked out so it could go in the 13 chapter itself, why I suppose we could do that, but I just 14 got a notion --
15 COMMISSIONER'AHEARNE:.By'latter January is just i
16 fine.
A separate document is. fine.
In fact, it might even 17 be more useful.
i 18 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
Well, you won't have to 1,
19 carry the annual report around..
20 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
It's just when people 21 raise the issue, it would be more convenient to have that 22 separate thing, too.
I 23 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
Depending on your printing plantf l
24 and how well you.are doing, you might even print the m-F ews noemn. is
- i I
. 25 chapter into it and have all the section 210 argument in one '
i I l
+
I i
143 18dd 1
place.
2 MR.'KENNEKE:- You will need writeups of the l
3 issues that'will be added-back in.
4 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
Yes.-
That's right.
That 5
constricts.
6 Okay.. That means that the writeups on those three, o
7 settling with Peter the A-30, checking with the rest of us, getting the definition squared away are what you ne'ed 8
9 to get your 210 chapter.
l, 10 MR. KENNEKE:
How about the introductory part of Il the report?
Looking back.over that now in the light of the r
12 comments, there are four pages of introductory material.
13 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
Let's see.
Are you asking 14 because-you had some suggestions about those?
15 (Simultaneous discussion.)
1 16 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
In view of the hour, the 17 weakness of Commissioners, the state of my seat, ask you
}
18 to consult with the Staff?
)i 19 MR. KENNEKE:
We offer it for whatever --
20 CGEISSIONER AHEARNE:
We take it with that in 21 mind.
22 (Laughter.)
23 MR. KENNEKE:
You have a choice of which version i
24 you would prefer.
That might be the easiest way to go.
A=4ews mesemn. inc 25 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
How do you mean?
fi
[
144 19dd 1
MR. KENNEKE:
I think if you take intent and try 2
to express it a little differently, perhaps --
3 MR. CASE:
I must say in all honesty I didn't read.
4 that part, Al.
5 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
What I would like to do is to 6
ask the staff authors to read what you have suggested and then i
y sit down with you and see if you could come to some --
8 MR. KENNEKE:
Everyone's objective is the same.
9 A superb product.
I am sure it can be worked out.
10 MR. KELLEY:
Can I make a comment about the 11 dafinition change?
I think if you stayed with the 12 one people don't like, this wouldn't arise; but as you move 13 toward the second question, you have Peter's piece in there 14 or something.
You have to make sure, I think, that your 15 definition is compatitle with continued operation of plants.
16 That begins to sound like, "Here is a list of problems; it 17 was sufficiently ominous and serious sounding so one wonders 18 why we have reasonable assurance of safety that operating 19 plants are operating."
20 COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:
The safety issue is ominous 21 itself.
e 22 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
I think you will find that
,]
23 OPE -- that was one of the objectives in OPE's version, that 24 we address that a little bit more directly.
1 i !
. w-Faves nowwn, em.
25 MR. DENTON:
We are really looking hard at
!i l
l
145 20dd 1
Commissioner Bradford's version.
2 MR. CASE:
The specific question I think Jim 3
is raising, can you make statutory findings 6f no one to 4
risk if you have a piece of paper that says the Commission 5
believes that this condition -- whatever it may be -- may not 6
be acceptable for the lifetime of the plant; and you have to 7
issue a license for four years.
8 COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:
I can ask that question 9
just as fast, though, under item one of your definition.
l l
10 MR. CASE:
I don't think you can ask it as 11 fast.
12 (Laughter.)
13 COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:
A possible major 14 reduction in the degree of protection in the public health 15 and safety?
16 MR. KENNEKE:
Slower.
17 (Laughter.)
l 18 COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:
Anyway, I was speaking 19 for emphasis.
20 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
I assume it's a semantic 21 question we are arguing.
Because if there really was 22 substantive risk, it would be shoved out.
I 23 MR. KELLEY:
It should be shut down.
24 COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:
Two other quick things.
.co Feoeral Coporters, Inc.
25 I
l a
146 21dd 1
One, it would help people like me if on the 2
descriptions of these issues you can make sure that somewhere 3
in there there is a paragraph that stated rather clearly 4
what they were.
If you compare A-1 with A-2, you will 5
see the difference.
You can read all the way through A-1 6
without knowing a thing about what waterhammer is.
'A-2 7
starts right off by stating more or less --
B CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
What the problem is.
9 COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:
Somebody could just 10 skim them.
II The second is I want to make sure I understand 12 the item in the second paper that says issues determined to 13 be unresolved safety issues pursuant to section 210 will 14 be given priority in terms of allocating those NRR resources 15 for generic technical activities.
16 That means -- that doesn't mean that you are 17 talking about deviating from the budget?
18 MR. DENTON:
It means we will take the -- I think 19 it's 51 manyears in'the '79 budget and put it on these un-l 20 resolved safety issues.
+
21 We expect it will cover all of those and a few 22 more.
I 23 COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:
I sec.
24 MR. DENTON:
It would mean pulling people off the m FMwel Rumners, lrm.
25 Bs and Cs and Ds that some people are now working on, and it
')
147 22dd I
would keep the same amount of manpower.
2 COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:
It's an allocation within 3
what's available for NRR?
4 MR. DENTON:
And it doesn't work perfectly because 5
of the disciplines involved.
We would tend to push it up 6
again to develop safety issues as far as we could.
7 MR. CASE:
I guess I want to make one point here.
8 I hope you agree.
It's certainly conceivable you will find 9
some issue involving the efficiency of the process.
Some 10 plants can't get licensts until something is done on the II environmental side.
It would have a higher priority then.
12 As high a priority.
13 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
Depends on how serious Id you end up thinking some of the issues are.
15 MR. KENNEKE:
It's not likely to be worked on by 16 the same people, though.
II CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
Peter, did that --
18 COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:
Yes.
MR. DENTON:
Once we get the list, we will be 20 attempting to use money rather than people to solve these.
2I We have set aside close to a million dollars in our NRR budget 72 to allocate on this list once we get it straightened out.
23 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
Okay.
I thank you very much.
I 24 Ace Federd Reporters, Inc.
j I
25 area or at least got it in shape where I can see how we can get
148 I
23dd it settled in a few days.
2
[Whereupon, at 5:30 p.m.,
the meeting was and 25-adjourned.J.
4 i
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22 23 24 m neoorwre, Inc.
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