ML20147C541
| ML20147C541 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Maine Yankee |
| Issue date: | 01/30/1997 |
| From: | Miller H NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | Frizzle C Maine Yankee |
| References | |
| CAL-1-96-15, NUDOCS 9702060255 | |
| Download: ML20147C541 (6) | |
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JANUARY 30,1997 CAL No.1-96-015, Supplement No.1 Mr. Charles D. Frizzle President Maine Yankee Atomic Power Company 329 Bath Road Brunswick, Maine 04011
SUBJECT:
CONFIRMATORY ACTION LETTER (NO. 1-96-015, SUPPLEMENT NO.1)
Dear Mr. Frizzle:
The purpose of this letter is to supplement the Confirmatory Action Letter (CAL)
No.1-96-015, issued on December 18,1996, to include actions that you have committed to take to resolve additional issues prior to restart of th3 plant. In the original CAL, you committed to specific actions to address design related and configuration control problems for cable separation and logic circuit testing deficiencies, including determining the extent of condition of these problems at Maine Yankee, and the root causes of their existence.
On November 9,1996, Maine Yankee experienced a complete loss of offsite power. The ISAT team had previously questioned whether the offsite power system satisfied the facility design and licensing bases. Since that time, the NRC staff has had this issue under review, and has corresponded with you on the docket about it. Our review is now complete, and the staff has determined that the existing offsite power capability does not meet the design criterion specified in the Maine Yankee Final Safety Analysis Report which is the current licensing basis. Furthermore, the staff has concluded that your current Technical Specifications need to be amended to provide reasonable assurance that Maine
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Yankee (MY) will operate within that basis. Our rationale for these conclusions is enclosed.
Further, during the current outage and as a result of your continuing review of ISAT findings, you identified additional design related and configuration control problems:
A reanalysis (commitment by MY in the response to the ISAT) has recently resulted in a change in the post accident containment flood level that affects additional I
components inside containment, several of which may need to be relocated above the flood level to remain operable. Among these are components that provide parameter inputs to Post Accident Monitoring instrumentation functions (e.g., steam generator narrow range transmitters provide an input to this instrumentation).
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9702060255 970130 PDR ADOCK 05000309 p
Mr. Charles D. Frizzle 2
During the review of Generic Letter 96-01, a non-Class 1E load was found to be connected to a Class 1E power source without an appropriate isolation device and environmental qualifications which are contrary to design requirements (Licensee l
Event Report No.96-032, dated November 15,1996).
During the ongoing review of the loss of coolant accident (LOCA) analysis to support power operations up to 2700 MWth, MY identified an error in the containment net free volume calculation. This volume is used in the post accident containment pressure analyses and the change results in a higher than expected containment pressure for the design basis LOCA (Maine Yankee letter of January 14,1997 to NRC).
These problems appear to be similar in nature or follow from design related and configuration control issues identified in the ISAT. On December 10,1996, you submitted a plan to NRC in response to the ISAT report. Your response is being reviewed by the NRC staff; results of our review will be provided upon its completion at a later time. From review to date, we note the plan does not provide details on the actions you intend to take to establish the extent and root causes of design related and configuration control problems which are being identified. It is important, however, that before restart you assess the current problems at Maine Yankee and their significance with respect to safe plant operation.
Based on a discussion of these issues on January 29 and 30,1997, between Mr G. Leitch of Maine Yankee and W. Kane and J. Zwolinski of the NRC, you committed to:
1.
Submit an amendment request to the facility Technic 6 Specifications (TS) to require that, when the reactor is critical, both 115 kV incoming lines shall be operable and allow continued operation for 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> with one line inoperable and 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> with
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both lines inoperable. You will not restart the facility until the NRC staff approves I
revised TS to assure that the facility is operated consistent with the current litensing basis.
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Assess the other developments discussed above in terms of their overall impact on safe plant operations. This awessment will address your understanding of the q
extent of condition of the types of design and configuration control issues noted J
above, the root causes of their existence, and a more complete definition of your plans to address these issues including actions that may need to be completed prior to restart of the plant. Meet with the NRC to discuss your response to these
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issues. You will provide a written response that provides your assessment prior to i
the meeting. At the meeting you should also address the information and actions included in the original CAL 1-96-015.
i The provisions of the original CAL 1-96-015 remain in effect.
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- i Mr. Charles D. Frizzle 3
Pursuant to Section 182 of the Atomic Energy Act,42 U.S.C 2232, you are required to:
1.
Notify me immediately if your understanding differs from that set forth above; 2.
Notify me if foi any reason you cannot complete the actions within the specified schedule and advise me in writing of your modified schedule in advance of the j
change; and 3.
Notify me in writing when you have completed the actions addressed in this Confirmatory Action Letter.
Issuance of this Confirmatory Action Letter does not preclude issuance of an order l
formalizing the above commitments or requiring other actions on the part of the licensee; nor does it preclude the NRC from taking enforcement action for violations of NRC requirements that may have prompted the issuance of this letter. In addition, failure to take the actions addressed in this Confirmatory Action Letter may result in enforcement action.
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In accordance with 10 CFR 2.790 of the NRC's " Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter, its enclosure (s), and your response will be placed in the NRC Public Document Room (PDR). To the extent possible, your response should not include any personal privacy, proprietary, cr safeguards information so that it can be placed in the PDR without redaction. If personal privacy or proprietary information is necessary to provide an acceptable response, then please provide a bracketed copy of your response that identifies the information that should be protected and a redacted copy of your response that deletes such information. If you request withholding of such material, you must specifically identify the portions of your response that you seek to have withheld and provide in detail the bases for your claim of withholding (e.g., explain why the disclosure of information will create an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy or provide the information required by 10 CFR 2.790(b) to support a request for withholding confidential commercial or financial information). If safeguards information is necessary to provide an acceptable response, please provide the level of protection described in 10 CFR 73.21.
Sincerely, Hubert J. Miller Regional Administrator Docket No. 50-309
Enclosure:
Maine Yankee Atomic Power Station - Offsite Power System
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5-l Mr. Charles D. Frizzle 4
cc w/ encl:
r G. Leitch, Vice President, Operations J. M. Block, Attorney at Law P. L. Anderson, Project Manager (Yankee Atomic Electric Company)
C. Shaw, Plant Manager L. Diehl, Manager of Public and Governmental Affairs J. A. Ritsher, Attorney (Ropes and Gray)
P. Dostie, State Nuclear Safety inspector P. Brara, Assistant Attorney General i
U. Vanags, State Nuclear Safety Advisor C. Brinkman, Combustion Engineering, Inc.
W. D. Meinert, Nuclear Engineer i
First Selectmen of Wiscasset Maine State Planning Officer - Nuclear Safety Advisor State of Maine, SLO Designee State Planning Officer - Executive Department Friends ' the Coast f
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Mr. Charles D. Frizzle 5
Distribution w/ encl:
Region i Docket Room (with concurrences)
Nuclear Safety Information Center (NSIC)
PUBLIC NRC Resident inspector D. Screnci, PAO D. Chawaga, i
j H. Miller, RA j
R. Conte, DRP H. Eichenholz, DRP
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Branch 5 Secretary, DRP Management Assistant, DRM D. Holody, ORA
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l Distribution w/enci (VIA E-MAIL):
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W. Dean, OEDO l
S. Varga, NRR D. Dorman, PM, NRR R. Correia, NRR R. Frahm, Jr., NRR l
Inspection Program Branch, NRR (IPAS) j OGC J. Lieberman, OE E. Jordan, OEDO DOCUMENT NAME: G:\\ BRANCH 5\\MY15RV1. CAL To receive e copy of this["gf= No copy cument, indicate in the box: "C" = Copy withpt attachment /enclost e "E" - Copy with attachment / enclosure p*fr I
OFFICE RI@ g ql J Rl/DRS l
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OfflCIAL RECOF D CDPf dyry J j J 4 g q ([ VJP
ENCLOSURE MAINE YANKEE ATOMIC POWER STATION - OFFSITE POWER SYSTEM By letter dated October 7,1996, the Chairman of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) issued the report of the independent Safety Assessment (ISA) of the Maine Yankee 4
Atomic Power Company (MYAPCo), in the ISA report, Section 2.3.1,"115 kV Offsite Power Lines," the NRC staff questioned the adequacy of conformance of the offsite power a
2 system at Maine Yankee Atomic Power Station (MYAPS) with the MYAPS licensing and design bases. The ISA's concern was based on a 1995 study of the 115 kV offsite power system conducted by Central Maine Power (CMP). As a result of the CMP study, MYAPCo concluded that one of the two 115 kV lines to MYAPS (referred to as the Suroweic line) would not recover voltage quickly enough after a fast transfer with a safety injection actuation signal and subsequent motor-driven feedwater pump auto start. This would a
result in disconnection of the offsite reserve power and automatic start and loading of the station emergency diesel generators. This ISA issue was forwarded to the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) for further staff review.
By letter dated November 21,1996, the NRC staff requested that MYAPCo clarify its understanding of the licensing basis of the offsite power system at MYAPS. MYAPCo responded in a letter dated December 12,1996. MYAPCo presented that Criterion 39 as stated in the MYFS Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) remains as the licensing basis for the offsite power system. The staff understands that MYAPCo believes Criterion 39 is satisfied by the availability of the primary 115 kV line (referred to as the Mason line) and a 345 kV backfeed using the station transformers that can be manually established within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />.
It is the staff's position that Criterion 39 requires two immediately available sources of offsite power and that the 345 kV backfeed does noi satisfy this requirement.
Furthermore, the staff has reviewed the MYAPS docket and concludes that the staff substantially relied upon the fact that MYAPS was designed to have two immediately available 115 kV power circuits when it granted MYAPCo an operating license.
Accordingly, the staff concludes that MYAPCo needs to implement corrective actions to ensure operability of the Suroweic line before startup of the plant from the current maintenance outage.
On November 9,1996, with the Suroweic line out of service for breaker maintenance, the Mason line tripped due to catastrophic failure of a lightning arrestor. For a period of approximately four hours until the Sur:weic line was restored, MYAPS operated without availability of offsite power. For over 10 hours1.157407e-4 days <br />0.00278 hours <br />1.653439e-5 weeks <br />3.805e-6 months <br />, the facility operated without the qualified Mason line. The MYAPS technical specifications (TS) allow operation for up to 7 da+/s without any 115 kV offsite power source available.
The staff has reviewed the MYAPS TS in light of the licensing basis concern and the November 9 event. The staff has concluded that the MYAPS TS need to be amended to require that both 115 kV lines be operable during reactor power operation. This action is needed to provide reasonable assurance that MYAPS will be operated in conformance with its current licensing basis.