05000277/LER-1997-003-03, :on 970601,HPCI Was Inoperable.Caused by Lifting of Common Power Wire Lug in HPCI Electrical Power Logic as Part of GP-25 Activity.Hpci Sys Was Restored to Operable Condition
| ML20141G539 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Peach Bottom  |
| Issue date: | 06/27/1997 |
| From: | Lengyel G PECO ENERGY CO., (FORMERLY PHILADELPHIA ELECTRIC |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20141G535 | List:
|
| References | |
| LER-97-003-03, LER-97-3-3, NUDOCS 9707090253 | |
| Download: ML20141G539 (4) | |
| Event date: | |
|---|---|
| Report date: | |
| Reporting criterion: | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function |
| 2771997003R03 - NRC Website | |
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Peach Botton Atomic Power Station 05000 277 1 OF III'l (4)
High Preasure Coolant Injection Inoperable 4
EVENT DATE (b)
LER NUMBER (6)
REPORT DATE (7)
OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)
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On June 1,1997, it was identified that the High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) Steam Leak monitoring element was indicating higher than the other temperature elements in that group. This condition requires, per the Technical Specifications (Tech Spec), that the instrument channel associated with the TE be placed in the tripped condition. This action was to be accomplished in accordance with General Procedure (GP)-25 Appendix 10. At 1301 hours0.0151 days <br />0.361 hours <br />0.00215 weeks <br />4.950305e-4 months <br />, during the performance of GP-25, a common power wire lug at a terminal connection was momentarily removed during jumper installation. This action resulted in the opening of two HPCI Torus Suction Valves and the annunciation of system alarms.
The issue was caused by the lifting of a common power wire lug in the HPCI electrical power logic as part of the GP-25 activity. The momentary lifting of the lug at terminal strip disrupted the daisy chain power supply which caused a portion of the HPCI logic power circuitry to de-energize. This occurred because a metal C-jumper, which was under the wire lug, was not seen by the GP-25 performers. Following identification of the event, the HPCI system was restored to its operable condition. The lessons learned from this event has been provided to the appropriate operations personnel and operational training enhancements will be initiated. No previous similar events have been identified.
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Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station 05000 277 2 op 4 l
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Reauirements for the Report This report is submitted to satisfy the requirements of 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(v) describing a condition that alone could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function.
Unit Conditions at Time of Discovery Unit 2 was in the "RUN" mode at approximately 100 percent of rated thermal reactor (Ells:EA) power. There were no other systems, structures or components that were inoperable that contributed to the event.
Description of the Event On June 1,1997 at 0840 hours0.00972 days <br />0.233 hours <br />0.00139 weeks <br />3.1962e-4 months <br />, during the performance of normal operator rounds, it was identified that the High Pressure Coolant injection (HPCI) (Ells:BJ) Steam Leak monitoring element (TE-4944D) was indicating higher than the other temperature elements (TE) in that group. This condition requires, per the Technical Specifications (Tech Spec), that the instrument channel associated with the TE be placed in the tripped condition within twenty-four hours. This action was to be accomplished in accordance with General Procedure (GP)-25 Appendix 10 " Installation Of Trips /Isolations To Satisfy Tech Spec Requirements For Inoperable Instrumentation" At 1301 hours0.0151 days <br />0.361 hours <br />0.00215 weeks <br />4.950305e-4 months <br />, during the performance of GP-25 to trip the channel, a common power wire lug at terminal connection BB-89 was momentarily removed during jumper installation. This action resulted in the opening of two HPCI Torus Suction Valves (MO 23-57 & 58) and the annunciation of the " Condensate Storage Tank Low Low Level" and "HPCI Logic Bus Power Failure" alarms.
At 1303 hours0.0151 days <br />0.362 hours <br />0.00215 weeks <br />4.957915e-4 months <br />, the Equipment Operator (Utility : Non-Licensed) re-landed the lifted lug which restored HPCI to an operable condition. At 1307 hours0.0151 days <br />0.363 hours <br />0.00216 weeks <br />4.973135e-4 months <br />, the HPCI Torus Suction Valves were re-aligned to the Condensate Storage Tank and the alarms were reset. The NRC was notified of this event via ENS at 1658 hours0.0192 days <br />0.461 hours <br />0.00274 weeks <br />6.30869e-4 months <br />.
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it was determined that the momentary lifting of the common power wire lug at BB-89 to support jumper installation, caused a portion of the HPCI logic power circuitry to de-i energize which resulted in the alarms and automatic opening of the HPCI valves. In addition, the momentary lifting of the lug interrupted electrical power to several other NR; FORM 366A (5 92)
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HPCI functions (e.g. logic initiation relay and auxiliary oil pump) which caused the system to become inoperable for approximately two minutes.
Cause of the Event
The issue was caused by the lifting of a common power wire lug in the HPCI electrical power logic as part of the GP-25 activity. The momentary lifting of the lug at terminal strip disrupted the daisy chain power supply which caused a portion of the HPCI logic power circuitry to de-energize.
This occurred because a metal C-jumper, which was under the wire lug, was not seen by the EO or the Shift Supervisor (SSV) (Utility : Licensed). The metal C-jumper acts as an electrical jumper to provide power to other portions of the HPCI logic. The EO was aware of a preference to not disturb wire lugs with multiple wires attached, however, the EO had no prior experience with terminal strips with metal C-jumpers installed and did not recognize its presence. The SSV did understand the concept of common power wire lugs and daisy chaining, but did not visually recognize the metal C-jumper. This was due to the fact that the metal C-jumper was difficult to see under the lug.
Analysis of Event
No actual safety consequences occurred as a result of this event. If a design basis accident or transient would have occurred, the Automatic Depressurization System 1
(Ells:RV) was operable to reduce reactor (Ells:RPV) pressure to allow the Low Pressure Coolant injection (Ells:BO) and Core Spray systems to inject. The Reactor Core isolation Cooling (RCIC) system was also operable to provide core cooling.
Corrective Actions
Following identification of the event, the HPCI system was restored to its operable condition.
The lessons learned from this event hasbeen provided to the appropriate operations personnel. An emphasis on the potential effects associated with installation of jumpers, lifting wire lugs in control circuits and metal C-jumpers was communicated. in addition, operational training enhancements will be initiated to address this and other similar situations.
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YEAR SEQUEhllAL REVISION Peach' Bottom Atomic Power Station 05000277 NUMBER N'NBER 4 OF 4 97 003 --
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Previous Similar Events
i No previous similar events have been identified which involve the metal C-jumpers.
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