ML20141E806
| ML20141E806 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Hatch  |
| Issue date: | 03/28/1986 |
| From: | Blake J, Coley J NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20141E766 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-321-86-05, 50-321-86-5, 50-366-86-05, 50-366-86-5, NUDOCS 8604220388 | |
| Download: ML20141E806 (9) | |
See also: IR 05000321/1986005
Text
..
,
.
.
.-
.
_-,
..
..
'
e. i
.
.!
,
i
,
\\ UNITEO STATES .
4
7
ffpM49'of
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION '
'
.
'
["
' REGlpN il
,
g
,j
101 MARIETTA STREET,N.W.
'
2
ATLANTA GEORGIA 30323
$'
,8
{
9 +4...
.
Report Nos.: 50-321/86-05 and 50-366/86-05
'
~
Licensee: Georgia' Power Company
'
P. O. Box 4545-
Atlanta, GA' 30302
Docket Nos.: 50-321 and 50-366
License Nos.: DPR-57 and NPF-5
Facility Name:
Hatch 1 and 2
Inspection Ccnducted:
February 24-28, 1986
Inspector:
% . d . hiu
3-dR-8f
J. L
W
q
Date Signed
3 ~ 2 F ' M*
Approved by: - -'
J. J. Blalie, Section Chief
Date Signed
E gi eering Branch
iv sion of Reactor Safety
SUMMARY
Scope:
This routine, unannounced inspection entailed 40 inspector-hours on site
in the areas of inservice inspection, observation of work activities, data
review, and evaluation (Unit 1).
Results:
One violation was identified - Failure to have a procedure for
conducting acid etch examinations on safety-related components - paragraph 6.
,
L
?
,
6
l
,
8604220388 860411
gDR
ADOCK 050,3321
l
l
.
-
-
- --
-
-
--
.
-
-
.
- -
_
. . . . _
_
. - _ _ .
.
!
.
,
'
REPORT DETAILS
l
l
1.
. Persons Contacted
Licensee Employees
- J. Beckham, Vice President and General Manager - Nuclear Operations
l
- H. Nix, Site General Manager
- D. Vaughn, Senior Quality Assurance Specialist
- S. Tipps, Superintendent of Regulatory Compliance
G. Goode, Supervisor of Engineering
T. Huckaby, Inservice Inspection (ISI) Engineer
R. Harrington, Inspector Quality Control
Other Organizations
Southern Company Service (SCS)
-J. Agold, Supervisor or Coordination and Documentation
!
'
G. Loftus, Lead Inspector-Level III
Bechtel Inc.
8. Miller, Test-Engineer
t
NRC Resident Inspectors
- P. Holmes-Ray, Senior Resident Inspector
G. Nejfelt, Resident Inspector
- Attended exit interview
2.
Exit Interview
The inspection scope and findings were sumarized on February 28, 1986, with
those persons indicated in paragraph 1 above.
The inspector described the
areas inspected and discussed in detail the inspection findings.
No
dissenting comments were received from the licensee.
(0 pen) Violation 321/86-05-01, Failure to Have a Procedure for
Conducting Acid Etch Examinations on Safety-Related Components,
para-
graph 6.b.
(0 pen) Unresolved Item 321, 366/86-05-02, NUREG-0619 Examinations, para-
graph 5.a.
l
(0 pen) Inspector Followup Item 321/86-05-03, Licensee Review of ISI Plans,
j
paragraph 5.b.
l
- -
- -
-
- - -
- - - - - - -
!
.
,
!
l
l
l
The licensee did not identify as proprietary any of the materials provided
to or reviewed by the inspector during this inspection.
3.
Licensee Action on Previous Enforcement Matters
This subject was not addressed in the inspection.
4.
Unresolved Items
Unresolved items are matters about which .r. ore information is required to
determine whether it is acceptable or may involve violations or deviations.
One new unresolved item identified during this inspection is discussed in
paragraph 5.a.
5.
Inservice Inspection - Observation of Work and Work Activities (737538)
(Unit 1)
The inspector observed the ISI activities described below to determine
whether these activities were being performed in accordance with regulatory
requirements and licensee procedures.
The applicable code is the ASME
Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code,Section XI,1980 Edition, W80 Addenda.
(See RII Report 50-321/85-35 and 50-366/86-02 for previous inspections in
this area).
a.
As noted in RII Inspection Report 50-321/85-35, the first 10-year
interval inspections are to be completed during the current outage.
The inspector compared the current outage plan for Class 2 components
and pipirg with the modified forty-year inservice examination plan for
Class 2 components to determine whether the first 10-year interval
requirements of the Technical Specifications, ASME Section XI, and the
ISI Program accepted by the NRC will be met during the current outage
in the areas of:
Number of items to be inspected
-
Methods of examination
-
Extent of examinations
-
The inspector verified that the ASME Section XI requirements applicable
during each inspection period requirements had been implemented and
accomplished for the 10-year inspection interval by reviewing in detail
Category CC welded supports in five Class 2 piping systems.
The following systems / components were reviewed:
Main Steam Auxiliary System
-
,
Core Spray System
-
Residual Heat Removal Heat Exchangers
-
High Pressure Core Injection
-
Reactor Core Isolation Cooling
-
.
-
-
-
-
- -
- - -
- -
-
-
.
-
-
.
-
- - - -
-
i
-
.
l
3
,
ASME Section XI requirements for Category CF pressure retaining welds
I
in piping were verified by selecting a sample based on a specific size
of pipe in six Class 2 piping systems.
,
!
The pipe diameters indicated in the following systems were selected for
review:
System
Diameter of Pipe
Main Steam Auxiliary
24-inch diameter
Turbine Steam Bypass
16-inch diameter
16-inch diameter
'
10-inch diameter
High Pressure Core Injection
10-inch and 14 inch diameters
,
Reactor Core Isolation Cooling
8-inch and 10 inch diameters
l
During the review of the modified inspection interval, the inspector
noted that weld No. IC11-2CRD-3-R-2 referenced a note in the plan which
!
invoked the requirements of NUREG-0619.
NUREG-0619 required that,
during each refueling outage, the welded connection joining the
rerouted control rod drive return line (CRDRL) to the system which then
returns flow to the reactor vessel is to be inspected. The inspection,
using ultrasonic examination (UT), must include base metal to a
l
distance of one-pipe-wall thickness or 0.5 inch whichever is greater,
,
on both sides of the weld.
The modified inspection interval did not
'
indicate that these examinations had been performed. The licensee also
could not find any examination reports on this weld, however, discus-
sions with Southern Company Service (SCS) cognizant personnel indicated
that the piping configuration at the Hatch plant was not exactly as
l
that described in NUREG-0619 since Hatch utilizes a thermal tee fitting
in lieu of a weld-o-let.
SCS stated that, this issue had been discussed earlier in the interval
and a safety evaluation had been performed.
The SCS representative,
however could not find the documentation allowing the deviation.
This item was found near the end of the inspection and cognizant
licensee personnel were not at the site to discuss the matter or to
provide the necessary documentation; therefore, the issue was reported
as Unresolved item 50-321, 366/86-05-02, NUREG-0619 Examinations,
b.
During the inspector's review of the above modified inspection plan,
questions concerning how the plan was set up (four periods in lieu of
three), what code was being used in each inspection period, and how to
,
coordinate the approved deviations into the plan during the review were
'
discussed with the licensee.
The licensee's ISI personnel were unable
to answer the inspector's questions.
Several days after the inspector
arrived on site the licensee arranged a telephone call between the
inspector and a cognizant SCS representative in Birmingham, Alabama.
l
-
-
- -
-
- _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ -
_ _ - . . - _ _
. _ - _ _ - _ _ _ _
_ _ _ _ _ .
_ _ _
. _ _ _ _ _ . . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _
.
l
-
,
.
!
4
i
r
,
f
In addition, the cognizant SCS represeatative from Birmingham arrived
l
at the site near the end of the week to assist the inspector in
interpreting the modified program and plans and where the deviations
fit into these plans.
The SCS representative was a very knowledgeable;
individual and the inspector's question and concerns were answered in--
depth.
The inspector, however, was concerned that the licensee repre-
sentatives in the ISI section could not answer the inspector's program
and plan questions since the licensee is responsible for reviewing
vendor work and ensuring that the regulatory and code requirements are
properly implemented.
The inspector, however, did not discuss this
concern with site quality assurance personnel.
!
The inspector will pursue this concern on a subsequent inspection and
!
identified ~ it as Inspector Follow-up Item 50-321/86-05-03, Licensee
Review of ISI Plans. This was opened to track the inspector's concern.
I
c.
The inspector observed the first 10-year interval ISI system pressure
test (P41-PT-2) for the service water system, division 1 pumps A&C.
This is a Class 3 system and was performed at normal operating pressure
!
rather than 1.10 times the design pressure required by the code. The
!
licensee had received approval for relief to the code requirements from
'
NRC because this portion of the system had a butterfly valve as the
hydrostatic test boundary and butterfly valves are basically flow
control valves not intended to be block valves.
The inspector
l
witnessed the pressure test to determine if the following requirements
,
l
were met:
Approved procedures are available and are being followed.
-
Examination personnel are knowledge of examination method and test
-
boundaries.
Examination personnel with proper level of qualification and
-
certification are performing the examination activities
Examinations results, evaluation of results, and corrective
-
actions / repairs / replacements are being recorded as specified in
,
the ISI program.
I
Within the areas examined, no violation or deviation was identified.
6.
DataReviewandEvaluation(Unit 1)(737558)
The inspector reviewed ISI data and evaluations performed by the licensee to
ascertain whether NDE data covered the scope of examination required during
the current inspection period, data files are complete and within previously
established acceptance criteria, and the licensee's disposition of adverse
i
findings and subsequent re-examination is consistent with regulatory
requirements.
l
!.
,
.
-
-
-
- -
-
-
-
.
-
,,
-
-
-
.
5
The applicable code is the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code,Section XI,
1980 Edition with addenda through W80.
The inspector performed the
following observations / reviews and compared the results with the applicable
procedures:
I
a.-
Class 1 Components - Ultrasonic Examination of Jet Pump Beams
<
0ne of the activities performed during the current refueling /mainten-
ance outage for Unit I was an inspection of the Jet pump beams pursuant
,
j
to General Electric Service Information Letter (SIL) 330.
During the
ultrasonic examination of all 20 jet pump hold-down beams an indication
of cracking was found on the beam for jet pump No.16. The indication
was located on the top surface of the beam, at the minimum ligament
adjacent to the bolt hole.
The initial estimate of the crack depth was
150 mils.
The beam was replaced during the current outage and a new
base line examination was performed.
The inspector reviewed the
following nondestructive examination (NDE) records:
Examination results and data sheets
-
Calibration data sheets
-
Examination evaluation data
-
Records on extent of examination
-
Records on disposition of findings
-
Re-examination data af ter repair work
-
SCS Procedure UT-H-414 Revision 1 Ultrasonic Examination of Jet
1
-
Pump Beams
)
NDE personnel qualification and certification records
-
In addition to the nondestructive test examination data, the inspector
reviewed Georgia Power Procedure No. 42 SP-INS-023-05, Revision 1 for the
replacement of the jet punp hold-down beam and witnessed a video tape
of the entire operation. Areas covered in the procedure and video tape
included the following:
Jet Pump Tensioner Setup
-
Detention and Break Keeper Tack Welds
-
Beam Bolt Retainer Cutting
-
Installation of Jet Pump Beam
-
Tensioner Installation and Operation
-
!
Welding Equipment Setup
'
-
Beam Bolt Keeper Weld Qualification Test
-
Tack Weld of Keeper to Beam
-
Inspection of Keeper Tack Welds
-
Inspection of Keeper Tack Welds
-
installation of Ultrasonic Fixture on New Beam
-
The inspector also reviewed the General Electric Service Information
Letter SIL-330 to insure that recommendations made by General Electric
(GE) in the letter had been implemented for hatch Units 1 and 2.
The
-following recommendations were verified:
-.
..
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
_
- _ _ _ _ _ _ - _
_ _ _ _ _ _
_-_-
-
<
,-
.
,
l
6
l-
.
-
'
,7
,
,
f
UT examinations of the Deams performed.-curing each refueling
~
-
l
outage and beams having crack indicatigns-replaced.
'
Jet pump surveillance initiated for evaluation of pump performance
-
Technical Specificatiohs modified for Units 1 and 2 to reflect
-
alternative B approach delineated in GE's SIL-330
l
Jet pump performance monitoring established
-
1
-
l
b.
Reactor Pressure Vessel Welds - Reactor Pressure Vessel Longitudinal
[
Welds Nos. C-3-B, C-3-A, and C-3-C
,
The inspector reviewed records for the longitudinal welds identified
above to ascertain whether the following requirements were met:
The method, extent, and technique of examination comply with
-
licensee's ISI program and applicable NDE procedure.
-
L
The examination data are within the acceptance criteria as
-
.
outlined in applicable NDE procedure and applicable code require-
ment.
The recordirg, evaluation, and disposition of '~inding 'are in
f
-
compliance with the applicable NDE procedure end applicable code
requirements.
The method used for NDE was sufficient to determine the full
-
extent of indication or acceptarice.
^
'
'
Nondestructive test examiners were qualified and certified to
'
-
perform the eximinations.
,
,
As a results of previous inspections in this area by RII' inspectors,
the inspector was aware .that SCS was having difficultidF)n ?ocating
I
the longitudinal welds because during the fabrication 5;tage of the
vessel, the outside diatneter of the vessel had been milled to ensure
its roundness.
This operation smoothed the welds to where they"could
not be distinguished from the base metal.
The licensee had rerformed
an acid etch examination and was unable to locate the welds. '
As a result, the licensee requested assistance from the Electric Power
Research Institute (EPRI) NDE Center in Charlotte, North Carolina and
sent an NDE examiner to the EPRI Center to learn how to perform the
examination correctly.
Discussions with the SCS Level III examiner
revealed that in addition to hands on acid etch training the following
recommendations were made by EPRI:
The metal su.rfaces to be etched must be polished brighter than
-
first thought by SCS
. .
.
..
.
..
- _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ - _
x-
.
-
7
,
- n
Fluorescent light should be used in lieu of incandescent light to
-
enhance examination.
Acid strength improvement
-
,
The inspector requested to see the procedure used to perform the acid
-
etch examination of the reactor pressure vessel since this test is a
'
controlled corrosive reaction and if not properly performed and cleaned
could have a detrimental effect on the reactor vessel.
Areas of
concern were acid strength, the time period acid is allowed to stay on
component, and the method of removing the acid after the test is
complete.
The SCS level III could not provide a procedure for the
inspector and indicated that the examinations were performed using trial
l
and error methods.
However, later in the week a SCS representative
'
from Birmingham, Alabama brought the inspector a draft procedure for
performing acid etch examinations on carbon and low-alloy steels.
Although this procedure was in a draft form it did not incorporate any
of the EPRI recommendations for performing the acid etch examination.
Failure to have procedures to perform examinations required for
surveillance testing on safety-related equipment is in violation of
Hatch, Unit 1, Technical Specifications paragraph 6.8.10.
This item
'
was reported as Violation 321/86-05-01, Failure to Have a Proce-dure
c
for Conducting Acid Etch Examinations on Safety-Related Components.
c.
Pressure Retaining Pipe Welds Within Reactor Coolant System
The inspector reviewed ISI records for pressure retaining welds
-
Nos.1B31-1RC-128R-B-3 and 1831-1RC-28A-5A,
Records for these welds
were chosen because of the following:
The licensee had reported that UT had detected a 20 percent
l
-
'
through-wall crack in weld 1831-1RC-12BR-B-3 during the pre-induc-
tion heat stress improvement (IHSI) examinations.
Liquid pene-
trant examinations performed after IHSI revealed several small
through-wall indications.
Subsequent, UT examinations were
perform by SCS and the results indicated that the through-wall
cracks were axial indications which could not be detected with the
l
tangential scanning methods used in the approved UT procedures.
j
The through-wall indications were not associated with the circum-
i
ferential crack reported during pre-IHSI examinations.
During a walkdown inspection of the recirculation system, this
-
outage, the licensee discovered that weld No. 1831-1RC-28A-5A had
been left off the vendor fabrication drawings and subsequently
left off the ISI drawings. The licensee planned to used construc-
tion radiographs for the base line examination and performed the
,
10-year interval examination during the present outage.
-
..
.
.. ..
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
i *
..
.
8
The inspector reviewed records for the above welds to determine whether
the following requirements were met:
The examination unit calibration data sheets show no ' major
-
deviations between initial and final calibrations.
Collected examination data and any recordable indications are
-
properly recorded to permit accurate evaluation and documentation.
Evaluation of examination data performed by a Level II or Level
-
III examiner.
Evaluation of examination data complies with the procedure.
-
Qualification and certifications records of examiners met codes
-
and regulatory requirements.
Within the areas inspected, no violations, except as noted in paragraph 6.b,
or deviations were identified.