ML20140E989

Proposed Tech Specs Incorporating Change Request 118, Clarifying Mode 5 & 6 Charging Pump Surveillance Requirements & Replacing Term Operational Condition 1 W/Term Mode 1

ML20140E989
Person / Time
Site:	Beaver Valley
Issue date:	01/24/1986
From:	DUQUESNE LIGHT CO.
To:
Shared Package
ML20140E976	List: ML20140E972 ML20140E989
References
NUDOCS 8602040156
Download: ML20140E989 (6)

Text

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ATTACHENT A Revise the Technical Specifications as follows:

Remove Pages Insert Pages 3/4 1-11 3/4 1-11 3/4 3-31 3/4 3-31 3/4 4-14b 3/4 4-14b B602040156 334 Ogj[PDR PDR ADOCK O P

REACTIVRTY CONTROL SYSTEMS CHARGING PUMP SHUTDOWN LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.1.2.3 One charging pump in the boron injection flow path required by Specification (3.1.2.1) or Low Head Safety Injection Pump (with an open reactor coolant system vent of greater than or equal to 3.14 square inches) shall be OPERABLE and capable of being powered from an OPERABLE emergency bus.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 5 and 6 ACTION:

With none of the above pumps OPERABLE, suspend all operations involving CORE ALTERATIONS or positive reactivity changes until one charging pump or Low Head Safety Injection pump is restored to OPERABLE status.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.1.2.3.1 The above required charging pump shall be demonstrated OPERABLE at least once per 31 days by:

a. Starting (unless already operating) the pump from the control room,

b. Verifying, that on recirculation flow, the pump develops a discharge pressure of > 2402 psig, and

c. Verifying pump operation for at least 15 minutes.

4.1.2.3.2 All charging pumps, except the above required charging pump, shall be demonstrated inoperable at least once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> by verifying that the control switches are placed in the PULL-TO-LOCK position and tagged.

4.1.2.3.3 When the Low Head Safety Injection pump is used in lieu of a charging pump, the Low Head Safety Injection pump shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by:

a. Verification of an operable RWST pursuant to 4.1.2.7

b. Verification of an operable Low Head Safety Injection Pump pursuant to Specification 4.5.2.b.2,

c. Verification of power available* to MOV-ISI-890C with the plug inserted in its control circuit and an operable Low Head Safety Injection flow path from the RWST to the Reactor Coolant System once per shift, and

d. Verification that the vent is open at least once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />.**

• Emergency backup power need not be available

• • Except when the vent path is provided with a valve which is locked or provided with remote positon indication, or sealed, or otherwise secured in the open position, then verify these valves open at least once per 7 days.

BEAVER VALLEY - UNIT 1 3/4 1-11 PROPOSED WORDING

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, TABLE 4.3-2 (Continued) 9

< ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURE ACTUATION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION -

9 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS D

Ei CHANNEL MODES IN WHICH E CHANNEL CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL SURVEILLANCE U FUNCTIONAL UNIT CHECK CALIBRATION TEST REQUIRED

4. STEAM LINE ISOLATION

a. Manual N.A. N.A. M(1) 1, 2, 3, 4 y b. Automatic Actuation Logic N.A. N.A. M(2) 1, 2, 3, 4 m

$ c. Containment Pressure-- S R M 1, 2, 3 pu Intermediate-High-High a s~

gy d. Steam Line Pressure--Low S R M 1, 2, 3 xv

~

e. Steamline Pressure Rate-High S R M 1, 2, 3, 4

5. TURBINE TRIP AND FEEDWATER ISOLATION

a. Steam Generator Water S R M 1, 2, 3 Level-High-High

6. LOSS OF POWER

a. 4.16kv Emergency Bus N.A. R M 1,2,3,4 Undervoltage (Loss of Voltage) Trip Feed &

Start Diesel

b. 4.16kv and 480v Emergency N.A. R M 1,2,3,4 Bus Undervoltage (Degraded Voltage)

REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEMS SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENT 4.4.6.3.1 Pe i dicsha]$akhe test (3) on each valve listed in Table 4.4,$ b accompjSkhedpriortoenteringMode1afterevery l time the plant is placed in the cold shutdown condition for refueling, after each time the plant is placed in a cold shutdown condition for 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> if testing has not been accomplished in the preceeding 9 months and prior to returning the valve to service after maintenance, repair or replacement work is performed.

4.4.6.3.2 Whenever integrity of a pressure isolation valve listed in Table 4.4-3 cannot be demonstrated the integrity of the remaining valve in each high pressure line having a leaking valve shall be determined and recorded daily. In addition, the position of the other closed valve located in the high pressure piping shall be recorded daily.

(a) To satisfy ALARA reouirements, leakage may be measured indirectly (as from the performance of pressure indicators) if accomplished in accordance with approved procedures and supported by computations i

showing that the method is capable of demonstrating valve compliance with the leakage criteria.

BEAVER VALLLY - UNIT 1 3/4 4-14b I

PROPOSED WORDING l

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ATTACHMENT B No Significant Hazard Determination Proposed Change Request No. 118 amends the Beaver Valley Power Station, Unit No. 1 Technical Specifications to 1) clarify the Mode 5 and 6 charging pump surveillance requirements, 2) to correct the Modes in which surveillance is required for the High Steamline Pressure Rate instrumentation for Steamline Isolation and 3) to replace the term " Operational condition 1" with the term

" Mode 1".

Description of amendment request: The intent of surveillance requirement 4.1.2.3.2 is to allow only one operable charging pump when in Modes 5 and 6 to limit the sources of high pressure injection which could overpressurize the RCS during modes of low temperature operation. This is in accordance with the NRC safety evaluation on Overpressure Protection dated April 4, 1983. As currently written, this specification also limits the operability of the LHSI pumps. Operability of the LHSI pumps is not a concern since the shutoff head of these pumps (178 psig) is less than the low temperature overpressure protection setpoint (350 psig). In addition, surveillance requirement 4.8.1.1.2.b.3.b requires loading emergency equipment onto the diesel generator at least once per 18 months to simulate a loss of offsite power and demonstrate emergency power capability. To satisfy this requirement, a LHSI pump must be operable. Therefore, since the LHSI pumps are not an overpressure concern and operability is required to demonstrate diesel generator emergency load capability, the Mode 5 and 6 limitation on LHSI pump operability is not required.

Mode 4 has been added to Table 4.3-2, Functional Unit 4.e, Steamline Pressure Rate-High, to provide consistency with the applicable modes specified for this function on Table 3.3-3.

Surveillance Requirement 4.4.6.3 has been revised by replacing

" operational condition 1" with " Mode 1" to provide consistency with current nomenclature.

Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration determination:

The proposed changes are considered to be administrative in nature since the changes involve clarification. Surveillance Requirement 4.1.2.3.2 currently requires verification of LHSI pump inoperability in Modes 5 and 6. This is not a required limitation since the LHSI pumps are not capable of overpressurizing the RCS. Mode 4 was added to Table 4.3-2 Functional Unit 4.e to provide consistency with the applicable modes specified in Table 3.3-3. " Operational Condition 1" specified in surveillance requirement 4.4.6.3.1 has been changed to " Mode 1" to reflect current nomenclature and thereby reduce the potential for confusion on the meaning of the terms involved.

Based on the criteria for defining no significant hazards consideration set forth in 10 CFR 50.92(c), plant operation in accordance with the proposed amendment would not:

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.. ' Attachment B Page 2

1. involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated since the intent of surveillance requirement 4.1.2.3.2 is to allow only one operable charging purp when in Modes 5 and 6 to limit the sources of high pressure injection which could overpressurize the RCS during modes of low temperature operation. The LHS! pumps are not an overpressure concern and therefore operation in conjunction with a charging pump would not affect RCS pressure.

There is no basis for declaring the LHSI pumps inoperable when a charging pump is operable. In addition, operability of the LHSI pumps is required to satisfy the diesel generator surveillance requirements for demonstration of emergency load capability.

Therefore, the Mode 5 and 6 limitation on LHS! pump operability is not required. The addition of Mode 4 to Table 4.3-2 reflects the applicable mode requirements of Table 3.3-3. " Operational Condition 1" specified in surveillance requirement 4.4.6.3.1 has been changed to " Mode 1" to reflect current nomenclature and thereby reduce the potential confusion on the meaning of

" operational condition" which is an undefined term. These changes are administrative in nature and do not affect the accident analysis, therefore, the probability of occurrence or consequence of an accident or malfunction of equipment previously evaluated will not be increased.

(2) create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any previously evaluated since no change in plant operations or to equipment or components is required. The changes clarify the intent of the Mode 5 and 6 charging pump surveillance requirements, correct the inconsistent mode requirements for the Steamline Pressure Rate-High function on Tables 3.3-3 and 4.3-2 and replace the term " Operational Condition 1" with " Mode 1" in surveillance requirement 4.4.6.3.1 to reflect current nomenclature.

(3) involve a significant reduction in the margin of safety since the changes are administrative in nature and will not affect the safe operation of the plant and do not affect the bases for any technical specification.

Therefore, based on the above, it is proposed to characterize the change as involving a no significant hazard consideration.