ML20140B291
| ML20140B291 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Black Fox |
| Issue date: | 09/01/1981 |
| From: | PUBLIC SERVICE CO. OF OKLAHOMA |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20140B281 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8109140141 | |
| Download: ML20140B291 (250) | |
Text
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- o l Public Service Company of Oklahoma Black Fox Station Units One and Two
,o Preliminary Safety - Analysis Report Emergency Response Report Add *"d'"" I O [sRi!8a#20!a83,8lg
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STATE OF OKLAHOMA - COUNTY OF TULSA
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N Martin E. Fate, Jr. , being first duly sworn, deposes and states: That he is Executive Vice President, PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANY OF OKLAHOMA, the Applicant herein; that he has read the following Amendment 16 to the Black Fox Station Units One and two Preliminary Safety Analysis Report and knows the contents thereof; that the same is true as he verily believes. DATED: This, 1st day of September , 1931 O Signed s/ Martin E. Fate. Jr. Martin E. Fate, Jr. Executive Vice President .. Subscribed and sworn to before me this 1st day of September , 1981 s/ Lina P. Holm Notary Public in and for the County of. Tulsa, State of Oklahoma My Commission expires Feb ruary 21, 1983 O
BFS O ERRATA AND ADDENDA SHEET A W.DMENT 16, SEPTEMBER 1, 1981 REMOVE INSERT PAGE ALL OF SECTId'N 13.3 13.3-1 Table ofSContents, 38a dated VOLUME I, page 38a dated 16-090181 3-051476 Table of Contents, Volume I, 39 dated page 39 dated 3-051476 16-090181 Section 13.0, Table of Contents, la dated page la dated 3-051476 16-090181 O Section 13.0, Table of Contents, 2 dated page 2 dated 3-051476 16-090181 Instructions Place Amendment 16 instructions directly behind Amendment 15 instructions. Amendment 16 begins a new PSAR volume designated Addendum I. ($) l
BFS O 13.3 SITE EMERGENCY PLAN 13.3.1 General This section superseded by the Black Fox Station Emergency Response 16 Reportu
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s O l l l [ l l O l l 13.3-1 16-090181 I
BFS O 13.3 SITE EMERGENCY PLAN *- 16 13.3.1 General 13.3-1 I N O 16 l e O 38a 16-090181
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; BFS Q 13.4 REVIEW AND AUDIT 13.4-1 13.4.1 Review and Audit Committee (RAC) 13.4-1 j 13.4.2 Test Working Group 13.4-1 13.5 STATION PROCEDURES 13.5-1 1
13.5.1 General 13.5-1 i
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13.5.2 Administrative Procedures 13.5-1 13.5.3 Operating Procedures 13.5-la l
- 13h5.4~ Systems Procedures 13.5-2 i
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O t I i l l l l l l i O i-t I 39 16-090181
BFS 13.3 SITE EMERGENCY PLAN *~ 13.3.1 General *~ N O 16 1 I i !O la l 16-090181
l BFS 13.4 REVIEW AND AUDIT 13.4-1 13.4.1 Review and Audit Comittee (RAC) 13.4-1 13.4.2 Test Working Group 13.4-1 13.5 STATION PROCEDURES 13.5-1 13.5.1. General . 13.5-1 13.5.2 Administra:ive Procedures 13.5-1 13.5.3, Operating Procedures 13.5-la
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13.5.4 Systems Proceduree 13.5-2 O ea O 2 16-090181
TABLE OF CONTENTS
, Page Section
- 1. d5 T I 'RODUCTION. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .5 1.1 PURPOSE. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .5
1.2 BACKGROUND
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . 6 1.3 EdERGENCY PLANNING ZONE BASIS. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 1.4
SUMMARY
AND COMPATIBILITY OF BFS EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLANNING . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 1.5 CROSS REFERENCES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 2.0 0FFSITE EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS AUTHORITIES. . . . . . . . . . . 16 2.1 JURISDICTIONAL AUTHORITY FOR EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS. . . . 16 {} 2.1.1 Response Authority Juri21stiction. . . . . . . . 17 2.1.2 Oklahoma Radiological Emergency Response Plan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 2.2 0FFSITE RESPONSE AUTHORITIES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 2.2.1 Primary Authorities. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 2.2.2 Support Authorities. . . . . . . . . . ... . . . 24 2.3 0FFSITE AUTHORITY RADIOLOGICAL ASSESSMENT RESOURCES. . . . 28 2.3.1 Oklahoma State Department of Health - Radiological Division Resources. . . . . . . . . 29 2.3.2 Other State and County Radiological j Assessment Resources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31 2.4 C.P. STAGE AGREEMENT LETTERS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32 2.4.1 Content of Emergency Response Agreement Letters. 32 2.4.2 Agreement Letter Process . . . . . . . . . . . . 32 2.4.3 Emergency Medical Aid. . . . . . . . . . . . . 35 3.0 EMERGENCY RESPONSE FACILITIES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36 3.1 CONTROL CENTERS. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36 l 1
TABLE OF CONTENTS (Cont'd) (lg Section Page 3.1.1 Technical Support Center . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
. 3.1.2 Emergency Operations Facility . . . . . . . . . . 44 3.1.3 Onsite Operational Support Center . . . . . . . 52 3.1.4 Emergency Medical Facilities . . . . . . . . . . . 54 \
3.2 COMMUNICATION SYSTEMS. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54 3.2.1 BFS Fixed Communicati.ns Sy.=tems . . . . . . . . . 55 3.2.2 BFS Portable Communications Systems. . . . . . . . 57 3.2.3 BFS/Offsite Fixed Communications Systems . . . . . 57 3.2.4 Offsite Respense Agency Communications Systems. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59 3.3 EARLY WARNING SYST: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59 3.3.1 Alerting System. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60 3.3.2 Instructional System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62 3.4 DOSE AND ACCIDENT ASSESSMENT EQUIPMENT . . . . . . . . . . . 66 ggg 3.4.1 Accident Assessment. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66 3.4.2 Dose Asser::nent. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67 3.4.3 Meterological Monitoring . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68 3.4.4 Environmental Monitoring . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69 ,. 3.4.5 Safety Parameter Display System. . . . . . . . . . 70 3.4.6 Nuclear Data Link. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71 3.5 BFS EMERGENCY ORGANIZATION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71 3.5.1 Emergency Personnel. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72 3.5.2 Emergency Coordination . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75 4.0 PROTECTIVE ACTIONS. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78 4.1 EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79 4.1.1 Notification of Unusual Event. . . . . . . . . . 80 4.1.2 Alert. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80 4.1.3 Site Emergency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81 4.1.4 General Emergency. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82 0 2
TABLE OF CONTENTS (Cont'd) Section Page 4.2 NOTIFICATION SCENARIOS. . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . 83 4.2.1 Notification of Unusual Event . . . ... . . 84 4.2.2 Alert Classification Notification . ... . . 85 4.2.3 Site and General Emergency Classification
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N Notification. . . . . ... . . . . . . . . . 85 ! 4.3 PROTECTIVE ACTIONS. . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . 87 4.3.1 Protective Action Options . . . . . . .. . . 88 4.3.2 Protective Action Initation . . . . . .. . . 96 4.3.3 Public Education. . . . .. . . . . .. . . .103 4.3.4 Emergency Respouse Training . . . . . .. . .104 4.3.5 Offsite Emergency Medical Support . ... . .107 5.0 POPULATION PROJECTIONS AND EVACUATION TIME ESTIMATES . . . .109 5.1 POPULATION PROJECTIONS. . .. . . .. . . . . . . . . .109
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d' 5.2 EVACUATION TIME ESTIMATES . .111
6.0 REFERENCES
. . . . . . . . . . . . . .'. . . . . . . .. . .113 LIST OF TABLES TABLE I Listing of Oklahoma Agencies Receiving Notification of Emergency Response Planning Effort. . . . . . . . . 115
> 2 Attendees of the Emergency Response Preparedners
- Presentations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . 116 3 Emergency Response Facilities. . . . . . . . . . . . . 118 4 Offsite Emergency Responsibilities . . . . . . . . . . 119 5 Recommended Protective Actions . .. . . . . . . . . . 120 LIST OF FIGURES FIGURE 1 Plume Esposure Emergency Planning Zone . . . . . . . . 121 2 Ingestion Exposure Emergency Planning Zone . . .. . . 122 3
3 Agreement Letter Flow Chart. 123 4 Black Fox Station Site General Arrangement . . . . . . (l) 124 5 Black Fox Station Major Plant Building Arrangement . . 125 6 Black Fox Station Technical Support Center
- General Services Building (GSB) Level
_ 610'-0" Floor Plan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 126 7 Black Fox Station Emergency Operations
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Facility Conceptual Floor Plan . . . . . . . . . . . . 127 8 Black Fox Station Operational Support Center
- General Services Building (GSB) Fourth Floor . . . . 128 9 Emergency Organization J Tlack Fox Station . . . . . . 129 APPENDICES APPENDIX A AGREEMENT LETTERS APPENDIX B POPULATION ANALYSIS APPENDIX C EVACUATION TIME ESTIMATES APPENDIX D EARLY WARNING SYSTEM g APPENDIX E CORRESPONDENCE 4=
0 4
1 Q
1.0 INTRODUCTION
1.1 PURPOSE The purpose of this report is to address the revised rules and regulations on emergency planning for nuclear power plants as is applied to the Black Fox Station (BFS). On August 19, 1980 the Federal Register published
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final rules revising Sections 50.33, 50.54 and Appendix E
\ and added a new Section 50.47 to Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations. These rules became effective on November 3, 1980. In particular, Section II of Appen-dix E has been revised requesting specific information on the new emergency response planning bases for the Pre-liminary Safety Analysis Report (PSAR) stage. This l report specifically addresses the PSAR portion of the new rules and is not intended to represent an operating license emergency response plan.
O Prior to the issuance of the new emergency planning rules and regulations, PSO was in receipt of a NRC letter dated October 23, 1979 (See Appendix E) which requested information regarding the new concepts of broadened emergency planning zones and greater informational de-l tails. This letter, even though it has been superseded by the rule, still provides useful guidance for the preparation of this report. The emergency planning criteria provided for this report also supersedes the previous .mergency planning criteria used for the initial submittal of the BFS PSAR. Therefore, the information contained in this report supersedes the information supplied by the Section 13.3 of the PSAR. O 5
1.2 BACKGROUND
h The requirements for emergency response planning on nuclear power facilities has greatly expanded since the accident at Three Mile Island Unit 2 on March 28, 1979. However, prior to the TMI-2 accident, expanded emergency planning zones were being considered which would envelope responses to accidents including certain core melt acci-
. dents. (Reference 1).
On September 19, 1979 the NRC published draft guide-lines (NUREG-0610) on emergency action levels which expanded and redefined previously accepted action levels (Reference 2). NUREG-061C was incorporated in NUREG-0654 Appendix 1 (Reference 4). All nuclear power plant emergency response planning had been previously handled by the NRC, however, on December 7, 1979 the President proclaimed that all off- 9 site respoase authority actions and state emergency preparedness plan review would be handled by the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) . On December 19, 1979 the Federal Register published a notice of proposed rulemaking to revise the rules governing emergency planning for nuclear power plants (Reference 3). This included changes to 10CFR Section l 50.33, 50.47, 50.54 and Appendix E to Part 50. The proposed rulemaking provided a more formal basis for the October 23, 1979 request letter. Du2 to the expanded l requirements for emergency preparedness, additional guidance and criteria were necessary. On December 26, 1979 guidelines for providing evacuation time estimates were received from the NRC (See Appendix E). O l 6
O idditionaltv. in suPPert of the Proposed rute. the NRC and FEMA, in a joint effort developed NUREG-0654,
" Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power Plants". The intent of this document is to
. provide complete guidance for all emergency planning and preparedness efforts for nuclear power plants and, there-
- fore, expanded or superseded previous guidance.
NUREG-0654 (FEMA-Rep-1) Revision 1 was issued on November 1980 (Reference 4). In July, 1980, the NRC issued draft NUREG-0696 entitled " Functional Criteria for Emergency Response Facilities". This document expanded or changed the design considerations for such emergency facilities as the Technical Support Center, Emergency Operations Facility, Safety Parameter Display System and Nuclear O Deta tink which are ferther discussed in this rePert. NUREG-0696 was issued as a final report in February 1981 (Reference 15). The final rulemaking on emergency planning for .- nuclear power plants was published in the Federal Regis-ter on August 19, 1980 (Reference 16). This rulemaking followed closely to the proposed rulemaking previously noticed on December 19, 1979. 1.3 EMERGENCY PLANNING ZONES BASIS All present emergency planning is based on expanded emergency planning zones to cover potential accidents including core melt accidents. The size of the Emergency Planning Zones (EPZ) radii represents a judgment using detailed planning to assure that an adequate response base exists for all potent!ial radiological releases. O V 7
r The plume exposure EPZ of a 9 mile radius was based g primarily on the following considerations (Reference 4): o Projected doses from the traditional design basis accidents would not exceed Protective Action Guide . levels outside the zone; e Projected doses from most core melt sequences would
. not exceed Protective Action Guide Invels outside the zone; e For the worst core melt sequences, immediate life threatening doses would gencrally not occur outside the zone; e Detailed planning within 10 miles would provide a substantial base for expansion of response efforts in the event that this proved necessar' j.
The ingestion exposure EPZ of a 50 mile radius was b.ised on the following considerations (Reference 4): g e The downwind range within which contamination could occur would generally be limited to about 50 miles from a power plant because of wind shifts during the .. release and travel periods; e There may be conversion of atmospheric iodine (i.e., iodine suspended in the atmosphere for long time periods) to chemical forms which do not readily enter the ingestion pathway; e Much of any particulate material in a radioactive plume would have been deposited on the ground within about 50 miles from the f acility; e The likelihood of exceeding ingestion pathway pro-tective action guide levels at 50 miles is compar-able to the likelihood of exceeding plume exposure pathway protective action guide IcVels at 10 miles. O 8
t 1.4
SUMMARY
AND COMPATIBILITY OF BFS EMERGENCY O RESPONSE PLANNING The Black Fox Station will be Oklahoma's first nuclear powered generating facility and, therefore, no previous emergency response plans have been required prior to BFS for responding to a potential nuclear power plant accident. Detailed planning, staffing and resources will be provided at the FSAR stage to demon-1
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N strate that in the event of an accident, effective
- emergency response actions can be taken at BFS.
This report denotes'that a workable plan presently exists for development of an effective emergency response between the proposed site and the surrounding emergency planning zones with respect to proposed station facili-ties, manpower, resources, and the offsite response capabilities. The planning capability will include the specific features within the EPZ's such as population distributions, land use, neighboring jurisdictional boundaries and access routes. In addition, the standards referenced in 10 CFR 50.47(b), as applicable to the - information required of this report, are compatible for preparation of future emergency preparedness planning. The following discussions summarize the text of this report and indicates how the total report culminates to assure that adequate preparation has been acco , _ : the cca-+ruction permit stage to provide emergency response plans in the future. Emergency response compa-tibility will include +he PSO response capability, the offsite response authority preparedness capability, the PSO/ response authority interaction, and the BFS site /en-viron emergency response relationship. Each one is important in the functioning of an effective emergency response operation. Both the BFS and state plan (Section 2.1.2) will be complementary and independent. In this 9
report PS0 demonstrates a comprehensive emergency response plan can be developed for the future operation of BFS. The BFS emergency response fitness is demonstrated by providing dose and accident assessment capability including the advanced control room design (Section 3.4.1), radiation monitoring (Section 3.4.2), a Safety
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N Parameter Display System (SPDS) (Section 3.4.5), and a Technical Su'pport Center (TSC) (Section 3.1.1). BFS will have an emergency organizational capability by assigning personnel to serve as Shift Technical Advisor and Emergency Coordinator (Section 3.5). An Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) will be designed and con-structed to coordinate protective action response (Section 3.1.2). An offsite response authority preparedness compati-bility has been established by the willingness of all the local and state authorities to develop future emergency preparedness plans for BFS (Section 2.4). The offsite preparedness will be coordinated by the Oklahoma State Department of Health - Radiation Protection Division (OSDH-RPD) (Section 2.2.1.1) with other local, state, and federal support. Response and assessment resources (Section 2.3) will be provided for complete emergency preparedness. Offsite authority protective action determinations will be simplified by use of the BFS EOF. Training will be conducted for designated offsite I response authorities to assure needed expertise (Section 4.3.4.1). Offsite medical capability will also be established for radiological related injuries (Sec-tion 4.3.5). O l 10
__ - - - .. - _ -. .= l l i l O A conceptual plan for an early warning system i (Section 3.3), and a complete communication system (Sec-tion 3.2) for BFS/offsite response authority interactions demonstrates the BFS/offsite response authority compati-bility. Specific emergency action levels have been agreed upon for future implementation (Section 4.1) along with offsite authority notification scenarios for each
% action level class (Section 4.2). Protective action initiations have been recognized for plan irplementation (Section 4.3).
The BFS site / environ relationship compatibility has also beer. shown to be more than adequate by such consid-erations as reviewing the plume exposure EPZ population density (Appendix B), and having good emergency egress l (Appendix C). The topographical features have been considered through the analysis performed for evacuation time estimates (ETE's) (Appendix C). These analyses have demonstrated reasonable evaluation times. Land usage (Appendix B) is not considered to hamper any emergency response actions. Review of the political jurisdictional - boundaries (Section 2.1) has been made and does not pose any recognizable problems. I a 11
l 1 0 1.5 CRLSS REFERENCES CROSS REFERENCE TO NUREG-0654 AND 10 CFR 50.47
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10 CFR BFS Emergency Response 50.47(b) NUREG-0654 Report Section 1 A. Assignment of Responsibility (Organiza- 2.1, 2.2 tional Control) 2 B. Onsite Emergency Organization 3.5 3 C. Emergency Response Support and Resources 2.3 4 D. Emergency Classification System 4.1 5 E. Notification Methods and Procedures 4.2 6 F. Emergency Communications 2.3, 3.2 7 G. Public Education and Information 4.3.3 8 H. Emergency Facilities and Equipment 3.1, 3.4, 2.3 9 I. Accident Assessment 3.4 10 J. Protective Response 3.3, 4.3, 5.0 .. 11 K. Radiological Ixposure Control 4.3 12 L. Medical and Public Health Support 2.4.3, 3.1.4, 4.3.5 13 M. Recovery and Re-entry Planning and Post- N/A for PSAR accident Operation 14 N. Exercises and Drills N/A for PSAR 15 0. Radiological Emergency Response Training 4.3.4 16 P. Responsibility for the Planning Effort: N/A for PSAR Development, Periodic Review and Distribution of Emergency Plans e 12
O CROSS REFERENCE TO 10CFR50 APPENDIX E SECTION II (AUGUST 19, 1980) 10C)R50~ Appendix E, BF3 Emergency Response Section II Report Sections i l A. (1) Onsite and (2) offsite organizations for (1) 3.5 coping with emergencies and (3) the means for (2) 2.2 notification, in the event of an emergency. (3) 2.1, 4.2, 3.2 of persons assigned to the emergency organizations. 4
! B. (1) Contacts and arrangements made and (1) 2.4 documented with local, state, and federal (2) 2.2 governmental agencies with responsibility for coping with emergencies, (2) including identifica-tion of the principal agencies, C. (1) Protective measures to be taken within (1) 4.3.2.1, 4.1 the site boundary and (2) within each EPZ to (2) 4.3.1, 4.3.2, 4.1 protect health and safety in the event of an (3) 4.1, 4.2, 3.3 accident; (3) procedures by which these measures (4) 4.3.2 l are to be carried out (e.g., in the case of an evacuation, who authorizes the evacuation, how the public is to be notified and instructed, how the evacuation is to be carried out); and (4) the expteted response of offsite agencies in the event of an emergency. -
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Page 2 g 10CFR50, Appendix E. BFS Emergency Response Section II (continued) Report Sections D. Features of the facility to be provided 3.1.4 onsite emergency first aid and decon-tamination and for emergency transportation of gnsite individuals to offsite treatment facilities. E. Provisions to be made for emergency 2.4.3, 4.3.5 treatment at offsite facilities of indivi-duals injured as a result of licensed activities. F. Provisions for a training program for 4.3.4 employees of the licensee, including those who are assigned specific authority and responsibility in the event of an emergency, and for other persons who are not employees of the licensee but whose assistance may be needed in the event of a radiological emergency. O 14
Page 3 0 .
< 10CFR50, Appendix E. BFS Emergency Response Section II (continued) Report Sections G. (1) A preliminary analysis that projects the (1) 3.3, 4.3.2 time and means to be employed in the notifica- (2) 5.0, Appendix C tion of State and local governments and the pubhic in the event of an emergency. (2) A nuclear power plant applicant shall ,
perform a preliminary analysis of the time required to evacuate various sectors and distances within the plume exposure pathway EPZ for transient and permanent populations, noting major impediments to the evacuation or taking of protective actions. O H. (1) A preliminary analysis reflecting the (1) 3.1, 3'.4, 4.1 m d to include facilities, systems, and 4.2, methods for identifying the degree of (2) 3.4, 3.2, 2.3 - seriousness and potential scope of radio- (3).3.1, 3.4, logical consequences of emergency situations 3.3.2, 4.3.2 within and outside the site boundary, (2) in-cluding capabilities for dose projection-using a real-time meteorological information and for dispatch of radiological monitoring teams within the EPZs; and (3) a preliminary analysis reflecting the role of the onsite technical support center and of the near-site , emergency operations facility in assessing information, recommending protective act. ion, and c'isseminating information to the public. O 15
2.0 0FFSITE EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS AUTHORITIES 2.1 JURISDICTIONAL ACTHORITY FOR EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS As in most states, Oklahoma operates within three levels of government; state, county and municipal. Each
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level is given certain authority and jurisdictional responsibilities. The normal operation and duties of the 3 overall governmental system in Oklahoma is delineated in the Oklahoma statutes and is conducted in accordance with these laws and implementing regulations. Jurisdictional authority in an emergency situation generally follows the authority assigned by the Oklahoma statutes. Under some conditions an overlapping of authority does exist. However, this is norme11y controlled by the higher level of authority or by avail-ability of m apower and resources. One such condition where all three levels of government may be involved is in the area of law enforcement. If any jurisdictional authority overlaps and hinders the effectiveness of the emergency response, then agreements can be established as discussed in Section 2.1.1. " The plume exposure pathway EP2 for BFS includes ( portions of three counties and one incorporated town. The counties are Wagoner, Rogers and Mayes counties which occupy approximately 50%, 40*. and 10% respectively of the total area in this 10 mile EPZ. The Town of Inola is located in Rogers County, approximately three miles N.E. of the BFS site (see Figure 1). The ingestion exposure pathway EPZ is located total-ly within the state of Oklahoma and encompasses seven counties and portions of ten other counties, including Tulsa which is approximately 23 miles west of the site h 16 L
O (see rigure 2). Jurisdictional authority within the ingestion EPZ ofil not require special coordination between counties for protective response actions. The local, state and county authorities who will be performing emergency response actions will be primarily 1 concentrated on providing sampling and protective action recommendations as directed by the OSDH-RPD authorities g
- for potential radiological contamination.
2.1.1 Response Authority Jurisdiction The Oklahoma State Department of Health, Radiation Protection Division (OSDH-RPD) is the responsible author-a ity in Oklahoma for developing the Oklahoma Radiological Emergency Response Plan and coordinating the interagency response efforts. This is clarified in the OSDH-RPD letter of agreement in Appendix A. Given this authority by the Governor's office and through state statutes, O c6S 0.S. Sugg 1971 Section 1-1soSce>>. emersencv resgenee agencies within Oklahoma are responsible to conduct their effo:-ts under the guidance of the OSDH-RPD. The Oklahoma Civil Defense (OCD) has responsibility .- for all natural, man-made and war time emergency pre-paredness activities and will have the secondary auther-ity for emergency preparedness in case of a radiological emergency at BFS. The OCD will work closely with the
- OSDH-RPD to develop and conduct the total planning and resconse effort for the state from the nonradiological aspects of emergency preparedness.
The remaining state, county and local authorities involved in the planning and response effort will receive guidance during an emergency from the OSDH-RPD and the OCD. During the actual d'evelopmental stage for the state O 9t en. tor =e1 e8ree ent- witt de 9teverea detecen eev i 17 i
emergency response agencies, as determined to be neces-sary. Title 70 of the Oklahoma Statutes Sections O 1001-1008 provides for agreement contracts between any state, county and locs1 political jurisdictions for a predesignated objective or function. Such an agreement can provide a better understanding of interagency and Intergovernmental coordination and response coverage to avoid duplicative efforts during an emergency. Any such
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N agreements will be determined upon preparation of the Oklahoma Radiological Emergency Response Plan. Notification of offsite emergency response author-ities for a particular emergency action level as dis-cussed under Section 4.1 may be different depending on the level of the accident. The OSDH-RPD, under nearly all condi* ions, will be the primary offsite authority to be contacted. However, under severe accident conditions initial notification of the local authorities for immediate response action may be required. O The emergency action levels for " notification of unusual event", " alert" and under most circ estances of a
" site" emergency do not require an immediate public yrotective response action. Response time for these levels would allow the OSDH-RPD adequate time to respond.
However, emergencies of the more severe " site" emergency and lixely all " general" emergency action levels that develop quickly, especially if the early warning system (See Section 3.3) requires actuation, would dictate a procedure for immediate of fsite authority response. The constraints on travel time would limit the effectiveness of the OSDH-RPD response and therefore would equire initial local authority action. The Sheriff's depart-ments of each County will be the most likely local authority to take the initial response actions with tha 9 18
aid of the County Civil Defense Directors. Immediate response action in Inola wo31d primarily be conducted by the Inola Police Department. Notification scenarios for alerting offsite emer-gency response personnel are discussed in Section 4.2. Federal emergency response organizations within such s agencies as the DOE, EPA, FEMA and NRC which have been
'stablished for the purpose of responding to nuclear power plant emergencies will be addressed at the FSAR stage.
2.1.2 Oklahoma Radiological Emergency Response Plan The Oklahoma Radiological Emergency Response Plan will be developed to cover all aspects of offsite response authority emergency preparedness for a potential radiological accident at Black Fox Station. Each local, county, and state emergency response authority will have specific plans and procedures that will be included by this plan. The basic objective of the plan is 1) to provide reasonable assurance that appropriate measures can and will be taken to protect public health and safety in the event of an emergency, 2) to limit public radiation exposure in the event of an emergency, 3) to identify and use the supportive and protective resources available to the local and state authorities, and 4) to provide timely dissemination of accurate information to local, state and Federal authorities and to the public. On May 29, 1979 a preliminary draft of the Oklahoma Radiological Emergency Response Plan was prepared and sant out by the OSDH-RPD for general review to various 19
r State agen:les, PSO, and to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory g Commission, Office of State Programs. This draft was acknowledged by the Governor of Oklahoma in a letter to Joseph Hendrie, Chairman of the NRC, dated June 20, 1979 (attached in Appendix E). This letter expresses Okla-homa's commitment to respond to the need for an effective response plan in a timely manner. The initial draft of _ the Oklahoma Radiological Emergency Response Plan was written to cover all radiological emergencies, however, the future plan will be written to cover the BFS. The above letter indicated that a final plan would be available in early 1980. However, since the initial draft was issued, new planning bases, expanded criteria, a change from the NRC as the governing Federal review agency to FEMA, and a substantial revision to the Code of Federal Regulations for emergency response pla. ming on fixed nuclear facilities has taken place. The revised state plan will be developed in accord-ance with NUREG-0654 (Revision 1). Federal review and concurrence for the plan will be in accordance with the ,. final rulemaking of 44 CFR Part 350. 2.2 0FFSITE RESPONSE AUTHORITIES 2.2.1 Primary Authorities The primary offsite emergency preparedness authority will be the following local, county and state agencies who will participate in the overall planning, development and implementation of the Oklahoma Radiological Emergency Response Plan as it specifically applies to the Black Fox Station. This will include an authority with 24 hour a day notification capability in the event of an accident at BFS. g 20
s 2.2.1.1 Oklahoma State Department of Health, Radiation Protection Division (OSDH-RPD) The Oklahoma State Department of Health is the official state agency within Oklahoma for the protection of the public with regard to the uses of atomic energy
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and sources of radiation. The Radiation Protection Division (RPD), under the Occupational and Radiological s Health Service, is the specific office within the OSDH that is responsible for handling radiological emergencies and will act as the primary agency for response to a radiological concern at BFS. As part of their respon-1 l sibility, they have been directed to develop the Oklahoma Radiological Emergency Response Plan. The OSDH-RPD will coordinate the jurisdictional planning activities to assure an effective comprehensive plan. This office will also be responsible for implementing protactive ections to limit public exposure during an emergency. Their office headquarters are located in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma. 2.2.1.2 Oklahoma Civil Defense Agency (OCD) - The Oklahoma Civil Defense Agency (OCD) has been designated as the second authority within Oklahoma for , nuclear accident response and will also act as the alter-nate state authority for notification of an incident. The OCD receives their authority from 'che Oklahoma Civil Defense and Emergency Resources Management Act of 1967 as regulated by 0.S. 63 9683. Their responsibilities for emergency preparedness in the event of an accident at BFS will be to mitigate the consequences to the public health by conducting a coordi-nated over-all response effort. This will include directing and coordinating fire fighting services, police 21
services, medical and health services, and rescue and warning services. The OCD will also aid the conduct of evacuation and welfare services along with emergency transportation provisions. The OCD will guide and direct local and county civil defense plans to include response functions for BFS. They will also receive guidance from the Federal Emer-
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N gency Management Agency (FEMA) on conducting emergency preparedness and planning for primarily non-radiological response activities. Radiological protective action will also be implemented by the OCD as directed by the OSDH-RPD. The OCD offices are located in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma. 2.2.1.3 Oklahoma Department of Public Safety (DPS) The Oklahoma Department of Public Safety will provide certain policing powers and emergency response through the Oklahoma Highway Patrol as provided by 47 0.S. $117. Their responsibilities will include 8= traffic and access control within the aree around BFS in the event of an emergency. They will also be capable of providing emergency transportation, law enforcement, and communications response. The DPS will receive directives from either the OCD or the OSDH-RPD in the event of an emergency at BFS. The DPS is located in Oklahoma City with twelve patrol hardquarters located throughout the state includ-ing one in Tulsa. These headquarters would be available for operation and dispatch of patrol units during an emergency. In addition, a DPS command post can be set up within safe distance of the site for immediate DPS operations for more effective response. O 22
iA 2.2.1.4 Rogers, Wagoner and Mayes County Sheriffs' Offices The county sheriffs' offices will be the p rima ry county authority for protection of the public by provid-ing policing actions and emergency activities on a county level as established by 19 0.S. $516. The sheriffs' offices for each county are located in the county seats
~ - which are Claremore (Rogers County); Wagoner (Wagoner County); and Pryor (Mayes County).
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In the event of an emergency, each sheriff's office which includes the sheriff, deputy sheriffs, and dispatch personnel, will be the primary county authority to be notified of an accident at BFS. Their responsibilities would include implementing protective actions recommended by the OSDH-RPD or OCD such as evacuation implementation, evacuation confirmation and individual emergency notifi-cation to the public. In an extreme situation the sheriffs' offices will likely be the initial offsite (g3 response authority for public notification and protective actions initiation with notification to the OSDH-RPD to follow. 2.2.1.5 Rogers, Wagoner and Mayes County Civil Defense Directors " Civil Defense preparedness on a county level for a radiological hazard will be handled by the county civil defense directors. The directors will prepare county emergency preparedness planning within their counties through the coordinated direction of the Oklahoma Civil Defense and the OSDH-RPD. The county civil defense
- directors are located in each of the county seats as are I
the sheriffs' offices. i Each county civil defense director will be respon-sible for preparing for an emergency within their respec-tive county and assuring that their emergency resources O 23
and manpower are activated in the event of an emergency. This would inc1.de coordinating and activating such resources as fir , and police protection, health and Red Cross services, and relation services. The directors will work closely with the sheriff's office and with the Oklahoma Civil Defense authorities for oroper implemen-tation of protective actions.
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2.2.1.6 Inola Police Chief The Inola Police Chief has the responsibility eithin the Inola city limits to protect the public which may involve implementing any protective or policing actions as necessary. Since Inola is the only incorporated town within the plume exposure EPZ, individual consideration for initia-ting protective actions will be developed for Inola. The Inola Police Chief, along with the Mayor and Inola civil defense officer, is responsible for conduct of implement-ing protective actions within the city limits of Inola. The OSDH-RPD and OCD will aid and instruct them in devel-opment of effective plans and recommendations of these - implementing protective actions. In the event of an accident at BFS, his specific responsibilities would include assuring recommended protective actions are recognized by the public, coordi-nating evacuations and confirming evacuations. Detailed efforts will be developed for the schools and churches in the area. 2.2.2 Support Authorities These authorities will be available and will par-ticipate in emergency preparedness exercisee, but will not be directly involved in the emergency plan prepara- h tion. Each of these agencies will provide a response for 24
O protecting the public health as directed by the primary authorities. 2.2.2.1 Gklahoma National Guard The Ohlahoma National Guard consists of both an Army
- National Guard and Air National Guard, however, the Army National Guard's 45th Infantry Brigade will be the primary section to respond in the event of an emergency N
at BFS. The Army National Guard operates 102 units throughout the state including infantry troops in Tulsa, Broken Arrow and Claremore. The state headquarters is located in Oklanoma City. The Operations and Military Support Officer conducts and performs the planning within the National Guard for emergency and civil defense operations. He will work with t.ite OCD and OSDH-RPD for developing emergency O ceerdi etiea i= reletion te arS. The Oklahoma National Guard will support the OCD by providing such activities as physical s ecur ity, access - control and emergency evacuation. Actuation of National ,, Guard in an emergency can be through the Civil Defense even chough the ultimate authority will be by the Governor. 2.2.2.2 Oklahoma State Department of Health - Consumer Protection Service (OSDH-CPS) The OSDH-CPS is the principal State authority for inspection and control of milk and foodstuffs as provided by Title 63 cf the Oklahoma Statutes. Part of their re-sponsibility as provided by the adopted rules and regula-tions is to aesure protection of the public health by minimizing injury or I'llness from contaminated milk, food, drugs and other consumer products. Two of the 25
I OSDH-CPS divisions that will be of significance to amer-gency preparedness in relation to BFS are the Milk Sanitation Division and the Food and Lodging Division. The Milk Sanitation Division under Article 13 of the Oklahoma Statutes has the authority to inspect and test raw milk from state dairies to assure the minimum quality g of the product. Normal testing by the Milk Sanitation's Division does not include analysie of radiological contamination at this time; however, in cooperation with the OSDH-RPD such milk s ,ples can be easily obtained for baseline and post accident analysis. Any such sample would be provided to the OSDH-RPD for laboratory analy-sis. Following an accident where potential contamination is expected, samples can either be taken at the process-ing dairy where samples are normally taken or at the producing dairies if isolated contamination is suspected. The Food and Lo(ging Division under Article 11 has the authority to inspect and test meat and foodstuffs for contaminatica or possible public health hazards. Food-stuffs are routinely inspected at the packaging facility - or processing house; however, in the event of e.n accident at BFS, product inspections could be performed in a broadened pattern to obtain potential source contam-ination. Samples collected by either OSDH-CPS division could be taken in the plume exposure or ingestion exposure EPZ's from suspected or actual contamination as deter-mined by the OSDH-RPD. Sixty of the seventy seven Oklahoma counties have established County Health Depart-ments which are responsible for performing inspection and sampling of milk and food products. All counties within the plume exposure EPZ have health departments and only 26
/N two of the peripheral counties in the ingestion exposure O
EPZ do not have individual health departments. In the event of an emergency where additional sampling and investigation is required, outlying State counties will be directed to send personnel into the affected counties for additional support. 2.2.2.3 Oklahoma State Department of Agriculture
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The Oklahoma State Department of Agriculture (OSDA), under Title 2, has authority to protect the health and safety of the public by preventing unfit agricultural products from entering the market. Of the eight divi-sions of the OSDA, the Agriculture Laboratory Division, the Animal Industry Division and the Dairy Division will be of importance during the emergency response planning stage for BFS. In both the plume exposure EPZ and ingestion exposure EPZ the OSDA, by request of the q OSDH-RPD, could obtain meat, dairy, poultry and vegetable b product samples for analysis that are suspected of potential contamination. Even though the GSDA and OSDH-CPS will perform similar functions for radiological emergency prepared-ness, each has distinct authority for inspection and control of consumable products for public health protection. 2.2.2.4 Tulsa City-County Civil Defense The Tulsa City - County Civil Defense has shown a i willingness to aid PS0 and other surrounding jurisdic-tions in the preparation of the future emergency planning effort for BFS. Tulsa, which is outside of the plume exposure EPZ but is within the ingestion EPZ, could provide capabilities which could be of value. 27 i
The Tulsa City-County Civil Defense, in cooperation g with the Oklahoma Civil Defense, has developed a Crisis Relocation Plan for the Tulsa area. This plan provides < for relocation of Tulsa area residents into neighboring (host) counties in the event of a nuclear attack. The plan is presently functional and agreements have been developed with the neighboring counties which include Rogers, Mayes and Wagoner Counties. This plan as dis-N cusscd in Section 4.3.1.7 can be expanded to host evac-uees from the plume exposure EPZ around BFS in the event of an accident. 2.2.2.5 Other Local, County and State Authorities Other local, county and state authorities will be available to supply emergency response activities if necessary. Included are the U.S. Army Corps of Engi-neers, the Oklahoma Department of Transportation, local and neighboring fire departments and any others which g will be able to respond, if called upon. Table 4 provides emergency responsibilities that will be conducted by of fsite emergency response authorities. 2.3 0FFSITE AUTHORITY RADIOLOGICAL ASSESSMENT RESOURCES The offsite authorities which will be involved in radiological dose assessment will have adequate resources to identify and provide needed protective actions to the public. The OSDH-RPO will be the responsible State authority for radiological dose assessment. The OCD will aid the OSHD-RPD efforts either directly or indirectly for monitoring, as required. Fedcral support by agree-ment from the Federal Radiological Monitoring and Assess-ment Plan (FRMAP), formerly the Interagency Radiological Assistance Program (IRAP), will also provide radiological assessment assistance. Each group will have sufficient equipment to perform monitoring tasks witHn the amount g of responsibility required of them. 28
g The specific equipment to be used by state and V county offsite response agencies in the event of an accident at BFS has not been identified at this time due to the preconstruction status of BFS. Section 2.3 will address the general provisions of necessary equipment for future use. The monitoring equipment supplied by FRMAP will be gene' rally the same for all nuclear stations throughout the U.S. and therefore, will not be discussed
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s further. 2.3.1 Oklahoma State Department of Health - Radiological Protection Division Resources The OSDH-RPD will have both portable and fixed radiological monitoring capability which will be operated by the OSDH-RPD Radiological Response Teams (RRT). 2.3.1.1 OSDH-RPD Radiological Response Team The Radiological Response Team (RRT) will be comprised of the staff of the OSDH-RPD who upon notifica-tion of an accident at BFS will respond by assessing the effects of the accident and taking necessary actions to - protect the public. The RRT will include the senior OSDH-RPD stafi member who becomes the team coordinator (Chief of tho Occupational and Radiological Health Service or the Director of the Radiation Protection Division) and their immediately available staff. It will be the Coordi-nator's responsibility to receive and . evaluate the initial information and to take the initial steps neces-sar/ to direct response activities. He will also be responsible for coordinating with the other response agencies such as the Oklahoma Civil Defense and the Department of Public Safety. m U 29
The team will be made up of several subteams which will perform various functions. The Response Team Head-quarters will be established at the BFS Emergency Operations Facility, and will assume the responsibility for direction of the offsite technical operations. The Emergency Field Teams will perform monitoring and st.rvey operations, sample collection, and supervision of offsite decontamination. The Communication Section, which can be
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\ made up of members from other subgroups, will establish communications between mobile units and fixed facilities. The Laboratory Section, as discussed in Section 2.3.1.2 will perform analyses, and report and record results from samples collected by applicable state agencies. Response equipment to perform all functions of the RRT will be maintained and tested to assure adequate response capability. This includes portable dose assessment equipment, air samplers and personal protec-tion equipment for the team members, complete communica-tions equipment to direct all response activities and laboratory equipment for field sample analyses. . 2.3.1.2 OSDH - Laboratory The OSDH-RPD Laboratory is located in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma at the OSDH offices. The lab presently performs general radio-chemical analyses of field samples col-lected from ooth radiological and nonradiological activi-ties being monitored by the department. Prior to the commencement of the operation of BFS, the lab will be evaluated by the 0?DH-RPD to determine whether the exis-ting laboratary resources will be sufficient to adequate-ly support an emergency at BFS and improvements made as necessary. O 30
O The lab will have the capability to perform isotopic analysis on the radiological field samples collected within the plume exposure pathway and ingestion exposure pathway EPZ's. The actual equipment and staffing of lab will be determined during the critical planning for the DFS emergency response plan. 2 3.2 Other State and County Radiological Assessment Resources The resources that will be provided by the Oklahoma Civil Defense (OCD) will consist primarily of coordina-tion and emergency response - direction activities, how-ever, the OCD personnel will have and will be trained to use dose rate survey meters which will provide gross gamma and beta radiation levels from plume or ground
. contamination. The neighboring county civil defense directors will also be provided with similar dose rate meters.
O Specific Highway Patrol units of the Oklahoma Depart-ment of Public Safety will be trained in the use of survey meters, radiation protection and protective action - response. Survey instruments will be provided to patrol ,. units as the individual situation requires. Oklahoma is also a member of the Southern Mutual Radiological Assistance Pltn (SMRAP) through the Southern States Energy Board. This plan is an agreement between 17 southern states including Oklahoma, Arkansas, Loui-siana and Texas where radiological monitoring and per-sonnel resources would be shared between states. -State resourco lists are maintained by all states whereby specific resources can he requested in the event of cn emergency. This system is activated by request between state Governorr . , O 31
2.4 CONSTRUCTION PERMIT STAGE AGREEMENT LETTERS g Agreement letters have been received from the pri-mary local, county and state agencies who will be in-volved in emergency preparedness activities for Black Fox Station. These agencies, as discussed under Section 2.2,
. are the Oklahoma State Department of Health--Radiation Protection Division, Oklahoma Civil Defense, Oklahoma Department of Public Safety, Rogers, Wagoner and Mayes County Sheriffs' Offices and Civil Defense Directors and the Inola Police Department. These letters have been requested by the NRC to demonstrate that no jurisdic-tional or interagency obstructions are presently recog-nized for developing the future Oklahoma Radiological Emergency Response Plan. Other local state .ad county agencies will also be involved in emerga.ncy preparedness, but to a lesser degree. Appendix A contains a copy of these agreement letters.
2.4.1 Content of Agreement Letters O Each agreement letter, at a minimum, contains a statement that the agency will provide necessary planning and response activity from their office to assure a workable state plan. This includes coordinating with the other response agencies for jurisdictional continuity. The second requirement of the letter was that each agency understand and agree to a standard emergency action level criteria for future response planning. These standard action levels were referenced to NUREG-0610 " Draft Emer-gency Action Level Guidelines for Nuclear Power Plants", l as discussed in Section 4.1. 2.4.2 Agreement Letter Process l To assure that the State and Ic . officials were l completely familiar with the ongoing PSO efforts on emergency planning for BFS, an informational and instruc- g tional program was conducted as shown in Figure 3. l l 32
Through a series of formal and informal contacts, each agency was notified of the present emergency response planning guidelines, expected futur' activity and the required content of the agreement letters. Initial discussions with the OSE!>RPD and the OCD began in December, 1979 to inform them of the need for agreement
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letters and the latest emergency preparedness require-ments for nuclear power stations.
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N On January 15, 1980 all agreement letter partici-pants were formally contacted by letter describing the activities and efforts being conducted for 'BFS on emer-gency preparedness. (See January 15, 1980 correspondence in Appendix E.) This was also transmitted to other officials and agencies, who were not directly involved with the ag;eement letters. They were contacted for information purposes, with an open iraitation to be in-volved in future planning discussions. This invitation g/ \v was sent to local mayors, county commissioners, city and surrounding county civil defense directors, county health officials and the Governor's office. A list of the - local, county and state offices who were invited to participate in this effort is given on Table 1. After receiving acknowledgment from the OSDH-RPD and the OCD regarding their understanding on the near-term BFS requirements, the remaining agreement letter partici-pants were contacted. A representative from PS0 and OCD met with the remaining agreement letter agencies in their offices. The need for the agreement letters was ex-plained including the recent emergency preparedness activities and each of fice's duties in relation to fixed nuclear power facilities. This provided the groundwork for future contacts to be made formally. 33
On February 7, 1980 and February 28, 1980 trans-mittals wers sent to the OSDH-RPD and OCD, respectively, h requesting their letters of agreement. The agreement letters were received on February 25, 1980 and March 13, 1980 respectively. Agreement letter requests were subsequently sent to g the remaining state, county and local agreement agencies. Each agreement letter participant was requested to attend one of three emergency preparedness presentations which would be conducted by PS0 on April 17 and 18, 1980. A letter was also sent to the other potentially interested officials and agencies previously contacted as an invita-tion to attend the presentations. l The purpose of the three BFS emergency preparedness presentations was to assure that each response office understood the future response activities and responsi- h bilities in which they would be involved and to answer any remaining questions concerning emergency prepared-ness. The presentations were given in the county seats of each of the three countias within the plume exposure pathway EPZ. Each presentation was identical and consisted of a slide presentation with copies of the presentation material distributed for reference. Repre-sentatives from the OSDH-RPD and the OCD were in atten-dance at all sessions to answer questions from a state perspectr,e. Representatives from every agreement letter cffice were present as well as many of the interestad participants previously invited. Upon completion of each presentation, questions were answered with regard to all aspec;s of present and future emergency planning ef-forts for BFS. A list of the attendees at the presenta- g tions is given on Table 2. 34 1
The remaining letters of agreement were transmitted to PSO, as shown in Appendix A to this report. 2.4.3 Emergency Medical Aid Competent medical assistance from neighboring hospi-tals will need to be established for potential radiation related injuries in the event of an accident at BFS. Adequate professional and facility resources will there-g fore need to be assured prior to BFS operation and concurrently with the development of the emergency response plan. The primary area that will require special expertise or equipment will be for decontami-nation and treatment of radiological injuries. In 1975, two Tulsa area hospitals were contacted with regard to providing potential emergency medical aid. Both St. Francis Hospital and Hillcrest Medical Center have radiological facilitics within their hospitals and have shown willingness to further discuss the provision for services that would meet BFS needs. This was discussed by letters dated June 20, 1975 and July 2, 1975 , respectively. Due to the subsequent time span from receipt of letters until preparation of this report the letters were updated to reconfirm the hospitals willing-ness to respond. Both hospitals were contacted through their administration offices for verification of their previous letters. Re-confirmation letters were trans- , . mitted to PSO from St. Francis Hospital on September 15, 1980, and from Hillcrest Medical Center on September 24, 1980 which are enclosed in Appendix A. Other hospitals in the Tulsa area which could be considered for emergency medical treatment include St. John's Hospital, Oklahoma Osteopathic Hospital and City of Faith Hospital which is under construction. f 35
3.0 EMERGENCY RESPONSE FACILITIES g This section will discuss the Black Fox Station control centers, organization, systems and equipment necessary to respond and mitigate the effects of any radiological emergency at the site. 3.1 CONTROL CENTERS Specific control centers have been identified as g being necessary to support an effective emergency re-sponse plan which will act to protect the public and provide technical support to safely maintain the station in case of a radiological emergency at Black Fox Station. The Technical Support Center, Emergency Operations Facility and the Operational Support Center are the primary centers recognized as important to the worka-bility of an emergency response plan. These centers will be linked closely and may perform some overlapping functions to assure complete response at all times during g. an accident. Table 3 shows the functional objectives of each facility that will be used for emergency control. PS0 will meet the objectives as described in NUREG-0696 with the exception of the two-minute interface for the control room by the TSC and the distance location for the backup EOF. PSO requests the NRC Staff to grant exceptions to these two items. Justification and bases are provided in Subsections 3.1.1 and 3.1.2. The staffing for these facilities is discussed in section 3.5.2 and communications are discussed in section 3.2. Figure 4 shows the preliminary location of the Emergency Response Facilities (ERFs) with respect to the plant. Figure 5 shows an expanded view of the major plant buildings. O 36
3.1.1 Technical Support Center (TSC) General Description The Technical Support Center (TSC) is an onsite facility located close to the control rocm that will provide plant management and technical support to tbc reactor operating personnel located in the control room during emergency conditions. It will have technical data displays and plant records available to assist in the
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\ detailed analysis and diagnosis of abnormal plant conditions and any significant release of radioactivity to the environment. The TSC will be the primary onsite communications center for the plant during an emergency.
A senior plant official, designated in the BFS Final Emergency Response Plan, will use the resources of the TSC to assist the control room operators by handling the administrative items, technical evaluations, and contact with offsite activities, relieving them of these functions. TSC Activation and Use The TSC will be activated for the Alert, Site Area, and General Emergency as described in the BFS Final to Emergency Response Plan. i When the TSC is functional, emergency response functions, except direct supervision of reactor opera-l tions and manipulation of reactor system controls, will i shift to the TSC. Plant administration, technical support functions, and contact with offsite activities to assist the control room operator will be performed in the TSC'throughout the course of an accident. TSC Data Systems Reliability The data systems of the TSC will be designed and A constructed to provide a very high degree of reliability. L.) 37 1
The operational unavailabilit.y goal of 0.01 is applicable to the TSC data systems when the reactor is above cold shutdown status. The term unavailability is used to express a complete loss of system function. Mathemati-cally, it is expressed as a ratio of time duration when a function is lost to the total duration when the function is required to be available.
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N TSC Function The onsite TSC will provide the following functions: o Provide plant management and technical support to plant operations personnel during emergency conditions. e Relieve the reactor operators of peripheral duties and communications not directly related to reactor system manipulations. e Prevent congestion in the control room. e Perform EOF functions for the Alert, Site Area, O and General Emergency classes until the EOF is functional. The TSC will be the emergency operations work area .- for designated technical, engineering, and senior plant management personnel; and other PS0 designated personnel required to provide the needed technical support; and a small staff of NRC personnel. The TSC will have facilities to support the plant management and technical personnel and will be the primary onsite communications center for the plant during the emergency. TSJ personnel will use the TSC data system to analyze the plant steady-state and dynamic , behavior prior to and throughout the course of an accident. O 38
The conceptual layout of the TSC may be found on D d Figure 6. TSC Staffing and Training Upon activation of the TSC, designated personnel will report directly to the TSC and achieve full functional operation within 30 minutes. The TSC staff will consist of sufficient technical, engineering, and g senior PSO personnel to provide the needed support to the control room during emergency conditicas. A PSO senior plant official will coordinate activities in the TSC and interface with the control room, the OSC, and the EOF. TSC Size The TSC will be large enough to provide: e Approximately 75 square feet per person; e Space for the TSC data system equipment needed to acquire, process, and display data used in the TSC; e Sufficient sp ce to perform repair, maintenance and service of equipment, displays and instru-mentation; e " Space for data transmissiot equipment neaded to transmit data originating in the TSC to other locations; e space for personnel access to functional displays of TSC data; e Space for access to communications equipment by all TSC personnel who need communications capabilities to perform their functions; e Space for storage of and/or access to plant records and historical data; and e A separate room adequate for at least three persons to be used for private NRC consulta-tions. O 40
The TSC working space will be sized for a minimum of lll l 25 persons, including 20 persons designated by PS0 and 5 NRC personnel. TSC Structure _ The TSC will be able to withstand reasonably expected adverse conditions during the design life of BFS including adequate ' capabilities for (1) earthquakes, \ (2) high winds (other than tornadoes), and (3) floods. TSC Habitability The TSC will be radiologically habitable to the same degree as the control room under accident conditions, but the ventilation system will not be safety-related. The TSC ventilation system will function in a manner comparable to the contro. room ventilacion system and will include high efficiency particulate air (HEPA) and llh charcoal filters. The TSC ventilation system will not be seismic Category I qualified, redundant, or instrumented in the control room. To ensure adequate radiological protection of TSC personnel, radiation monitoriug equipment will be provided. Protective equipment will also be provided for the staff who must travel between the TSC and the control room under adverse radiological conditions. Should the TSC become uninhabitable, the TSC plant management function will be transferred to the control room. TSC Communications The TSC will have reliable voice communications to the control room, the OSC, the E0F, and the NRC. The TSC voice communications facilities will include means for reliable primary and backup communication. llh 41
The TSC voice communications equipment will include: e Hotline telephone (loc.-ted in the NRC consul-tation room) on the NRC 1 nergency Notification System (ENS) to the NRC operations center; e Telephone (located in the NRC consultation _ room) on the NRC Health Physics Network (HPN); e Telephones for managemet.t communications with direct access to the control room, the OSC and
\ the EOF; e Telephones that provide communication to onsite and offsite locations; e Communications to PSO mobile monitoring teams and to state and local operations centers prior to EOF activation.
The TSC communications system will also include , designated telephones (in addition to the ENS and HPN telephones) for use by NRC p3rsonnel. PSO will provide two telephone lines for NRC use when the ' TSC is acti-vated. In addition, PS0 will furnish the onsite access facilities and cables to NRC for the ENS and HPN tele-phones. TSC Instrumentation, Data Svstern Equipment antd Power Supplies Plant data will be available for display in the TSC. Hard copies of any display can be made by the video copiers or line printer located in the work 'rea. The TSC electrical equipment load will not degrade the capability or reliability of any safety-related power source. Sufficient alternate or backup power sources will be provided to maintain continuity of TSC functions and to resume display of TSC data if lors of the primary TSC power sources occurs. 42
TSC Data Systems lll The TSC technical data system will receive and display information acquired from the plant as needed to perform the TSC function. The data available for display in the TSC will enable the plant management, engineering, and technical personnel to aid the control room operators in handling emergency conditions.
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Data that is available for display in the TSC will be available without interference to the control room during emergency operations. The data selected system variables specified in Regulatory Guide 1.97, Rev. 2, Table 1 will be available for display and printout in the TSC. The TSC displays will include: o Plant systems variables, e e In-plant radiological variables, lll Meterological inforn.ation, and e Offsite radiological information. Data trending capability and SPDS fo rmats will be available in the TSC. TSC Records Availability and Management The TSC will have access to plant records to aid in a technical analysis and evaluation of emergency condi-tions. The plant records, operational specifications, e and procedures include: o Plant technical specifications, o Plant operating procedures, e Emergency operating procedures, e Final Safety Analysis Report, O 43
o Plant operating records,
\m'J e Plant ope ra tim ~e reactor safety committee t records and reports, e Records needed to perform the functions of the EOF when it is not operational.
And up-to-date, as-built drawings, schematics, and diagrams showing:
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N e Conditions of plant structures and systems down to the component level, e In plant locations of these systems. The Technical Support Center will be fully discussed in the FSAR. 3.1.2 Emergency Operations _ Facility (EOF) General Deceription The EOF is a nearsite support facility for the management of PSO's over-all emergency response (includ-ing coordination with federal, state and local officials, coordination of radiological and environmental assess-ments, and determination of recommended public protective 6= actions. The Ei ill have appropriate technical data displays and plant records to assist in the diagnosis of plant conditions and to evaluate the potential or actual release of radioactive materials to the environment. EOF Function The BFS Emergency Operations Facility will be controlled and operated by PSO and will serve as the location fer perforning the following functions: i e Management of over-all PS0 emergency response, e Coordination of radiological and environmental assessment, O 44
e Determination of recommended public protective actions, and e Coordination of emergency response activities with federal, state and local agencies. The EOF space may be used for other purposes during
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normal operations. Provisions wil. be made to assure the cmergency functions of the EOF are not degraded by those g activities and will ensure all necessary systems meet required availability. Activation and Use The EOF will be activated for the Site Area Emergency or a General Emergency as defined in the BFS Final Emergency Response Plan. EOF Location The EOF will be located approximately 0.9 miles east of the plant. A conceptual laycut for the EOF is shown on Figure 7. Location, Structure, and Habitability The EOF is located within ten (10) miles of the TSC; Therefore, the following habitability criteria will be met: e The EOF will be well engineered for the design life of DFS in accordance with the Uniform Building code. The EOF will be able to withstand the expected adverse conditions of high winds (other than tornadoes) and floods. e A radiation reduction factor greater than or equal to five (5) will be provided to those areas nf the EOF in which dose assessments, communications, and decisior. making take place. 45
l e Ventilation protectio 1 will be accomplished with H2PA filters (no charcoal) and will function in a manner comparable to the control room and TSC systems. i _ The nearsite EOF is located within ten (40) miles of the TSC; therefore, a preliminary location for a backup EOF will be provided at the PSO Corporate Offices in
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Tulsa, approximately twenty-three (23) miles west of the TSC. The additional three (3) miles beyond the twenty (20) mile siting requirement will not impair movement between the nearsite and backup EOF nor will it impede communications with emergency response personnel. EOF Staffing and Training
, The EOF will be staffed to provide. the over-all management of PS0 offsite resources and the continuous evaluation and coordination of PS0 activities during and after an accident. Upon EOF activation, designated personnel will report directly to the EOF to achieve full functional operation within one hour. A PSO senior management official will be in charge of all PS0 ,,
activities in the EOF. The EGf staff will include personnel to manage PSO onsite and offsite radiological monitoring, to perform radiological evaluations, and to interface with offsite officials. The specific number and type of personnel assigned to the EOF may vary according to the emergency class. The staffing for each emergency class will be fully detailed in the EFS Final Emer,tency Response Plan. The EOF staff will participate in EOF activities drills, conducted periodically in accordance with the BFS Final Emergency Response Plan. These drills will include operat. ion of all faciliti'.- that will be used to perform the EOF functions. i . l l 46 l l
EOF Size The EOF building complex u.ll be large enough to g provide the following: e Working space for the personnel assigned to the EOF as specified in the BFS Final Emergency Response Plan, including federal, state and local agency persepael. A .orking space of approximately 75 square feet per person will be used as a basis for size and layout of the EOF.
~ \ The conceptual EOF layout provided in Figore 7 assumes approximately 25 persons from PSO, 10 persons from state and local agencies, 9 persons from NRC and 1 person from FEMA.
e Space for EOF data system equipment needed to transmit data to other locations. e Sufficient space to perform repair, mainten-ance, and service of equipment, displays and instrumentation. e Space for ready accese to communications equip- gl ment by all EOF personnel who need communica-tions capabilities to perform their functions. e Space for ready access to functional displays of f.0F data. .. e Space for storage of plant records and histori-cal data or space for means to readily acquire and display those records. e Separate office space to accommodate at least five NPC parsonnel daring periods that the EOF is activated for emergencies. e A space to brief select groups of approximately 50 persons. e A secured entrance. e Sufficient space outside the EOF for parking PSO, federal, state, and local vehicle.s. O 47
1 EOF Communications The EOF will have reliable voice communications facilities to the TSC, the control room, NRC, and state and local emergency operations centers. The normal communication path between the EOF and the control room
- wili % through the TSC. The primary functions of the EOF voice connunications facility w.411 be:
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N e EOF management communications with the desig-nated senior PSO plant official in charge of the TSC, e Communications to manage PS0 emergency response resources, e Communications to coordinate radiological monitoring, e Communications to coordinate offsite emergency response activities, and e Communication:: to disseminate information and recommended protective actions to responsible government agencies. The EOF voice communications facilities will include ,. reliable primary and backup means of communication. PSO will provide a means for EOF telephone access to l commercial telephone common-carrier services that bypass any local celephone switching facilities that may be susceptible to loss of power during emergencies. PSO will insure that space commercial telephone lines to the plant are available for use by the EOF during emergen-cies. The EOF voice communications equipment will include: l f e Hotline telephone (located in the NRC office space) on the Emergency Notification System (ENS) to the NRC operations center; l l I fr
- t t
e Dedicated telephone (located in the NRC office space) on the NRC Health Physics Network (HPN); e Telephones for management communications with direct access to the TSC and the centrol room; e Telephones reserved for EOF use to provide access to onsice and offsite locations; e Radio communications to PS0 mobile monitoring
. teams; e Communications to state and local operations centers; and e Communications to facilities outside the EOF used to provide supplemental support for EOF evaluations.
The EOF communications system will also include designated telephones (in addition to the ENS and HPN telephones) for use by NRC personnel. PS0 will provide at least three telephone lines for NRC use while the EOF is activated. PSO will also furnish the access facili-ties and cables to the NRC for the ENS and HPN tele-phones. Facsimile transmission capability bstween the EOF, the TSC, and the 57C operations center will be .. provided. EOF Instrumentation, Data Systems Equipment, and Power Supplies The EOF will contain equipment for the acquisition, display, and evaluation of radiological, meterological and plant system data necessary to determine prote *.ive measures recommended to offsita authorities. This equipment will also be used to evaluate the magnitude and effect of potential or actual radioactive releasea and to project offsite doses. Data will be transmitted to the EOF from plant computer systems. The data will be presented in the EOF using equipment such as CRTs and a 49
printer / plotter. The details of the data system will be provided in the FSAR. The data system will display the Safety P.rameter Display System (SPDS) formats and data needed in the EOF to analyze and exchange information needed on plant conditions with the designated senior PSO plant official in charge of the TSC. The system will perform these functions independently from actions in the control room without degrading or interfering with control room and plant functions. Trend information display capability will be available in the EOF. The total EOF data system will be designed to achieve and operational unavailability goal of 0.01 during all plant operating conditions above cold shutdown. O The term unavailability is used to express a complete loss of system function. Mathematically, it is expressed as a ratio of time duration when a function is l lost to the total ditristion when the function is required ,, to be available. l The EOF electrical equipment load will not degrade the capability or reliability of any safety related power source. Circuit transients or power supply failures or fluctuaticas will not cause a loss of any stored data, l l vital to the EOF functions. EOF Technical Data and Data Systems l The EOF data set will include radiological, metero-logical and other environmental data as needed to: o Assess environmental conditions, O l 50
e Coordinate radiological monitoring activities, llg and e Recommend implementation of offsite erergency plans. A sufficient number of data display devices will be
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provided in the EOF to allow all EOF personnel to perform their assigned tasks. They include:
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N e Plant systems variables, e Inplant radiological variables, o Meteorological information, and e Offsite radiological information. As a minimum EOF data set, selected variables specified in Regulatory Guide 1.97, Rev. 2, Table 1, and selected meteorological variables specified in proposed Rev. I to Regulatory Guide 1.23 will be available for g display in the EOF. Plant system data that is available
. for display in the TSC will be available in the EOF. The sample frequency will be chosen to be consistent with the use of the data.
Records Availability and Management The EOF will have access to up-to-date plant
- records, procedures, and emergency plans needed to 1
exercise over-all management of PS0 emergency response resources. The EOF records will include: l l e Plant technical specifications, l e Plant operating procedures, o Emergency operating procedures, e Final Safety Analysis Report i e Up-to-date records related to PSO, state and I local emergency response plans, ggg l 51
e Offsite population distribution data, (} e Evacuation plans, o Environs radiological monitoring records, e Licensee employee radiation exposure histories, 1 And up-to-date drawicks and schematics showing: o Conditions of plant structures and systems down to the component level, and
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\ e Inplant locations of these systems.
These records will either be stored and maintained in the EOF (such as a hard copy or microfiche) or will be available via transmittal to the EOF from other records storage locations. 3.1.2 Public Relations Center The Public Relations Center will be adjacent to the EOF and will function as the central location for dissem-(} inating information to the news media and public. This will include capacity for approximately 50 press repre-sentatives. In the event of a major accident, a larger nearby existing facility such as local school gymnasiums, ,, or meeting halls will be designated for press briefings of up to several hundred media members. 3.1.3 Onsite Operational Support Center (OSC) General Description The Operational Support Center (OSC) is an onsite assembly area separate from the control room and the TSC where PS0 operations support personnel will report in an emergency. There will be direct communications between the OSC and the control room and between the OSC and the TSC so that the personnel reporting to the OSC can be assigned to duties in support of emergency operations. O 52
. _ . . _ __ . . _ . _ _ _ . _ . _ _ . _._ -. . . _ . . _ - ~ _ ,
}
.gtivation and Use g
The OSC will be .setivated for the Alert, Site Area, and General Emergency classes. OSC Function The OSC is an onsite area separate from the control room and the TSC where PS0 operations support personnel will assemble in an emergency. The OSC will:
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N e Provide a location where plant logistic support can be coordinated during an emergency. e Restrict control room accest to those cupport personnel specifically requested by the Shift Supervisor. When the OSC is activated, it will
- be supervised by PS0 operations management personnel designated in the Black Fox Station Final Emergency Response Plan to perform these functions.
g OSC Location 1 i The preliminary location selected for the OSC is the training area large classroom at the north end of the l s-1 General Services Building on the fourth floor. Figure 8 1 illustrates the preliminary OSC location. This area provides sufficient space in a central location. Its I location does not interfere with access to the control l l room, the TSC, or the unaffected unit. i OSC Habitability l l The OSC's habitability is not comparable to that of the control room; therefore, the Black Fox Station Final Emergency Response Plan will include procedures for evac-uation of OSC personnel in the event of a large radio-active release. The BFS Final Emergenc'y Response Plan will include provisions for the performance of the OSC g 53
functions 'oy essential support personnel from other onsite locations. OSC Communications The OSC will have direct communication with the control room and with the TSC so that the personnel reporting to the OSC can be assigned duties in support of emergency operations. The OSC communications system will 3 consist of one telephone extension to the control room, one telephone extension to the TSC, and one telephone capable of reaching onsite and offsite locations. OSC Details Details concerning the OSC final location, backup assembly area, station access control, etaffing require-ments, conduct of operations, training, and equipment storage locations will be provided in the BFS Final Emergency Response Plan. 3.1.4 Onsite Emergency Medical Facilities the Black Fox Station will provide a single first aid center for both radiological and non-radiological injuries. It is expected that most treatment rendered at " the onsite medical facilities will be for non-radio-logical inj uries . However, medical personnel will be trained and equipment supplied to cope with radiological contaminated injuries. Raliological first aid will consist mostly of survey and decontamination facilities. Surface contamination of station personnel without injury will normally require only special showers and decontam-ination agents to remove contamination. This treatment will be supplied by the onsite first aid center; there-fore, no offsite treatment is normally necessary. Information from personnel dosimetry will be available for reviewing exposures. 54
e Severe exposure and radiation related accidents with injury will require hospital emergency facilities and professional care as discussed in Section 4.3.5. The main function of the BFS first aid facility for severe radiation related injuries will be to survey and prepare the person for transporting to offsite health care facilities.
. Emergency t.ansportation to offsite treatment cen-ters will be supplied by designated vehicle or heli-copter. BFS will maintain an emergency transportation vehicle onsite with the capacity to transport injured personnel to the established medical center for offsite treatment. An emergency medical helicopter called " Life Flight" is presently available which is sponsored by the two Tulsa hospitals with which agreement letters exist (Section 2.4.3). The helicopter has capacity for trans-porting two injured persons and one nurse. The estimated travel time for a round trip transport to BFS is about 30 minutes.
3.2 COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEMS A reliable communication system between the main - facilities at the station, and with the offsite authori-ties who are rerponsible for responding to a radiological emergency at the BFS is crucial to the effective conduct of an emergency plan. Both fixed and portable communica-tions equipment, including dedicated and backup systems will be utilized. The following discusses the basic aspects of the systems which are considered effective for use at BFS. The control room is the initial location for all onsite and offsite einergency response cominunica tions . This requires a communication link to all off ite O 55
response authorities and the NRC along with normal inplant communlcations. Upon activation, the TSC becomes the central communication location for inplant emergency respouse. The EOF is the BFS facility which will be available to coordinate the onsite/ offsite rasponse for protection of the public in the event of an emergency condition. All EOF communication syste.as will be available as soon as the facility can be activated by the BFS Emergency Coordinator.
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N 3.2.1 BFS Fixed Communications Systems Fixed communication systcms will be established , throughout the station facilities in order to maintain complete contact with station personnel. The Technical Support Center will be the central location for BFS com-munications and information exchange. Dedicated priority voice communication links will be provided between the TSC, EOF, control room and the designated offsite response networks. Dedicated communication links will be supplied between BFS and the NRC along with separate com-munication capability for NRC personnel between emergency facilities. Even though the station status through the SPDS will be available by callup display to the EOF, the station condition as determined by the TSC or control room personnel will be verbally transmitted to the EOF for protective action initiation. The primary fixed communication system for the station will be the in plant telephone system shich will be operated and controlled within BFS. The system will coesist of telephone receptacles distributed and inter-connected throughout the the plant including the TSC and EOF for immediate connectiori with other inplant lines. O 56
A two-way public address system will be supplied within the plant to alert and notify personnel which cannot be reached by the p rima ry inplant phone system. This paging system will have multi-channel capability for simultaneous communication as well as paging.
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Both of these systems will use normal inplant power systems with emergency back up in case of loss of normal g ac power. 3.2.2 BFS Portable Communications Syste.as Contact and communications will be maintained with station personnel in the field (i.e., field monitoring teams and security) by the use of hand held or vehicular two-way radios. An effective range of ten miles will be provided by repeaters to assure complete communication capability within the plume exposure EPZ. 3.2.3 BFS/Offsite Fixed Communication Systems In order to initiate and maintain communication links between the site and the offsite emergency response agencies, a primary and backup communication system will be provided. The basic requirement of these systems is l that notification to the predesignated offsite response agencies (see Section 4.2) be immediate and that con-tinued effectual communication can be maintained through-out the duration of the accident. This can be attained through several individual systems, or a combination of systems. The specific systems will be determined during the final design for BFS. The following systems will be investigated for potential use. The National Warning System (NAWAS) is a proven and reliable communication system which has been recognized e as being available to private facilities (such as nuclear 57
O power stations) for emergency notification. The NAWAS system, which has been primarily used by military, public ( safety and civil defense authorities, has been shown to be an effective communications network for alerting authorities of emergency situations. The NAWAS system presently being utilized by emergency respense authori-ties in Oklahoma would only require approval for a NAWAS drop at the EOF, TSC, and control room. Contacts could
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j 5 be initiated simultaneously to county and state agencies by predetermini.ng selected drops. The commercial telephone system, as presently sup-plied by the Oklahoma Communications Tel.ephonc System, will be available as a primary means of offsite com-munications to the response agencies. This system would be reliable during initial contact of offsite agencies; however, during an emergency condition it could become
/ overburdened with extraneous phone calls thereby reducing its effectiveness. This system will primarily fum tion as the routine communication system for everyday usage.
Dedicated tie lines, upon request, will be purchased to establish non-interruptable communications with appropriate offsite response agencies and the NRC. Microwave communications systems which are being used at BFS during construction and operation could also serve as a useful system for emergency resnonse during operation. This system will provide communications between the PSO corpo rate headquarters in Tulsa and BFS,but the same system could be used for emergency communications. As a primary system, it would have a backup power supply to protect against loss of availability. O 58
Satellite communications represent a potential method for a secure and relatively reliable communication h link. This system utilizes a communications satellite for signal conveyance and satellite earth terminals for receivers and transmitters. It is limited, however, by the earth terminals provided for exchange points. ( 3.2.4 Offsite Response Authority Communications Systems l The OSDH-RPD, OCD, DPS and the County Sheriff's
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office and County Civil Defense Directors will have portable radio communication systems which will be used to conduct protective actions in the event of an accident at BFS. A potential system which could be used is the Jepartment of Public Safety vehicle radio system which has 24-hour manned dispatching capability. Special portable communication equipment is avail-able throughout the Federal Radiological Monitoring and Assessment Plan (FRMAP) using a microwave system for telephone and control communication which is installed on aircraft transporation pads for quick airlift to BFS. This can be supplied upon request in the event of an emergency at BFS. ,, l For emergency medical treatment, communications systems will be capable of being established between the site and the hospitals. Similar communications are alro available in the Tulsa area hospitals. Normal microwave telephone communications could also be available for j direct communications. l 3.3 EARLY WARNING SYSTEM This section will discuss the requirement of an early warning systea to the public within the 10 mile plume exposure pathway EPZ. It is the intent of an early 0 59
warning system to have the capability to alert the public O within 15 minu.es after determination by the offsite authoritics that protective action needs to be taken. The system to be inse.alled at BFS will meet the requirement of 10CFR50, Appendix E. The early warning system consists of the al'rting portion and the instractional portion as discussed below.
\ 3.3.1 Alerting System The alerting system will consist of the actual hardware to be installed within the plume exposure pathway EPZ to notify the public in order to receive protecr.ve action instructions. Sevaral systems or a combination of systems have been identified that may be acceptable to comply with this requirement. This includes siren systems, tone alert systems, automatic dialers and public address systems. Each of these O systems have inherent capabilities that make them more appealing for specific applications than the other systems.
3.3.1.1 Siren Systems ,, Siren systems are generally considared throughout the industry as the primary means to fulfill the early warning system criteria. This is especially true in higher po;g: ?'ed areas where many residents, businesses and institutions can ue alerted through a single siren. The demography within the plume exposure pathway EPZ l around BFS, even though fairly thin, would require at I least a partial coverage of sirens for several areas (see Section 5.0 for existing demography characteristics). A preliminary early warning system using USGS topo-graphical maps of the 10-mile area around BFS has been O 60
prepared by a reputable warning system manufacturer (Appendix D). The purpose of this initial warning system layout is to allow PS0 the preliminary knowledge of the general siren system coverage that would be required for BFS. The area within the 10-mile radius has terrein variances and a population distribution sufficiently
- dispersed so that a combination of various-sized sirens will serve to provide general coverage for public alerting. Other methods which provide notification are N
mentioned in this section. This survey was prepared from USGS topographical maps and does not represent a detailed study that would need to be performed for actual siren placement coverage. Final placement of sirens for the BFS area will be performed using accepted guidance as FEMA's Publication CPG 117, " Outdoor Warning Systems Guide" (Reference 5). 3.3.1.2 Tone Alert and Other Systems Radios and receivers which are capable of receiving a prerecorded message from a local transmitter similar to that supplied by the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) weather alert system will also be .. considered. In lightly populated areas where a siren would not be the most cost effective method, sepa rate receivers can be supplied and maintained for individual usage. The other types of emergen,y alert aystems which are available include automatic .elephone dialers and loud-speakers; however, these systems will be primarily con-sidered for special applications. O 61
() 3.3.2 Instructional System Upon alerting the public that an emergency situation exists at Black Fox Station, instructions as to the actions they need to take must be forthcoming. To prevent potential overreaction by the public, the instructional portion of the total system must be fully understood by the public and must be immediately
, available for public access.
The instructional system will consist of (1) pre-emergency information supplied to educate the public which resides within the plume exposure pathway EPZ and any workers or transients that can be readily identified and (2) post-accident availability of preprepared and live instructional messages to notify the public of specific actions to be taken. () 3.3.2.1 Pre-Emergency Information During the FSAR development of the emergency response plan for BFS and prior to operation, PSO will develop and distribute educational information to the public within the plume exposure pathway EPZ concerning .- basic aspects of the station and actions to be taken in the event of an emergency at BFS. Included in this educational information will be simplified station design and health effects literature, description of the early warning system, a discussion of the actions to be taken after being alerted, radio and television stations where instructional information can be obtained, types and effectiveness of various pro-tective actions and evacuation routes and sectors if an evacuation is considered necessary. O 62
l l Public meetings, periodic redistribution of informa-tion, and effectiveness survavs will be pe rfo rmed to ggg l assure public awareness of established emergency pro- l cedures for the public. These efforts will be canducted l with the approval and recognition of the respo.isible l l state emergency prepart.dness agencies. ' 3.3.2.2. Post-Accident Information Availability Once the public is alerted by the early warning \ system, protective action instructions must be available for public advisory. The most effective means to accomp-lish this is to have available prerecorded broadcast 1 messages for dissemination through the edia. Prere-corded messages would consist of (1) nots :ation of an emergency; actions to be taken by the public or (2) a l standby notice followed by live broadcasts. I 1 TL Emergency Broadcast System (EBS) has been estab-lished to provide an expeditious method for communication glg with the public in the event of an emergency of any type , 1 including an emergency at a nuclear facility. The EBS '.s provided through volunta ry participation by designated broadcast stations as a public service. Verified emer- ; gency messages will be transmitted by request of author-ized state officials or other designated individuals as l pre-established. Upon activation of the Emergency Broadcast System no rmal p rogramming will cease. The designated key EB3 station will carry the broadcast massage while the non-EBS stations will only carry periodic stand-by emer-gency notificati n messages. The public will be notifieu through approgriate messages of actions to be taken. EBS messages pertaining 'g
- 3FS will be included in the i 1
procedures of the Oklahoma EBS Operational Plans. 63 l l l M
The Key EBS station that will be transmitting the initial EBS message in the BFS area will be KELI located in Tulsa (approximately 20 miles west). This station transmits at a frequency of 1430 KHz with Skw output. This station will be responsible for transmitting appro-priate EBS messages as supplied by designated authorities and will then act as the program source for the sur- , rounding counties in the " program area." The KELI pro-
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gram area includes Wagoner County. Rogers and Mayes N counties fall under a different program area, however, they receive their source message from KRMG in Tulsa (740 kHz, 50 kw) who ia the backup Key EBS station to KELI. The county EBS stations in the BFS area are KWPR (1770 KHz, i kw), for Rogers County, KOLS (1570 KHz, 1 kw), in Mayes County and KJEM (1530 KHz, .25 kw) in Wagoner County. 3.3.2.3 Special Public Notification Within the plume exposure pathway EPZ some spr. ial conditions may exist where a standard " alerting system" or " instructional system" will not be applicable. Within this 10 mile radius there does not presently exist any hospitals or nurcing homes, where special arrangements must be made. This area does, however, have campground areas and some population.; which will require special attention in the development of the emergency response plan. I The Corps of Engineers maintains recreational areas along the Verdigris River for camping, fishing and hik-ing. Rocky Point is such an area which borders the BFS site to the north. During an emergency that would re-quire activation of the early warning system, the visi-tors to such area could be alerted adequately by a siren O 64
system, but the instructional portion could not be effectively provided through the public broadcast networks due to the potential lack of radio systems. h Therefore, posted instructions, bullhorns, a public address system or similar means of instructions would be provided. Certain Mennonite populations are present approxi-mately five to six miles northeast of the BFS site.
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These households are generally separated from each other due to larger acreages owned by the families. Many of these families typically have rejected electric service to their homes and therefore do not have radios or tele-visions to receive instructional broadcasts after an alert. Similarly, many do not own automobiles or on-road motorized transportation for evacuation. Their primary means of travel is by buggy or by farm tractors. For these cases, special provisions will be arranged for protective action instructions and also for means of h evacuatien. The instructional provision can be similar to that discussed for the recreational areas above. The means for evacuation will likely include a procedural ,, requirement in the overall emergency plan to supply alternate transportation to these families. Arrangements with neighboring residents could be made to provide transportation to these people as will be individually identified. The evacuation time estimates (Appendix C) allow for adequate preparation time prior to evacuation to encompass the extra time necessary to handle these special conditions. Evacuation time estimates for the FSAR submittal stage will include these conditions due to the added protective action steps involved. O 65
- _ = _.
3.4 DOSE AND ACCIDENT ASSESSMENT EQUIPMENT In order to determine what protective actions should be taken in the event of an emergency at BFS, it is necessary to have adequate instrumentation to evaluate station conditions and the radiological considerations for personnel and public protection. Providing protective
, actions to the public and plant personnel requires beth dose rate measurement instrumentation and accident assessment instrumentation. The station status ins t.ru-
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mentation will exist in the control room and the Techni-cal Support Center to monitor various parameters for accident assessment. Actual dose rate measurements for areas in the station or for releases from the station are important for integrating with existing environment-al/ meteorological conditions at the nearsite EOF to estimate potential offsite consequences. In addition, even though no direct release of radiation may have occurred from the station, accident assessment instru-mentation can be used to determine the potential for , offsite consequences. The control room, Technical Support Center, and Emergency Operations Facility will all perform various ,, i emergency response functions and will require proper dose and accident assessment capability. The specific instru-( mentation to be used for this function will be selected from the requirements of Regulatory Guide 1.97 for final l station design. 3.4.1 Accident Assessment The control room and the Technical Support Center will be the primary locations for readout of the station l parameters to determine accident assessment. The TSC t l displays and indicators will be isolated from the control l l room instrumentation. The purpose of this instrumen-tation is to provide information to the operator for safe 66
shutdown, determination of whether the engineered safety features are properly functioning, determine cause and response actions for degraded systems, and for the h purpose of initating actions to protect the public. The BFS control room will be based on the General Electric BWR/6 Nuclenet control complex. This system uses multiple color video CRTs for station analysis and monitoring. Station system status displays may be
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\ obtained on the control panel CRT's or can be available by separate isolated recording and indication. The BFS TSC may have similar callup display charac-teristics but will not have any control capability. Included in the TS system will be the ability to display system trends and to record and indicate station operating conditions prior to the accident. The TSC will also be able to callup displays and information calcu-lated within the EOF. Pertinent portions of Regula- h tory Guide 1.97 (Reference 6) will be used as the basis for these instrumentation provisions. 3.4.2 Dose Assessment Inplant doce assessment will be based on radio-logical monitoring instrumentation supplied throughout the station. The process radiation monitoring system will be used to determine source levels and potential effluent releases. This instrumentation monitors the radiation levels in selected liquid and gaseous pr oc .ss streams. When the radiation level exceeds predetermined s e tpcir.ts , alarm and trip signals initiate annunciation in the control room and automatically close isolation valves to control the release of radioactivity within the plant or to the environment. Process radiation monitor-ing data will be input into the dose projection models O 67
available within the EOF for predicting offsite exposures and doses. In a slailar manner, area radiation monitoring data will also be available in the TSC and EOF. Monitors will be located in various locations throughout the station to
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monitor gross gamma / beta radiation levels. Area radia-tion monitoring information from station structures such g as the auxiliary building, radwaste building, and contain-ment, along with the station ventilation and exhaust systems will be available in the TSC and EOF. 3.4.3 Meteorological Monitoring Meteorological data will be supplied from an onsite meteorological tower with instrumentation at 10, 53 and 100 meter levels. The measurement program will consist of wind direction, wind speed and temperature sensors at
- all three levels; relative humidity at 10 meters; and precipitatio'. and barometric pressure at ground level.
This system will meet the criteria provided by Regulatory Guide 1.23 (Reference 7) and NUREG-75/087 (Reference 8). In order to determine diffusion and dispersion from an accider.tal release of radioactive material to the atmosphere, real time data from the meteorological instruments will be input into a station computer for storage and for usage in calculational analysis with indication in the control room, Technical Support Center l and the Emergency Operations Facility. Meteorological information received by the additional instrumentation location on the meteorological tower will provide backup data in the event of tempo-ary loss of the other I instrumentation. A l V i~ 68 ~
Computer models will be developed to simulate atma-spheric effluent transport and diffusion due to release g of radioactivity. Input into the enodels will include site area topographical features, onsite real time meteorology, stability classes, and source term descrip-tion. As defined in NUREG-0654, this system will follow _ a Class A model to provide basic transport and diffusion predictions. The BFS topography is primarily gently rolling hills; therefore, a simple two dimensional
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gaussian model should be sufficient. Arrangements will be made with the DOE Atmospheric Release Advisory Capa-bility (ARAC) for use of the three dimensional complex transport and diffusion models for determinicg long-term estimates. This system can be made ava21able within hours and will serve as a reliable dose asse e-nt prog-ram. Such a system will meet the requirements of the Class B model described by NUREG-0654. 3.4.4 Environmental Monitoring g BFS will have a complete environmental monitoring program of both fixed and portable environmental moni-tors. These environmental monitoring resources will be used to develop baseline data during normal operations to ,, measure dose levels in the field and to confirm modeling estimates. The no rmal operational field monitoring system is discussed in Section 6.2.1 of the BFS Environmental Report. This same monitoring system, which includes TI.D field monitors and air, water and foodchain sampling, will be used during and af ter an emergency enndition at BFS. This system will provide a b .as fc r long term protective actions and for computer modeling verifica-tion. f 9 69 l
In addition to the above, PSO will provide portable
] instruments capable of measuring gamma radiation vposure rates to approximately 50 R/h and air samplers which can discriminate between noble gases, radiohalogens and particulates, and can be evaluated with the gamma instrument in situ. These instrument sets would consist of the following:
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- a. Low-range gamma survey instruments (range: approxi-
\ mently 0.1 to 50 mR/h).
- b. High-range gamma survey instruments (cange: approx-imately 0.05 to 50 R/hr).
- c. High-volume airborne radioiodine and particulate sampler.
These instruments will be used to verify plume travel distance, plume diffusion, plume direction and, if possible, plume deposition. The data from these instru-mants will be radioed to the EOF. 3.4.5 Safety Parameter Display System The safety paran eter display system (SPDS) will be designed to function strictly as an alerting display ,, panel which will assist the BFS control room personnel in evaluating the station safety status. The SPDS will be designed to continuously operate during both normal and l 4 abnormal statioa conditions and will be capable of providing magnitude and parameter trending. , The SPDS, to be located in the BFS control room, i will have display visibility to the supervisory and control personnel. Additional callup SPDS displays will also be located in the TSC and EOF. 70
The data set of the SPDS will consist of those station parameters considered necessary to determine the h station status in the event of an accident. A basis for consideration of the data set will be Regulatory Guide 1.97. All data shall be capable of validation, as practical, to insure accurate status of plant condition. 3.4.6 Nuclear Data Link The Nuclear Data Link (NDL) is being considered by
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the NRC to provide a data transmission system for sending a specified set of variables from nuclear facilities to the NRC Operations Center in Bethesda, Maryland. The purpose of this system is to provide NRC management personnel timely reliable and accurate station, meteoro.- logical, and radiological data for the BFS. The intent of the NDL will be to allow NRC independent review of station status and operator action in order for he NRC te reliably inform offsite state, local and Federal officials and the public of aspects of the incident. h In lieu of a NDL, PS0 believes that a dedicated telephc 3 line in connection with a high speed telecopy will serve for data transmission. The voice communica- ,, tions system provided from BFS to the NRC Operations l Center will also function for supplemental and backup i information exchanges. 3.5 BFS EMERGENCY ORGANIZATION The emergency organization for BFS will be diwn primarily from personnel assigned to the station during l normal operation. Job functions of onsite personnel during an emergency will be expanded and off shift l l personnel will be utilized. Station personnel will be trained to perform emergency functions outside of their
- daily routine. The BFS station organization is discussed O
71
under PSAR Section 13.1 and will therefore, only be addressed here as it applies to emergency response j activities. a ( i ! 3.5.1 Emergency Persont.al The following BFS facility organization will have
, direct or indirect responsibilities in the event of an
, emergency at BFS (See Figure 9). ? 1
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4 3.5.1.1 Station Manager _ I The Station Manager has responsibility and authority for all phases of station operation at the BFS. He will , report to the Vice President, Power Generation in the PSO corporate office during normal operation but will report
- to the Recovery Manager during site and general emer-gencies. He is directly responsible for the safe, orderly, and efficient operation of the station includinr, j administration of the BFS Emergency Response Plan. He O serves as the station's liaison to the NRC for all communications concerning station operation. He, or a designateo alternate, will assume command of the TSC j during an accident.
3.5.1.2 Shift Technical Advisor i The Shift Technical Advisor reports to the Shift Supervisor during normal operation and to the Station ! Manager after the emergency plan is activated. His primary responsibilities are to provide on-shift advice and assistance to the shift supervisor in the event of a transient or an accident and to provide evaluation of operation experience. The Shift Technical Advisor may perform additional functions during normal operations but will be required to perform these obligations during an emergency. O i 72 i
., . . , _ . _ _ . _ _ _ _ . . _ _ - - . . . _ , . _ _ - _ _ _ , . . - _ . - _ _ _ _ _ , _ - - . . . _ _ _ _ , _ _ - - . _ _ . , . - _ . - - - ~ . .
- - - ~ _ - - - - . - - .
3.5.1.3 Station Superintendent The Station Superintendent reports directly to the Station Manager and in an emergency would be an alternate h to tae Station Manager. ( 3 5.1.4 Operations Supervisor The Operations Supervisor supervises
- the activities of the Shift Supervisors and will be responsible to the Station Superintendent for coordinating t'he activities of the operating shift during normal operation. Following N
activation of the emergency plan, he or an alternate would be in charge of the control room and support the Shift Supervisor. 3.5.1.5 Shift Supervisors The Shift Supervisors report to the Operations Supervisor and will have direct supervision over station operations. Each unit will have a Shift Supervisor assigned to duty at all times. One "onshift" Shift Supervisor will be designated "in charge" of the entire h station during normal operation. He will have authority over all direct unit related activities including aut..or-ity to render the plant in a safe condition when con-tinued operation may jeopardize the station or the health and safety of the public. During an accident he will take charge of the control room until relieved by the Operations Supervisor. 3.5.1.6 Technical Supervisor The Station Technical Supervisor will be responsible for supervising the facility's Technical Support Staff consisting of reactor engineering, station engineering, instrumentation and control, and quality control. He will coordinate tLe technical support staff activities with the other facility operating sections. He wil' O 73
1 l assure that the necessary engineermg support to effic-iently and safely operate and maint sin the station is provided. Personnel under the responsibility of the Technical Supervisor will man the TSC during an accident. 3.5.1.7 Emergency Coordinator
,,, The Emergency Coordinator will be responsible for all emergency response planning onsite. He will maintain and revise emergency procedures, be responsible for the '
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EOF, be the primary coordinator between the facility and offsite age -'.es, dispatch radiological monitoring teams and be responsible for conducting drills and exercises. The Emergency Coordinator reports to the StaFon Manager during normal operation or minor emergencies and to the Recovery Manager in the event of an accident where the recovery operations are activated. The Emergency Coordinator will coordinate all activities associated with offsite emergency response. Other key BFS managers or supervisors will serve as alternates. 3.5.1.8 Recovery Manager The position of Recovery Manager is not an opera-tional position in the BFS organization. This position ,, will be manned only during site and general emergencies. He will be a senior ranking member of the co rporate office who has the technical and managerial ability to direct plant recovery. When emergency conditions are in eifect, he vill be the senier ranking person in charge of BF3. 3.5.1.9 Public Relations Director The Public Relations Director will be a corporate employee who reports directly to the Recovery Manager as required by the situation. He will be responsible for coordinating onsite news media activity, distributing 74 i l - - - - -
news releases and will be the Company spokesman for formal press conferences. He, like the Recovery Manager, will not hava an operational position at the BFS site but h will be called upon during an emergency only. 3.5.1.10 Radiological Monitoring Teams
~ The radiological monitoring teams will be made up of two or three men using station health physicists, plant operators, engineers or technicians.
The members of the team will report to the Radiation Safety and Chemistry Supervisor or his designee for inplant emergencies and will receive direction from the Emergency Coordinator for offsite monitoring. 3.5.2 Emergency Coordination The coordination of available onsite personnel and off duty shift personnel during an emergency is of extreme importance to protect the health and safety oC the public and station personnel. Since emergency personnel cannot be maintained onsite strictly for the h unlikely event of an accident, station manpower must be assigned to both routine and emergency duties. The following will explain those routine positions and the - resulting emergency coordination. At any given time during the operation of SFS, the personnel who are stationed at or readily available to the control room for emergency operations will be a minimum of the Shift Supervisor, Reactor Operator, two Assistant Reactor Operators, and the Shift Technical Advisor. As the senior responsible person present, the Shift Supervisor would be the person who would perform initial emergency response activities prior to other staff members being available. O 75
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Initial response activities by the Shift Supervisor
' will be to evaluate station condition, notify other on-duty and off-duty personnel of the emergency condi-tion, and to notify offsite local, county, and state response agencies for standby or immediate action and to notify the NRC.
3.5.2.1 Facility Activation
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\ The TSC will be the first emergency support center to be activated in the event of an accident with subse-quent priority given to the EOF. The amount of time to activate these centers depends on the available onshift personnel and the emergency action level determined. The availability of manpower varies substantially between shifts which will effect the method of initially respond-ing to an accident. These response actions are discussed in Section 4.2.
O To better assure facility manning availability, specific plant personnel will be trained to manage the TSC and/or EOF. The primary person to supervise the TSC will be the Station Manager and likewise the EOF will be managed by the Emergency Coordinator until the Recovery Manager assumes that responsibility. Additional plant personnel will be crained to activate and operate either facility, including the Station Superintendent, Opera-tions Supervisor, Technical Supervisor, Shift Super-j visors, and Maintenance Supervisor. i This provides a pool of personnel which can be selected for initial facility manning and for shift manning should the accident be extended. If the primary or assigned first alternates to man each facility are I Travailable within a reasonable amount of time, other personnel can be activated from the pool to provide the O 76
initial manning of either the TSC or EOF. Up-to-date call lists of all trained facility manpower will be kept at the control room, TSC and EOF. If manpower resources are immediately available within the station, the on-shift. supervisor will notify
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through inplant communications that these individuals' assistance is required. In the event that responsible s personnel are not immedictely available, off-duty resources must be notified. Under the direction of the Shift Supervisor these persons will be alerted for activation via the call list. Residential location will be recognized for travel time in order that the facil-> ities can be manned within approximately 30 to 60 minutes from notification. The available individuals will be directly assigned to the designated emergency center. 3.5.2.2 Activation of BFS Radiological Monitoring Teams At the same time the activation of the TSC and EOF commences, BFS Radiological Monitoring Teams will need to be activated from available on-duty and off-duty personnel. During the emergency response planning stage for operation, a methodology will be developed to assemble monitoring teams for onsite and offsite monitoring. Some specialized teams may require predetermined team members with a specific level of expertise required to perform the response function. The onsite radiological monitoring teams will gener-ally require a higher level of expertise for such actions as health protection and decontamination. The teams will initially be led by the on-duty Health Physists and will have specific functions to be performed. Additional O 77 m
teams can be assembled from en-duty or off-duty personnel. The offsite munitoring teams will be made up of other available station personnel who have been trained in offsite monitoring. These teams will be made up of qualified station and/or corporate personnel. These teams will receive their assignments and kits at the EOF _ as determined by the monitoring needs at that time. 4.0 PROTECTIVE ACTIONS If an accident should occur at BFS resulting in an uncontrolled release of radiation within the station or into the environment, actions must be taken to best assure that its consequences can be mitigated. These protective strategies to limit or mitigate the radiation exposure and, therefore, the consequences of such exposure to the workers and general public are of prime concern to PSO and the offsite response agencies
- fa) involved. Preplanned mitigative and surveillance resources, implementation procedures, preestablished
. protective actions and exercises will be recognized and secured prior to operation of BFS.
The first step neccessary to protect the public is to recognize that an accident has occurred within the station and to determine its actual or potential serious-ness. Upon recognition of the accident, measures must be taken to classify it and determine what steps should be taken to protect the public health. This can be best i accomplished by use of preestablished standard action levels. Each action level will be based on a certain potential health effect as identified by the station condition or release whereby an expected protective action can be applied. t O 78
Protective actions include one or a combination of alternatives such as evacuation, sheltering, thyroid lh prophylaxis, removal of contaminated foodstuffs and access control. No predetermined single or combination of protective actions can be considered the only ultimate action to be taken for a given action level, but effec-
, tive response will depend on a well planned but flexible program considering all identified factors. ~
\ The emergency action levels, notification scenarios, and protective action scenarios which will be considered are discussed in the following text. 4.1 EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS Emergency Action Levels (EAL) are a system of class-ification of unusual or emergency conditions which cover the spectrum of possible emergency conditions into exclu-sive groupings. The emergency action levels to be used by BFS are described in NUREG-0610, "Dra f t Emergency Action Level Guidelines for Nuclear Power Plants." (Reference 2) This document identifies four separate action levels each with a distinct categorization of events and release potentials which are: e Notification of Unusual Event e Alert e Site Emergency e Generai Emergency The potential health hazard to the public included by the levels range from no health hazard to potential life threatening doses. To better explain each action level and how it will interact with expected protective actions, a more extensive breakdown is necessary. 9 79
4.1.1 Notification of Unusual Event This is the least critical of the four Emergency Action Levels. It includes those situations which, unless complicated by other factors, pose no harm to the public, but for which it is prudent to contact state and Federal officials to provide them with current informa-tion on unusual events which are occurring or have occurred at the station. Typically, these situations are brought under control and terminated in less time than it
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takes to activate an emergency response organization. The purpose of offsite notification is to assure that the first step in any response later found to be necessary has been carried out, provide current informa-tion on unusual events, and provide a periodic scheduled test of the offsite communication link. There is little or no potential for release of radiation under this event. O It will be the responsibility of BFS to notify the state of such an event and for them to standby for verbal closeout. The emergency control centers will not be activated for this action level. 4.1.2 Alert The alert energency action level includes those situations for which it is necessary to notify station, local, state and federal officials in order to assure that emergency personnel are available to respond should the situation become more serious. These situations, unless upgraded to a more severe Emergency Action Le 1, pose no harm to the public. The purpose of an offsite alert is to assure that emergency personnel are readily available to respond if n m 80
the situation becomes more serious or to perform con-firmatory radiation monitoring, if required. The alert EAL also provides offsite authorities with current status information, and can serve as possibla unscheduled tests of emergency control center activation. Only limited releases are expected te occur for the alert class. g Under this condition, BFS will notify the offsite response agencies of an alert, and depending on the accident severity may activate the TSC and the EOF and provide periodic station status, and dose measurements until closeout. If activated, the offsite agencies will man the nearsite EOF and provide confirmatory offsite radiation monitoring and will be prepared to recommend protective actions to the public. 4.1.3 Site Emergency This emergency action level includes those situa-tions for which it is necessary to mobilize plant, local, state and federal officials so emergency control centers can be manned, and personnel required for evacuation of nearsite areas are made available should the situation become more serious. Situations classified under the Site Emergency Action Level should also be those for which it may be necessary to provide early warning to the population within the Emergency Planning Zone so they may be in a state of readiness should the situation become more serious. Actions to be taken for the site emergency consist of manning control centers, dispatching monitoring teams, verifying that personnel required for evacuation of nearsite areas are at their duty stations, providing current information for and consultation with offsite O 81
authorities, informing the public, and requesting assis-r tance from federal response agencies such as Interagency b} Radio 1ogical Assistance Program. This event has the possibility of affecting the public health and would therefore require PS0 to quickly _ notify offsite agencie,s of a site emergency. If the situation provides an imminent hazard to the public, BFS will recommend activation of the early warning system to
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notify the public. All resources will be activated, including the TSC, EOF, and radiation nonitoring teams. Dose estimates will be performed from real time meteor-ology and releases. Press briefings and management personnel, along with off-shift personnel, will be called to duty. The recovery organization will be developed to begin station recovery operations. The offsite response agencies will man the EOF and assess the situation for taking adequate protective ac-tions. Additional offsite response personnel such as the National Guard may be detailed to perform non-radio-logical emergency activities. Milk, vegetables and soil samples may be taken and monitored by offsite personnel ,, for protective actions recommended. Out-of-state federal resources may be activated such as IRAP, who will perform dose analysis, and ARAC who will perform complex diffu-sion and transport estimates. All onsite and offsite assessment and protective , actions will be escalated or reduced as the situation requires until closeout of the emergency. 4.1.4 General Emergency This is the most severe of the four Emergency Action Levels. This Emergency Action Level includes those ( 82
l l l l situations for which it is necessary to notify station, local, state and Federal officials so they may take h predetermined protective actions, such as sheltering or , evacuation of the public, in order to minimize the poten-tial for radiological exposure to the public. For these situations it is also prudent to provide early warning to the-population within the Emergency Planning Zone so tLty may be ready to take protective action.
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N The purpose of the general emergency is to initiate immediate protective actions for the public, provide continuous assessment of information from the licensee and offsite measurements, initiate additional measures as indicated by event releases or potential releases, and provide current information for and consultation with offsite authorities and the public. Response and protective actions by both BFS and the offsite agencies for a general emergency will be the same h as that for a site emergency, but to a greater escalated extent. Additional manpower will be activated and more drastic protective actions will be implemented. 4.2 NOTIFICATION SCENARIOS This section will discuss the initial notification actions to be taken by BFS to alert the local, county and state emergency response authorities of an accident condition. The notification format will vary with the urgency of the emergency as established by the action levels discussed in Section 4.1. The following notifica-tion processes will address the protective actions that will be recommended by BFS and be implemented by the offsite authorities. O 83
The Oklahoma Civil Defense, in their agreement letter of March 13, 1980 has requested that a means be included to automatically alert a 24 hour manned location of any emergencies that fall under the emergency action levels. This would likely consist of an alerting device displayed in a county sheriff's dispatch center or in the _ OCD Emergency Operations Center which would be initiated by a station condition (s). Notification procedures would be written to require onsite and offsite contact within a \ set time from alarm actuation. As discussed in Section 3.2, the offsite notification may be by local telephone, NAWAS system or 'ay dedicated ties. This offsite alarm system would be designed to cover as many EAL classifica-tions as possible using the minimum number of station systems. 4.2.1 Notification of Unusual Event The notification process under this EAL is strictly a notification of an unusual event. Due to the common frequency of this condition and extreme unlikelihood of affecting the public, nothing more than a communication check with the offsite response agencies is necessary with a closeout. Upon recognition of an event which falls under the notification of unusual event classifications, the BFS on duty supervisor will either place or direct that a call be placed to the location of the automatically initiated offsite alarm or the OSDH-RPD as predetermined. The contact would be logged, and contacts and reports with the other designated response agencies made. A standby or closeout will then be communicated. Plant notification will consist of notifying person-nel responsible for station operations of a condition that is abnormal operation and to take any response action required. 84
4.2.2 Alert Classification Notification The alert classification may involve some offsite llh and onsite exposures to the public and station personnel and will require a somewhat more urgent conduct of noti-fication. Upon determining an alert condition at BFS, the on-duty shif t supervisor as above wl.1 either direct or
. place a call to the initiation location for the offsite alarm or the OSDH-RPD to notify them of the alert condition. BFS will transmit any information concerning the station condition and radiation releases as deter-mined by the station. Additional offsite communication will be made as determined by the established procedures or if adequate contact had not been previously made.
Under this condition, the EOF will be activated, if required, and offsite authorities be dispatched to the center. The remainint offsite response agencier will be contacted by ?he agencies first alerted by BFS. control centers are activated, further communications If the lll between DFS and offsite agencies will either be through the EOF or the TSC, whereby info rmation on station conditions, offsite releases and protective action recom- - mendations will be updated regularly. At basically the same time, the BFS shif t supervisor or the station manager will alert the station personnel to take any necessary protective actions. Inplant alarms will be the primary warning to station personnel with confirmation from the control room. 4.2.3 Site and General Emergency Classification Notification Both the site and general emergency classifications incur inplant and offsite conditions that can affect the public health due to potentially high radiation levels. O 85
Even though these conditions differ in the level of Os health effects that might be expected, each will have about the same urgency of notification to offsite authorities. Due to the potential severity of a site and general
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emergeacy, prompt notification is of extreme importance. Once it is learned that one of these two conditions g exist, the BFS onshift supervisor will be responsible for notifying the response authority manning the offsite alarm (See Section 4.2) to confirm an accident condition exists. Under all conditions of a general emergency and under most conditions of a site ev'rgency, the public early warning system will requiu- activation. The on-duty shift supervisor will briefly describe the conditions of the station and reconnend activation of the early warning system on that basis along with the immediately needed emergency p rc.tective actions. The C prerecorded broadcast messages will be selected depending on the protective actions to be taken by the public. The OSDH-RPD will be immediately notified of the condition and requested to respond. They will in turn notify the Oklahoma Civil Defense for support and proceed to BFS for conducting response activities at the EOF and for access to dose assessment capability. "he EOF will keep all offsite authorities updated on station condi-ticus and radiation releases. Other offsite agencies involved with protective actions and dose analyses within the ingestion exposure pathway EPZ will be called into action. At the station, all available personnel resources will be put into action to assure personnel protection from contamination in the station. Station communication 86 m _
will be used to notify personnel of all hazardous areas and assure that access control and personnel accounta-g bility are maintained. 4.3 PROTECTIVE ACTIONS The primary purpose of the BFS and state emergency plans are to best assure that employees and the public are protected against any radiological hazards. There-
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N fore, protective actions which are the heart of the plan, will be established for the area of concern. In the event of an accident at BFS, these protective actions will be primarily planned for within a ten mile radius from the site with secondary protective actions out to 50 miles. The basis for a protective action is to avoid or reduce the hazard to the public health when the benefits derived from such action are sufficient to offset any undesirable features of the protective action itself. There are no hard-set rules for acceptable dose to the public in an emergency whereby protective actions should or shoald not be taken and no dollar figure applied for public protection. The following discussions are made to represent the types and levels of protective actions that will be i /
- ' included in the future emergency plans to be prepared by BFS and the State of Oklahoma.
The EPA " Manual of Protective Action Guides and Protective Actions for Nuclear Incidents" (Reference 9) provides guidance on types of protective action options and their initiation during an accident at a nuclear power facility. The basis for the protective actions at BFS are derived from this document along with other published documents. Types of protective action options and the bases for initiation will be the same for all g 87
nuclear facilities, however, the actual initiation and implementation of protective actions will be site .nd state specific. 4.3.1 Protective Action Options Many protective action options or combinations of
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options exist that can be taken during an accident by the offsite response authorities. Included in these options s are evacuation, sheltering, populatien relocation, radio-iodine prophylaxis, food and water control and personal protection. Each protective action provides unique levels of protection, however, no one action can be applied to a specific release condition at all times. Table 4 provides the typical responsibilities of the offsite authorities and BFS for carrying out protective actions in the event of an emergeucy at 2FS. 4.3.1.1 Evacuation An orderly evacuation should consist of a well planned program to remove the public over specified road systems by personal or public transportation to a distance outside the affected area. The effectiveness of evacuation in limiting radia-tion dose is a function of the time required to evacuate. If a radioactive cloud is present, the dose will increase with the time of exposure; if the evacuation is completed before the cloud arrives, then evacuation is obviously 100 percent effective. Anything that delays an evacua-tion is therefore a constraint, and such constraints will be a function of the site conditions and planning. While evacuation may seem to be the protective action of choice following a nuclear incident at a fixed O V 88 1
nuclear facility, constraints associated with a specific g site could render the evacuation ineffective or unde-sirable such that other optional protective actions should be censidered. The planner must take into con-sideration all local constraints to determine whether or not evacuation is a viable protective action for the
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given situation. These considerations will be identified by performing evacuation time estimates for various site s specific constraints. The BFS evacuation time estimates are discussed in section 5.0 and in Appendix C. If the affected population is not completely removed prior to release and pt'tage of a radioactive plume, then some exposure will result to the public and therefore evacuation will not be completely effective. Effective-ness estimates of evacuation are expressed in terms of the dose reduction factor (DRF). This value for evacua-tion is the ratio of the dosages received during evacua-tion to that incurred in the open assuming no evacuation. 4.3.1.2 Sheltering Sheltering is the action of taking advantage of normally inhabited structures to reduce exposure from external radiation sources by utilizing the inherent radiation shielding from the structure itself. The local contraints on seeking shelter es a protec-tive action, such as time to take action, cost of taking the action, and societal considerations, intuitively tend to support taking such action since the cost in each case is relatively small. However, if one compares the effect of seeking shelter with some other action such as eva-ua-tion on the basis of dose savings, it may be concluded that evacuation will save a far greater dose than seeking shelter. Generally, shelter provided by dwellings with 89
= - . - - .
.: indows and doors closed and ventilation turned off would provide good - wection from inhalation of gases and vapors for a short period, but would be generally in-effective after about two hours due to natural ventila-tion of the shelter.
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Not every constraint can be evaluated using estab-lished scientific techniques; a certain amount of sub-g jective judgement must be made on the part of BFS and the response authorities. It is important that the decision makers be aware of the constraints associated with each action and that these contraints be balanced on whatever i basis possible in order to arrive at an effective decision. In a similar manner to the evacuation dose reduction factor, DRF's can be c.,1culated for shelters. This value is given by the ratio of the dosage received during ' shelter protection to that which would be received in the
- open.
t } Thi sheltering dose reduction factors are primarily 1 d'6 pendent on the shielding quality of different types of ' structures. Shielding factors for various structures are available for both airborne and surface deposited radionuclides '(Reference 12). 4.3.1.3 Population Relocation Population relocation is an actior, taker sometime after passage of the cloud of radioactive material to limit radiation axposure from ground contamination (Ref-erence 12). Before relocation, the exposure that indi-viduals receive from airborne and surface deposited radionuclides depends on the radiation shielding avail-able from the particular structure they are, inhabiting. 90
The tit ~ required ts implement a sheltering / popu-lation relocation strategy significantly influences the effectiveness of each of the response strategies dis-cussed. Ideally, shelter access by the public would be accomplished prior to the arrival of the ci ud of radio-active material. If this cannot be accomplished, the effectiveness (dose reduction) diminishes almost linearly with increasing outside exposure time. Radiation expo-N sure from radionuclides deposited on the ground and other eurfaces continues long after cloud passage and, in many instances, in a relatively short time results in a great-er dose than the dose from the other exposure pathways. Therefore, the time interval between the cloud passage and the public relocation is very important and should be minimized. The dose reduction facters for population relocation can be determined by combining the dose reduction factorr for sheltering plus evacuation. 4.3.1.4 Thyroid Prophylaxis The uptake of inhaled or ingested radioiodine by the thyroid gland may be reduced by the ingestion of stable ,- iodine. Potassium iodide as a prophylaxis (blocking agent) is only effective for exposures from radioiodine, and is administered before or shortly after the start <,f intake of radioiodine. Potassium iodide has been approved in quantities of 130 mg. for adults and 65 mg. for infants to be taken for 10 days to assure complete stable iodine uptake. For public usage it is difficult to distribute after an accident in the short amount of time required to be r completely effective. Additionally, potassium iodide cannot be maintained for long periods of time due to the 91
)
relatively short shelf life allowed for potassium iodide. Thyroid blocking agents do not block whole body exposures from other radionuclides and could give the public a false sense of radiation protection. Therefore, thyroid prophylaxis is ccasidered more useful for BFS personnel and offsite radiation response personnel. 4.3.1.5 Food, Water and Milk Control Control of contaminated or potentially contaminated s foodstuffs such as water and milk is applied to both the 10 mile and 50 mile emergency planning zones. The effort involved in taking protection actions on contaminated consumables is proportional to the amount of contami-nation observed. Foodstuffs exposed to airborne radioactive materials may become contaminated by deposition of radioiodine and radioactive particulates. To avoid populction exposure from ingestion of these foodstuffs, they should either be removed from consumption and substituted with noncon-l taminated foodstuffs or they should be decor.tamina ted. lae primary constraint on the disposal of foodstuffs will be the availability of adequate substitutes. If substitute foodstuffs are not available or the cost is high, then it may be necessary to implement decontamina-tion procedures. For protection beyond a few days where availability and cost constraints would be more critical, then decontamination may be even more cost effective. The primary means of decontamination would be through washing and peeling of fresh fruits and vegetables. Foodstocks, such as grains that are only mildiv contaminated may be stored until radiation has decayed to reduce exposure to a level safe for consumption. b 92
Animal foodstuffs, as cattle and poultry, can be protected by removing them from contaminated pasture and g placing them on stored feed. Planning for this type of action must be considered prior to an accident to assure that adequate stored feed is available and that there are personnel to carry out the feeding acticis in the amount of time necessary to prevent stock contamination. " To N
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prevent ingestion of contaminated milk in the event of an accident, certain protective actions are available such as removing cattle from pasture, diverting the milk to other uses as powdering it to (allowing the radioactivity to decay before ingestion), or by destroy-ing the milk and substituting uncontaminated milk. The milk will require monitoring for radioactive contamina-tion and checked at the processing location prior to further distribution. Milk producers in the affected area may be restricted from distributing milk until it has been monitored. If monitoring of all milk supplies g becomes constrained, monitoring efforts may be concen-trated on milk supplies where pasture and feed control had been implemented and on the fringes of the contam-inated area in order to allow distribution of uncontami- .. nated milk. Water may be contaminated either by direct releases of radionuclides to surface waters or by deposition from an atmospheric release. Reservoirs supplied by streams and lakes would be most affected by contaminated liquid effluents. Spring and well water should not be affected by an accidental release of radioactive material to the atmosphere or to waterways. The protective actions for water can be to prevent contamination, ta decontaminate *he water supply or to g l 93 I l
temporarily condemn the use of the water for consumption. Reservoirs receiving their supply from a stream or lake normally are filled through pumping and filtration stations which are controlled by operators. These stations could be shut off if the water supply becace contaminated. 4.3.1.6 Other Protective Response Actions s Access control may be required to restrict the public and/or BFS personnel from entering contaminated areas. This may include a complete or partial control of movement through or into a contaminated area. Access control whether on station personnel or the general public will be imposed in direct proportion to the ex-pected health hazard that would be experienced if access were allowed. Access control of BFS personnel within the station can be maintained by use of high radiation alarms, the stations public address system, and by interlocking doors. To limit public access within the plume exposure EPZ, however, requires sufficient manpower resources to cover ingress points, quick mobilization and centralized supervision. The manpower resources will be supplied through such organizations as the Highway Patrol (Department of Public Safety), County Sheriff's Offices, and the National Guard who have been previously trained to perform this type of emergency response function for other emergen-cies. Mobilization resources will be supplied by their respective organizations such as patrol cars and National Guard trucks. Supervisory capability will be given by the OSDH-RPD or the OCD to the ranking officers within the organizations who are performing access control d neasures. 94
Respiratory protection is effective against posures due to inhalation of particulates and radio-ex-g iodine. Respirators are primarily for radiation workers, however, these may be made available to the public under unique conditions where other means of protective action may be restricted. Available household articles, such as handkerchiefs and washcloths, will also provide some protection against particulate inhalation. Information
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5 for household aids will be supplied to the local public prior to operation of BFS in order that these actions can be taken without instructions during an emergency. 4.3.1.7 Host Counties After Evacuation In case of an accident at BFS where the affected public would be requasted to evacuate their residences, provisions would be necessary to supply temporary re-location facilities in host areas. These special arrangements will be made during the emergency response and preparedness planning prior to BFS operation. How-g ever, at this time the Oklahoma Civil Defense has coordinated similar efforts in their Crisis Relocation Planning (CRP) which would be implemented in case of nuclear attack. The Tulsa area has oeen considered a risk area for nuclear attack, therefore, the OCD, in establishing the CRP, has contacted neighboring counties to act as host areas for providing food and lodging facilities. Spec-ific towns in each of the counties are designated as the reception or host locations for that county. Rogers, Mayes and Wagoner Counties have each been designated as a host-county with each of the host towns outside the plume exposure EPZ. In addition, several other counties sur- l rounding these three counties have also been designated l as being host counties for accepting evacuated persons. g l l 95 l l l l
The number of evacuees from the BFS plume exposure EPZ could be easily provided for within the total provisions of the Tulsa CRP. Provisions have been t. ranged for coordination of Reception and Care Services and Resource / Supply Services
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with each of the host towns through their city managers or mayors. Coordination of these two services include s housing or shelter, and food and supply provisions. Law enforcement, haalth and medical, and rescue service have, also been provided for in the planning. 4.3.2 Protectivc Action Initiations Initiating protective actions for the general public and station personnel in the event of an accident will depend on various factors. Such factors include the determination of the emergency action level (source terms), the wind direction, the characteristics of the b plume travel, the :esponse time allowed by the sccident, the weather conditions, the population at risk and the manpower available to implement protective actions. All of these combined will enter into the decision making process as to the most effective means of reducing ex- , posure to individuals, communities, and in many instan-ces, farm animals . l i l The protective action that vill be taken at any given time will be the action best determined by the response agencies involved using their knowledge and expertise of the response personnel and using the j emergency situatioc. I Protective action initiation scenarios may be deter-mined for a combination of different variables for each type of exposure pathway. The exposure pathways to be considered are direct exposure and ingestion exposure. U i 96 i
Table 5 provides t.he recommended initiations for protective actions to be taken at nuclear facilities (Reference 9). 4.3.2.1 Direct Exposure From a Confined Inplant Source Direct exposure from an inplent source is oaly a hazard to personnel in the area of the source and will be protected by provisions established within or around the N facility. 2 A high radiation level in a particular building will be generally detected by high radiation alarms for that specific area and will alert all personnel in that crea along with reactor operators within the control room. Personnel upon being alerted will take action t. remove themselves if posaible. At the same time, health physics teams will be dispatched to the hazardous area for back no stonito ring , personnel accountability and aid in the removal of injured persons, if necessary. Protective c20 thing and respirators will be supplied to team person-nel. Access into a high exposure area will be limited to removal of injured personnel and to secure plant control. Radiation levels of surrounding rooms and buildings will be monitored for additional personnel protection and access control. If the inplant source causes an excessively high exposure rate for a large portion of the facility, then a local or station evacuation may be required. If this occurs, nonessential personnel will be moved offsite and the remaining personnel will report to the BFS Onsite Operational Support Center (OSC) for emergency duty. Other off-duty personnel will also report to the OSC for duty. Removal or isolation of the source would be con-ducted as soon as possible to mitigate further exposure to plant areas. 97
For personnel that would have to reenter contamina-ted areas, personnel exposure time limitations would be conducted to reduce the individuals' total exposure. This would depend on the exposure field, the available personnel to perform the job and the allowable exposure that an individual could receive. The time phasing would be performed to reouce each individual's total exposure by allowing as many individuals to perform the job as possible.
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N 4.3.2.2 Direct and Inhalation Exposure from Airborne Plume For the purposes of this report, direct exposure and inhalation exposure from an airborne plume will be con-sidered together since the initiation of protective actions will not differ substantially between the two. A radioactive plume will normally consist of both gaseous and particult.te material contributing to a whole 0' body dose v (direct exposure) and an inhalation dose. The primary contributor to a whole body dose will be the gamma emitting radionuclides in the plume while the primary inhalation dose will be from those plume con-stituents that the body may uptake .. particulates. as radioiodines and An airborne radioactive plume will be the initial concern for the public health after a release of radia-tion from BFS in the event of a major accident. This will also likely provide the highest dose in the shortest time due to both inhalation and whole body exposures. Protective action response time for plume exposure is of prime importance. Initiating protective actions can be determined by either actual releases or projected releases considering O m 98 I
the plant condition. During an actual release, less time is available to the emergency response authorities to conduct protective actions and is therefore, less de-sirable to wait for an actual release if it can be reasonably projected that a major release will occur. Doses and time to release of various core melt accidents have been addressed by WASH-1400 (Reference 13) and will be included along with other lesser a ccir' ints for pro-
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s jecting source terms for health effects from BFS. In the event of a major accident at BFS with the advent of a radioactive plume being oispersed to the environment, it is important to take the proper steps to protect the public health. It will be the responsibility of BFS to contact the offsite response agencies and then determine what specific actions should 'm taken. If the plume is or may be highly contaminated where doses would approach or exceed the EPA Protective Action Guides (PAG's), the initial reaction will be to evacuate the public and maintain access control. If time allows, this will be the action taken by the offsite response author-ities as recommended by BFS. 4= If it is believed that the plume will be short lived and arrive during the onset of evacuation, then it will l be more advantageous to tacommend sheltering with reloca-l l tion after the plume passage. Both actual and projected releases can be used to perform offsite dose estimates at the BFS ECF as discussed in Section 3.1.2. l If plume dose estimates are not substantial enough to require evacuation, but are high enough to require some type of protective action, then sheltering would be l the likely response action to be recommended. Actions l
- can then be escalated or reduced as determined by BFS and 1
the offsite authorities. l l 99
Table 5 recommends protective actions to be taken for whole body and inhalation doses from an airborne plume as recommended by the EPA (Reference 9). This guide will basically be followed for protective action response, however, protective actions may be initiated at a lower projected dose than recommended by Table 5. The Oklahoma Radioldgical Emergency Response Plan will follow guidelines for protective action doses as recommended by the EPA. s 4.3.2.3 Direct Exposure From Ground Contamination After passage of the plume and the initial quick radiation exposure has occurred af ter an accident, it is expected that some of the particulates and solubles vill be deposited within the immediately surrounding environ-ment. Higher exposures could be expected due so deposi-tion than from the plume given the longer time that a person may be exposed to contamination. Therefore, certain protective actions must be taken to reduce the long term dose to the public from deposition. Seposition is difficult to predict due to the nature 3 the particulates involved and the atmospheric condi-tions upon release. Deposition can occur by either dry or wet deposition whereby, the percentage of deposition will vary under various conditions and is not necessarily less at greater distances from the nuclear facility. The only sure waf to know what protective actions should be taken for the public from ground contaiaination is to monitor various areas for exposure. If the resulting depositional dose rates are high due primarily to short lived radionuclides, such as iodines, then temporary relocation of the public with resulting decontamination of roads and buildings would be 100
conducted to a level that the exposures would not be a health hazard to the public. Thereafter, sheltering 9 could be recommended to further reduce exposure doses. < If the public were not evacuated, but only sheltered during plume passage, the exposure from dep,sition may
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cause some long term health hazard. The primacy protec-tive action would be to decontaminate and recommend s further sheltering. i In the event of an sxtremely high ground contamina-tion, temporary relocation, sheltering or decontamination efforts would likely be ineffective. In this case property interdiction would be enacted until sufficient isotopic decay has occurred to reduce the contamination to an acceptable level. This action would be extremely unlikely and would be conducted only as a last resort. 4.3.2.4 Ingestion Exposure From Water, Milk, and Foodstuffs Contamination The same depositional contamination for direct public exposares may also enter the food chains to provide an additional ingestion exposura. Radionuclides such as the io:ines and strontiums will concentrate in the foodchain. It is therefore important to analy c food chain products for contamination. In addition, since the smaller amounts of , deposited contamination may cause eventual higher doses due to uptake, the radiation levels in the ingestion exposure EPZ will require monitering and protective action. Prior to BFS operation, and periodically throughout operation, a listing of all dairies, commercial crops .ind beef cattle operation _s will be identified in the plume exposure EPZ for reference in the event of an accident at BFS. Similar major operations will be also identified 101
within the ingestion expo:sure EPZ. This listing will allow BFS and the state te quickly recognize the probable contributors to an ingestion exposure. BFS will acquire periodic milk, vegetable, water and meat samples to deteimine background radiation levels from the neigh-boring areas. In the event of an accident with minor radioactive
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N releases, the food chain in the plume exposure EPZ will be the primary area to analyze for contamination. The Oklahoma Department of Agriculture and the Oklahoma State Department of Health, Consumer Protectior. Service will acquire various food chain samples for analysis under the directica of the OSDH-RPD. If samples indicate that J protective actions are r.ecessary, then actions such as placing cattle on stored feed and scrubbing vegetables and fruic products will be performed prior to shipping to a cannery. Subsequent monitoring of decontaminated products would be required. The owners of individual gardens and livestock will be warned against inadvertent consumption without some type of protection. Major water , supplies during a minor release will not be significantly contaminated to require any protective action. Larger releases with more significant. ground deposi-tion aut?matically reouires mcre analyses over a wide-sprer.d area. Normal manpower and laboratory capability will be excessively strained and would require outside aid. Nearby dairies and farms would be required to retain products for processing until thorough analysis is performed. If significant contamination is prasent the l products would need to be destroyed to avoid public consumption. Livestock would be placed on stored feed or l monitored and released for offsite shipment if radiation , levels were safe for human consumption. Protection O l [ 102
actions for the more distant and less contaminated areas would be conducted similarly for the minor releases dis-cusred above. Water supplies under this condition (i.e., Verdigris River) may become significantly contamir.ated to require a tempora ry halt to pumping at the treatment facility intakes. Alternate supplies and bottled water would need
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s to be provided to chat portion of the public without municipal water. Ground water supplies generally would not be affected. Once the contamination is diluted, normal water supplies would resume. 4.3.3 Public Education The educating of the public within the plume exposure EPZ prior to a potential radiological concern at BFS is also of prime importance. If proper actions are not being taken by che public as directed then radio-logical exposure may be increased instead of reduced. Educational assistance on taking protective action in the event of an emergency for the general public involves discrete postings, mailouts, and public meet-ings. The public will be previously informed of actions to be taken when directed. Sheltering will include such actions as closing windows, reducing air flow in homes, moving to better available sheltered areas at the resi-dence en basem-ots and storm cellars. For evacuation the public will be previously informed on what items te take, maps on evacuation routes, where to ge after leaving, and generally available household items that may reduce exposure. This type of information does not require person to person conveyance and can be easily provided through periodic informe, tion distribution. O 103
The majority of the general public will be able to take protective actions to protect themselves without any special outside aid. This includes all persons who have standard communication equipment (televisicas, radios, telephones, etc.), transportation means (cars, trucks and or possibly tractors) and are not physically or mentally handicapped. A small percentage of the public will, however, require special attention due to either a lack of recog-nition of an emergency, receipt of adequate protective action instruction, or being able to take the recommended protective action. Included in this group will be handi-capped persons (blind, deaf, bedridden) special commun-ities (Hennonites), and transients (campers, visitors). Individuals or groups who will require special considera-tion within the plume exposure EPZ will be identified during the development of the BFS emergency response plans. Each one of these special conditions will require separate attention depending on location and the specific limitation. Individuals who are limited by transporta-tion will be coordinated with others in the area or separate transportation will be acquired. Instructional l limitations will be provided by postings or face-to-face contact with informed individuals. Handicapped persons l or institutions with handicaps will be given individual attention to provide whatever steps are necessary to mitigate the limitation. 4.3.4 Emergency Response Training The ability to respond to an accident at a nuclear power station or any other location not only requires the resources for responding, but, also the knowledge of how O 104 I
to use them and how to respond. This knowledge will come primarily from training and experience. In order to respond to an accident at BFS both station personnel and offsite response authorities must have adequate training in order to provide an effective response program. This section will discuss the basic types of emergency training that will be conducted in order to respond in the event of an accident at BFS. 4.3.4.1 Training For Offsite Authorities Radiological - All members of the OSDH-RPD and the OCD who will have the responsibility for emergency pre-paredness at BFS will maintain training for use of survey meters for determining gross radiation levels or dose rates. Members of the OSDH-RPD will be trained in the use of instrumentation for speci fic radiological analyses. All OSDH-RPD laboratory personnel will be periodically tested on performing isotopic analysis of water, milk, tissue and soi.:. samples. Local and county h level authorites will only be trained for the use of general survey meters. Members of the OSDH-RPD and the OSDH-CPS will be checked against sampling procedures for radiological l analysis. 1 All local state and county authorities who will likely be involved in the plume exposure EPZ will be trained to use and read personal dosimeters. Medical Aid - Offsite emergency response authorities will be trained in basic first aid, CPR and rescue opera-tions for both radiological and non-radiological incidents. 9 105 [
Specialized training and procedures will be provided for medical support groups such as hospital personnel and emergency transport personnel in order to handle radia-tion related injurica to BFS personnel. Protective Actions - Training for recognizing the need for protective actions and carrying out protective actions will be provided to offsite response authorities. They will be trained to use the resources provided in the BFS EOF. The extent of trsining will depend on the protective at'. ion functions that will be carried out as 1.isted in Table 4. Training for protective action initiations will be primarily provided for the OSDH-RPD and the OCD. How-ever, similar training will be provided to the Sheriff's Departments, County Civil Defense Directors and Inola Police Department for special conditions as conducting immediate evacuation of the plume exposure EPZ without having the OSDH-RPD or OCD direction. 4.3.4.2 BFS Personnel Training For Emergency Response BES personnel will be trained for both onsite and offsite emergency response activities. Training For Onsite Actions - Training of BFS personnel onsite will include adherence to evacuation procedures, radiological monitoring procedures, rescue and first aid operations, protective actions and plant recovery procedures. This training will provide them the basic ability to recognize and act during an emergency to assure theirs and others safety. Personnel who will be required to provide more technical emergency response actions will be trained for more specific duties as operations of specialized radiological instrumentation, O 106
providing radiciogical emergency aid, fire protection, and operation of the emergency control centers. The emergency control centers personnel will require continued training to assure proper activation and operation. This will include access to and operation of the computer for dose assessment, communications with local authorities and the NRC, knowledge of emergency action levels, understanding of SPDS operation and gener-al conduct of the BFS emergency response plan. Training for Offsite Actions - The primary training of BFS personnel for offsite emergency response will be for radiological dose assessment within the plume expos-ure EPZ. This will consist of performing dose assessment using portable instrumentation. 4.3.5 Offsite Emergency Medical Support In the event that an accident were to occur at BFS which caused inj ury with radiological contamination to station personnel or possibly the public, then special-ized offsite medical aid would be required. This aid would be supplied by neighboring hospitals which have been previously trained and facilitated to handle such a condition. Section 2.4.3 mentions two Tulsa hospitals which will consider providing such emergency medical services for BFS. Minor radiological contamination without injury will be treated at BFS as discussed in Section 3.1.4. For contaminated injuries beyond this, the BFS first aid room will primarily act as a stabill:ation and preparation area for transport to offsite medical facilities. 9 107
Transportation of the contaminated person (s)
.(Section 3.1.4) will require that a BFS health physics technician accompany him with his available medical records and account of the injury. The he oital(s) which will be receiving the injured persan(s) will be contacted by BFS to prepare staffing.
for ad.nittance and appropriate Twenty-four hour on call capability will be provided by the hospitals. Contaminated individuals will be taken directly into a special decontamination area where the external decon-i tamination and the simple internal (wounds) decontsm- ! ination will be perfo rmed. Trained ht, spital personnel will perform decontamination tasks to thereby reduce any exposure to physicians and nurses who will be performing medical treatment. Radiation monitoring instrumentation will be available for identifying and t accomplishing decontamination. An area will also be i.vailable to check potential ccetamination transmitted to the hospf tal staff and a change area to reduce spread of contamination to other parts of the hospital. Following the above procedures these patients can now be medically treated as other in patients with the exception that any treatment will be considered given the internal radiation exposure received. The hospitals may also have the capability to determine radiation dose evaluation from biological analyses. This could include the ability to perform dose analyses by hemotological etwparison, excretory evaluation, tissue analyses, mucous analyses and eventual chromosomal analyses. Provisions for this type of medical treatment will be established by hospital procedures and training prior to operation of BFS. O 9 108
5.0 POPULATION PROJECTIONS AND EVACUATION TIME ESTIMATES g In support of the efforts for emergency response pl.anning and preparedness for future planning, PS0 has developed population projections and evacuation time estimates (ETE). The ev.cuation time estimates were prepared to determine the length of time necessary for the public to prepare and execute an evacuation from the plume exposure EPZ around BFS. These estimates were based on available demographic and geographic conditions existing around BFS in the pre-construction stage. Therefore, an accurate baseline population location and density was considered necessary to prepare evacuation time estimates for the plume exposure EPZ. Both the population projections and the ETE's for tLe ten-mile radius around BFS were performed by a re-search group at Oklahoma State University as discussed in Appendices B and C. Oklahoma State University was chosen g to perform the population projections due to their estab-lished expertise in growth and development analysis. Their previous development of a program called the Second Century Proj ect focused on projecting industrial and economic growth patterns in Oklahoma. The University's professional staff provided a technical basis for pre-paration of the evacuation time estimates. 5.1 POPULATION PROJECTIONS Prior to preparing the projections the existing population data base was determined by PS0 in a survey of the ent.re plume exposure EPZ for BFS. A ten man PS0 team was organized including a team leader to survey the twelve-mile radius around BFS to assure that all popula-tion characteristics just beyond the ten-mile radius created no reccy.izable problems. O 109
The team members were briefed on the type of information that needed to be collected by each member during their survey. The data t.-ken during the survey included pinpointing of residences, description of type of residence, identification of churches, schools, businesses &nd other public use structures, road networks and traffic control information. Survey form utilizing a square mile area were used by each member to collect their data and identify its location as shown on Figure B-1 of Appendix B. To aid the members in their survey, an entire USGS topographical map of the survey area was prepared and portions assigned to each member of the team. Besides the topographical map they were given access to county road maps and a recent set of aerial photos of the survey area. The aerial photos were taken in December 1979 specifically for this purpose. The approximate scale was one inch equals 400 feet and mach photo provided a four square mile area on a 42" x 42" map. Each survey sheet was verified using the aerial photos to assure no resi-dences had been overlooked. Upon completion of the survey a matrix of the popu-lation results broken into 1/2 mile squares (quarter sections) was plotted for the 12-mile radius. Since only the residences were counted and not the actual persons, an occupancy rate had to be applied to each household to obtain a total population. In 1976, PSO conducted a similar survey of all rural residences for dairy operations in the 5-mile radius around BFS which included the number of occupants of each household. Using this survey, an average rate of 4.2 persons / household was estimated for this type of resi-dence. The 4.2 persons / household therefore, were applied 110
to all residences within the 12-mile radin including apartments and trailers. It should be recognized that the 4.2 occupancy rate may be typical for rural areas but is quite high for average over-all households and there-fore provides a conservative population density for this study. The population density matrix, a complete set of aerial photographs and a set of all of the field survey data sheets were provided to Oklahoma State University warning system is being assumed. Confirmation times were provided on a qualitative basis. The growth rate projections were determined by standard growth estimates for this area of the state, however, certain special factors were included in the estimates such as the migrational growth effects of suburban Tulsa, along with BFS itself and its economic inducements. Tne results of the population projections are shown in Appendi:. B, Tables B-1 through B-4. 5.2 EVACUATION TIME ESTIMATES The evacuation time estimates (ETE) for BFS are specifically discussed in Appendix C. The estimates included at minimum the requirements of the NRC Decem-ber 26, 1979, letter " Request for Information Regarding Evacuation Times" (See Appendix E). Besides the fair weather and severe weather conditions required by the NRC's letter, time of day and day of week (incident-time-of-occurrence) conditions were investigated. In addi-tion, ETE's were provided a broader base for simulating actual conditions. O 111
In order to provide accurate evacuation time esti-mates, the speciff c characteristics within the plume exposure EPZ needs to be identified. As a part of the population survey performed by PSO in February 1980, the existing road conditions, traffic control measures, churches, businesses, inatitutions and any other particu-lars that might affect an evacuation were identified. A computer model was developed by Oklahoma State University to calculate the total and sectional evacuation times. The program iacluded mobilization time, local road travel time and primary road travel time. The time for notifica-tion was not considered in the program since an early warning system is being assumed. Confirmation times were provided on a qualitative basis. The results of the evacuution times estimates for the four incident-time-of-occurrences using normal and adverse weather conditions is shown on Table C-16 of O V Appendix C. The evacuation time estimates for the year 1980 through 2020 are shown on Table C-17. j The evacuation time estimates have been reviewed and approved by the Oklahoma Civil Defense. During the early stages of development of the ETE's, the OCD was appraised and attended meetings where the programming and method-ology was explained. On September 15, 1980 PS0 and Oklahoma State University met in the OCD offices to review the results of the estimates. The nighttime normal and nighttime abnormal weather conditions for the entire plume exposure EPZ were the primary times reviewed. The sector and projected ETE' s were also discussed but to a lesser extent. An October 1, 1980 letter from the OCD approving these estimates is attached in Appendix E. O 112
6.0 REFERENCES
- 1. " Planning Basis for the Development of State and Local Govern-ment Radiological Emergency Response Plans in Support of Light Water Nuclear Power Plants", a Report prepared by a U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission and U.S. Environmental Protec-tion Agency Task Force on Emergency Planning, Report NUREG-0396, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, D.C. (December, 1978).
- 2. "Draf t Emergency Action Level Guidelines for Nuclear Power Plants", NUREG-0610, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, D.C.
(September, 1979).
- 3. " Proposed Rule on Emergency Planning", Federal Register Notice of December 19, 1979 (Vol. 44, No. 245).
- 4. " Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power Plants", Report NUREG-0654, FEMA-REP-1, (Revision 1) U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Federal Emergency Management Agency, Washington, D.C.
(November, 1980).
- 5. " Outdoor Warning Systems Guide", Publication CPG 117, Federal Emergency Mansgement Agency, Washington, D.C. (March, 1980).
- 6. " Instrumentation for Light-Water-Cooled Nuclear Power Plants to Assess Plant Conditions During and Following an Accident",
Hegulatory Guide 1.97 (Revision 2) (December, 1979).
- 7. "Onsite Meteorological Programs", Regulatory Guide 1.23 ,
(Februa ry, 1972).
- 8. " Emergency Planning", Section 13.3, Standard Review Plan, Report NUREG-75/087 (Navember 24, 1975); also nee Appendix A l to Section 13.3.
i 9. " Manual of Protective Action Guides and Protective Actions for l Nuclear Incidents", Report EPA-520/1-75-001 (September, 1975). l
- 10. " Evacuation and Sheltering as Protective Actions Against Nuclear Accidents Involving Gaseous Releases", Protective Action Evaluation Part II, EPA 520/1-78-001B, U.S. Environ-mental Protection Agency (April, 1978).
- 11. "The Effectiveness of Sheltering as a Protective Action Against Nuclear Accidents Involving Releases", Protective Action Evaluation Part I, EPA 520/1-78-001A, U.S. Environ-mental Protection Agency (April, 1978).
- 12. "Public Protection Strategies for Potential Nuclear Reactor Accidents: Sheltering Concepts with Existing Public and lll 113
Private Structures", SAND 77-1725, D.C. Aldrich, D.M. Ericson () and J.D. Johnson, Sandia Labs (February, 1978).
- 13. " Reactor Sufety Study - An Assessment of Accident Risks in i
U.S. Commercial Nuclear Power Plants", Report WASH-1400 (NUREG-75/014) (October, 1975).
- 14. " Clarification of NRC Requirements for Emergency Response Facilities at Each Site"; Letter from NRC (D. Eisenhut) to all Power Reactor Licensees,.1pril 25, 1980.
- 15. " Functional Criteria for Emergency Response Facilities", Final Report, NUREG-0696, U.S. NRC (February, 1981).
I 16. " Emergency Planning"; Final Regulations, 10CFR50 Federal Register, Vol. 45, No. 162, August 19, 1980. r 1 C) i s. O O 114 i i
TABLE 1 LISTING OF OKLAHOMA AGENCIES RECEIVING NOTIFICATION OF EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLANNING Primary Response Agencies e Oklahoma State Department of Health e Mayes County Sheriff Radiological Protection Division e Rogers County Civil Defense e Oklahoma Civil Defense e Wagoner County Civil Defense e Oklahoma Department of Public Safety e Mayes County Civil Defense e Rogers County Sheriff e Inola Police Chief e Wagoner County Sheriff Secondary Interested Agencies (for Information Only) e Governor's Office e Oklahoma Department of Agriculture O e Rogers County Commissioners (3) e U.S. Representative, District 2 e Wagoner County Commissioners (3) e State Senator, District 2 e Mayes County Commissioners (3) e State Senator, District 3 e Rogers County Health Department e State Representative, District 12 e Wagoner County Health Department e State Representative, District 8 e Mayes County Health Department e State Representative, District 9 e Inola Civil Defense e Mayor of Inola e City of Wagoner Civil Defense e Mayor of Tulsa e Tulsa County Civil Defense e Mayor of Broken Arrow e Broken Arrow Civil Defense e Mayor of Claremore e City of Catoosa Civil Defense e Mayor of Catoosa 1 e Tulsa City / County Health Department e Mayor of Coweta ! e Broken Arrow Police Department e Mayor of Chouteau l e Oklahoma State Department of Health- e Mayor of Wagoner Milk Sanitation Division e Broken Arrow City Manager e Oklahoma National Guard e Wagoner City Superintendent l l l l l 9 l 115
TABLE 2 ATTENDEES OF THE EMERGENCY RESPONSE PREPAREDNESS PRESENTATIONS APRIL 17-18, 1980 Rogers County - April 17th - 9:30 a.m. ATTENDEES REPRESENTING T.L. Riggs Mayor of Inola (Police Chief) Lynn Brown Rogers County Health Department Franklin Everytt Oklahoma Highway Patrol Denny Lindley Oklahoma Highway Patrol Pau' Clark Department of Public Safety J.C. Conkle Oklahoma Civil Defense Hayden Haynes Oklahoma Civil Defense Pete Reed Governor's Office Fritz Freeman Rogers County Sheriff's Department John Miller Public Service of Oklahoma Bob Campbell Public Service of Oklahoma Dale McHard OSDH-Radiation Protection Division Elmer McGuire Rogers County Commissioner Dist. #3 Erwin Burchette Rogers County Civil Defense Dale E. Martin Oklahoma Army National Guard John W. Coleman Oklahoma Army National Guard J.L. Rhodes Robert A. Wilson
. Oklahoma Army National Guard Oklahoma Army National Guara lll Keith Owens Tulsa County Civil Defense Steve Bennett (Presentor) Public Service Company of Oklahoma Wagoner County - April 17th - 2:30 p.m.
4-Spuddy Wright Wagoner County Special Police E.E. " Buck" Pratt Wagoner City Civil Defense Max Cole Wagoner County Civil Defense Dale McHard OSDH-RPD Charles Matlock Oklahoma National Guard Virginia Lindsey Wagoner County Health Department Phil Simpson Wagoner County Sheriff's Department Hayden Haynes Oklahoaa Civil Defense Paul Hagle Oklahoma State University Steve Bennett (Presentor) Public Service Company of Oklahoma O 116
e TABLE 2 (Cont'd) (} Ma'yes County April 18th 10:00 a.m. ATTENDEES REPRESENTING Chief Jordon Mayor of Pryor , Hayden Haynes Oklahoma Civil Defense John Baumert Mayes County Civil Defense Dale McHard OSDH-RPD Dan Rackley OSDH-Milk Sanitatioa Division Mary Jean Sell Pryor Daily Times Bob Pierson Lilahoma National Guard Michael Wheat tryor Jeffersonian Keith Owens Tulsa County Civil Defense Al Boyer Mayes County Sheriff's i Department Bill Moon Pryor Police Department Wiley J. Buckwater Pryor Police Department Steve Bennett (Presentor) Public Service Company of Oklahoma 1 I I ea 117
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- - ~ - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -- - - - --- -- -
O O o Table 3 Emergency Response Facilities Activation Occupants Habitability function Data Dis 91ay Location Rec;uired? ln Charge Member Skills Center Utility Operational Plant Complete, Hide Accident Car. trol In Plant No operations
& Technical Control SPDS Spectrum (SRP 6.4 Roca Supervisor Variable with NUREG-0660)
NRC (1) Reporting No Mone olant 25 Operational Operational Should be j Yes, Alert Sitt ,
& Technical Location for Requirement Support near En.argency and Official j
,I Support Operating Support Center Control Gcr.eral Emer- Personnel j gency Class Personnel OSC) Room Engineering Accident Direct display TSC will be sane !
Techr.ical Should be Yes. Alert, Site, Senior 25 of plant safety as Centrol Racn 1 (including & Senior Assessment by Suppcet near Control Emergency and General Emer-Plant Official 5 NRC) Plant Operations system parame+.ers, call-up display except for siste.n lll redundancy aad safety i l y tenter Management Engineers; Support (TSC) F.oom gency Class to Control Room of radiological class design 'l I
- L During Accidents parameters, SPOS
- 1. Overall Manage- Direct display of Shielding for 0.5 PaV Recovery 10 NRC, Corporate Gaumas HVAC HEPA fil-Emerger.cy One mile Yes, for Site fianagudent, ment of Utility radiological and Oparations E;1F cf Emergency or fianager 20 Utility meteorlogical ters (no charccal)
General Emer- 5 State & Radiological Resources, no safety class design; Facility EFS Local Accident 2. Analysis for parameters (EOF) gency Class offsite action Stinimum Assessment Occupancy decisions Provided 3. Briefing loca-for 53 tion for offsite Persons officials & press pools , Revised from Reference 14. e
TABLE 4 0FFSITE EMERGENCY RESPONSIBILITIES RADIATION MONITORING - OSDH-RPD, IRAP, OCD, Neighboring State Aid, BFS COMMUNICATIONS ASSISTANCE - OSDH-RPD, OCD, DPS, County Sheriffs, BFS 4
! ACCESS CCNTRCL - OCD, DPS, County Sheriffs, Inola Police Department, National Guard I
INITIATING EVACUATION & OTHER PROTECTIVE ACTIONS - 4 OSDH-RPD, OCD, County Sheriffs, (Oklahom: Governor, County Government, Inola Mayor) i PUBLIC INF0_KMATION MEDIA CONTACT - OSDH-RPD, i OCD, Governor, BFS i H ,I k I PROPERTY & PUBLIC PROTECTION - County Sheriffs, Inola Police Department, DPS EMERGENCY TRANSPORTATION - National Guard, i DPS, Oklahoma DOT, Hospitals, BFS - RECOVERY - OSDH-RPD, OCD, BFS (Governor of Okla- ,, homa, County Government, Inols Mayor) l OSDH-RPD -- Oklahoma State Department of Health Radiation Protection . Div. ! OCD -- Oklahoma Civil Defense i DPS -- Department of Public Safety OSDH-CPS -- Oklahoma State Dept. of Health-Consumer Protection Services OSDA -- Oklahoma State Department of Agriculture DOT -- Department of Transportation IRAP -- Interagency Radiological Assistance Plan BFS -- Black Fox Station O 119
O O- - O TABLE 5 RECONMENDED INITIATION OF PROTECTIVE ACTIONS Projected Dose (Rem) to the Population Recomend(d Actions Comments l Whole body < 1 *No protective action required. Previously recommended l
- State may issue an advisory to seek shelter and await Protective actic,ns may Thyroid <5 further instructions or to voluntarily evacuate. be reconsidered or l
- Monitor environmental radiation levels, terminated.
Whole body 1 to
- 5
- Seek shelter and wait further instructions.
' Consider evacuation particularly for children and Thyroid 5 to< 25 pregnant women.
*Mor.itor enviror. mental radiation levels, g
- Control Access
-- l E
Whole Ndy 5 and above Conduct Mandatory evacuation of populatforis in the Seeking shelter would predetermined area. be an alternative if Thyroid 25 and atcve
- Monitor environmental radiation levels and ,1djust area evacuation were not for mandatory evacuation based on these levels. imediately possible.
' Control access.
Projected Dose (Rem) to Emergency Team Workers Whole body 25 *Ccatrol exposure of tweegency team members to these Although respirators levels except for- livesaving missions. (Apprcpriate and stable iodine should Thyroid 125 controls for emergency workers, include time limita- be used where effective tions, respirators, and stable iodine.) to control dose to emer-gency team workers, thy-roid dose may not be a
- Control exposure of emergercy team members performing limiting factor for Whole body 75 lifesaving missions to this level. (Control of time lifesaving missions.
of eyv>sure will be most effective.)
. . ~
Revised from Reference 9
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Requested Agreement Letters of I Response Agencies ar,i Notified I of Scheduled Emergency Response Meetings Invited all Interested ___.___________ _______________- L-+ Agencies of Scheduled February 7, 1980 (OSDH-RPD) eWs Februery 28, 1980 (OCD) _______________--__---- April 4, 1980 (DPS) April 7, 1980 (Others) April 7, 1980 1 O l l l l l V + .. Conducted Emergency Response Planning Meetings in three l County Areas April 17, 1980 (AM) - Rogers County April 17, 1980 (PM) - Wagoner County April 18, 1980 (AM) - Mayes County l l l l V Received Agreement Letters from Response Agencies Agreement Letter Flow Chart O (Dates - See Appendix A) FIGURE 3 123
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.f APPENDIX A t
Agreement Letters With Emergency Response Authorities 'l 1 i l l I l l l l i O i
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i 1 TABLE OF CONTESTS i
)
Page j ' Oklahoma State Department of Health-Radiological Protection Division . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A-1 i Oklahoma Civil Defense . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A-5 , Department of Public Safety. .. . . .. . . . . .. . .. , A-6 Rogers County Sheriff's Office . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . A-8 i i Wagoner County Sheriff's Office. . .. . . . . .. . . . . . A-9 t Mayes County Sheriff's Office. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A-10 Rogers County Civil Defense Director . . . . . . . . . . . . A-12 Wagoner County Civil Defense Director. . . . . . . . . . . . A-13 1 Mayes County Civil Defense . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A-14 i i Inola Police Department. . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . A-15 St. Francis Hospital . . . . .. . .. . . . . . . . . . . . A-16 Hillcrest Hospital . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . .. . A-17 ( i L
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ManotD A TOAL ascastaa, JOAN K. LE AVITT, M.D. AaACE SvRD. M D OMAS DO8esCA, M O f / DwA40 M FrTE. JR_. M D [M
==
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& @pf cWda 1000 Northeast 10th Street Post Office Bos 53551 Oklanoma Ci*y. Oxlanoma 73152 February 25, 1980 Vaughn L. Conrad Manager, Licensing and Compliance Public Service Company of OklaMma P.O. Box 201 Tulsa, Oklahoma 74102
Dear Mr. Conrad:
With roference to your request dated February 7,1980, and the lette- dated October 23, 1979 from the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Com-mission (NRC) to Public Service Company (PS0) requesting certain activi-ties and submission of inforeation on an accelerated basis, this letter is to advise you of this department's responsibilities and present and future activities with respect to evergency response planning. O'
~ This department has been dasignated as tne official agency of the State of Oklahema for all activities pertaining to atomic energy and the use of sources of radiation (63 0.S.1971, Section 1-150S(a)).
i In addition, in 1975, then-Governor Boren designated the Occupational and Radiological Health Service of this department as having the primary responsibility and authority for radiological emergency response planning (copy of Boren letter attacbed). As you are aware, the radiological emergency response plan for Oklahoma is in draft form at this time; we fully intend and expect the plan to be complete and to have received concurrence prior to the currently-estimated initial operation date of Unit 1 of the Black Fox Station (BFS). We recognize that the plan must undergo review by the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) and receive concurrence by the NRC in accord with proposed guidelines and regulations of these two federal agencies. We recognize the need for guidelines within the plan to be used in making decisions necessary to institute certain actions for the mitigation of the effects on the public health and safety of releases of tadioactivity to the environment. We are familiar with the contents of the recently-issued " Draft Emergency Action Level Guidelines for Nuclear Power Plants (NUREG-0610)". We agree in principle with the four action leveis (noti-( ,) fication of unusual event, alert, site emergency, and general emergency)
' stated in this document, and we intend to incorporate these action levels into our plan. We realize that these guidelines may change, due A-1
Page 2 Vaughn L. Conrad February 25, 1980 . to the draft nature of NUREG-0610, and we are prepared to revise our plan to the extent necessary in that regard. g We conceive our responsibility to be to develop and e.vercise an acceptable plan through a working relationship with the apprepdiate itate and local agencies, the general public, FEMA, NRC, and PS~0 . In the event of an emergency at BFS after its operation begins, we conceive our responsibilities to be (1) to dispatch trained and well-equipped radiological response personnel to the vicinity of the BFS site on a timely basis, (2) to monitor and assess the actual or potential releases of radioactivity off-site, (3) to perform necessary analyses of milk, watcr, food, and other environmental media for radioactivity related to the emergency, (4) to direct off-site emergency response activities and to coordinate such with other state, local, and federal agencies involved in the response, (5) to inform the Governor and reccmmend to him those protective actions necessary to protect the public health and safety, (6) to provide information to the news media on the status and character of the emergency on a timely basis, (7) to evaluate the situation and provide guidance on the means to cope with the emergency and to b"ing it to an end, and (8) to take such other actions as may be necessary to mitigate the consequences of a resease of radioactivity off-site on the public health and safety. Finally, please be assured that we intend to develop an emergency response plan in regard to BFS, to receive concurrence from the NRC on A such plan, and to have suitable emergency response capability to carry W out our responsibilities as briefly summarized in this letter. Very truly yours, , 7 -c
$lL $f b s,}[
Dale McHard, Chief Occupational and Radiological Health Service D.I/kc Attachment O A-2
"\ -
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\
O STATE OF OKLAHOMA OFFICE OF THE GOVERNOR h OKLAHOMA CITY
~
DAVfD L. BoiW.N '
'" -* "{- May 27, 1975 dlill f j gig Mr. Herbert H. Brown Director, Office"of Government Liaison-Regulation Atomic Energy Comqission Washington, D. C. 20545
Dear Mr. Brown:
In response to your letter of December 12 concerning emergency radiation response planning, please be advised
'- that the State of Oklahoma does not have written response planning ~d'ocuments which are specific to fixed nuclear facilities at this time. .
As requested, the following are the names of the state officials regard to. concerned with emergency fixed nuclear facil.ities: response planning in Primary responsibility and authority for planning: Dale McHard Chief, Occupational & Radiological Health Service Post Office Box 53551 Oklahoma City, Oklahoma 73105 Principal supportive role. in planning: , Hayden Haynes Director, Oklahoma Civil Defense Post Office Box 53365 Oklahoma City, Oklahoma 73105 ()
.. A-3
O Mr. Herbert H. Brown May 27. 1$75 It is hoped that this information is responsive to your request. Sincerely, DAVID L. BOREN _ cc: Dr. R. LeRoy Carpenter Commissioner of Health Hayden Haynes Director, Oklahoma Civil Defense O S e A-4 ..
CKLAH'sMA CIVIL DEFENCE SEOuCYAH - WILL ROGERS BUILDINGS POST OFFICE BOX 53365 OKLAHOMA CITY, OKLAHOMA 72152 hEORGE NIGH 405-521 2481 Governor HAYDEN HAYNES Saa Dtructor March 13, 1980 R. Robinson Mr. Vaughn L. Conrad, Manager 1.icensing and Compliance Public Service Company of Oklahoma P. O. Box 201 Tulsa, Oklahoma 74102
Dear Mr. Conrad:
In reference to your letter of February 28, 1980, we agree in principal to the provisions of NUREG-0610 entitled U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Draft Emergency Action Level Guidelines for Nuclear Pcwer Plants dated September,1979. C) We understand the four classes of emergency action levels and concur with the method of notifying state and local off-sight authorities but reserve the right to require an automatic warning device be installed in a continuously manned state office that would in effect alert that state agency to expect a call from the Black Fox Facility within a reasonable time. Details for this alerting device can be worked out at a later date. The-State Civil Defense Agency pursuant to State Statute 63 0.S. 683 and Governor Boren's letter of May 27, 1975, will make such plans and assist local authorities with the writing of such local p12.ns as are necessary and as are required by NUREG-0610. Respectfully, bayd Haynes RR/bt (o3 A-5
i 9J o V l Oklahoma Department of Public Safety P.O. BOX 11415 P AUL W. REED, JR. '
- Commissioner DARRELL WlEMERS A ssistant Commissioner Vaughn L. Conrad, Manager Licensing and Compliance Public Service Company of Oklahoma P. O. Box 201 Tulsa, Oklahoma 74102 RE: Letter of Agreement
Dear Mr. Conrad:
In response to your request and the letter dated 4 April 1980 from the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) to Public Service Company C~' (PS0) requesting certain activities and submission of information on a preconstruction basis, this letter is to advise you of the Oklahoma Department of Public Safety's responsibilities for future activities in respect to emergency response planning at your Black Fox Station. This department has the power and responsibility at all times to expedite and direct traffic to a sure the public safety in accordance with the provisions of 47 0.S. 52-117. As part of this provision, we will also have certain policing power inside our jurisdictional i I boundary for law enforcement as may be needed during an emergency. Our powers of authority would fully apply under an emergency condition at your Black Fox Station. We are in receipt of and are familiar with the contents of the recently issued " Draft Emergency Action Level Guidelines for Nuclear Power Plants
' HUREG-0610)" . We agree in principle with the four action levels (notificat. ion of unusual event, alert, site emergency, and~ general i
emergency) stated in this document. We recognize this document may l change, however, we will resoond to similar such action levels as will be provided by Oklahoma's raciological emergency response plan being prepared by the Oklahoma State Department of Health's Radiological Health Service (050H-RHS). l In the event of an emergency condition at BFS upon it's operaticri, we l - conceive our responsibilities to be to aid the OSDH-RHS and the Okla-l (s) homa Civil Defense in accordance with the established plan and existing l l 3600 NOltTH EASTEltN
- OKLAIIOM A CITY
- rAC 4n 424 40111 A-6
Vaughn L. Conrad Letter of Agreem:nt 5 April 1980 , Page Two emergency conditions. O This should include such activities as (1) removing persons out of an affected area if an evacuation has been declared, (2) provide access control into and out of affected areas, (3) provide transportational support as deemed necessary, (4) provide any policing action deemed necessary and (5) notify the OSDH-RHS in the event we are first alerted of an accident condition at BFS. Sincer ly, G PAUL CLARK Civil Defense Coordinator Department of Public Safety PC/bjr O 1 l O A-7
AMOS G. WARD ~ ~
"^ ",*%^
u ~llP,' " * " Sheriff, Rogers County GMUTY FRITZ FREEM AN 0NSLA depuy,MEuMAmn AM-w utn OFFICE DEPUTV1M ALOVO MULAN AK ASST. O FFICE DEPUTY OEPUTV HOMEY M ARMMAM M ATRON Of SP A THCH E R CAROL PAVNE TELEPHONE 349*35 35 DEPUTY JACM TANNER 40 LOG AH 2 9 9 SOUTM MISSOURI DEPUTY EDWARD BEARSCATOOSA CLA REMORE* ONLA. 7409 7 I DEPUTY EUCM JOHNSON <HELSE A 4
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May 1, 1980 Vaughn L. Conrad ffanager, Licensing and Compliance Public Service Company of Oklahoma P.O. Box 201, Tulsa, Ok. 74102
Dear fir. Conrad:
With reference to your request dated April 7,1980, referring to Emergency response planning and actions as in regard to the Black Fox Station, Inola, Ok. O We have read and do agree to use NUREG-0610 " Draft Emergency Action Level Guidelines for Nuclear Power Plants." We will incorporate where applicable these guide lines, recognizing the possioility of change due to the draft nature of HUREGU160 and will make revisions as needed. We see our responsibility to be one of coordination and cooperation with the various agencies involved; Federal, State and Local and Public Service Company of Oklahoma. In event of an emergency at BFS after its operation begins, we conceive our responsibil4 ties to be the orderly evacuation of the area population (If necessitated by the emergency), the safe guarding of the BFS site, if threatened by outside forces, the preservation and protection of prperty in and about the Incia area in event of an evacuation and or any other course of action necessitated by the circumstances whereas the safety of the general public population of Rogers County is in any way threatened. Deputy Sheriff F.E. Freeman, Rogers Ccanty, will act as liason officer between this department and others involved agencies in the absence of the undersigned. Sincerely,
@eM O Al'0S G. WARD, SHERIFF ROGERS COUNTY, OKLAH0W.
AGU:em
~
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k Tomdty> Gilbert
- k. I.SHERI,FF, /
unoersnenft WAGONER COUNTY Phil Simpson /gg/;Ag O'Dut** S***'*'Y p g g4gim , Jce Reynolde Phyllis Fulcher WAGOsERT KTiAHOMA 74467 C -l O urchman o.. oaten < Jim Reeves Dallas Diompson Steve Schirman Vaughn L. Conrad; Manager Licensing and Compliance Public Service Company of Oklahoma P.O. Box 201 Tulsa Oklahoma 74102
Dear Mr. Conrad:
In response to your request dateJ April 7 1980; this letter is to advise you of the Wagoner County Sheriff's Office responsibility for future activities in respect to emergency response planning at your Black Fox Station. O 18e a ties #a no er or e=r orrice greviaea 8v 19 o.s. ste i-to keep and preserve the peace of the county and to call to aid any persons of the county we deem necessary. This will include any emergency response effort. In conjunction with the overall radiological emergency plan for Oklahoma; we will prepare prior to the scheduled operation of Black Fox; a local plan to assure adequate emergency response for Wagoner County and coordinate with the neighboring counties and the responsible state agencies. We are in receipt of and are familiar with the contents of the recently issued " Draft Emergency Action Level Guidelines for Nuclear Power Plants (NUREG-0010). We agree in principle with the four action levels (notification of unusual event; alert; site emergency; and general emergency) stated in this document. Our office will use these er similarly adopted guidelines in our future local planning effort as coordinated with the overall state emergency preparedness effort. t Sincerely; j f.W / 4 - Mr. To rny Gilbert Wagoner County Sheriff A-9
~
E BOm - OFFICE OF - Under Sh; riff MAXINE RANDOLPH
~ ****
nela Depuue, GLEN "Pete" WEAVER HUGH HOR' ION Sheriff of Mayes County BETTY KNIGHT I NM Office Phone 825-3535 - Res. Phone 825-0478 D. DAVID Jailers 34 North Adair ED BRASSWELI. PRYOR. OKI.AHOMA 74361 CLYDE VAUGHN BOBBY BIAS Pryor, Plahono Fa ., -9 .P , 10.A0
' Inn ahn L. Conrad Lice ei g and Cc.pliance Publi" Se-ice Cer: any of Oklehona P.O. Fox 201 Tulsa, Oklaho-'a ?!;192
_Nrr Mr. Conrad: In response t: rmr request datad April 7, 7.980. thi letter is to advise ycu cf t'~ .'; a : Ccunty Sheriff'c Offi ce re pense-Fility for futu~a activi+ ice in respect te e.cernency response g
't ) plen"ing at your Ble.ek Pc:: Statien.
The duties and powers of our office as provided by 19 0.S. 95161:: to ha r r"d pracerva the peace of the county nnd to esl to sii .ary percent ef th2 c ~ n t r era deer.nec"-' . "'S i r 'M '.1 inal- d a gay a-argn.n- w = r,- ---**"-+. -n conjunction vi t'- the l overn11 rr'iological erargenc plun for ^klahe c, we will pre-1 l I pc."e, pri.cr t o t he : chad" led ope"eti.nn nf Black Fox, n local 1 1 719n to assure a 3 equate ever -ency res"nnte f or "mye- Qun.y and l coordinate rdth the ne'.chborin~ cour.t - es and the ."e::non c thle scr.te agencine. l 'dc a re in receipt of and are f amil'or 'eith the centente of 1 1 the racantly '.es"ad " Draft 9 ercenc; 'iction Leve'. Cuidelinec (,) fcr ?:>clen" ' 9uar -'lants ('"9 - Of.10 ) . ' ?c n -'i . pr:ncinle l 'o I with tFe four cction levels (retifi.cction ? r.nusuni event, 918." t s 9fI" ~3 '. O '*e-* "
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u O docum ir.t . O'.tr office ' 2 '.1
. ' Ire them er sirilcrly adopted guide-lines '- cur futitre 1.,cr1 pleni.in6 eff ort as coorinnted with tSe t overall state energency praperedness effert.
Sincerely.
/
Pete ' .'e e v e r "syes County Sheriff O i O l l l A-11
O CtiaEMORE / a0GERS c 0-a s t r CIVIL DEFENSE 219 SOUTH MISSOURI, CLAREMORE 74017 ipril 24,1980 Vaughn L. Conrad, Manager Licensing and Compliance Public Service Company of Oklahoma P.O. Box 201 Tulsa, Oklahoma 74102
Dear Mr. Conrad ,
' In response to your request dated April 7,1980, this letter is to advise you of the Rogers County Civil Defense's responsibility l yourfuture for Blackactivities Fox Station. in respect to emergency response planning at l O Our authority is provided under 63 0.S. s 683.11 whereby each political subdivision within Oklahoma is directed to establish a local orgenization for civil defense in accordance with the State l Civil Defense plan and program. In conjunction with the overall radiological emergency response plan for Oklahoma, ve vill prepare, prior to the scheduled operation of Black Fox, a local plan to assure adequate emergency response for Rogers County and coordinate with the neighboring counties and the responsible state agencies. We are in receipt of and are familiar with the contents of the recently issued " Draft Emergency Action Level Guidelines foi Nuclear Power Plants (NUREG-0610). We agree in principle with the four action levels (notification of unusual event, alert, site emergency,'and general emergency) stated in his document. Our office vill use these or similarly adopted guidelines in our future local planning effort as coordinated with the overall state emergency preparedness effort. Sincerely, hin aa.v4 1 bu A Mr. Ervin Burchette Rogers County Civil Defense i O bit /EB A-12
. . - - . _ ~ - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ' -- ~
g - ___ _ COWETA CIVIL DEFENSE gg Q
@ M AX COLE . DIRECTOR BOX IC2 COWETA OKLAHOMA 74429 918 486 2179 April 25 1980 Vaughn L. Conrad, Manager Licensing and Compliance Public Service Company of Oklahoma P.O. Box 201 Tulsa, Oklahoma 74102
Dear Mr. Conrad:
In response to your request dated April 7, 1980, this letter is to advise you of the Wagoner County Civil Defense's responsibility for future activities , in respect to emergency response planning at your Black Fox Station. Our authority is provided under 63 0.S. j 683.11 whereby each political sub-division within Oklahoma is directed to establish a local organization for civil defense in accordance with the State Civil Defense plan and program. (') k- In conjuntion with the overall radiological emergency response plan for Oklahoma, we will prepare, prior to the scheduled operation of the Black Fox Station, a local plan to assure adequate emergency response for Wagoner County and coordinate with the neighboring counties and the responsible state agencies. We are in receipt of and are familiar with the cor..ents of the recently issued " Draft Er.ergency Action Level Guidelines for Nuclear Power Plants (NUREG-0610). We agree in principle with the four action levels (notification [ of unusual event, alert, site energency, and general energency) stated in this document. Our office will use these or similarly adopted guidelines in our future local planning effort as coordinated with the overall state energency preparedness effort. l Sincerely, f Mr. Max Cole Wagoner County Civil Defense
.g A-13
Mr. John Baumert, Director May 8, 1980 Mayes County Civil Defense , O 1301 N.E. 4th Pryor, Oklahoma 74361 Vaughn L. Conrad, Manager Licensing and Compliance Public Service Company of Okla o* P.O. Box 201 Tulsa, Oklahoma 74102
Dear Mr. Conrad:
In response to your request dated April 7, 1980, this letter is to advise you of the Mayes County Civil Defense's responsibility for future activities in respect to emergency response planning.at your Black Fox Station. Our authority is provided under 63 0.S. g 683.11 whereby each polit-ical subdivision within Oklahoma is directed to establish a local , organization for efvil defense in accordance with the State Civil Defense plan and program. In conjunction with the overall radiolog-ical emergency response plan for Oklahoma, we will prepare, prior to the scheduled operation of Black Fox, a local plan to assure adequate emergency response for Mayes County and coordinate with the neighbor-O ing counties and the responsible state agencies. We are in receipt of and are familiar with the contents of the recently issued " Draft Emergency Action Level Guidelines for Nucler.r Power Plants" (NUREG-0610). We agree in principle with the four action levels (notification of unusual event, alert, site emergency, and general emergency) stated in this document. Our office will use these or similarly adopted guidelines in our future local planning effort { as coordinated with the overall state emergency preparedness effort.
,(incerely,
, A J hn Baume' w
M res County Civil Defense O l A-14
TOWN OF INOLA -
**eCOR M RAftO INOLA. OKIAHOMA 74036 l
l Vaughn L. Conrad, Manager Licensing and Compliance Public Service Company of Oklaho.sa P.O. Box 201 Tulsa, Oklahoma 74102 Desr Mr. Conrad: In response to your request dated April 7,1980, this letter is to advise you of the Inola Police Departuent's re::ponsibility for future activ.ities in respect to emergency response planning er your Black Fox Station. Within -the dutiec and powers of this office under 34 0.S. S 101-103 ve vill respond as necessary to any e=ergency conditions at your station in order to protect the public health and safety. In conjunction with the overall gradiological emergency response plan for Oklahoma, ve vill prepare, prior U to scheduled operation of Black Fox Station, a local plan to assure adequate cmsrgency preparedness within and around the Town of Inola. We tre in receipt of and are familiar with the contents of the recently iscued " Draft Emergency Action Level Guidelines for liuclear Power Plants (1:UREG-0610). We agree in principle with the four action levels (notification of unusual event, alert, site emergency, and general e=ergency) stated in this document. Our office vill use these or similarly adopted guidelines in our future local planning effort as coordintaed with t% overall state emergency preparedness effort. Sincerely. 6bx Chuck Ormiston O 1 nota ro11oe cnier A-15 i
s i ,. - it i !a , A li! l< l 5 h dd } f 4, . . 3 b)i bister Mary Blondine. Adrninist ator i September 15, 1980 Public Service Company of Oklahoma P. O. Box 201 Tulsa, Oklahoma 74102 Attention: M r. V. L. Conrad Licensing Engineer Nuc1 car Division Gentlemen: This letter is sent to Public Service Company of Oklahoma to re-confirm our previous letter of June 20, 1975, concerning emergency medical treatment of radiation related injuries for Black Fr>x station perscnnel. W e fcc1 that Saint Francis Hospital has the potential in both facilities and professional capability to treat radiation related injuries which would include those postulated for your proposed nuclear station. W e recognize that your station will not be operational until at least 1987 and that the terms and conditions of providing medical services can be agreed upon during your detailed emergency response planning. Until such time as details can be mutually agreed upon, this letter will serve to indicate our desire to work with you in providing med-ical and emergency services which win meet your needs. W e look forward to hearing from you and to working with Public Service Company of Oklahoma. l Since cly, W Sister Mary Blandine Administrato r SMB:bs l O 6 '6 : SOUTH YALE AVENUE OCT 011980
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l l HILLC R EST M EDICA L C ENTER """" "'"'^" '""^ ~""^ """ ' " " " " " ' " ' " " Vice President - Administration 9 September 24, 1980 Mr. Vaughn L. Conrad Manager - Licensing and Compliance Public Service Company of Oklahoma P. O. Box 201 Tulsa, Oklahoma 74102
Dear Mr. Conrad:
This letter is being provided to PSO to reconfirm our previous letter of July 2, 1975 concerning emergency medical treatment of radiation-related injuries for Black Fox Station personnel. Hillcrest Medical Center has the facilities and profesional capability to treat radiation-related injuries which we believe would include potential injuries at your proposed nuclear sta-tion. We recognize that your etation will not be in operation until at least 1987, whereby the terms and conditions of such treatment -services can be agreed upon during your detailed emer-genev response planning. Until the time that such details can be mutually agreed upon, this letter will serve to indicate our a W intent to discuss future medical services that will n.eet your needs. Our office is yilling to further discuss this matter with you at your cot.venience. Sincerely, Phil Goodwin \ Vice President-Administration PG/dka cc: Bob Suellentrop , Charles Kahlig 6 m OCT 011980 A-17
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O l l APPENDIX B Population Projections ( 1980-2020
- O I
i l l l O
- - - . , _ _ . - _ _ _ . _ . _ . . ~ . _ _ . _ . _ _ _ - - _ . _ _ . . _ , _ - _ . . _ _ _ . _ _ - . - _ _ _ . _ _ _ - . . - . _ - - - . . . _ _ - - _ .
. APPENDIX B O F0PULATION PROJECTION, DISTRIBUTION AND LAND USE MAPPING Table of Contents Section Page
1.0 INTRODUCTION
B-1 1.1 DATA STRUCTURE B-2 1.2 POPULATION TYPES B-2
?,3 SEASONAL AND TIME OF DAY VARIATIONS B-4 1.4 POPULATION PROJECTIONS B-5 1.5 LAND USE MAPPING B-5 2.0 THE POPULATION DISTRIBUTION MODEL B-6
- 2.1 NIGHT TIME INCIDENT-TIME-OF-0CCURRENCE B-7 m)
(_ 2.1.1 Existing Residents B-7 2.1.2 Tulsa Growth B-8 2.1 3 Black Fox Station Construction Work Force B-9 2.1.4 Black Fox Station Indiract Impact B-9 2.1.5 Institutionalized B-9 2.1.6 Recreation B-9 2.2 WOPK TIME INCIDENT-TIME-OF-0CCURRENCE B-10 2.2.1 Existing Residents B-10 2.2.2 Tulsa Growth B-10 l 2.2.3 Black Fox Station Construction Work Force B-11 2.2.4 Black Fox Station Indirect Impact B-11 2.2.5 Institutionalized 5-11 2.2.6 Recreation B-11 2.3 SUNDAY MORNING INCIDENT-TIME-OF-0CCURRENCE B-11 l l 2.3.1 Existing Residents B-11 2.3.2 Tulsa Growth B-12 2.3.3 Black Fox Sta-ion Construction Work Force B-12 l 2.3.4 Black Fox Station Indirect Impact B-12 2.3.5 Institutionalized B-12 O B-1 L
I r 2.3.6 Recreation B-13 ggg 2.4 SUMMER SATURDAY INCIDENT-TIME-OF-0CCURRENCE B-13 2.4.1 Existing Residents B-13 2.4.2 Tulsa growth B-13 2.4.3 Black Fox Station Construction Work Force B-13
! 2.4.4 Black Fox Station Indirect Impact B-13 2.4.5 Institutionalized B-14 2.4.6 Recreation B-14 1
I 3.0 ?0PULATION DISTRIBUTION AND PROJECTIONS B-15
)
3.1 NIGHT TIME INCIDENT-TIME-0F-0CCURRENCE B-15 3.2 WORK TIME INCIDENT-TIMES 0F-0CCURRENCE B-16 3.3 SUNDAY MORNING INCIDENT-TIME-OF-0CCURRENCE B-16 3.4 SUMMER SATURDAY INCIDENT-TIME-OF-0CCURRENCE B-17 3.5 SPECIAL CONSIDERATIONS B-17 4.0 LAND USE AND LAND COVER TYPE MAPPING THROUGH REMOTE SENSING B-19
4.1 INTRODUCTION
TO LANDSAT B-19 4.1.1 LANDSAT's Sensitivity B-19 0 4.1.2 LANDSAT Crbit and Resolution B-20 4.2 LANDSAT IMACE ANALYSIS B-20 4.3 DIGITAL PROCESSING OF LANDSAT DATA B-22 4.3.1 LANDSAT Digital Classification B-22 4.3.2 LANDSAT Derived Land Cover Type Map B-23 4.4 LANDSAT ADVANTAGES FOR LAND COVER TYPE MAPPING B-23
4.5 CONCLUSION
S: USE OF LANDSAT DATA FOR MAPPING WITHIN THE EMERGENCY PLANNING ZONE B-24
5.0 REFERENCES
B-26 TABLES B-1 BFS AREA RESIDENT POPULATION AND PROJECTIONS (NIGHT TIME ITO) B-27 B-2 BFS AREA RESIDENT POPULATION AND PROJECTIONS (WORK TIME ITO) B-31 k!h 3-11
B-1 BFS AREA RESIDENT POPULATION * , ROJECTIONS (SUNDAY MORNING O 'to) 8-zs B-4 BFS AREA RESIDENT POPULAT .J AND PROJECTIONS (SUMMER SATURDAY ITO) B-39 B-5 LANDSAT DIGITAL CLAST ACATION: LAND USE AND LAND COVER B-43 FIGURES B-1 FIELD SURVEY DATA SHEET B-44 B-2 POPULATION NUMBLIS PER CELL B-45 B-3 URBAN DEVELOPMEi1T: 1972 5-46 B-4 URBAN DEVELOPMENT: 1974 B-47 I B-5 URBAN DEVELOPMENT: 1976 B '-4 0 B-6 URBAN DEVELOPMENT: 1978 B-49 B-7 URBAN DEVELOPMENT: 1979 B-50 B-8 SECTOR DEFINITIONS B-51 B-9a POPULATION DENSITY: 1980 B-52 B-9b POPULATION DENSITY: 2020 B-53 B-10 LANDSAT TRACKING SCHEME B-54 B-11 LANDSAT MSS SCANNING B-55 b-12 MULTIPLE LANDCOVER IN A SINGLE PIXEL B-56 B-13 ANALYSIS PROCEDURE FOR DIGITAL MAPPING B-57 B-14 LANDSAT DIGITAL CLASSIFICATION B-58 B-15 LANDSAT DIGITAL CLASSIFICATION B-59 B-16 LANDSAT DIGITAL CLASSIFICATION B-60 B-17 LANDSAT DIGITAL CLASSIFICATION B-61 B-18 ELECTROSTATIC PRINTER / PLOTTER M AP B-62 O B-iii
APPENDIX B - O POPULATION PROJECTION, DISTRIBUTION AND LAND USE M APPING
1.0 INTRODUCTION
This appendix was prepared by the directors of the Center for System Science and the Center for Applications of Remote Sensing, both research centers at Oklahoma State University (OSU). The appendix contains a description of the population characteristics of the plume exposure Emergency Planning Zone (EPZ), projections of these populations to the year 2020, and 1 an explanation and example of land use mapping by using LANDSAT remote sensing data for the ingestion pathway EPZ. The analysis of the populations that would be involved in an evacuation was divided into three main parts. First, the sev-eral different types of people that would be involved vere identified. Six categories were selected for ex amination-existing residents, growth due to the nearby Tulsa metropolitan area, the construction work force at the BFS, new rerldents due to the indirect economic impact of the BFS, institutionalized persons, and a miscellaneous category to include such tran-sients as recreational facility users. (
\- Second, time of day and time of year variations were consid-er ed . While many choices are possible, those selected as representative in this study were night time conditions, normal working hours, Sunday morning and a summer Saturday.
Thire, projectior . for each of the different population types were v.e7 eloped. Separate growth factors were calculated for each population category. reflecting the most recently available trends and local conditions. l Remotely censed data techniques were used both for the demo-graphic proj$ctions and in investigating applications for ing-estion pathway EPZ considerations. Aerial photographs, Lt.NDSAT photographs and LANDSAT digital data provided images for iden-tifying metropolitan growth corridors, existing building loca-tions and current land use patterns. Each of these topics is summarized in the remainder of this introductory section. Detailed descriptions are contained in Sections 2, 3 and 4. B-1
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1.1 DATA STRUCTURE ggg Since the geographic distribution of the population is as important as the gross numbers in estimating evacuation times, a rather fine quantization of locations was developed . A square array was established , 24 miles on a side, with the BFS site at the center. Consequently, all residents within 12 miles of the site were considered, and some higher population density areas more than 12 miles in distance were included in the corners of the square. Within the square, 2304 individual cells were identified, with each cell totalling one-quarter square mile (one-half mile on a side). Existing section line roads, which are spaced at one mile intervals, wera used as convenient cell edges. Thus, each section was divided into four cells, and each cell fronted a section line road. Each of these cells next was assigned 24 population numbers, corresponding to the six population types and the four possible times of day /ycar. A total, then, of 55,296 individual numbers describe the erea's population for any given year . This data base is belit ied to be quite accurate as well as quite comprehensive. Within the 12 mile radius, every cell was viewed in person, with every building and road condition noted on a field survey sheet, nd the survey sheets were verified by canparison with aerial pho tographs . A sample field survey lll sheet is included as Figure B-1, and illustrates the quality of the initial data set. The less crucial corner areas (some as far as 17 miles from the site) were 'usited to identify insti-tutions, road conditions, etc. 1.2 POPULATION TYPES As indicated previously, six population types were identi-fied as being pertinent to the objectives of this studv. The first type, the population currently residing within approximately 12 miles of the plant site, is clearly the major contributory factor to consider in estimating an evacuation time. Consequently, s substantial effort was devoted to establishing an accurate count of the initial 1980 nunbers. As was indicated in Section 5.1 of the main report, field survey sheets provided actual house counts per one-quarter square mile cells, with populations found by assuming a residency of 4.2 persons per house. This multiplier was established from a door to door survey of the five mile radius area undertaken in i976, and is a conservative estimate (would tend to overstate the population) when compared w4.th official statewide counts. In O B-2
addition, this same multiplier was used even for apartments and (~N mobile homes, which again would make the population estimates
\s ~
slightly exceed the actual numbers. Estimates for county population growths through the year 2020, which provided cal _ibration points for the model's total population counts, were taken insofar as possible from the Oklahoma Employment Security Commission (Reference 1), the stata agency designated a.s the official agency for projecting populationa. Un fortunately, estimates were available only through the year 2000, so extrapolations were required. In addition, the popalation estimates were confirmed by a compari-son with independent estimates prepared by a research team at Oklahoma State University (Reference 2). That team has devel-oped a ca:puter based model of Oklahoma's economy, and prepares population estimates as a function not only of the present age distribution, but evaluates migration patterns as influenced by salary levels, unemployment rates, regional costs of living , e tc . Finally, the population numbers were canpared with offi-cial national estimates prepared by the Oak Ridge National Laboratory (Reference 3) . The second population type considered was that due to growth of the Tulsa metropolitan area. These num5ers clearly depend both on the growth rate for Tulsa and the geographic character of the growth corridors. In addition to considering the topo-logical characteristics that would influence residential devel- {g m,/ opment, the history of Tulsa's growth was quantified through an exanination of LANDSAT photographs. These photographs provided actual images of the location of Tulsa real estate development from 1972 through 1979. The popular growth corridors were easily identified , and their influence on the EPZ projected. The third population type is the plant construction work , force. These numbers were estimL;ed by PSO for the construc-l tien teriod of BFS with regional resident projections as pred-icted in Section 4.0 of the BFS Environmental Re port . This , category also includes the permanent operating crew to be sta-l tioned at the plant site. The fourth population type , new residents attracted by BFS, are additional residents attracted by the economic incentive of the work forces and increased area revenue. These would be l primarily in the retail and service industries. The fifth population type consists of those institutional-ized. There are no hospitals, homes for the aged , jails, etc ., within the 10 mile radius of the site. Such facilities are located within the 24 by 24 mile square, and have been identi-fled for possible future use as the actual evacuation plans are l () i (> B-3 I
d eveloped . The final population type consists of so-called transient O persons . This category is intentionally broad, and would include any persons which neither live, go to school nor work in the plume exposure EPZ. The most obvious exanple of this type person would be anyone using one of the recreation fac'ii-ties located along the McClellan-Kerr srkansas River Navigacion System. To again insure an accurate data base, all of these sites were visited by OSU project staff, and estimates prepared for the maximum likely number of users. These numbers were obtained by actually counting parking spaces, picnic tables, etc. 1.3 SEASONAL AND TIME OF DAY VARIATIONS Both the total number of persons involved and their geo-graphic location within the plume exposure EPZ will certainly vary with time of day and season of the year. While the total number of combinations is almost limitless, four special condi-tions were considered as representative. Each of these times is termed an " incident-time-of-occurrence" (ITO). First, a night time ITO wat thought to be important to con-sider, primarily because the populations are so accurately located by residence locations. For this case, all persons are assumed to be at home, with the exception of BFS operating per-so nnel . g The next ITO considered was that of work time, a weekday during work and school hours. This condition consequently is influenced by the location and size of all schools and busi-nesses, with certain percentages of the population assumed to be at home. Next, a Sunday morning ITO was considered . This case of course included estimating that percentage of the population which attends church, and locating those numbers at the loca-tions of the identified churches. Finally, a summer Saturday ITO was considered. This case was developed by paying particular attention to the recrea.- tional locations, and then summing the transient visitor num-bers with the local resident totals. It is clear that not every combination of time of year and time of day has been considered , for there are simply too many possible combinations. For ex am ple , the night time case does not include the possibility of visitors spending tle night in campers at a recreation area, nor does the work time case O B-4
include the possibility that a ladiet club might be meeting at (} a local church. Nevertt.eless , the four cases considered do cover the major possible variations, and any special conditions that need to be considered can be evaluated quite easily. For example, if it appears important to study the population densi-ties on a summer Sunday morning, the data sets containing the recreation and Sunday morning numbers can be simply combined. 1.4 POPULATION PROJECTIONS Projections for the various population types were obtained in a variety of ways. As has been indicated , the resident population projections were established through official growth figures, with checks against other pertinent sources. Growth from the Tulsa metropolitan area was evaluated from LANDSAT photographs. Less critical estimates, church atten-dance percentages for example, were obtained through various local sources. Construction workers and plant personnel num-bers were provided by Public Service Company of Oklahoma. A final projection for population dispersement was not available from any source. The information needed was how increases in population of the area were going to be located geographically. Certainly, some residential additions will merely become more dense, while others will expand into areas now consisting of only farm land. A very specialized computer simulation was performed to model this activity. Briefly, each x_,' of the individual 2304 cells was assigned a maximon population density, in some cases zero to indicate land for some reason not suitable for residential use. Then, as tne population growth caused some cell densities to exceed their maximums, the canputer program redistributed the excess numbers in adjacent cells. 1.5 LAND USE MAPPING Previous paragraphs have included a description of the use of aerial photographs and LANDSAT photographs in determining building locations and residential growth corridors. In addi-tion, LANDSAT digital data tapes were obtained for various regions surrounding the plant site, and the data were processed and converted to color image form. This was done to provide an exanple of the use of such imaging techniques in the monitoring of land use in the ingestion pathway EPZ. A facility for such work is available at Oklahoma State University, currently one of only two such facilities in the United States (Reference 4). B-5
2.0 THE POPULATION DISTRIBUTION MODEL The population distribution model was developed to provide O population estimates from 1980 to 20'0, identified with respect to population type (existing residents, construction workers, etc.) and location of the population at any of the identified incident-times-of-occurrence (night time, at work or school, e tc . ) . To permit an accurate spatial location of the popula-tion, a 24 mile by 24 mile square was identified , with the BFS site at the center. This 576 square mile region includes the incorporf.ed towns of Inola, Catoosa , Chouteau, Cowetc and Wagoner, ana the unin-corporated communities of Tiawah, Nea' Tulsa and Fair Oaks. Of these, Inola (with a 1970 population of 948) is closest to the site, some three miles distant. The larger towns of Broken Arrow and Claremore lie some 14 miles distant, and the center of metropolitan Tulsa is about 23 miles to the west. This land area was next subdivid ed into 2304 individual one-quarter square mile cells. The cells were numbered in a grid notation, with the convention that cell (1,j) is i cells to the south and j cells to the east of the northwest corner of the region of interest. This numbering system corresponds to the mathematical notation for matrices, and is convenient for the required numerical processing of the large amounts of data. Throughout this section, three different land areas will be discussed. The largest is the previously identified 2i mile by 24 mile square. Next, the plume exposure EPZ is defi,ed as a 10 mile radius circle, centered at the BFS site. Finally, a 12 mile radius circle, also centered at the BFS site, has been defined. The use of this larger circle permits censideration of populations, businesses, schools, etc., that may influence the population characteristics lying at the edge of the plume exposure EPZ. For ease of expression, these three areas 5411 be referred to as the 24 mile square, the plume exposure EPZ and the 12 mile radius area. With any cell's location established , the next task was to assign the 24 required population numbers, one for each of the 6 population types and 4 possible incident-times-of-occurrence. These numbers were organized as indicated in Figure B-2. For each of the 2304 cells, an array was established containing the 24 population numbers. With a vertical column representing one ITO, a computer program was developed to receive as an input the particular ITC d esired , then to sum the corresponding column for each of tne individual cells. In this manner, each of the population types could be kept separate for the purposes of utilizing different projection techniques, then combined to O B-6
provide a spatially and numerically accurate representation of () the area's population characteristics. This section includes descriptions of how each of these num-bers was developed for the precent (1980) data set. The results and descriptions are divided by ITO, followed by a further division by population type. 2.1 NIGHT TIME INCIDENT-TIME-OF-0CCURRENCE The term " night time" is used to refer to the ITO of all residents at Bheir homes. This case is important in that it characterizes the actual resident population and the spatial distribution of that population. It applies directly to an actual late night or eaely morning ITO, and forms the base data set for the generation of several of the other population type numbers. 2.1.1 Existing Residents The data :ase describing the existing resi' dents in the 12 mile radius area was developed as follows. First, employees of PS0 surveyed each cell within a 12 mile radius of the BFS site. The sample survey sheet of Figure B-1 illustrates the detail of this survey, and indicates the quality of the initial data base. Next, OSU personnel compared each survey sheet with aer-ial photographs. These photographs were taken in December , s- 1979, at a scale of 1" to 400' . This survey and validation served to locate all residences (as well as roads, businesses, schools, c hurches , e tc . , for other uses). To convert house counts to population, a resi-dency rate of 4.2 persons per house was assum ed . The multi-plier is conservative (in an emergency planning context) since other sources (Reference 1) indicate a statewide residency rate of less than 3 persons per house. Al so , the same factor was used for apartments and mobile homes, housing units with smal-ler than average residency rates. Finally, all units were assumed to be occupied, even though an occupancy rate of 905-95% would probably have been more accurate. Considering all of these fac tors , the population figures i developed for the EPZ are certainly larger than the actual num-bers, perhaps by as much as 25% in those areas with mobile home parks and apartment complexes. More accurate numbers could be developed by using the 1980 census figures as they become available. Nevertheless, these results can still be termed
- conservative and will envelope any inaccuracies that may be
- caused due to the inexact science of population prediction.
(~) B-7
Outside the 12 mile radius, the corners of the 24 mile square were considered to be less crucial, and the cell popula-tions were estimated by examining the aerial photographs and county road maps ( whic h show house locations in the rural areas), and distributing known town populations over the incor-porated areas. 2.1.2 Tulsa Growth While the BFS site is some 23 miles east of the center of Tulsa , Oklahoma, the site is only about 11 miles from the most eastward of the Tulsa " bedroom" communities, and about 11 miles northeast of the edges of the suburb of Broken Arrow. Since this type of reside.4tial development gives rise to rather dense population distributions, it was considered of suf ficient importance to be identified as a separate population class. The problem considered was to determine the number of people that were moving into these areas per year, and to specify exactly where the developments were being located. Information on the raw numbers involved was obtained from population statistics furnished by the Oklahoma Employment Security Commission and the Indian Nation Council of Govern-ments. Discussions with Tulsa planning personnel identified the major growth areas in and around Tulsa, and a reasonable fraction was determined to use for estimating the population growth in the areas of interest. lll The more difficult problem was to determine exactly where the growth was taking place. This information was obtained through a study of LANDSAT photographs. While this procedure is completely explained in Section 4, in brief, satellite pho-tographs were obtained for the Tulsa region, one photograph for each 6-month period from 1972 through 1979 Trained photo interpreters then mapped the urban, developed regions, and pre-pared grephic illustretions of the growth areas. Figures B-3 through B-7 show the urbanized areas for the years 1972, 1974, ! 1976, 1978 and 1979, and the growth corridors are quite obvi-ous. As would have been expected even without the clear evi-dence of the satellite images, development is following establ-ished transportation routes, with the major developments to the northeast of Tulsa (northwest of the BFS site) along Interstate 44 and US 66, and to the southeast of Tulsa (southwest of the BFS site) , along State Highway 51. While there is a good high-way route ease from Tulsa , passing about miles north of the BFS site, tha economic attractions of Broken Ar. v. ad Coweta to the southeaat and Claremore to the northaast of Tulsa are apparently causing the major development to remain outside of the plume ex posure EPZ. O B-8
2.1.3 Black Fox station Construction Work Force O The construction work force has its greatest impact on the population numbers during the work time ITO. Due to the lack of housing facilities near the site, almost all cf the work force will be required to commute from outside the immediate area. For the night time case, then, only *0% of the work force is assumed to be housed in the pluma exposure EPZ. Since such construction crews typically have a substantial number of single workers, an average family size of 2.5 was assumed. 2.1.4 Black Fox Station Indirect Impact The indirect impact of the BFS on the immediate area is defined to be the retail and service jobs that will develop to serve the needs of the construction work force and the plant operating personnel . The impact will be greatest when the con-4truction work force is at a maximum, declining to a much smal-ler value when only the operating personnel are left. The impact was estimated to be a maximte of 80 jobs created, and counting families, a total of 330 new residents was assumed at the peak of construction. While it is doubtful that these families will all live in the immediate ares, the model assumes that they all will find housing in and around Inola. 2.1.5 Institutionalized () For this study, the tenn " institutionalized" refers to those persons living in group quarters, and without independent means of transportation. Examples would include those in hospitals, nursing homes, orphanages, or jails. While there are no such facilities in the plume exposure EPZ, there are several located in the 24 mile square area under study. Four nursing homes were located , one in Chouteau, one in Coweta and two in Wagoner; one hospital is located in Wag-oner; and a county jail is located in W a goner. The closest of these facilities to the BFS site is the nursing home in Chou-teau, approximately 12.r miles distant. While schools and churches are often considered institu-tions, they were included in ttt3 study as part of the existing resident data set for the work time or Sunday morning incident-time-o f-oc c ur rence . 2.1.6 Recreation While there are several recreation facilities in the plume exposure EPZ, attendance at such sites was not included in the night time ITO. The great majority of the recreation sites are O B-9
for daytime use onl y , with very limited overnight camping The summer Saturday ITO will specifically be facilities . devoted to a consideration of the users of these facilities. (l) 2.2 WORK TIME INCIDENT-TIMEw0F-0CCURRENCE The working hours incident-time-of-occurrence was selected to include both normal working conditions and st4 ~.dard school atterdances. 2.2.1 Existing Residents The existing residents were assumed to be either at work, school or home at the work time ITO. Every business or other working location within the 12 mile radius was identified , and an estimate made of the averag e number of workers enployed at each. Each school was also locs;ed , and a student population developed for each by assumirs a student / teacher ratio of 20 to 1, and determining the number of teachers from the state educa-tion handbook (Reference 5) . Census data (Reference 6) was utilized to determine the num-ber of farmers, who were assumed to be at work at their resi-dence location. In total , 1109 non-farm workers were assigned work locations and 1973 m ldren were assigned schocl locations within the 12 mile radius area. These numbers are of course quite small con-sidering the total number of residents in this area, and is due to the " bedroom community" character of particularly the west-ern half of the area. In essence, the number of businesses and
, schools is clearly insufficient to support the po pul ation ,
implying that large percentages work and attend sc hool *n . nearby Wagoner , Chouteau, Coweta , Broken Arrow, and especially, Tulsa. Consequently, the populations that will be reported in the next section for the work time ITO will be dramatically smaller than the night time numbers. i 2.2.2 Tulsa Growth Those new residents in the region identified as being .. art of the growth of Tulsa could particularly be assumed to have work and leisure patterns more closely identified with the Tulsa area than the more rural Inola community. Consequently, only 30% of these new residents are assumed to remain in -the area during the daytime, at least during the first year of their residency. After the first year, these new residents are assumed to be assimilated into the region's population more completely, and are assigned the same tark, school and leisure time characteristics as the existing residents. O B-10
(} 2.2.3 Black Fox Station Construction Work Force The BFS construction work force is assumed to start in 1981 with approximately 550 workers, peak in 1985 with about 2400 workers, and then decline after 1990 to the permanent operating crew. All of these rersons are located in the four cells which immediately surround the station site. 2.2.4 Black Fox Station Indirect Impact Families attracted to the Inola area due to the economic hupact of the construction workers and plant operating person-nel were not treated exactly like the normal area residents, since their jobs are specifically tied to serving the BFS per-sonnel . Consequently, all of these workers were assumed to remain in the area curing work hours. 2.2.5 Institutionalized The institutionalized persons are assumed, of course, to remain at theit institution at all times. While some resid;nts of homes for the aged may leave the institution to shop or for meals, these numbers would be too small to influence the to tal s . While such persons would deserve special consideration if their evacuation were required , it has been noted that noae of these institutions is within the plume exposure EPZ. 2.2.6 Recreation While the recreation sites near the BFS may contain visitors at any time, the work time ITO assumes that these sites are empty. Since ic is assumed that schools are in sassion for this ITO, it is unlikely that many family vacationers would be in the area. Certainly, the major influence of recreation sites on evacuation times occurs when the sites are crowded , with concomitant heavy loading of rather poor ac7ess roads, and these conditions are considered under the summer Saturday ITO. 2.3 SUNP4Y MORNING INCIDENT-TIME-0F-0CCURRENCE A Sunday morning ITO was selected for study to evaluate the influence of localized high density populations at church loca-tions on road loading and , hence, evacuation times. 2.3.1 Existing Residents For the Sunday morning ITO, the existing residents were assumed to be either at home, at church in the immediate vicin-ity or completely outside the 24 mile square. While some B-11
businesses are doubtless open even on a Sunday morning (such as serv ce stations), thay were not considered in this case. lll All of the churches located within 12 miles of the BFS site were identified during the PS0 field survey, and estimates of possible attendance were obtained by examining the building and parking lot sizes. The total of these attendances yielded only about 1800 persons, compared to over a 13,000 1980 population in the plume exposure EPZ. Apparently , many of the residants of this area attend churches in the larger surrounding communi-ties, or do not attend church at all. In order to make sure that the population numbers were not minimized for this case , it was assumed that about 90% of the persons remained within the 12 mile radius , either at home or at the identified church locations . 2.3.2 Tulsa Growth The residents in the far western edge of the 12 mile radius area are expected to have slightly different churcP attendance patterns from the existing residents. Having only recently moved into the area , most probably from the Tulsa metropolitan area, they are more likely to attend church in Tulsa. For *51s reason, 25% of that population are ex pected to leave the area for church, and the remainder are assumed to remain at home. 2.3.3 Black Fox Station Construction Work Force Except for the small percentage of the construction work force which are assumed to live in the Inola area, and which are assumed to have church attendance patterns just like the existing residents, the work force is expected to have no effect on this ITO. For the purposes of this study, a normal, single shift, Mond ay through Friday work schedule will be ex pec ted . 2.3.4 Black Fox Station Indirect Impact "a new residents in the Inola area projected to locate there due to the economic attraction of the BFS station are assumed to have the same church attendance patte. ns as the existing residents. I 2.3.5 Institutionalized While some rest home residents are able to leave the insti-l tution to attend church with relatives, friends, e tc . , these numbers would certainly be quite sm all . Most attend services in the rest home itself. In any event, all such facilities are outside the plume exposure EPZ, and have been included in this B-12
study only because of their particularly special character and ( )) their location in the 24 mile square. 2.3.6 Recreation As for the night time ITO, even though there may be some users of the recreational facilities on a Sunday morning, their influences on the population distributions, and hence on the evacuation times, is reserved for the summer Saturday analysia. 2.4 SUMMER SATURDAY INCIDENT-T7.ME-OF-0CCURRENCE The sunmer Saturday ITO was sel ected for study since the population locations are so very oiff erent from all other con-ditions, and the roads to these recreation sites may be of lower quality that the roads around businesses, churches, etc. 2.4.1 Existing Residents While the recreation sites around the BFS site serve as an attraction for people from outside the area, the local resi-dents are quite likely to leave the area on a summer Saturday for shopping , s ports , vacations or other reasons. Co nse-quently, about 70% of the night time residents are assumed to remain in the 12 mile radius for this ITO. Tulsa Growth (gl 2.4.2 New area residents, even though perhaps with even greater ties to the Tulsa area, are assumed to remain in the area in the same percentages as the existing residents. 2.4.3 Black Fox Station Construction Work Force As was stated earlier, the construction schedule does not call for Saturday work by the construction work force. Conse-quently, only that percentage which was assumed to locate hous-ing in the immediate area is present during a summer Saturday. Those which are residents are assumed to remain in the area in the same manner as the existing residents. 2.4.4 Black Fox Station Indirect Impact The families which were attracted to the Inola area because of the generation of jobs by the BFS are assumed to spend their Saturdays just like the existing residents. l G l L.) t i B-13
2.4.5 Institutionalized Those institutionalized are cssumed to remain at their institution's location even on a Saturday. While Saturday is a common visiting day at such facilities, the numbers involved are small, and the sites lie outside of the plume exposure EPZ. 2.u.6 Recreation The recreational facility users play a cruciel role in the analysis of the summer Saturday ITO. Fourteen recreation sites we ' located within the 12 mile radius, providing facilities t u r- _.1 estimated 2491 visitors. These sites ranged from small campsites (spaces for 8 campers), to fairly substantial facili-ties ( spaces for 9f cars, 49 picnic arets and 2 boac docks) . Each of these sites was visited by OSU project staff personner , and actual counts of maximtm occupancies were made. There are r.o large bodies of water in the 24 mile square, so there are no possibilities of events such as boat races, water skiing exibitions, etc . The facilities that are available are primarily for picnicking and fishing , with one access point to a public hunting area. A lock and dam facility, approximately 4 miles southeast of the BFS site, could be considered a "ightseeing attraction. While many visitors could be expected in any given day, an exa-mination of parking facilities indicates that no more than 550 lll persons would be at the site at any one time. l 9 B-14 L
_ 3.0 POPULATION DISTRIBUTION AND PROJECTIONS The previous section of this appendix described the differ-ent population types consid ered , and the different incident-times-of-occurrence selected for study. The final results of the population modeling are presented in this section. The results are presented for each of the three ITO's, but the dif-ferent population types 1 eve been combined to give total popu-lation n':mbers. In terms of the spatial location of the population , some difficulty was encountered in organizing the numbers in terms of the geometric sectors as requested by the NRC. The popula-tion cells are square, and do not easily conform to an essen-tially triangular output formst. Nevertheless, an effort was made to comply with the desi ec output form. Figure B-8 shows just over one 90-degree quadrant of the plume exposure EPZ, and illustrates how the cells were assigned to the sector end radius defining shapes. While the larger radius shapes are fairly close to that desired, some of the interior ones are clearly not a very good approximation to the desired wedge shape. Nevertheless, the shapes as shown were carefully selected to insure that sectors of the same radius contained within one of the same number of cells. Similarly, the total number of cells contained in any one total 10 mile
~g radius sector is within one of that number contained in any sj -
other. 3.1 NIGHT TIME INCIDENT-TIMEwoF-0CCURRENCE The populations ano uheir locations that would be expected for a night time ITO are cresented in Table B-1. The numbers are shown for the required 16 compass directions and radial dimensions of 0-1, 1-2, 2-3, 3-4, 4-5, and 5-10 miles. The totals for each sector are provided, and all of the numbers are given for 1980, and for 10 year intervals to the year 2020. The projections of population indicate just over a 2.2% growth rate. This rate is sub: 1 antially larger than the eati-mates for C: ' ahoma's growth as a whole, with these estimates ranging from 1.3% to 1.9% in References 1 and 2. In fact, this growth is more than is expected in all of the plume exposure EPZ except for the far westarn edge. This growth, due to the metropolitan Tulsa area, is graphi-cally illustrated by Figures B-9(a) and B-9(b) . These figures are computer generated maps of the plune exposure EF2, showing the densities in persons per square mile, for 19F; and 2020. Growth along the transportaiton corridors is apparent, as is O v B-15
the relatively much smaller growth closer to the SFS site. The highway routes northeast and southwest out of Tulsa are provid-ing a very useful location for urban growth that is almost out-lll ' side the plume exposure EPZ. Of course , the computer model that generated these growth patterns has no way of predicting any particular new real estate development, new highway, or other excgeneous influence. The program was developed to show expansion radially from existing population locations, with the Tulsa growth corridors identified by the LANDSAT images previously discussed. These fiJures also show the relatively sparse populations close to the BFS site. Even by the year 2020, there will be few cells s ith densities exceeding 100 persons per square mile within 5 miles or so of the site. 3.2 WORK TIME INCIDENT-TIME-OF-OCCURRENCE The same population information for the work time ITO is presented in Table B-2. As would be axpected from the discus-sions of the preceeding section, these numbers are substan-tially smaller than for the night time ITO. To summarize these reasons, the plume exposure EPZ simply does not contain work opportunities for the populace, a nd a large portion of the residents clearly commute to surrounding g cities. The same observations are applicable to the school' W capacities, particularly unen considering the -lls located close to the Tulsa and Broken Arrow areas. . . teen schools were located within the 24 by 24 mile square area, with a total estimated student population of 6698. Only three of these schools are inside the plume exposure EPZ, with an estimated total capacity of just 425 students. Recalling the resident night time population for the plume exposure EPZ of over 13,000 persons, such a population clearly has more than 425 school age children. Considerations such as this suppurt the small population numoers as indicated in the table. The 1980 population of under 7000, compared to the night time number of over 13,000, is primarily non-working wcmen, small children and farmers. 3.3 SUNDAY MORNING INCIDENT-TIME-OF-0CCURRENCE The population projections for the Sunday morning ITO are presented in Table B-3 The numbers are very similar to the nig" time table, differing only in that the to tals are s' *butly smaller, indicating some resident 3 leaving the area to actend church, and some sectors containing churches show O B-16
increases. As an example, the NNE, 2-3 mile sector shows an (') increase fran 15.' to 230 persons (for 1980), reflecting a church located it this area. Since relatively few churches
. were found in the area, this ITO is not now felt to be of sur-ficient importance for further study. Future evacuation plan-ning procedures would be better devoted to either tne night time ITO, with the larger numbers involved , or the recreation influences in the summer Saturday ITO to be discussed next.
3.4 SUMMER SATURDAY INCIDENT-TIME-OF-OCCURRENCE The population numbers for the summer Saturday ITO are pro-vided in Tcble B-4 The totals are again smaller than for the night time ITO, reflecting the expected weekend shopping trips of a percentage of the populat'on to the fulsa and other nearby
., commercial centers. Some of the sectors, however, show dra-matic increases due to recreation sites. Sector S, 4-5 miles contains the lock and dam facility, and a population increase from 16 at night to 559 for a summer Saturday (in 1980) is noted. Such changes are substantial and, particularly since roads to recreation sites may be less developed than in high density residential areas, confirm the decision to include this ITO as one of the four to be considered.
3.5 SPECIAL CONSIDERATIONS (w ( While the preceeding sections have rather completely charac-terized the population numbers and spatial locations, there are some special considerations which are not reflected by mere numbers. First, an Amish Mennonite community is located in an area east of the BFS site. This is of importance since many modern technologies are not used by some families. The staunch Men-nonite families use n ither radios nor telavisions, and do not use modern vehicles except for trac tors. Their normal trans-portation needs are filled by horse-drawn buggies. Some of these families are becoming more progressive and are using pic-kups for transportation, and will be able to support neighbor-ing households for transport , tion. The community's church is located three and one-half miles due east of Inola, and one mile south of SH 33 Since these families are exclusively farmers, they are spread over a rather extensive area. While there are only about 40 f amilies, some of them are located over four miles from the church, and hence are included in about a 40 square mile region. If evacuation l plans require special consideration be given to this community, their fanns can be located exactly. Since there are no tele-i phone or electricity service lines to the farm houses, they can l l B-17 l l l
be identified by the aerial photographs available. Second, special notice must be given to rest homes. While O there are currently no such institutions _within the plume expo-sure EPZ, the rural yet convenient to urban areas character of the region would make it suitable for such facilities in the fut ur e . Since the residents of such homes do not have indepen-dent means of transportation, and may require trained health care persennel to move in any case, the development of such a facility should be noted and included in the evacuation plan-ning function. Similarly, future development of businesses J schools could alter particularly the work time ITO popul cion totals and locations. However, since the numbers for this ITO are so much smaller than for the night time ITO, considerable develop-ment would have to occur before any special evacuation problems d eveloped . Finally, the presence of the river navigation system offers the possibilities of cor.siderable future recreational facility d ev elo pment . Such es pansions of facilities would be essen-tially independent of the population in the immediate vicinity, and would result from demands of the nearby Tulsa urban resi-dents. O 1 l l B-18
4.0 LAND USE AND LAND , COVER TYPE MAPPING THROUGH REMOTE SENSING O The Oklahoma State University Center for Applications of Remote Sensing (CARS) was contracted by PSO to perform two par-ticular work-tasks for populations projections. The first was to determine the growth corridors and encroachment of the Tulsa metropolitan area into the plume exposure EPZ around the Black Fox Station. The second was to demonstrate the capability and to appraise the potential of LANDSAT digital satellite data to map land use and land cover types within the 50 mile radius ingestion pathway EPZ.
4.1 INTRODUCTION
TO LANDSAT The LANDSAT series of Earth orbiting satellites have sup-plied data for most of the planet's land surface continuously since July, 1972. Three satellites have been launched and the fourth in the series is scheduled for launch in the last quar-ter of 1981. Two imaging sensor systems operate on the LANDSATS. The first is a television camera system referred to by the acronym RBV, for return beam vidicon. The second is a multispectral scanner (MSS), which produces a continuous image strip built up from successive scan lines extended perpendicular to the for- {} ward direction of the stellites orbital motion (Figure B-10), and divided into 115 by 115 mile swaths or LANDSAT scences. Reflected light from the ground is transmitted by an oscillat-ing mirror in the MSS to a recorder system after passing through filters that select different wavelength intervals of this light (Figure B-11) . Each of the four wavelength channels of MSS and the three channels of RBV possess a predetermined spectral interval or band. 4.1.1 LANDSAT's Sensitivity The detectors that sense in the pre-determine' d bands or slices of the electromagnetic spectrum of LANDSAT are sensitive to different properties or attributes of the same earth surface feature being detected.
- Earth surface features can be highlighted or discriminated i in one band, while the same feature can be obscured or not easily delineated on another LANDSAT band. Generally, band 4 (500-600nm) is sensitive to urban structures; band 5 (600-700nm) is sensitive to vegetation; band 6 (700-800nm) is i
sensitive to geologic features , and band 7 (800-1100nm) is - sensitive to delineating the land / water interface. 1 ) i B-19
In sensing the earth in dircrete wavelengths of the electro- g magnetic spectrum (multispectral scanning), the opportunity for w recognizing the sensed object as distinct from all other back-ground objects because of its unique spectral signature is greatly enhanced . A method of comparing spectral responses in bands is by having the sensed data recorded in the fbrm of digital tapes in order to facilitate comparisons through quan-titative techniques. 4.1.2 LANDSAT Orbit and Resolution Digital data is available from the LANDSAT satellite for a given geographic location every 18 days. Each satellite orbits the Earth 14 times a day actively scanning only during the southward path. The MSS scans an are 185 km wide in a continu-cus swath ( Figure B-11) . The spatial resolution of the MSS aboard LANDSATS 1, 2, and 3 is 1.118 acres or 57 x 79 meters. Over 7.5 million picture elements (pixels) occur in a single 183 x 185 km frame of LAND-SAT MSS data . If two or more land-covers with varying spectral reflectance characteristics occupy a single 1.118 acre pixel, then the resulting values for each band arc determined .v the ratio of the spectral canposition and percent reflectancc of each land cover (Figure B-12) . These border pixels do occur, but generally they are not a significant number in terms of the overall data set. llh A full range of image processing software supplies by the NASA / Earth Resources Laboratory is available at CARS for LAND-SAT digital data viewing and enhancement, statistical manipula-tion, automatic landcover cl assification, and product genera-tion on the CARS minicomputer and image display system (Figure B-13). In addition to the above, LANDSAT digital data can be geographically referenced to a Universal Transverse Mercator (UTM) grid system. A software package is available which resamples the data, removes the distortions and fits the satel-lite data to a UTM northing and easting coordinate system. l Other data sets, such as LANDSAT data 2. om a different date over the same area, soils data from maps, topographic data , rainfall, or slope and aspect can be superimposed onto the ori-ginal LANDSAT data set. These data are often of assistance in interpretation of land cover types not discernable by spectral l reflectance alone. 4.2 LANDSAT IMAGE ANALYSIS LANDSAT color canposite images were used to determine the growth corridors and encroachment of the Tulsa metro politan area into the plume exposure EPZ around the Black Fox Station. O B-20
A LANDSAT color composite image is a color image prepared by () projecting individ ual black and white multispec tral images (obtained by the multispectral scanner) in color. The result-ing color canposite is a falsecolor rendition, similar to color infrared aerial photography. LANDSAT color canposite images at a scale of approximately 1:250,000, covering 115 by 115 miles, and for the years 1972-1979 were used to determine the growth trends, growth cor-ridors, and growth encroachment of Tulsa, Claremore, Fryor, Wagoner , Cowe ta , and Muskogee into the BFS plume exposure EPZ. Tulsa, by far, is the most significant in terms of metropolitan growth and cncroachment into the area. In addition to the MSS LANDSAT color canposite images, RBV black and white images for 1979 were also utilized . The 2BV images provide approximately twice the resolution of the MSS images, but are only recently available due to prior satellite sensor failings. The 1979 RBV data was used to provide greater control and accuracy for mapping current urban and metropolitan conditions, in conjunction with 1979 MSS images over the same area. Ground truth data was gathered to prov4.de additional control and accuracy for proper interpretation of urban. and suburban areas from the satellite images. In addition to image interpretation for 1979, the years of
/T 1972 to 1978 were also mapped from MSS color canposite images. \l Images of all years were chosen for minimal cloud cover, avail-ability at the U.S. geological Survey's EROS data Center, Sioux Falls, South Dakota for quick delivery of orders, good image quality, and good discrimination of urban areas.
I Since ground truth could not be gathered for years past to complement the satellite MSS image interpretations, larger sc al e , more detailed color infrared aerial photography was acquired for the Tulsa area for 1974 to provide more control and assistance in satellite image interpretation. From the interpretation, maps were compiled to show urban growth from year to year. Figures B-3 to B-7 show the growth patterns for the years 1972, 1974, 1976, 1978, 1979, respec-tively. It should be noted that very small urban units have not been attempted to be mapped cue to the resolution limita-tions and slight scale variations of LANDSAT. These figures indicate that the major growth corridors and major urban encroachment into the plume exposure EF: is from Tulsa and heading in a northeast and southeast directions. The other cities analyzed and mapped indicate negligible effects. l I l B-21 l
4.3 DIGITAL PROCESSING OF LANDSAT DATA gg A demonstration of the capability of LANDSAT digital data for the classification of land use and land cover types within a 50 mile radius ingestion pathway EPZ was completed by Center for ApplicEtions of Remote Sensing personnel. 4.3.1 LANDSAT Digital Classification A LANDSAT digital classification is the process of assigning each of the pixels of a LANDSAT scene study area to a class based upon the set of input statistics generated by training set selection and cluster fermation. The unsupervised classi-ficatien technique was utilized in this study and a June 14, 1o75 digital tape was anal yzed . The unsupervised classifica-tion technique consists of a 3 x 3 pixel search of the study area by the computer. This search sought to group into a sta-tiatical class, these pixels with similar reflectance values as detected and measured by LANDSAT sensors. The search routine produced 45 statistical classes. The computer algorithms pro-vided mean reflectance value statistics for all four LANDSAT bands for all the 45 generated classes. The computer does not indicatee the corresponding land use or land cover type associ-ated with the generated classes. The computer can indicate, however, the areal distribution throughout the study area of each of the generated classes through various data output and display m odes . Ground truth information and data secured through photographic interpretation provide the needed informa-llh tion to icentify the particular land use or land cover type asacciated with each computer generated class. Not all the 45 classes generated by the computer and deter-mined by the unsupervised classification apuroach were utilized as a totally unique land use or cover type category. Numerous classes, far example, may represent different types of agricul-tural crops or different conditions of one particular crop type. For demonstration purposes, the general clasa " cropland" is sufficient. The 45 classes were therefore combined into seven general classes. The process of displaying a class or group of classes on the Comtal color video display screen, studying its spatial organi-zation and reflectance statistics in order to combine classes into similar surface cover types is very effee.tive and accu-rate. Each class is displayed on the Comtal screen individu-ally in a bright color to appreciate very small pixel clusters. Classes were combined into the same color to further study spa-tial similarity of classes within the study area for determing usable canputer class combinations. O B-22
4.3.2 LANDSAT Derived Land Cover Type Map O Table B-5 shows the seven land use and land cover classes defined in this study. These classes were chosen because they demonstrate the capability of LANDSAT to map major land use and land cover types over large areas. Figures B-14 to B-17 show various portions of the 50 mile ingestion pathway EPZ which has , been classified according to the seven major land use and land cover types, representative colors, and class combinations show; in Table B-5. Figures B-14 to B-17 are contact prints taken from the Comtal image processing system screen. Other output products are available, such as, eletrostatic prin-ter/plottermaps where symbols represent land uses and land cover types instead of colors (Figure B-18), and Cromalin color processed maps where the erd're study area can be shown with summary statistics including au_.ar of acres per class and per- 1 cent area of each class throughout the entire study area. Graphics can also include labeling of geographic areas on the map, and the use of various grid overlays on the colored maps, such as, Town ship-Range , Latitude-Longitude, and Universal Transverse Mercator. It can be notr* in Table B-5, that the class names may include a combination of major land uses or cover types. This is due to the fact that grassland and pasture, for ex ample , have very similar reflectance statistics during various seasons 5 of the year, and if their discrimination or separation is (~j-s required , a multi-temporal anlalysis may be needed. A similar situation is seen in the case of urban and bare soil in Table B-5. There are some bare soil pixels that have a spectral sig-nature similar enough to urban to be classed together, and dis-played as the same color. This does not mean that the classi-fication is in error, but more data is required , in the form of additional LANDSAT data acquired on different dates than the one employed to adequately differentiate between urban and the isolated pixels which are bare soil. For demonstration pur-po se s , a complex and ccatly multi-temporal analysis was not attempted, but is capabile of being canpleted by CARS person-nel. 4.4 LANDSAT ADVANTAGES FOR LAND COVER TYPE MAPPING The application of LANDSAT data to detect and map land cover types and characteristics was employed because of LANDSAT's repetitive coverage over approximately the name geographic area; regional area utility of LANDSAT data; computer compati-- bility of sensed data for detailed quantitative analysis; and the capability of wavelength detection through the' visible and into the near infrared portion of the electromagnetic spectrum. These characteristics of LANDSAT were important to this study O B-23
because large geograptde areas were analyzed, vegetation and land use discrimination was completed, and statistical summar- llh ies for the various land cover types could be extracted to include acres per mapping class, and its percent area within the study area.
4.5 CONCLUSION
S: USE OF LANDSAT DATA FOR MI.PPING WITHIN THE EMER-GE!CT PLANNING ZONE The Center for Applications of Remote Sensing has special-ized equipment and personnel to analyze and process aerial pho-tography and satellite digital data for land cover-type mapping and resource assessment. The Center has been designated by the National Aeronautics and Space Administration as the state center for remote sensing technology, and has received substantial training and financial support from that administration. The value and applicability o( remote sensing for land cov-er-type mapping has historically been doc umented . The use of LANDSAT digital data for land cover-type mapping within the ingestion pathway EPZ has been demonstrated in this r e po rt . Because of the demonstration status of remote sensing in this project certain factors were generalized (land cov er-type s) , and other factors were simplified (graphics) . Even with these generaliza tions , the demonstration has shown that remote sens- g ing techniques would be of great value in the event of an inci-dent at the BFS. Land cover-type mapping could immediately identify agricultural production areas, surface water, and any other cover types that would have to be examined or tested. In a true application of aerial photography and LANDSAT digital data to land cover-type mapping in an emergency plan-ning zone, the following activities could be accomplished: Greater detail and discrimination in land cover-type map-ping to include such cover-types as:
- orchards
- crop-type
- urban
- suburban
- transportation arteries
- grazing land
- water bodies and rivers and creeks Topographic delineation including:
- elevation
- slope angle
- slope aspect O
B-24
- - drainage basins s_/ - geology
- geomorphology Acreage and percent area measurements per land cover-type:
Grid overlays on graphics, such as:
- township
- range
- Latitude
- Longitude
- Universal Transverse Mercator
- Counties Merging of tabular data, map data, aerial photography, and satellite data to provide digital infonmation per sectors as to:
- citmate
- populations
- land use
- housing
- topography
- wind patterns
- transportation Graphics, to include:
/~T - hardcopy color-coded maps at a variety of scales and kl colors
- color slides and prints
- high resolution electrostatic computer maps
- tabular area summaries In short, the application of LANDSAT digital data for land cove -type mapping, especially over large areas, has high util-ity and numerous advantages over conventional methods. The LANDSAT capability of repetitive monitoring over time and area is essential to up-date data and maintain its usefulness. The wavelength of LANDSAT detector also provides for good land use and vegetation discrimination, and when used in conjunction with aerial photography, additional detail over small areas can be obtained to supplement large area inventories.
i e A w i B-25
) 5_. 0 REFERENCES g (1) Oklahoma Employment Security Commission , Oklahoma Popula-tion Pro jections , Data for State Planning Regions, 1970-2000, Revised January 1979. (2) Second Century Project, Oklahoma's Second Century, Oklahoma State University, 1980. (3) Oak Ridge National Laboratory, Long-Term Projections of Population and Employment to Regions of the United States, Dec ember , 1978. (4) Center for the Application of Remote Sensing , Oklahoma State University. (5) Oklahoma Department of Education, Oklahoma Education Direc-tory, 1978-1979. (6) U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census General Population Characteristics, 1970. O l O B-26
TABLE B-1 BFS AREA RESIDENT POPULATION AND PROJFCTIONS
-' (NIGHT TIME ITO)
RADIAL DISTANCE FROM REACTOR (MILES) 10-MILE SECTOR YEAR 0-1 1-2 2-3 3-4 4-5 5-10 TOTAL N 1980 0 8 67 141 137 510 863 1990 4 8 87 188 176 595 1058 2000 4 10 102 219 207 749 1291 2010 4 23 126 247 253 933 1586 4 2020 5 29 135 261 292 1174 1896 i NNE 1980 0 0 152 235 83 70 540 1990 0 , 0 188 286 96 75 645
; 2000 0 0 225 344 117 92 778 2010 0 0 282 394 150 135 961 a
2020 4 10 354 494 173 207 1242 l () NE 1980 4 4 899 1079 L20 198 2404 i 1990 4 4 1167 1406 273 218 3072 2000 5 5 1406 1695 327 267 3705 2010 7 7 1718 2078 376 349 4535 2020 10 15 2228 2376 414 442 5485 ENE 1980 0 4 4 187 59 309 563
- 1990 0 4 4 68 219 344 639 I
2000 0 5 5 267 83 419 779 i , 2010 0 7 8 314 114 546 989 2020 1 12 23 330 130 674 1170 i E 1980 0 8- 13 12 34 183 250 i ~ 1990 4 9 15 '3 39 200 280 , _ 2000 4 11 18 16 47 246 342 O- 201C 4 14 23 21 61 329 452 4 l 2020 5 21 32 36 82 418 594 B-27
TABLE B-1 (Continued) O SECTOR YEAR 0-1 1-2 2-3 3-4 4-5 5-10 io-81's TOTAL 1 ESE 1980 13 12 12 104 4 130 275 1990 15 13 13 122 4 138 305 2000 18 16 16 148 5 170 373 20'O 23 21 21 184 7 228 484 l 2020 24 27 26 222 9 270 578 i SE 1980 25 21 124 163 49 114 496 1990 29 24 153 208 54 119 587 ] 2000 36 29 183 246 67 147 708 2010 42 37 226 304 84 ~ 200 893 i 2020 42 41 280 376 95 228 1062 SSE 1980 0 54 54 24 13 166 311 , 1990 0 71 63 26 15 177 352 4 2000 0 83 77 32 18 218 428 I 2010 0 42 103 95 23 191 554 2020 2 132 116 52 27 342 671 S 1980 0 25 13 4 16 89 147 1990 4 29 15 4 17 96 165 l' 2000 4 35 18 5 21 119 202 2010 4 43 23 7 28 154 259 2020 7 49 28 8 34 216 342 4 SSW 1980 0 0 0 29 25 259 313 1990 0 0 0 33 28 294 355 2000 0 0 0 40 34 399 473 i 2010 0 0 0 51 44 577 672 O 2020 0 1 0 58 es 785 909 l B-28
TABLE B-1 (Continued) p 10-MILE SECTOR YEAR 0-1 1-2 2-3 3-4 4-5 5-10 TOTAL SW 1980 0 0 0 4 24 626 654 1990 0 0 0 4 25 802 831 2000 0 0 0 5 31 1040 1076 2010 0 0 0 7 48 1254 ;309 2020 0 0 0 8 72 1456 1536 WSW 1980 0 0 0 8 33 3031 3072 1990 0 0 0 9 38 3692 3739 2000 0 0 0 11 46 4682 4739
~
2010 0 0 0 14 57 6178 6249 2020 0 0 0 18 66 8053 8137 W 1980 0 0 21 0 8 398 427 ry (/ 1990 4 0 24 0 8 461 497 2000 4 0 29 0 10 617 660 2010 4 0 37 0 14 969 1024 2020 4 1 42 1 42 1386 1476 WNW 1980 0 4 4 8 0 1562 1678 1990 0 4 4 9 0 1966 1983 2000 0 5 5 11 0 2411 2432 2010 0 7 7 14 0 2932 2960 2020 2 15 22 24 32 3322 3417 NW 1980 0 0 80 121 34 236 471 1990 0 0 100 143 40 279 562 2000 0 0 120 175 48 367 710 2010 0 4 143 202 71 517 937 1 2020 5 11 158 214 126 801 1315 B-29
h l TABLE B-1 (Continued) 4 4 i 10-MILE l SECTOR YEAR 0-1 1 -2 2-3 3-4 4-5 5-10 TOTAL i NNW 1980 0 21 80 79 146 245 571 i i 1990 0 25 108 98 173 280 684 l 2000 0 30 126 116 211 395 878 l 4 2010 0 39 144 165 244 534 1126 2020 5 44 154 190 272 695 1360 i i GRAND ,. TOTALS j 1980 42 161 1523 2198 885 8226 13035 1990 64 191 1941 2768 1054 9736 15754 2000 75 229 2330 3330 1272 12338 19574 2010 88 305 2853 4044 1574 16126 24990 2020 116 408 3598 4668 1931 20469 31190 DATE OF RUN: 08/13/80 1 i 1 ' i
+
i B-30
J
! TABLE B-2 O ars ^"e^ ass 1os"t roeu'itto" ^"o eaoarctto"s (WORK TIME ITO)
- RADIAL DISTANCE FROM REACTOR (MILES) 10-MILF I SECTOR YEAR 0-1 1-2 2-3 3-4 4-5 5-10 TOTAL N 1980 0 2 32 102 65 310 511 l
1990 186 2 42 139 84 361 814 2000 9 2 49 159 99 430 748 2010 9 4 65 191 123 513 905 2020 9 6 87 228 154 626 1110 NNE 1980 0 0 73 431 37 24 565 1990 0 0 90 520 42 26 678 2000 5 0 108 631 51 29 824 2010 5 1 133 771 63 34 1007 2020 5 2 163 942 78 48 1238 NE 1980 1 1 435 657 109 75 1278 4 1990 1 1 526 841 137 82 1588 i ! 2000 4 1 637 997 163 96 1898 2010 7 1 778 1225 199 115 2325 f 2020 10 3 951 1' 246 153 :!866 ENE 1980 0 1 1 85 27 130 244 l
- 1990 0 1 1 99 31 141 273 2000 5 1 1 121 37 171 336 l
l 2010 5 2 1 147 46 208 409
- 2020 5 3 2 181 56 265 512 i
E 1980 0 3 6 4 21 77 111
- 1990 187 3 7 4 24 101 326 i
l 2000 9 4 8 5 29 138 193 i O 2010 9 5 10 6 35 188 253 2020 9 7 12 8 42 251 329 B-31 __,e.-_,_.__._-__,,_ . . _ . - _
i TABLE B-2 (Continued) 10-MILE (lg SECTOR YEAR 0-1 1-2 2-3 3-4 4-5 5-10 TOTAL ESE 1980 6 4 4 48 1 42 105 1990 7 4 4 56 1 44 116 2000 15 5 5 68 1 50 144 2010 20 6 6 83 1 58 174 2020 24 9 8 102 2 86 231 SE 1980 12 9 58 77 19 35 210 1990 14 10 '? 99 21 37 253 2000 20 12 85 116 25 40 298 2010 26 15 105 143 30 45 364 2020 33 19 129 176 39 70 466 SSE 1980 0 26 24 8 6 54 118 1990 0 34 27 8 7 56 132 2000 5 40 34 10 8 65 162 2010 5 50 41 12 10 76 194 2020 5 62 51 16 12 109 255 S 1980 0 11 6 1 5 31 54 1990 186 12 7 1 5 33 244 2000 9 15 8 1 6 39 78 2010 9 20 10 1 7 45 92 2020 9 25 12 2 10 64 122 SSW 1980 0 0 0 17 10 104 131 3 1990 0 0 0 19 11 114 144 2000 5 0 0 23 13 138 179 2010 5 1 0 29 16 167 218 2020 5 3 0 36 20 213 277 ggg B-32
TABLE B-2 (Continued) C' ' 10-MILE SECTOR YEAR 0-1 1-2 2-3 3-4 4-5 5-10 TOTAL SW 1980 0 0 0 1 7 281 289 1990 0 0 0 1 7 318 326 2000 3 0 0 1 8 390 402 2010 5 0 0 1 9 472 487 2020 5 0 0 2 14 591 612 WSW 1980 0 0 0 3 14 1455 1472 1990 0 0 0 3 15 1719 1737 2000 5 0 0 4 19 2097 2125 2010 5 0 0 5 23 2561 2594 2020 5 0 0 6 29 3127 3167 W 1980 0 0 9 0 2 174 185 () 1990 187 0 10 0 2 197 396 2000 9 0 12 0 2 239 262 2010 9 0 15 0 2 294 320 20;0 9 0 19 0 4 364 396 WNW 1980 0 1 1 3 0 794 799 1990 0 1 1 3 0 939 944 2000 5 1 1 4 0 1145 1156 l 2010 5 3 1 5 0 1401 1415 l 2020 5 5 2 6 0 1714 1732 l i NW 1980 0 0 37 56 21 115 229 1990 0 0 48 79 35 124 286 2000 3 0 57 99 42 149 350 2010 5 0 72 125 54 182 438 [)
225 557 2020 5 1 94 162 70 B-33
TABLE B-2 (Continued) 9 10-MILE SECTOR YEAR 0-1 1-2 2-3 3-4 4-5 5-10 TOTAL NNW 1980 0 10 37 142 69 134 392 1990 0 11 58 116 109 139 433 2000 5 14 66 i34 138 168 525 2010 5 17 88 150 173 205 638 2020 5 22 123 154 207 254 765 GRAND TOTALS 1980 19 68 723 1635 413 3835 6693 1990 768 79 893 1988 531 4431 8690 2000 116 95 1071 2373 641 5384 9680 2010 134 125 1325 2694 791 6564 11833 2020 148 167 1653 3524 983 8160 14635 g DATE OF RUN: 08/13/80 0 B-34
TABLE B-3 O BFS AREA RESIDENT POPULATION AND PROJVCTIONS (SUNDAY MORNING ITO) RADIAL DISTANCE FROM REACTOR (MILES) 10-MILE SECTOR YEAR 0-1 1-2 2-3 3-4 4-5 5-10 TOTAL N 1980 0 6 57 119 116 528 826 1990 4 6 71 151 145 618 995 2000 4 8 85 180 174 749 1200 2010 4 10 104 223 213 891 1445 2020 4 25 126 249 264 1025 1693 NNE 1980 0 0 230 199 68 55 552 1990 0 0 287 253 99 65 704 2000 0 0 344 31 122 85 862 2010 0 0 421 386 146 109 1062 2020 0 1 524 501 171 166 1363 () NE 1980 3 3 771 1384 186 158 2505 1990 3 3 1014 1554 373 192 3139 2000 4 4 1227 1883 381 251 3750 2010 5 5 1502 2343 386 326 4567 2020 6 6 2058 2555 420 419 5464 ENE 1980 0 3 3 157 49 290 502 1990 0 3 3 213 73 329 621 2000 0 4 5 262 96 407 774 2010 0 5 12 309 117 509 952 2020 0 to 23 331 134 635 1133 E 1980 0 6 11 9 28 142 196 1990 4 7 13 10 32 175 241 2000 4 8 16 12 40 232 312 0 2010 4 to 19 15 49 302 399 2020 4 14 32 33 78 388 549 B-35
TABLE B-3 (continued) SECTOR YEAR 0-1 1-2 2-3 3-4 8-5 5-10 10-MILE TOTAL g ESE 1980 11 9 9 88 3 100 220 1990 13 10 10 103 3 108 247 2000 16 12 12 127 4 136 307 2010 19 15 15 155 5 169 378 2020 24 19 18 188 6 214 469 SE 1980 21 17 104 138 69 88 437 1990 25 19 127 177 72 96 516 2000 30 24 153 213 89 124 633 2010 37 29 188 267 97 155 773 2020 42 37 229 334 105 192 939 SSE 1980 0 96 45 58 11 127 337 1990 0 123 53 47 30 141 394 2000 0 145 64 56 35 177 477 0 2010 0 179 78 73 39 221 590 2020 0 220 97 92 44 281 734 S 1980 0 21 11 3 12 69 116 1990 4 24 13 3 13 75 132 2000 4 30 16 4 16 94 164 2010 4 36 19 5 21 117 202 2020 4 43 24 6 26 147 250 SSW 1980 0 0 0 23 20 227 270 1990 0 0 0 26 23 257 306 2000 0 0 0 32 28 317 377 2010 0 0 0 39 34 389 462 2020 0 0 0 49 44 476 569 ggg Y B-36
TABLE B-3 (Continued) 10-MILE SECTOR YEAR 0-1 1-2 2-3 33 4-5 5-10 TOTAL SW 1980 0 0 0 3 48 523 574 1990 0 0 0 3 42 617 662 2000 0 0 0 4 51 760 815 2010 0 0 0 5 60 923 988 2020 0 0 0 8 72 1094 1174 WSW 1980 0 0 0 6 27 2580 2613 1990 0 0 0 7 31 3070 3108 2000 0 0 0 8 38 3751 3797 2010 0 0 0 10 47 4570 4627 2020 0 0 0 12 58 5695 5765 W 1980 0 0 17 0 6 350 373 O 1990 4 0 19 0 6 a02 43i 2000 4 0 24 0 8 493 529 2010 4 0 29 0 10 602 645 2020 4 0 36 0 17 868 925 W!M 1980 0 3 3 6 0 1515 1527 1990 0 3 3 7 0 1795 1808 2000 0 4 4 8 0 2198 2214 2010 0 5 5 10 1 2664 2685 2020 0 6 9 18 26 3073 3132 W 1980 0 0 67 102 75 195 439 1990 0 0 82 133 71 224 510 2000 0 0 99 163 82 276 620 2010 0 0 122 194 90 350 756 2020 0 5 148 207 115 507 982 B-37
TABLE B-3 (continued) 0 10-MILE SECTOR YEAR 0-1 1-2 2-3 3-4 4-5 5-10 TOTAL NNW 1980 0 18 67 65 124 200 474 1990 0 21 87 79 154 226 567 2000 0 26 102 90 188 280 692 2010 0 31 125 123 230 354 863 2020 0 41 144 173 256 512 1126 GRAND TOTALS 1980 35 182 1395 2360 842 7147 11961 1990 57 219 1782 2766 1167 8390 14381 2000 66 265 2151 3359 1352 10330 17523 2010 77 325 2639 4157 1545 12651 21394 2020 88 427 3468 4756 1836 15692 26267 O DATE OF RUN: 08/13/80 0 B-38
( T.1BLE B-4 BFS A2EA RESIDENT POPULATION AND PROJECTIONS
- (SUMMER SATURDAY ITO)
RADIAL DISTANCE FROM REACTOR (MILES) 10-MILE SECTOR YEAR 0-1 1-2 2-3 3-4 4-5 5-10 TOTAL N 1980 4 4 101 96 94 339 638 1990 4 4 141 135 125 393 802 2 2000 4 4 1?9 153 145 481 966 i
- 2010 4 6 225 192 180 587 1194 2020 4 8 274 235 220 725 1466 NNE 1980 0 0 106 161 55 41 363
! 1990 0 0 133 195 62 43 433 1 2000 0 0 159 238 78 51 526 l 2010 0 0 194 289 94 65 642
- 2020 0 0 239 356 117 84 796 NE 1980 2 2 62 7 754 150 120 1655 l 1990 2 2 841 1017 191 130 2183 i
2000 2 2 1008 1222 224 156 2614 2010 3 3 1233 1492 279 196 3206 2020 4 4 1506 1822 340 248 3924 ENE 1980 0 2 2 126 39 191 360 1990 0 2 2 147 45 203 399 2000 0 2 2 179 55 257 495 2010 0 3 3 219 67 310 602 2020 0 4 4 270 82 392 752 E 1980 4 5 9 7 22 110 157 1990 4 5 10 7 25 115 166 l 2000 4 7 13 9 31 143 207 (]} 2010 4 8 15 11 37 177 252 2020 4 10 19 14 46 225- 318 B-39
I TABLE B-4 (Continued) 10-MILE SECTOR YEAR 0-1 1-2 '-3 3-4 4-5 5-10 TOTAL ESE 1980 9 7 7 71 2 74 170 1990 to 7 7 83 2 76 185 2000 13 9 9 101 2 90 224 2010 15 11 11 123 3 116 279 2020 19 14 14 152 4 150 353. SE 1980 17 13 84 112 30 63 319 1990 20 15 106 147 33 65 386 2000 24 18 125 172 39 73 451 2010 30 22 155 213 50 98 5e8 2020 36 27 191 263 62 128 707 SSE 1980 0 37 36 14 49 94 230 1990 0 51 41 14 68 97 271 2000 0 59 51 18 92 115 335 2010 0 73 62 22 114 148 419 2020 0 90 76 28 139 190 523 S 1980 4 16 9 2 559 52 642 1990 4 18 10 2 814 55 903 l 2000 4 22 13 2 1100 65 1206 2010 4 27 15 3 1386 84 1519 2020 4 34 19 4 1674 107 1842 SSW 1980 0 0 64 314 16 163 557 1990 0 0 93 453 17 177 740 l 1 2000 0 0 126 610 22 220 978 2010 0 0 159 768 26 270 1223 2020 0 0 192 928 33 338 1491 0 B-40
[f l TABLE 3-4 (Continued) O 10-MILE ! SECTOR YEAR 0-1 1-2 2-3 3-4 4-5 5-10 TOTAL i SW 1980 0 0 0 2 13 415 430 l 1990 0 0 0 2 13 477 492 l 2000 0 0 0 2 15 583 600 ! 2010 0 0 0 3 20 716 739 i 2020 0 0 0 4 26 880 910 WSW 1980 0 0 0 5 21 2097 2123 { 1990 0 O 5 23 2479 2507 t i 2000 0 0 0 7 29 3034 3070
- 2010 0 0 0 8 35 3697 3740 i
I 2020 0 0 0 10 44 4521 4575 W 1980 4 0 13 0 4 50 281 O 1990 4 0 15 0 4 294 317 l 2000 1 0 18 0 4 364 390
- 2010 4 0 22 0 6 442 474 2020 4 0 27 0 8 547 586 WNW 1980 0 2 2 5 0 1142 '151 1990 0 2 2 5 0 1347 135C 2000 0 2 2 7 0 1646 1657 2010 0 3 3 8 0 2006 2020 2020 0 4 4 10 0 2455 2473 NW 1980 0 580 54 83 143 204 1064 1990 0 849 69 96 201 248 1463 2000 0 1148 82 120 270 313 1933 2010 0 1447 101 145 338 385 2416 2020 0 1746 125 178 410 471 2930 B-41
TABLE B-4 (Continued) 10-MILE SECTOR YEAR 0-1 1-2 2-3 3-4 4-5 5-10 TOTAL NNW 1980 0 14 54 52 100 158 378 1990 0 16 78 67 117 174 452 2000 0 20 88 79 144 216 547 2010 0 24 109 97 176 263 669 2020 0 31 135 120 214 328 828 GRAND TOTALS 1980 44 682 1168 1804 1297 5523 10518 1990 48 971 1548 2375 1740 6373 13055 2000 55 1293 1875 2919 2250 7807 16199 2010 64 1627 2307 3593 2811 9560 19962 2020 75 1972 2825 4394 3u19 11789 24474 l DATE OF RUN: 08/24/80 1 B-42
() TABLE B-5 LANDSAT DIGITAL CLASSIFICATION: LAND USE AND LAND COVER Class Name Class Cover Classes Combined Grassland / Pasture Light Green 1, 2, 4, 7, 9, 10, 17, 33 Cropland Medium Green 3, 5, 6, 8, 15, 30, 39 Cropland / Pasture Yellow 11 Forest Black 12, 13, 16, 18, 25 Urban / Bare Soil Purple 14, 19, 20, 22, 24, 26, 27, 41, 43 Bare Soil Orange 21, 34, 36, 37, 42, 44, 45 Water Blue 23, 28, 29, 31, 32, 35, 38, 40 Note: " Classes combined" column indicates which classes of the 45 total classes recognized by LANDSAT and clustered (} by the computer were combined into the same land cover type. Classes 1, 2, 4, 7, for example, are all grouped together representing Grassland / Pasture. Class 1 may actually be sparse grass; class 2 may be dense grass; class 4 m';y be unimproved pasture, and class 7 may be improv ed pasture. They all represent, however, the general land cover category, Grassland / Pasture used in this d emonstration , and therefore should be grouped together. B-43 l
SECTION SURVEY DATA RECORD Nwy 33
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_, _ .6aa A -- J ----- ----x. n.- .. > _ w-- - _ a 2 - - - m m O APPENDIX C Evacuati n Time Estimates O . 1 O
{} APPENDIX C EMERCENCY EVACUATION TIME ESTIMATES STUDY Table of Contents Section Page
1.0 INTRODUCTION
AND GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS C-1 1.1 OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY C-1 1.2 CONDITIONS WHICH MAY IMPACT ON EMERGENCY EVACUATION PLANNING C-2 1.3 PREVIEW OF PROCEDURES AND METHODS OF THIS STUDY C-3 2 ._0 DESCRIPTION OF THE EVACUATION NETWORK AND EVACUATION POPULATION C-6 2.1 IDENTIFICATION OF THE EVACUATION NETWORK C-6 2.2 ASSIGNMENT OF EVACUATING VEHICLES TO THE NETWORK C-6 () 2.3 EVACUATION NETWORK ORGANIZATION: FUNCTIONING OF NODES AND ROUTES C-7 2.4 EVACUATION ROUTE CAPACITIES AND TRAFFIC FLOW C-9 2.4.1 Analysis of Route Capacity in the BFS Evacuation Network C-9 2.4.2 Adverse Weather and Energency Evacuation C-11 2.5 HIGHWAY CAPACITY AND EVACUATION FLOW INTERRELATIONSHIPS C-12 3.0 METHODOLOGY OF THE EVACUATION TIME ESTIMATES MODEL C-14 3.1 STRUCTURE OF THE EVACUATION TIME ESTIMATES PROBLEM C-14 3.2 MODEL CHARACTERISTICS AND GENERAL ASSUMPTIONS C-15 3.3 MODEL INPUTS AND INITIALIZATION C-15 3.4 PROCEDURE FOR DETERMINING MOBILIZATION TIME C-16 3.5 MODELING MOVEMENT AND MOVEMENT TIMES C-16 l 3.6 STATISTICAL ANALYSIS C-17 O C-1
3.7 CONFIRMATION TIME ESTIMATES C-17 llh 4.0 EVACUATION TIME ESTIMATES: FINDINGS AND EVALUATION C-19 4.1 SELECTION OF PLUME EXPOSURE EPZ SECTORS FOR PARTIAL EVACUATION C-19 4.2 EVACUATION TIME ESTIMATE ANALYSIS C-20 , l 4.2.1 Total Evacuation of 1980 Night Time Population Under Normal Weather C-21
4.2.2 Evaluation
Total 1980 Night Time Population I Evacuation, Normal Weather C-22 i 4.2.3 Partial Evacuations of the 1980 Night Time Population; Nornal Weather C-25 l l 4.3 El iUATION OF THE 1980 NIGHT TIME POPULATION UNDER ADVERSE WEATHER C-25 4.3.1 The Total Evacuation Case Under Adverse Weather Conditions C-2 6 4.3.2 Partial Evacuations During Adverse Weather C-2 6 4.4
SUMMARY
OF EVACUATIONS FOR OTHER 1980 POPULATION BASES C-27 4.5 EVACUATION TIME {STIMATES FOR 1990 THROUGH 2020 C-29 lg
5.0 REFERENCES
C-31 TABLES C-1 INFORMATION FOR COLLECTOR AND EXIT NODES: NIGHT TIME C-32 C-2 EXTERIOR INTERSECTION TRA*FIC NODES C-33 C-3 IDEAL FLOW CAPACITIES AND ASSOCIATED TRAFFIC DENSITIES FOR ALL NODE SEGMENTS OF THE EMERGENCY EVACUATION NETWORK OF THE BLACK FOX STATION EMERGENCY PLANNING ZONE C-34 C-4 DISTRIBUTION OF MOBILIZATION TIMES FOR THE BFS/EPZ EMERGENCY EVACUATION MODEL C-35 C-5 1980 POPULATION OF PARTIAL EVACUATION QUADRANTS BY INCIDENT-TIME-OF-0CCURRENCE (ITO) C-36 C-6 STATISTICAL
SUMMARY
- 25 MONTE CARLO TRIALS USING DATA FOR EVACUATION OF TOTAL 1980 NIGHT TIME POPULATION (NORMAL WEATHER) C-5" C-7 MINIMUM EXITING TIME FOR ALL SECTORS: NIGHT TIME C-38 O
C-ii
(} C-8 MAXIMUM EXITING TIME FOR ALL SECTORS: NIGHT TIME C-39 C-9 AVERAGE EXITING TIME FOR ALL SECTORS: NIGHT TIME C-40 C-10 PARTIAL EVACUATION STATISTICS - 1980 NIGHT TIME POPULATION C-41 C-11 AVERAGE EXITING TIME F0h SECTOR N5: NIGHT TIME C-42 C-12 AVERAGE EXITING TIME FOR SECTOR W10: NIGHT TIME C-43 C-13 INFORMATION FOR COLLECTOR AND EXIT NODES: WORK TIME C-44 C-14 INFORMATION FOR COLLECTOR AND EXIT NODES: SUNDAY MORNING C-45 C-15 INFORMATION FOR COLLECTOR AND EXIT NODES: SUMMER SATURDAY C-46 C-16 EVACUATION OF THE 1980 POPULATION BY INCIDENT-TIME-OF-OCCURRENCE, BY SECTORS, AND BY WEATHER CONDITIONS C-47 C-17 EVACUATION TIMES FOR PROJECTED NIGHT TIME POPULATIONS C-48 FIGURES C-1 REGIONAL SETTING AND HIGHWAYS C-49 C-2 HIGHWAY EVACUATION NETWORK C-50
~- .
C-3 EVACUATION ASSIGNMENT ZONES C-51 C-4 EVACUATION TIME COMPUTER MODEL C-52 C-5 MOBILIZ ATION TIME CURVES C-53 C-6 POPULATION SECTORS C-54 C-7 EVACUATION QUADRANTS AND POPULATION SECTORS C-55 C-8 EVACUATION QUADRANTS C-56 l i l l l l L f l O C-iii A
( APPENDIX C EMERGENCY EVACUATION TIME ESTIMATES STUDY
1.0 INTRODUCTION
AND GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS The central purpose of this study is to provide carefully developed estimates for the time required to evacuate popula-tion from the plume exposure Emergency Planning Zone (EPZ) of the proposed Black Fox Station (BFS) nuclear facility in nor-theastern Oklahoma. This research report was prepared by a project research team of Oklahoma State University (OSU). 1.1 OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY The objective of this study is to develop a series of evacu-ation time estimates which at a minimum will satisfy the requirements of a Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) letter dated December 26,1979 (see Appendix E), which provides guide-lines for evacuation time estimates to be developed for nuclear power generating stations (Refer ence 1). Based on the require-ments of the NRC letter, the OSb team has developed evacuation time estimates using 1980 populatio n data which consider: a. ('/T
'- lows:
Partial evacuation of the plune exposure EPZ as fol,-
--Two 180-degree sectors for areas within 2 miles of the facility.
--Four 90-degree sec tors for areas within 5 miles of the BFS site.
--Four 90-degree sectors for areas within 10 miles of the facility.
--Evacuation of the entire plune exposure EPZ.
- b. Evacuation time estimates for both normal and adverse l weather.
- c. Evacuation time estimates for each of four " incident-time- of-occurrence" cases (night time, work time, Sun-day morning, and summer Saturday) .
- d. Total number of evacuation time estimates equals 11 x 2 x 4 = 88. This is based on: 11 areal coverage condi-tions, 2 weather conditions, and 4 incident-time-of-oc-currence conditions.
I
- e. Unique or special conditions which may affect any evac-uation time estimate will be included in the estimate or considered separately.
l i l C-1 i
O
- f. Evacuation time estimates based on projections of 1990, 2000, 2010 and 2020 population numbers, densities and other pertinent characteristics.
1.2 CONDITIONS WHICH MAY IMPACT ON EMERGENCY EVACUATION PLANNING The Black Fox Station and plume exposure EPZ is located in a region of river plain (Verdigris River) and rolling plains land of northeastern Oklahoma. The BFS site is located about 23 miles east of the central business district of Tulsa. The land surface character poses no major, special problems for evacua-tion planning. The Verdigris River presents a minor to po-graphic barrier to movement east-west as it is bridged at only one point within the plume exposure EPZ (on State Highway 33). Figure C-1 is a general map of the area. Population density of the region is relatively low. It has one incorporated town, Inola (1970 population 948), and a few other areas of closely settled rural subdivisions. However, the western portion shows evidence of spreading suburban subdi-vision development associated with the Tulsa metropolitan region. The eastern half of the area is a rather prosperous farming zone with scattered farmsteads. No major facili, ties for institutionalized population exist h within the plume exposure EPZ (e.g., group quarters for the elderly, room and board schools, hospitals, penal facilities), although some smaller centers of group quarters occur plus sev-eral public schools. Mobility of the population is dependent almost entirely upon private automotive vehicles, with school buses the only significant public transportation. The only special population in the region is a small number of Amish Mennonites centered about 3 miles east of Inola. Because of their reluctance to accept many modern conveniences, their notification and evacuation will require special atten-tion. Their case has been discussed in Section 4.3.3 of this report, and will not be considered further in this Appendix. A general statement on the Black Fox Station area is that it occurs in a gently rolling plains region with a sparsely popu-lated rural landscape also containing some sections devoid of population and a few areas of low density urban development. Thus the general character of the area presents no major obsta-cles to the movement of an evacuating population, so long as appropriate consideration is given to notification of the sparse population that an emergency condition exists. O C-2
() 1.3 PREVIEW OF PROCEDURES AND METHODS OF THIS STUDY Attempting to develop a r,talistic model of a complex pro-cess, suc'n as time estimates for evacuating a dispersed, inde-pendent population under energency conditions, requires accep-tance of some limiting assumptions about expected behavior, conditions, rates of change, e tc . Those things we have accepted as "given" were either established 4.nitially or things which we identified , examined, and foua. necessary to limit within the scope of the stud y. These assumptions are clearly defined so that they may be evaluated as more relevant informa-tion beccmes available in the future. Minor assumptions are indicated in appropriate places in this report. Some of the more broadly-based assumptions are: ,
- a. All relevant persons have been given notification to evacuate such that the entire population may be evacu-ated. The procedures and process of notification of official evacuation order are considered in Section 3.3 of this report. This study is concerned only with the evacuation process after notification to evacuate has been given,
- b. All households and institutionalized population will be evacuated. This is a strong assumption--studies of
(~} various other threatening events (including the Three - Mile Island incident) have found that some persons are highly resistant to emergency evacuation orders and may remain unless forcibly removed (Reference 2). Howev er , time estimates for a total evacuation depend upon the time at which the last person leaves the emergency evacuation zone. Thus it is necessary to make an esti-mate (or assumption) of time of departure of the last evacuees. However, some alternative assumptions could be considered. The computer model will be able to pro-vide estimates of the cunulative percentage of the population which has complettd evacuation by time intervals after notification ( for ex ample , percent evacuated after one hour, after two hours, etc) . i l c. All persons will be evacuated by motor vehicle (automo-l bile, truck, and , under some scenarios, by bus) .
- d. All persons will 'ae evacuated from their place of loca-tion at the time of notification. This is a " strong" assumption if behavior of evacuees depends upon indivi-dual decisions (See Reference 3, Pages 48-52). How-ever, this assumption can be replaced only by much more
! detailed additional information allowing incorporation i of other variables in the analysis cn- by a set of O C-3
weaker assumptions. h Identification of problem variables and conditions was accomplished by examination of prior studies of emergency evac-uation planning; from consultations with various fed eral , state, and local officials; from information supplied by the Public Service Company of Oklahoma; and from field observa-tions. In progressing toward the objective of developing evac-uation time estimates, the following procedure was followed:
- a. The population was identified and data were supplied by another OSU sttdy team, whose results were reported in Appendix B (BFS population projections). In order to completely encompass the official 10 mile evacuation planning zone, the total area defined was a square mea-suring 12 miles from the BFS site in each of the four cardinsi directions, resulting in a study area with dimensions of 24 x 24 miles. This area was subse-quently divided in square cells with 1/2 mile sides, crsating a 48 x 48 cell grid or 2304 basic aresl data cells. The population estimates and projections made to the year 2020 are discussed in Appendix B.
- b. All data on population used in the evacuacion time estimates are obtained from the study of Appendix B.
All of the cells within 10 miles of the plant site were included in the area to be evacuated. lll
- c. An emergency evacuation roadway network was identified and access of all households to the network was d efined ,
- d. The evacuation network was subjected to analysis and evaluation with respect to traffic carrying capacity, potential obstacles to movement, and traffic flow rate po tential .
- e. The geographic pattern of population and the evacuation network (with appropriate capacity and flow const-raints) serve at input data to a computerized model of the evacuation process,
- f. After notification to evacuate has been given, the departure time of vehicles leaving vacuating house-I holds is determined by a random " decision" process.
The amount of time between notification and departure is recorded for each household as mobilization time.
- g. Evacuating vehicles are " moved" along the evacuation network with the total anount of elapsed movement tine 9
e C-4
, () depending upon the traffic volumes encountered and the capacity of the routes.
- h. The time required for total evacuation depends upon assumptions about the time of departure and movement of the last vehicle to " clear" the plume exposure EPZ bound ary. However , the evacuation model can provide estimates of the nunber (or percentage of the total nunber) of vehicles which have " cleared" at any of a varied selection of time intervals after the evacuation order has been given--30 minutes after, 45 minutes, an ho ur , 80 minutes, three hours, or otcer period of elapsed time,
- i. Finally, the evacuation time estimates are evaluated and problems of evacuation can be identified and exa-mined.
O O C-5 t'
2.0 DESCRIPTION
OF THE EVACUATION NETWORK AND EVACUATION POPULATION llh In developing a model of evacuation time estimates, essen-tial input data must be identified and specification of model variables must be made in a compatible form. This section reports on the input variables ..hich serve as data inputs to the model of the evacuation process. 2.1 IDENTIFICATION OF THE EVACUATION NETWORK The basic pattern of highways , streets, and roads in the Black Fox Station area is shown on Figure C-1. Information on conditions and characteristics of these roadways was obtained from three sources:
--Survey conducted by Public Service Company euployees during February, 1980 (types and locations of all structures and roads were mapped for every quarter mile grid cell) .
--Publications and maps from the Oklahoma Department of Trans-portation.
--Acrial photographs at an approximate scale of 1"=400' were available for the entire etudy area (date of photography was Dec ember , 1079) .
--Field checks by project team members.
Exit routes for every one-quarter square mile cell uithin the plume exposure EPZ were determined. Estimated nunber of g people and households for each cell was obtained from the PSO W survey and the study of Appendix B. Roads were classified as being either paved , gravel, or dirt. Figure C-2 identifies ( major routes and nodes of the network. ! 2.2 ASSIGNMENT OF EVACUATING VidICLES TO THE NETWORK l l Exit routes for evacuating households (vehicles) were l assigned using the following assumptions: l
- a. People will travel in a direction away from the Black Fox site, given that this choice is possible.
- b. Given a choice, people will exit via the best quality roads available, and thus would choose paved over gravel over dirt.
l c. People will exit via the shortest route available to ! them. Most exit route assignment decisions were rela-L tively straightforwa rd , but occasionally arbitrary l decisions were necessary. For example, a cell's evacu-ation route mig.ht involve a choice between seven miles of dirt or gravel road heading directly away from the Black Fox site , or twelve miles of paved road of which O C-6
() the first two miles require travel toward the site,
- d. For the case of population projected to the year 2020 it was necessary to assume that roads would be con-structed to cells which are presently inaccessible.
Our method assumes that gravel roads would link into existing paved roads and that dirt roads would connect with existing gravel roads,
- e. All persons will be evacuated by private motor vehicle with an average passenger occupancy of three persons per vehicle assumed . While schools will almost cer-tainly evacuate the students by school bus, the evacua-tion model does not treat such buses as a different type vehicle. This analysis assumes that the numbers and capacities of buses are sufficient to evacuate all students in a single trip.
- f. As the number of persons residing in group quarters is rather small in this area, we have assumed that those persons can be evacuated in a manner similar to the rest of the population.
- g. For the town of Inola and environs it was assumed that people would exit in three directions--west, north, and
~% east--and that heaviest movement would be westward
(\--) toward Tulsa. Thus 70% of Inola's population was assigned evacuation via State Highway 33 westward, 20% by S.H. 88 north, and 10% via S.H. 33 eastward. Because of varied rates of mobilization and departure times, only minor traffic congestion was anticipated for the town of Inola, and it was assumed that local traffic control personnel would be available. 2.3 EVACUATION NETWORK ORGANIZATION: FUNCTIONING OF NODES AND ROUTES Each cell of the gridded plume exposure EPZ may be viewed as a point or node of origin for evacuating population . Other nodes on the evacuation network represent other points having special functions in the evacuation process. Three types of evacuation route nodes are recognized in terms of function. However, some nodes may have more than one functional role.
- a. Collector nodes. Each individual cell was assigned an exit route linking it with an intersection where indi-vidual vehicles would be able to enter the traffic flow of a major evacuation route. Collector nodes outside the plume exposure EPZ are identified as nodes 1 - 26; those inside are identified as nodes 27 - 56. Areas O
i l C-7 l L
assigned to each of these nodes are shown on Figure llh C-3. The nunber of vehicles assigned to these nodes under the 1980 night time population distribution is listed in Table C-1. Individual vehicles are assumed to travel from their starting locations to these collector nodes at an aver-age rate of 30 miles per hour under normal weather con . ditions and 15 miles per hour under adverse conditions. The model assumes that there will be no traffic conges-tion problems in this portion of the evacuation trip.
- b. Ex_it nodes. On any given evacuation route, the first recognized node that is outside the plume exposure EPZ is called an exit node, identified as nodes 1 - 26 on Figure C-2. Each exit node is located at an intersec-tion on a major evacuation route. All exit nodes also serve as collection nodes for their own localized area as some vehicles will travel directly to them and enter a major' highway at that point. Some exit nodes, such as node 1 on S.H. 33 west, also serve as important traffic nodes since vehicles from other collector nodes must travel through them.
The calculation of evacuation time includes the time required to leave the ten mile circle en route to an llg exit node. For exanple, the evacuation time recorded for vehicles heading toward node 6 on S.H. 20 (east of Claremore) would not include the three miles of gravel road between the edge of the ten mile circle and Hig h-way 20. The number of vehicles collecting at each of these nodes is given in Table C-1. The total nunber of vehi-I cles exiting through each of these nodes is also recorded in Table C-1. l l c. Traffic nodes. Exit nodes and collector nodes are located at intersections on major evacuation routes to enable the model to simulate traffic flow conditions I and predict possible points of congestion associated with those key intersections. Thus both exit nodes and collector nodes also serve as traffic nodes and the program monitors traffic flow conditions through those nodes. Beyond the exit nodes ten additional exterior inter-section nodes (nodes 57 -66 on Figure C-2) were identi-l fled as potential traffic bottlenecks, possible affect-ing exiting vehicles. These are included in the model C-8
() to determine if traffic congestion at these nodes could cause traffic to backup into the plume ex;7sure EPZ, thus increasing evacuation time. These nodes are iden-tified in Table C-2. 2.4 EVACUATION ROUTE CAPACITIES AND TRAFFIC FLOW Rates of movement in a highway network are dependent both on characteristics of users and the nature of routes making up the network. Capacity of routes and individual route segments depend Lnportantly on assorted design characteristics: number of lanes, width of lanes, alignment and grades, type of roadway sur face , traffic control devices, shoulders, e tc . In turn, capacity is constrained by traffic conditions (user charactere istics): volume of demand for travel, average operating speeds of users, and traffic interruptions (intersections, accid ents , vehicle breakdowns, and variable behavior of drivers) . Thus highway capacity is commonly viewed as a rather complex inter-action between design characteristics and traffic flow conii-tions. 2.4.1 Analysis of Route Capacity in the BFS Evacuation Network Most studies of highway capacity are based on tha only com-prehensive and definitive reference, the Highway Capacity Manual, 1965, published as Special Report 87 by the Highway {-}/ s- Research Board . Our analysis is based on the concepts and principles of that report (References 4-8). The Highway Capacity Manual suggests that the capacity for a multilane (4 or more lanes) highway under ideal, uninterrputed flow conditions is 2,000 vehicles per hour (vph) per lane. Under these conditions on a four lane divided highway, an aver-age of 4,000 vehicles in either direction would pass a given point each hour. This ideal capacity assumes an average oper-ating speed of about 30 miles per hour and a lane density of approximately 66 vehicles per mile (vpm) . On a two lane highway with traffic in both directions the ideal capacity r- ,f flow is 2,000 vph total for both direc-tions. If drivers in a given direction (for example, outward frot the plant site) know that they will encounter no opposing traffic, then the ideal flow rate of 2,000 vph per lane could be realized. Under two way traffic flow, gaps in the traffic stream occur, resulting in the lower capacity due to the reduced traffic density. If traffic were about evenly divided between opposing flows , the ideal capacity at 30 mph would yield a density of about 33 vehicles per mile per lane with flows of 1,000 vph in each direction. C-9
Based on the preceding considerations, various segments of the emergency evacuation network were analyzed to estimate capacity flow and density, which in turn are used in the compu-ter model along with average operating speed as factors which determine the nature and rate of movement in the evacuation
--and thus, evacuation time estimates. The procedures used in developing flow and density are:
- a. Multilane highways. State Highway 33 from a point about two miles northwest of the town of Inola is a modern four lane divided highway without access con-trol. It is a highly important route in the network.
Al so , SH 51 beyond the plume e .posure EPZ toward the west (between nodes 64 and 66) is similar to SH 33 westwa rd . US 66 between nodes 57 and 59 is also four lane divided but of lower quality flow characteristics. To obtain capacity flow, the following equation was used (See Reference 4, page 294): C = 2,000 N W TC
/ where C is the capacity flow (vehicles / hour in one direction); N is the number of lanes in one direction; W is the adjustment weighting for lane width and lateral clearance (shoulder, etc.), from Table 10.2 of Reference 4; and TC is the truck factor at capacity.
Actually this fac tor was not used because it wa s llh assumed that trucks would be excluded from emergency evacuation flows. The high quality characteristics of the segments of SH 33 west and SH 51 resulted in a W of 1.0 for both but in the case of SH 66 segments W = 0.75. The resulting capacity flow data are shown in Table C-3 Although something of a " chicken-egg" relationship exists, it seems logical to view capacity as a function of density, but because of the nature of our data and assumptions it became more effective to derive density from our capacity flow calculations. This was accom-plished by deriving the following equations from rela-tionships discussed in Reference 4 on Page 51 and related pages: ? Headway = 3600 / Volume where Headway is in seconds between vehicles, 3600 is the number of seconds in one ho ur , and Volume is in vehicles per hour. Next, we can use our assumed aver-age operating speed to derive a density estimate: O C-10
O
\# Density = 1 / (Speed x Headway) where Density is in vehicles per mile, Speed is in miles per second and Headway is seconds between vehi-cles. The resulting density estimates are also listed in Table C-3
- b. Two lane highways. All other highways in the Black Fox area are two lane, two directional road s. However, these vary considerably in roadway characteristics.
Using examples from the Highway Capacity Manual (Refer-ence 4) plus some judgemental factors, an attempt was made to realistically adjust capacity estimates. Flow capacities were calculated as: C = 2,000 W D where 2,000 is the total number of vehicles per hour for both lanes, W represents weighting factors found in Table 10.8 of Reference 4, and D is a special judgemen-tal factor. The weighting factor D may be called a directional flow factor and is based on the following argument. It rS is assumed that under emergency evacuation order all (_/ normal traffic on routes approaching the plume exposure EPZ would be halted by traffic control before entering the area. Therefore evacuating traffic would encounter less opposing traffic, allowing for greater ease of passing, and thus higher densities and larger capacity flows. Thus the capacities calculated with the above equation are estimates of the outward flow capacity of each route. The factor weightings used ranged from 0.75 for high quality (wide lanes, wide shoulders, good roadway surface) highways such as SH 33 eastward to 0.55 for low quality, dirt-surfaced section line roads. Data used in developing both the W and D weighting factors were obtained from the Oklahoma Department of Transportation, aerial photography, and field surveys. Table C-3 shows the capacity flow rates and traffic densities for all node segments of all evacuation routes in the network. 2.4.2 Adverse Weather and Emergency Evacuetion As bad weather conditions can hamper any kind of movement of people, such occurrences could be disruptive of emergency evac-uation where time may be critical. Meteorological records for C:') . C-ll
weather stations in the Black Fox area indicate thunderstorms to be the most common type of adverse weather, occurring an lll average of 53 days per year in Tulsa. Heavy f?g is the second most likely type of adverse weather, occurring 10 days per year on the average. Snow and/or ice pellet storms may also cause temporary paralyzing conditions, but have a probabilit t of occurring only 4 days a year in amounts of one inch or more. In view of the low probability of occurrence of snow / ice storms and heavy fogs, our consideration of the impact of adverse weather on emergency evacuation concentrates on potential effects of rainstorms. Severe thunderstorms with heavy rainfall are rather common during the summer six months of the year ( April through Septem-ber) and have occurred in all months in the BFS area. Heav y rainfall often accompanied by high winds and some hail causes a needed reduction in operating speeds of vehicles and increases the likelihood of traffic incidents (accidents, vehicle break-down s , e tc . ) which may slow traffic flow. Also the possibil-ity of flash flooding exists. The technical literature on highway capacity exhibits a not- [ iceable deficiency of studies investigating the effects of rain and other natural environmental hazards on roadway capacity (Reference 9). With little evidence to support our efforts, we found it necessary to proceed under some intuitive logic and g assumptions about the impact of adverse weather. W First, it seems likely that the spacing between vehicles in traffic flow would increase as drivers become more wary of oth-ers --so we adjusted the spacing (headway) . Second, slower average operating speeds seem reasonably predictable--so aver-age operating speed was reduced to 15 mph. Following these adjustments to headway (spacing) and average operating speed , the capacity flow rates and segment densities
~
were recomputed using the adjusted data. The results of these calculations are shown under the adverse weather case in Table C-3 l 2.5 HIGHWAY CAPACITY AND EVACUATION FLOW INTERRELATIONSHIPS The model assumes that traffic will flow at an average speed of 30 mph under normal weather conditions and at 15 mph under adverse conditions. Along with other assumptions about traffic cond itions , the node segment capacities and densities are l developed as shown in Table C-3 and these in turn become data l inputs to the evacuation time estimates model . The number of
- vehicles expected to use mest of the evacuation routes is far below these maximtm capacities. With lower traffic volumes, l
! C-12
/
( speeds greater than 30 mph would be expected under normal con-ditions. For exanple, vehicles at node 40 moving east on SH 33 would travel the six miles to exit node 9 in 12 minutes at 30 mph, but would require only 6 minutes at a speed of 60 mph. Our model errs on the conservative side in such cases by pred-icting a larger evacuation time. The model assumes that all roads within the evacuation-im-pacted area will remain two-way (two-directional) . This allows for inward access of emergency vehicles. However , we also assume that local authorities will close the road network to inward flow of non-evacuation related traffic. For that reason we introduced a direction bias ( weighting) in calculating the at-capacity ficw rates for two lane highways. The intricate interrelationships between capacity, traffic density, and operating speed are viewed as the critical behav-ior which when combined with the geographic distribution of the population at risk enable the model to simulate the evacuation process. The result is a set of evacuation time estimates der-ived from clearly defined process rules and limiting assump-tions. - O e O . C-13
3.0 METHODOLOGY OF THE EVACUATION TIME ESTIMATES H0 DEL Under NRC policy guidelines, total time required for evacua-tion of an emergency planning zone (EPZ) has four main compo-nents:
--Notification time (time needed to notify all population to be evacuated after an emerge.ey evacuation decision has been made).
--Mobiliza tion time (time span between notification of the population and their departure; this is sometimes called pre-paration time) .
--Travel time ( following departure from their location when notified, the time actually expended in moving out of the EPZ).
--Confirmation time (time required to confirm that the popula-tion at risk has been evacuated).
As stated previously, this study was required to consider only mobilization time, travel time, and confirmation time in devel-oping evacuation time estimates. There fore , the model des-cribed below does not incorporate any element of notification time. 3.1 STRUCTURE OF THE EVACUATION TIME ESTIMATES PROBLEM As identified for model development, the components of evac-uation time are estimates of mobilization time (TM), travel llh time over local access roads (TLT), and travel time on primary network roads (TPT). The distinction made between local and primary evacuation network roads was discussed in Section 2.0 of this Appendix . It is assumed that mobilization time is random and TLT and TPT are variable depending on distance, types of highways trav-eled , and traffic congestion. _ Each vehicle within the EPZ leaves its starting location at some random time TM and proceeds along a local access road until it reaches one of the primary routes at a collector node. These nodes where vehicles must enter a primary route represent points where queues may form if the primary road is congested. A vehicle arrives at the collector node, waits in a queue (if necessary) before entering, and then moves onto and along the primary evacuation route. Subject to traffic congestion, the vehicle reaches the boundary of the evacuation zone ar.d contin-ues onward to some designated area. The total evacuation time for a given vehicle is TTOT = TM + TLT + TPT. O l C-14
() The time TLT is assumed to be non-rar. dom and strictly a function of distance and speed. Because of traffic congestion, TPT will exhibit random variations because of the randomness in TM. The calculation of TTOT is performed for all vehicles within the evacuation zone. After most of the vehicles have left a given area within the zone, an evacuation confirmation team would move into the area to assess the status of the evacua-tion. 3.2 MODEL CHARACTERISTICS AND GENERAL ASSUMPTIONS Based on the preceding conceptual structure, a computer model was developed to determine evacuation time estimates. Use of a computer model not only provides estimates of TTOT for specific vehicles and areas but also pinpoints potential bott-lenecks to evacuation movements and indicstes those areas likely to be evacuated last . A flow chart of the computer model developed to determine evacuation time estimates is shown as Figure C-4. The six { modules of the model perform the following functions:
--Model inputs and initialization
--Determine mobilization time (TM) p/ --Calculate travel time over local access roads (TLT) s- --Determine movement time over primary network routes (TPT)
--Perform statistical analysis.
--Determine confirmation cime.
Each of these modules is described in detail later in this sec-tion. One general assumption is that mobilization time of indivi-dual household units can be sdequately described by a given probability density function (Reference 10). Based on data from Section 2.0, traffic capacities (vehicles per hour) and node segment densities (vehicles per mile) are used as model inputs to predict traffic movement. Another assumption is that j the use of repeated computer runs (Monte Carlo trials) provides l a statistical base which can be analyzed in order to assess expected model accuracy. 3.3 MODEL INPUTS AND INITIALIZATION M.dule 1 of tlc computer model performs the initialization of the program, including the insertion of all physical data describing the EPZ boundaries, the populstion in each cell, the primary roadway network segment in terms of lengths (miles), capacities (vehicles per hour) , and densities (vehicles per mile) , and all local access roads with their lengths,
- O .
C-15
capacities, densities, and conditions (paved , gravel, or dirt) . In addition, Module 1 indicates the incident-time-of-occurrence (ITO) and whether normal or adverse weather conditions are in effect. 3.4 PROCEDURE FOR DETERMINING MOBILIZATION TIME In Module 2, mobilization time is generated randomly for each vehicle in all cells within the pime exposure EPZ boun-dary. Reports on the Three Mile Island incident were investi-gated, but these were of little aid because the evacuation was both partial and highly tentative (References 2 and 11). Lack-ing a clear precedent, estimates of mobilization times become an arbitrary decision. It appears reasonable to assume that the maximtra number of vehicles are being mobilized approxi-mately a half hour after the population is warned to evacuate. Moreover, we expect that only a few vehicles remain to be mobi-lized after an hour following notification and that all are mobilized within two and a half hours. The evacuation model assumes a curve (Figure C-5) which results in the distribution.of mobilization times presented in Table C-4. The random variable TM is generated to obey the Rayleigh probability density function given by (-2 x (TM) x (TM)) f(TM) = (4) x (TM) xe , which has a peak when TM is equal to 0.5 hours (shown as 30 minu'c es in Figure C-5) . Values of IM above 2.5 hours are disre-garded and new values generated. 3.5 MODELING MOVEMENT AND MOVEMENT TIMES f In Hodule 3, assumed capacities, speed of travel over local access roads, and their lengths are used to calculate the res-l ponse time over local access roads TLT). The sum of TM and l TLT is formed and arranged in ascending order for all vehicles assigned to a particular node for entrance onto the primary roadway network. A vehicle which has arrived at a node on the l primary roadway network is either allowed to enter upon the primary road immediately or wait until the congested traffic has clear ed enough to provide a space for another vehicle. Time is incremented while the vehicle waits in the queue, thus adding to the time of travel along the primary road (TPT). When a space is available, the vehicle enters the primary road and travels amid congested traffic along this road toward the exit node at the zone boundary. The two alternating steps in O
~
C-16 L
() the process of load and flow occur during each time interval to produce an effective " pulsating" operation in terms of calcula-tions performed for this potential "stop-and-go" traffic pat-tern. The travel time TPT for a given vehicle is determined when the vehicle leaves the evacuation zone. These operations in Modules 2, 3, and 4 are repeated for all primary roadways. 3.6 STATISTICAL ANALYSIS Repeated Monte Carlo trials are performed as indicated in Figure C-4 to form a sufficient statistical base for estimating evacuation time. The computer model simulates evacuation by using 25 different sets of random mobilization times in order to estimate an average expected result and expected variations (standard deviations) . Module 5 performs these statistical analysis calculations. 3.7 CONFIRMATION TIME ESTIMATES Confinmation time estimates in Module 6 are based both on the results of the statistical analysis of Module 5 and the particular assignments of evacuation confirmation teams to } given areas within the plume exposure EPZ boundary. While pre-cise estimates of confirmation time depend largely coon the planning of local emergency management decisions, we ;an pro-(} vide an estimate based on a reasonable assignment of confirma-tion person el. Using ti sse results from Module 5 identifying the last areas of total evacuation within the plume exposure EPZ, we' assign confirmation teams to verify that designated areas have been completely evacuated. The number of confiraation team person-nel to be assigned to each area depends upon the relative esti-mated evacuation time, the population density, and the total number of miles of local access roads within that area. These teR:s would begin their confirmation tasks even before the last evacuees have left the area, requiring some back-tracking to account for these special cases. For ex ample , confirmation within an area might begin when 99% of the population has been evacuated; the remaining 1% can be identified by the confirma-tion team and their evacuation can be verified when they arrive at a particular collector node for entry onto a primary road . If the confirmation team within an area begins its work too early, the number of such special cases becomes too large. On the other hand, postponing the start of confirmation until an area is completely evacuated unnecessarily increases the total time for evacuation and confirmation. Ideally, the assignment of confirmation personnel to spe-cific areas within the plume exposure EPZ should be aimed at O C-17 i
1 i l l completing the confirmation tasks within all areas at approxi_ l mately the same time after notification for the evacuation. l l l 1 1 1 l l l l I r i l l l 1 l l l l l l 1 l 1 l 1 l 1 l O ' I c-18 1 1
4.0 EVACUATION TIME ESTIMATES: FINDINGS AND EVALUATION (} Coupling of the study structure and data of section 2.0 with the process model of section 3.0 yields the required evacuation time estimates. These estimates are reportad , analyzed , and evaluated in this section. Cx amination of the tiae estimates is preceded by a definition and discussion of the geographic sectors of the Black Fox plume exposure EPZ used for considera-tion of partial evacuation as per NRC requirements. 4.1 SELECTION OF PLUME EXPOSURE EPZ SECTORS FOR PARTIAL EVACUATION Using the 1980 night time population distribution (See Appendix B) as the base, sectors were geographically oriented in order to place as large a population as possible in a given sector (this might be called a "maximte risk sector" ) without dividing major concentrations of population. Stated another way, in defining the sectors we attempted to place sector boun-daries through zones of low population density. In the plume ex posure EPZ , the major population concentrations of concern are the Inola area (NE population sector, 2 to 5 mile band) and suburban Broken Arrow (WSW population sector, 5 to 10 mile band). The term population sector refers to the area subdivi-sions identified in Appendix B for developing population esti-mates and projections (See Figure C-6) . (")N (_ An orientation 33.75 degrees west of north (33.75 degrees east of south) was selected as the most appropriate trend for the 90-degree sectors. This resulted in the fc110 wing associa-tion between these sectors (which will be called evacuation quadrants ) and the population sectors: Evacuation Quadrant Associated Population Sectors North NNW, N, NNE, NE East ENE, E, ESE, SE South SSE, S, SSW, SW West WSW, W, WNW, NW The Inola area falls within the North evacuation quadrant, and the Broken Arrow suburban area is contained withir the West quadrant. Within the two mile radius, portions of the North and East evacuation quadrants were combined to fbrm one 180-deg ae sec-tor (identified as NE2), with the South and West pc ; ions of the two mile radius band fonning the other ( termed SW2) . As the two mile circle around the BFS contains only 3% of the 1980 po pulation , and since it seemed unlikely that only one half of the two mile band would be evacuated during an emergency, the evacuation time estimates for the five and ten mile quadrants C-19
include the entire two mile circle. See Figure C-7 and Figure C-8. The discussion of partial evacuation uses the terminology N10 to refer to evacuation of the North quadrant out to the 10 mile boundary of the plume exposure EPZ; NS refers to the North quadrant being evacuated only out to the boundary of the five mile distance band. Thus N10 includes N5, and both include NE2 and SW2. For analysis purposes, if any part of a cell fell within an evacuation quadrant, the entire cell's population was included within the evacuation of that quadrant. Thus cells intersected by an evacuation quadrant boundary, such as on the line between the NW and NNW population sectors, would be included in evacua-tion time estimates of both quadrants (in this exanple in both N10 and W10). It was decided that in a partial evacuation it is better to e' r on the cautious side and evacuate too many rather than to) few. Because of this double-counting, the sum I of the partial evacuation ;opulations exceeds the total popula-tion by about 24%. The total population for each of the partial evacuation qua-drants is g'.ven in Table C-5 for each of the four 1980 inci-dent-time-r.f-cccimrence population distributions. Pre..iling wind direction is another possible criterion for O selection of evacuation quadrant orientation, but was consid-ered to be less critical than population distribution. It should be noted , however, that the predominant winds (and espe-cially strong winds) are from the south, making the North qua-i drant the most likely to be evacuated under a partial evacua-l tion order. As cold fronts pass through the area, the l prevailing wind shifts to northerly, making the South quadrant the next most likely to be evacuated. East and west winds are much less frequent and less violent, thus reducing the proba- - bility of a partial evacuation of those quadrants. 4.2 EVACUATION TIME ESTIMATE ANALYSIS This section summarizes the results of 88 separate evacua-tion simulations resulting from analysis or:
--four different ITO population distributions for 1980 repre-senting where the population is located should an emergency incident occur at night time, work time, Sunday morning , or summer Saturday.
--for each population btse , a total evacuation and 10 partial evacuations by area ss noted earlier (and outlined in NRC guid elines) .
--consideration of both normal and adverse weather cases for e
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(q _) each of tha 44 combinations of ITO population bases and evac-uation area types. This results in a total of 88 separate evacuation :mulations: 4 ITO population bases times 11 types of evacuation areas times 2 types of weather conditions. Four othcr evacuations are also included in order to inves-tigate the relationship between evacuation time and projected population growth in the arca. These four simulations are based on only the cases of total evacuation under normal weather conditions using the night time population distribution for 1990, 2000, 2010, and 2020. As Appendix B contains popula-tion projections for all ITO geographic distributions for each decade 1990 - 2020 it would be possible for us to make 88 simu-lations for each projection year. But as this is expensive, largely redundant, and involves some strong assumptions about future transportation conditions, we have elected to run only the four simulatione described above. One of these 92 separate cases of evacuation time estimation will be given a detailed discussion below, in ordsr to demons-trate the capabilities of the model and the level of detail available as output. The remaining 91 cases will then be sum-marized in tabular form for easy comparison. ('l 4.2.1 Total Evacuation of 1980 Night Time Population Under Normal Weather Output from the computer model includes the following infor-mation :
- a. A table showing the number of vehicles entering an evacuation route at each collector node, and number of vehicles leaving the plume exposure EPZ at each exit node (Table C-1).
- b. A table showing the average evacuation time for the 25 Monte Carlo runs, as well as the standard deviation and range (Table C-6). Note that each of the 25 Monte Carlo runs represents a different simulation of the evacuation based on a different random distribution of mobilization times. Since in reality there is no way to predict who will be on the road in fifteen minutes and who will take two hours, this approach allows for the possibility that those who are slow to pack up could be located anywhere within the plume ex posure EPZ. By usirg 25 separate and different simulations, the probability of being misled by a single unusually rapid, or anusually slow, evacuation is greatly r ed uc ed .
O(_/ C-21
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- c. Tatles which show the detailed progress of the evacua-tion every five minutes by major exit routes and nodes.
Tables C-7, C-8 and C-9 show the details for the fas-test, slowest, and average evacuations of the total 1980 night time population under normal weather condi-tions,
- d. When traffic congestion occurs, the program reports the node ir.volved and the number of vehicles delayed. Two types of traffic problems are monitored : (i) a node may become a bottleneck causing traffic to back up slong a maj(- exit rot.e. Nodes 24 and 52 on 71st Street near Broken Arrow are exanples of this problem.
(ii) a major route may be operating at or near capacity resulting in a delay for vehicles attempting to enter the evacuation network at nodes along that portion of the route (i.e. , an entry queue fo rm s) . Nodes 52 and 53 on 71st Street encounter this problem.
9.2.2 Evaluation
Total 1980 Nigh; Time Population Evacuation, Nor-l mal Weather Dais evacuation situation has been selected for detailed evaluation ,
- a. The average evacuation time for the 25 simulations was 143 minutes with a standard deviation of 8 minutes.
Statistically this means that for a large number of similar evacuations, two-third s of outcomes would
. eport an evacuation time between 135 and 111 minutes (plus or minus one standard deviation) and t. tat 95% of the results would be in the 127 to 159 minute range.
The actual simulations made ranged from a low of 127 to a high of 160 minutes,
- b. In the nodel, mobilization time is the major canponent of total evacuation time. While 99% of the population are rcady to move in one hour and 24 einunes, achieve-ment of 99% evacuation occurs about 21 minutes later (one hour and 45 minute mark). For most vehicles travel time is relatively small.
- c. Traffic problems were encountered only along the 71st Street exit route heading into Broken Arrow. This is a fairly highly suburbanized part of Broken Arrow, with over 3,000 population in the 5 to 10 mile portion of the WSW population sector. Most of these residents probably use 71st Streoc, a narrow two lane paved road ,
as their normal access route and it would be their O C-22 I _ _ _ _
{} natural exit under emergency cond itions. In an emer-gency, traffic congestion along this route should be anticipated and traffic control personnel should be made available. In the long run, if population in this area continues to grow, improvement of 71st Street and provision of alternative access routes would be advisa-ble. The model predicted traffic delays on 71st Street as early as 15 minutes after time of notification. The problem became serious (involving over 50 vehicles) after 25 minutes and reached a peak (involving 280 veh-icles) after one hour and five minutes. Congestion then declined gradually such that after one hour and 35 minutes it was no longer serious, and cleared com-pletely by the one hour and 45 minute mark. None of the other exit routes experienced enough traffic congestion to seriously impede the flow of traffic along the route or to prevent vehicles from entering an evacuation route at their access node.
- d. In spite of the predicted traffic congestion on 71st Street, in only three of the 25 simulations was that area the last to be evacuated. Most often (17 of 25 trials) SH 33 heading toward Tulsa was the last route O to be cleared.
This evacuation route incluies most of the Inola population and is the largest exit route in terms of number of vehicles. The larger nunber of vehicles assigned to that route increases the probability that one of those vehicles will be the last to mobilize and start on the road. In addition, vehicles from Inola have farther to travel before they leave the plume exposure EPZ than those from suburban Broken Arrow. It is reasonable that SH 33W would be the lasc exit node to complete its evacuation. Node 18, to the south, was the last node to evacuate on three of the 25 simulations.
- e. Attention shoud be drawn to the time differences bet-ween a 99?. completed evacuation and 1005 (Tables C-7 to c-9). On the average, 99% of the population was evacu-ated within 105 minutes after first notification, c om-pared with 144 minutes for the entire population. This
- indicates that it required an additional 39 minutes for the stragglers, those with the longest mobilization times, to be evacuated. This is probably quite O
C-23
realistic. It also suggests that in this example con-firmation could begin at the 105 minute mark instead of waiting until 144 minutes have passed; that is, confir-mation could begin approximately 40 minutes before the projected ;00% evacuation time. In any of the low population se ? tors, confirmation could reasonably be started still varlier.
- f. It is assumed that at a minimtra the available manpower for confirmation teams consists of two deputies each from the three County Sheriff Departraents and ten guards from the National Guard. Their activity would be to survey by automobiles and one helicopter to ver-ify that evacuation had occurred.
Forming eight tit-man teams from these deputies and guards, we could then assign two teams to the Broken Arrow area (71st Street exit route), three teams to the Ir.ola area (33rd West exit route), and one team each to the areas with 33 East and 88 North exit routes. Each of these teams would be in an automobile. The remain-1 ing team would i e placed in a helicopter to survey the entire southeast area of the pitzne exposure EPZ. Based on about 50 miles of local access roads in scattered areas at 25 miles per hour and about 15 miles in densely settled areas at 15 miles per hour, we esti-g mate that the Broken Arrow area can be covered by the two confirmation teams in approximately an hour and a half. Starting at 105 minutes after notification of evacuation, these confirmation teams complete their assigrrnent with a total time for evacuation and confir-mation of ~195 minutes, or 41 minutes after total evacu-ation has occurred. In the Inola ares, we estimate that the three teams can cover approximately 65 miles of local access roads in scattered areas (at 25 miles per hour) and about 25 miles in densely settled areas (at 15 miles per hour) in approximately an hour and 25 minutes. Beginning this confi.rmation at 115 minutes after notification for evacuation gives a total time for evacuation and con-firmation of 200 minutes, or 46 minutes after total evacuation has occurred. The Broken Arrow area and the Inola area are the two
" worst case" areas, having the largest populations and most likely to be the last to complete evacuation.
Since the other areas can begin verification sooner, we estimate that the other teams, including the helicopter e C-24
() team, can complete verifications within the total time of approximately 200 minutes ( i .e . , 3 hours and 20 minutes) for the evacuation and confirmation of the entire plume exposure EPZ. 4.2.3 Partial Evacuations of the 1980 Night Time Population; Normal Weather The left side of Table C-10 sunmarizes the nunber of vehi-cles involved and the average, minimtm, and maximum evacuation time estimates for the ten partial evacuations. Of these, the North 10 mile and North 5 mile quadrants required the largest amount of time. This was expected as the Inola population is included in both of these evacuations, and the Inola population was usually the last evacuated in the total area evacuation discussed above. The time difference for these two partial evacuations is not significantly different than that ??r total evacuation. And, as noted before, most of the time is account-able to mobilization rather than travel. Table C-11 provides an evacuation summary for the NS quadrant. Consid tring the other partial evacuations, only the West 10 mile quadrant involves a large population--the Broken Arrow suburban area. Nearly 50% of the total population resides in that quadrant, with 90% of that living in the five-to-ten mile portion of the quadrant. Simulation of this quadrant's evacua-k/']'
~
tion reveals the same traffic congestions problems along 71st Street which were discussed earlier in total evacuation. The evacuation summary for this quadrant appears in Table C-12. None of the remaining partial evacuations involve more than 15% of the total population. Average evacuation times ranged from one hour and 57 minutes to two hours and 13 minutes, with the largest amount of elapsed time attributable to mobilization delays. No traffic problems were observed for any of these partial evacuations. 4.3 EVACUATION OF THE 1980 NIGHT TIME POPULATION UNDER ADVERSE WEATHER As indicated in prior discussion above, under adverse weather conditions the model assumes that the average travel speed of vehicles would be reduced to 15 mph. This should increase evacuation times for two reasons. First, it would double the driving time required to traverse the exit route for each vehicle, since the speed is cut in half. Second , for most routes both traffic capacities and densities would be reduced because of the slower speeds (See Table C-3). This in turn should increase traffic congestion and result in more and lon-ger delays in both entering and moving along evacuation routes. O - C-25
Results of the adverse weather evacuations are summartzed in lh the right side of Table C-10. 4.3.1 The Total Evacuation Case Under Adverse Weather Conditions As expected , the total evacuation time increased consider-ably to an average of three hours and 39 minutes conpared with two hours and 23 minutes under normal weather conditions. Most of the additional time resulted from increased traffic conges-tion being predicted along the 71st Street evacuation route in the West quadrant. Except for the SH 33 west exit node, involving the Inola tra ffic , the model predicted that all other quadrants would be totally evacuated within two and one-half hours. The SH 33 west exit node (node 1) was the next to the last (after 71st Street) to clear in 24 of 25 simul 9tions. It cleared in an average of two hours and 45 minutes for the 25 trials, and required less than three hours in all but one run. The model predicted the beginning of traffic problems on 71st Street as early as 15 minutes after notification, with serious delays starting after about 25 minutes. Congestion peaked at about one and one-half hours after notification, involving approximately 700 vehicles, after which it gradually declined until the evacuation was complete. lll Other than brief and slight intermittent slowups on SH 88 and SH 33 west, the model did not predict serious traffic prob-lems on any other evacuation routes during adverse weather con-ditions. 4.3.2 Partial Evacuations During Adverse Weather While all of the partial evacuations took slightly longer under adverse weather conditions, as expected , the predicted evacuation time for most increased by only 20 to 25 minutes (See Table C-10) . This increase is mainly due to the reduced speed of 15 mph which doubled the time needed to travel a fixed distance. Bottleneck effects (stoppages, e tc .) did not increase significantly on most routes. The fact that total evacuation time was increased only by a relatively small and constant factor under adverse weather reflects that mobiliztion time, rather than travel time, is the major contributing fac-tor. Only the West 10 mile quadrant shows a greatly increased evacuation time (77 minutes longer than under normal condi-tions). This increase is similar to that obtained for total evacuation and is caused by the same traffic problems along the O C-26
() 71st Street evacuation route, as discussed in the preceding section. 4.?
SUMMARY
OF EVACUATIONS FOR OTHER 1980 POPULATION BASES Total and partial evacuations fcr other incident-time-of-oc-currence (ITO) population distributions (work time, Sunday morning, and summer Saturday) under both normal and adverse weather conditions were also simulated. Tables C-13, C-14, and C-15 list the nunber of vehicles assigned to each collector and exit node for a total evacuation based on each of these three ITO population distributions. Compared to the night time population base, the total number of vehicles evacuating is smaller for each of the other ITO population distributions. This suggests that, although various problems of evacuation planning might be encountered with a more dispersed population such as during the middle of a work day, a Sunday morning, or a summer Saturday, the lx+ gest number of vehicles to be evacuated would be associated with the resi-dent population when most household members are at home during a weekday night. Although a few individual collector and exit nodes show an
. (~ increase in number of vehi,cles, most do not, and more bnpor- \ tantly the number of vehicles using the two major evacuation routes. SH 33 west from Inola (exit node 1) and 71st Street near Broken Arrow (exit node 24), is decreased in all cases.
For exit node 1 the decrease ranges from about 5% for Sunday morning, to about 10% for summer Saturday, to as high as 47% on a work day. Comparable figures for exit node 24 are 14% on Sunday morning,10% sunmer Saturday, and 59% on Sunday morning. i The reduction in number of vehicles is largely due to vary-ing proportions of the resident population that are in Tulsa at a given time fbr purposes of work, shopping, or leisure. The assumptions and methodology used in estimating the different ITO population distributions are fully discussed in Appendix B. Average evacuation times and standard devis; ions for these 66 runs are summarized in Table C-16. Summary statistic; for the night time ITO simulations are also included in the taole for purposes of easy canparison. The effect of the reduced number of vehicles for the three other population bases can be seen by comparing the total evac-uation time for the 88 different evacuations. As expected , the average evacuation time for the other ITO population distribu-tions was generally less than the night time ITO evacuations. C-27
Except for 71st Street, no serious traffic problems were encountered on any of the other 66 simulations. Because of the lll reduced traffic , congestion along the 71st Street evacuation route was never as bad as for the night time ITO cases. In the case of a work day ITO, there was no traffic flow problem under normal weather conditions and even under the assumption of adverse conditions, the traffic problem lasted less than forty minutes and involved fewer than 100 vehicles at its peak per-iod. A few of the results presented in Table C-16 appear unusual and require some explanation. For example, on a stormy Sunday morning, why did it take longer to evacuate 217 vehicles for the S5 quadrant than it took to move 659 vehicles from the South 10 mile quadrant, which in fact includes the other 217 vehinles? The nature of the Monte Carlo randomization process acounts for these apparent anom alies . The details of the simulation output reveal that the SS evacuation times ranged from a low of 129 minutes to a high of 186 minutes, while the 25 simulations of the S10 evacuation ranged between 135 and 171 minutes. Com-paring the 25 simulations for these two partial evaceations reveals that the SS quadrant emptied more quickly eleven times, compared with thirteen more rapid evacuations for the S10 qua-drant. In other words, the two evacuations essentially take ggg the same amount of time. In fac t , the difference between the average evacuation times is only a matter of a few minutes, a nd , given the size of the standard deviations, would not be considered statistically significant. Thus such apparent inconsistencies are easily within the range of statistical probability and are most likely the result of the random variations in the assignment of mobilization times. As noted earlier, mobilization time accounts for the major portion of all of the evacuation time estimates predicted by the computer model . It is also reasor.able to expect that evacuation times for the five mile quadrants would differ little from those for the corresponding ten mile quadrants. It is likely that the last vehicles to exit in a ten mile partial evacuation come from within the five mile portion of the quadrant anyway. The ran-dom process usually assigns a long mobilization time to at least some of the households idthin the five mile radius (prob-ably quite realistically) , at which point their longer exit trip would frequently make them the last to exit. Conse-quently, Lne average time required to canplete the two partial evacuations would be about the same since the average in both cases is heavily dependent upon the same people, those within l 1 l l c-28 l
() the five mile radius. If evidence would support it, an alternative to this problem would be to assume that people nearer the nuclear power site would perceive danger as more imminent and mobilize more rapidly. Therefore for populations within the five mile radius, the probability density function generating mobiliza-tion times could be designed to have a lower mean departure time and truncated at a lower upper ibnit for departure. In reality, there is not much to support this contention as there always seems to be laggards or resisters no matter how threat-ening the incident (for ex anple , Harry Truman and Mt. St. Helen). Finally, for the summer Saturday simulations some of the evacuation tir-- cor snall population sectors can be quite high, sLmply becau ,e most of the recreation areas within the plume exposure EPZ have relatively poor access resulting in longer travel times. Exanples are some of the areas for out-door recreation found in the Black Fox Station area. 4.5 EVACUATION ' TIME ESTIMATES FOR 1990 THROUGH 2020 In order ,to anticipate future problems steming from popula-tion growth in the area, canputer simulations for total evacua-
<-- . tions were run using the projected 1990, 2000, .2010, and 2020 night time populations. The night time evacuation was selected i since it generally involved more people and longer evacuation times than evacuations of the three other population distribu-a tions. Partial evacuations were considered unnecessary since any problem that occurred for a partial evacuation for the 1980 population also occurred in the simulation of the total evacua-tion.
The results of these simulations are summarized in Table C-17. The 1990 simulation revealed no significant change in the total evenuetion time. Although the 20% increase in pop"l a-tion caused additional congestion along 71st Street, that evac-uation route was seldom the last to be cleared in either '.980 or 1990. For both years, the Inola population exiting to the west on SH 33 was usually the last to be evacuated. The projected increase in population was not sufficient to cause a traffic problem along that route. Since the range of mobilization times was unchanged , evacuation time estimates for the In91a popula-tion remained approximately the same for the two years. The simulation for the year 2000 indicates that the situa-tion has changed. Severe traffic congestion along 71st Street, O C-29
l 1 due to the projected population increase in the Broken Arrow kh area, caused trat area always to be the last to canplete evacu-ation. The 71st Street traffic problem should become progres-sively worse in 2010 and 2020. None of the other exit routes should encounter serious traffic congestico. For all three years (2000, 2010, and 2020), the model pred-icted that the evacuation of the remainder of the plume expo-sure EPZ would be completed in approximately two and one-half ho ur s. For the year 2000, the last 4% of the total population was stalled on 71st Street for an additional twenty-two minutes. By 2010 the last 10% of the total population was d elayed on 71st Street for an extra hour and twei.ty-three minutes. By 2020 the model predicts an additional two hours and forty minutes would be required to evacuate the last 15% of the population held up by the 71st Street traffic. It is important to note that these simulations use the existing 1980 transportation network. It is inconceivable that the population using the 71st Street evacuation route could f more than triple (from 1272 vehicles in 1980 to 3892 vehicles in 2020) without significant improvement in the highway net-work. In this sense the estimates of total evacuation times for 2000, 2010, and 2020 are unrealistic. On the other hand, these simulations indicate that the existing highway network should be s,ufficient to accommodate evacuation of projected increases llg in population throughout the rest of the plume exposure EPZ. O C-30
_5_. 0_ REFERENCES (1) U.S. General Accounting Office, Areas Around Nuclear Facil-ities Should Be_ Better Prepared for . Radiological Emergen-cies, Washington, D.C., March, 1979. (2) Brunn, Stanley D. , James H. Johnson and Donald J Siegler, A Social Survey of Three Mile Island Area Residents: Final Report, East '=nsing (Dept. of Geography, Mi-higan State University) , A..-g . , 1979 (3) Hans, Joseph M., Jr., and Thomas C. Sell, Evacuation Risks: An Evaluation, Las Vegas, NV (National Environmental Research Center, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency), June , 1974 (4) Highway Research Board (NAS/NRC), liighway Capacity Manual, 1965, Washington, D. C. (Government Printing Office), 1965. (5) Roess, Roger P., et al, " Freeway Level of Service," Trans-portation Research Record, Vol. 699, 1979, pp. 7-16. (6) Stock, William A. , and Adolf D. May, " Capacity Evaluation of Two-Lane. Two-Way Highways by Simulation Modeling," Transportation Research Record, Vol. 615, 1976, pp. 20-26. O (7 ) U.S. Department of Transportation, A Guide for Highway Traffic Regulation in an Emergency, Wa shington , D. C. (GPO), 1974. (8) U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Manual o_f Protective Action Guides and Protective Actions for Nuclear Incidents, Washington, D. C. (EPA, Office of Radiation Programs), 1975. (9) Jones E. Roy, et al, ' Environmental Influence of Rain on Freeway Capacity," Highway Research Record, Vol. 321, 1970, pp. 74-82. (10) Lombardo Thomas G. , and Tekla S. Perry, " Mitigating the Effects of a Nuclear Accident," IEEE Spectrum, July, 1980, pp. 30-35. (11) Center for Planning and Research, Inc., Evacuation Time Estimates for Areas Near Rancho Seco Power Plant: Final Report, prepared for the Sacramento Municipal Utility Dis-trict, January 30, 1980. O U i
.C-31
1 TABLE C-1 INFORMATION FOR COLLECTOR Ah3 EXIT NODES: NIGHT TLME NODE VEHICLES EN7ER14G VEHICLES LEAV!ho NUMBER EVACUATION ROU7E EPZ 1 0 1537 2 41 41 3 6 6 4 104 104 5 115 416 l 6 9 9 7 27 27 8 15 15 9 9 358 10 14 14 11 16 16 12 31 31 13 7 7 14 18 18 15 11 11 l 16 19 19 17 8 8 18 43 256 19 142 142 20 1 1 21 40 40 22 22 22 23 36 36 24 4 1272 ,* 25 95 95
- 26 9 9 27 484 l 28 119 i 29 69 30 31 l
31 108 32 60 33 55 34 87 35 206 36 318 37 61 38 25 39 19 40 139 l 41 25 a? 29 43 13 44 14 l 45 24 46 145 47 54 48 9 49 72 50 7 i 51 14 l 52 424 53 428 54 363 l 55 53 l 56 213 O 1 l l l l C-2 2
. - . . . - . - . - - - .. - - _ = .. - . - - . . _ _ _ = , . . . _ _ - . . - . .. ..- .
i t i O '**'t c-2 a EXTERIOR INTERSECTION TRAFFIC NODES Node # Intersection 4 l 57 US 66 and SH 33
- 58 SH 266 and access road i
59 US 66 and SH 88 60 US 69 and SH 33 61 US 69 and SH 33 l 62 US 69 and SH 51 j 63 SH 51 and SH 72 l 64 SH 51 and 71st Street ! 65 SH 51 and 51st Street
- 66 US 66 and SH 51 1
1 l 4 e p I I i i l l l l l l 1 l l O c-33
TABLE C-3 8 IDEAL FLOW CAPACITIES AND ASSOCIATED TRAFFIC DESSITIES FOR ALL NODE SEGMENTS OF THE EMERGENCY EVACUATION NETWORK OF THE BLACK FOX STATION EMERGENCY PLANNING ZONE Normal Weather Conditions Adverse Weather Conditions Routes Capacity Density Capacity Density ( veh./ hr . ) (veh./ mile) (veh./hr.) (veh./ mile) SH33 (node 34 and west) 4000 133 1800 120 SH 33 (nede 35 and east) 1500 50 643 43 SH 88 (nodes 5 and 59) 1330 44 600 40 SH 88 (nodes 46-51) 1079 36 571 38 71 st St . , Tulsa ( node 55 ) 781 26 450 30 71st St. (nodes 24, 52-54) 949 32 514 34 51st St. (node 25) 949 32 514 34 31st St. (node 26) 949 32 514 34 US 66 (nodes 2-4, 57, 59) 3000 100 1440 96 US 69 (nodes 7-8, 10-15,62) 1500 50 643 43 SH 51 (node 21 and east) 1079 36 571 38 SH 51 (nodes 22, 23, 63) 1500 50 643 43 SH 51 (nodes 64, 65, 66) 4000 133 1800 120 (ll County Road (node 56) 792 27 461 31 SH 266 (node 58) 1500 50 643 43 SH 20 (nede 6) 15GO 50 643 43 l Other Paved 923 31 500 33 Other Gravel 792 27 461 31 Other Dirt 726 24 434 29 l Normal weather estimates are based on an assumed average operating speed of about 30 mph; adverse weather estimates, 15 mph. 1 0 C-34
O t>S's c-a DIST):IBUTION OF MOBILIZATION TIMES FOR THE BFS/EPZ EMERGENCY EVACUATION MODEL Time After Notification Percent Leaving Cumulative (minutes) During Interval Percent Departed 4 6 2.0 2.0 12 6.0 8.0 18 8.0 16.0 24 11.0 27.0 30 12.2 39.2 36 11.8 51.0 42 11.0 62.0 48 10.0 72.0 54 8.0 80.0 60 6.0 86.0 66 5.0 91.0 72 3.5 94.5 78 2.6 97.1 84 1.9 99.0 O 90 0.5 99.5 96 0.2 99.7 102 0.12 99.82 108 0.08 99.90 114 0.05 99.95 120 0.03 99.98 150 0.02 100.00 i The above are discrete, rounded estimates of mobilization times derivec from the continuous Rayleigh probability distribution j function. It has been " forced" to peak at approximately 30 minutes and to curtail estimates at 150 minutes (assuming, I therefore, that all persons have begun evacuation by the end of two hours and 30 minutes. f i , C-35 1 - - - - - - - - - --
i l l TABLE C-5 hI I 1980 POPULATION OF PARTIAL EVACUATION QUADRANTS BY INCIDENT-TIME-OF-0CCURRENCE (ITO) ITO Population Distribution Quadrant Night Time Work Time Sunday Morning Summer Saturday NE2 237 104 246 166 SW2 188 88 209 718 N5 3689 2350 3743 3186 E5 1181 533 1103 1378 S5 633 275 667 1954 W5 648 386 630 1138 N10 5000 3028 4925 4042 E10 1971 836 1766 1848 S10 2254 968 2020 3007 W10 6871 3099 6071 5464 Total EPZ 13035 6693 11961 11356 O 9 O C-36
i () TABLE C-6 STATISTICAL
SUMMARY
- 25 MONTE CARLO TRIALS USING DATA FOR EVACUATION OF TOTAL 1980 NIGHT TIME POPULATION (NORMAL WEATHER)
Mears S.D. Minista Maxista Time Re. quired for Evacuation (minutes after notification) 143 8 127 1 60 Percent Evacuated Minutes After Notification 10 24 20 32 30 39 40 45 50 51 j 60 57 70 64 80 73 . 90 104 ! 100 143 (:) f i i l i O C-37 l- - -._ . - - . - - . - . -,
TABLE C-7 h MINIMUM EXITING TIME FOR ALL SECTORS: NIGHT TLME TIME NUMBER OF CA8F EXITED BY ROUTE C.) NODE TOTAL PERCENT ELAPSED CARS OF CARS (MINUTES) 18 21 4 25 88N 33E 7137 33W OTHER EII7ED EIITED 5 0 1 1 2 0 0 4 0 2 10 0.22 10 0 1 5 6 6 1 33 5 7 64 1.42 15 2 1 8 17 14 6 99 25 20 192 4.26 20 4 6 19 25 27 12 169 66 36 364 8.07 25 12 to 28 36 55 27 242 126 69 605 13.41 30 20 11 40 48 91 54 315 214 110 903 20.02 35 41 19 54 56 121 88 384 321 145 1229 27.25 40 70 21 57 63 162 122 461 482 182 1620 35.92 45 96 29 68 72 201 159 532 610 222 1989 44.10 50 119 33 75 80 240 192 607 74G 269 2355 52.22 55 146 35 82 85 274 235 677 898 305 2737 60.69 60 161 36 87 87 301 263 752 1024 338 3049 67.61 65 181 36 93 87 329 284 823 1135 356 3324 73.70 70 196 36 98 90 353 300 887 1221 377 3558 78.89 75 214 37 99 92 375 317 958 1299 393 3784 83.90 ' 80 222 40 100 93 390 332 Ic24 1361 407 3969 88.00 85 230 40 103 95 397 340 1077 1416 413 4111 91.I5 90 237 40 103 95 405 350 1137 1453 417 4237 93.95 95 243 to 103 95 408 351 1191 1482 420 4333 96.0S 100 249 40 103 95 411 352 1243 1497 426 4416 97.92 105 251 40 104 95 411 355 1267 1510 428 4461 98.91 110 254 40 104 95 414 356 1269 1521 429 4482 99 38 115 255 to 104 95 414 357 1271 1527 432 4495 99.67 120 256 40 104 95 415 358 1272 1535 432 4507 99.93 125 256 40 104 95 416 358 1272 1536 432 4509 99.98 127 256 40 104 95 416 358 1272 1537 432 4510 100.00 l l l l O C-38
TABLE C-8 MAXIMUM EXITING TIME FOR ALL SECTORS: NIGHT TIME TIME NUMBER CF CARS EXITED ST BOUTE OR N0DE TOTAL PERCENT ELAPSED CARS CF CARS (MINUTES) 18 _21 4 25 88N 33E 7137 33W CTHER EIITED EXITED 5 0 1 0 3 1 0 4 0 1 to 0.22 1s 1 2 5 7 6 2 33 1 12 69 1.53 15 2 3 11 13 13 7 94 20 30 193 4.28 20 4 6 17 20 30 15 162 57 56 367 8.14 25 9 9 31 32 67 37 236 113 83 637 14.12 30 21 16 40 39 93 62 310 226 114 921 20.42 35 37 19 49 46 129 92 334 341 150 1247 27.65 to 53 23 59 58 176 127 451 480 196 1623 35.99 45 78 28 70 66 213 168 526 617 241 2007 44.50 50 110 31 81 74 251 202 600 743 284 2376 52.68 55 130 34 11 77 281 234 673 883 316 2719 60.29 60 159 34 95 80 305 263 740 1023 344 3043 67.47 65 186 38 98 84 334 288 815 114' 381 3367 74.66 70 199 38 100 87 361 305 886 1236 399 3611 80.07 75 211 38 101 89 373 321 951 1313 410 3807 84.41 80 217 39 103 92 387 332 1018 1377 414 3979 88.23 85 229 40 104 93 394 343 1071 1424 423 4121 91.37 90 239 40 104 93 401 348 1128 1464 426 4243 94.08 95 244 40 104 94 406 355 1'86 1491 430 4350 96.45 100 248 40 104 94 407 356 1240 1512 431 4432 98.27 105 250 40 104 95 410 356 1266 1519 431 4471 99.14 110 251 40 104 95 416 356 1268 1526 431 4&87 99.49 356 1270 1529 O' 115 120 125 254 255 255 40 40 40 104 104 104 95 95 95 416 416 406 358 1270 1530 358 1270 1532 432 432 432 4496 4500 4502 99.69 99.78 99.82 130 256 40 104 95 416 358 1271 1533 432 4505 99.89 135 256 40 104 95 416 348 1271 1534 432 4506 99.91 140 256 40 104 95 416 358 1271 1536 432 4508 99.96 145 256 40 104 95 416 358 1271 1536 432 4508 99.96 150 256 40 104 95 416 358 1271 1536 432 4508 99.96 155 256 to 104 95 416 358 1272 1536 432 4509 99.98 160 256 40 104 95 416 358 1272 1537 432 4510 100.00 I O C-39
TABLE C-9 h AVERAGE EXITING TIME FOR ALL SECTORS: NIGilT TIME l l l l TIME NUMBER OF CAR: !"17ED 87 ROUTE OR NODE TOTAL PERCENT ELAPSED CARS OF CARS j (MINUTES) 18 .21 4 25 88N 33E 7137 33W 07HER EXI7ED EXITED 5 0 2 1 2 3 0 0 0 2 10 0.22 to 0 3 5 6 7 2 21 4 13 61 t.35 15 0 5 7 to 14 2 76 30 27 171 3.79 j 20 3 11 14 20 34 8 145 69 49 353 7.83 25 9 13 20 26 64 18 216 127 69 562 12.46 ! 30 18 20 29 31 89 39 286 230 103 845 18.74 ! 35 33 23 39 41 122 77 3 ',8 338 145 1176 26.08 40 53 26 51 45 159 117 433 485 183 1552 34.41 - 1 45 82 26 61 55 196 150 506 633 232 1941 43 04 50 101 28 66 59 255 192 580 767 275 2326 51.57 55 118 31 80 68 295 225 651 904 316 2688 59.60 60 142 31 84 76 332 225 119 1033 339 3011 66.76 65 167 32 83 82 358 275 792 1139 364 3298 73.13 70 180 34 93 87 372 299 867 1227 384 3543 78.56 75 197 34 100 90 384 315 936 1294 393 3743 82.99 80 206 37 102 90 392 328 1001 1356 408 3930 87.14 85 216 38 102 93 401 337 1056 1411 417 4071 90.27 90 229 39 102 95 408 345 1108 1459 422 4207 93.25 95 240 39 103 95 411 351 1171 1485 424 4319 95.76 100 246 39 103 95 411 356 1219 1503 427 4399 97.54 105 248 39 103 95 412 357 1266 1514 431 4465 99.00 110 251 40 103 95 413 357 1269 1520 431 4479 99.31 115 253 40 103 95 414 357 1270 1527 431 4490 99.56 . 120 254 40 103 95 415 357 1270 1531 431 4496 99.69 125 255 40 104 95 115 357 1270 1533 431 4500 99.78 130 255 40 104 95 416 357 1271 1536 431 4505 99.89 135 256 40 104 95 416 357 1272 1536 431 4507 99.93 140 256 40 104 95 416 358 1272 1537 431 4509 99.98 144 256 40 104 95 416 358 1272 1537 432 4510 100.00 0 C-40
() TABLE C-10 PARTIAL EVACUATION STATISTICS - 1980 NIGHT TIME POPULATION EVACUATION EVACUATION TIMES (MINUTES) QUADRANTS NORMAL WEATHER ADVERSE WEATHER AVERAGE RANGE AVERAGE RANGE Vehicles Time (SD) Min. Max. Time (SD) Min. Max. 2 Mile Band NE2 73 121 (9) 103 137 146 (9) 131 164 SW2 61 117 (9) 116 129 142 (9) 121 154 5 Mile Quadrant NS 1201 140 (8) 123 106 163 (9) 148 179 ES 369 130 (12) 114 153 154 (12) 134 206 SS 190 126 (11) 107 159 151 (11) 133 186 W5 198 124 (11) 112 158 148 (12) 133 184 10 Mile Quadrant N10 1601 140 (8) 126 152 162 (8) 148 175 E10 582 133 (10) 114 154 155 (11) 136 176 O- S10 684 129 (11) 113 148 151 (11) 135 175 W10 2219 134 (8) 120 149 211 (1) 217 220 Total EPZ 4510 143 (8) 127 160 219 (1) 217 220 i t C-41
l TABLE C-ll h AVERAGE EXITING TIME FOR SECTOR N5: NIGHT TIME i I I I TI"E NUMBER CF CARS EXITED ST ROUTE OR N00E TOTAL PERCENT ELA P5 ED CARS OF CARS l (MINUTES) 18 .21 4 25 88N 33E 7137 33W OTHER EXITED EXITED
$ 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.0 10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 0 0.0 15 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0.08 20 0 0 0 0 5 2 0 3 0 to 0.83 25 0 0 0 0 13 7 0 9 0 29 2.41 30 0 0 0 0 25 18 0 35 0 78 6.4*
35 0 "O O O 45 28 0 91 0 164 13.66 40 4 0 0 0 53 47 0 153 0 257 21.40 45 11 0 0 0 78 59 0 230 0 378 31.=f 50 17 0 0 0 94 74 0 313 0 498 41.47 55 22 0 0 0 111 80 0 392 0 605 50 37 60 27 0 0 0 130 94 0 457 0 708 58.95 65 28 0 0 0 la3 16. 0 532 0 811 67.53 70 36 0 0 0 156 122 0 585 0 899 74.85 75 40 0 0 0 170 131 0 639 0 980 81.60 80 40 0 0 0 177 136 1 682 0 1036 86.26 85 42 0 0 0 185 145 1 714 0 1087 90.51 90 43 0 0 0 187 148 1 734 0 1113 92.67 95 44 0 0 0 188 152 1 757 0 1142 95.09 100 45 0 0 0 189 155 1 769 0 1159 96.50 105 45 0 0 0 190 160 1 777 0 1173 97.67 110 45 0 0 0 190 160 1 785 0 1181 98.33 115 47 0 0 0 190 161 1 788 0 1187 93.83 120 4A 0 0 0 191 161 1 790 0 1191 99.17 125 49 0 0 0 192 161 1 792 0 1195 99.50 130 49 0 0 0 192 161 1 794 0 1197 99.67 115 49 0 0 0 192 161 1 796 0 1199 99.83 140 49 0 0 0 192 161 1 798 0 1201 100.00 i O C-42
I i , l t TABLE C-12 ; i AVERAGE EXITING TIME FOR
; SECTOR W10: NIGHT TIME t
i i TIME NUM8ER 0F CA83 EIITED ST ROUTE OR NODE 707)1. PERCENT ELAPSED CAR 3 0F CASS , (MINUTES) 18 . 21 4 25 88N 33E 71ST 331f OTHER EXITED EIITED 5 0 0 0 1 0 0 4 0 0 5 0.23 10 0 0 1 6 0 0 27 3 3 40 1.80
- 15 0 0 1 15 0 0 77 21 8 122 5.50 20 0 0 1 22 0 0 139 57 13 232 10.46 .
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- 125 49 0 9 95 0 0 1211 794 60 2218 99.95 130 49 0 9 95 0 0 1211 794 60 2218 99.95 133 49 0 9 95 0 0 1212 794 60 2219 100.00 l
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TABLE C-13 h INF0lufATION FOR COLLECTOR AND EXIT N0 DES: WORK TIME NODE VEHICLES ENTER!4G VEHICLES LEAV!NG NUMBER EV4CU47!CN ROUTE EP2 1 0 818 2 19 19 3 0 0 4 49 49 5 82 222 6 3 3 7 8 8 8 4 4 9 4 261 to 5 5 11 8 8 12 10 10 13 1 1 14 1 1 15 3 3 16 5 5 17 2 2 18 12 104 19 60 60 20 0 0 21 13 13 22 9 9 23 9 9 24 2 517 25 41 41 26 3 3 27 226 28 56 29 35 30 15 31 83 32 26 33 36 34 43 35 97 36 201 37 133
- 38 11 39 8 40 62 41 10 42 13 43 4 44 6 45 10 46 70 47 25 48 2 49 27 50 0 51 16 52 120 53 206 54 169 55 20
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C-44
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INFORMATION FOR COLLECTOR AND EXIT NODES: SUNDAY MORNING f i N0DE VEHICLES ENTERING VEHICLES LEAVING NUMBER EVACUATION ROJTE EPZ 1 0 1454 2 47 47 [ ]' 3 4 89 6 89 6 1 5 111 393 i 6 8 8 7 24 24 1 8 14 14 1 9 8 427 < 2 10 14 14 i i 11 15 . 15 12 27 27
, 13 7 7 i 14 18 18 -
15 10 to 16 17 17 17 8 8 18 51 265 ! 19 133 133 20 1 1 1 21 37 37 22 19 19 ! 23 32 32 l 24 4 1100 ! 25 90 90 ! 26 9 9
- 27 424 28 126 29 60 30 42 -
31 93 32 51 i 33 47 ( 34 74 1 35 211 36 326
?I 52 38 21 39 117 40 120 41 22 42 40 43 11 l 44 14 45 22 46 125 47 46 48 8 49 84 50 7 51 12 52 363 j 53 368 54 207 55 58 56 214 Y
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TABLE C-15 h INFORMATION FOR COLLECTOR AND EXIT NODES: SUIDiER SATURDAY EODE VENICLES EN7tRIEG VEHICLES LEAVING BUMBER EVACUA7!ON ROUTE 1P2 1 0 1314 2 27 27 3 19 19 4 72 72 5 78 288 6 7 7 7 21 21 8 12 12 7 6 245 to 9 9 11 12 12 12 25 25 13 6 6 14 17 17 15 9 9 16 16 16 17 6 6 18 45 192 19 281 281 . 20 1 1 21 28 28 22 14 14 23 24 24 24 2 879 25 66 66 26 6 6 27 334 28 83 29 43 30 60 31 70 32 232 33 56 34 59 35 15-36 222 37 41 38 16 l 39 13 i 40 96 41 18 42 21 43 11 44 8 45 15 46 101 I 47 37 1 48 8 l 49 49 50 7 51 8 l 52 294 l 53 299 54 247 55 37 56 147 O C-46
TABLE C-16 EVACUATION OF THE 1980 POPULATION SY INCIDENT-TIME-OF-0CCURRENCE, BY SECTORS, AND BY WEATHER CONDITIONS (Number of Vehicles, Mean Evacuation Time, and Standard Deviation) EVACUATION TIME (MINUTES) NIGHT TIME WORK TIME AREA EVACUATED VEHICLES NORMAL ADVERSE VEHICLES NORMAL ADVERSE NE2 73 121 (9) 146 (93 30 109 (11) 134 (11) SW2 61 117 (9) 142 (9) 27 109 (12) 133 (12) NS 1201 140 (3) 163 (9) 761 134 (9) 156 (7) ES 369 130 (12) 154 i'12) 158 124 (12) 146 (12) SS 190 126 (11) 151 (11) 78 118 (9) 143 (9) W5 198 '.24 (11) 148 (12) 116 117 (12) 139 (13) N10 1601 140 (8) 162 (8) 964 135 (8) 157 (8)
% E10 532 133 (10) 155 (11) 229 125 (13) 148 (14)
(d S10 684 129 (11) 151 (11) 277 123 (15) 146 (16) TOTAL 4510 143 (8) 220 (1) , 2175 139 (8) 159 (9) EVACUATION TIME (MINUTES) SUNDAY MORNING SUMMER SATURDAY AREA EVACUATED VEHICLES NORMAL ADVERSE VEHICLES NORMAL ADVERSE l NE2 80 119 (10) 145 (11) 52 114 (11) 140 (11) SW2 69 119 (9) 143 (10) 235 130 (13) 154 (13) l N5 1235 141 -(9) 164 (9) 1040 140 (8) 163 (8) ES 358 129 (11) 152 (11) 450 134 (11) 158 (12) SS 217 131 (12) 155 (12) 521 136 (10) 161 (11) , W5 205 126 (13) 149 (14) 369 130 (11) 154 (11) l l N10 1617 140 (8) 162 (7) 1320 141 (8) 164 (7) E10 568 132 (11) 153 (11) 613 134 (12) 159 (11) S10 659 129 (10) 152 (11) 865 137 (9) 159 (10) O W10 1992 133 (9) 183 (i) 1779 132 (7) iS4 (6) TOTAL 4264 141 (8) 192 (1) 3596 144 (9) 166 (9) C-47 i .
\ \ l i i TABLE C-17 hl EVACUATION TIMES FOR PROJECTED j NIGHT TIME POPULATIONS ; 1
- Date Vehicles Average Evacuation l Time (SD) 1980 4510 143 (8) l 1990 5695 144 (7) l 2000 '119
, 172 (1) 2010 9273 233 (1) 2020 11733 310 (1 )
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MODULE 1 INITIALIZAT!ON I
- DETERMINE MOBILIZATION TIME (TM) MODULE 2 FOR ALL VEHICLES T
CALCULATE TRAVEL TIME OVER ALL MODULE 3 LOCAL ACCESS ROADS (TLT) t S CONSIDER A PARTICULAR PRIMARY ROAD T _I CONSIDER EARLIEST ARRIVING PERFORM REPEATED lVENICLE NOT YET ON PRIMARY ROAD MONTE CARLO RUNS a 3 CONSIDER NEXT i3 PRIMARY ROAD PRIMARY YES . INCREMENT TIME WHILE A R ADS GM NT VEHICLE W AITS IN OUEUE TO ENTER PRIMARY ROAD CONSIDER 7 NEXT VEHICLE h yNO ENTER VEHICLE ONTO PRIMARY ROAD AND MOVE TOWARD ZONE BOUNDARY AM:D TRAFFIC CONGESTION
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y NO DETERMINE MOVEMENT TIME OVER PR: MARY ROAD (TPT) HAVE ALL VEHICLES NO ASSIGNED TO THIS PRIMARY RO AD BEEN EVACUATED 7 YES HAVE ALL PRIMARY NO ROADS BEEN CONSIDERED 7 J YES T PERFORM MODULE 6 STATISTICAL ANALYSIS t DETERM!NE G MODULE 6 CONFlRMATION TIME EVACUATION TIME COMPUTER MODEL END FIGURE C-4 C-52
I PERCENT 100- - O % CUMULATIVE PERCENT DEPARTED 90-80-l 70-60-50-O 40-l 30-l 20-PERCENT LEAVING 10- I DURING INTERVAL 1 1 1 ! 8 l l ( 0- - - - - - 0 12 24 36 48 60 72 84 96 108 124 TIME AFTER NOTIFICATION (MINUTES)
- O I MOBILIZATION TU4E CURVES l
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4 - .& l 1 i i l l 4 i APPENDIX D EARLY WARNING SYSTEM i i l i i r O
, , . . .- . ----n.__-- _..n...,--,,,- ,,,,,, -,- - - --,--,--
EARLY WARNING SYSTEM 1.0 A preliminary early warning system, using USGS topographical maps of the 10 mile area around BFS has been prepared by a reputable warning system manufacturer. The purpose of this initial warning system layout is to allow PSO the preliminary knowledge of the general siren system coverage that would be required for BFS. The topographical maps used were updated from between the mid-1960's and the mid-1970's. The topographical information accurately represents the land contours within the area; however, the residential information does not represent the most recent demographical data for the 10 mile radius. Even though new residential structures have been added during the resulting time period, the siren systems provided will repre-() sent a close approximation of requirements for the area. A step up in a siren system capacity would merely be required. The area within a 10 mile radius of this plant has terrain variances and a population distribution sufficiently dis-i persed so that a ccmbination of various-sized sirens and a number of Local Coverage Sirens (LCS's) are required to give i effective coverage. The estimated total number of sirens required for that area is 92. This includes: l 54 - 128 dB full coverage sirens
- 19 - 115 dB single te.te sirens 19 - 102 dB single tone sirens
( 1 The general procedure followed in the application of the out-door warning system and the many environmental effects related to outdoor warning are covered in the FEMA-Document No. CPG 117, entitled " Outdoor Warning Systems Guide," dated gg March, 1980. The applied criteria corresponds to NUREG-0654. V D-1 d 9 v.,-.-- ..w..y.. ---- y . ~,..-., , - , , . _ , , - , , e ,o _ - , gv----n-.-m.,-m,n-,,y-----, .. -,.---,-----g9-9.----ve,- ,-yyw.-y . ,-r -y. ~.
In addition to the outdoor area warning siren equipment proposed, equipment for alerting public institutions, such as hospitals, schools, nursing homes an/. large business operations is also included. This will consist of 58 tone activated emergency radio alert units or small local coverage sirens. Depending on the individual application, these units can be interchanged. The specific cho(ce of sirens and means .f control must be based on a detai;ed 91te survey and evaluation of avail-ability of power, surrounding buildings, terrain and popu-lation distribution. This will be cor. .cted prior to selection of the actual hardware during actual emergency response plan preparation. O O D-2
,_2 6 - - - - - - - - . , - - - A -L. a, ua w O
APPENDIX E Correspondence O e
-m O .
l Appendix E Table of Contents
- 1. NRC Letter of October 23, 1979
- 2. Governor Nigh Letter to NRC Commissioner Hendrie E-4
- 3. PS0 Letter to Governor Nigh (Example of Agreement Letter) January 15, 1980 E-S
- 4. NRC Letter Requesting Evacuation Time Estimates of December 26, 1979 E-10
- 5. Evacuation Time Estimate Approval Letter from Oklahoma Civil Defense dated tober 1,1980 E-14 O
i l 4 I g e lO . 1 I [ \
w no .;,,, ' Y' [ C, UNITED STATES g).[', y/j/[
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,c NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION w4swmorou. o. c. zossa gg ;-
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QCT 2 31979 Docket Nos. 50-556 and 50-557
\
Mr. T. N. Ewing, Manager Black Fox Station Nuclear Project Eb'Et[bb
.. Public Service Company of Oklahoma a sf=7n Nr .a e LI%Eb,O
.jD P. O. Box 201 Tuisa, Oklahoma 74102 OCT 2 91979
Dear Mr. Ewing:
SUBJ5CT: EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS REQUIREMENTS (Black Fox Station Nuclear Project) In a recent letter dated October 10, 1979 on the " Followup Actions Resulting from the NRC Staff Reviews Regarding the Three Mile Island Unit 2 Accident", we outlined the staffAs requirements resulting from its Emergency Preparedness' Studies.
~
In that letter we stated -that the Comission was considering what
'6 Q changes to current regulations and pelicy would be appropriate as a result of the Siting Policy Task Force Report (NUREG-0625), and it was likely that they would endorse the 10- and 50-mile emergency planning zones recomended
( by the EPA /NRC study. l On October 18, 1979, the Comission cencurred in and endorsed the guidance on emergency plarihing zones recomended in the NRC/ EPA report. In a policy statement on that date (Enclosure 1), the Comission directed the NRC staff to incorporate the planning basis guidance into existing documents used in the evaluation of State and ~ local emergency preparedness plans to the extent practicable. Thus, in addition to the requirements now set forth explicitly in Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50, and the requirements of Enclosure 7 of our October 10, 1979 letter, it is the staff position that for near term cps, preliminary plans for coping with the potential consequences of emergencies beyond the site boundary must include provisions for a plume exposure pathway Emergency Planaing Zone (EPZ) and an ingestion pathway Emergency P1anning Zone. The EPZ for the plume exposure pathway must encompass an area of about 10 miles in radius, and the EPZ for the ingestion pathway an area of about 50 miles in radius. Q . e
- t. Mr. T. N. Ewing ..
The following infonnation must be provided and eval ated in order to implenent this staff position.
- 1. Contacts and agreements with locai r State and Federal governmental agencies with responsibility for coping with emergencies for developnent of final plans must be documented for the areas wi. thin the plune exposure Emergency Planning Zone. This shall include agreement in principle between these agencies on a framework for emergency notification and protective action criteria acceptable to the NRC. For a description of the draft Emergency Action Level Guidelines see Enclosure 2. The principal government office or agency in each local political jurisdiction (county and municipality) within the plune exposure pathway EPZ, which would have the responsibility for prompt implementation of protective action warn-ings and instructions to the public, must be clearly identified.
- 2. A preliminary analysis which describes the means to be employed in the notification of State and local governments, Federal agencies and the public in:the event of an emergency must be submitted for the plune exposure EPZ and for notification of the agricultural agencies and other governmental bodies having jurisdiction within the ingestion pathway EPZ.
i commitment must be made to provide prompt notification to offsite author-ities and to assure that offsite authorities have the resources to provide a general early warning and clear instructions to the public, acceptable l to the NRC, in the plume exposure EPZ within 15 minutes following notiff-cation from the facility.
- 3. Preliminary pl~anning must reflect the need to include facilities, systems, h ~
and methods for identifying the degree of seriousness and potential scope of radiological consequences of emergency situations within and outside the site boundary, including capabilities for dose projection using real-time meteorological information and for dispatch of radiological monitoring teams within the EPZ's. The anticipated role and capabilities of offsite agencies in radiological monitoring and dose assessment in the environs must be described for both plume and ingestion exposure pathways. Pre-liminary planning must reflect the role of the on-site technical support center and of the near-site emergency operations center in assessing infonnation, recommending protective action and disseminating information to the public. 1
- 4. preliminary planning must reflect provisions for initiating protective actions for all exposure pathways, onsite and offsite, including:
(a) Direct radiation exposure from a confined source in-plant, an
- airborne plume, and ground depo'sition, (b) Inhalation exposure from an aiborne plume, and l (c) Ingestion exposure from contaminated water, milk, and other agricultural products.
O E-2
.~ .
Mr. T. N. Ewing A preliminary analysis which describes various available protective action ([) options must be submitted for the areas within the Energency Fianning Zones. This must include estimates of evacuation times for various sectors and distances within the plume exposure EPZ. Preliminary plans for protective action recommendations within the plune exposure EPZ must include evacuation, sheltering, and area access control. Preliminary plans for protective action recommendations within the ihgestion exposure EPZ must include taking cows off pasture when required and controlling the use of milk, drinking water, and agricultural products whose source is within the ingestion EPZ. If you have any questions concerning this matter, please contact the NRC Project Manager for your facility. Sincerely,
/
D. 8. Vassallo, Acting Director Division of Project Management Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Enclosures :
- 1. Commission Policy Statement .
2'. NRR Staff Draft Guidelines -
)
cc w/ enclosures: See next page i ( l l ($) . I f[-3
~
STATE OF OKLAHOMA f, [* {t
*. */
OFFICE OF THE GOVERNOR 212 STATE CAPITOL BulLDING
,/ OKLAHOMA CITY. OKLAHOMA 73105 GEORGE NIGH
" " " June 20, 1979 4.".5 / 321 2345 Mr. Joseph M. Hendrie, Chairman U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Comission Washington, D. C. 20555
Dear Mr. Hendrie:
I share your concern with regard to states having ade-quate radiological emergency response plans in opera-tion which support fixed nuclear facilities. I appreciate your kind offer to assist in preparing such a plan through the mechanism of the Federal Interagency Re-gional Advisory Comittee and your agency. The Occupational and Radiological Health Service of the Oklahoma Department of Health, in cooperation with the Oklahoma Office of Civil Defense, has recently completed a preliminary draft of Oklahoma's radiologi-cal plan. Copies of this draft have bee.) circulated to my office, several State executive agencies, the NRC Office of State Programs, and Public Service Company of Oklahoma for comments. Edilowing revision in accord with these coments, the plan will be circulated for
~
coment to these State agencies, local officials, the public, and the NRC. Ou. current schedule calls for a final version of the plan to be ready by early 1980. We fully intend and expect to receive NRC concurrence to the final plan several years prior to the now anticipated operational status of the Black Fox Station in 1985. incerel yours , u U George ligh O E-4
PUBUC SERVICE COMPANY OF OKLAHOMA L TW* JYC - A CENTRAL AND SOUTH WEST COMPANY P O. 80x 201/ TULSA. OKLAHOMA 74102 / (918) 583-3G11 $ . January 15, 1980 IL U. Newmas Presnient Governor George Nigh 212 State Capitol Building Gklahoma City, Oklahoma 73105
Dear Governor Nigh:
/
Public Service, Compar.y of Oklahoma is presently in the process of obtaining a full construction permit for our Black Fox Station (BFS), a nuclear powered electric generating facility. During this phase, the facility is thoroughly reviewed by various government agencies to assure that the public health and safety is protected. Sinco the accident at Three Mile Island (T?lI) on tiarch 28, 1979, many aspects of safety design and public protection are being re-reviewed and changes incorporated into all nuclear power facilities around the country. One of these aspects is reevaluation of emergency response planning in the area around nuclear facilities to better assure the complete protection of the public in the event of an accident. Even though it is expected that a comprc-hensive evacuation will never be required, we recognize that complete emargency response preparedness must be availabic throughout operations of the facility.
]
Public Service Company of Oklahoma has previously considered the basic aspect of emer,ancy response planning for BFS and presented them to the FRC for review and approval. Included in our early planning were discussions of our organization for coping with emergencies, means for notification, identifica-tion of local, State and Federal agencies which will be responsible, and other onsite training and evacuation features at the plant. This description wa= previously considered adequate at this early stage to show the feasibility to conduct future emergency response actions (prior to the operation of the l plant, detailed emergency response programs will be provided by the facility and the State). However, it has now been determined that more comprehensive descriptions r.nd agency contacts should be provided prior to onset of full construction, even realizing our station is still at least six years away from operation. i PSO recently received a request from the Nuclear Regulatory Commission to expand our preliminary emergency response planning for cor.struction to include many areas that were previously to have been covered during the advanced planning stages for operation. This includes documented agreements with local, State and Federal agencies which will be involved with emergency response around BFS. We also must determine protective action response times which will require PSO to perform population surveys within about ten mile.s of the s ite . O CENTRAL AND SOUTH WEST SYSTEM Central Power and Light Pubic Servce Company of Oktanoma Southwestern Electre Power West AwneTexas Ut* ties temas corous chnse. Tanas Tuosa onnenoma Snre,sous. Lawsea E-5
- w. - gt@6 .
PSO will be directly contacting u rtain State d cal authorities to discuss their responsibilitics for responding under an omorgency condition. Basically, these responsibilitics will not differ substantially from the duties already provided for emergency response to other types of emergencix as rail accidents and tornado alorts. To satisfy the NRC request, we will be aceding' documented agreements from the agencies listed on tho Attachment I. PS0 has at this time aircady centacted the Oklahoma State Departa mt of lie.ilth and the Oklahoma Civil Defense who are the primary responsibic state agencies for Emergency Responso Planning. Recognizing their responsibility and knowl-edge for such planning, they will be assisting us in our upcoming activities with the local authorities. Our study profilos in the area will involve performing population dens ity checks out to ten miles. (The DFS site is located approximately three miles southwest of Inola). As part of the activity, we will be obtaining information on many institutions and residences. PSO also desires any assistance avail-abic on determining the local population distribution and special conditions i1 your area. Inola and Tiawah are the only townships within ten miles of our Black Fox Sta-tion which we will need direct agreement from. Several other towns and cities lying between ten and fiStoon miles which include Tulsa, Broken Arrow, Catoosa, Claremore, Cowet s, C14outaau, and Wagoner are also being notified to allow these communitics the opportunity to ta b part in our activities These spe-cific parties are listed on Attachment II. PSO greatly appreciates your assiatance on our acquisition of the documented preliminary emergency response agreements for BFS and any input you can pro-vido on population distribution. Your cooperation on this matter is important to the future of the Black Fox Station. Sincerely,
/
1 R. O. Newman I Attachments l 1 O E-6
ATTACllMENT I PRIMARY AGENCIES () (Parties Which PSO Will Need Agreement Letters) Mr. Dale McHard Mr. John Baumert. Oklahoma State Health Department Mayes County Civil.Defc:se 1000 N.d. 10th St. 1301 N.E. 4th P.O. Box 53551 Pryor, Oklahouti 74361 Oklahoma City, Oklahoma 73152 Mr. Hayden Haynes, Director Mr. Max Cole Sequoyah - Will Rogers' Buildings Tannel Wagoner County Civil Defense Oklahoma City, Oklahoma 73152 Box 103 Coweta, Oklahoma 74429 Colonel Paul Clark Mr. Amos Ward Oklahoma Department of Public Safety Rogers County Sheriff
- 3600 N. Eastern 219 S. Missouri Oklahoma City, Oklahoma 73111 Claremore, Oklahoma 74017 Mr. Chuck Ormiston, Chief of Polic - Mr. Tommy Gilbert Broadway & Commercial Wagener County Sheriff Inola, Oklahoma 74036 307 E. Cherokee Wagoner, Oklahoma 74467 Mr. Erwin Burchette Mr. Pete Weaver I
Rogers County Civil Defense Mayes County Sheriff 219 S. Missouri 34 N. Adair Claremore, Oklahoma 74017 Pryor, Oklahoma 74361 (
- E-7
ATTACllMENT II SECONDARY AGENCIES (Parties for Information Only) O Dr. E.L. Leonard Mr. Richard Brimmer, Administrator Wagoner County Health Department Rogers County Health Department 203 W. Cherokee 1415 N. Florence Wagoner, Oklahoma 74467 Claremore, Oklahoma 74017 Mr. Elmer McGuire Mr. Richard Brimmer, Administrator Rogers County Commissioners Mayes County Health Department 219 S. Missouri 111 N.E. 1st Claremore, Oklahoma 74017 Pryor, Oklahoma 74361 Mr. Averd L. Dye , Dr. Edgar Cleaver Rogers County Commissioners Tulsa City / County Health Department 219 S. Missouri 4616 E. 15th Claremore, Oklahoma 74017 Tulsa, Oklahoma 74112 Mr. Glenn Sweet Francis Krause Rogers County Commissioners Inola Civil Defense 219 S. Missouri P.O. Box 123 Claremore, Oklahoma 74017 Inola, Oklahoma 74036 Mr. Bob Mahan ,
,Mr. John Wilson Wagoner County Commissioners Tulsa County Civil Defense -
307 E. Cherokee 200 Civic Center, E24
- Wagoner, Oklahoma 74467 Tulsa, Oklahoma 74103 Mr. Rufus Young Mr. Paul Rhodes, Director Wagoner County Commissioners Broken Arrow Civil Defense 307 E. Cherokee 115 E. Commercial Wagoner, Oklahoma 74467 Broken Arrow, Oklahoma 74012 Mr. Lee Roy Denton Mr. Dale Lynch Wagoner County Commissioners City of Catoosa Civil Defense 307 E. Cherokee 108 Muskogee Wagener, Oklahoma 74467 Catoosa, Oklahoma 74015 .
Mr. V.E. West Mr. E.E. Pratt, Jr. Meyes County Commissioners Wagener Civil Defense Box 95 1115 S.E. 15th Pryor, Oklahoma Wagoner, Oklahoma 74467 Mr. Lee Mitchell Mr. J.W. Rampey Mayes County Commissioners Broken Arrow Police Department Box 95 115 E. Commercial Ptyor, Oklahoma Broken Arrow, Oklahoma 74012 Mr. Henry Campbell Governor George Nigh Moyes County Commissioners 212 State Capitol Building Box 95 Oklahoma City, Oklahoma 73105 r~g Pryor, Oklahoma 74361 V E-8
NATACllMlWT L A Page 2 O Mr. T.L. Riggs, Mayor Mr. Curtis Conley, Mayor Broadway & Commercial Streets P.O. Drawer 190 Inola, Oklahoma 74036 Catoosa, Oklahoma 74015 Mr. James Inhofe, Mayor Mr. M.I. Dunn, Mayor . 200 Civic Center City Hall Tulsa, Oklahoma 74103 Coweta, Oklahoma 74429 Mr. Clyde Wright, Mayor My Lyman Carter, Jr., Mayor 115 E. Conunercial Drawer C Broken Arrow, Oklahoma 74012 Chouteau, Oklahoma 74337 Mr Jim Whitlock, City Manager Mr. Kenneth reters, Mayor 115 E. Commercial P.O. Box 406 Broken Arrow, Oklahoma 74012- Wagoner, Oklahoma 74467 Ms. Elizabeth Gordon, Mayor Mr. Ed Caldwell, City Superintendent P.O. Box 249 P.O. Box 407 , Claremore, Oklahoma 74017 Wagoner, Oklahoma 74467 l O E-9
p t**K8to y g UNITED STATES
- a NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
% jj WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555 O ****R*/ December 26, 1979 APPLICANTS FOR CONSTRUCTION PERMITS AND LICENSEES OF PLANTS UNDER CONSTRUCTION Gentlemen:
SUBJECT:
REQUEST FOR INFORMATION REGARDING EVACUATION TIMES This letter is being sent to all applicants for construction permits, and licensees of plants under construction. The purpose of the letter is a request for information regarding estimates for evacuation of various areas around future nuclear power plants. The requested information is in addition to that requested by the November 21, 1979, letter to all applicants for an operating license and licensees of plants under construction from Domenic B. Vassallo, Acting Director, Division of Project Mslagement, Office of ';uclear Reactor' Regulation. Although evacuation time estimates are expected to be prepared in the cource of the upgrading of the state of emergency preparedness as previously specified submission of these estimates to the NRC is being requested on an accelerated P time scale so that the NRC can identify those instances in which unusual
\
evacuation constraints exist and special planning measures should be considered. In some cases of extreme difficulty where a large population
~is at risk, special facility modifications may also be appropriate. The~
information requested in the enclosure should be submitted no later than March 31, 1980. Previous correspondence indicated that efforts to develop a model plan were continuing. It now appears that the model plan will not be completed on a schedule which will be of use in developing upgraded plans in the near term. The upgraded plan development should therefore proceed on a site-specific basis. , I Sincerely, [ ,
% d. , s - % t' C-<-
Brian K. Grimes, Director Emergency Preparedness Task Group Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Enclosure:
Request for Evacuation Time Estimates cc w/ enclosure: Service Lists E-10 1
l l l Enclosure l
. l REQUEST FOR EVACUATION TIME ESTIMATES (AFTER NOTIFICATION)
FOR AREAS HEAR NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS
Background
Prior to recent NRC requests that means for prompt notification to the public I be installed around each nuclear power plant site, a significant component - l l of evacuation time estimates was the time required to notify the public of a l need for evacuation. Studies of actual evacuations that have taken place generally do not distinguish between the time required for notification, the time required to implement the evac that an evacuation has taken place.gtion, Theand the time estimates ' -equired to confira
'me required for J
I evacuations now requested relate primarily to the time to ..nplement an ! evacuation as opposed to the time required for notification. These estimates l may be based on previous local experiences (e.g., enemical spills or floods) or may be based on studies related to population density, local geography and ! road capacities. No standard method for making such estimates is identified for use at this time. .The basis for the method chosen should be described l in the response. As a check on the evacuation time estimates, coments on the time estimates made should be obtained from the principal local officials responsible for carrying out such evacuations. Such coments should be included in the submittal. , The format given below is aporopriate for reporting to the NRC estimates of i the time required to implement evacuation of areas near nuclear power plants. These estimates, are to be made for the primary purpose of making available, to those officials who would make evacuation decisions in an emergency situation, knowledge of the time required to complete one of the protective action options (evacuation) available for a particular potentially affected segment of the population. A second purpose of these estimates is to identify to all concerned those instances in which unusual evacuation constraints exist ano that special planning measures should oe consicered. In some ) cases of extreme difficulty where a large population is at risk, special facility modifications may also be considered. Given a decision to evacuate rather than shelter in an actual event, fewer or more sectors or different distances than given in the reporting format l might be evacuated should this be the chosen protective action. For example, three 22-1/2' sectors might be initially evacuated in a downwind direction (the sector containing the plume and an adjacent sector on each side), followed Dy the evacuation of other sectors as a precautionary measure.
~
1/ O Hans, J. M. , Jr. , and T. C. Sell,1974 Evacuation Risks - An Evaluation, l U. S. Environmental Protection Agency, ilational Environmental Research Center, Las Vegas, EPA-:520/6-74-002. E-11
. O Format for Reporting Information The areas for which evacuation estimates are required must encompass the entire area within a circle of about 10 miles radius, and nave outer boundaries corresponding to the plume exposure EPI. These areas are as follows:
Distance Area 2 miles two 180* sectors 5 miles four 90* sectors about 10 miles four 90* sectors Estimates for the outer sectors should assume that the inner aciacent sectors e are being evacuated simultaneously. To the exent practical, tne sector boundaries should not divide densely populated areas. Knere a direction corresponding to the edges of areas for which estimates have been mace is thought not to be adequately represented by the time estimates fer acjacent areas, an additional area should be defined and a separate _ estimate made for this case. The format for submittal shoUld include noth a table and a figure (overlaid on a map) whic,h each give the infonnation requested in items l, Q l and 2 below. Additional material may be provided in associateo text. Required Information
- 1. Two estimates are requested in each of the areas cefined in item 1 for a general evacuation of the population (not including special facilities).
! A best estimate is required and an aaverse weather estimate is required l for movement of the population.
- 2. The total tire required to evacuate special facilities (e.g., hospitals) within each area must be specified (best estimate and aaverse weather).
- 3. The time required for coafirmation of evacuation shculd oe ir.dicated.
Confirmation times may consider special instructions to the public (e.g., tying a hankerchief to a door or gate to indicate the occupant has left the premises).
- 4. Where plans and prompt notification systems have not been pu , in place for areas out to about 10 miles, estimates of tne times requireo to evacuate until such measures are in place for the plume exposure erer;ency planning zone (EPZ) should also be given. Notification times greater 'than 15 minutes should be incluceo in the evacuation times and footnotea to inoicate the notification time.
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- 5. Where special evacuation problems are identified (e.g., in high population density areas), specify alternative protective actions, such as sheltering, which would reduce exposures and the effectiveness -
of these measures.
'6. 'A short background document should be submitted giving the methods used to make the estimates and the assumptions made including the rtutes and methods of transportation used. This document should also note the corments of principal 'lodal officials regarding t> tse estimates.
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i OKLAHOMA CIVIL DEFENSE i '!$Y [ SEQUOYAH-WILL ROGERS BUILDINGS POST OFFICE BOX 53365
- OKLAHOMA CITY. OKLAHOMA 73152 405/521-2481 i GEORGE NIGH NORRIS PRICE 0etober 1, 1980 Governor State Director Mr. Vaughn L. Conrad, Manager Licensing and Compliance Public Service Company of Oklahoma P. O. Box 201 Tulsa, OK 74102
Dear Mr. Conrad:
Our office has reviewed the evacuation time estimates for the ten-mile radius around your Black Fox Station as pro-vided by Oklahoma State University. We believe the method- 4 ology and data base used to prepare the e s t iina t e s has been g(._) adequately considered for reasonably estimating evacuation times. Given the use of an early warning system for the public and the relatively low population density around BFS, the over-all evacuation time estimate of 143 minutes is considered by our office to be sufficient time to evac-uate the public. The time estimate of 219 minutes for ad-verse weather conditions of the same population sufficiently represents the increased travel time required. The complete program developed for the BFS evacuation time estimates is adequate for the detail used at this stage. We will reserve the right to again review similar estimates for Black Fox Station prior to operation. l Sincerely, N A LA AW orris Price, Director Oklahoma Civil Defense Agency vw l l O 1 G E-14 i}}