ML20137W927
| ML20137W927 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Vogtle  |
| Issue date: | 02/28/1986 |
| From: | Mark Miller Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | Linenberger G, Margulies M, Paris O Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel |
| References | |
| TASK-AS, TASK-BN86-008, TASK-BN86-8 BN-86-008, BN-86-8, NUDOCS 8603030042 | |
| Download: ML20137W927 (2) | |
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FEB 2 81986 Docket Nes.: 50-424 and 50-425 m
MEMORANDUM FOR: The Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel for Vogtle:
(M. Margulies, O. Paris, G. Linenberger)
FROM:
Melanie A. Miller, Project Manager n
PWR Project Directorate #4 i
Division of PWR Licensing-A, NRR l
SUBJECT:
SUMMARY
BOARD NOTIFICATION FOR V0GTLE UNITS 1 AND 2 l
(BOARD NOTIFICATION NO. 86-08) 7 l
In accordance with the NRC procedures for Board Notifications (BNs), this sumary BN is being provided within 30 days of the start of the hearing for your infomation. All Board Notifications from 1982 through BN 86-3 were reviewed for potential relevance to the licensing of the Vogtle units. The enclosure lists those BNs which relate to the staff's licensing review of Vogtle and which either (1) remain unresolved and have not been addressed in the staff's Final Environmental Statement (FES) or the Safety Evaluation Report (SER) and its Supplement 1 or (2) were addressed and resolved through
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a mechanism other than the staff's FES or SER..e.g., inspection reports.
f Therefore, in line with item (1) above, the list does not include BN issues being tracked as Vogtle-specific open or confirmatory issues. Those BNs falling under item (1) are provided as enclosures to this summary BN.
Further, while Trar.sameri_ca Delaval, Inc., diesel,qenerators have been the subject of many BNs since late 1983, those BNs that are within the generic resolution are not addressed here because the generic resolution of the TDI issue for Vogtle is identified as a confimatory issue in the SER.
Melanie A. Miller, Project Manager PWR Project Directorate #4 Division of PWR Licensing-A, NRR l
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Enclosures:
As stated f
1 Parties to the Proceeding See next page 860303o042 D
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N ENCLOSURE
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BN Number Subiect Status and Method of Resolution 82-90 Deficiencies in Weld This issue was adequa.teTy resolved -
82-90A Control Panels in Inspection Reports 84-07 and 84-15.
- 83s118 Materials Supplied The identified issue was adequately by Ray Miller resolved by Inspection Report 85-23.83-139, Reactor Coolant Pump This issue is being addressed as part 84-76 Seals of Unresolved Safety Issue-44, " Station 84-123, Blackout."
J 85-64 1
i 84-34 Fire Ressarch Regarding This issue is the subject of ongoing Fire in Electrical staff sponsored research. The issue Cabinets in Control Room will be further addressed for its applicability to Vogtle as necessary.
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84-73 Sandia Early Containment This issue is the subject of ongoing Failure Study staff-sponsored research.
Early con-tainment failure is not design-basis accident and utilities are not required to address it by Commission regulations.
I The staff will inform the Board if a significant issue develops for Vogtle.
85-90 10 CFR 21 Report on Although this BN indicates that the Intake and Exhaust issue is resolved, the staff has Valve Springs in recently learned that utilities are Perry Diesel Generator still conducting inspections. Georgia l
Power Company plans to replace the affected component. The staff will infom the Board of final resolution.
I 85-91 Diesel Generator Overspeed The root cause of the overspeed prob-Condition Occurrence at lem was determined to be due to Grand Gulf insufficient procedures. The staff will ensure that Vogtle procedures are adequate so that a similar prob-lem is avoided.
86-3 Staff Preliminary Invest-The staff is currently assessing the igation of Earthquake Near ponericimplicationsofthisevent.
Perry
,his issue will be addressed for f
Vogtle as necessary.
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m o nas Docket Nos. 50-440/441 MEMORANDUM FOR: Chaiman Pelladino Comissioner Roberts Comissioner Asselstine Comissioner Bernthal Comissioner Zech FROM:
Robert M. Bernero, D.frector Division of BWR Licensing Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
SUBJECT:
BOARD NOTIFICATION 86-03 7
NRC STAFF PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION OF AN EARTHQUAKE WHICH OCCURRED IN THE VICINITY OF THE PERRY NUCLEAR POWER PLANT SITE This Notif':ation is being provided to the Comission in accordance with the current Board Notification policy. Parties to the Perry OL-Proceeding are being notified by copy of this memorandum.
At 11:48 a.m. (EST) on Friday, January 31, 1986, an earthquake was experienced at the Perry plant having a magnitude of 5.0, as reported by the U.S. Geological Survey. The epicenter of the earthquake appears to be located at a point approximately 10 miles south of the plant site.
The earthquake activated alarms in the Perry, Unit I control room which prompted the licensee to declare a site area emergency, although not required to do so since the plant has not yet been licensed to operate. A NRC investigation team visited the plant site on February 1-2, 1986, to inspect the plant for any damage and to obtain data recorded by earthquake sensing equipment installed in the plant (the first such data obtained from a nuclear plant oukside of California).
Preliminary findings determined from the investigation team's site visit are as follows:
1.
Plant walkdowns revealed little or no damage to the plant. A pipe flange.
on the hot water heater in the radwaste treatment building developed a small water leak and some hairline cracks were observed in concrete walls below grade in the auxiliary, intermediate and radwaste treatment buildings.
Several of the cracks are known to have existed prior to the earthquake.
2.
Two systems electrically tripped as designed when vibration monitors were activated by the earthquake. The auxiliary boiler used for plent space heating tripped due to a change in water level. A significant number of j
safety and non-safety systems were in operation and being tested in pre-paration for plant licensing at the time of the event. These'sy, stems did not appear to be affected by the earthquake.
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The first load of nuclear fuel for Perry Unit 1, currently stored at the plant, was not damaged and there were no radiological consequehces on-site or off-site.
4.
Evaluation of data recorded by the seismic motion sensors in various parts
-of the plant have not been completed. However, based on a preliminary assessment of the data, it appears that the seismic motion data mainly fall within the OBE/SSE design spectrum, except possibly in the relatively high frequency range, i.e., greater than 15 Hz. An analysis by the licensee is underway to determine whether or not (and if so to what extent and at what frequency) the design spectrum was exceeded. A meeting with the licensee is scheduled for February 11, 1986, at the plant site, during which time the licensee will advise NRC of his pFeliminary findings on this event, and his plan of action.
The NRC staff's evaluation of this earthquake event will be factored into the decision to issue an operating license for Perry Unit 1.
We will keep the Consnission and the parties in the Perry OL-Proceeding advised of significant developments on this issue as they occur.
r Robert M. Bernero, Director Division of BWR Licensing Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation 4
Enclosures:
As stated cc: Secy(2)
OPE OGC EDO Parties to the Proceeding J. Gleason, ASLB
'i G. Bright, ASLB J. Kline, ASLB A. Rosenthal, ASLAB W. Johnson, ASLAB H. Wilber, ASLAB ACRS(10)
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wasumarow.o.c.aossa p 21 E Docket Nos.: 50-322 and 50-440 MEMORANDUM FOR: Chairman Palladino Comissioner Roberts Comissioner Asselstine Comissioner Bernthal l
Comissioner Zech l
FROM:
Hugh L. Thompson, Jr., Director Division of Licensing, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
SUBJECT:
EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR OVERSPEED CONDITION OCCURRENCE AT GRAND GULF NUCLEAR STATION (BOARD NOTIFICATION NO.85-091) l In accordance with procedures for Board Notifications, the following in-formation is being provided directly to the Comission. The appropriate boards and parties, for all facilities with TDI diesel generators are being infomed by a copy of this memorandum. This information is relevant to all facilities that have diesel generators manufactured by TDI including Perry and Shoreham, which are currently before the~ Comission.
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An overspeed condition was experienced with the Division 1 Transamerica DeLaval, Inc. emergency diesel generator (TDI/EDG), at the Grand Gulf Nuclear Station, on November 6,1985. The Grand Gulf EDG was subjected to an overspeed condition for approximately 15 seconds before it could be shut down and did sustain.significant damage during this event.
The NRC/TDI Task Group representatives are investigating the incident to determine if there are generic implications which could affect other nuclear facilities utilizing the TDI/EDG and the Woodward governor. Although the specific cause(s) is not yet known, it is thought to be associated with a i
malfunction of the Woodward governor and overspeed trip mechanism.- This event occurred after some preventive maintenance of the EDG was performed.
The Grand Gulf licensee, assisted by FaAA, Woodward and TDI personnel, is l
in the process of evaluating the damage sustained by the EDG. The governor was removed and sent to Woodward for inspection and testing. Preliminary infomation regarding the bench testing performed by Woodward indicates that the governor failed to respond to an overspeed condition because of inadequate governor lube oil levels.
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. i Event followup is continuing in the offices of NRR, I&E and Region II to determine the significance of this event, its applicability to other licen-sees and applicants for operating licenses, and the nece.ssity.for. issuance of an I&E Information Notice and/or Bulletin.
We will advise the Commission and the Boards of results of those investiga-tions as they proceed.
Htsh L. Thompson J r.
rector Di v sion of Licensin 01 ice of Nuclear Reactor Regulation ec: SECY(2) 7 OPE OGC EDO Parties to the Proceeding ACRS (IO)
ASLB's for: Midland Shearon Harris Comanche Peak ASLAB's for: Shoreham Perry See next page M
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UNITED STATES 8
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e Docket Nos.: 50-322 and 50-440 MEMORANDUM FOR: Chairman Palladino Comissioner Roberts Comissioner Asselstine Comissioner Bernthal Comissioner Zech FROM:
Hugh L. Thompson, Jr., Director Division of Licensing Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
SUBJECT:
10 CFR PART 21 REPORT OF POTENTIAL PROBLEM WITH INTAKE AND EXHAUST VALVE SPRINGS INSTALLED IN PERRY NUCLEAR POWER PLANT EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR ENGINES (BOARD NOTIFICATION NO.85-090) i In accordance with the procedures for Board Notifications, the following in-
~ fonnation is being provided directly to the Comission. The appropriate boards and parties for all facilities with TDI diesel generators are being informed by a copy of this memorandum. This information is relevant to all facilities that have diesel generators manufactured by TDI, including Shoreham and Perry, which are currently before the Comission.
j Enclosed is a 10 CFR Part 21 report issued by Transamerica Delaval, Inc (TDI) j on November 6, 1985, relating a potential problem with the emergency diesel generator engine intake and exhaust valve springs, which is provided for your I
infonnation. The TDI Owners Group has evaluated this issue, involving valve i
springs furnished to TDI by the Betts Springs Company of San Leandra,
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California, and has submitted findings to the NRC in the Design Review / Quality Revalidation Reports, which are required from each utility. This issue is considered resolved.
Mi H gh L. Thompson, Jr,
rector D
ion of Licensin Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation ~
Enclosure:
As stated cc: See next page
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ACRS (10) i ASLB's for: Midland Shearon Harris Comanche Peak ASLAB's for: Shoreham Perry See next page e
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NIS~SE! S EnWne.nd Compr.ssor Mon gglggl 560 85th Av.nue g
P.O. Box 2161 O.kl.nd, C.lif orni. 94621 (415) 577 7400 November 6,1985 Director, Office of Inspection and Enforemmt U.S. Nuclear Regulatory r=nission Washingtm, D.C.
20555
Dear Sir:
In ac derce with the requirements of Title 10, Osapter 10, Code of Federal P@tions, Part 21, Tran*.ca Delaval Inc., hereby notifies the =niasim of a potential defect r
in a couponent of a DSR or DSRV Stancby Diesel Generator.
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'Ihere exists a potential problem with the engine's intake and exhaust valve springs Wiich could result in engine non-availmhility.
Tran% Delaval has supplied the DSR and DSRV engines with this potential defect to the following sites:
Utility Site Serial No.
2 del Img Island Lighting Shoreham 74010-12 DSR 48 Middle South Energy Grand Gulf 74033-36 DSRV 16-4 Gulf States Utilities River Bend 74039-40 DSR 48 Carolina Power Shearcn Harris 74046-49 DSRV 16-4 Duke Power Catawba 75017/20 DSRV 16-4 h h California Edison San Onofre 75041-42 DSRV 20-4 Cleveland Electric Illuminating Perry 75051-54 DSRV 16-4
'1VA Bellefcnte 75080-83 DSRV 16-4 Washington Public Power WPPSS 1 75084-85 DSRV 16-4 Texas Utilities Serv. enm=nche Peak 76001-04 DSRV 16-4 Washington Public
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Power WPPSS 4 76031-32 DSRV 16-4 Georgia Power Vogtle 76021/24 DSRV 16-4 Cons mers Power Midland 77001/04 DSRV 12-4
'IVA Hartsville 77024/35 DSRV 16-4 90D Rancho Seco 81015/16 DSR 48
'Ihe valve springs are manufactured by Betts Spring Capany, San Imndro, California.
- ! hey are installed on the aigine cylinder head asserbly (4 per cylinder head) by Transamerica Delaval or.
provided as spare parts.
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T November 6,1985 Pat;c 2 Director, Office of Inspection and Enforement U.S. Nuclear Regulatory canniasicn We have recently experienced isolated failures of this spring in m=arcial applications. In Jme of 1984, cne spring failed in a 16 cylinder engine used for ship propulsion, and in October 1985 eleven springs failed in a seccnd ship.
'Ihe eleven sprin6s all failed within a short time following a Coast Guard required over-speed test. We have not dernmined the canaal relae4mahip between the two events.
T Wile our investigaticn ecntinues, preliminary indicaticns reveal inpurities on the wire coupled with draw marks frcxn the manufacturing i
process and subsequent inecmplete shot peening. Addirimally, all l
springs failed after an extensive operating period (.yyr healy 5,000 to 7,000 operating hours).
During acr investigation we r+>---A all users inspect their engines for broken springs and to identify the original =mdarturer.
'Ihis identification is made by the color of stripe painted on the
, springs the Betts spring has a dtite stripe.
Our investigation of this problem is ye_--wing on a high priority basis. To assist in this process we request all users report the results of their inspection within thirty (30) days of this notificaticn. We will keep the canniasion and engine users apprainad
-of the progress of our investigation.
1 i
A copy of this letter will be sent to all of the sites referenced in paragraph 2 of this letter as indicated by the carbcn copy list.
Our evaluation of this potential problem was ccmpleted cn November 4, 1985.
Very
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B. C.
Manager, Quality Assurance s
BOG:hw 7p Enclosure l
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4 Transamenoa Delaval Page Date U.S. Nuclear Regulatory M asion CC:
Long Island Lighting Go.
Shoreham Nuclear Power Station North Country Rd.
Wading River, New York 11791 Attention: Mr. M. H. W114==n Project Engineer Middle So. Energy - Grand Gulf P.O. Box 1640 Jackson, Mississippi 39205 Attention: Mr. J. B. Richard Sr. Vice-Pres. Nuclear Proiaction Gulf States Utilities Co.
Stcme & Webster Eng. Co.
Gerry Hill Operatirms Center 3 Executive Campus P.O. Bax 5200 Gerry Hill, New Jersey 08034 Attention: Project Manager (J.O. No.12210)
Gulf States Project Carolina Power & Light Co.
Shearon Harris Nuclear Plants P.O. No. 101 New Hill, North Carolina 27662 Attention: Mr. R. M. Parsons Projecg General Manager Duke Power - Catsuba Mill Power Supply Co.
P.O. Box 32307 Quirlotte, North Carolina 28232 Attention:
W. T. Robertson, President s_
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4 Transamenos Delaval Page Date U. S. Nuclear Regulatory I'dasim CC: (cmtimed)
MirMm California Edison P.O. Box 800 Rosmaad, Calif. 91770 Are=*W:
Q. A.
Manager Cleveland Electric Illun. Co.
c/o Perry Nuclear Power Plant P.O. Box 97 Perry, Chio 44081 Attation: Mr. C. M. Shuster, Manager Nuclear Quality Assurance (TVA - Bellef mte)
Mr. C. A. Chandley Tennessee Valley Authority W7C126, 400 West Stamit Hill Dr.
Knarville, Tenn. 37902 Attentim: Mr. I. L. Beltz Mr. G. K. Dyekznan, Acting Assistant Prcar-u Director - Engineering (899)
WashinStm Public Power Supply Systen Post Office Box 460 Richland, Wash. 99352 (Call Vince Dilwrth for i that will go with 10CFR21)
Texas Utilities Services Inc.
P.O. Box 2300 Glen Rose, Texas 76043 Attentim: Mr. J. T. Merritt, Jr.
Engineering & Constructim )gr.
Georgia Power Bechtel Power Corp.
Ios Angeles Power Div.
P.O. Ecm 60860, Terminal Amex Bldg.
r-Ios Angeles, Ca. 90060
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Attention: Mr. M. Malcom Project Engineering )tr.
Transamenoa Delaval Page Date U. S. Nuclear Regulatory CWasion CC: (continued)
Consumers Power Co.
1945 West Parnall Road Jacksco, F4hig=n 49201 Attenticxu J. W. Cook Vice President acts MARK OUISIdE DNE!J0FE "1
'IVA Hartsville W 10 D224-400 cm Ave.
Knoxville, Tenn. 37902 Atreim: Mr. C. A. Chandley Chief, Hoch. Eng. Branch Sacramento tbnicipal Utility Dist.
L. R. Failman Nuclear Engineering Dept., M.S. 32 P.O. Bcx 15830 Sacramento, CA 95S13 i
Mr. George Bockhold, Jr.
j Plant Manager Georgia Power Co.
Plant Vogtle P.O. Ban 282 Wayansboro, Georgia 30830 Sacramento Manicipal Utility Dist.
J. R. Beal Purchasin6 Department, M.S.
50 P.O. Box 15830 Sacramento, CA 95813 x
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February 23, 1984 Docket Nos.: 50-289.483,443/444 382,50-275/323,440/441 352/353,329/330,322, 247/286,358,482 529/530 t
MEMORANDUM FOR:
Chairman Palladino Comissioner Gilinsky i
Comissioner Roberts Comissioner Asselstine Comissioner Bernthal l
FROM:
Darrell G. Eisenhut, Director Division of Licensing
SUBJECT:
FIRE RESEARCH RESULTS CONCERNING FIRES IN ELECTRICAL CABINETS IN THE CONTROL ROOM (BOARD NOTIFICATION 84-69F OSh l
In accordance with present NRC procedures regarding Board Notifications, the enclosed memorandum from Richard Vollmer to Darrell Eisenhut, dated February 6,1984, is provided for your information. This information is applicable to all nuclear power plants. By copy of this memorandum, we are notifying appropriate boards and parties.
This infonnation relates to the staff's preliminary review of experimental results concerning the effects of fire on electrical equipment in cabinets located in the control room and other nuclear plant locations. The experiments were conducted by Sandia Laboratories as part of a fire protection research program initiated by the NRC.
As stated in the enclosure, the results of the Sandia experiments are reported in, " Fire Safety of Electrical Cabinets", R. B. Williamson, F. W. Howrer, and F. L. Fisher, November 1983, revised January 1984 The summary of this report states that direct damage to the cabinets and their contents during the experiments suggests the need for greater scrutiny, especially if redundant safety systems are located within the same or adjacent cabinets.
The staff's preliminary review of the test report indicates that imediate action is not required because of the three reasons given in the enclosure.
Further evaluation of the test data is required to determine if there is a safety concern in the level of fire protection provided for electrical cabinets.
The staff will keep you informed reg rding the re tion of this issue.
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Enclosure:
As Stated
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FEB 6 1984 MEMORANDUM F,0R: 3.ates.tidGgEife$.an;gtrettoGi Division of Licensing FROM:
Richard H. Vollmer, Director Division of Engineering 4
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SUBJECT:
BOARD NOTIFICATION REGARDING FIRE RESEARCH l
RESULTS CONCERNING FIRES IN ELECTRICAL CABINETS IN THE CONTROL ROOM E
i In 1982, the NRC initiated.a fire protection research program to determine how electrical equipment in cabinets located in the control room and other plant locations may be affected by fire and fire suppressants.
As part of this research effort, Sandia Laboratories conducted two experiments in October 1982 and February 1983 which exposed an aluminum electrical equipment i
cabinet to fire.
The results of these experiments are reported in " Fire Safety of Electrical Cabinets", R. 8. Williamson,,F. W. Mowrer, and i
F. L. Fisher, November 1983, revised January 1984.
In the Summary of this report the authors state:
"The two experiments described above have demonstrated the potential for serious fires in electrical cabinets resulting from a " typical" transient ignition source.
The direct damage to the cabinets and their contents during these experiments suggests the need for greater scrutiny, especially if redundant safety systems are located within the same or adjacent cabinets.
The flashover which occurred in the room surrounding the cabinet during the second experiment is considered to have important safety implications for new as well as operating reactors" Our requirements recognized the difficulty of predicting the magnitude of damage in the control room that may result from a fire o'r from fire j
i suppressants.
To account for this uncertainty, we normally require an alternate shutdown capability independent of the control room.,
Our preliminary review of the test report indicates that immediate action i
is not required, because:
]
1.
The ignition source used for these experiments was a trash fire composed of loosely packed paper in two polyethylene bags, loosely e
packed paper in a 32 gallon polyethylene waste container, as well as two cardboard boxes with polyethylene foam packing material or loosely packed paper.
We consider the accumulation of such combustibles in the control room to be a low probability event becaUse$ e control Rh' room is a restricted area that is continuously manned y licensed j
operators and administrative controls prohibit the accumulation of unnecessary material in the area.
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Darrell G. Eisenhut 2.
Because the control room is continuously manned, we expecti that a fire would be detected and extinguished promptly.
The report indicates a light spray of water was applied to the upper part of the cabinet approximate,1y 15 minutes after ignition.
This spray resulted in a rapid decrease in heat release rate and temperature.
In our opinion,
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i the application of such spray shortly after ignition would control such a fire.
3.
The test configuration did not accurately similate the control room cabinet configuration with regard to cabinet material and. construction, 4
ventilation openings and contents.
In addition, the size of the test enclosure is small compared to a control room.
In view of the contents in the " Summary" section of the report, there may be a potential safety concern in that the level of fire protection provided for electrical cabinets may not be adequate.
There are electrical cabinets 1
j in every nuclear power plant. We, therefore, recommend that this information
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be submitted for board notification pursuant to NRR Office Letter Number 19, i
dated October 1, 1982.
Further evaluation of the test data is required to resolve this matter.
To this end, we are working with RES.
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Richard H. Vollmer, Director Division of Engineering
Contact:
R. Ferguson x28005 cc:
H. R. Denton M. Srinivasan i
E. G. Case F. Rosa R. DeYoung Z. Rosctoczy G. Arlotto J. Wermiel I
W. Johnston J. Taylor i
G. Lainas S. Ebneter, RO: I F. Miraglia T. Conlon, RO: II i
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T. Novak C. Norelius, R0: III L. Rubenstein E. Johnson, RO: IV i
D. Muller P. Sternberg, RO: V J. Hayes W. Morris V. Benaroya W. Shields
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T. Sullivan S. Trubatch S. Pawlicki B. Buchbinder T. Wambach A. Thadani
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SECY (2)
The Atomic Safety and Licensing Boards for:
Callaway (Gleason, Bright, Kline)
Palo Verde 2 & 3 (Lazo, Callihan, Cole)
Waterford 3 (Wolfe, Foreman, Jordan)
Byron 1 & 2 (Miller, Callihan, Cole)
Catawba 1 & 2 (Kelley, Foster, Purdom)
- Clinton (Clark, Ferguson, Paris)
Comanche Peak 1 & 2 (Bloch, Jordan, McCollum)
Limerick 1 & 2 (Brenner, Cole, Morris)
Midland 1 & 2 (Beckheefer, Cowan, Harbour)
Perry 1 & 2 (Bloch, Bright, Kline)
Seabrook 1 & 2 (Hoyt, Harbour, Luebke)
T Shoreham (Brenner, Carpenter, Morris)
Wolf Creek (Wolfe, Anderson, Paxton)
The Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal Boards for:
Diablo Canyon 1 & 2 (Moore, Johnson, Buck)
Waterford 3 (Kohl, Johnson, Wilber)
Callaway 1 (Rosenthal, Edles, Gotchy)
TMI-1 (Edles, Buck, Gotchy, Kohl)
All Parties for above proceedings s
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April 19,1984 i
Docket No.: 50-275/323 50-483 50-247/286 MEMORANDUM FOR:
Chainnan Palladino Comissioner Gilinsky i
Comissioner Roberts Commissioner Asselstine Comissioner' Bernthal T
FROM:
Darrell G. Eisenhut, Director Division of Licensing
SUBJECT:
BOARD NOTIFICATION REGARDING WESTINGHOUSE REACTOR COOLANT PUMP SEALS (BN-84-076)
In accordance with the procedures for board notification, the following information is being transmitted directly to the Comission.
The appropriate boards are being notified by copy of this memorandum.
This information is applicable to Diablo Canyon, Callaway and Indian Point 2/3 which are currently before the Commission.
' This recent information updates the information provided in BN-83-139 and Atomic Energy Canada Limited test results that may indicate a potential for Reactor Coolant Pump Seal failure under loss of cooling conditions.
As stated in BN-83-139 this issue may ultimately raise a new safety concein and is therefore being forwarded for your informa, tion.
However, the staff recognizes that the conditions of the test represent events which are currently beyond the designed basis.
fV arrel G.
ie irector Division of Licensing
Enclosure:
Memo Vollmer to Eisenhut 4/6/84
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2-i ASLB FOR:
Byron - 50/454/455 (Smith, Callihan, Cole)
Callaway 483/486 (Gleason, Bright, Kline 50-413/41h (Kelly, Purdom, Foster) )
Catawba -
ComanchePeak-50-445/446(Bloch, Jordan,McCollom)
Seabrook - 50/433/434 (Hoyt, Harbour Luebke)
Wolf Creek 482 (Wolfe, Anderson, Paxton)
ASLAB FOR:
Callaway 483/486(Rosenthal,Edles,Gotchy)
Byron 454/455 (Rosenthal, Gotchy, Kohl)
Diablo Canyon 275/323 (Moore, Buck, Johnson)
Catawba 413/414 (Rosenthal,.% ore, Wilber)
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A*R 0 6 1S84 MEMORANDUM TGR:. C ; C _I b khf((($~7 5~~<
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O bition of Er.gineering
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Richard H. Yo11mer, Director Division off Engineering
SUBJECT:
BOARD WOT.1FICATION REGARDING WESTI%NOUSE REACTOR C00LMT PUMP SiiALS
Reference:
Meno from D. Eis,enhut to the Comission dat.ed September 21,.1923 Board Notification Regarding Westinghoase Peactor Coolant Pump Sesis (BN-33-139)
As part of the confirmatory research prograss related to equipment quali-l fication, RES is conducting scale model tests at Atonic Energy Canada, Limited ( AECL) of :econdary seals (0-rings and channel seals).cich are an integral part of tt:e seats of some reactor coolant pumps (PCP).
These tests simulate the conditions which RCP seats wou!d be sunjected to during s tatf or. blackcut. Fre1Toinery indications from AECL $ndicate failure to seal in seine small size 0-ring tests for a range of test conditions whicn is both e. ore and less severe than the conditions established by Westinghouse for fts pumps.
The tests are continuing in order to verify the behavior and c.wplete the planned test program. 7bese sca)ed 0-ring and channel seal tests are to be conducted over a range of pressures,. temperatures, and gap sizes which will bracket the conditions established by Westinghouse for its pumps.
Westinghouse is in the process of submitting an analysis t.o thee staff which establishes icwer pressure differentials ar:d somewhat lower temper.sture conditions for the 0* rings and channel seals. This analysis is subject to staff review.
A contractor has also been selected to ao an independent verification review of the Westinghouse calculations.
Although the tests are still in progress at AECL and the ress.,1ts are to be considered preliminary at this time, we recomend board cotification of this additional informattor,as it relates to the previcus referenced board notification.
f/N Richard H. Vollmer, Director Divistor. of Engineering Contact-J Jackson, NRR Ext. 27930
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50-483 50-247/286 MEMORANDUM FOR:
Chairman Falladino Conmissicner Gilinsky Conmissioner Roberts Commissioner Asselstine Comrissioner Bernthal y
FRCH:
Darrell G. Eisenhut Director Division of Licensing
SUBJECT:
BOAR 0 NOTIFICATION REGARDING WESTIllGHOUSE REACTOR COOLANT PUMP SEALS (BN-84-123) in accoraance with the procedures for ooard notification, the following inferriation is being transmitted directly to the Commissicn. The apprcpriate boards are being notified by copy of this nemerandum.
This infomation is applicable to Diablo Canyon, Callaway and Indian Point 2/3 which is currently before the Comr.ission.
5 This recent infomation updates the information provided in BN-8f-139 and BN-64-076. During the April 16-17, 1984 meetings with Electricite DeFrance, tre staff obtained information relating to reactor ccolant pump performance with no seal cooling.
The French tests shcsed a rapid rise in seal test results.
~
The staff is hoping to obtain the actual temperature anc laak. age flow rate.
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.F Darrell G. Eisenhut', Director Division of Licensing En:Icsure:
Memo vo11Aer to Eisenhut 6/21/84 i
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June 21, 1984 MEMORANDUM FOR:
Darrell G. Eisenhut, Director Division of licensing FROM:
Richard H. Vollmer, Director Division of Engineerir.g
SUBJECT:
BOARD NOTIFICATION REGARDING INFORMATION RECEIVED FROM FRENCH ON REACTOR COOLANT PUMP SEALS
References:
(1) Memo from D. Eisenhut to the Commission dated September 21, 1983, Board Notification Regarding Westinghouse Reactor Coolant Putp Seals (BN-83-139)
(2) Memo from R. Vollmer to D. Eisenhut, dated April 6,1984, Board Notification Regarding Westinghouse Reactor Coolant Pump Seals During meetings with Electricite De France (EDF) in Paris, France on April 16-17, 1984 the staff acquir,ed new information relatir.g to reactor coolant pump (RCP) seal behavior as discussed in the memoranda referenced aboue.
EDF conducted RCP seal tests at the 900 MW pump test loop at Gennevilliers during 1983 which convinced them to ba:kfit their plants to provide an emergency source of cooling to the RCP seals, during station blackout conditions.
The RCP seals tested are similar if not identical to the Westinghouse seals used in the United States.
The tests were performed with.the RCP seal in a stationary configuration, subjected to full reactor coolant temperature and pressure, with no seal cooling.
The tests were terminated after several minutes in order to prevent damage to the pump assembly being tested.
The rapid rise in seal temperature and leakage flow rate observed during the tests convinced the French that the RCP seal cooling should not be interrupted, except for very short periods of time, during emergencies such as station Nackputs.
The Gennevilliers test results also showed that with rapid temperature and flow transients the number one stage of the RCP seal would open.
i Based on information received from the French and on a recent RES trip report, it is our understanding that the French are providing a steam turbine driven pump to supply emergency cooling for the RCP seals in their smaller plants.
In the larger plants they are providing a steam turbine
~
driven generator as a source of emergency power to an existing pump to supply the RCP seal cooling.
In addition, a backup gas turbine generator will be installed at each four unit plant site to provide anotfie? level of emergency electrical power for cooling the RCP seals.
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Darrell G. Eisenhut..Oce 21, 1o84 Although the actual test results have not been made available to-es at this time, we believe %at this additier.al information should be provided fs an update f.o tne. referenced toard notification.
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' Richard H. Vollmar, Director 4
Division of En;;ineering cc:
H. Danten I
i E Case R. Vol!aer D. Eisenhet r -
R. Mattson T.'Speis J. Knignt i
V. Noonan G. Bagchi J. Jackson a
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Contact:
J. Jackson, NRR Ext. 27930 2
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April 19,1984 2
Occket No.: 50-275/323 50-483 50-247/286 MEMORANDUM FOR:
Chairman Palladino Co.missioner Gilinsky Comissioner Roberts Co11nissioner Asselstine Comissioner' Bernthal T
FRCM:
Dcrrell G. Eisenhut, Ofrector Divisfon of Licensing SUBJZCT:
BOARD NOTIFICATJON REGARDING WESTINGHOUSE REACTOR CCOLAWPUMP SEA'.S (BN-84-076)
In accordance with the procedures for board notification, the following information $s being transmitted directly to the Comission.
The appropriate boards are being notified by co infonnation is applicable to Diablo Canyon,py of this memorandum. This which are currently before the Comission.
Callawa/ and Indian Point 2/3 4
This recent information updatcs the information provided in BN-83-139 and Atonic Energy Canada Limited test results that may indicate a potential for Reacter Ccolant Fun Sea \\ failure under loss of cooling conditions, As stated in BN-83-139 this issue may ultimately raise a new safety cor.cdn ar.d is therefore being forwarded for your infori.1ation.
However, the staff recognizes that the conditions of the test represent events which are currently beycod the designed basis.
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frectcr Division of 1.fcensing
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Enclosure:
Memo Yollner to Eisenhut 4/6/84
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P Callaway 483/486 (Rosenthal, Edles, Gotchy) l Bynn 454/455 (Rosenthal, Gotchy, Kohl)
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WAsHINoToN. D. C. 205S5 APR 0 6 1984 MEMORANDUM FOR:FC.J.J Z'-Nb5$
I Division of Engineering FROM:
Richard H. Vollmer, Director Division of Engineering
SUBJECT:
BOARD NOTIFICATION REGARDING WESTINGHOUSE REACTOR COOLANT PUMP SEALS
Reference:
Memo fror.: D. Eisenhut to the Commission, dated September 21,.1983, Board Notification Regarding Westinghouse Reactor Coolant Pump Seals (BN-83-139)
As part of the confirmatory research programs related to equipment quali-fication, RES is conducting scale model tests at Atomic Energy Canada, limited (AECL) of secondary seals (0-rings and channel seals) which are an integral part of the seals of some reactor coolant pumps (RCP). These tests simulate the conditions which RCP seals would be subjected to during station blackout.
Preliminary indications from AECL indicate failure to seal in some small size 0-ring tests for a range of test conditions which is both more and less severe than the conditions established by Westinghouse for its pumps.
The tests are continuing in order to verify the behavior and complete the planned test program.
These scaled 0-ring and channel seal tests are to be conducted over a range of pressures, temperatures, and gap sizes which will bracket the conditions established by Westinghouse for its pumps.
Westinghouse is in the process of submitting an analysis to the staff which establishes lower pressure differentials and somewhat lower temperature conditions for the 0-rings and channel seals. This analysis is subject to staff review.
A contractor has also been sele::ted to do en independent verification review of the Westinghouse calculations.
Although the tests are still in progress at AECL and the results are to be considered preliminary at this time, we recommend board notification,
of this additional information as it relates to the previous referenced board notification.
l
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Richard H. Vollmer, Director Division of Engineering
Contact:
J. Jackson, NRR s
Ext. 27930 T e..
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SEP 2 1 I M Docket No.: 50-275/323 MEE RANDUM FOR:
Chairman Palladino Cosmissioner Gilinsky Cosmissioner Roberts Cosmissioner Asselstine Cosmissioner-Bernthal FROM:
Darrell G. Eisenhut. Director Division of Licensing
SUBJECT:
BOARD NOTIFICATION REGARDING WESTINGHOU3E REACTOR COOLANT PUMP SEALS (BN-83-139)
In accordance with the procedures for board notification, the following infomation is being transmitted directly to the Cosmissicn. The appropriate boards am being notified by copy of this memorandum. This
(.
information is applicable to Diablo Canyon which is currently before the Comission.
This recent infonation relates to recent Westinghouse Owners Group i
test results that may indicate a potential for Reactor Ccolant Pump Seal failure ur. der loss of cooling conditions. It nay ultimately raise a significant new safety concem and is therefore being forwarded for your infomation.
. o.
Darm11 G. Eisenhut. Director Division of Licensing Enclosums:
Mem Vo11 mar to Eisenhut 9/15/83 Meco Speis to Eisenhut 9/16/83 See Next Page for cc's y[2l 2 f/'
DIST: 50-247/286,454/455,483/486,413/414,445/446,433/434,275/323
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Byron 50-454/455 Smith,Callihan, Cole)
Callaway 50-483/486 Gleason, Bright, Kline)
Catawba 50-413/414 Kelly, Callahan Foster)
Comanche Peak 50-445/446(Bloch, Jordan,McCollom)
-Seabrook 50-433/434 (Hoyt, Harbour, Luebke)
ASLAB FOR:
Callaway 50-483/486 (Rosenthal, Edles, Gotchy)
Diablo Canyon 50-275/323(Moore, Buck, Johnson) i i
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MEMORANDUM FOR:EKrEi(N.TnitiuW'01netsi=*
7tytsTd'n~of uceniTrif FRON:
Richard H. Vollmer, Director '
Division of Engineering J
SUBJECT:
BOARD NOTIFICATION REGARDING WESTINGHOUSE REACTOR COOLANT PUMP SEALS:
j This memo supercedes my meno dated September 6, 1983 on the subject board notification.
~
The Westinghouse Owners Group initiated a test program in June 1983 to i
determine the survivability of the reactor coolant pump (RCP) secondary 2
seals under conditions wherein seal cooling is loft. The secondary seals I
were thought to be the weak components in the design of the RCP seaf.
Their failure under a loss of cooling condition could lead to a"small break LOCA resulting from failure of the complete RCP seal.
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The secondary seal survivability test program has now progressed through test number four. These tests have not been successful in confirmin0.;the ability of the secondary seals which consist of 0-ring and channel seals to survive under loss of cooling conditions. Two of the four tests resulted
~
in 0-ring blow-out with complete loss of sealing ability and two tests,;
although maintaining sealing ability, resulted in moderate to severe damage to the seals.
Westinghouse believes that their 0-ring and channel seal test rig does -
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not represent the actual design or loss of cooling conditions in the RCP, and therefore Westinghouse believes that the results of these tests are i
inconclusive. Westingho'use is now proposing to the Owners Group that i
changes be made to the test rig which will eliminate these differences.
At the present time the staff does not have enough information to either agree or disagree with Westinghouse conclusions regarding the results of the first four tests.
~
CONTACT:
J. Jackson, NRR Ext. 27930
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Darrell G. Eisenhut.
ExperiencedatafromWestinghousepumpsshowRCPsealsurvivalu of cooling conditions for a period of up to 65 minutes with no abnormal leakage.
There are other instances of interruptions of cooling function for periods of 45, 30, and 10 or less minutes also with low leakage.
In addition, Westinghouse has presented 0 ring experience data from valve tests at 550*F and 2250 psig which show survival of ethylene propylene 0-rings up to 10 hours1.157407e-4 days <br />0.00278 hours <br />1.653439e-5 weeks <br />3.805e-6 months <br />.
Westinghouse has committed to supply the sta'ff with additional infor-nation which will include a schedule for further testing and analysis.
The staff is independently pursuing an analysis of the problem as well as further testing of the RCP seal failure mechanisms. The staff will meet with Westinghouse and the Westinghouse Owner's Group September 30, 1983 to discuss the RCP seal problem and decide on a course of action for further testing and analysis.
In addition we have involved Region IV in this problem and they are scheduling audits of both the Westing-house pump manufacturing facility and their seal vendor, Stein Seal Corpany. Members of NRR and RES will acc w any Region IV personnel.on, these audits.
In any event, the results of any further Westinghouse Owners Group testing and analysis will most probably not be complete until the end of 1983. Until.the staff has had an opportunity to aqcess these results and other information being developed, the integrity of the RCP seal under long tern loss of cooling conditions can not be
t confirmed. We will keep you informed regarding the further progress of J
this issue.
However, since the current Westinghouse Owners Group test results indicate the possibility for a RCP seal failure under loss of cooling conditions, we.
recommend board notification of this issue.
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' Richard H. Vollmer, Director Division of Engineering cc:
H. Denton A. Thadani E. Case P. Baranowsky i
T. Speis R. Lobel G. Lainas E. Sylvester T. Novak R. Riggs F. Miraglia J. Richardson J. P. Knight W. Campbell 4
W. Johnston-G. Bagchi
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September 16, 1983
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MEMORANDUM FOR:
Division of Licensing FK0M:
Themis P. Speis, Director Division of Safety Technology
SUBJECT:
BOARD NOTIFICATION REGARDING WESTINGHOUSE REACTOR COOLANT PUMP SEALS (RECOMMENDED BY -
THEDIVISIONOFENGINEERING) g This memorandum concerns the subject reconsnendation dated September 6,1983.
We believe it appropriate, for Board infonnation purposes, to identify on-going Staff = actions related to RCP seal failures. The on-going Staff actions include: Generic Issue 23 (RCP Seal Failures), Generic Issue 65 (Component Cooling Water System Failures), and USI-A44 (Station Blackout)'.
The Westinghouse tests described in the reconsnended Board Notification, are-primarily addressed at resolving certain USI-A44 concerns. However, the.,,,
test results also have a direct bearing on Staff concerns being evaluated in the above mentioned generic issues.
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G Themis P. Speis, Director Division of Safety Technology cc:
R. Vollmer
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'*,......o April 16,1984 Docket No. 50-247
,I and 50-286 MEMORANDUM FOR:
Chairman Palladino Comissioner Gilinsky Commissioner Roberts Comissioner Asselstine Comissioner Bernthal FROM:
Darrell G. Eisenhut, Director DivisiBn of Licensing Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
SUBJECT:
BOARD NOTIFICATION (BN 073) SANDIA NATIONAL LABORATORY STUDY OF EARLY CONTAINMENT FAILURE DUE TO CORE MELT In accordance with the NRC procedure for Board Notification, the following infonnation is being provided directly to the Comission. The Boards and parties are being informed by copy of this memorandum.
The enclosed memorandum (R. Mattson, Director, Division of Systems Integration to D. Eisenhut, Director, Division of Licensing dated April 5, 1984) forwards the Sandia infonnation on the above subject. This infonnation is presently being evaluated and our assessment will be completed in several months.
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'D h1 f'G'..isenh t bt Eto'r '
Division of, Licensing Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Enclosure:
As stated CC:
See next page l
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2-April 16, 1984 The Comission cc:
J. P. Gleason, ASLB Dr. O. H. Paris F. J.-Shon Judge Sheldon J. Wolfe, ASLB Judge Gustava A. Linenberger, Jr., ASLB Ju~dge Ivan W. Smith, ASLB Dr. John H. Buck, ASLAB Judge Reginald L. Gotchy ASLAB Judge Christine N. Kohl, ASLAB Dr. Lawrence R. Quarles, ASLAB Judge Gary L. Edles, ASLAB Parties to Hearing OPE OGE EDO SECY (2)
Contact:
P. Polk, NRR X28196 4
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APR 0 51334 J
MEMORANDUM FOR:
Darrell Eisenhut, Director Division of Licensing FROM:
Roger Mattson, Director Division of Systems Integration
SUBJECT:
BOARD NOTIFICATION The purpose of this memorandum is to request that you notify the
~
Comission in connection with the Indian Point Hearing and any other licensing boards associated with severe accident considerations in PWRs of new and possibly relevant information which has recently come to our
.- ~
attention. A description of this information is prcvided in the enclosure.
The staff is evaluating this information to determine its safety significance and relevance.
In particular, we are evaluating how the new information affects our assessments of risk associated with core melt and early containment failure. We anticipate completing our evaluation within several months, depending on the extent of analysis necessary, i
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W Roger J. Mattson, D' rector Division of Systems ntegration Enclosu-e:
As stated CCi H. Denton J. Stolz D. Eisenhut R. Vollmer R. Minogue, RES
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ENCLOSURE BACKGROUND Under some conditions, a core melt accident may proceed with the primary system at high pressure.
In such cases, t'he melt material might be dispersed into the containment due to high pressure ejection of the melt from the reactor vessel.
The sequence is typified by Figure 1.
The range of possible containment response in terms of melt location, chemical reaction, particle size, and atmospheric heating has not been well established. An experimental investigation is ongoing at the Sandia National Laboratories to study molten core debris interaction with reactor cavity configurations. The program objectives include confirmation of debris dispersal mechanisms; assessment of melt jet geometry, gas solubility and aerosol generation; assessment of 2
melt-concrete water interaction and synergistic effects.
The staff was recently inforned of test results by Sandia which indicate that the conditional probability of early containment failure following a core nelt accident at high primary system pressure due to the rapid I
heating of the containment atmosphere may be higher than previously dete rmined. The applicability of the test information has not been determined.
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o PROBLEM The new test information is related to accidents in which core sneltdown i
and vessel breach occur with the Reactor Coolant System (RCS) pressure above several hundred pounds per square inch.
It has been previously hyp'othesized that, for this event, there would be insufficient material participating in direct heating of the containment atmosphere to seri-i ously jeopardize a large PWR containment.
In the test, a large propor-tion of the simulated melt was blown out of the reactor vessel cavity in a dispersed form.
Rapid chemical reaction with the atmosphere occurred, which was estimated to increase the immediately available thermal energy in a nuclear melt down event by about a factor of three over what would be anticipated from sensible heat of the melt alone. The large
. proportion of dispersed melt caused rapid energy transfer to the atmosphere.
If the test behavior were to occur in a large dry PWR containment, containment failure could potentially occur shortly after vessel failure due to short term overpressure, with the potential for an increase in predicted early health consequences as compared to what has been reported in plant PRAs and recent staff assessments. The magnitude of.the health consequences would be a strong function of the specific site and evacuation model.
The test geometry was intended to simulate the vessel cavity of a W NSSS design.
There was no attempt to simulate other regions of contain' ment.
I The test melt, which consisted of a hot thermite mixture to sip la,te the 5
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noiten fuel-steel-zirconium mixture, was not impeded ir assinc ciu of the vessai cavity.
There are many questions "elete.d to ap:1'[cbility cf i
2
test information to response of a PWR containment atmosphere. These include concerns with influence of cavity scaling, influence of: s.kruc-ture to impede flow and limit air for chemical reaction, and
.proto-typicality of thermite as a molten fuel simulator.
Consequently, test results are not directly applicable to PWR and NSSS containment response, and conclusions must await further test evaluation, which is in progress.
1 Additional information is provided below in the slide copies taken from two Containment Loads Working Group meetings; the first is a Sandia presentation at EPRI, Palo Alto, CA., February 2,1984; and the second is~ a Brookhaven presentation at Rockville, MD., March 13-14, 1984. The important point in the first presentation is that if most of the melt' is ejected from the vessel cavity directly into the containment of a large " dry containment" PWR, the resulting chemical reaction with the containment atmosphere may lead to pressures which could fail the containment. The point of the second presentation is that the geometry of the PWR containment will probably prevent full ejection and will limit mixing of dispersed melt with the containment atmosphere, thus alleviating the concerns raised in the first presentation.
The staff is evaluating information pertinent to these phenomena and how it affects assessment of risk associated with core nelt and early containment failure. This rvaluation is anticipated to take sexepel r.crths, depencing on the extent of analysis necessary.
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- 1. How much melt exits cavity?
- 2. How much mass is fragmented to a small size?
CSmalr meaning that residence time exceeds I
time to cool.)
- 3. How much additional energy from i
chemica! reactions is added?
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~
- 4. Of the energy Jost from fragmented material, how much goes into g'
Co) radiation to heat sinxs and condensate films?
(b) direct heating of gas?
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- EcJi unit of thermal energy l
ocded to cirect heating l
reduces energy to steam l
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I Zion Direct Heatine S"ucY w
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Case 7.
No c'irect heofinc.
v rast wa:'er cuenci t
Case 9.
20% c'irect hearinc, oxicize m
ony 'C% of Zr, out not e or UO2 Y
i Case "L.
90% e:eccion; comde:e e
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l Zion Direct Feating CC'NTAIN Results i
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Chemical f
Peak Peak Thermal Energy Energy i
Press e Temp to steam to gas to gas 1
Case (bor)
- K J
J J
i 7
6.40 430 2.0E11 0.0 0.0 9
6.83 502 1.6E11 4.0E10 6.0E9 11 13.9 1342 1.6E10 5.9E10 2.4E11 oPressure..'ai ve seI foilure is 3.0 bar (nonadiabatIc calculatlon.)
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i Surry Stancard 3roolem Case 12.
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20% e:ection anc! c'irec-
{
,ea"inc, oxicize M l
Zr on y.
Case X.
90% e action; oxic'ize a i
Zr anc e, au on'y 2% o:
2 i
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l S"arVa" ion.
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.ON DIRECT HEATING IN ZION CONTAINMENT T. GINS 3ERE l
ER00KHAVEW NATIONAL LA50AATORY DEPARTMENT OF NUCLEAR ENERGY EXPERIMENTAL MODELING GROUP UPTON, NEW YORK 11973 I
P 1
CONTAINMMENT LOADS WORKING GROUP, MEETING ROCXVILLE, MD MARCH 13-14, 1934 I
3 BROCKHMN uitout LAB 0biO A550CATD UNIVEP.501E3, thi(ilii 1
1 i
)
-)
e PERSPECTIVE e
FL6W PATffS IN ZZON CONTAINMENT KEYWAY JET STAGNATION AND DP.0PLET DEPOSITION e
FLOW WITHIN STEAM SEXERATOR COMPARTMENT s
l S'MMARY J
e t
e RECOMMENDATIONS O
e
'h t
\\
c.
f ERDOKHAVIN NATIOflAL IABOP!JORY[3 g)[
a AssxtMD UNIV [R5WE, INC. Gill, I
~
~ PERSPECTIVE 1
CAVITY SWEEPOUT POTENTIAL UNDER HIGH-PRESSURE e
EJECTION HAS BEEN DEMONSTRATED BY SNL/ANL TESTS C'ONSERVAT!'IE SOUNDING CALCULATION PREDICTS EARLY e
. IION CONTAINMENT FAILURE e
MITIGATION ARGUMENTS
- FUEL MASS EJECTED F?.0M VESSEL
_ DEPOSITION / FALLOUT DURING. TRANSPORT TO CONTAIWNEyT
.E05f.
- RATE-LIMITED CHEMICAL REACT 10NS 6
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ZION FLOW PATHS: KEYWAY JET STAGNATION AND REFLECTION FLOW DIRECTED UP KEYWAY TOWARDS CRANE WALL e EXPECTED SMALL FLOW UP SEAL TABLE SHAFT e FLOW STAGNATION AND SHARP DIRECTIONAL CHANGE T e NEAR ENTRY TO SEAL TABLE SHAFT EXTENSIVE TURBULENCE AND MIXING INDICATED e s PLUME RISE AND STRATIFICATION t BROOKHAVEN NATIONAL'1A3,0RATORYl} r} l A5500ATED UNIVER5iTIELINC.G Ui - + -we.
s e i~ \\ e =w A 21 s l f 14 0' r l s PCLAR CRANE l g i s 4 209' ? g i r. g t A STEAM GENERATORS b NZ Q dlllllllh 3 { 5 s N t I 5 d E W) I-g_+j.gy-- l m. ,al 2 l l 3 4 i l j! j SEAL TABLE %j m p, M, yNt 4 F. v g. g m.. _ N, ~ .. - - -1 MfNMIMi h.Il.'@.53M5 -$1'4 L I }",gk; Y u -e. IN-c0RE INSTRUMENT GUlOE TUSE3 .g/$idAT.,5h i t'- 6* k u e REACTOR VESSEL ~ t sure 1-1. Schematic Illustration of Zion Reactor Containment Att [ ding. i
.~ l i SCHEMATIC OF FLOW DIRECTION CHANGE I SEAL TABLE [ SHAFT / / ^ / / STEAM /' / GENERATOR ANNULUS ~ / f / ( ( KEYWAY BROOKHAVEN NATIONAL FA55thTORYJ A5500ATED UNIVERSITIES, INC.(I ElI ...r- -e
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- I . i I ..i, i 5 5 I;I '! IO'S OF MICRONS MAY 10T MAKE THE TURN e DEPOSITION OF EJECTED DEBRIS ON WALLS INDICATED FOR ALL e BUT " SPIT
- EROSOLS DROP SIZE DISTRIBUTION WILL BE ALTERED DUE TO DEPOSITION
~ e EXPERIMENTS SHOULD SIMULATE DETAILS OF KEYWAY, CRANE e WALL, SEAL TABLE SHAFT BROOKHAVEN NAT10NAL DG6R TORY l}[ A5500ATEDUNIVERSITIES,INC.GllI --+--,,-v.e
i FLOW WITHIN STEAM GENERATOR COMPARTMENT e PATHS TO CONTAINMENT DOME - JET / PLUME RISE TO STEAM GENERATOR PENETRATIONS - FLOW OUT CRANE WALL PENETRATIONS TO OUTER ANNULUS AND THROUGH GRATINGS \\ e DEPLETION MECHANISMS ~ - MIXING a - FALLOUT - DEPOSITION
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o 3 LOW t., 1%L 6WD & M\\h C the 7 t b i.- ~ e. .5;a _ __ ~ n .n N 9 2 i F 14 0' r i c POLAR CRANE l l s s M Q W s E STEAM GENERATORS ? NI C C l t i i 1 l j h-g43 l .{! l i Ir! j,, ad 3 .c% 4 p 4e
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SPIT-19 DEBRIS DISTRIBUTION ~ i 09.99 ,,,,y,, ^ 99.9 / ~ / y 99 p / i / 95 O 90 I Q 80 / F 70 I / m 60 i z 50 I l 40 c ~30 I DGM = 0.43 mm r[ l 20 a = 3.4, g 10 5 J I / (D / l m 1 / 1 4 / 2 i ,1 9 I I 'I' I '. ,,i .01 .01 0.1 1' 10 100 i l PARTICLE DIAMETER (mm) h Samlia NationalLahora 4
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SUMMARY
e POTENTIAL FOR DEPOSITION ON STRUCTURES EXISTS FOR 'op > 100 MICRONS WITHIN STEAM GENERATOR COMPARTMENT e MORE DETAILED FLOW MAPPING, PARTICLE TRAJECTORIES NEEDED FOR QUANTITATIVE ASSESSMENT I SROOKHAVEN NAT10NAL DW6ftdTORY[3 A5500ATED UNIVER5mES, INC G Ul w -n
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SUMMARY
e NO DIRECT PATHWAY FROM KEYWAY TO UPPER CONTAINMENT IDENTIFIED f e KEYWAY JET IMPACTS CRANE WALL AT SEAL SHAFT ENTRANCE. SIGNIFICANT MELT DEPOSITION EXPECTED. RE-ENTRAINMENT IS KEY ISSUE. DETAILS OF GEOMETRY IMPORTANT. e JET / PLUME RISE AND STRATIFICATION EXPECTED IN STEAM GENERATOR COMPARTMENT (SGC). MUCH OF VERTICAL MOMENTUM MAY BE DISSIPATED. e FLOW TO OUTER CONTAINMENT WITH NO SIGNIFICANT DEPOSITION / FALLOUT UNLIKELY. CANNOT QUANTIZE DEFINITIVELY WITHOUT t DETAILED FLOW MODELING AND, PERHAPS EXPERIMENTS. 4 l a BROOKHAVEN NATIONAL LE80RATORY A5500AE UNIVER5mES, IN':.G UI x
~* 5 RECOMMENDATIONS i e-EXPERIMENTS MUST MODEL STRUCTURE ADEQUATELY TO PROPERLY ~ e SIMULATE JET INTERACTION WITH CRANE WALL / SEAL SHAFT REGION. PROPOSED MINIMUM METALLIC OXIDATION REACTION: e '~ CONSUME OXYGEN IN LOWER COMPARTMENT - REACT AEROSOL ONLY (LESS THAN 100 MICRONS) IN UPPER CONTAINMENT ~ e ON UPPER BOUND: - CERTAINLY LESS THAN.90% - BUT ????? d BROOKHAVEN NATIONAL IlBERATORY[} ASSOCIATED UNIVERSITIES, INC. (E LI E ,_m. y.
a' -.. ;=..= ....:.-.= . a.= ,.. ~ ~... (C.r. ae-4 r t / UNITED STATES 5" NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION [ wasumaTow p.c.aosss i \\,,,,,. June 24, 1985 Docket Nos. 50-275/323/498 y-MENORANDUM FOR: Chaiman Palladino Comissioner Roberts Commissioner Asselstine Comissioner Bernthal j Comissioner Zech FROM: Hugh L. Thompson, Jr., Director 4 Division of Licensing Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
SUBJECT:
BOARD NOTIFICATION (BN-PS-064 ) REGARDING WESTINGHOUSE REACTOR COOLANT PUMP SEALS In accordance with thesprocedures for board notification, the following j information is being transmitted directly to the Comission. The 4 appropriate boards are being notified by copy of this memorandum. This information is applicable to Diablo Canyon and South Texas, which are presently before the Comission. This recent information updates the information provided in BN-83-139, BN-84-076 and BN-84-123. The results of the AECL tests on the reactor coolant pung secondary seal under station blackout conditions are provided in the enclosed report, NUREG/CR-4077. These tests show deformation and failures of the seal materials presently in use in the Westinghouse pumps. Subsequent to these tests and before issuance of the NUREG/CR-4077, the Westinghouse Owners Group (WOG) submitted a letter dated January 3,1984 (inadvertently dated 1984; actually issued in 1985) which acknowled possible failure of the secondary 0-ring material used in W pumps. ges the letter is also enclosed. This In the WOG letter, reference is made to the ETEC analysis which estimates 20 gpm leakage under the condition of loss of all cooling. This analysis is correct with no seal failure; the ETEC analysis estimates 422 gpm leakage with seal failure. The WOG letter also addresses the development of a replacement program of the 0-rings to be implemented during nomal maintenance replacement schedules. The French tests mentioned in the WOG 4 letter have been completed and the results of the tests, although not exactly prototypical of the U.S. seals, are expected to be made available l to you in the near future. 5 l HughL.Tbson, r., Director Division of Licensing 3( Office of Nuclear Reactor Jtepulation
Enclosures:
As stated /- cc w/ enclosures: plf +JOC/L See next page t l
. - -_c ..-n .u.- - -- - t i The Comission e CC: Parties t Hearing CPE OGC EDO SECY(2) ACRS(10) Atomic Safety and Licensing Board For: Comanche Peak (Bloch, Jordan, McCollom) Seabrook (Hoyt, Harbour. Luebke) Shearon Harris (Kelly, Bright, Carpenter) South Texas (Bechhoefer, Lamb Shon) i i Vogtle (Margulies, Linenberger, Paris) Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal Boards For: T Catawba (Rosenthal, Moore, Wilber) Diablo Canyon (Moore, Johnson) Shearon Harris (Moore, Gotchy, Wilber) 5 4 l t J l l i 1, s-- h 4 'i i l f
..r. 1 F C9AL caronna Power a utm compen, OG-If,2 o q,- ~ January 3, 1964' Mr. Harold Centon Office of NJclear Reactor Regulation U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washingten DC 20555 Nestinghouse Owners Group Reactor Coolant Pump Seal Intectfty Procras Dear Mr. Denteni Because it has been some tirie since the Westing 5ouse 0mers Creep (WCG) last met with the Nuclear Regulatory Ccamission (NEC) to discuss the subject program and since there have recently been several signfficant developments, we believe it appropriate to advise you of the status of the program. The purpose then of this letter is to provide that status to yco: 1. Ccnfirmation of WOG Analyses We u9derstand that independent analyses performed for the KRC by Energy Technolcgy Engineering Center (ETEC) confirm analyses perfcrmed by Westinghouse for the HOG, and that these results havn been reported to the MC. That is, the best estisate leak. age ficw under the conditlocs of the loss of all seal cooling is approximately 20 gpa per puep. i 2. Secendary Seal Tests A program of testing of O-rings and channel seals at the Chalk River National Laboratory of Atomic Energy of Canada, Ltd. (AECL) is ap;roximately 507, complete. All of the 0-ring tests have been completed. Channel stal tests are espected to be completed by early January 1985. The results to-date confirm the results of the earlier NRC sponsored tests. O-rings cf two materials (Parker E740-75 and Seals Eastern 7228-75) have been tested at conditions more severe than expected to exist in the ACP seal system during a loss of all seal coo 11pg event and liave retained their toteirity for 18 hours. At the extreme conditions, these materials proved to be superior to the Parker E515-80 material which is comparable to the material currently in use. . i 6,i r d,,t v -n~1,,. n r 7 411 Feyeeente Sateet
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/ 0G-142 Mr. Harold Denton January 3, 1984 3. 0-Ring Replaceunt A plan for replacement of the 0-rings in the ACPs of Wes,ftertinghouse plants is being developed. This plan will be completed a successful completion of the ongoing tests to assure acceptable performance of the material for normal plant service. Additionally, review and approval of the quality assurance programs of the secondary seal material suppliers and procurement of molds to make O-rings of the appropriate sizes must be completed. The 0-ring replacement program would then be implemented consistent with normal maintenance replacement schedules. 4. Full Scale Demonstration Test i-The NOG has committed to participate in a full scale test of a French 7-inch RCP seal assembly to be run at Montereau, France in late January or early February 1985. Other participants are Electricite de France (EDF), Framatome, and Jeumont-Schneider. The test will simulate a Westinghouse seal installation more closely ~ than previous French tests, in that leakoff Ilnes from the #1 seal and #2 seal will be included and the test will be run with the leakoff lines open. The Montereau facilit has been modified to provideamakeupcapabilityofupto100m{/ hour (about440gpm) 1, and this test will be more fully instrumented than previous tests. The test condttions are still being worked out. The intent is to maintain a constant temperature of the water supplied to the seal j assembly and to reduce pressure with time to simulate what would i happen in an actual plant as the pressurizer drains as a result cf RCP seal leakage. The final plan depends on the capabilities of the test facility, which are currently under review by Westinghouse and EDF. i Though there are some differences between the French 7-inch seal t: l-assembly and the Nestinghouse 8-inch seat assemblies, we believa j. that this can be a meaningful test and could contribute to closure of this licensing 1ssue. Because of a prior commitment of EDF to the French licensing J authority, the 0-rings in the test assembly will be the Parker E515-80 saterial. On the basis of separate. secondary seal tests, we expect that there will be 0-ring i failure (s) in the course of the test. He hope though to obtain a few hours of essentially steady state behavior h before 0-ring failure. s The internal geometry of the seal package, most particularly U M the thickness of the #1 seal face plates, are somewhat b different. He espect that the result will be a greater angle of convergence between the #1 seal faces 14.the French l i test than would be the case in a Westinghouse 8-leth seal 1 assembly. This is expected to result in greater leakage flow in the French test. I l-4713g:12 9
. ~ _ OG-142 Mr. Harold Denton January 3, 1384 I The #1 leakoff Ilne, which is prototypical of a French plant, has somewhat lower resistance than the average of leakoff Ilnes in U.S. plants. This will also tend 30 give somewhat h!;her leakage flow in the French ttst.? \\ Despite these differences, we expect that, in the absence of early O-ring failures or some unexpected behavior, the test will temonstrate, with adequate sargin, that the leakage rate from a Westinghouse plant under the condition of the loss of all saal cooling is sufficiently low that core uncovery would not occur during the maximum espected duration (4 to 8 hours) of a foss of all AC pewsr. 5. Future Meettnes With NRC We are available to provide t!!e NRC with further inforsatfon on any of the above items. In the absence of any specific requests from j the NRC. we plan to meet with the NRC in March 1985 to discuss all of the results to date, in particular, items 2, 3 and 4 above. He would also expect, at that asetting, to address the issue.of whether { the results provide a basis for concluding that RCP leakage in a j loss of all seal cooling during a loss of all AC power event is not 1 1 a safety concern. very truly yours, f --s cc: WOG Reps. J. J. Sheppard, Chairman Westinghouse Owners Group l l i 1 v-i l 4 1 4713g:12 I i
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r~ n=r ~ 4.R.~:::v'.,' ' -n ~ V M M:-} W "i M g hidiSiNI-d'g,g %,..iF Esh"IG: M % W 6-% D +fy: fk II$s: 5 w "$$ W n. 6..J.W.. E g. h.. _.p e c..;. 4 _h.a.. g- _as 'W,... Idaho Naticnal Engineering Laboratory c: era:e te re U S Ct:a*:me-t cf ESer;/ I Reacto.r Coolant Pum Shaft Seal Behavior Durino i ... Station Blackout w .,, n.. :... i Char:ss A. Kittrner Ray hiercalfe Ron G. Wtnsel Brian M. Co: nam w j David 8. Rnedes Henry Gent 10 i 1 Walter J.Mings s <y, J s; .v..>s. ..n,.. 1 p 7;g3ggg .,u-. p .... ~. er.w.wr v U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission z=r re: W ogs,eaimus.Id4AO Un zer DOE Contract No. DE-AC07 76tD01570 V s I r i r
~ _~ t NUREGICR4377 EGG 135 , AECLMISCM DistritM.fot1 Cetegory: A3. R4 I O l REACTOR COOLANT PUMP SHAFT SEAL BEHAVIOR DURING STATION BLACKOUT I h l Charles A. letmer, Ron G. Wensel, Osvid B. Rhodes, May Metcalfe, I Bsian M. Cetnam, Hervy Condit Waher J. Mings 1 / i l l Fublished April 1985 l l X.T. I s. u l EG&G idaho,.Inc. Idaho Falls, Idaho 33413 i ~ l Prer**d tw ** u.c. w=i..r n.can ry cum N r-- wucinazan,0.c. sanas under poc convut.w. ns.acer.wpois79 ~ rne w Asana ______m_
, %a.-- ~.. w ma m.-.a aa = -. '? 't i$ ABSTRACT A testing program desig,ned to provide fundamental in formation pertaining to the beha:vior of reactor coolant pump (RCP) sha ft seals during 2 postulated nuclear power plant station blackout has been completed. The test plan was developed by ~ EGAG Idaho personnel wt the Idaho National Engineerina Laboratory (INEL) and performed at the Chalk River Nuclear Laboratory. Ontario, Canada. under auspices of the U.S. Nuclear Aegalatory Commission (NRC). On?.. seal assembly, utilleing both hydrodynande and hydrostatic types of seals, was esodded andtested. Extrusion tests were conducted to determine ifseat snater ~',' could withstand predicted temperatures and pressures. A taper. face seaf medel w as testec for seal stability under coaditions when leaking water flashes to steam across the seal face. Test information was then used as the basis for a station blackout ) anatysis. i Test resuksindicate a poteittialprobiern wirh an elastomer mascrial used for O-rings by a pump vendor: that vendor is considering a change in material specificanon. Test results also indicate a need Ier further research on the generic issue of RCP sealin. segrity and its possible consideration for designation as an unresolved safety issue. / N.2-g k a s l 3 s 's s FIN No. A6322-Environmental and Dynamic Qualification Program q ~ 1 11
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SUMMARY
Th6 document b an acccun! of an equipment The tesdng effog was divide [ima three parts. qualfication testityt togram designed to predict :he first, extrusion tests were condu:ted to determme becasior of reac301 coolant puctp (RCP) shaft xals if the seat materials tcaid withstand predicted dart g a pos:wjated station blackcut.st a outlear temperatures ar.d presseret, Testing indiat:d that ~ power plant. The progrt.it was co np eted in Int the e'.istome-used hr O. rings and the polymer;c by Aren.ic Energy of Cseada t.imited,scientis's at used for chann:t seals were likely to fail at 'the Chalk Riser Nuclea-Laboratory in Ontaric, postulated condidens. 5ecord, the taper-face seal Caeada. model *.as tested to obtain information rektcd to seal stability under coditices wheo leaLina wg.tcr The United States Nec! car Reg::ta:ory Cca trds-flashes to nesen actoss th.e seal face and to provide sion (NRC) is conce ned ose' possible primary a bssis for ea!ct!ation of Je:L rrres. Resplis indicase coolant ptsnp seal fadures from overbeating daring a;ctentle.!for costable behavior by th seal durin; postulated rJatisn Mackout. During the sta:lon tws pham fia* conditions. The third tast was a e b(acLout sequer.ce, a primair pu:np sea! failtne may t.iea blackout analysis latended to iden'ify pertincot lead to substantial coc!ans !cakage. The cor.cerns problem areas and funher research treas. The of NR C are defined 'n1 "Ge,eric Jssue 23:.Keactor saalysis Confirmed the sMCeptibility of RCP thaft Coolant Pump Seal Failues" and Uniesched seals to (aPure during A sta: ion blackci.t. Safety issue A-44, Station Blackou:/* During sta-tion blackous, all offsite pcwer and auillary power 1NEL personnel ruoitored tet: progesm prog- "" #" N '"# "" is unavailable to the plant, causing pucp shaft rota. D tien to cease. Seal injection and cooligt water is lost, permitting shaft seal exposure to prt:t;ary the pamp ver.do; usir.g the soir,'ect seal design. n tet desc a @ en, the cocJant conditions. Resultant cataurophic seal failues may then allow significant pri. mary coolant pump vecdor is considercs a chacte in the elastomere metedal spee:fied for 0-cinge, m p,, Work tonducted to dateis eOniidere.d scoping in A r. search plan to address this issus sas nature, and several sugCestic ts for future researsh developed by tachalcal personnel at the Idaho tads are bring comid rtd Since 0.;tnas of sm;ll National Er:gineennt Laboratory (INEL) in diameser and crou secticns were used in tr.is s.1itial Idaho Falls, Idaho. The initial testing effort con-3esdr.g e(fort, both intermediate and full wale tetts centrated upon oce type of seal at:angersent which are future possibilities. Re:carggs hope to ex. seemed most vulnerable to poseatial failure. One
- rapojue the essults from the termen small seals test fixtu;te was used to model tisc conditions in a to a larger scale, but there is uncertsiaty thitt es.
conically lapped (taper. face) first stage RCP seal. trapolation s,ill correctly indicate ti.e periormance Secondary seals, utilizf::s clastomenc O-rinss and of tarser seals. The generic issu: of reactof coolant polymeric channt! seals, wers !ssted is a separate pump seal integrhy is being ccesidered for desistia. f'txt ure. tion as an unresolved saf,ety lasue. d
- P
m. _.s. ~ __c - _c. a.; ~ 4 FOREWORD Project Description i In recent yeen, there has been considerable cencern over the possibility of failure of primary reactor coclaat pump shaft seals leading to significant loss of reactor ~ primary coolant. Tl.is concern has been detailed by the United States Nuclear Regula:ory Commission in " Generic Issue 23: Reacter Coolant Pump Seal Failures" and " Unresolved Safety Issue A 44: Station Blackout." A research plan, including limited tesling of materials at a nuclear Jaboratory, was developed to evaluate the impact of rescor~ coolant pump shaft seal damage due to loss of cooling caused by loss ef offsite power during a station blackout. The test plan *as des eloped by EGAG Idaho personnel at d. INEL in Idaho Falls, Idaho. The testing was performed by Atomic Energy of Canada Limited scientists at the Chalk River Nuclear Laboratory, Ontario, Canada. Program funding was provided by the United States Nuclear Regulatory e e-:.. ion (USNRC) Office of Research, in Washington, D.C. Project Objective The objective of this project was :o provide fur.damentalinformation and test data i pertaining to the behavior of reactor coolant pump shaft seals during a power outage to a nuc.%st power station. There are presently no licensing requirements for reactor coc! ant pump shaft seals; this project and subsequent research may lead to pursp shaft seal quahfication requirements. Project Results Reactor coolant pump shaft seals fail because of (a) mechanical fai!ures. (b) loss of seal cooling for sundry reasons, or (c) loss of seal cooling as a result of station blackout. This project provided test data related to seal performance under loss of. \\ sealcookng conditions. One seal assembly, mihnne both hydrodynamic and hydroratic types of seals, was modeled and tested. Test information was used as I the basis for the station blackout analysis included in this repen. Test roults ladicate a potential problem with an elastomer amerial used by a pu r.p vendcr; that vendor is consMering a change in material specification. Test resubs were also instrumental in causing the seneric issue of reactor coolant pump seal failure to k considered as an unresolnd safety issue. O b J I er* * \\ f, e iv
_.g..-. ..- ~... = _.._. 5 ~! i C AECL-Mite-305 REACTOR COOLANT FOMP SEAFT SEAL - CONSIDERATICES AND ASSESSMDrT W DER STATICE SLACKOCT CORDITIONS 1 C.A. Estamar, R.C. Messel, D.B. Rhodes,1. Metcalfe, B.M. Cotnam, 2. Osat111 .4 Submitted by: Atomic Energy of Canada Limited Research coupesy 1 Chalk River Nuclear Laboratories-Chalk River, Catario Canada EQJ SJO To: RC&G Idaho, Inc. P.O. aos 1625, i a 1955 Freemost Avesse Idaho Falls Idaho 5.8.A. 83415 1 Work Order No. 83318 v Fluid Sealing Technoloty D*it I l 1984 September .i I t' a.. k e d i h ..m. ,.7- ,.r.-
., ~. - .. ~ - h, l P6 TABLE OF CENTENTS i AR'OL-MISC-305 PACE MM4ET 1 { INTRODUCTION - CENERAL 4 i A. ELASTCMEE 70LBER SEAL arvem 333TS IN EICE TRE'ER&IWER 542EE 5 - R.C. Wessel, B.M. Cotsam i 1. 2N120DUCTIc5 - EETRUSION' TESTS 5 a e j. 2. PR32DORES 5 I J 21 Cesara1....&.....................................................$ r 2.2 Precedure Cbeeklist................................ Materials.......................................... ............ 6 2.3 ............ 7 3. RESULTS 7 e 4. DISCUSSION OF RESULTS S 5. CDecLUSloss 8 6. C&CTIONARY RENARES 9 3. SEICAL FACE ERAL N 1E515 10 j = D.3. Rhodes, R. Gentili, 'C.A. Eittner i' ' 7. INTRODUCTION - ELOEDOW 23T8 10 8. RIFERDIENTAL 33 :"'".*7 MMTDUtz 10 8.1 Tes t Fac i11 ty................................................... 10 4.1 1as trunes ta ties................................................. 11 p. 8.3 C.mr.ti.., n te, e m.i tr h.e................ ;.11 8.3 Seal F.ece Des1ga............................................... 11 ~ 9. RESULTS 11 91 S tagl e Phas e T e e te............................................. 11 i 9.2 T h Teste sa 2 7/81s. CD 3eale (Tests 1 to 10)..........12 9.3 Two-Phase Test as 4 3/4 is. Os S.nale (Test 11)................. 14
- 10. DISCUS $10s 14
-i
- 12. CopCLUSION s
-- 5 14 h s' 6 i ,) lt l: ~.. - - -.... - -
t J '1 e 1 ~ i.j TABLE OF GlWTENTS AICL-MISC-305 FACE 't:; l q -C. STATIDE EWMT QlEgMRATWR AB ANALYSIS 15 i t - C.A. Kittner. D.3. Rhodes.1. Metcalfe
- 12. INTRODUCTION - ASSESSMENT AND AEALYSIS 15
- 13. TWO-FEASE F1CW CALCUZATICE5 FOR FAILID SEAIJ 15
. i 13.1 0bjectives................................................... 15 - 1 13.2 Approach............................................. Calculation Method................................... ....... 15 13.3 ....... 16 13.4 laportan t Parame ters......................................... 16 i q 13.4.1 Saester Caelast Pressure and Tessperature............. 16 l .j 13.4.2 Geome t ry............................................. 16 i I II 13.5 Samanary of Two-Phase Flow Calem1stions....................... 17 14 TACED SEAL AIAANCIMENT ). 17 >j 14.1 Censra1...................................................... 17 14.2 Elas t ome r Asial Seal Failure................................. 18 14.3 Seal Face *FoFying 0 es*..................................... 19 F ). 14.4 S tag ing 0p tions.............................................. 19 t
- 15. WESTINC"'C'*!! ETDRCSTATIC' SEAL ARIANCIMENT 20 15.1 Geners.1...................................................... 20 13.2 Two-Phase Flow Between Parallel Faces........................ 20 1
15 3 Two-Phas e Fl ow Be tween Cenical Faces......................... 21 'l1 15.4 Feesible Sequence for Response of Westiaghesse No. 1 Eydree tatic Seal to S tation Blachos t.............. *.......... 21 15.5 Implications of Staties Blackout se Westi No. 2 Sas1...............................asbesse Radial Fluid 1acertia.................................... ... 22 13.6 ... 22 1
- 16. FURTIER RCP SEAFT SEAL CONSIDERATICES 23 16.1 Seal Ins talla tion and Maistenance............................ 23 16.2 El as tome r Sea 1 s..............................................
Thermal Effects.............................................. 24 1 16.3 25 0 16.4 B isenssies of Seal Failure Analysis.......................... 26
- )
i:
- 17. PUITIER uoEE a
1 27 sl 17.1 Further A=m 1 eis soggee ced...........................b w... 27 F 17.2 Furthe r Tes ting sessen tad..............................*. t.... 2 7 -17.3 candidates for bestas changes Seggested...................... 28 je u j 6 m w
i e t l ? i M OF CDETIETS ABCL-MISC-305 M EEF18ZNCES 28 CLOSSARY 29 TABLES 1 to 3 31 1 AFFENDII 1 Approach for Selection of Dianasions and Caps for Ertrusion l Teste..................... ................................. 36 AFFINDII 2 Tes t Fisture Cleasing Procedures............................ 43 AFFEMDIX 3 Procedare for Measuring Durometer Eardness of 0-tiass....... 44 AFFENDIX 4 Westinghouse Baseter Coolant Pump 0-11ag and Chanaal Seal "Wors t-Case
- Condi t1eas..................................... 4 6 0
AFFENDIX $ Sample Calculation for Adiabatic tapansion of Two-Fbase Flow Between Parallel Faces...................................... 47 FIGURES 1 - 33 4g i i l i li t ,k d e e e h N ll ~r j i l ?
g -1 i (j AECL-MISC-305 -s ij REACTOR CDOL&lrf PREF A;&FT SEAL - ESESIDERATICES AED ASSIggMENT EEDER STATION Ef_AtTCUT COEDITIONS smWAIT OTERALL ASSF fMENT U The objective ma to provide information most relevant to RCP seal effectiveness in WRs during a " station Blackout" (SB) event, hence: !i If seals all " fail" (ao face restriction), leak rates above 100 US sym-are espected. j " Popping open* is the most serious anal failure concera under S3 conditions. This is a predicted and dmonstrated result if sufficient flashing escurs between seal faces. .} All investigated seal types are at risk of "poppias eyes", most risk corresponding to lowest halsace ratio. Individual seals in staged arrangements (Byron Jackson and Biaghan W111mette) are less likely to experience full system temperature (predicted on total outflow and therefore dependent en the stagias flow ] belag valved alosed) than are the No.1 and 2 seals of the hydrostatic arrangenent (WestimaLouse). Elastomer seals of E515-30 become seriously degraded and are therefore likely to fail at conditions representative of 33. E740-75 is a superior satrusioe-resistaat material. Tetrales 720 (as used in *h====1 seals) suffers permanent deformation throgh plastic flow at 33 conditions. Riewout of static elastomer seals with exposure of their downstraan .} , leakage paths is generally a minor concera compared with the potential for partial extrusion and j-fng of the axial esal, which exacerbates i
- poppias-open".
Many details of anal desiga, manufachre, mais Wee.e and prior waar can i he of critical importance. MAJot IECONGMDATIONS Because this preifminary assessment gives a high risk of high leakage through ~ j, pop seals during a 33, the following actions are strongly reconsended: Determina critical parameters for seal stability over appropriate range of flashing conditions. Determine seal environment temperature as interdependent en time and lesk rate. Calculate worst-case leak rates for specific pumps. Puther investigate axial seals for high temperature estrusies and axial fricties. Persue materials, systes and design chaages to aduce ausee'pl:dliity to high tenhage darias 83. f i L 3 i. e
7 .a -- I' 'I l4li -2~ AECL-MISC-30$ 'e ! t SECTItNE SUMMARIES i I Estrusica Tests Maia conclusions I SB ceeditions predicted la high temperature water.Ethyless propylen Ladested by fingernail), sometimes within as little as t , easily temperature of 350*F. Tests on oospound 1740-75 at a te high temperature estrusion. showed superior resistance Tests on TF878-217 revealed severe estrusien af Tetrales 720 La many tssts.Tetralos 7 r ngs) estruded asterial prevented embeequent osaling by t At small gaps this escurred. proper 0-ring esaling, and sensits correspecded to those for 0-rings al one. Further estrusion concerns ares
- {
Effects of lubrication en estrusion resistance.Effect of larger i1
- I e.
t Effects of seal ring movement (even small) in 0-ring / channel as l estrusica performance. a Adverse effects of low level s'adiation en the Tetrales 720 cha material. nnat seal Effects of etsam environment. 11owdova Tests 4 : 8 - I Main conclusion: provides potential for unstable seal behaviour. Water flashing to steam The seals tested were shown to be more prone to instability the low balance ratio and the less the subcooling ta unter at the seal er the This emphasises the importance of hatanes ratio and the degre entrance. e of flashing. One test showed that once a seal pope opea, hydraulic forces ar the faces remala opea despite subsequent increases in balae such that 1g tests resulted la recklag frequencies and esp 11tudes suffielent t nce ratio. Other further concera for integrity of the axial elastomer seal under SB o give esaditions, especially its potential to jos and allow seal faces to be p ) opea. i e _ Considerations and Analvets l ~4pecific design details were not available a genAn upper ' so j ) Because developed. eralised nothed was excess of 100 US syn for 33 conditions.A
- typical
- esal was analysed show 3
pressure and temperature, earface roughness, emit area and annular elest vere verified as leportant parameters to be included La each salcis&q1 I rances - 1 s. - i e
- I L
__..m._ i i t AECL MISC-305 Focusing next on specifics, a staged seal arrangement of similar seals (Byron Jackson, Ringham Willanette) appears susceptible to a cascading of estrustor.s from one stage to the next esce it begins, unless the staging flow is valved ~ closed. This option la therefore preferred; however, a precarious interdependence of heat and leakage results, and any significant leakage is apt to become rapidly worse. Popping open of esal faces is a concera if unter temperature becomes sufficiently high. r Is the Westinghouse arrangement, the No. I hydrostatic seal marmally 1 withstands most of the full systen pressure and teasperature of 53. If it l becomes popped or janned open, as seems plausible, the No. 2 seal mast take over this service. The potential for the No. 2 seal to also pop open under such conditions is e major monears. s b i This section concludes with discussion of the necessary supporting progress ~ for seal manufacture, asiatemance and operation. Adequate da:imentation 1 pisys a key role throughout any such quality assarance programs, performance monitoring and failure analysis. While these topics are of ten taken for granted, lack of attentica to such detail could easily land to unsatisfactory performance and become the cause of unacceptably large leakade. l a i u o I I q 1 i 4 9 I 3 N e i i -,.-r. _m--,- y -...---y,, y.,-- .w.-y,,r-, ,-..m-me- - -,9 -r--
. ~. o i 4 , AECL5 MISC-305 EEACTOR (Il0LANT FUMP SEAFT SEAL - COB 31DERATIOR5 AND ASSESSMENT Enamn STATION ELACEDUT CCEDITICES 4 l INTRODUCTION - GENEIAL Ouring a " Station Blackout" (33), all off-site AC power as umil as auxiliary pouer (diesel generators) is easvailable to the auclear station for an eatended period. Under these esaditions AC power is est available to operate the Reactor Coolant Peeps (RCP), the Chemical and Volume Control I Systen and compoeast cooling water pe pe. This results is a stationary (non-rotattag) RCP, the less of seal injection / cooling water to the 3CF shaf t seal and infiltration of high camperature/high pressure primary coolant unter throughout the RCP shaft seal (costacting 0-rings and other elastomeric ^ components). For the 33 condition, the temperature and pressure of the primary coelaat that any reach the RCP seal is nominally 550*F 1150 poi, and can be as high as 570*F,1400 pai (and higher if other failures are added to ss). Seal response to SS is a safety concera la RCFs for FURS. Leakage of primary coolant through the now stationary RCP seal contributes to the possibility of secovering the reactor core with all ensuing consequences. Core uncovery can occur if leakage of high temperature /high pressure primary coolant is sufficiently high or for a sufficiently long period of time. Accordingly, leakage rates of the end face seal and elastomeric components of the RCP seal costribute to core uncovery, and assessnest of their performance is a necessary input to the probability of this occurrence. 3 The Westinghouse arrangement of a hydrostatic, higher leakage No. I seal withstanding almost all the pressura drop has been considered more vulnerable
- j than the Byron Jackson and 31aghsa Willamette multi-staged seal arrangements.
4 In Europe, it has been felt desirable to install additional systems to malatsin seal cooling for 85 conditions in pumps similar to the Westinghouse pumps. 1 The objective of this project, esaduated by Atomic Energy of Canada Limited Research Company, use to provide fundansotal information and test data that portalas to the behaviour of RCP shaft seals during a station blackout soadition. The work identifies asjer areas for concera and outlines further testing and analysis that any be required. The progran tasks consisted of:
- q A.
Elastemer/ Polymer Seal Estrusies Testa is Righ Temperature Water, { 3. Taper Face Seel Blowdeva Testa, s C. Station Blackout Considerations and Analysis, 7 4.- with Tasks A and 3 having impet to Task C. e l L 1_1
w i..... ... _.~ -- - u _ l o ,? t 1 -s 5-AECL-MISC-305 ELA.'53EER/POLMER SEAL EETEUSION TESTS II ElGR TEWIRANRk WATIE A. i i 1. ~ INTRODUCTION - EITEUSION TESTS 1 l This test program was tightly specified to focus on the Westinghouse seal arrangement. hre than twenty alastomer (or elastomer / polymer) seals are used in the three stages of the Westinghouse cartridge seal. Ca loss of 1 injection / cooling, the elastomer seals would be exposed to water at high temperature. Entry of hot water to the seal cavity accompanied by localised cooling due to flashing of outleakage would lead to thermal gradients and i l, large temperature variations between seal components. Clearance gaps at l; certain elastomer seal locations could greatly exceed the as-machined values. i. l II Soth temperature and the increased clearances have the effect of lowering the elastomer seals' resistance to estrusion. pailure (blowout) of an elastomer seal by artrusion would result in additional leakage of main coolant and thus 1 contribute to the potential of reactor erre uncovery. The objective of the elastomer seal tests was to determine the ability of seal materials (both presently used and promising alternatives) to maintain a seal during la bour exposures to combinations of temperature, pressure and clearance gaps that could occur during a loss of injection / cooling event. i 2. pgoCEDURE i, 2.1 General 1-Because of proprietary considerations the clearance gaps and temperatures the elastomer seals would be esposed to in an in-service seal cartridge during a l i: l, loss of 31and cooling event were not well defined. Therefore, the test program covered a range of plausible clearance sape at two differeat temperatures. The als was to define a 11mittag pressure above which failure by blowout of the seal will escur, for each gap / temperature condition. .t Only one size of 0-ring cross-section was tested, this being the smallest t. of the varied cross sections represented in the Westinghouse seal. As prior AECL experimental evidence indicates that susceptibility to extrusion i l is greater the smaller the 0-ring cross-section, the test results are considered to be conservative. Similarly, one size only of channel seal (elastomer-backed Teflon seal) was evaluated, the size corresponding to the smallest diameter 0 ring. This crost-section is smaller than the varied f, sises used in the Westinghouse seal cartridge. ] I! Test seal inside/estside diameters were less thea is.the Westinghouse seal. 1; Rio paraseter is not seasidered important for 0-rings, het any have a minor 1 influence en susceptibility to artrueles in the case of chesnel goals. Tests U sore sendus'ted with the sealed parts held esecentr(c. Cland geometry and
- }
dimensions were selected by the sentractor to be representative of those for 0-ring and chamael seals is the nestinghouse cartridge. Se contractor also i i specified the test temperatures, the apper sad lower pressure limits sad the maximum clearance sape, beoed on predictions free two-phase fisw analysis by Westinghouse (see Appendix 1). ...-,._..,_.,.,_,,,_._,,m.,__ m.%.m .,%,.mmm___,._,.,-,,_,,r.,,,mm,,..,wmy-_-
- ~_ l ~0* i AEEI.-M.ISC-305 0-rings were tested in cells as shown in Figure 1, and channel seals in cells as shown in Figure 2. The cells were connected to a water source pressurized with altrogen, and after bleeding to remove trapped gas, were bested in convective ovens. A thermocouple in the water adjacent to the seal recorded cell temperature starting from the soment the caus were placed in the ovens. A typical plot is shown in Figure 3. It can be seen from Figure 3 that the temperature rose to about 95% of the test temperature within 2 hours. Cell tank to the call was not heated and any significant outlaakage at t was accompanied by a drop in temperature. The test conditions are tabulated in Tables 1, 2, and 3 (with the results). The test cells were sequentially modified at the disseters noted in Figures 1 and 2 to increase the gaps progressively. ~ 2.2 procedure Checklist Following is a checklist of test procedures - Calibrate cesperature recorder and preesure gates - Inspect and record test fixture dimensions - Degrease and clean test fixtures following procedure of Appendix 2 - Select test seal and assign the code number (0-rings starting trom #1, channel seals fros #C1) - Inspect seal visually for imperfections - Maasure and racord alastomer hardness by procedure of Appendix 3 - Install seal in gland (fingers clean, contact minimitedi - Fill call cavity with dominera11aed water = galt cap to body of test cell - Connect cell to water supply /pressuriser tank - pressurize supply tank with nitrogen slightly to bleed all gas from tast - Insert :hermocouple connected to chart recorder and tighten svagelok fitting - Pressurize slowly by adjusting mitrogen regulator until required test pressure is reached - Place test fixture as wire rack ta convective oven - Tura even heatore en and bring seem to required test temperature - Run test for total of 20 hours from the time fixture is placed la oven, with costianous recording of seal cavity temperature - Af ter 20 hours turn oven off, open door, draw test fixture to front and cool by blowing room air acrose it with a fan - When gland temperature is less than 200*F, depressurise by loosenias svagelok at thetnocouple connecties after reductas regulater setting to aero - Remove esp free body of test es11 - laspect seal ta gland and nota esadition = genove seal, note visual asedition ad photograph if unusual N g- - - Measure elastomer hardness as per precedure of Appendia 2 - File in envelope marked with code ember File temperature / time short by test sede sunber i i I l
._n ~_- . _.... ~. -. C
- ! ggt. MISC-305 A
2.3 Materials Parker E515-40 0-Rings Type - ethylene propylene Cure dare - 4Q83 Ratch # 728976 parker E692-75 0-Eings Type - ethylene propylene Care date - 4Q83 Batch i 726647 .~ Parker E740-75 0-tians Type - ethylene propylene Care date - 4Q43 Batch i 7291t1 Tetrafluor ebennel seals i Tetrales 720 - Teflon with unspecified fillers Tetralon - Virgin FI7E processed for w.ar resistance, meeting or i azeeeding MIL-t-8791 3. RESULTS tasults are presented in Tables 1, 2 and 5. The visual condition of the seals af ter testing can be assessed by reference to the photographs of Figures 4 to 13, each being representative of seals from a sunber of tests. Figures 14 and 15 are plots of pressure versus gap eenditions for blevout by estrusion (open leak path established over at least part af the seal gap amanlas siremaference) of the two othylene propylene 0= ring compounds tested and of the *h====1 seal asterial, at the two different test temperatures. The figures show compound E740-75 to have much greater resistance to estrusion than 1515-80. Both 0-ring materials had significantly better resistance to estrusion at 320*F than at 350*F. At gape less than about 0.012 inch, the abaamel seals, although backed with E740-75 0-rings, failed at louer pressures than did the 0-rings alese. At larger sape the 1740-75 backed chaamel seals had resistance ta astrusion esaparable to that of the E740-75 0-rings alone. ' t' f e
w =- . AECI.-MISC-303 4. DISCUSSION OF RESULTS ? The following discussion reviews the test results in the light of subsequent Norst-case
- predicted conditions provided by Westinghouse. These seven
} - eoeditiosa for 0-ring and =h====1 seals in the cartridge are tabulated in Appendix 4. The toets showed esopound E315-go to be unsuitable for the predicted i conditions - test seal #34 (Table 1) failed at a gap one-half that of the predicted condition 32A (Appendiz 4). t> rings of eeapound E740-73 passed (or surpassed) predicted conditions. j TFS73-117 Tetrales 720 chamael seals backed with E740-73 thrings passed predicted conditions without blowout, but the channel seal estarial estruded severely is assy tests. At the larger gaps, failure uns apparently averted by the 0-rings which seek over the sealing function af ter the aha===1 seal asterial estruded through the gay. In certata tests at san 11er gaps the entruded channel seal material apparently interfered with sealing of the 0-ring, resulting is blowout of the chassel seal and high leakage at pressures and gaps well below those passed by E740-73 0-rings alone. This is shown in Figures 14 and 13. Due to the observed discontianity in the perforesace of the chsaael seals, there is concern that results from the tests os eas11 cross-section chaamel seals any not conservatively indicate the performance that saa be expected of larger cross-section seals. 'l j 3. CONCLUSIONS Based on the results of these taats Parker Seal Co. ethylene propylene compound 1315-30 is likely ta biswoot under the SE conditions predicted by the Westinghouse analysis. It is also probable that chamael seals backed with this compound would fail under the predicted conditions. Farker Seal Co. ethylene propylene seapound E740-73 appears suitable for 18 hours er less espesure r,s the predicted esaditiose. Tetrales 720 shammal seals as used La the Westieghouse eartridge, but backed with E740-73 La place of E313-40 0-rings any be suitable for the predicted conditions; however, further testing en larger cross-vection seals is recomaded to resolve uncertsiaties regarding the ability of the 0= rings to take ove' 6e sealing function. i s.,f-9 ,-_,..,--,,..,n,-,- -,---._,.,-,,,-..-.m n,,_ .,-,...n,-,,
..--_ _-- ~ i; d 1: J b 5. ' AICL-MISC-305 _ _. - 6. CAUTIONARY IIMARES The tests indicated cause for.concera about the ability of the asterials to withstand the predicted conditions. The study, however, was not sufficiently eemprehensive to permit reliable predictica of time to failure for in-earvice l eesla. Possible effects of seal lubrication, of sas11 novaments of the sealed I ~ components, and of prior agias (radiation etc.) of the polymeric estarials j .e. m.t.ddre...d in tua.t.dy. Friction forces between the elastomer and shaf t, and between the elastomer and the gland any be significant in helping a seal resist estrusio2; reduction of friction force by lubrication any lead to failure at lower pressures and smaller gaps than indicated by unlubricated tests. The tests of this study were conducted using rigid, ses11 diameter fixturing i where the inner sealed member was a semb shaft held la metal-temetal contact with the ester (housing) assber. In the actual seal eartridge, aset ..] elastomer seals are os lares diameter rings that are certata to sete (under ] the action of thermal and anchanical infisences) to a much greater extent j than did the sealed composesta in the test fixtures. Although normally q tolerant to such disturbaseee, even ses11 novements any have a meh greater i destabilistag effect es alastomer seals under the stressful conditions of concera. It is not expected that aging of 0-ring compounds such as E740-75 under l normal seal operating conditions (not including degradation due to seal misalignment) would adversely affect their r'esistance to high temper.iture d conditions. There is concern however, that the Tetralen 720 channel seal i material, a filled Teflon, would be adversely affected by exposure to ~ ? relatively low levels of radiation (less than 10 g), 5 Withis a particular class, elastomer sempounds saa vary widely la resistance j to a given set of conditions. This is shown esplicitly by the large b difference la high temperature autrusies resistance of the two ethylene propylene suopounds investigated in this study. When a compond has been qualified for this service, the saly way te verify the adequacy of all future seals for the high temperature event would be to subject at least one ses! from every elastomer batah to a high temperature estrusion test asrginally I es the safe side of the limite established in this study. Is this study all tests were run with ester is the liquid phase. A separate l eet of tests at 350*F/1050 poi se Parker Seal asapesad E315=GO.,'0139" i erose-section, is a teet osal with a 0.013* 3ap.' govere estrustsoLressited 4 j when t.be 0-ring saa esposed to staan and me carrusies occurred whom t,be 0-ring,ues empeoed to unter, indicating that steam is a more severe envireasset for 1315-00 than is seter. lti 3
q - g ~ l . AECI.-MZ3C-305 3. GNICAL FACE 3EAL armm" TEST 5 .~ 7. INTRODUCTION - BLOVDOWN TESTS During SS, there is concera that the leak rate of primary coolaat through The Byrom Jackson and Bingham V111ematte seal through pressure, temperatste sad wear-induced cesing. ' seal is assafsecured with comias. The Westinghouse No. 1 This section describes blowdown tests conducted on two hydrostatic seals with seal face outer diameters of 2 7/8 la and 4 3/4 la. lubrication conditiosa of a typical Westinghouse No.1 seal.These w i } and sesi stability when the leaking water flashes to stea t, e face.
- i 8.
EIFERIMENZAL DE3 Igg AND PROCEDUtz 3.1 Test Facility A schematic and photograph (71gures 16 and 17) show the rigs used for th tes ts.' The non-rotating seal rings were free to move axially. l ese force them towards the seal rings on the rotor (kapt stat A back li u. The back pressure could be controlled by one of two means. accumulator filled with compressed gas and wa The first was as
- j strangensat was that the supply pressure, ya (ter. The disadvantage of this i
balance ratio (retto of forces tending to close the seal ga j tending to open the gap) for the seal changed with leakage rate , to those forces i pressure at a gives fraction of the supply pressure and g The ratio constant. The whole back pressure system was origins 11 j.: asking the taertia of the seals artificially high. water, but this had t 7 filled with 'i i as rednes the effective Laertia of the seals.the piston was embeequently lj I: coupling and The teet rig saa sensested to a leep eestalains water at 530*7 and 1240 i frictiemal losses is the lions.During blowdown, the pressure at the rig uma typ poi. , due to lower than the moniaal systes temperature due to heat loss in the line dropped further during the tests des to inability of the loop to maintai This i steady eseditions with a significant leak rate. n limited by the velman of the 1eep, opprestartaly 8 ftp.raties of each test oss The 1 free the 1eep through the body of the rig and beak t .o.an y, reb.ated by -.iag het t.r retura line. The fisw was then shot off and the temperature of the { 1sakage. allowed to stabilise before twaalms the test. ha
m. x_ ,AECL-MISC-305 82 Instrumentation i As shown la Figure 16. flow rate, pressure and temperature of the inlet water were esasured. They were recorded by a Roseywell Visicorder er a etrip chart i recorder. The thermocenole was placed quite close to the rotor to give an Ladication of the temperature of the rig when the supply was turned off. Three eddy current probes were used to monitor seal ring movement. These probes were located at the top, left side, and bottom of ese end of each rig. Their,eetpute were also eennected to the recorder. A pressure transducer and pressure gauge were ceanected to the back pressure systen to monitor performance of the pistes. Another pressure gauge was nousted on top of the (, acenaulator. 8.3 Calibration of the Flow Meter and proximity Probes ~ The leak rate threesh the seals was measured using an erifice meter with e 0 5 is. Laternal diameter body and a 0.3 is. diameter erifice. The output from this aster was displayed on a pressure gauge and recorded on the Visitorder. The meter was calibrated using water at 113*F and corrected for the higher temperature water used in the seal tests. The discharge coefficient for the orificeat113*Fwasslightlyhigherthanatthetesttemperagtesbecause Raymolds member (Re) through the orifice was slightly below 10. (The discharge seefficient for an erifice is saly independent of te for Re 10.) 3 The proximity probes were calibrated before the teste and found to be essentially 11asar with a sensitivity of about 0.005 in/ volt at room temperature. It was found their output was reduced at higher temperatures and did not fully recover. became negligible when the temperature reached 390*F.Above 354*F the outpu This meant they could not be used to obtain accurate seal gap widths; bewever, they were useful for a their primary purpose of observing esal ring moveenst. 8.4 Seal Face Design Drawings of the seal rings are shows in Figure 18. The inner diameters of the 3 faces were sheses to give an approximate t aspect ratie of 0.71, where aspect ratio is defined as the rette of the samer and outer diametere of the seal fees. The back pressures were choses to give as initial balance ratio of 0.78, although the balance rette was est the ease for all tests. The seals were lapped to give face separatios serresponding to a leakage per circuaference through full-eise reactor coolant pump seals of 3 Us pa (11 in3/s) at 2200 poi and 130*F. This ses 0.00046 is. and 0.00054 in. gap s eenvergence seress the smaller and larger seal faces respectively. 9. BR30LT3 0 9.1 Sisale phase Tests I f-a i To sheek that the lapping was adequate, tests were done estag water at 113*7 en the small test rig. The beak pressure was kept seastsat at see poi, which gave a balance ratie of 0.78 at the fall systes pressure of 1240 pot. The pressure aeroes the seals, P., was thes reduced la steps and the leakage t {' i
m i C . AICL-tISC-305 i i through each seal was seasured. The resulta are shown in Tab 1s '4. resulte, and it was found that tbs flow rates chsaged by ab Teets at i variability could be explaimed by alight variations in the supply pressure and This to errors is measurement er timing. seal 3 indicated that the gap eenvergence in this seal use greater than seal A. i l' 9.2 Tue-Phase Teste on 2 7/8 is. CD geale Test 1 i For this test neither the system piping ser the rig were preheated before the test, therefore the temperature of the incoming water reached only 230'T b the and of the test. No flow measurement was taken. y epened g 0.0015 la. - 0.002 in.une applied to the seals, the eddy current pro for which this susch eyesies of the seal faces was observed.This une the only te separation of the Meetinghoues as.1 esal is about 0.0004 in.). (Normal face Test 2 i 4 Again, the rig and piping were not deliberately preheated, but the rig was L still wara fram the previeue test se the temperature reached 277'F. i used to control back pressure util Test 6), and the suppl The j o use 1 3.9 in]5 pet which gave a resulting hatanee rette of 0.91. ,F, /s and the seals were stable. The leak ra,te was two phase test results are contained in Table S.taclude the. ji All simultaneously and represent typical conditoes for each test. Parameters were seasured Test 3 The piping laadias to the rig was preheated, but the rig itself one net seals were stable. The _ Test 4 The rig was preheated for this and all subsequent taste by passing flow through the body before the test wee started. emplitude of about 0.002 is. The seals oscillated with an The frequency una not measured. appeared ta some free warteus angular positiene around the seal indicattag Jete of steam that the esala sore sebbling rather than alternately eyealms and cleei j feet S ng. 1 For this and all sobeequent testa, higher short speeds were seed en record a seal tastabilities. f at a frequency of 20 Es.The seals escillated with as amplitude of aMO.002 in.y The eddy curvest probes indiaated the emisi j displacement of the "left* eide of tha seal ring wee approminately 90* '(ese ,-.r.-- ...e,.-. ,,-,-.--y., -. _, - -,., - -,, - - -. -., - -,,. - - .-w..-.-,~ ,v --,,,-,,.,,-
~
- r,
i'. AECL-MISC-305 j quarter cycle) earlier la phase from that of the " top
- and *bottos" of the i
ring, implying a rocking type motion. The flow was approximately in phase with the opening of the gap at the top and bottom of the seal. Figure 19 contains plots of the flew and seal ring position for a short period during l this test. 1 Test 6 m pistoe-type pressure divider (sempletely fined with water) was cosaected to the system for this test to maintain the balance ratio constant at 0.78; i-however, the valves were opened in the wrong order so the systes pressure was applied to the seal faces before pressure wee applied to the back of the esale. N esale popped esoplately open and did met close esce the heck i pressure had been applied. A photograph taken during the test la shows la Figure 20. The flev escillated with a frequency of about 8 Es. l Test 7 The pressure divider une again used to sentrol the heck pressure but the seale did not open at all for this test. The cause le not known. l Test 3 ) m accumulator me used to oestrol the back pressure. lattially, it une set to 640 poi but the seale did set leak, se the back pressure was lowered until 4 leakage started. The mala supply valve use then sleeed slowly, reducing the l pressure from 1110 pet to 1020 poi when the seale started to oscillate with a frequency of 26 Es. This time the signale from the three eddy surrent probes unre all La phase with each other, implying that the seal ring was moving back and forth rather than rocking. The pressure peaks occurred roughly 90' (one quarter cycle) before the seal opesies peaks. The flow did set escillate j moticeably. l Test 9 3p To centrol the back pressure for this test, the pressure divider (sempletely filled with unter) wee used. The system pressere ses gradas11y decreased estil it reached 980 poi. At this point the pressure dropped quickly to 610 poi and the seale started to essi to with a frequency of 10 Es. Before this the lagkage see eenstaat at 2.7 is /s but then the flew taeressed to about 3 3 3.1 1a /s with a fluctuation of +2 ta /s. The presimity probe signale j were all is phase. The pressure,was high when the seals were elesed and the peake to flow rete legged the pressure peaks by shout 90*. The esale were a very slese to belag stable because they stopped sec111stieg every semple of h seseeds, esly to restart agata about a seceed er se later. H h' Test 10 s 7 A-B The pressure divider une used for this test to control the helence'retio. The j. seals were stable. l
g l 1 . AECL-MISC-305 9.3 Two-phase Test on 4 3/4 in. CD Seale (Test 11) m pressure divider uns used to oostrol the balance ratio, but this time it . na partly filled with air. Agata, the seals were stable. u [ 10. 31SCOssION } The high temperatures used for these teste eaused tue problems with the equipseat. The most serious was the damage done to the eddy current probee used for ebeervtag seal motion. Less esposure to the hast, while the rig was preheated, reduced the sensitivity of the probes and caused them to crack. a j The other problem was deterioraties of the 0=riass used for sealing the osal f rig and the flow meter. These 0-riage had to be replaced periodically because i they became permanently set. ~ The frequency of socillaties of the esels was set the anse for the three teste ) during which they becas mestable. The piston was used to control the back pressure for Test 9 and the seal socillated with a frequency of only 10 as. 1 Since the piston was completely filled with water for this test, it became i coupled to the seals and lowered their astural frequency by increasing their l effective ease. The seal frequencies during Teste 5 and 8, which need the 4 task to oestrel back pressure, were 20 ed 26 Es, respectively. j The temperature, pressure and balance ratio probably also influence these frequencies. Is Test 6, where the seale popped soapletely opea, the flow rate 1-escillated with a frequency of 8 Is, but this was set a smooth einusoidal escillation as when the osals were closed. i i teste 8 and 9 showed that the inlet pressure has 'an tafluence en osal stability. geducing the talet pressure brings the unter closer to esturation i and se the point in the seal say where the water begins to flash moves eetwarde. Other factore influencing sesi stability are temperature and balance ratio. \\ .i { 11. CONCLUSION O'. These two phase bloudeum testa beve shown there is potential for metabir seal behavior when het primary eselaat leaks through pump esal fisshing to steam between the osal faces. leere riserous testing is needed to tesolve this concera. 1 1 i 1 o, i $' k' h 4 8 4. _ _ _ _ ~.. ~,,. - -..., _,.. _ _ - -. _..,
-n _ - - -. =- - -. (- (..--- 9 1 15 - AICI.-M sc-305 C. gTATION ELACEDUT CDNSIDEIATIONS AND ANALYSIS 12. INTRODUCTION - ASSESSMENT AND ANALYSIS In Sections A and 5, laboratory tests were conducted to provide data that could be related to performance of RCP shaft seals under $2 conditions. With this information as background, an asseessent is now made based on two-phase flow theory and general information that is openly available on the different p aanufacturers' esal eartridge arrangements se used la U.S. put stations. The assaament will progrees from generalised two-phase flow calculations for the worst-case (apper bound leak rate), to specifies for the three manufacturers' esal arrangements. ht is intended to identify the weakest 11aka in esisting seals subject to 33 conditions ad thus provide the foundation for further study as necessary. 13. Tut > FEASE FLOW CALCULATIONS FOR FAILED REALS 13.1 Objectives In the fs11 swing calculations the seals are aessed to have failed so that the amis flow resistance is ao longer the gap between the faces, but a complicated amaular passageway through the osal cartridge. The objectives of ~ this study are to outline a mothed for calculatlag the leak rate of high enthalpy primary system coolant through a failed RCF essi cartridge, sad to determine the important permeters required for the analysis. 13.2 Aporee:h The tuo causes of pressure drop when a single-phase fluid flows through a 1 complicated passage are frictional losses and expansion /costraction leases. Both of these losses neceae ladepgadent of Bayselds unaber if the flow is fully turbulent (typically la >10') which means that the flow rate through the passage varies directly as the equare rest of the pressure drop across the passage ad does act depend en viscosity. / If unter flowing through a passage drops below its saturaties pressure, then - seee will flash te steam. This may reduce the flow rate des to two facters: (a) the choking speed is significantly reduced by the presence of steam, h ad (b) pockets of steam reduce the flow area available for liquid to flow 3 h through. The mass flow rate of unter that flashes as it flows through a passese is more strongly dependent se pressure than if as flashing eesure. This means 1 that as the inlet pressure is decreased, met only is the driving ),imad ] reduced, but more vapor la seaerated; these factore combine to sause a sharper detresse la flew shes would be observed without flashing. o p h I l! ---n-, - - - _..n..---..,,. ..,,-,-n ,-m-,~,-,,-,--,---, -n ,,-.,--,------.-..--,,..,.,_-n ,,--,,n .--,---.-----.,--.-w,-.
it._ w ;_,. a. I - 16.- AECL-MISC-305 i 13.3 Calculation Method ~ Because of proprietary saforestion as attempt was made to model the esact detaile of a particular pump and seal desiget however, based se prior AECL l esperience a geoestry was chosea which is typical of 3CF shaf t seal designe "by Byres Jackson (Figure 21). For the leakage analysis, the seals were ) i, assuand 1staat but their faces fully open, the staging flew was anglected because it is negligible seepared to the leakage flow, and the leakage ) es11ecties line was set lacanded (although it could easily be added if the geometry of the line were known). Rest transfer between the leakage flew and 3 the peep esterial was neglected beesmee of the high flow rates and because l esly steady state analyses have been deae. The seepster code IIL&P5hsODI uns used. This sede una designed to endel reactor bloudeus transience, after postulated less of eeslaat accidente. It j includes mesy sophisticated features not necessary for the present analysis, but its excess compleatty wn) compensated by its availability and telative 4 esse of use. 13.4 Important Parameters 1 13.4.1 gesetor coolset Pressure and Temperature Figure 12 shove the effect of eyetes pressure sa leak rate through the i " typical
- seal cartridge (Figure 21). The upper curve represente single-phase water at 200*F, showing the equare root variation of leak rate with systes pressure.
j The lower leak rate curve shows that for a systes temperature of 530*F. the leakage is lower and more strongly dependest on i pressure due to the flashing effects described earlier. For the range of f pressures seasidered leek rate varise alacet directly as the systes The void fracties (steam I by volume) of the flow at the exit is pressure. slee shows. It can be sees that this decreases ekseply as the afstem pressure is raised. Figure 23 shows the effect of systes temperature se the leakage and exit veld fracties for a coastsat system pressure of 1400 pet. As the systes temperature is raised, the amount of flashlag withis the seal eartridge lacreases becsese the fleid starts off aleser to saturaties. This reduces the leakage. 13.4.2 Geenetry l Surface roughnese is a signifiesat faster because it Lafluescas the amount of [ frictiemal pressure drop. As shows la Figure 24. for our " typical
- 3essetry, leak rate seuld very by about 35% depending en the assumed surface roughness.
If frictiemal pressure deep is sempletely anglected, leak rate increases by abeet 232 above the sero-roughness asynytete. Further fastere that should be lavut14sted estas the gue phase flev endel are emit area and aanslar clearance. These are more important thas espected for stagle phase leakage. For esseple, a reduced emit aree % d be -ia atacle-phase flee would just add as ineressed espassies/seatracties less, het la two phase flew a redened exit area has a sore direst effect because the leak rate is limited by operreas theking. c
-_-,-n ( - AICL-M:s:-305 l j 11.5 g anary of Two-Fbase Flow Calculations - The asjer.1aplications of the two phase calculations of leak rate through's l rypical seal cartridge with fully opea seals are smarised below. 1 i 1) The leak rate of primary coolant through a failed sosi cartridge i decreases signifitaatly due to flashing effects as the temperature of i the water entering the eartridge approaches the esturation temperature. This means that stadle-phase upper bound leakage calculations for SB could be encessively esseervative. For our typical seal cartridge (Lf), the predicted leak rates at a system pressure of 1400 poi vary frea 31.21km/s (226 Us gym at 70*F) for a systes temperatura of 200*F, down to 13.51km/s (134 USgym at 70*F) for a system temperatues of 330*F. The preocure and temperature history of the laaking seolant thus has a large effect sa the predicted upper bound leak rate. a ] 11) Surface roughness has a moderate effect en the calculated Isak rate. ( 111) Area restrictions la two phase flow are more important than in single phase flow. To minimise laakage, the exit area should be j reduced as much as possible. (The choking speed in two-phase flow is quite low.end so two phase flow through a seal cartridge is likely to be sheked near the emit). j iv) If both sarbos anal rings broke, they would no longer offer a i resistance in the annular passage between the rings and the shaft and j so the leakage would lacrease, but probably not by more than 10-201. i 14. STACED SEAL ARRANGEMElff 14.1 General i Baving first assessed complete osal failures, the likalthood of this er of significant partial failure medes will new be addressed. Byrea Jachsen (RJ) and Singhen W111meete (EU) seale (Figure 25) are lastalled es series arrangements of similar stages sharing the pressure drop (Figure 26). Under j Sg seeditions, either (1) the staging flew is maintained, causing the e temperature surrounding each stage to approach system temperature (=550*F) with the pressure drop still shared, er (ii) staging flow is valved closed at the bleedeff (Figure 26), thereby cutting off this throughflow of ha: water (1 gym) but at the same time esposing the last seal stage to full systes pressure ( 2150 psi). Whichever opties is takes, the elastseer asial seals any fail due to high
- l temperature La both seal types. Is the EU sese, there is also as 0-ring areemd the outside of the stationary seal ring whose failure would.. allow
? perhaps a few spa leakage through the pressure relief hole.
- [
i i, In addities there to the likaltheed that flashing of water to steam'htveen i. the seal fases will 31.ve additiemal opeatag force, speet the seal balance and sause fases to pop eyes. This will be aseeeeed ta a later secties. j., - -, - ,,-----,--,-,-,,,,,---n-v-ww- .-v-, ..,,..,.--,vm-----v, ---44.
f a ,t {# j AICL-).'ISC-305 t 14.2 Elastemer Asial Seal Failure There are tue reasons why asial seals may cause high leakage. I any partially estrude and jas, thereby allowing the seal First, they l i .ithis local movement la large relative to nestaal esal gap widths); secon they any entrude sempletely and espose the amaular clearance { whereas the ascend involves sene restriction of laakage The first is i emmular clearance. t i seal-laduced causes of high leakage are different.Sueceptibility o a 5 tolerances E seals may aise differ ' stage to stage and staties t0ther than la dimensio 4 depending en else, balance and particularly sleeve stiffnese and support o station i significant differences and their relevance are listed below: l ~ Itse M EN Desirabia for No t i tatrusion of Antal Seel Under SB Condition Seal face area tsaller krger talanes ratia Larger smaller krger i gleeve Stiffenes Sneller Larger Larger Elassener material Nitrile Ethylene propylema Ethylene propylene Larger 1 i Bega that the foregoin l esal as to the "sev* (g assessment applies equally to the EE *ald* type of
- stationary balance *) type shown in Figure 25.
4 33, then high out-leakage can be perceived to be reac e uring EW cartridge (in good esadities and asetening no ring breakages) by ge M or fellowing four sequences of events: ese of the 4 I FIRST ETENT One Saal stage SECOND E7 TNT t (550*y, 750 poi Asether Seal stage FINAL EVENT i, i (350'F 1075 pet Last Remaining Seal Stage _ 3ressure differential). (550*y, 2150 poi eressure differential) pressure differential) i) Partial astrusies/ jamming open Partial estrustem/ jennias spes Ceaplete entreeton 11) Ceaplete estrustea 111) Complete estrustes i fI 19) i Partial entrusies/ jennias opes i Note that it any be any one of the three seal stages that is tav l N r*
- ftrat event".
e ved In the ,,a. i 1 j l t e e ,,., ~. - - - nnnn--,-----m-,,~e., ,n,,~,___e,. --,,,-e__,. ,,.--n---,, _n-.-,-.,,,---,-.,_..
l 4 1 l . L AEC1.-XISC-305 Note that for the last remaining stage it is ~ deemed improb bl i could jaa opea dua te estal alastomer forces alene, given the larg i a e the seal faces closing force. Jasmieg open, bewever, appears highly probable if parti l y raulic i extrusion occurs it previous stages because sace these seal faces ar their hydraulic slosing force becesas essentially sere a e spes, ' With each esal stage betag similar, a esecading of satrusione the east saa be predicted if esca it besimo. likelihood of seal esoposeats havias deteriorated before thConsidering th e acoge to 1 3-stage U er gW cartridge) le not mach leser than t e 33 event, she a seale in a estrusica at 350*F and 2150 pet of a stagle stage. a ty of esoplete 14.3 Jeal Face "Pesstaa Ones'* i t
- poppias eyes" of the faces la a mejor eencers for any b l flashing conditises.
relevesce to the 'Weetiegheese asal arrangement.It will be discussed lat a esced seal ander i l "los leakage
- eesle auch as the U and EW types (Fig rSesceptibility of==
perhaps tbs most importast.several factere, with h=1 mace ratie (sisaifisme 7 u e 25) depeeds ou Resever, since 33 imposes a re e BW type) seeditions from 350*F and 2150 poi deem to lower pressures (ase of s to escaraties temperature), it appears both th bet becostag closer Lead es the seale is e small properties of the hydraulic mpera ture. spring essi rings at moraal pressera and therefore has as tasignifi orces acting es the
- popping eyes"..
caat effect en 14.4 Staataa Optious If asial seal estrasies (onder high temperature sad pr tapese entreerstaary pressure differeettal acrees see s i i d i es them to, failed, would then treasier this estreettinary dery se di i age ehich, if it reestains stages is tura. { e t es to tha eartaisty of flashlag conditions between the seal faces.5emover, stag associated risk of *poppias spea* are thersfers the major esem This and the the preferred opties appears to be te valve she etasi ers. Besce, leakage threesk the final oesling stage by this phenom g 5 g to esmos high s. When a veper esal (se la figure 26) le alas fastall d staged seale, it is eartainly receanseded te valve the stagias fl en back-up to the e 33. la this saea, if the esper seal failed, the rematains a ew cleeed on estematically to the staged seedities - and if the reper seal did nale sould return there sould be angligible flew up through the emel 1ess than system temperators being reached la the seal e vitteartridge not fail ? e ee. Is all staged essi arrangeoeste for US FWas, them i appears se he to valve the stasies. flee sleeed. , the preferred 'eities" i het enter to the seals bec depending se ess! 1eak este, does est gearsa' tee i that sosi fases will no,t pop eyes. samos the seals to reach system temperatore.siteeties of hea , which aar itself
youw .mnw n-. u n~.~ - l l s J I AEC1-MISC-305 ) i 13. WESTDGE003E ITDaogTAT10 SEAL AREANCDtE.T! 'I, 4 l 4 i 13.1' General l The Westingheese (W) arrassment si osale (Figure 27) is fundamentally I differest frem the N and si staged arrangeests (Figure 26) in that the { first stage is a hydreetatic type coal and aermelly withetser's alaset i preeeste differential. all the 150*F reming ee stationary) is set byIts mental 3 syn leak rate (for z et 1 seeing eashised into the anel i fase. all-liquid flew (Figure 18).This gives ik!1 Anabriestion and stable, beleased Bader Se seediciens, heuever. ekte stage will i gelchly be subject to higher temperatures op to 550'F, esentag chseging }- lankage and some flashlag to stem matese the seal faces. l l' 11am and other flew poche, flashing is espected to ca 4-c i paesesse es she Jie. 3 seal stage med %eck preesyre es the No.1 stage. I' peaseuro drop will be eseestially ediabatit, mad there are esperal The j 7 encertaisties shout how the No.1 esal ser behove. i 13.2 fee-phase View seeween paralle2 Fagee i t Appendia 3 for a sample salsalactea).As adiabetic espassies from I Initial Ceedleton tassaded Condities - f Pressurin (peta) 2200 1200 1000 300' 406 Wl6 230 100 Temperature 4'F) 350 550 543 518 43d AAS 383 313 i (2 'llass) 0 0 0.7 S.A 10.3 15.8 22.7 30.0 Steam Fraccion (! Volume) 0 0 13 41 81 92 97 99 tapaastee natie 4 0 11
- 2.4 4.3 9.3 24.9 f8 5
{ This.111metrates the large espaastos sation and the way that vepetisatten thereby change the preesere prefile in the seal gap and speet asigt b61 sc j. [ of and fate seals. Referring cm figures 2p and 30. seal iner. ability ande e
- p;
- popplas eyes
- with parallet faame bogenee atte likely as eyerm conditdoes (seel atrasse) move eleser to setzesties destag the tattial phase of 33 i:
(depreewarisettes et seesteet toeperatura). e j . profile marses sacrossingly more of the seat taas will be effected byT 1 4-flasidag. at the emit from tse seal faces (or earlier) is emotherIf the deem ] 1 i the pressere profile throggk the esp. ter influmac3ng ( This hea hees epeates readieser even further, beyped that ehese by Cerve 1. Figere 30. to lastesse see i 't 8 p,
- Seperscript enseber,e 'Ladi,este referenses.
l. s ? i f 6 i i f f r J -. - -. - -, -.-- - -. -. -
l ~ Alci,-t'isc-305 j Example 1 -_ Deceide Pressorised Seal with Perallel Faces (Ref. 21 l Aarer(tag to two-phase turbulent ediabetic emelysis, hydrastic agening feree is sett (Figurs 31) to tacrogee with is, creasing gap width whap water at . naturation condition (645 peta 495'y) leaks to seneschere scenes e l prellel. faced seal. This aurve sea he used to Andicat.a the imaressing ~ balasca rasie required to seeasteract she hydraulic opening force at increasiing gap widths. Only at 0.01 la. (about Cteety times the " mar:eal" gap l for a Meetinghouse hydre.stacts paal) does the aurve lavel off and abes l eealine. Cap Vidth (1s.) 0,00004 0.0004 0.004 4.010 0.040 Bydraulle Opening Perse (,1bf.) 800 $15 .950 152 951 Raquired Salance Bette 0.736 0 818 0 649 0,431 0.850 ( l tson,1e 2 - Two-phase Fles threesh Parallel sided Cee (AECL A.salveie5 I As ledependent smalysis of top phase ef tebetic estposeine (Figure 32) shows t.5e Lacremaieg hydraulic opening fome (area beesath prseewr= psofile) with larger say width, including stehias ef fect. Duth two phase praseere profiles } sentribute each more spealag force.them wou.14 the all 11guid pwfi?.e (dashed line. Figets 32), despite the large eseant of taitial subseeling at 1687 pois 1 and $11'F. 13.3 Two-Phase riew terveen Cenies! Feces I Referring to Figure 28, the effeat of esadst depende en the ratie e/h centsg e to 3ap width, This la apptcajaately waity for moraal (all liquid) ope;ation, j As e/h approaches este (i.e., larger then normal gep), faces asy be sonsidered l eenentially parallel. This masse that.if erstes esoditieke beesee such that e t seal with parallel fases seuld " pop open* if set to the gap width portainigg So the morrespeedtag a==8==? seal, then the sealcal oest would aloe "per j opme*. 0$ hor es,alysis aesfirms this by settludings3 "These, sealag which to seed to leereses stabillef in liquid esale actually peemetes the limit cycle behowicut la two phase anale*. ( t I 15.4 Poe_s!%1e Seguense for Reseesse__of Weettaaheese No.1 Erdreera:y f l e Stettes 31asheet t f 1) Assume spenal operettee at sep = 0.0C44 As., balanes rette = 0 75 and j radial fees width = 1 ta. i AL) Sn seinees semperatess inersaae, peep stationary. l j 111) Meter vieseesty 4etresseel leak rate therefore increases l petportionally (there te appressaately e Encter of fevr between 100*F and 350*F). i 17) flachtag begime at the aest esit med progresees boek into the esel asp i os temperegere seetAmees to 13stesse. F1sentes eauses leeressige gep l widels (setoesties}1y seistaistag estal balasse and peepeasating the t l , tendency fer fisshier to easies es opeedog feten seeresse). Leak rate e Saaresses to screespose irith taerseeig gap steth, bot-egt 'gette se a embia re!stionship beseems of flestonin of the 11guid'esstim4 ef the proceves penfile eed steepeates of the see. phase asettee. 4 1 4 h t l I
- - - - ~ _n m .2 n._-.. -- --...-,-w..~.--- 6, AIC' ':I!C-305 1 v) Increased leak rote of teereseissly het ester /stees contributes to an increasing back pressure se the hydreetatic essi. ..j; (Note: Without eignificaat back pressure it appears the faces woeld 4 pes wide. It is eseused dessetrees vestrictices 3 significant and back pressure then assess the seal faces to eyes less wide.) Therefore, depending os 4 deemstreme restrictione, a partieder 1evel of esal face og,eatng and leak rate is reached sorteepeedias to maah level of systen j eseditiese. 1 vi) j Insk rete seseesse any be unstable (through face sebble er heck presoste variaties) and will be Makly depeedent en the hydraulic r j, ba2 mace Intia and any frictiesel opening force caused by the asial 1 alsetener seal (Figure 28). i vif,) (( after the seeyerature at the osal strance reachee $30*F (at 2150 poi), conditions for high task rate are likely to worses as the eyetes 1 ;. blues deus, unlese a similar levd of liquid eebeoelias cae be esistained thsoughese this event. i; II v111) {i Complete fallere and less of elastomer seals in the No.1 essi mesembly may escar, but effects se leak rate are insiseifiaast if seal i' faces are already tending to spes wide. i I is) Tertial estrusion and jasmiing of the antal elastomer seal i i-(tellee-based ehessel seat) could sause seal fases to opes wide et t lese severe fleid seeditions. i Ai 13 5 1selicati_eet af staties 81ackese ee Westiaahouse No. 2 Seal 1) Assuming the No. 2 seal remalaa sleeed, it will be avbject to a ettsifiteet frassies of erstes pressere at cleos to sysses i ) temperstare, with two-phase maatw.=e in the No. I seal esvity. l 11) ~ Elastener esale is the No. 2 assembly say fail. 0 any seetribesa frisateaal drag, The emial alastseer 1 }, iii) Seal fasse mer
- pop opes' bessees of flashing betooes thee.
i la order to asesse ehether
- poppies opes
- is likely, en analysis of the for verlene gay widths) ender the appsopriate see pha i4
{} evadittees is segelred. see seeetene the hydrae 114 alesias force (as set by the bela l fases any epee wide and effer essentially as vestristtoa. 13 6 Esdfal fisid Isertia ese redessing fester est yet in11y esseeeed la the isectie of the fluid ,? i esterias and eseeleracias radially betones the eed fases. d redese the oposing forse and any limit *popplag eyee'. This este to i-eL1-11gadd operettee of a Neettaghewtype bydswetatic sed has beenIts oiseificance f i' ii doestabed is a peper effered resently for pehliestice (*The W deostatic poesentact Seal Insieding Fleid teactis Iffest", by 7. Rosa and!T. Fujf.te). 3 o asese, ele.iti ines.e.reater (e,.e.h.bf.ag) se fl.eu.3 de,.1.,e fe,oee, h M6dr1*u111 Wr isaan.5Wu'tne*LI*f,entWIPQH*nflim!' "8" t 6 t
.w a_ -~ 1 ) i y I j l 13 " AECL-tt SC-305 l 16. FURT1EE ACP SB4FT SEAI, CONSIDERAyIONS t 16.1 teal Jast411 sties and Maioresems i i IP. has been eseused Oe fgr that seals are in good condities prior to the 33 This may set %e de edes for eeny :ceaseos. The RCP esal is composed event. of precision cosyeeest.o. de much it requires a certain alaisum level of i dec;mentciew ad eare (espertie ) in her.441ag, Leapection ad assembly at au otages of eneamfactating, iscta11stian sad use. In order to provide the sec.osary desmaataties, a detailed gaality teoursoca program should address, t but ser be Itaited te, the.felledag itase: 1) A memp1(ta list an' esoposeste eseprislag the oral cartridge. This defines the esepe e.f the program med acta as a checklist both for i genlity assuroest ens) esseekly perpeees. 1 11) Clear identifisatise of' all aset,oceats in the esal assembly, samally by an assembly aumber. In edeittJoe, the end fase asal campeesste ar.1 identified by the meaufactweet's serial ember (i.e., they are 4 certified and traceshle, me are 0-riage and 0-cupa hist without serial { sabere). 4 4 j. iii) An est11aa of tests to esafira adherence to specified toleraatas on eeecestricity, parallelity, flatmene end surface finish. Standard i attenties to dimensional asterassee is also required with particular j asaalderaties to gland dineestees for 0-ring, 9 ag and shtamal seale. i tv) Quality eestrol precedures to ansere adheressa ta specified asterial j standards, porttemiarly for both face osal and elastaaeric esepenente, i but else for the remainias support hardware. v) Bevias performed and deemented the flaief.ed composest taspeettee, a eterage facility la required to adequately protect esoposeste prior to final tasposties, assembly and tastallaties. 4 As with any quality amourasse program, the avecess of the progres relies heavily en the quality of the availabla equipsoot med the training of the perseenel Assolved. desordingly, 6 vi) Perocenal aheold be profleteet med)=ewledgeabla to all aspects of inspecties, assembly and desmestasies preenderes. vii) At as time ehesad desmestaties requirments be allowed to lapea as l these form the beats of the overall seat program, tying ta initial seal seeditions (natorial quality, peakage selerances) with subseqeest seal 1 performance. Final 1sepeaties prior ao assembly generall,* toquires some "seeshing up* of flatnessee, sed a thorough elemains of all parta to remove any foreign 3 asterial (areaey fingerpriate, list, etc.). This meet be deae.Jo a. eleen t swireenest. The seal peakage is now sarefully assembled followfas detailed 1 prosedures (and a sheek11st). Sena11y, 'a hydreetatic aset la perfereed to 1 verify serrect assembly of she peehage, and denssetrate proper opere 1em and integrity of the seale prier as lastalletten. j' l' -w-+-w--ww,---~,,-p,,, -n-,,.w,_m,,----cm,,---.,,-m-+---n--,--,,,,,,--,n_._nw-.,, amm,,,.w .,_m,,a- ,,,,-_,e a--+-w ,_--wn .,ww--,-,w-,em ew-
- n
-- m - + mn- - u,.a. n,mc r .----w- =w 4 j 24 - a AICL MISC-305 i Dece iss&slied, ceasideration must now be given to sositoring the e als as to their perfossance and the conditican they are subjected to. Minisua requiressata seuld coastat of recetif3ns all pctsineet pressures, temperature 6 sad. flows (bypass, injection and seal leakage). Dw6 mentation of performance ' history (pressure oscillaciess, leekage trends, etc.) providas the basis f or es-Lise analysis se answer suah gusatioes as "la st.e praderat candistos inlicative of a seal malfunctiost', *Did the resect tasperature neursion ],; seriously affect osal 1stegrityf*, or %e the rapid thange in sencrst laakage trends eusseet essessive wear sad faissadics vsal is11vre, eod far which asal?* A large percentas's of seal failures as util e utsecusary abstdowns occur des to iaeorrect laterpretation of seal perforecace.ani inappropriate intervention by operatore, To avoid this, the data can be ( processed to provide easily interpreted records of performance for each esal 1 for various parameters with well deffsed failure criterion at eich action is required. Such acties by an operator could be eisarly out11aad for various circumstances (e.g., womitor closely, alter operating conditione, akastdo;en
- j immediately, no acties required, etc.).
Tne data es11 acted slee provides the hasis for analysing why a seal failed or performsd erratically. This in turn d provides invaluable inferr,stion when it comes time ti predics seal behaviour under aboernal conditions, or to make modifications to correct seal deciso inadequacies. On removing a seal from service, for whatever purpope, a detailed faepection suet he carried n t. To start with, general eenditiosa much as erud accumulation, heat diseeleration and state of elastaaer seals should be a noted. Following decosteninstion, a detailed inspection should be carried out es the package is disassembled, with the same attention to detail ao used 3 in the preparation for service. Any damage, wear, deterioration or change in flatsees or roundnese should be recorded along with as such information as possible about the operating conditions (dates, running times, transients, etc.). This is combined with the preservice inspection data to form a j documentation package which becomes part of the seal cartridge. At this point the cartridge is ready to be refurbished. This genera 117 ceneists of replacenest of all alsetener seals, and ralapping of seal rings J if reusable, and all support surfaces. The composants are thes placed in eterage ready for reassently sa needed. i 8 Clearly, itene presented im the preceding discussion could have impact en ,i esal performasca regardless of the design. Well destgoed seals have given useatisfactory performance through lack of attenties to each detsti, t i 15.1 11astomer gesle At eermal temperetares, the integrity of 6*riage and the various special i alassemer seals used to accousadate shaft movement (ege, 0-cup and shaesel q 1 seale) la of less cenaers than et higher temperatures. For 33, elastomer s seal perfernamee is oracial due as the potential leakage and laterference i f with entistaatery operation of the and fase meals. q N, f 6 S-rtage are used throughouc a seal eartridge to seal off high preeeurs fluid i and provide specific hydraulic leadings se seal eesponents as determined ) 1 ] ,) i ,i
runm .~ ~ ~ -~a.nn..._......-, i f
- AECI.
- SC-305 by detailed deflection analyses. If as 0-ring fails, these requirements are not met, the significance of which depende sa the 0-ring loca. tion. Failure any occur because the 0-rias is defective due to age or lack of care during assembly. This mode of failure as well as incorrect gland seeeetry should be addressed La the quality amourance program. yailure may slee escur due to estrusion (high pressure, large estrusion gap) or thermal degradation of the l
0-ring material. Eigh temperature estrusies tests outlined is section A indicate that compound E515 will deteriorate to the point of failure under $3 conditions. Elastseer esals are aloe used to permit slight axial action of the flexiblywted seal ring of the eed face seal. Experience has shown that the sleeve entfaae beneath this alastomer seal aan become severely soused due to settee of the seal en the surface (resulting from angular aisaligament of the seal esepenents with the shaf t). With asial movement of the shaf t, this surface damage can essessive leakage. pt to drag the eed face seal rings apart, causing A similar effect saa result des to partial artrusies of this elasteBer seale As the Satruded material Wedges into the amaular estrusies gap the seal ring metica hacenee lacked to the asial acties of the shaft. la 64dities, asial shaft metica may eescrihete to estrusies. Details of the high temperature estrusies tests of channel seala used la Westinghouse j RCy packages are giram is section A. 4 16.3 Thermal Effacts General chsages in temperature saa he espected to cause chsages is esal face deflectlpa la seaposite assemblies with different coefficienta of thermal I l arpageien. This is a result of interface fricties and slip between anal coopegoats. Under 35 condittees disterstem would alas eccer des to thermal l gradiests wirkla each esepeemat. These effects saa he amiculated ed i taciuded in a thermal analysis of the seal desias. Care is geserally takaa to slaialse hysterssis affects, and to amoute that the seals' respessa to 'i thessal gfadiente Le benefisial and met self-destructive la nature. feentature changne cas Mao affect alearances due te differential tharsal l anpassies. Standard c.1aarances may he diminished with taspeteture to the 2 erseat that eut-of-scuedesse er eteestricity values acceptable at normal coed 1 Clone new eases ipterforneca and possibly damaged er brokes meal rings. Agata, this esa generally be dealt with at the design stage. 9tste bested up, seasideration aset slee be givaa to the sneling process. j Coolias down should be desa iplieving a systematic procedere so as te avoid thermal sheek and resultant aceposest damage, specific details of such a precedura 6bvieuely depend es the desigt t's the system is question. i i Another capic related to the mal effects le that of fluid vaporisation y between the seal fases. Ae setlined is geetles 2, whilst Isakage ses flashing
- m. et.
6.t een the dal e.1 faces, th. osal.ad.r e,eri.us.ed.e.i ) e If g ap - *
- p
[i h I J t ( 1,
7 c. 3 i )}e j AF.C: 4CSC-305 i } operaties it reenleed etable. it rocked about en este, it escillated and it pepped open. The hCp shaft osale may or any est be subject to all modes of eparaties se danessereted; hemover, the implicatises should be cessidered. In the etable mode, all that to seguired is a value for leakage is the ! I preseece of two phase flow. The pepped open mode forme the beste for the solculaties of en wper keepd leak rate (secties 13). The rocking ad escillating medes have leek retas eseewhere between the two entremes, but 11 they ales have 1mpl14atless with sospect to estrusion of the elastomer esel i aseeciated with the flealbly mousted seal ring. ij While the leek rate la ig higher thas La the etable made, the potential for estrusien se usil as eerface damage beneath the :rN=y seal to also higher and may lead to open !j essi faces se M:: :::f previeuely. jt rate aere likely, This tende to make the gper bound leak ~i; a fi 16.4 Discuestes of 3eal Fe11ere Analvete i! }; laboratory a detailed failure analysis diagramneeed es entensive data s (Figure 33) hoe been j developed at Chalk giver Nuclear laboratories. have bees yet into three elseetfacetienes The causes of seal failures q i }# 1) design (Laborest Amedequecise in specifications or designe) {}
- 11)
- Lasta11 sties (landestuste lopplag er handling precedures dur*ing
- i preparattee, assembly and tastelletten and iii) operater (incorrect precedures er reope)a,se) er eyeten (abeermal j'
seeditiene of pressure, temperature, vibraties er dirt). l e j, g y using emch a diagten it to possible to trace boyeed the general type of failure, se stated la Intel 3, ta idestify the specific cause of failure in jt level D er 3. signittenace evaluated, correstice estian een them be takes.When the fa J ~I i j of 3Cp shaft seals to fattere during 33 are highlightef la Figura j i three of the gameral eleasificatteep are peseests design, asetallaties and All y; operator er erstem failure. Given that 33 eessre, resulties in lose of. i seelias, verises esemaries ens be seedily sovieleoed through me of the a failure sealyste diagram. &see of seelies by Steelf see (and i' la the sete of 3315) lead directly to elastseer seal fetiere. probably will } This eeuld alee he brought about by tendequate clearesses to meet she higher temperature ]. seedittees, er more directly by inadequate taspeetten, headlies or ensembly 1 precedures. Seek imedequate procedures eeu14 slee lead to failure of the end 11 fase seel, sempletely independent of any lose of emeling. i ij Inadequate seeling esadialese saa lead to seal ring breakage.attenties te steerses 3j. la addities, less of ese1Jeg slese, or la somjenaties eith advarse thermal defessattee, p lead }{ te leadequate emeetheses (the seat, frequest feilwre type) er imedegeses i
- }
evere11 #1stamos. ( I Ic 4 e (' i l }l1 - - - - - - - - - - ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~~
~-. - + !l !l l* ' 1-AECL-lG5C-305 i jj The above discussies of failure restes applies whether 'the yrkaary seal is eperating la some sede of decated performence, or is pepped wide open. newever, the pepped opes ande is of primary tapertence la the salev.lation of i time to sore uncovery. This is further emphaatsed in that once the hydrostatic seal faces de asperate, they are unlikely to elese again. Secause of this, any facter which can initiate the seal popping open requires i-critical assessment. ii
- i One facter which falls into this sategory la estruatoo of the ehemsel seal
{ t into the radial gap between shaft end flesibly-mounted roter. This cas ~ inersase the frictional drag and present the possibility of the rotor I becesing *1ecked up*, leading to a wide spee seal. A seceed critical facter ii is fluid vaporisaties between the seal faces. Emperience la the laboratory j< (Secties 5) ladicates that water flashing to stsaa between seal faces saa
- I initiate seal gap instability. This een by itself, or is ersjuncties with Lacreased frictieaal drag due to chamael seal estrusies, lead to wide open seal fases. Both of these fasters require estficient attenties to emeure they have bees adequately addressed is the overall 33 assessment.
4 17. 7717Eg1 WDEK 1 1 17.1 purther &aalvsis Sorsestedr I II i! 1t taeeter bleedown seeditions versue time following SI for various leak rates - to define senditions the seals anst withstaed. Local shaf t toeperature sevement versias,tima - to relate to !i i eyesing er elesing of eaal faces due to elastseer asial fricties. Opostag force versus gap width for parallel seal faces moder various estresse and azit condittens (adiabatic flow including )- fluid inertia) - to flad the reage of eenditions for which esal feess bessee stable wide eyes. 1 3 Casperisena of openias and sleeing forces for Byrea Jackees, l , p. .~ l Bingham Willanette and Westiagheese seals to identify essditions to cause "poppiag-opes
- to address the " popping open" prenless for
( {- specific seals. i Temporarmee wereas laak rate (eteady state analysis) for seal
- I entireement followieg St, partiaular y for &J and SV sartridge arrangemoets with staging valve sleeed - to assess the interacties j
of seal respeese with the severity of esaditiese to which it is subjected. j,j' Veret-case leak rates aseendng esopletely failed seats with specific clearaseee, cellecties time siees, etc. for varieus t; pumpo - to determise te what astent the seals aset be relied on 18 If for fluid restristies la each pump. i 17.1 purther Testies Seatestedt } yrir.tional openias forse eestribsties free asial elastomer seals
- i l {.
ender verises osedittees - to find their angnitude ad influesee ) 3 es belasse and
- popping eyes".
Critical balasse sette versus estranee/esit senditiene for "popptog i l, eyes
- of perallel seal fases of typical diasseisme - to eenfire I
analysis and settle she seems of whether esal fases wil! oyes wide. I 1 1i t - - - ~ ~ ~ - - ~ ~i
p y,_ _n-n... n ---n n -. ~. ~ r . ARCLi.t13C-303 Forther estrusies teste for specific elastomer seals and esaditions, lacaudlag asial asties and lubricant - to sever e ~ realistic range of seeditions pertaistas to actual alastaaer seaJe is "aes sed" esadities. + 17.3 Candidates for Desian Chamaes Susnested: 5 111minaties of stagias flow - to reduce the emaissas temperature sees by the seals. Thermai syphoning airemit for stationary seelias - to reduce the maaiana6 tamperature sees by the seals. Eigh temperature resistance elastenere - to uske nest one of j available estariale. Addities of a beek-up
- safety" oesl to each eartridge - to provide a sea!
3 desigasd for the job. i Zacrease is seal eleeing force (balance rette) moder S3 t eseditions - to prevent *poppias eyes". Iacrease la flew restrictions, pertiestarir towarde emit from seal eartridge - to reduce *uerstwese" leek rete. Seal design to preeste divergest seal face deflecties dee to flashing - to reduce oesl 'suoceptibuity to *poppias opes". Staa H rives seelias erstes - to provide emeling asses indepeedent } et the 33 ovest. EE3EEEE135 e 1.
- Eege, T., "Eydrostatic sea-seatact seal and its applicattee to artrene seedities *Pree.10th 1st. Conf. Fluid Sealias, BELA F1sid Engineettag, Craafield, W.E., (April 1944).
he, W.F..- and Seeler, E.M., "forbulest tue phase f1se is ring and 1. face seale*, pres. 9th Int. Conf. Flaid Sealias, BERA Fluid Engisserias, Creafield, U.K., (April 1981). 3. l Beeler, R.M. and Rugbee, W.F., "Dynastes of two phase seale*, AsLE Transactises E, 2, pp.144-151, (1984). tealse,.. red v e.. ale is u.h er-o.,e ter - iss,.ias ree. These Faileres*, AECL Report unsber ARCL-3407,1976. i
- i i-
\\ ,o !a,' h c c fh i. il L l i
.._n -n -- - ~ _..
- g
.. AECL-Misc-305 1 GIAggAIT l l This Clessary, while as asans exhaustive, was intended as sa introduction to same of the terms sammealy used in fluid sealing with the als of facilitating easier ceaprehensies of the work presented la this report. Aspect reties ratie of inside radius to outside radius of the seal face being significaat for diametral tilt stability I i !i Balance reties ratie of forces acting en the seal faces to increase the 1eakage gsp to these forces acting to bring the seal faces together (see sketch below) a d *'fp Nils'ie's % \\ i
- s umam M
pasma p 3 F Nf6fl4 man A balanced and face seal i h s. with inward laakage sad = = = = = - eesvergence la the sealing \\ 'A sap. N ' L"" w..sutis e as en m==o mia w== su asia e emipais: /,,s.'"
- f,,,' '"
1 """ ""*f. N,' ), ' E.' 'e'.d * ' l Convergest gaps a face seal say deEsasing la tr..... :len of leakage due to the pressure /deflectica response of the seal er seeing i aschined into the sesi rings (eesperallel faces, sometimes . termed comismi convergence) N" Elassemer asial alassemer/ polymer seal between the fleaibly asusted seal seals ring and its espport. This quasi-static esal (semally shamael seal er t> cup) sesst acceandata some axial movement et the seal rias. Elastener class general slassificaties of elastomer compenade for breed ~ earviae conditiene (e.g., attrile - racistance to petroleus prediacts with eacellent asupressies set, tear and abrasien resistance, rated -45' ta 175'F3 othylaae propylene = ence11est for steam and het water, rated -45' to 300*F) Elastseer alature of elastomer, polyears and other tage'edt{ats sempemad (*sleamised or navulcanised) with various proprietary agents to produce e rubber-like material for a specific applicacion 1 } 1l, i l - ---~ ' - - '- ' ~~ ~~~
g- -m_ i l , AgCL-l(Isc-305 satchs group of elastomer seals of the same c.aspound made in one production run using the sene initial ingredients sad 4 usually produced at the same time sattmaios says gap betwees adjacent componente through which the elastomer / polymer seal any estrude under pressure. For the centred test fixtures used in this work, the extrusion gap is half the total diametral clearance. Por test fixtures with the shatt pushed over to one side, the extruaios say would be i the total diametral clearance. For the size of seals tested, this difference in test arrangement is not i considered significant, and extrusion test results ebeuld be camparable for eenparable gap values. Shaft sleever l a composest of a seal package wtI1ch fits ever the rotating shaft and is locked to it. The sleeve may have special surface treatments to prevent wear and reduce friction in the region beneath the axial elastomer sesi.
- Stastag flows flow through labyrinths or orifices in a malti-staged seal package to give a certain specified pressure drop across the individual samla.
Stationary rings the non-rotating seal ring which, depending on its support arrangement, any be subject to axial action (also termed the stator, as opposed to the rotor, the rotating ring) Seal Identification: (I) Parker 0-rings; Designation 3-515-80: E signifies Re material; 515 is Parker formula ideni:glene propylene Tricatiod; 80 is Durometer hardness number. (II) Tetrafluor Slipper Seals: Designation TF 878-217 of Tetralen 720: TF signifies { Tetrafluor product; 878 is product identifier; 217 is product sequence number; Tetraloa 720 is teflon i identifier. (Designation is of significance primarily to vendor) l i (.-. b_ - e i s' I 4
n _ . ~ . -- a, l . "AIC M ISC-305 TAILZ 1 E221:510lt TESTS IN Ft 35URIZZD WATIR 1I305, PAREZ1 1515-60 RE7EIZNCE i TEMP GAF PRESSURE TIME TO CtzrDITI0tt AT AFF302. CottGNTS TEST (DIANE!RAI, DIFFEREN EIAWOOT END OF TEST CRANCE = CLEAAANCE TIAL (Esfer to the IN I + 2) meted Figure SECRE J aunber) RAID-j (*F) (ine:ise) (ps1) (hours) NESS 1 I
- 1 Ss0 0.0015 160c Fig. 4
-55 9 560 0.0015 1600 .3 5 3 560 0.0015 2600 6 5 -10 1 560 0.0015 2600 2.8 5 -20 2 560 0.00 15 2400 2 5 -25 10 550 0 0015 1200 4 -25 5 550 0 0015 1200 4 -15 6. 350 0.0015 1200 4 -25 8 350 0.0015 1400 4 -25 7 i 550 0.0015 1900 2.3 5 -to 12 550 0.0015 2000 1.5 -20 11 550 0.C027 1200 -25 signe of optrailing 13 350 0.0027 1600 4 -25 li. 550 0.0027 1800 4 -25 15 350 0.0027 2000 4 -22 17 5.*0 0.0027 2200
- 2.3 3
-15 18 550 0.0027 2600 'l 5 16 550 0.0044 1000 'l 550 0.0048 1200 4 -15 27 i 3 lost pressure to G 23 i 550 0.0048 1600 500 poi af ter 2 krs. 1.5 5 -5 22 ! 'l 350 0.0048 1800 1.8 5 -12 21 350 0.0065 400 35 5 -25 entire cartumference 29 estruded 350 0.0065 1000 2.5 6 -20 28 550 0.009 800 6 6 M 520 0.0027 2200 -6 19 320 0.0027 2600 4 -10 20 520 0.0048 1600 4 -10 26 320 0.0044 1000 2.5 5 -12 25 520 0.0065 800 4 -12 30 'j 520 0.0065 1000 3.5 5 -10 entire aire nference 31 i estraded ] 520 0.009 000 17 4 -20 34 30TES: N A... 1 - m r.d harea. .f as. ria.e 7
- t. 82 f Ring stas 1.17" ID t 0.159"
- Tested as sweeived (se 1mbrisaties, se sleening) ) ,o - et. m t.o I f - Mandmea test duraties la hoste, after 2 hour un g ,2 lt
.-n..-.. I . AEC.L-!!ISC-303 TAM.E 2 EE3D31GT TEST 3 IN FRESSURIZED WAITE 523C3 FAEE22 E7&O-73 EEFERENCE TEMP CAF PRES 3URE TIME TO CONDITION AT AF?30Z. COMENTS TEST (DIAMETIA1 DIFFERD 31AWOUT END OF TEST CIANCE W CLZARANCE TIAL (Rafer to IN + 2) the noted 33011 A Figure IAAD-(*7) (inches) (pei) (heurs) samsber) 3E33 550 0.005 2400 Fig. 7 -10 E692-75 in place 26 5 50 0.004} 2400 of E740-75 7 -10 5'O 0.009 2400 32 8 -7 350 0.012 2400 35 8 -11 330 0.015 1600 36 8 -11 350 0.015 1300 39 8 -13 350 0.015 2000 1.5 9 40 550 0.015 2400 0.5 9 38 350 0.018 1200 37 8 -12 550 0.018 1400 44 8 -11 550 0.018 1600 1.5 9 45 520 0.015 2000 44 8 -7 320 0.015 2200 3 9 -10 41 320 0.015 2400 1.3 9 -7 43 $20 0.018 1800 42 8 -7 520 0.018 2000 2.5 9 -4 47 ]1 S20 0.029 400 48 8 -7 320 0.029 1200 3.5 9 -2 30 430. 0.029 400 31 8 -2 49 50TES: - Measured hardassa of new ring, ' 3740-73.. 71 to 73 l 2892-73.. 79 ring sina 1.17* ZD z 0.139' - tested as received (ao lubrication, as clamains) - Static tests - Maziam test duraties 18 heers, af ter 2 hose unre up T 1 i l i li
,....--. m : a ,j ' AEC1.-!CSC-30$ 2 mu3 EE 1C310N TESTS D FRES$312ZD HATER - CIA.T!!* SIAI.S. 2ETRAFL301 TF d75-17/Tetrales 720 with Parker 1740-75 0-11 ass n;.rs.aI5cl TEMP CAF FBIS$tBI TIME TD CONDITION AT AFFhCI. CCNMENTS TEST (DIL M DIFFEREN-ELOICUT IND OF TEST MANCE D CLEARANCE
- TIAI, (Rafer to 330tZ A 2) the noted EAEDNESS 1
Figure j ('F) (inches) (pai) (heure) manher) 1 550 0.008 2400 i Fig. 10 -7 extruded lio C1 0.04" long 550 0.010 1800 10 -4 artruded lip C3 0.07" long 550 0.01 0 2000 5 12 -7 C4 550 0.010 2400 2 12 -3 C2 550 0.013 1200 11 -7 C1 350 0.013. 1200 11 -7 C11 1 350 0.013 14C0 'A 12 -9 CS '{ 550 0.015 @C0 10 -7 estruded lip C12 0.04* 1eag SSC 0.015 1000 , 13 -7 C13 350 0.018 1200 13 -7 CIS 550 0.015 1^00' 13 C16 520 0.01 0 1800 11 -7 C7 520 0.010 2000 13.5 12 -4 C6 520 0.010 2200 9 12 -5 C5 320 0.013 1400 13 -3 CIO a am m nI W (Ap t I X .d.sl 1 p ,,/)o ,r{ip gg. c .S: v r L y, 2 mos au .._z c e i c=a ms wn. .msa , L._ tu. m J,1 5, sw a nem nas aAss:s un EDTaf13 As tuMI.Y y TNW. As passar a i
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nas a suzn ret i EP T h i-CLost m wne srMau.y-t'Jbien Pot.seMr.est MEIFACE T M CDuitTER. SAPCRAL.*LEAAA.C MDt 3085 m 800Y S SFACE T W 800Y OWWER V?rWI' 991 BA CIAA. 3005'1 -T SA. PtosissNCL t avoi Asta tocausa a4P { + //Be%Ist 4 WClas W 21/8* 84 ONitAO4/P OEC'l 1 ~ -- t5s m im h ,,I I e 1 !, s,(4 y x o .m 4$jj 5', i ~ = 13 "i'G P rM MM,s D pcm v t* 53 f m , SIAL,-WC,,ats l l ) cc y mau, vr j g. N O*""O I SEPASS 3, t )t gang 3NT1tz' M l i Jees* Fut t e j O-;O;gO' ~ / OlIk g'g i l0 1 \\\\ // i dh*O O v.- t Figure ! F 43At Test Calf. 1 t i
M - 49 _.y VP WT twAGt 5 AfCL-Mit;-305 , Wir-LCK MALE C:PNECJ w gg l TOR PCA vr M M. WW i mes.sut .i _E'.cED.w_ent/ Y~AC.;
- W
~ M j,- r p:- DR12. 3/17 _ a,, ,w 1 its ll. g .s c. w u-a. u g' jrI i (, e e e 371;n Acg:; y & I E i L 4 l g o-r- en a xTaic =
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\\ 1 N Se6 I \\ i / 6 i j ggg a a a e I e a e I i a e a e a ? l al v t 'M e 2 4 s a w 12 M w is 2e 22 24 - 26 2e 3e M 1 j EXTRUSION GAP 101ADEIRAL ELEARANCE-i-21 (Je 3 llNENES m19) i i j l'I.... . l i Pr. sens e vs Cap for Short-Tetu (Typically 2 to 4 fineer) Blowout bg F.utriision i est tholiebricated Static H-Rings anet Channel Scale in Water at 520 F i j I
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i .{ t SUPPLY t ( XV1 A PflES$UllE I isaune i b j ri OllR[E V4 V7 l t 3 ROW DETER V Dif - # < i t XV2 itEIMOCOUPLE StrPLY --n PRESSURE Pl N hl 3 Pfl0XHTY PR00ES 1,( y4 TADOC f d l g g = ) , LEAKAGE 1 qmm um-I g A ROW mm-g J I l PflE55tNIE 4 W ? I [ fj XVs K ve ) ( ? ( i BACK PflESSINIE I p TRAltsoUCER (v3 d { l RETINtit p t .I g 1 ' ?- g } j Figeste 16 SchcoatIc Diagram of Seal Test Rig t; g 4 i j C ,l 5 'd h s
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,_,;,~. ,, = - m.c m~ u m ;,--.. _ _, m u. mm. ; ..,w,..,..._ ,h o e i ' AECL-MISC-305 ~ ~ / g,) '// /// /'/ i // / // t Is / - 1550" i l 2.041" 1 2.875" = 1 t V i // i / (b) / // / a / / / / / i 3.500" l 3.715- = 1 I d 4.750" = 713we 18 Diagrams of Seal Rings: (*) 2 7/8" CD Rings j (b) 4 3/4" OD 11 ass e-. 3,' a< r* i b
~... -.. n-l c 1 1 \\ Ascr. 4asc.305 l r. I __ _ ] I i l I l l I i l.. I I; ..u.... i I , _4 i .i .. :.4r. l i. i .. r... I a i 7 L.. n .r.. i \\. \\.. .g. ..a p I ..a,... i j i i q. ..~7. i a .e l s .a. u . m.. g. i .. a:. I 1 l .i .. <e. .....a. l, g 1 t I i l t l I l 4 i I i l). i %N.) ..I a i s. r ) q 7 L L .i [,I ~ 2 3 . 788E TIN E L 9M4 mang 4l t i n 4 6 4 d i; i i .l l 1 ..q i i SE AA. 60. i L SEAL. GM SEAL. sap l Pl.dW (. TOP) / L(t.EM istE) (SarTM) ~_ l I.. \\ I,. ( ..l .bl e. g. l l, sorias Test 3 l i I 4 t l - * - - - - - - ~ ' ~ ~ ' ~ ~ - ' ' ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ' ~ " " * ' ' ' ' ' ~ ^ ^ ~ ' ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ' ~
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l 64 - AEct.-Misc-305 i ,e U!! ) W ) P 11, s l ll -+ t _,. w y % ,\\\\\\\\\\ g stagina riov s g-.. g . A. A s. w y /J /a Q 41:
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AECL-MISC-305 ~ ~ 40 T = 200*F SINGLE-PHASE WATER f LEAK (g/ PRESSURE / SYSTEM 1 RATE 4 i \\g 35 40 \\ \\ m 35 N j s 30 T = 530*F 30 W TWO-PHASE { 4 7 LEAK (~"YSTEM 8E 25 <0 1 RATE 4 PRESSURE u g E -d 25 20 @ T = 530*F Vot0 DECREASES e, G HARPLY. W H - 15 xl SYSTEli 20 - PRE 55URE i 10 6 =-- b ,/'e 0-5 5 1200 % 00 M00 1800 2000 2200 O { SYSTEM PRESSURE (ps0 1 5 ] Figure 22 LeakRateandExitvoidFraction'VersusSygteIn for Two System Temperatures (200 F and 530 F) ressure i l4 p-h l
( i l - To - act.-msE-sos SINGLE-PHASE WATER TWO-PHASE O 35 30 30 25 l' ~ Y } Y 25 20 E j.i e kg } ( CE 15 ' w E c 20 R 10 %.2 ' i 5 N ( 15 i e i i i e i 200 250 300 350 400 450 500 550 0 SYSTEM TEMPERATURE (*F) figure 13. Laak Bate and East Teid Freeties verene System t Temperature for a Constaat System Freasure if 1600 poi ( i i s l b-e 4 iu
- ArcL-m:sc-305 1
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I I . AECL-MISC-305 FECW ENFEDINCE PRESSURE BREAEDOWN PARI) r r 111,1111,1,1111111,1,1111111111111111,1 : N[D r:E'" T. _ _, PRESSURE IN TRIN tur uEzr SEAI. FIER ANJO CAVITY [ 7.,, SPRINGS y 5 (TO PRoVIDS h STATIC SEAL mms FACE &cac) I//////X7////F ///N///N/ % angnggyg I Sur2cunar \\acTATING 3!b l TONER AIZAI. (PUMP SEAFF SEAL ("aCEI g SEAL (!O FIIKIT DRIVEN) I AIZALIEITEMEETS){ r i i.T* l A) STRON.7ACESON TTPE SEAFT PUMP - kM .,~w,-- x j kg; - ' - ixwAxTxNNN, Aif f WNNNNNA k 7.m -- - s., M h / \\ h \\ VM///h//////////mr i %% /EA t \\ --- \\ - \\\\ - J 1 N EAL (To FIEMITw S { i ... - s x _L, AEgAL set 3xgyg) i \\ spearzas \\ sur:0maar notarras PUNP SEAL SEAL SEAL SEAFF RZuG azug 3LE373 (FACE) (FACE) SURE RELIEF BOLE 31 BIBCEAINrE11AMETTE "WIW" 'gTFE x i F1 sere as staged seat Types F Onyyright 1983. Elastria Feuer Beenarab !astatute. Ert! WP-1963 T2, Mais toelaat Pues thaft Seal Guide 11aas - Telme 2: amarate - t a aa-i.-- . W rta W wi e pesatsetes.
= - 73.- AECL-MISC-305 h z.raxAsE [ 'N -E l. a rLow SEAL PuxPe i < 3 GPE SSAFT SEAFT t ' SLETVE M m = =# [APOR rIXED To 1 GPM g pr EAL rUxP S art mz. Enorr ) 50 PSI I { ~: ~ o i l.% a \\<._l! l 1 LOW PRESSURE l 1 ) Jan STAsE e = l y 750 PSI .l b 4 i - r 2ND STAGE r INTESMEDIATE SEAL }' stagggg L3lf/,j/ PRESSURE a-j /) g ) 3.. g 1450 PSI p a , s': BACE-UP --E I ,3ryg f p fEAz.T IST STAGE jl gggg EIGE PRESSURE SEAL G _- noTATInc i J Mi SEAL te i RZhg ) k SECONDAM I 2150 PSI 1 ' l STAcIwo rzow gl I I APPROE 1 gPM e FUMP END Figure 26 A Typisal 3 Stage Byrva Jaaksen Arrassement (with a 4th Taper Stage) CePyright 1983. Elastric Power Basearch fastitute. EFRI SP-2945 T2, Main Coelane Pump Shaf t Seal Guide 11aar[- Telee 21 i Oserational Guidelines. Espriated with permisstes. 4
e i ~ . AECL-MISC-305 B ~ E ranP.suArt No. 3 sEAI. LEAKorf 100,CC,/ER 0-2 _.s 1. U 3 j no. 2 SEAL i* e' 0E On 3 QR g 3gURZ e ,I 10 PSI I J EYDRODYNAMIC l j. sEAz. L o u _,_ i a. 6 e c a 1 I g g 2No STAGE i NO. 1 SEAL gglm PREssoRE g s LEAKOFF 3,CP,M EYDRoDYNAMIC 30 PSI t j != } l ( ? l ( >' I i j 4 i e. I 7 I isT STAGE
- TATItatARY EIGE PRES 5URE me. I sEAz.
/ szAL mmo uroRosTATIC ga l 2 asPAss (WomeALLY CZosto) LI A 1 mo'tATras a% coz.z.Am 1 \\ h C e w 3 CPM 're wo.,1, SEAL J 2150 PSI 0 runt suo Fisure 27 A >$tage tytrid tydreetatic seal Arransement L Copyright 1983. Elastria Power Researsk Institute. +r IFEI P 2963 72, Main Caelmat Pies Shaf t Seal Guide 14==s - Val-2 Geeratismal Gaidain--. Sapriated witt permissies. l i
a i t j 4 1 h j e P, 3 ll ls 1 = .= P u h I 1 = l NYDRAtRK ROTATelG R9Ei l a i no5 sri l NYDRAtA.E / J I! FORE J OPEIENG fI i f {[ AX1AL FORES i 7 l = ,/[ ELASTODElt an=, </,,Pirl SEAL = i /gf STATIONARY RelG j FRETIDNAL OPEIGIG FORg i i /3 ~ = j IAXIAL DRAGI / l 3 r [ 's r ( P-7' _ s,* l SHAFT BAtt I PRE 55 tale l l1 l l Z ..' k .,( j" Carve I represente large gap width, h, relative to raning, e. Resnit Seal faces will close sentit matel forces became balanced. h eg coer.e, re,re.ent. eleel s.nndit ., h ~.. a l-1 ',A Renselt : Seal to balanced and etable at thle man width. Caerve 1 re presents small amp wideh, h. relat twe to canina. e. aceset t : Seal facce will onen eentil malat forces hecease balanced. S l, i Figure 28 All Liquid Flow Through Nydrostatic Seal with Coning Showing Axial Forces Acting on the Rotating Ring. Cap Width, h has been Creatly Exagerated I Y t t i t
~...... ..... ~. e 3 AECIA CSC;305 .= I ew3 e. E i b e 7 4 \\ ~ C i SA21m&2ED W IID SAftmATED LIII. TAPOR 02 STER
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Entropy F1aure 19 & Poseable Trajestery is the Temperature - Entropy Fame y for Flow Through a Seal (met to seals). The Fluid Esserg.. j l as a Subseeled Liquid (point a) and Emits as a itse h 1 Mistwo (point b) or,as Superheated v (peist a) i 1 )
) l ii8 -n-m..uncy p IE l y: 123 - :2 1 lu gijs a i i !!! si issIas]-
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s f 73 - Arct-Mrsc-305 l I ( s 4 i GAP W)DTH (in.) .00004 .0004 .064 .040 A500 l c i i i. i>>l ,. > a ii> r -- 4 . r ' a i e -* 1riss _g i J J e ( 0 RPM \\ i ~ I E l ~ 4000 - 900 ~ s ~ SEAL ENTRANCE CON 0lTIONS: ~ WATER (SAT.) 645 psia, 495'F SEAL EXIT: ATMO5PHERE FACE AREA = 1735 in.2 INNER RADIUS = 1693 in. OUTER RADIUS = 18481n. 3g0 i 3500 ,3 10 1 10 10 10 l 2 1 g GAP WIDTH $m) i Flaure 31: Eydraulic Opening Forca Versua Cap Vidth for Turbulent Adiabatic Espansion Between Parallel races \\ o s l 1 l i W t. s
=<_ m.m - - _ \\ AECL-H21C-305 ) 15 0 0 - --- - -- - - - - -- - - - - -- j ] l - -\\ I 1 i N 1 i g A I N g i g ] \\ \\ F \\ l \\ I 1G00 \\ l l i 1 \\ \\ g 't i N L h .) { \\ c ~IARGE' GAP m = 51 W .T t. \\- h = 0.06366 in. 750 q +-- -= ~5Mauf GAP,h a 0.000354 Jn, s & = 123 x 164 lbm/s.in I' g. LEAK RATE PfR UNii $READTH, I A n 12.1 x 104 tha/ gm \\ ~ g \\ i \\ \\ l . sos. 1 AT h l- \\ g I \\ i i -- e _t 1 'j _ 3.< o e.s to q NORMAUZED POSm0N ALONG 5F.AL GAP j rieur mi n....r. netti eg aduwuc agm.t=.t sAgv4 w s.r a Free ic47 peia 311 Y sc assesphere Through a Pata11.! S'ded 4 Sap of flow Length 0.16 ta. (Unit Breadth. Vidth. k)' i 1
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==='**** a.* aer,_mer we ......m..... .....u..c - Reactor Coolant Pump Shaft Seal Behavior During ~ 3Catf on Blackout i I April 1985 = i 't17"rles A. Kittinert Ron G. Wensel; David B. Rhodes l Aay Metcalfe; Briac M. Coinam; Henry Gentili; APg g I9g Walter J. Mengs J .r v, Atomic Energy of Canade Limited Research Company Chalk River Nuclear Laboratories A6322--Environmental and Chalk River. Ontario Oynamic Qualification Prog - Canada K0J IJO
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. r. - 4 EG6G Idaho Inc. { Idaho Falls. Idaho 83415 ,.,rsarapas l ...,........r = 4 ( ABSTRACT
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b A testing program designed to provide fundamentallaformation pertshing to the behavior of rear. tor coolant pump (RCP) shaft seals during a postulated nuclear power plant station blackout has been cornpleted. The test plan was developed by i EG,LG Idaho personnel at the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory (INEL) and performed at the Chalk River Nuclear Laboratory. Ontario. Canada, under auspices of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). l One seal assembly, utilising both hydrodynamic and hydrostatic types of seals, was esodeled and tested. Extrunon tests were conducted to determine if seal materials i could withstand predicted temperatures and p.itaures. A taper face seal model was a tested for semi stabilsty utder conditions when leaking water flashes to steam across 2' the seal face. Tot information was then used as the basis for a stauon blackout analysis. l Test results indicate a potential problem with an elastomer insterial used for 0 rings 0 by a pump vendor: that vendor is considering a change in material specification. Test " Tier: results also ladicate a need for further research on the sawric issue of RCP nealin. testify and lu possible conuderation for designation as an unresolved safety issue. h
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{ ( UenTE3 STATES i e NUCLEAR RESULATCTN COMMISSION l eAsmweTow, s. c.nosu s g g4 W NENORANDUM FOR: Hugh L. Thompson, Director Division of Licensing FRON: James P. Knight, Acting Director Division of Engineering }
SUBJECT:
80ARD NOTIFICATION REGARDlWG REPORT ON REACTOR i COOLANT PUNP SNAFT SEAL BEHAVIOR DUR R G $7ATION 8 TACK 0UT (APRIL 1985 NUREG/CR-4077)
References:
O Memo from D. Eisenhut to the Cornission dated i September 21, 1983, Board Notification Renarding i Westinghouse Aeactor Coolant Pump Seals (3N-83-129)
- 2) Memo from4. Eisenhut to the Conscission dated i
April 19,1984, Board Motification Regarding WestinghousaReactorCoolantPumpSeaLs(BN-84076) l
- 3) Memo from D. Eisenhut to the Comission dated June 29, 1984 Board Notification Regarding Westinghouse Reactor Coolant Pump Seals (BN-84-123)
Board Notification 8N-84-076 made the boards aware of the l reactor coolant pump (RCP) seal test program at Atomic Energy of Canada limited (AECL) and the preliminary test results which indicated failures of i certain secondary seal materials at conditions which could be expected to occur ) during extended station blackout. Board notifications BM-83-139 regardfr.g results from a Westinghouse test program and 8N-84-123 regarding French RCP seal testin, provided infor1 nation frees other sources regarding possible L reactor coo ant pump seal failures, i The RCP seal test program at AECL is now complete and the final results have been published in NUREG/CR.407/, Reactor Coolant Pump Shaft Seal Behavior During Station Blackout, dated April 1985. The report sug3ests several failure modes which could result in large leakage through RCP seelt during l extended station blackout. The report gives detailed infomation on the test program and the implications of the results, including identification of secondary seals in present use which may be likely to fail in a staticn a blackout. '}
Contact:
J. Jackson Ext. 27930 s, 7.. .y 1 i ! r,I s n r. 1 g .-ro-' I ~ o ._s,_; e,m-, e-- w- . A me. ;.. s. ----"----% e- ,e e, egy,._., - %
~ - O <pd> r b SY24198$ Hugh L. Thcmpson -?- T.5e West'nghouse Owners Group (WOG) has ackr.owledged the possible failure. of a secondary 0-ring seal paterial (Parker E515-80) used in Nestirw; house RCP -seal assemblies and has ctoitted to the replacemert of the 0 ri g used in the RCPs of Westinghouse plants, This c:xmitmert is cutlined in a - n s presently letter January (OG 142) from J. J. Shepperd. Chairman of NOG, to Harold Denton s 3, 1984. t We reconnend board notification of this additioul informaton as it rela to the previous referenced board notifications and industry wide notification through an IE bulletin or information notices. i h /i-es P. Knig t. Actitig Director s ivision or Ecgineering
Contact:
J. Jackson s ExC. 27930 Inciosures: I, WREG/CR-4077 2. WOG Letter 06-142 l, l* 1 F
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