ML20137S038
| ML20137S038 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Trojan File:Portland General Electric icon.png |
| Issue date: | 01/24/1986 |
| From: | Dodds R, Kellund G, Richards S NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20137S025 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-344-85-39, NUDOCS 8602130559 | |
| Download: ML20137S038 (10) | |
See also: IR 05000344/1985039
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U.S.NUCLEARREGULATORYCbMMISSION
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. Report No'. 05' -34'4/85-39
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Docket No.'50-344'
License No. NPF-1
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Licensee:
Portland General Electric Company
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c121 S. W. Salmon Street
Portland, Oregcn 97204
Facility Name: .Troj an
Inspection at: Rainier, Oregon
^ Inspection conduct
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January 3, 1986-
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Inspectors:
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. A. Ridtard5 -
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. Kellund '
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T. Dddds{ Chief ~
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' Approved By:
Dateisiigned
eactor Projects Section 1
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, Summary:
Inspection _on November 17, 1985 - January 3, 1986 (Report 50-344/85-39)
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Areas Inspected: Routine inspection of operational safety verification,
corrective action,-maintenance, surveillance, followup on a reported potential
act of sabotage, review of modification testing, and inspection of various
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aspects.of. plant operation. The inspection involved 212 inspector-hours by
the NRC Resident Inspectors. 35 hours4.050926e-4 days <br />0.00972 hours <br />5.787037e-5 weeks <br />1.33175e-5 months <br /> of'insp'ection were during back shift
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hours.
Inspection procedures 30703, 40700, 61726, 62703, 71707, 71710, 72701,
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93702 and 94703 were used as guidance during the conduct of the inspection.
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Results: No violations or deviations were identified.
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J 1. . ' Persons' Contacted
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0rser,IPlantU General: Manager ~
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~ 1*R.P..Schmitt',9 Manager, Operations and Maintenance
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1*D.R.^Keuter,1 Manager, Technical Services ,
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"J.D. Reid, Manager,.. Plant. Services.
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R.E. Susee, Operations. Supervisor: .
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'1D.W? Swan ~(Maintenance Supervisor
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i A.~S( Cohlmeyer, Engineering. Supervisor
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JG.L; Rich, Chemistry. Supervisor.
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7T.0. Meek, Radiation' Protection Supervisor
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1 ?S.B. Nichols,; Training Supervisor
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- %D.L'.-Bennett,ControlandElectricalSupervisor
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lM.R.~ Snook,fActing Quality Assurance Supervisor ~
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-R.W.:-Ritschard, Se.curity: Supervisor..
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. .H.E.'Ro~senbach,. Material Control. Supervisor ~
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- J.K.~ Aldersebaes, Manager, Nuclear Maint. and Construction
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.The. inspectors also' interviewed :and talked with other licensee employees-
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during~the' course of the inspection. }These included-shift supervisors,
reactor and auxiliary operators,Jaaintenance personnel,' plant; technicians
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and engineers,'and quality assurance personnel'.
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2 ? Operational Safety Verification.
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.During this inspection. period,tthe' inspectors-bbseived and examined-
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cactivities.to verify the operational; safety.of theylicens'e'sffacility.
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daily, weekly,' or biweekly basis.
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_. - ~(The observations'and examination's of those, activities were conducted on a.
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On'a daily basis, the inspectors: observed control room activities to
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. verify the' licensee's adherence to? limiting' conditions for operations as. ^
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' prescribed in'the. facility technical' specifications.+ Logs,
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' instrumentation,' recorder traces, and other operational' records were--
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examined to obtain-informatiion on plant, conditions, trends, and
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compliance with regulations.
On occasions when asshift turnover was.in
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progress,-theiturnover of information on plant status was1 observed to
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qdetermine tha't all; pertinent information,was relayed to the_onroming
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- shift.
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.During'each week, the inspectors toured the, accessible' areas of the
. facility to observe the.following items:
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' Maintenance reqiests and repairs'.
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General' plant and.equipmentcconditions.
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Fire hazards and fire fighting equipment.
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d I Ignition sources'and flammable material control,.
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Conduct of activities in accordance with the licensee's
administrative controls and approved procedures.
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Interiors of electrical and control panels.
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Implementation of the licensee's physical security plan.
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Radiation protection controls.
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Plant housekeeping and cleanliness.
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Radioactive waste systems.
The licensee's equipment clearance control was examined weekly by the
inspectors to determine that the licensee complied with technical
specification limiting conditions for operation with respect to removal
of equipment from service. Active clearances were spot-checked to ensure
that their issuance was. consistent with plant status and maintenance
evolutions.
During each week, the inspectors conversed with operators in the control
room, and with other plant personnel. The discussions cent'ered on
pertinent topics . relating to general plant conditions, procedures,
security, training, and other topics aligned with the work activities
involved.
The inspectors examined the-licensee's nonconformance reports (NCR) to
confirm that deficiencies were identified and tracked by the system.
Identified nonconformances were being. tracked and followed to the
completion of corrective action. NCRs reviewed during this inspection
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period included P85-40, P85-47, and'P85-63.
Logs of jumpers, bypasses, caution, and test tags were examined by the
inspectors.
Implementation of radiation protection cot trols was verified
by observing portions of area surveys being performed, when possible, and-
by examining radiation work permits currently in effect to see that
prescribed clothing and instrumentation were available and used.
Radiation protection instruments were also examined to. verify operability
and calibration status.
The inspectors verified.the operability of selected engineered safety
features. This was done by direct visual verification of the correct
position of valves, availability of power, cooling' water supply, system
integrity and general condition of equipment, as applicable. ESF systems
verified operable during this inspection period included the spent fuel
pool cooling system, diesel fuel oil system, containment spray system,
the auxiliary feedwater system, and the safety injection system.
No violations or deviations were identified.
3.
Corrective Action
The inspectors performed a general review of the licensee's problem
identification systems to verify that licensee identified quality related
deficiencies are being tracked and reported to cognizant management for
resolution. Types of records examined by the inspectors included
Requests for Evaluation, Event Reports, Plant Review Board meeting
minutes, and Quality Assurance Program Nonconformance Reports. The
inspectors concluded that the licensee's systems were being utilized to
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correct identified deficiencies. Plant Review Board meetings were
attended by the inspectors on December 11 and January 2.
The inspectors
verified that the appropriate committee members were present at the
meeting and that the meeting was conducted in accordance with the
requirements of section 6.5.1 of the facility technical specifications.
No violations or deviations were identified.
4.
Maintenance
A maintenance activity observed during this inspection period was the
calibration of the internal drawer modules of the N41 channel of the
power range nuclear instrumentation on December 19.
During this
activity, the inspectors verified that the personnel performing the
activity were qualified, that the appropriate procedure was followed, and
that the equipment was removed from and restored to service in a manner
allowed by the technical specifications. The inspector also verified
that the appropriate administrative procedures were followed in
conducting the calibration, The inspectors also observed that the test
equipment was indicated to be in calibration and data were properly
recorded by the technicians when required by procedure.
No violations or deviations were identified.
5.
Surveillance
The surveillance testing of safety-related systems was witnessed by the
inspectors. Observations by the inspectors included verification that
proper procedures were used, test instrumentation was calibrated and that
the system or component being tested was properly removed from service if
required by the test procedure. Following completion of the surveillance
tests, the inspectors verified that the test results met the acceptance
criteria of the technical specifications and were reviewed by cognizant
licensee personnel. No corrective action was required due to the test
results. The systems were returned an operable status consistent with
the technical specification requirements following the completion of the
test. . Surveillance tests witnessed during the inspection period were
associated with a full' core flux map on December 5, safety injection pump
inservice testing on December 18, and incore/excore nuclear
instrumentation calibration on January 3.
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No violations or. deviations were identified.
6.
-Modification Testing
The inspectors reviewed the documentation of testing performed for four-
modifications which were implemented during- the 1985 outage. The
modifications, designated by the licensee as Requests for Design Change
(RDC), are as follows:
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RDC 83-042, which implemented shunt trip attachments on the reactor
trip breakers.
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RDC 83-051, which modified the function of the boron injection tank
such that heat tracing and recirculation of the tank contents is no
longer required.
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-RDC 83-054, which installed environmentally qualified electrical
connections on the reactor head vent valves and the hydrogen.
analyzer containment isolation valves.
RDC 83-059, which replaced the limit switches on two chilled water
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containment isolation valves with environmentally qualified
switches.
The inspectors verified that the testing conducted checked the
modification for proper operation and that the completed test results
were properly reviewed and filed for document retention. The inspectors
concluded that the testing for the four modifications reviewed was
adequate. The inspectors did observe that testing requirements for
modifications are not always clearly stated in the modification packages.
This concern was previously noted by the licensee's q:ality assurance
organization and is being acted on by the licensee.
No violations or deviations were identified.
7.
Technical Review Meeting
As discussed in inspection report 85-21, the number of engineering
discrepancies noted during the past 18 months had caused the inspectors
to question the adequacy of licensee's reviews of technical work. On
December 13, 1985, the licensee met with several representatives of the
NRC, at the licensee's corporate office, to discuss actions underway to
improve their performance in this area. These actions are summarized as
follows:
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Additional resources are being provided to the nuclear division.
Twenty-nine new positions have been approved for 1986 and 42
temporary or contract positions will be made permanent.
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Design change and calculational procedures have been or are being
revised to eliminate the source of past errors.
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Programs are underway to update and reverify vendor manuals and
electrical vendor drawings.
Specific problem areas, such as safety related tank volumes being in
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error, are receiving detailed engineering reviews.
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The licensee's management has initiated several actions to more
closely control and monitor activities in this area.
The NRC representatives discussed the importance of ensuring that strong
. independent technical reviews are being performed by personnel in the
nuclear division. They also stressed-the need for management to
encourage a questioning attitude in their personnel and to reinforce that
atmosphere by frequent personal contact with workers at the site. The
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NRC' representatives concluded that-the actions taken by the licensee are
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a positive step towards minimizing errors in technical work.
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No violations or deviations were identified.
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Shift Crew Manning
The inspectors. reviewed the information associated with the Possible-
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Reportable Occurrence (PRO) report dated June 25, 1985. This PRO
. concerns potentially inadequate shift crew manning on the day shift of
June 25, 1985. On this date, the plant was in Mode 5 and in a solid
plant condition. Technical Specification 6.2.2 and Administrative Orders
11-4, 3-1 and 3-8 require a minimum shift crew of six operators in Mode 5.
In addition, Administrative Order 3-8 requires that during solid plant
operations, one operator will monitor RCS' parameters and have no other
' concurrent duties.
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The inspectors discussed this event with the initiator of'the, PRO and
with the Operations Planner / Scheduler.
Based on these discussions and
review of the associated ~ records, the inspectors determined that th'e
' shift was adequately manned. (The inspectors did, however, question the
lack of firm criteria for determining the -availability of fire. brigade
members for response-to a fire. -In this, instance, one of.the fire
. brigade members was inside the- containment building for a portion of the
shift, and his ability to respond to a fire in the uncontrolled areas of
the plantL in a timely manner 1was~ in ' question. The. Operations
. Planner / Scheduler agreed to investigate this_ issue to determine if
additional guidance on7 fire brigade member availability is necessary._
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This issue will be followed up in a future inspection (344/85-39-01).
9.
Potential Sabotage Event
On December 9, 1985, while in the process of performing a semi-annual
preventative maintenance inspection on the
'A' emergency diesel generator
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(EDG), a licensee mechanic discovered an 8 ounce ball peen hammer under a
rocker-arm cover on the east unit of the EDG. The engine was operating
at_the time and the worker immediately removed the hammer from the
engine. The hammer had not caused'any-damage to the engine.
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location was such that the probability for damage to occur should the
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hammer have shifted its position due - to engine vibration appeared very
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Iow. The licensee initially thought that the hammer had been
inadvertently left in the engine by a maintenance worker, however, a
review of maintenance records indicated that during the time frame in
question, no work had been performed on the engine which~could account
.for the hammer. Because the licensee was unable to determine how the
hammer ~came to be placed in the engine, tLe licensee reported.the event
to.the NRC and the FBI as a potential act of sabotage.
A special agent from the Portland office of the FBI commenced an
investigation into the circumstances surrounding this event. The.
licensee initiated action to survey the plant for other evidence of
tampering. These actions included detailed visual examinations of
electrical panels, rotating equipment, and other selected vital
' equipment; sampling of oil from selected safety equipment; a -visual
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examination of the 'B' EDG rocker arm assemblies; extensive plant wide
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tours by operations personnel looking for out-of-normal conditions; and
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verification of the locked valves in the EDG and auxiliary feedwater
systems. No other evidence of tampering was found.
The inspectors reviewed the licensee's actions with plant management and
clcsely .followed the licensee's efforts to survey the plant. The
inspectors also independently reviewed maintenance records associated
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with the EDG. The Plant Review Board (PRB) met and discussed the event
and the actions'being taken. Because no further evidence of tampering
was found, the PRB recommended to plant management that no further action
be taken pending the completion of the FBI investigation. At the
conclusion of the inspection period, the FBI investigation remained open.
The licensee's security organization is also reviewing this event. The
inspectors concluded that the licensee response to this event, to date,
has been appropriate. Licensee management stated that the resident
inspectors will be kept informed of any further developments.
No violations or deviations were identified.
10.
Miscellaneous Observations
During a routine control room tour, the inspectors noted that component
ceoitng enter (CCW) flow had been secured to the B-2 and B-3 containment
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. air coolers (CAC) in an effort to increase CCW flow to the excess letdown
heat exchanger, which was then in service. The inspectors questioned
whether the operability of the CACs was affected by this condition,
however, the control operator indicated that the CACs could still be
considered operable.with CCW flow secured. After a review of technical
specification requirements, the personnel on shift agreed that CCW flow
to the CACs was required to consider them operable. A technical
specification violation did not occur due to the short period;of time
that the system was in this condition. Based on discussions with other
operations personnel, the inspectors concluded that this was an isolated
weakness in'the individual operator's knowledge. The inspectors
discussed this occurrence with the plant general manager.
Because of the recent removal of the boron injection tank from the
service for which it was originally designed, valves MO 8803 A/B have
been placed in the open position with power to the valve operators
removed. This also deactivated the valve position indication in the
control room. -These valves are in the direct flow path of the high
pressure injection pumps and as presently aligned are basically manual
valves. The inspectors questioned whether they should be designated as
locked valves. The licensee is considering this concern.
-The licensee has continued to experience an increasing primary to
secondary leak in the 'C'
steam generator. At the close of the
inspection period, the leak rate was approximately 140 gallons per day.
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The licensee has taken action to increase health physics monitoring of
secondary plant systems.
The inspectors will follow the licensee's
actions to monitor the leak closely.
.No. violations or deviations were identified.
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11.
Inservice Testing of Snubbers
The.results of the licensee's inservice testing of snubbers in
conformance to technical specification requirements during the 1985
refueling outage was examined by a review of test and maintenance data
and discussions with responsible engineers. The testing was performed
pursuant to procedure number 0816N.0185, Snubber Inservice Test Program.
All changes to test acceptance criteria and/or deviations had been
properly reviewed and approved by the Plant Review Board and the General
Manager.
The licensee determined that a high percentage of PSA-1/4 and PSA-1/2
mechanical snubbers manufactured by Pacific Scientific were inoperable.
The cause of these failures has not yet been determined. Additionally,
hydraulic snubbers manufactured by both Anker-Holth and Bergen-Paterson
were found significantly degraded, primarily due to deteriorated seals.
The inoperable mechanical snubbers were replaced with operable mechanical
snubbers, and the hydraulic snubbers were rebuilt and retested
satisfactorily.
All of the mechanical pipe snubbers at Trojan were manufactured by
Pacific Scientific. An initial sample of 10 percent of each type of
mechanical snubber ranging from PSA-1/4 to PSA-35 was tested. Each
snubber was evaluated for operability based on predetermined acceptance
criteria established for Trojan on the basis of manufacturer's acceptance
criteria and generalized stress analyses. Each snubber which failed the
predetermined acceptance criteria was declared inoperable and an
additional 10 percent of that type of snubber was tested. As a result of
high failure rates, 100 percent of the PSA-1/4s and PSA-1/2s were
functionally tested. The following table displays for each type of
mechanical snubber, the number tested, the percent of the total of that
type which were tested, and the number of failures. Several snubbers
which did not meet the predetermined acceptance criteria were later
declared operable when a specific stress analysis for the particular
installation was performed. The table represents the final failure
total.
Snubber Type
No. Tested
Percent of Total
No. of Failures
PSA-1/4
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100
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PSA-1/2
74
100
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PSA-1
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20
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PSA-3
11
10
0
PSA-10
10
10
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PSA-35
2
10
0
The cause of some of the failures (22) was attributed to exceeding the
5 percent drag force criterion. The failure mechanisms for the snubbers
was still being evaluated by the licensee and the manufacturer.
There are four 900-kip, Anker-Holth hydraulic snubbers installed on each
of Trojan's four steam generators. -During the 1985 refueling outage, all
16 snubbers were visually inspected with no significant discrepancies
noted. Paul-Munroe Incorporated, was contracted to perform the
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functional testing of these-snubbers. The first two snubbers tested
(from.the D steam generator) would not respond under a 100-kip load. The.
snubbers appeared to be locked in a cold position (i.e., fully
compressed). As a result of these test failures, and in light of the
uncertainty.regarding the time required to rebuild the snubbers, a
' decision was made to assume all the steam generator snubbers were
inoperable, and not perform any further testing. The snubbers were then
removed and overhauled by Paul-Munroe. During the overhaul of the
snubbers, marks were found on the cylinder walls indicating the snubbers
had been moving. The snubber seals were found to be degraded and the
hydraulic fluid was heavily contaminated with seal material and rust.
Paul-Munroe was of the opinion that the foreign material in the hydraulic
fluid would not have affected the normal operation of the snubbers
because of the relatively large channels through which the fluid would
normally flow.
In the case of a seismic or other severe dynamic event,
it was determined the snubbers would have locked up but that the foreign
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material could have blocked the bleed orifice, thereby preventing the
snubber from unlocking. There have been no seismic or other severe
dynamic events at Trojan which would have caused the snubbers to lock up.
This was further evidenced by the fact the seals showed no signs (e.g. ,
extrusion) of having been under a large load.
Following overhaul, the snubbers were retested using the criteria in
Section 5.4.12.1.7 of the Trojan Updated' Final Safety Analysis Report;
-namely the snubbers maximum drag force is 1,000 lbs. at a minimum
displacement rate of 25 mil / min. The snubbers could not satisfy these
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criteria. Each time the snubber. velocity approached 25 mil / min., the
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snubber locked up.
Through correspondence with Westinghouse (the NSSS),
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the acceptance criteria were revised to a minimum displacement rate of
7.6 mil / min with a maximum drag force of 5,000 lbs. The snubbers tested
satisfactorily with these criteria.
There are four hydraulic pipe. snubbers installed on safety-related piping
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at Trojan. These snubbers were manufactured by Bergen-Paterson, and are
installed'on the four main steam lines inside Containment. The snubbers
installed on the A and B main steam lines are rated at 130 kip, and those
installed on the C and D main steam lines are rated.at 70 kip. Each of
these snubbers was visually inspected and functionally tested.
Due to the problems encountered during the functional testing of the
first two steam generator hydraulic snubbers, all four main steam line
snubbers were declared inoperable and sent offsite to be rebuilt before
being tested. Two were found to have physical defects which would have
presented them from performing their intended function. One snubber had
a damaged reservoir, which was found by visual inspection. The second
snubber had a compression side poppet and spring installed backwards and
would only have been able to carry load in the tension direction. The
seals in all of the snubbers were found degraded. This degradation alone
would not have caused the snubbers to restrict thermal growth, but would
have affected the capability of the snubbers under severe dynamic or
seismic events. Following overhaul, the snubbers tested satisfactorily.
At the time of the inspection the licensee was still evaluating the
effects of the failed snubbers on system components. The analysis had-
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apparently only been underway for about a month and appeared to have been
prompted by an inquiry from plant engineering to downtown engineering.
The need to~ perform this analysis required by the technical
specifications had not been identified as an open item on any of-the
licensee's tracking systems. The results of the licensee's investigation
will be furnished to the NRC as a special report, according to the
licensee.
Preliminary analysis indicated that the piping had not been affected by
the failed mechanical snubbers.
As a separate issue, the licensee has been meritoring unusual pipe
movements of the pressurizer surge line since 1982. A walkdown of this
line at the beginning of the 1985 refueling outage revealed additional
. movement had occurred. A consultant was hired to evaluate and analyze
the movements of the. pressurizer surge.line. The consultant analyzed
various potential causes of the observed movement.
It was determined
that none of the potential causes, either alone or combined, could have
produced the forces required to ' result in the observed movement.' The
consultant was advised that some problems.had been encountered in testing
the steam generator snubbers. The licensee directed the consultant to
analyze the surge line movements using the. worst-case assumption that the
snubbers may have been locked. The preliminary analyses, which were
completed in November 1985, revealed that locked-up snubbers could have
produced the movement necessary to displace the surge line as observed.
Based on this finding, further worst-case analyses of reactor coolant
loop thermal expansion with locked-up snubbers was to be performed to
' demonstrate the structural integrity of the Reactor Coolant System (RCS),
and its associated supports. The analyses was to be performed under the
rules of Subsection NB-3600 of'Section III of the ASME Boiler and
Pressure-Vessel Code. The licensee subsequently stated that the
worst-case analysis was on the B reactor coolant loop and revealed the
stress at the elbow where the B RCS hot leg enters the B steam generator
would be in excess of the yield stress for the material. Subsequently, a
plastic analysis was performed for this elbow in accordance with
Subsection NB-3228 of Section III, with strain acceptance criteria as
specified in Appendix T of Code Case N47. This' analysis revealed the
strain in the elbow due to thermal expansion loads would be less than the
one percent limit specified in Appendix T of Code Case N47. The fatigue
usage factor was determined to be less than 0.1 based on 30
heatup/cooldown cycles.
This work will be followed up as open item 85-39-02.
11.
Exit Interview
The inspectors met with the plant general manager and members of his
l
staff at the conclusion of the inspection period. During this meeting,
,
the inspectors summarized the scope and findings of the inspection.
,