ML20137K000
| ML20137K000 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 09/16/1994 |
| From: | Armenta J NRC OFFICE OF INVESTIGATIONS (OI) |
| To: | NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV) |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20137J811 | List: |
| References | |
| FOIA-96-434 NUDOCS 9704040206 | |
| Download: ML20137K000 (6) | |
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i i j September 16, 1994
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) MEMORANDUM FOR: File (Case No. 4-94-010)
FROM: Jonathan Armenta, Jr., Investigator Office of Investigations Field Office, Region IV i
SUBJECT:
OPINION FROM THE RIV 0FFICE OF GENERAL COUNSEL, i
REGARDING TWO SEPARATE ISSUES:
(1) ALLEGATION OF HARASSMENT AND INTIMIDATION, i (2) ALLEGATION OF DISCRIMINATION l 4 On September 16, 1994, I vis;ted with Bill Crown, RIV OGC and discussed the i i
following allegations that were brought to the attention of our office. These l i two issues concerning matters in the above case file have surfaced in the i
- preliminary investigative effort conducted on or about August 25, 1994. !
1 j RE: (1) It is suggested that the alleger be informed of his rights with regard to the Department of Labor.
The reasons outlined by SAWYER in his complaint to Public Service I 4
Company do not moet the criteria of Section 211 or 50.7. !
It does not appear that SAWYER was engaged in protected activity at the time he was interviewed by members of the Stier, Anderson &
i Malone investigative team, since he was on administrative leave at l 4 the time and he voluntarily submitted to be interrogated; further it I does not appear that the investigative team precluded or interfered 2
with any of SAWYERS job related responsibilities or efforts.
i It appears there is not enough to' merit an investigation by the NRC 4
or at the minimum, expand further investigative efforts.
4 RE: (2) There appears to be sufficient basis for expanded investigative l efforts to determine validity of the discrimination allegation.
I On the surface, it appears like there could be something. The mere
- fact that CARRILLO mentioned something to this effect in the initial interview on March 7,1994, only to refuse to talk about it because he feared for his job.
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i It appears there may be some validity to his claim of discrimination
- allegation if in fact PSC has named his replacement (with someone who is not qualified to do the work and that CARRILLO is having to train) even before he is terminated.
It appears the NRC would have to prove that Public Service Company transferred CARRILLO from QA to engineering because PSC did not want CARRILLO to find anymore possible violation of procedure.
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97o4040206 970331 /
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DATE: April 17,1995 )
TO: Mary Fisher, PSC FROM: Bill Hug,- MK-Ferguson h j As a result of Mr. Armenta's visit during the week of April 6,1995 you requested that MK j prepare a summary of the steps MK has taken and efforts MK has participated in to improve '
conditions and attitudes at the Fort St. Vrain Project.
It was our understanding that the NRC's initial visit to the Fort St. Vrain Project in early 1994 was directed at the layoffs of four workers that occurred in April of 1993. The four layoffs were being scrutinized to ascertain if those workers' expression of skfety concerns contributed to the layoff decision. In that early 1994 visit the NRC's representative Conathan Armenta) also expressed his intention to assess the project for evidence of a " chilled" atmosphere.
Coincidental to that visit, strained relations between the operations and radiation protection groups at the Fort St. Vrain Project became evident. It was the strained relations that set in motion a series of voluntary investigations and management evaluations. It was during the voluntary investigations that irregularities in the documentation of radiation ~ surveys were identified.
As a result of the investigations and management evaluations MK is acutely aware of the heightened sensitivity required to promote the free expression of safety concerns by NRC licensee personnel. MK would like to take this opportunity to outline the types ofinvestigations, work groups, and presentations MK has participated in, and other steps MK has taken to address and improve conditions and attitudes at Fort St. Vain project. Our clarification and enhancement of existing project policies and procedures evidences MK's heightened sensitivity to the need for free expression of safety concerns.
Project hekground To be successful as an engineering and construction firm MK must be sensitive to safety and labor issues on both a project and company-wide basis. This sensitivity is evident from the outstanding safety record and congenial labor relations MK has maintained throughout the Fort St. Vrain decommissioning, and at other projects on a national and international basis.
Regardless, over the last few years employee harassment and intimidation related to the expression of safety concerns has seen increasing attention by the NRC. In fact, the NRC's Review Team Report " Reassessment of the NRC's Program for Protecting Allegers Against Retaliation" was issued almost simultaneous to Mr. Armenta's first visit and some ten months after the layoffs.
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Like NRC, since the April 1993 layoffs MK has been challenged to elevate our level of sensitivity to reflect the revised NRC policy in dealings with the temporary union labor at the Font St. Vrain Project. MK consistently took a construction perspective to staffing the project.
By establishing a sound relationship with the unions, MK has had access to a pool of temporary labor to draw upon as project needs dictate. With that temporary employment relationship there was no commitment to long-term employment. An unfortunate attribute of the decommissioning is that layoffs were and are anticipated throughout the project.
As it turned out, the duration of the fear laborers' assignment to Fort St. Vrain was predetermined by the task assignment that occurred many months before the layoffs. Ironically, it was that task assignment that also " connected" the four laborers to the task-specific safety concerns they expressed.
MK Onen Door Policy Throughout the Fort St. Vrain project MK has recognized the importance of employee input to the identification and resolution of safety concerns. A component of MK's policy to encourage expression of safety concerns was the "open door" policy. The open door policy was intended to ensure that labor had access to more senior management for review and resolution of safety concerns that labor believed were inadequately addressed at lower management levels. At all times, employees have numerous avenues in the work place to express safety concerns. The avenues include the union foreman, the shop steward, and the safety supervisors.
In addition, weekly safety meetings were held in a very relaxed open forum which allowed numerous safety concerns to surface, be communicated to management, and resolved. It was the expression of and handling of the many safety concerns in that open and relaxed forum that contributed to the project's excellent safety record.
When the four laborers had premium pay and safety concerns about the number of persons manning the core drills they decided to bring those concerns to upper management. Mr.
Herrerra was and is a union member and acts as general foreman in the project organization.
Mr. Herrerra is a highly principled individual with very strong work place ethics. As a result, Mr. Herrerra reacted strongly when labor under his direction appeared to usurp the chain of command by approaching upper management.
Clearly the MK open door policy had been communicated to labor, and the four laborers had recourse and elected to express their safety concerns. Although MK was sensitive to need for open expression, the reaction of Mr. Herrerra indicated a need to clarify the open door policy and it's impfementation to both management and labor.
Responses i i
Nearly a year elapsed from the layoffs of the four laborers to the time MK became aware of a need for heightened sensitivity to the expression of safety concerns. During the remainder of 1993, numerous safety concerns were raised by employees and addressed, and layoffs occurred without additional claims of adverse employee action.
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Shortly after the in'vestigation of H&I began in early 1994, the Westinghouse Team (WT), of which MK is a inember, developed an action plan to meet with all on-site personnel and to hold round table discussions with management personnel. Feedback from the meetings reveal d prevalent misconceptions about program and management philosophy. In response, PSC met with the WT and suggested that a third party investigation be undertaken. MK responded favorably and provided complete cooperation.
Subsequently on March 10, PSC and WT management held project wide meetings to emphasize management values, philosophy, and project expectations. This meeting was followed on March 31, with a meeting of PSC, Westinghouse, MKF and SEG senior executives and project management to discuss core values and re-emphasize on site management responsibilities and expectations.
Following the executive meeting the WT and MK immediately undertook a variety of steps to ensure the free expression of safety concerns at the site. In summary MK:
e participated in safety team walk downs composed of management, radiation protection technicians, craft personnel and safety personnel; e ensured an understanding of the open door policy, and improved the feedback essential to that policy through tool box sessions, job briefings, meetings with union representatives, and better communication from the supervisory and
. foreman levels; e performed additional, heightened sensitivity training for MKF management related to H&I and its role in layoff decisions; e routinely meets to ensure involvement and unified expectations at various management levels when destaffing; and e developed and implemented enhanced guidelines for evaluation layoffs; (SEE !
ATTACHED MEMO DATED AUGUST 15,1994) l In August of 1994 a follow-up "all hands" meeting was conducted to once more re-emphasize i the MK and WT commitment to safety, and the freedom to express safety concerns. The following core values were again highlighted:
e safety first e employees right to stop work e freedom to raise safety concerns e open door policy e importance of communication e mandatory procedure compliance e teamwork e respect individualism
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1 Conclusion i
At the Ft. St. Vrain project MK has developed a heightened sensitivity to the need to create and maintain _ policies and procedures to encourage free expression of safety concerns. Mr.
r Herrerra's strong work place ethic and recognition of the chain of command did, to a degree, conflict with the open door policy. MK is confident that the enhanced training and improved ,
! communication will prevent future incidents.
i- It is also important to recognize that Mr. Herrerra's strong v ork place ethic and concern for ,
morale also discouraged MK from disrupting crew' assignments when layoffs were required.
Mr. Herrerra's view of work place " etiquette" and the unwillingness to disrupt crew assignments ,
, remains a compelling explanation for the identification of the four laborers which were laid off. !
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I l' DISTRIBUTION !
l Ton: Dieter Alan Westman l Dennis Rabia -
I2 ster Hugg Bob Fessenden Mike Dionigi -
Clarence Bollman Don Reed ,
Stuart Kibbee Clifford Norris Sr. l Marion Herrera Robert Carrera i Joe Ben Velasquez Dean Ross Tim Schleiger Dave Schreiner Ernesto Arguello Milt Trumble ,
Daniel Boone i l
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