ML20137F002

From kanterella
Jump to navigation Jump to search
Forwards Response to Generic Ltr 85-12 Re Implementation of TMI Action Item II.K.3.5, Automatic Trip of Reactor Coolant Pumps
ML20137F002
Person / Time
Site: Byron, Braidwood, Zion, 05000000
Issue date: 08/22/1985
From: George Alexander
COMMONWEALTH EDISON CO.
To: Harold Denton
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
TASK-2.K.3.05, TASK-TM GL-85-12, NUDOCS 8508260121
Download: ML20137F002 (8)


Text

-

Commonwealth Edison O_ne First National Plaza. Chicago. tilinois Address Reply to. Post Othee Box 767 Chicago. Illinois 60690 l

August 22, 1985 Mr. Harold R. Denton, Director Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555

Subject:

Byron Station Units 1 and 2 Braidwood Station Units 1 and 2 Zion Station Units 1 and 2 Response to Generic Letter 85-12 Implementation of TMI Action Item II.K.3.5 Automatic Trip of Reactor Coolant Pumps NRC Docket Nos. 50-295/304, 50-454/455 and 50-456/457 Reference (a): Generic Letter 85-12 HL Thompson to all OLS and CPS with Westinghouse Nuclear Steam Supply Systems

Dear Mr. Denton:

Reference (a) requested that applicants respond to questions in Section IV of the enclosed Safety Evaluation on reactor coolant pump trip or establish a schedule for responding to the questions. ,

Commonwealth Edison's PWR plants are basing their responses on the WOG RCP trip methodology. Attached are responses for Byron and Braidwood and Zion to most of the questions. Where responses are not complete, proposed dates for supplementary responses are offereo.

Please contact this office if you or your staff have any further questions regarding Generic Letter 85-12.

Forty copies of this letter with attachments will be forwarded under separate cover.

Respectfully, 85082 PDR g g $$$$$95 d Greg Alexander PDR P Nuclear Licensing Administrator atts.

cc: US NRC, Document Control Desk Washington DC 20555 J. G. Keppler - RIII RIII Inspectors - BY,BW and Z

,g U l 0524K l

ATTACHMENT A Byron and Braidwood Response to Generic Letter 85-12 Automatic Trip of Reactor Coolant Pump IV. IMPLEMENTATION A. Determination of RCP Trip Criteria

1. The instrumentation to be used is a lE qualified RCS wide range pressure instrument. Currently there are two (2) monitor channels installed that are separate, independent and redundant.
2. The instrument uncertainties have been calculated by Westinghouse NSD and were provided to Byron and Braidwood by W. Kortier as part of the Emergency Procedures development effort. Normal containment uncertainties were established as 3% of span or 90 psi. Abnormal containment uncertainties were established as 13% of span or 390 psi.

adverse containment conditions are defined by the WOG ERG criteria as greater than:

a. 5gsigcontainmentpressure, or
b. 10 R/hr containment radiation levels.

The concern of pipe whip or jet impingment can be answered in three (3) parts.

a. For Steam Generator Tube Rupture (SGTR), neither condition creates a problem since any break would be inside the Steam Generator.
b. No problems arise from secondary break accidents because steamline and feedline transmitters are located at the 377' level inside the missile barriers and away from all feedwater and steamline piping,
c. Regarding Small Break LOCA, the two pressure transmitters are located such that even if one was to be disabled by a Small Break LOCA, the other transmitter would be unaffected.

Byron has also committed to installing four (4) qualified wide range RCS pressure transmitters (per Reg. Guide 1.97) outside containment during the first refueling outage.

Braidwood has committed to the installation prior to fuel load.

3. The selection of criterion and consideration of uncertainties will be addressed after review of WOG supplied information. A tentative submittal date for this information is September 16, 1985.
8. Pote.ntial Reactor Coolant Pump Problems
1. Containment isolation-can be divided into two (2) parts, Phase-A and Phase B. .The important " water services" which are of concern are:
a. _ Seal water injection from the charging system.
b. Seal water return.
c. Cnmponent cooling to both the pump thermal barrier and the motor oil coolers.

Phase A isolation affects only the seal water return by redirecting it from the VCT to the Pressurizer Relief Tank. This is designed so that seal leakoff will continue but collect inside containment following a Phase A isolation. Therefore Phase A isolation',

whether inadvertent or~ intentional, will not cause any RCP problems.

Phase B isolation interrupts the component cooling to the thermal barrier and to'the motor coolers. No seal problem should be encountered due to the continued cooling flow supplied by the charging system seal injection flow. However, the RCP must be stopped due to the loss of motor oil cooling. Because of this, the

. emergency procedures require that the RCP's be tripped when Phase B isolation occurs. Inadvertent actuation of Phase B isolation is virtually eliminated at Byron and Braidwood since manual actuation requires simultaneous operation of two (2) hand switches. 'Also,

' Operators are extensively trained to stop RCP's for any Phase B actuation.

2. The components able to trip each RCP are as follows:
a. RCP breaker located in the 6.9 KV electrical switchgear room.
b. 125 VDC relay power.
c. Two (2) separate manual trip actuators, the control switch at the main control board and the emergency trip button on the remote shutdown panel.

All of these components are located outside containment and as such cannot be affected by adverse containment conditions.

C. Operating Training

1. All licensed operators have had previous training on RCP operation and trip criterion during several phases e of their training. In addition, they will receive

additional updated training on RCP operations and trip criterion during the review of revisions to the Emergency Operating Procedures. . This training takes place:

a. During systems training on RCS.
b. During accident analysis and mitigating core damage series.
c. During Licensed Operator retraining lectures.
d. As encountered regulsrly during annual simulator sessions.

Additionally, the philosophy regarding the need to trip pumps versus the desire to keep pumps running, is covered during initial training on 'the Byron and Braidwood Emergency Operating Procedures.

2. Procedures which include RCP trip related operations.
a. RCP trips - see Tables 1 and 2

'b. RCP restart - see Tables 1 and 2

c. Decay heat removal by natural circulation

- see Tables 1 and 2 Note, where a restart is authorized but not accomplished, decay heat removal instructions are also given.

d. Primary system void removal (18EP-ES 0.3, 0.4, 1BFR -1.3)(1 Bw EP ES.O.3,0.4 and Bw FR 1.3)
e. Use of steam generators with and without RCP's operating (answered in b & c above).
f. RCP trips for other reasons - see Tables 1 and 2

Byron' Station Table-1 Summary of RCP Trip and RCP Restart Steps

' ERG RCP Trip RCP Restart 1BEP-0 T 1BEP ES-0.1~ R 1BEP ES-0.2 R 1BEP ES-0.3 R 1BEP ES-0.4 R 1BEP 1 T 1BEP ES-1.1 R 1BEP ES-1.2 TA,TI R 1BEP 3 T,TA R 18EP'ES-3.1 TI 18EP ES-3.2 .TI

-1BEP ES-3.3 TI 18CA 1.1 TI 1BCA 2.1 T R 18CA 3.1 TA,TI R 1BCA 3.2 TA,TI R 1BCA 3.3 TI R 1BFR C.1 ST SR 18FR C.2 ST 18FR H.1 ST-1BFR P.1 R 18FR I.3 R

  • T - RCP trip criteria steps TA - Trip all but one RCP steps TI - No. 1 Seal RCP_ trip steps ST - Other special trip steps R - Restart criteria and support conditions required SR - Special restart-without support conditions required 0524K

s h

Braidwood~ Station Table 2 Summary ~of RCP Trip and RCP Restart Steps

.lBwEP ES-0.1 R 18wEP ES-0.2 R 18wEP ES-0.3 R 18wEP ES-0.4 R

-18wEP 1 T 18wEP ES-1.1 'R.

1BWEP ES-1.2 TA,TI R 18wEP 3 T,TA R 1BwEP ES-3.1 TI 1BwEP ES-3.2 TI 18wEP ES-3.3 TI 1Bw0A 1.1 TI 18w0A 2.1 T R 18w0A 3.l' TA,TI R 18w0A 3.2 TA,TI R

'1Bw0A 3.3 TI R

~18wFR C.1 ST SR 18wFR C.2 ST.

18wFR H.1 ST

-1BwFR P.1 R 18wFR I.3 R

  • T - RCP trip criteria steps TA'- Trip all but one RCP steps TI - No. 1 Seal RCP trip steps ST - Other special trip steps R - Restart criteria and support conditions required SR - Special restart without support conditions required 0524K

p ATTACHMENT B Zion Station Response to Generic Letter 85-12 Automatic Trip of Reactor Coolant Pumps A. Determination of RCP Trip Criteria Response-to Item 1:

~

The RCP trip criteria to be used at_ Zion 1s based on Revision 1 of the Westinghouse Owners Group (WOG) Emergency Response Guidelines (ERG's). The specific criterion to be used will be:

RCS wide range pressure less than a constant. The above

" constant" will be different for normal and adverse containment conditions.

For Zion, two (2) environmentally qualified wide range pressure transmitters, each on a separate'RCS loop, will be used to determine the RCP trip setpoint.

Response-to-Item 2:

The instrumentation uncertainties for both normal and adverse containment conditions for the RCP trip setpoint will be submitted by October 31, 1985. The .two (2) Barton wide range RCS pressure transmitters to be used to determine the RCP trip setpoint are both located inside the containment but outside the missile barrier. As such, the transmitters are not subject to local conditions such as fluid jets or pipe whip which might influence instrumentation reliability.

Response to-Item 3:

Uncertainties associated with the WOG supplied analyses

' values used in the RCP trip study is scheduled to be studied generically by the WOG. Based on this generic evaluation, it is expected that this item will be addressed by September 31, 1985.

B.- Potential Reactor Coolant Pump Problems Response to Item 1:

For SGTR's and most non-LOCA events, adverse containment conditions will not be present. As such, only Containment j Isolation Phase A will actuate on a Safety Injection (SI) signal for these events. Containment Isolation Phase A closes all containment isolation valves, except for the five (5) component cooling valves that supply cooling water to the RCP's. Containment Isolation Phase B will close the

)

4 *.- . .

l l

l l

- 2- j l

five component cooling valves to the RCP's. RCP seal injection flow-is not isolated by either Containment Isolation Phase A or 8. The Phase B signal is only actuated automatically following an SI signal with a

~

, high-high containment pressure of 23 psig. High-Hign containment pressure will not occur for SGTR's and most i

non-LOCA events.

- Response Item la

Based on the above discussion, Containment Isolation-Phase A, which actuates on an SI signal, does not isolate the water services'needed for RCP operation.

Response to-Item-lb:

Actuation of Containment Isolation Phase A does not isolate the services needed for RCP-operation (e.g. seal' injection

water and cooling water will not be terminated) and thus

! will not lead'to seal or pump damage or failure.

Response to Item 2:

The components able to trip each RCP are as follows:

a. RCP breaker located in the 4KV electrical switchgear room i b. 125 VDC relay power
c. Two (2) separate manual trip actuators, the control switch at the main control board, and the emergency l

trip buttons in the electrical switchgear room.

All of these compenents are located outside containment and as such cannot be affected by adverse containment conditions.

! C. Operator Training and Procedures (RCP Trip) f' Response to Iteia 1: ,

- ,The new E0P's for Zion Staton have not yet been implemented and the training program is still being developed. The operator training program will be available on January 1, 1986.

Response to Item 2:

'The new E0P's for Zion Station have not yet been

. implemented. The list of procedures pertaining to RCP trip

! related operations will be available on January 1, 1986.

0524K ,

  • '*1-- t- -g:, __--_.py_.. __. ,y_, . . ,,_.m- + . . - ,

,y_, , . , , , _ _ . , . , , , _ _ _ , . , - _ _ , . . ,,,c%.m_, ,.,_,y ,,,,_ygw.,,%,,,, 9_y--,m--