ML20136J230
| ML20136J230 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Pilgrim |
| Issue date: | 11/07/1985 |
| From: | Cheung L, Nimitz R, Pasciak W NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20136J205 | List: |
| References | |
| RTR-NUREG-0737, RTR-NUREG-737, TASK-2.B.3, TASK-2.F.1, TASK-3.D.3.3, TASK-TM 50-293-85-27, NUDOCS 8511250309 | |
| Download: ML20136J230 (37) | |
See also: IR 05000293/1985027
Text
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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION I
Report No. 50-293/85-27
Docket No.
50-293
License No. OpR-35
Priority
Category
C
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Licensee: Boston Edison Company M/C Nuclear
800 B6ylston Street
Boston, Massachusetts
02199
Facility Name:
Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station
Inspection At:
Plymouth, Massachusetts
Inspection Conducted:
September 16-20, 1985
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Inspectors:
SLd d
11/ 6 ! 6 5
R. L. Nimitz, Sen%r Radiation Specialist
date
2A.0%
n// t'W
L. '5. Ihueng, Reactor Engin er
date
A. P. Hull, Brookhaven National Laboratory
W. H. Knox, Knox Consultants, (contractor to Brookhaven
fatin
boratory)
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Approved by:
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(A.o k /
A__
_ // (7 f[
W. J .' /lasciak, Chief, BWR Radiation
/ d/ti
Prot &tion Section
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InspectionSummary:(
Inspection on September 16-20, 1985 (Report No. 50-293/85-27)
Areas Inspected:
Special, announced safety inspection of the licensee's
implementation and status of the following task action items identified in
NUREG-0737:
II.B.3, Post Accident Sampling Capability; II.F.1-1, Noble Gas
Effluent Monitors; II.F.1-2, Sampling and Analyses of Plant Effluents;
II.F.1-3, Containment High-Range Radiation Monitor; III.D.3.3, Improved
Inplant Iodine Monitoring.
The inspection involved 140 hours0.00162 days <br />0.0389 hours <br />2.314815e-4 weeks <br />5.327e-5 months <br /> onsite by two
region-based inspectors and two contractors from Brookhaven National
Laboratory.
Results: No violations were identified.
Several areas requiring improvements
were identified.
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DETAILS
1.0. Persons Contacted
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The individuals contacted during this inspection are listed in
Attachment I to this inspection report.
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2.0 Purpose
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The purpose of this inspection was to verify and validate the adequacy of
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the licensee's implementation of the following task actions identified in
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NUREG-0737, Clarification of TMI Action Plant Requirements:
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Task No.
Title
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II.B.3
Post-Accident Sampling Capability
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II.F.1-1
Noble Gas Effluent Monitors
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II.F.1-2
Sampling and Analysis of Plant Effluents
II.F.1-3
Containment High-Range Radiation Monitor
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III.D.3.3
Improved Inplant Iodine Instrumentation
under Accident Conditions
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In addition, and as part of the inspection, a review was performed to
verify and validate the adequacy of the licensee's design and quality
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assurance program for the design and installation of the Post-Accident
Sampling System (PASS). The findings in this area are presented in
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Section 9 of this report.
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3.0 TMI Action Generic Criteria and Commitments
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The licensee's implementation of the task selection actions specified in
Section 2.0 were reviewed against criteria contained in the following
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documents:
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NUREG-0578, THI-2 Lessons Learned Task Force Status Report and
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Short-Term Recommendations, dated July 1979,
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Letter from Darrell G. Eisenhut, Acting Director, Division of
Operating Reactors, NRC,'to all Operating Power Plants, dated
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October 30, 1979,
NUREG-0737, Clarification of TMI Action Plan Requirements, dated
,
Ovember, 1980,
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Generic Letter 82-05, Letter from Darrell G. Eisenhut, Director,
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Division of Licensing (DOL), NRC, to all Licensees of Operating
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Power Reactors, dated March 14, 1982,
Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1, Updated Final Safety Analysis
Report, dated July 11, 1982,
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Letter From Darrell G. Eisenhut, Director, Division of Licensing,
NRR to Regional Administrators, " Proposed Guidelines for Calibration
and Surveillance Requirements for Equipment Provided to Meet Item
II.F.1, Attachments 1, 2, and 3 NUREG-0737," dated August 16, 1982,
Order confirming Licensee Commitments on Post-TMI Related Issues,
dated March 14, 1983,
Modification of March 14, 1983 Order, dated June 15, 1984.
Regulatory Guide 1.3 " Assumptions Used for Evaluating Radiological
Consequences of a Loss of Coolant Accident for Boiling Water
Reactors,"
Regulatory Guide 1.97, Rev. 2, " Instrumentation of Light-Water-Cooled
Nuclear Power Plants to Assess Plant and Environs Conditions During
and Following an Accident," and
Regulatory Guide 8.8, Rev. 3, "Information Relevant to Ensuring that
Occupational Radiation Exposure at Nuclear Power Station will be As
Low As Reasonably Achievable."
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In addition specific review criteria and/or commitments relative to each
task item numbers are included in Attachments 2-7 of this report.
4.0- Post-Accident Sampling System, Item II.B.3.
4.1~ Position
NUREG-0737, Item II.B.3, specifies that licensees shall have the capabil-
ity to promptly collect, handle, and analyze post-accident samples which
are representative of conditions existing in the reactor coolant and con-
tainment atmosphere.
Specific criteria are denoted in commitments to the
NRC relative to the specifications contained in NUREG-0737.
Documents Reviewed
The implementation, adequacy and status of the licensee's post-accident
sampling, monitoring, and analysis systems were reviewed against the
criteria identified in Section 3.0 and in regard to licensee letters,
,
memoranda, drawings and station procedures as listed in Attachment 2 of
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this Inspection Report.
The licensee's performance relative to these criteria was determined from
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interviews with the principal personnel associated with post-accident
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sampling, reviews of associated procedures and documentation, and the
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conduct of a performance test to verify hardware, procedures and personnel
capabilities.
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4.2 Findings
Within the scope of the review, the following items items were
identified:
4.2.1
System Description and Capability
The licensee.has installed a Post Accident Sampling System which is
a standard General Electric design.
It has the ability to obtain
unpressurized undiluted and diluted samples of reactor coolant from
the jet pump and the RHR System. Also, samples can be obtained
from the drywell, suppression pool and reactor building atmospheres.
Redundant containment hydrogen analyzers provide a hydrogen analysis
back-up capability.
Analysis for chloride, boron, and hydrogen _are conducted in the
laboratery, using an ion chromatograph, plasma spectrometer and gas
chromatograph, respectively.
Back-up analysis capability is being
negotiated with other nearby utilities.
.
4.2.2 PASS Performance Testing
Grab samples of reactor coolant and of the drywell atmosphere were
collected during an operational test on September 18, 1985.
During
the test, licensee personnel verified the intergrated ability to
collect and analyze samples within the time constraints of
NUREG-0737, II.B.3.
(See Attachment 3 of this report.)
4.2.3.1
Reactor Coolant (Findings)
The reactor coolant sampling system is designed to obtain samples of
liquids and dissolved gasses during all modes of operation. Although
samples could be obtained from all sampling points, the following
matters requiring licensee attention were identified:
a.
Demonstrate the adequacy of system purge times.
Data were not
presented to demonstrate the adequacy of the purge times speci-
fied in procedures. Adequate purge time is needed to ensure
representatives sampling.
(50-392/85-27-01)
b.
Demonstrate the adequacy of the sample dilution method and
related equipment. Data were not available to demonstrate the
adequacy of the sample dilution method and related equipment.
Sampling dilution is a key element in the quantification of
sample results.
(50-293/85-27-02)
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c.
Determine the volume of the coolant collection ball valve.
During the preoperational testing, the ball valve, wh!,ch collects
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a measured volume of coolant, was determined to be 0.14 ml,
instead of the value of 0.10 ml.
The valve of 0.10 ml. was
presented in procedures. The valve, which was actually_ tested
during preops, has since been replaced, but the new valve's
volume has not been determined.
(50-293/85-27-03)
d.
-Repair and/or replace the flow control check valve. After the
primary system tests had been successfully conducted, the flow
control valve stuck open in a fixed position (0.6 GPM). The
design flow rate of 1 GPM could not be attained.
(50-293/
85-27-04)
4.2.3.2 Containment Air (Findings)
Atmosphere samples can be obtained from the Drywell, Reactor Build-
ing and Suppression Pool.
The following matters requiring licensee attention were identified:
a.
Demonstrate the adequacy of system purge times.
Data were not
presented to demonstrate the adequacy of the purge times speci-
fied in-procedures. Adequate system purge time is needed to
ensure representative sampling.
(50-293/85-27-05)
b.
The capability to obtain a representative sample of containment
atmosphere should be demonstrated. (50-293/85-27-06):
1.
There has been no line loss or plate-out study conducted.
2.
The sa;npling assembly is not heat traced.
This could lead
to excessive condensation collecting on the iodine car-
tridges.
This problem would be particularly troublesome
with high humidity in containment.
c.
Correct the air sampler rotometer reading for differences in air
density created by pump suction. The sampling procedure
(5.7.11) uses the rotometer reading in the calculation of the
radioiodine concentration. (50-293/85-27-07)
4.2.4 Analytical Capability (Findings)
Attachment A to BEC0's May 30, 1985 letter contains the licensee's
commitment relative to the range, sensitivity and type of analytical
capability available.
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4.2.4.'1. Chloride (Findings)
Chloride analysis of diluted coolant is conducted using an ion
chromatograph. The lower range sensitivity commitment is 0.01 ppm.
However, the water used for dilution has a higher chloride
1 concentration (approximately 0.03. ppm).
In order.to detect 0.01 ppm, analysis would have to be conducted
using an undiluted sample. The licensee's May 30, 1985 letter in-
dicated'that'an undiluted sample would be collected and retained for
up to 30 days for subsequent confirmatory analysis.
However pro-
cedures did not provide for the collection and retention of an un-
diluted sample for further chloride analysis. The accuracy of +/-10%
at the 0.01 ppm level could not be achieved.
(See Attachment 3 for
test results).
The following matters requiring licensee attention was identified:
The detection limit and sensitivity of the chloride analysis
method should be clearly defined.
Procedures'should be revised
to include provisions for the retention of an undiluted sample
for up. to 30 days for more detailed chloride analysis.
(50-293/
85-27-08)
u4.2.4.2 Boron (Findings)
Boron analysis is conducted using two methods:
Plasma Spectrometry
and Carminic Acid (Spectrometry). The analysis of spiked samples
were conducted using the primary method (Plasma Spectrometry) and
- acceptable results were obtained.
Reagents needed to conduct back-up analysis using the Carminic Acid
method were not available.
Hewever, they were on order.
The following matter requiring licensee attention was identified:
Obtain and maintain supplies necessary to conduct boron
' analysis with carminic acid method.
(50-293/85-27-09)
.4.2.4.3
pH Analyses (Findings)
Although the licensee has purchased the equipment for performing pH
analyses,.his procedures for this purpose were not established. The
licensee personnel indicated that this analysis.is unnecessary.
The following matter requiring licensee attention was identified:
Clarify commitments and capabilities relative to pH analyses.
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(50-293/85-27-10)
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4.2.4.4
Gross Gamma and Isotopic Analyses (Findings)
An isotopic analysis of the PASS grab sample was compared to the
normal sink sample. The comparison was within acceptable limits.
Provisions had not been made to conduct an isotopic analysis on the
depressurized dissolved gasses in core damage procedures.
The following matter requiring licensee attention was identified:
Review and evaluate the need to perform isotopic analyses of
dissolved gasses.
If a need is identified, provision should be
made to conduct isotopic analyses on dissolved gasses.
(50-293/
85-27-11)
4.2.4.5
Hydrogen and Dissolved Gas (Findings)
Licensee personnel differed in their views on the type of analysis
to be conducted and how the data would be used. The core damage
assessment procedure uses the hydrogen content to assess core
damage.
Procedures are available for the analysis of hydrogen,
using an ion chromatograph.
Licensee personnel indicated that the primary analysis method to
quantify hydrogen was the use of total dissolved gas. However, the
procedure for this purpose had not been completed. Additionally
licensee personnel indicated that the total gas, once determined, was
to be equated to hydrogen and used as such in core damage assessment.
Others indicated that the total gas data would be obtained but would
not be used.
It was not clear that the total gas obtained was equi-
valent to total hydrogen. Equating hydrogen to total gas could lead-
to an overly conservative estimate of the hydrogen content.
Additionally, tests have not been conducted to demonstrate that the
committed range and accuracy of either dissolved ges or hydrogen
could be achieved.
The hydrogen analysis procedure required that 0.25 cc of gas be
injected into the gas chromatograph.
During the test, approximately
5 cc was collected and transported to the laboratory. The bringing
of excessive amounts of gas into the laboratory could unnecessarily
increase radiation exposure.
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Although the procedure directed the operator to inject 0.25 cc into
the gas chromatograph, a method had not been developed to extract
this volume from the large syringes in which the gas is transported.
The operator indicated that an undetermined volume, up to 5 cc
would be injected directly from it.
Since the calibration gas
volume is 0.25 cc, the GC will respond differently if a 5 cc volume
is used.
The following matters requiring licensee attention were identified:
(50-293/85-27-12):
a.
The use of dissolved gas or hydrogen analysis data in the as-
sessment of core damage should be clearly specified. Also, it
should be demonstrated that the committed range and accuracy can
be achieved.
Procedures should be established and implemented
where needed.
b.
The amount of gas transported to the laboratory for analysis
should be minimized.
c.
Personnel should be instructed either to follow procedures or
the procedures should be revised to reflect actual practices.
Incorrect gas volumes were injected into the gas chromatograph.
4.2.5 Additional Findings
The following additional findings were identified.
These matters
require _ licensee attention:
a.
Establish a routine maintenance program for the PASS.
Not all
components of the PASS have been included in a regular surveill-
ance/ calibration program. Also, there does not appear to be a
formal administrative procedure for assuring that non-safety
related equipment, such as the PASS, is incorporated in the
routine maintenance (50-293/85-27-13)
b.
Establish a spare parts program for the PASS.
A PASS spare parts program is under development.
The licensee
is coordinating this program development with the BWR Owner's
Group. (50-293/85-27-14).
c.
Establish PASS sample shipping procedures.
The procedures for the handling, loading and off-site shipment
of samples are in a draft form and arrangements are being made
through the PIMS to supply the needed shipping cask.
(50-293/85-27-15)
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d.
Complete arrangement for backup off-site analyses of samples.
Arrangements for backup off-site analysis are incomplete. A
verbal agreement exists with Millstone to provide backup sup-
port.
This agreement is being formalized by the licensee's
legal staff.
(50-293/85-27-16)
e.
Establish provisions for detection of leakage across chiller.
Provisions have not been made for the detection of leakage of
reactor coolant into the chiller cooling water.
The pressure
differential between the sampling and the cooling lines could
result in the buildup of significant activity in the chiller in
the event of such a leak.
(50-293/85-27-17)
f.
Provide provisions to preclude PASS from exceeding its design
temperature specification.
The chiller will automatically shutdown on low or high pressure
signals. However, mechanisms have not been provided for the
interruption of the flow of the uncooled water into the PASS or
of operator actions procedures to prevent the PASS from exceed-
ing its temperature design specifications. (50-293/85-27-18)
g.
Improve the safety of the access to the PASS.
Under accident conditions personnel may be required to climb a
20' ladder to the location of the PASS controls while wearing
protective clothing and SCBA gear. The ladder does not have a
cage to prevent a person from falling backward.
(50-293/
85-27-19)
h.
Establish Alarm Set Points for the PASS Area Radiation Monitor.
Consider using an alarm set point based on maximum dose rates
that could be encountered such that 10 CFR 50 GDC 19 dose
limits will not be exceeded. (50-293/85-27-20)
1.
Evaluate the need to install charcoal filters in the exhaust
hood of the chemistry laboratory.
A charcoal filter has not been provided for the laboratory
ventilation exhaust system. During an accident radioiodine
releases may result from the operation of the gas chromatograph,
plasma spectrometer and laboratory hood. (50-293/85-27-21)
j.
Calibrate the PASS radiation detector in accordance with
manufacturer's specifications.
The three radiation detectors associatsa with the PASS are not
calibrated in accordance with manufacturer's specifications and
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recommendations.
For example, the manufacturer requires the
one electronic channel to be set at 2200 volts and the other
two channels at 2500 volts.
Based on the calibration procedure,
all electronic channels were set at 2500 volts. Also, there was
no in-situ check of the instruments response following rein-
stallation.
(50-293/85-27-22)
k.
Reevaluate the adequacy of the " time and motion" study
performed for collection of PASS samples.
Ensure the re-
quirements of 10 CFR 50 GDC 19 can be met.
The " Time and Motion Sedy" was conducted using generic methods
before the actual procedves were developed.
It is not clear
that the samples can be co'lected and analyzed within
GDC limits using the existing procedures.
(50-293/85-27-23).
1.
Clarify use of pressure in procedures.
Procedure 5.7.4.1.9 does not include provisions for the speci-
fication of the pressure in units of inches of Hg. Procedures
use units of psig.
Subatmospheric readouts in " inches of Hg"
are the most appropriate readouts.
(50-293/85-27-24)
m.
Establish reliable backup power for the chiller.
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A reliable source of backup power has not been provided for the
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chiller used for cooling the incoming reactor coolant in the
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event of a loss of off-site power. While a backup method of
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cooling has been devised, it has not been tested for proper
hose fitting. Also, the heat removal capability of this method
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nas not been established.
(50-293/85-27-25)
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n.
Identify and provide " carrying devices".
Procedure 5.7.3.1.2 states that a " carrying device" would be
used to transport the syringe containing radioactive gasses.
It is not clear what type of " carrying device" is to be used.
(50-293/85-27-26)
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4.2.6
Item for Improvement
The following improvement item was identified:
Consider / identify methods to ensure adherence to PASS procedures.
One operator was solely responsible for the operation of the system
and the collection of the sample. A mechanism for verifying that the
correct procedure steps had been properly followed or assuring that
the correct information had been recorded has not been provided.
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5.0 Noble Gas Effluent Monitor, Item II.F.1-1
5.1 Position
NUREG-0737, Item II.F.1-1 requires the installation of noble gas
monitors with an extended range designed to function during normal
operating and accident conditions.
The criteria, including the de-
sign monitors for individual release pathways, power supply, cali-
bration and other design considerations are set forth in Table II.
F.1-1 of NUREG-0737.
Documents Reviewed
The implementation, adequacy, and status of the licensee's monitoring
systems were reviewed against the criteria identified in Section 3.0
and in regard to licensee's letters, memoranda, drawings and station
procedures as listed in Attachment 4 of this Inspection Report.
The licensee's performance relative to these criteria was determined
by interviews with the principal per sons and consultants associated
with the design, testing, installation and surveillance of the high
range gas monitoring systems, a review of the associated procedures
and documentation, an examination of personnel qualifications and
direct observation of the systems.
5.2 Findings
Within the scope of this review, the following was identified:
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5.2.1
Description and Capability
There are three atmospheric release locations at Pilgrim Nuclear
Power Station (PNPS), the free-standing main stack (to which the
effluent from the SBGTS is ducted), the reactor building exhaust
stack and the turbine building roof exhaust.
The licensee has i. stalled high re.nge ion chambers to supplement the
pre-existing normal range monitors for the main stack and for the
reactor building vent. An ion chamber has also been installed to
provide high range monitoring for the turbine building roof vent,
which is not normally monitored.
5.2.1.1 Normal Range Description
The normal range monitors for the main stack and the reactor
building vent consist of identical GE designed shielded gamma
sensitive Na! detectors which view a volume of gas in a shielded
chamber.
Each has a seven decade range.
From calculations supplied
by the licensee's consultant, ENTECH, the sensitivity of the main
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stack monitor appears to be 4.4 x 10
-4.4 uCi/cm and that for the
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reactor building vent appears to be 6 x 10
- 0.6 uC1/cm .
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The turbine building is not normally monitored by installed instru-
mentation.
5.2.1.1 High Range Description
General Description
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General Atomic Model RD-2A fon chambers, with a range of 10
-10
R/hr are employed for high range monitoring.
For the main stack one
is installed externally to a 20" horizontal duct at its base, while
those for the reactor and turbine buildings are externally mounted
at elevated levels on the vertical ducts near the roof vents.
High Range (Main Stack)
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The licensee's submittal of February 27, 1981 indicated a range for
1
6
3
133
the stack monitor of 10 - 10 uti/cm equivalent
Xe concentra-
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tion. A subsequent licensee submittal of June 4,1984 indicated an
5
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upper limit of 2 x 10 uC1/cm
Xe equivalent. The basis for these
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submittals could not be established at the time of the inspection.
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From calculations supplied onsite by ENTECH, the apparent range of
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the ion chamber monitor for the high range main stack is 60 - 6 x
6
133
10 for
Xe, in which case overlap with the normal range monitor
would not be provided. However, the attenuation of the 3/8" thick
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duct well is embodied in ENTECH's calculations. When this is taken
into account, the effective range of this monitor appears to be
4
3
133
0.7 - 7 x 10 uC1/cm on a
Xe equivalent basis.
ENTECH's calculations showed that in the event of a design basis
accident, there would be an initial overlap for the immediate post-
accident mixture. However, the overlap would narrow with elapsed
time post-accident, as the average energy of the mixture decreased.
For a design basis accident, it would be very narrow before the upper
range of the low range monitor was reached some 100 hours0.00116 days <br />0.0278 hours <br />1.653439e-4 weeks <br />3.805e-5 months <br /> later.
High Range (Reactor Butiding}
In its submittal of February 24, 1981, the licensee indicated a range
-2
for the High Range monitor for the reactor building vent of 8 x 10
3
3
to 8 x 10 uC1/cm while that of June 14, 1982 indicated an upper
4
3
limit of 2 x 10 uC1/cm , 133Xe equivalent.
From ENTECH's calculations reviewed onsite, the range of this monitor
5
3
133
appears to be 1 - 10 uC1/cm of
Xe.
This monitor also showed a
range overlap for the immediate mixture which also narrowed with time
post-accident.
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High Range (Turbine Vent)
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The licensee's submittal of February 17,\\ 1981 indicated that the
apparent range of the turbine vent monit'or was 1.5 x 10-2
3,5 x
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10 uCi/cm , which agreed with the upper limit indicated in the sub-
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mittal of June 14, 1982.
From ENTECH's calculations, its apparent
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3
133
range was approximately 3 x 10
-3 x 10 uCi/cm of
Xe. The
upper limit meets the criterion of the NURCG-0737, II.F.1 Attachment
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1.
Since NRR has accepted the licensee's contention that low range
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monitors are not appropriate for the turbine roof vents, as they are
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not normal release points, the question of range overlap is not ap-
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plicable.
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5.2.1.3 General Findings (High Range Monitor)
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The possible effect on monitor indications of the deposition of post
accident radiotodines on duct walls has not been considered in
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ENTECH's calculations.
The initial type calioration of the RD-2A ^
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ion chambers by the vendor (General Atomics) remains in open item
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from Inspection 50-293/83-02. However, data were supplied to dem-
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onstrate that the installed chambers are regularly calibrated
against a solid source throughout their range. Although.ENTECH's
code has not been verified with gaseous sources, they supplied a
report to demonstrate that the one used to establish the radiation
levels at the installed location of the ion chambers had been bench-
marked against an ANSI approved code.
Due to the limited range overlap between the low and high range
._
monitors for the main stack and the reactor building vent, the
ability of the former to function throughout their stipulated ranges
,
and beyond for extended period of time (up to a few days) and to re-
,
cover therefrom is an important element of the licensee's ability to
follow a post-accident release.
This ability has not been
documented.
Local readout and remote readout and recording in the Control Room
of the indications of the high range monitors in units of R/nr is
'b
provided.
The interpretations of these indications in terms of re-
lease rates and/or concentrations can be niade by means of nomograms
'
or a computer program.
Initial operator responses for unusual rele'ases are based on in-
dications of the low range monitors, for which appropriate alarm
,
'
levels have been established.
There are no alarms on the high range
s
channels, nor are there specific provisions in emergency procedures
whereby the operator is directed to consult them.
s
e
b
%
_ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ . _ . _ _ . _ _ _ . _ . _ . . _ _
-
^
..
.
14
The licensees indicated that an ion chamber was normally maintained
in its spare parts inventory. However, it had been utilized as a
replacement following a recent lightning induced failure at the main
stack. Another spare was on order.
5.2.2 High Range Monitors (Findings)
The installed system meets the guidance for high range noble gas
monitoring as contained in NUREG-0727, II.F.1, Attachment 1.
The
following matters requiring license attention were identified:
a.
Clearly specify the range of all High Range Noble Gas Monitors.
The reasons for the inconsistencies between the range of capa-
bility of the high-range monitors as can be derived from the
reports by ENTECH and from information supplied by the licensee
to NRC should be investigated. Also range overlap should be
clearly specified.
(50-293/85-27-27)
b.
The ability of the low range monitors to function for sustained
periods of time at concentrations close to and beyond their
upper range for and to recover therefrom during a post-accident
sequence should be established.
If this cannot be satisfac-
torily acccomplished, provisicns for turning off the power to
thc,and/or bypassing them during these periods of time should
be c.onsidered.
(50-293/85-27-28)
c.
The possible effect of radioiodines deposited within ducts on
the response of the high range monitors should be considered.
If it is appreciable, considerations should be given to relo-
cating the detectors to a shield cave within which they view a
suitable volume of an off-line aliquot of the stack / vent flow.
(50-293/85-27-29).
6.0 Sampling and Analyses of Plant Effluents, Item II.F.1-2
6.1 Position
,
NUREG-0737, Item II.F.2, requires the provision of a capability for the
collection, transport, and measurement of representative samples of radio-
active iodines and particulates that may accompany gaseous effluents
following an accident.
It must be performable without exceeding
specified dose limits to the individuals involved. The criteria
including the design basis shielding envelope, sampling media, sampling
consideration, and analysis considerations are set forth in Table
II.F.1-2.
.
.
15
,
I
'
6.2.1'
Description and Capability
The licensee has elected to utilize the pre-existing normal sampling
arrangements for compliance with NUREG-0737, II.F.1. Attachment 2.
As such, they are integral wfth the low-range gas monitors which are
routinely employed for the sampling of iodines and particulates in
the effluent from the main stack and the reactor building vent.
.The probe for the main stack is installed at an elevation of about
25', at which point it samples the combined flow from the SBGTS duct
of 4,000 cfm and of stack dilution air at a rate of 16,000 cfm. The
sampling line is heat traced and has a relatively-short run to the
sampling station, which is located at the base of the main stack.
The probe for the reactor building vent is installed at the 163'
level near the top of this 9' x 9' exhaust duct.
The licensee's-
calculations indicate that this probe is sized to be isokinetic for a
stack flow rate of 65,000 cfm. No correction features were available
for other flow rates, such as the much lower ones which would occur
during accident conditions.
The sample line has over a 100' vertical
run, which is followed by a relatively short horizontal run to the
sampling and monitoring station, which is located on the turbine deck
adjacent to the stack. This sample line is not heat traced.
For routine sampling, a particulate filter and charcoal base iodine
collection canister are installed in'a filter holder which is mounted
with quick disconnect fittings on the sample station rack ahead of
the low range gas monitor.
This filter holder is unshielded. The
'
emergency procedure calls for.the replacement of the in place can-
ister with one containing a silver zeolite collection medium at the
onset of accident-conditions.
The licensee's procedures envision the use of a nomogram to estimate-
131
the
I activity released to the environment, based on gamma dose
rates of the cartridge.
However, this is not specifically called for
in the sampling procedures for the main stack and the reactor build-
ing vent. Also the nomograms which are contained in the procedures
permit only an estimation of the activity on the filter.
Further-
more, as written, these procedures call for the setting aside of
sample holders with contact dose-rates that are above the limit for
" hand-touching". The sample holders are placed in a shielded cave
adjacent to the sampling station, prior to any other measurement of
them.
These procedures also call for a purge step prior to the removal of
the filter holder from the sample rack.
During the inspection, it
was found that the purge enters the sample line subsequent to the
holder. As a result, the purge only purges the gas monitor chambers.
The sample racks also contain a number of unlabeled valves.
.
.
16
The procedure for sampling the effluent from the turbine building for.
iodines and particulates under the accident conditions calls for the
use of a portable air sample pump and filter holder to collect a 10
minute sample at a pre-established location on the turbine deck lev-
el.
It also calls for the measurement of the gamma dose rate of the
filter with a survey instrument and the estimation of the activity on
the filter, using the same nomogram that is contained in the stack
and reactor building vent emergency sampling procedures.
-The licensee was unable to furnish any calculations that at the
shielding design basis, plant personnel could remove samples, replace
the sampling media and transport samples to the on-site analysis
facility with radiation exposures that would not exceed the GDC-19
criteria.
A review of the licensee's manual dose assessment procedures indi-
cated that they provided only for the use of assumed iodine to noble
gas ratios and did not provide for the use of the measured radio-
fudine activity on effluent sampling media for the estimation of
field iodine dose rates.
6.2.2
Sampling Plant Effluents (Findings)
The following matters requiring licensee attention were identified:
!
a.
Establish provisions in procedures for the sampling of the main
stack and the reactor building vent (similar to those now con-
tained in these for sampling in the turbine building) for the
measurement of samples of radiation levels up to and including
design basis, so as to accomplish continuous sampling throughout
a post-accident sequence.
(50-293/85-27-30)
b.
Perform a time and motion study to ascertain that the system
design will make it possible to remove and transport design
basis samples within GDC-19 criteria. All appropriate source
terms should be used for this study. (50-293/85-27-31)
c.
Provide the necessary nomograms and calculator / computer pro-
cedures, whereby measurement of the collected radioiodine
activities can readily be translated into release concentra-
tions and rates.
(50-293/85-27-32)
d.
Develop correction factors for the non-isokinetic sampling rates
for the range of stack flow rates of the unit vent especially
for those anticipated under accident conditions.
(50-293/
85-27-33)
.
-
-
- - ~
.
,
.
.
~
-
17
. e.
-Evaluate the capabilities of the sampling system to collect
representative samples under accident condition. (50-293/
85-27-34)
'
- .
6.2.3 -
Additional Items for Review / Resolution
In order to reduce the anticipated dose rate of the collected sample,
and/or to facilitate its analysis, the licensee should review and/or
resolve (as appropriate) the following matters: (50-293/85-27-35)
f
a.
Provide shielding for the effluent sample holders.
' b.
The provision of' labels and a flow diagram for the valves and
indicators on the sample racks.
c.
The heat tracing of the sampling line for reactor building vent,
'in view of the possibility that it may contain steam leakage or
.
,
- moisture therefrom under accident conditions.
'
d.
The provision of featJres which will- enable the purging of in-
place sample canister and nearby sample' lines with an clean air
supply, prior.to their removal for transport and analysis,
e
e.
The addition to manual dose assessment-procedures of nomograms
which would make it possible to estimate field iodine dose rates
on-the basis of measured radiciodine activity (or release rates
derived therefrom).
7.0 Containment High-Range Radiation Monitor, Item II.F.1-3
7.1 Position
.
NUREG-0737, Item II,F.1-3, requires the installation of two in-con-
tainment radiation monitors with a maximum range of~1 rad /hr to 10'
,-
rad /hr (beta and gamma) or alternatively l' R/hr to 107 R/hr(gamma
,
only). The monitors shall be physically separated to view a large
portion of~ containment and developed and qualified to function in an
accident environment. :The monitors are also required to-have an
energy response as specified in NUREG-0737,~ Table II.F.1-3.
~
Review Criteria
-
- .
L
.The implementation adequacy, and status of the installed in-contain-
ment high range' monitors were reviewed against the criteria set
.forth in Section 3.0 of this report and in regard to interviews with
cognizant licensee personnel, licensee letters, station procedures,
as-built prints and drawings as listed in Attachment 5 to this
Inspection Report.
,
.
4
,w-
e
r
e r~~--.e
,<-m
, , - - , ,-
~-wr
.,e,
,r~r-
-
e
,,
--ww,
, . - -
-w,n-- wr
.
.
18
The licensee's performance relative to these criteria was determined
by:
Interviews with cognizant personnel;
Review of applicable operational and emergency plan procedures;
Review of applicable lesson plans and training records;
Review of calibration data; and
Direct observation of installed equipment.
7.2 Findings
Within the scope of this review, the following was identified:
Installation / Placement
The licensee has installed four- (4) gamma sensitive ion chambers for
monitoring of gamma radiation emanating from primary containment.
Two of the detectors monitor the torus at the North and West areas
of the Torus respectively (-17' elevation). The remaining two de-
tectors are mounted in close proximity to each other (about 2 feet
apart) at approximately the north mid plane area of the Drywell.
These latter two detectors project into primary containment through
two caped penetrations. The location and number of the detectors was
verified. The number and location of these detectors was found
acceptable to the NRC.
The detectors read out at the Post-Accident Monitoring (PAM) Panel,
located in.the Main Control Room.
The read outs were operating
properly.
Procedures
The licensee has established procedures which included monitor
response curves. An estimate of core damage may be made by:
1.
obtaining a reading from a detector;
2.
determining time after shutdown; and
3.
usirig an appropriate curve to estimate core damage.
Different
curves are used for the Torus and Drywell detectors.
,
e
.
..
19
.The monitor response curves incorporate corrections for inherent
shielding of the steel penetration liner in which the detectors are
inserted.
Procedures are in place for calibration and periodic verification of
operability of the detectors.
Environmental / Seismic Qualification
See section 9 of this report.
Training / Qualification of Personnel
The licensee has provided training and qualifications of both oper-
ations and radiological controls personnel in use/ interpretation of
detector readings. Appropriate personnel are provided periodic re-
fresher training in use/ interpretation of the read outs.
Calibration-Range
The detectors were found to be calibrated in accordance with
NUREG-0737. The range of the detectors is consistent with
NUREG-0737 Table II.F.1-3.
7.3 Acceptability
The installed system can be considered to meet the guidance specified
in NUREG-0737, Attachment II.F.1-3.
However, the following matters
requiring licensee attention were identified:
a.
Fully establish and implement the operator Training Modules for
operation /use of the PAM Panel (Module CT-SH/IG-S-120).
l
(50-293/85-27-36).
b.
Train and qualify appropriate personnel on Procedure 5.7.5,
" Estimating Core Damage".
Personnel have not been trained in
the new procedure.
(50-293/85-27-37)
c.
Include North / East Torus Monitor Response Curve in Procedure
5.7.5.
The procedure contains only the Drywell monitor response
curve.
However, the Drywell response curve is being incorrectly
used with the Torus monitors (50-293/85-27-38)
d.
Review dose / damage response curves for the Dryweli Monitors.
At less than 100% core damage, no other radiation ';curce (e.g.
primary lines in area of detectors) are used as contributors to
the detector readings. A review should be performed to ensure
that sources in the area of the detectors (other than the gas-
eous activity in primary containment) do not adversely effect
the core damage estimates. (50-293/85-27-39)
i
.
.
20
8.0 Improved In-Plant Iodine Instrumentation Under Accident Conditions,
Item III.D.3.3
8.1 Position
NUREG-0737, Item III.D.3.3, requires that each licensee shall
-provide equipment and associated training and procedures for
accurately determining the airborne iodine concentration in areas
within the facility where plant personnel may be present during an
accident.
Review Criteria
The implementation, adequacy and status of the licensee's in plant
iodine monitoring under accident conditions were reviewed against
the criteria in Section 3.0 of this report and in regard to the
documents identified in Attachment 6 to this Inspection Report.
The
licensee's performance relative to these criteria was determined by:
Interviews with cognizant licensee personnel;
Review of applicable operational and emergency plan procedures;
Review of applicable lesson plans and training records;
Direct observation of performance during a walkthrough; and
Verification of equipment availability and storage.
8.2 Findings
Within the scope of this review, the following was identified:
Equipment
The licensee was found to have appropriate equipment for sampling
and quantifying airborne iodine in areas within the facility where
plant personnel may be present during an accident.
Procedures
The licensee has established procedures for calibration / operation of
the equipment used to determine concentration of airborne iodine.
Training
The licensee provides initial training and refresher training to
personnel responsible for calibration / operation of airborne iodine
collection and analysis equipment.
.
.
21
8.3 Acceptability
.
The licensee's program to sample and analyze iodine against a back-
ground of noble gases can be considered to meet the guidance spec-
ified in NUREG-0737, section III.D.3.3.
However, the following
matters requiring licensee attention were identified:
a.
The licensee should obtain additional SAM-2s.
Currently all
SAM-2s (4) have been assigned to specific locations.
The
licensee does not have any spare units. Spare units should be
obtained in the event an assigned SAM-2 becomes defective or
needs calibration.
(50-293/85-27-40)
b.
Certain aspects of the procedures for calibration and use of
the SAM-2 are written in such a manner that literal reading of
the procedures would cause errors in quantification of airborne
iodine:
(50-293/85-27-41)
.
the method for determination and use of iodine measurement
--
efficiency is not clear / consistent between SAM-2 calibra-
tion /use procedures,
' CPM' is not defined (i.e. net or gross)
--
c.
Some of the procedures for use of the SAM-2 do not include the
correction factors for determination of total iodine dose.
The
procedures only include correction factors for dose due to
(50-293/85-27-42)
d.
No verification of acceptability of air flow calibration
devices used to calibrate iodine air samplers has been
performed (50-293/85-27-43)
e.
Procedures for use of the SAM-2s for analysis of iodine
activity collected on sample media allow the analyses to be
made in up to a radiation field of 4 mR/hr.
The licensee
should perform and document an evaluation that demonstrates that a
SAM-2 can detect 1x10 7uci/ml in a 4 mR/hr field.
(50-293/
85-27-44)
9.0 Quality Assurance (QA) and Design Review
9.1 General Design and Installation Records
The following design records were reviewed:
The design and installation records reviewed in this area are
presented in Attachment 7 (Section A) to this report.
___
.
.
22
The inspector found that there were sufficient sample points to
obtain samples after the accident and that the installation
documents were readily retrievable.
No unacceptable conditions
were identified.
9.2 Alternate Power Supplies to' PASS
The Pilgrim SER on PASS, Section 2.0, criterion 1 indicated that
during loss of off-site power, alternate power sources were avail-
able for both gas and liquid sampling systems that could be
energized in sufficient time to meet the three hour sampling and
analysis time limit.
The inspector reviewed pertinent documents concerning the power
supplies to the PASS and its associated electrical equipment, (e.g.,
sample cooling water pumps, valves that require operation to draw
samples) to ascertain whether all power supplies can be switched to
the diesel generator after a loss of off-site power.
Items examine included:
BECO Drawing S-E-155 " Station Electrical Single Line Composite
Diagram" Rev. 2 dated November 18, 1984.
Bechtel Drawing No. E8 " Single Line Meter & Relay Diagram 4160V
Breaker A409, 480V load Center 88 480 Volt".
Revision E5.
BECO Drawing M239 " Post Accident Sampling & H and 0 Analyzer
2
2
System" Revision El dated September 13, 1985.
The inspector verified that the power supplies to the PASS could be
switched to the diesel generator after a loss of off-site power. A
self contained cooling unit was used to cool the sample.
The unit
would be inoperable after loss of off-site power.
Should this
happen after an accident, water from Fire Main System can be
supplied to the sample cooler by manually open two hand valves (one
for supply, one for discharge to sump).
The water from Fire Main
System does have sufficient head to perform this function.
No unacceptable conditions were identified.
9.3 Environmental Qualification of PASS Valves
The Pilgrim SER on PASS, section 2.0, Criterion 3 indicated that the
PASS valves which were not accessible after an accident were environ-
mentally qualified for the conditions in which they need to operate.
_
.
23
The PASS solenoid valves required to be operable for post accident
sample collection are SV-5065-63 through SV-5065-86. (24 valves
total)
The inspector randomly selected the EQ files of 4 valves (SV-5065-63
and 64, SV-5065-69 and 70) for review. The documents reviewed in-
cluded the Equipment Qualification Evaluation Sheet (EQES) for each
of the 4 valves, all dated June 11, 1985, and Wyle's Qualificattun
Report 47066-50V-8, Revision B dated June 21, 1985.
Within the scope of this review, the following matters requiring
licensee attention were identified:
a.
The model of the installed solenoid valves differed from the test
model.
The licensee tried to qualify the installed model by
similarity. However, evaluation of similarities and differences
between the installed model and the test model (e.g. organic
materials used and their thermal aging effect, coil temperature
rating, physical size and construction etc.) were not performed.
(50-293/85-27-45)
b.
The valve manufacturer recommended the 0-rings be replaced once
every five years. This was not addressed in the EQ file, Jus-
tification should be provided if this recommendation is not to
be implemented.
(50-293/85-27-46)
c.
Information Notice 84-68 identified field cable degradation
when connected to high power solenoid valves. This cable degra-
dation was caused by substantial temperature increase in the
solenoid housing. The effect of this should be addressed in
the EQ file.
(50-293/85-27-47)
9.4 Physical Observation of System Installation
The inspector physically observed the installed PASS and discussed
its operation with the licensee's I&C personnel. The licensee
stated that the instruments on the PASS panel were calibrated during
the preoperational test early this year. Although there were no
evidences that the calibrations of the PASS instruments were
overdue, there were no calibration schedules set up for these in-
struments.
Within the scope of this review, the following matter requiring
licensee attention was identified:
Review and evaluate the need to incorporate the periodic cal-
ibration of PASS instrumentation into the routine maintenance /
calibration program.
Critical instruments should be included
in such a program.
(50-293/85-27-48)
_
.
.
24
9.5 Containment'High Range Radiation Monitor (CHRRM)
9.5.1
EQ of CdRRM Detectors
.The inspector reviewed the EQ files of the CHRRM detectors to
ascertain whether the files contained sufficient evidence that
these detectors were qualified for the environmental conditions
in which they need to operate after an accident.
There were four CHRRM detectors in Pilgrim, two for Drywell
(RE1001-606A&B), and two for Suppression Pool (RE1001-607A&B).
These detectors were manufactured by General Electric Company.
RE1001-606A&B were mounted in capped pipe sections extending
into the drywell atmosphere from drywell outside wall.
RE1001-
607A&B were located in the secondary containment adjacent to
the suppression pool.
The following documents were reviewed:
BECO Equipment Qualification Evaluation Sheets for RE1001-
606A&B, RE1001-607A&B.
Advanced Systems Engineering Memo. Qualification of Gamma
Sensitive Ionization Chambers for Cams Post-Accident En-
vironmental Conditions, Report No. 943-81-003, April 24,
1981.
Environmental Qualification Test Report of Raychem WCSF-N
' Nuclear In-Line Cable Splice Assemblies for Raychem Cor-
poration Menlo Park, California. Report No. 58442-1,
May 15, 1980.
The inspector physically observed the installation conditions
of these four CHRRM detectors.
The following matters requiring licensee attention were
identified:
a.
The radiation exposure qualification data was not
contained in the EQ files. This data should be made
available for NRC review (50-293/85-27-49).
b.
The coaxial cables for the radiation detectors at the
Drywell were found laying on the floor and were subject to
being stepped on.
The licensee's May 18, 1982 letter in-
dicated the cables were-in conduit.
This appears to be a
Deviation from the information provided to the NRC.
,'
(50-293/85-27-50)
.
_. . . . _
_
__
_
.
.
._
_.
. _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - -
.
.
25
9.5.2
Power Supply to CHRRM Detectors
The inspector reviewed pertinent documents to ascertain that
safety related redundant emergency power supplies were used in
these four detectors.
The documents reviewed are identified in Attachment 7
(Section B) of this report.
The inspector verified that these four radiation detectors were
powered by safety related redundant power supplies channels A &
B.
1
Within scope of this review no unacceptable conditions were
f
identified.
j
)
9.6 Environmental Qualification of Containment Hydrogen Monitors
(Analyzers)
The inspector reviewed the EQ files of Containment Hydrogen Monitors
(C172 and C173) to ascertain whether the file contained sufficient
evidences that these hydrogen analyzers were qualified for the en-
vironmental conditions in which they were required to operate after
an accident.
The following documents were reviewed:
BECO Equipment Qualification Evaluation sheets for Hydrogen
Analyzer C172 & C173, both dated June 28, 1985.
Test Report 1035-1 " Prototype Qualification Test for Hydrogen
Analyzer System K-III & K-IV" Revision 1 dated September 1981
(COMSIP Inc.).
Each of the containment hydrogen monitors was a rather complex
system.
It consisted of numerous solenoid valves and automatic
sequencing circuits, sample pump, pressure regulator, flow meters,
etc. and a control cabinet.
Within the scope of this review, the following matter requiring
licensee's attention was identified:
Page 18 of the Test Report 1035-1 described the yearly, 5 year
and 10 year maintenance requirements for the H 0 analyzer.
22
The yearly maintenance requirement states " carefully inspect for
degradation, replace as necessary".
This description appears to
provide less than acceptable guidance relative to performing an
inspection of this safety related system.
The qualification
l
l
_ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ . _
.
.
.
26
maintenance for this-system was not available for review. The
licensee. should clearly identify the inspection acceptance
criteria.
(50-293/85-27-51)
10.
Exit Interview
The Post-Accident Sampling and Analysis Team met with licensee rep-
resentatives at the conclusion of the inspection on September 20,
1985. The Team Leader summarized the purpose, scope, and findings
of the inspection.
At no time during the inspection was written material provided to
the licensee.
_
--
.
.
ATTACHMENT 1
TO INSPECTION REPORT
50-293/85-27
PERSONS CONTACTED
A.
Licensee Personnel
- C. J. Mathes, Station Manager
- K. P. Roberts, Outage Coordinator
- J. F. Crowder, Senior Compliance Engineer
- A. Shatas, Acting Chief Chemical Engineer
- B. Eldridge, Assistant Chief Radiological Engineer, Operations-
- E. T. Graham, Compliance Management, Group Leader
J. Smallwood, Senior Chemical Engineer
- L. Dooley, Training Supervisor, Technical
- W. Hoey, Senior ALARA Engineer
- T. L. Sowdon, Radiological Section Head
- E. Rochelle, Energy Support Services
- T.
Kelley, Bartlett Nuclear
- N.
Eisenmann, CYGNA
- R. Andrew, I&C Engineering
- R. Velez, Project Manager, EQ
- E. De Lemos, Project Manager, TMI Modifications
.
- D. Sanford, Manager, Training
- P. J. Moraites
R. Fairbank, Deputy Manager of Engineering,-Nuclear
J. Pawlak, Power System Group Leader
L. Perfetti, Power System Engineer
R. Sherry, Assistant System Chief Maintenance Engineer
J Burbank, I&C Technician
.
M. Akhtar, Senior Modification Engineer
B.
NRC
- M. McBride, Senior Resident Inspector
0ther members of the licensee's staff were contacted and/or participated
in an exercise of post-accident and effluent monitoring systems during
the inspection.
- Denotes attendance at the exit interview on September 20, 1985.
- _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
_ _ _ _ _ - _
.
.
ATTACHMENT 2
TO INSPECTION REPORT
50-293/85-27
Documentation for NUREG-0737, II.B.3
Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station Emergency Procedures
.
2.2.113
"H2/02 Analyser and C-19 Systems," dated August 21, 1985.
-
5.7.4.1.1
" PASS Small Volume Liquid Sample From Jet Pump Flow
-
Sensing Line," dated September 4, 1985.
5.7.4.1.2
" PASS Undfluted Liquid Sample and Dissolved Gas Grab
-
Sample From Jet Pump Flow Sensing Lines," dated
September 4, 1985.
5.7.4.1.3
" PASS Small Volume Liquid Sample From Residual Heat
-
Removal System," dated September 8, 1985.
5.7.4.1.4
" PASS Undiluted Liquid Sample and Dissolved Gas Grab
-
Sample From Residual Heat Removal System," dated
September 4, 1985.
5.7.4.1.7
" PASS Dissolved Gas Measurement From Jet Pump Flow Sensing
-
Lines," dated September 4, 1985.
5.7.4.1.8
" PASS Dissolved Gas Measurement From RHR," dated September 4,
-
1985.
5.7.4.1.9
" PASS Iodine / Particulate Sample From Drywell," dated
-
September 4, 1985.
5.7.4.1.10
" PASS Iodine / Particulate Sample From Torus," dated
-
l
September 4, 1985.
!
5.7.4.1.11
" PASS Iodine / Particulate Sample From Reactor Building,"
-
dated September 4, 1985.
1
.
5.7.4.1.12
" PASS 14 ml Gas Sample From Drywell," dated September 4
-
'
1985.
5.7.4.1.13
" PASS 14 ml Gas Sample From Torus," dated September 4,
-
l
1985.
5.7.5
" Estimating Core Damage," dated August 21, 1985.
-
,
I
_ _ _ - _ _ _ -
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
.
.
2
6.5-305
" PASS Source Calibration of PASS Radiation Monitoring
-
Instruments," dated March 27, 1985.
7.11.1
" Analysis of Liquid Samples for Baron (By Spectrophoto-
-
metry) Under Accident Conditions," dated June 12, 1985.
7.11.2
" Analysis of Liquid Samples for Boror (By Plasma Spectro-
-
metry) Under Accident Conditions," dated June 12, 1985.
7.11.3
" Analysis of Liquid Samples for Chloride Under Accident
-
Conditions," dated July 17, 1985.
7.11.4
Radioisotopic Analysis of Liquid Samples Under Accident
-
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!
Conditions," dated June 12, 1985.
7.11.5
" Radioisotopic Analysis of Gas Samples Under Accident
-
Conditions," dated June 17, 1985.
7.11.6
" Radioisotopic Analysis of Iodine Cartridges Under Accident
-
Conditions," dated June 21, 1985.
l
7.11.7
" Radioisotopic Analysis of Particulate FtIters Under
-
Accident Conditions," dated June 12, 1985.
7.11.8
" Analysis of Dissolved Gas Sample (By Gas Chromatograph)
-
Under Accident Conditions," dated September 11, 1985.
'
TP 84-226
" Pre-operational Test for the Post Accident Sampling
-
System," dated October 26, 1984.
Other Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station Procedur_es
" Interim Safety Evaluation by the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
-
Relative to Technical Specifications Requested by Generic Letter 83-36,"
dated July 5, 1985.
I
" Safety Evaluation by The Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Post-
-
Accident Sampling System (NUREG-0737, Item II.B.3) " dated July 1,1985.
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ATTACNeeEMT 3
TO 198SPECTIOtt REPORT
50-293/85-27
COMPARISOM OF AMALYTICAL RESULTS
A.
Chemical Analysis
Bo ron
The test data were:
Analysis
Licensee
Actual
Commitment
Standard
Results
Coenitment
Pecuireme m
%Erro r
Meet
100 pps
90 ppa
+/- 10%
+/-50 ppa
-10%
Yes
500 ppm
460 ppe
+/- 1G%
+/-5%
- 3%
Yes
1000 ppa
1000 ppa
+/- 10%
+/-5%
0%
Yes
1 ppa
1.13 ppe
+/- 10%
10%
+13%
No
2 ppa
1.99 ppa
+/- 10%
10%
- 1%
Yes
5 pps
4.97 ppa
+/- 10%
10%
1%
Yes
-
10 paa
9.34 ppa
+/- 10%
10%
- 7%
Yes
Q.
Isotopic Anasysis
8toraa I
Licensee
NUREC-0737
Comeitaent
Isotope
Sink
Cormitment
Requirements
%Erro r
Meet
5-131
1.29D-4
1.53E-4
-50/+200-%
-50/+200%
+19%
Yes
,
8-132
4.62E-3
4.75E-3
-50/+200%
-50/+200%
+ 3%
Yes
i
8-133
1.67E-3
2.30E-3
-50/+200%
-50/+200%
+30%
Yes
I-134
1.39E-2
1.65E-2
-50/+200%
-50/+200%
+19%
Yes
I
8-135
5.01E-3
4.67E-3
-50/+200%
-50/+200%
- 7%
Yes
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ATTACHMENT 4
TO INSPECTION REPORT
50-293/85-27
Documentation for NUREG-0737. II.F.1-1.2
Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station Emergency Procedures
2.2.55
" Reactor Building Exhaust Radiation Monitoring System,"
-
Rev. 6, dated May 1, 1985.
5.7.2.18
"Offsite Dose Projections and Protective Action Guides for
-
the General Public," Rev. 4, dated June 8, 1983.
5.7.2.22
"Use of the Emergency Dose Assessment System (EDAS), Rev.
-
dated
5.7.2.23
"Use of Off-site Dose Rate Nomograms", Rev. 3, dated
-
June 8, 1983.
5.7.2.25
"Use of HP-85A Off-site Dose Calculators", Rev. 3, dated
-
August 7, 1985.
Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station Drawings
P. + I. D. M-282, " Plant Ventilation Diagram," Rev. E-4, dated
-
March 25, 1985.
Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station Construction Package
PDCR 79-62, " Noble Gas Effluent Monitoring System".
-
Licensee Correspondence
W. H. Deacon, Actg. Mgr., Nuc. Opns BECO to D. G. Eisenhut, Dir. DOL,
-
dated January 25, 1982.
W. H. Deacon, Actg. Mgr., Nr Opns BECO to D. G. Eisenhut, Dir. 00L, dated
-
April 16, 1982.
D. B. Vassallo, Chief, ORD #2 to A. V. Morisi, Mgr. Nuc1 Opns BECO, dated
-
May 10, 1982.
A. V. Mortsi, Mgr. Nuc. Opns BECO to 0. B. Vassallo, Chief, ORB #3,' 00L,
-
dated May 18, 1982.
,
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.
.
2
4
'.
A. V. Morisi, Mgr. Nuc. Opns, to D. G. Eisenhut, Dir. DOL, dated June 9,
-
1982.
D. B. Vassalo, Chief, ORB #2 to A. V. Morisi, Mgr. Nuc. Opns BECO Boston,
-
dated August 9, 1982.
A. V. Morist, Mgr. Nucl. Opns BECO, to D. B. Vassallo, Chief, ORB #2 00L,
-
'
dated September 14, 1982.
W. D. Harrington, Sr. VP, Nuclear BEC0, to D. B. Vassallo, Chief ORB #2
-
00L, dated August 9, 1984.
l
D. B. Vassallo, Chief, Operating ORB #2 DOL to W. D. Harrington, Sr. VP
-
Nuclear, BECO, dated December 17, 1984.
W. D. Harrington, Sr. VP Nuclear, BECO to D. B. Vassallo, Chief, ORB #2
-
'
DOL, dated February 27, 1985.
W. D. Harrington, Sr. VP Nuclear, BECO to D. B. Vassallo, Chief, ORB #2
-
DOL, dated May 18, 1985
,
D.-B. Vassallo, Chief, ORB #2 00L to W. D. Harrington, Sr. VP Nuclear,
=
-
BECO, dated July 5, 1985.
'
W. D. Harrington, Sr. VP Nuclear, BECO to D. B. Vassallo, Chief ORB #2
-
o
DOL, dated May 30, 1985.
.
,
NRC Memoranda
W. V. Johnston Asst. Dir. Materials, CEB to G. C. Lainas, Asst. Dir. for
-
,
Oper. Reactors, DOL, dated December 14, 1984,
i
)
Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station Drawings
J
. Drawing No. M239, Sh. 1-3, " Post Accident Sampling and H2 and 02 Analyzer
-
System," Rev. E3, dated September 13, 1985.
,
Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station References
11.t.1-1 and II.F.1-2
Procedures
5.7.3.3
Sampling, Transport and Analysis of Effluent Iodines and
-
Particulates from the Main Stack Under Emergency Condi-
tions, PIL 52-F1, dated December 28, 1982.
,
.,
- _ . . _ _ . _ _ .
. . _ . _ _ . . . _ . . - _ , - - _ . - _ _ _ . . _ _ . _ . _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ . . _ . _ _
_ _ _ _ _ . _
_ _ _ _
___
.
1
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5.7.3.4
" Sampling, Transport and Analysis of Effluent Iodines
-
and Particulates from the Reactor Building Vent Under
Emergency Conditions", Rev. 3, PIL 52-01, dated
December 28, 1982.
~5.7.3.5
" Sampling, Transport and Analysis of Effluent Iodines and
-
Particulates.from the Turbine Building Under Emergency
. Conditions", PIL 52-115, Rev. 2, dated December 28, 1982.
7.4.2.9
" Source Calibration of General Monitor High Range Noble
-
Gas Monitors", Rev. 1, dated November 24, 1984.
Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station Memoranda
R. A. Smith BECO to A.R. Trudeau, BECO, "Representativenats of
-
Samples from the Main Stack and the Reactor Building.Ver.t", PNPS
i
File HP-83-151, dated March 31, 1981.
!
R. A. Smith BECO to A. R. Trudeau, BECO, "NRC Inspection 83-12/
-
Follow-up Item 83-02-02, Representativeness of Samples from the Main
Stack and the Reactor Building Vents" PNPS File HP-83-283, dated
June 30, 1983.
ENTECH Engineering Co. Reports.
'
i -
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P10368
"A nomogram for Correlating the Effluent Sample-Line Filter
Radioactivity to the Amount of I-131 Released to the
Atmosphere", dated May 24, 1981.
P100-R2
" Didos-III, A Three-Dimensional Point - Kernel Shielding Code
-
for Cylindrical Sources", dated December 1980.
- P103EC1
" Pilgrim Station Unit 1 -Main Stack and Reactor building Vent
Monitors: Correlation Between Monitor Readings and Off-site
Whole Body Gamma Doses", Volumes I-III, dated June 1980.
P103-EC3 " Pilgrim Station Unit 1, Emergency Plan Engineering Calcula-
-
tions to Correlate Radiation Monitor Readings with Plant Re-
leases and Off-site Dose Rates", Vol. I-III, dated June 1980.
l
P100-R3
"A Nomogram for the Interpretation of I-131 Field Sample
-
Measurements Without the Need of Numberical Calculations", dated
l
January 1981.
!
Licensee r
- ondence
+
l
l
W. ' :iarritt, Mgr. Nuc. Engr. , BECO to D. G. Eisenhut, Dir. DOL, dated
-
l
February 27, 1981.
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.
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.
4
A. V. Morist, Mgr. Nuc. Opns. BECO to T. A. Ippolito, Chief, OR8 #2, DOL,
-
dated October 16, 1981.
T. A. Ippolito, Chief ORB #2, 00L to A. V. Morisi, Mgr. Nuc. Opns. BECO,
-
dated December 8, 1981.
D. B. Vassallo, Chief ORB #2, DOL to A. V. Morisi, Mgr. Nuc. Opns. BECO,
-
dated March 1, 1982.
W. H. Deacon, Accts. Manager, Opns, BECO to D. G. Eisenhut, Dir. 00L,
-
dated April 16,-1982.
' D. B. Vassallo, Chief, ORB #2, 00L to A. V. Morisi, Mgr. Nuc. Opns.,
-
BEC0, dated May 10, 1982.
A. V. Morisi, Mgr. Nuc. Opns, BECO to D. B. Vassallo, Cheif ORB #2 00L,
dated June 4, 1982.
_ A.1V. Morisi, Mgr. Nuc. Opns, BECO to D. G. Eisenhut, Dir. 00L, dated
-June 9, 1982.
-
D. B. Vassallo, Chief, ORB #2 00L, to A. V. Morisi, Mgr. Nuc. Opns. BECO,
dated August 25, 1982.
P. H. Leach, Proj. Mgr., ORB #2, to W. D. Harrington, Sr. VP Nuclear
BECO, dated November 7, 1984.
-W. D. Harrington, Sr. VP Nuclear BECO to D. B._Vassallo, Chief ORB #2
DOL, dated May 28, 1985.
NRC Memoranda
W. E. Kregar, Asst. Dir. Rad. Prot. DSI, to G. C. Lainas, Asst. Dir.
-
Safety Assessment D0L, dated October 23, 1981.
R. W. Houston, Asst. Dir. Rad. Prot. DSI to T. Novak, Asst. Dir. OR. DOL,
-
dated January 29, 1982.
R. W. Houston, Asst. Dir. Rad. Prot. DSI to T. Novak, Asst. Dir. OR. 00L,
-
dated April 26, 1982.
T. Eipen, R-1, Inspection Report 50-293/82-13 dated May 15, 1982.
-
.
M. Shambecky R-1, Inspection Report 50-293/83-02.
-
G. C. Lainas, Asst. Dir. OR, 00L to D. M. Crutchfield, Asst. Dir. Safety
-
Assessment, DOL, dated October 17, 1984.
.
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ATTACHMENT 5
,
i
TO INSPECTION REPORT 50-293/85-27
l
Documentation for NUREG-0737
,
ITEM, II.F.1.-3, High Range
'
Containment Monitor
G.
E.- Product System and Sensors Engineering MEMO No. 127-82-004, dated
i
December 20, 1982.
Letter, W. H. Deacon (BECO) to D.13. Eisenhut (NRC), dated March 25, 1982
(
,
'-
(BECO ltr. 82-91).
.
I
Letter, H. R. Balfour (BECO) to D. B. Vassallo (NRC), dated May 18, 1982
(BECO Ltr.82-145).
t
Letter, D. B. Vassallo (NRC) to A. V. Morisi (BECO), dated May 13, 1983.
[
Letter, W. D.- Harrington (BECO) to D. 8. Vassallo (NRC), dated June 1,1983.
7
NRC Inspection Report 50-293/83-02, dated February 23, 1983.
!
Procedure No. 5.7.5, Revision 0, estimating Core Damage, dated March 6, 1985.
,
!
Procedure No. 5.7.2.18, Revision 4, Offsite Dose Projections and Protection
Action Guides for the General Public, dated June 8, 1983.
!
Procedure No. 6.5.-296, Revision 1, Source Calibration of the Containment High
Radiation Monitoring System, dated February 10, 1984.
Varicus Emergency Plan Qualification Cards.
s
!
daedJu$y$b,i98.
1
r
l
Procedure No. 2.3.2.4, Revision 5, Panel 904 Left Control Room, dated
i
December 14, 1984.
1
t'
Procedure No. 5.7.2.22, Revision 3, Use of the Emergency Dose Assessment
System (EDAS),datedAugust7,1985.
Procedure No._2.2.124 Revision 4, Containment High Rad Monitor System, dated
'
May 22, 1985,
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ATTACHMENT 6
TO INSPECTION REPORT
50-293/85-27
Documentation for NUREG-0737
Item III.D.3.3. Inplant Iodine
Letter, D. 8. Vassallo (NRC) to A. V. Morist (BECO), dated April 8,1982.
Letter, A. V. Morisi (BECO) to D. B. Vassallo (NRC), dated May 5,1982 (BECO)
Ltr82-118).
Procedure No. 5.7.2.19, Revision 0, In-Plant I-131 Air Sampling and Analysis,
dated April 1, 1981.
Procedure No. SI-RP.5700, Revision 0, Calibration of Eberline RAS-1
Regulation Air Samples, dated August 22, 1985.
Procedure No. SI-RP.4701, Revision 0, Operation of the RADS Co Model H809V
Air Sampler, dated August 22, 1985.
Procedure No. PNPS SI-RP 4700, Revision 0, Operation of the RAS-1 Am Sampler,
dated August 22, 1985.
Procedure No. SI-RP.5701, Revision 0, Calibration of Radus Model H809V Air
Sampler, dated August 22, 1985.
Procedure No. 6.5-287, Revision 9 Calibration of Eberline SAM-2, dated
July 12, 1985.
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ATTACHMENT 7
PASS QA AND DESIGN / INSTALLATION RECORDS
A.
General Design and Installation
Boston Edison P&ID No M239 " Post Accident Sampling and H &0
2
2
Analyzer System".
Sheet 1 Revision E4 dated June 1985, Sheet 2 Re-
vision E3 dated September 13, 1985, Sheet 3 Revision E4 dated
September 13, 1985.
GE Document No. C5474-SP-1 "BWR Generic PASS Design Requirements"
Revision 1 dated November 24, 1980.
GE Document No. C5475-SP-5 "LOCA Sampler Installation" Revision 2
dated March 3, 1981.
Boston Edison Field Revision Notice FRN 80-31-120 dated April 21,
1983 " PASS Modification Sample Supply and Return Piping Installa-
tions & Tie-in".
Boston Edison FRN 80-31 Attachment A "Special Procedures for Welding
to Valcor Engineering Model V5265-5295 Solenoid Valves - to avoid
overheating of valve, rubber seat welding."
Boston Edison FRN 80-31-142 " Work Installation for the Removal and
,
Replacement of Valve Nos. SV-5065-72, SV-5077 and 5078, Liquid
Sample Return Line Containment Isolation Valves".
4 pages
B.
Power Supplies to High Range Containment Monitors
BECO Schematic Diagram E550 Sheet 1 " Containment High Radiation PAM
System - Channel A" Revision El dated May 7, 1985.
BECO Schematic Diagram E550 Sheet 2 " Containment High Radiation PAM
System - Channel B" Revision El dated May 7, 1985.
BECO Drawing SE 155 " Station Electrical Single Line Composite
Diagram, 4.16KV & 480V AC System" Sheet 1, Revision E10 dat.d Feb-
ruary 18, 1985 and Sheet 2 Revision Ell dated December 25, 1984.
BECO Wiring Diagram M227A3 " Post Accident Monitoring C170" Sheet 1,
Revision E2.
Beco Wiring Diagram M227A5 " Post Accident Monitoring C171" Sheet 1,
Revision E2.
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