ML20136E832
| ML20136E832 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Catawba  |
| Issue date: | 03/12/1997 |
| From: | Tam P NRC (Affiliation Not Assigned) |
| To: | NRC (Affiliation Not Assigned) |
| References | |
| TAC-M98107, TAC-M98108, NUDOCS 9703130338 | |
| Download: ML20136E832 (2) | |
Text
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g UNITED STATES s
j NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION l
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20666-0001
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- March 12, 1997 l
MEMORANDUM FOR: iDocket Filet y FROM:
Peter S. Tam, Senior Project Manager Project Directorate II-2 T
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Division of Reactor Projects - I/II M
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
SUBJECT:
CATAWBA UNITS 1 AND 2 - PUTTING A DOCUMENT IN THE PUBLIC l
DOCUMENT ROOM (TAC M98107 and M98108)
The attached message was faxed today to. Mike Kitlan of Duke Power Company.
The sole purpose of the message is to prepare Duke Power Company personnel for a conference call. The message itself does not constitute a formal request for information or represent a formal NRC staff position.
-Docket Numbers 50-413 and 50-414 Distribut.ign PUBLIC H. Berkow M. Shuaibi W. Lefave G. West J. Hayes i
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L 9703130338 970312 y
DR ADOCK 0500 3
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ISSUES FOR AN UPCOMING CONFERENCE CALL Catawba's 3/7/97 submittal requested approval of local manual operator actions l
to operate a steam generator PORV following an SGTR event.
However, it has not provided sufficient information for the staff to make a determination as to l
whether manual operation is acceptable:
1.
Justification (accessibility, lighting, operator qualifications, communications, etc.) for the time assumed in the analyses of steam generator overfill and dose consequences for the operator to complete the manual actions.
2.
The maximum time that could be credited for operator actions without exceeding the acceptance criteria of the analyses, i.e.,
how much time is actually available for the operator to perform the necessary actions.
3.
The iodine-131 concentration assumed in the Catawba analysis (administrative limit) and what concentration will be assumed in the final analysis. Also, how do they compare to the original analysis?
4.
The complete SGTR FSAR section markups as a result of the reanalysis of the SGTR accident, including tables and graphs of the different parameters as is included in the current FSAR.
5.
The assumptions used in the new analysis and the sequence of events, including a justification of each assumption that is different from the current analysis of record and a discussion of the effect of the change on the parameters analyzed.
6.
In the submittal, Catawba use the BTP RSB 5-1 criteria of local manual operator action to support its justification of local manual operation of the SG PORV during the SGTR scenario.
The SGTR and the BTP RSB 5-1 scenarios are quite different.
Can local i
manual operation of the SG PORV during a SGTR accident be justified without reliance on the more lax criteria of BTP RSB 5-I 17 (Either provide further justification of the use of the BTP
(
RSB 5-1 criteria or provide a justification for local manual operation of the valves without reliance on BTP RSB 5-1.)
l 7.
' n page 15-100 of the FSAR, in the last paragraph, the text is O
changed from, "... bounded by feedwater line break coastdown transient from an elevated RCS temperature...." to " complete loss p
of flow.", This change needs explanation.
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