ML20136E446

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Investigation Rept 70-1193/75-09 on 750714-15.Noncompliance Noted:Packaging Matls Not Compatible W/Contents Per 10CFR71.12(b) & 71.31(a)
ML20136E446
Person / Time
Site: 07001193
Issue date: 08/14/1975
From: Allan J, Finn J, Fisher W, Hind J, Ridgway K
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
To:
Shared Package
ML20136E405 List:
References
FOIA-85-644 70-1193-75-09, 70-1193-75-9, NUDOCS 8511210488
Download: ML20136E446 (7)


Text

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U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT N

REGION III

  • IE Investigation Report No. 070-1193/75-09 '

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Subject:

Kerr-McGee Nuclear Corporation

  • Kerr-McGee Center

Exothermic reaction in a waste package during a shipment to Nuclear Engineering Company, Inc. at Beatty, Nevada on June 24-25, 1975.

i l Period of Investigation: July 14-15, 1975 4

Investigators: 6 2

/ p . R. Ridgway (Date) ,

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bwn227. //Ib tw-W

( J' A. Finn (Date)

Reviewed by fff/L .

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/& W / *-l'/-M

. L. Fisher ,w (Date) '

Senior Health Physicist - -

' Facilities Radiological Protection Section

.; +1W G N f /ffU lY ~I James M. Allan, Chief XDatie) adiological and Environmental i

i ,, Protection Branch m_

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//.A. Hind, Chief (Date) ,.

/ Materials and Plant Protection '

Branch t J

6%D 89** 8

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M CN mapp REASON FOR INVESTICATION Nuclear Engineering Company, Inc. (NECO) notified IE:III by telephone on July 2,1975, that an exothermic reaction had occurred on June 25, 1975 in a Kerr-McGee Nuclear Corporation (K-M) waste shipment to NECO's Beatty, Nevada burial site. I

SUMMARY

OF FACTS ,

On June 30, 1975, NECO notified K-M that their vaste shipment of June 24, 1975 to "NECO's" radioactive waste burial facility at Beatty, Nevada had contained a box that was found to be hot to the touch. The box sides were darkened as if scorched from heat within the box. The box was identified by K-M to be an intermediate 24" X 24" X 12" High Efficiency Particulate Filter (HEPA) from the Scrap Recovery Operations, Room 127. One of the processes in this room in Glovebox 25, is the dissolution of mixed oxide pellets and oxides for purification. The dissolution is carried out batchwise in a covered 4-quart Corningware """"*

Casserole dish on a hot plate. Nitric oxide gases and water vapor escaping f rom the covered dish are evacuated through four primary 8" X 8" X 8" HEPA filters and a PVC duct to a 24" X 24" X 12" HEPA intermediate filter located in a stainless steel enclosure near the ceiling of Room 127. From there the air travels through stainless ducts to two final filter banks and exhaust fans located in the second story, each containing six, 24" X 24" X 12" HEPA filters.

One of these systems is standby backup.

Since January 1, 1975, 41 intermediate and 14 final filters have been removed from service because of plugging and decreased capacity. Of the above filters only six have been used in the wet acid systems in Rooms 127 or B-01.

Further shipment of HEPA Filters was halted and a Health and Safety ~

Nonconformance Report (Pu-5) was issued on July 1,1975. The -

results of K-M's investigation attributed the cause to a nitric acid reaction with cellulose material either within the package or the packaging itself. This is in noncompliance with 10 CFR 71.12(b) and 71.31(a) which require a package or the packaging materials to be compatible with the contents. This infraction had the potential for causing or contributing to an occurrence >=-w=

related to health cnd safety.

The licensee has written procedures for the handling of cellulose materials and filters from all nitric acid systems. The materials will be either washed or leached with water or burned in a calciner.

HEPA filters from acid systems will be immediately transferred to a glovebox where they will be washed, dried and packaged for burial.

..- P rh twx th Swr REPORT DETAILS

1. Personnel Contacted Nuclear Engineering Company, Inc. (NECO)

I Moorehead, Kentucky

  • 9 B. Roberts, Vice President, Corporate Sales J. Lenard, Radiation Safety Officer Beatty, Nevada
  • Bill Mitchell, Radiation Safety Officer Kerr-McGee Nuclear Corporation M. Moore, Manager, Cimarron Facility D. E. Rhodes, Superintendent, Plutonium Plant ""

M. Binstock, Manager, Laboratory Operations and Quality Control R. Janka, Manager, Administration and Accounting A. W. Norwood, Manager, Health Physics and Technical Services B. J. Buntz, Manager, Engineering, Technical Services and Maintenance

2. Description of Incident On July 2,1975, Nuclear Engineering Company, Inc. (NECO) notified IE:III by telephone that they had received a vaste shipment from Kerr-McGee Nuclear Corporations' (K-M) Cimarron Facility at their Beatty, Nevada 'iurial site on June 25, 1975.

On the morning of June 26, when the Super Tiger model shipping package *, Certificate of Compliance No. 6400 was opened the crew noted a slight grey colored haze inside. They notified the site Radiation Safety Officer who checked for contamination and found none. The shipment consisted of thirty, 55-gallon

  • A protective overpack which provides containment, impact resistance and thermal resistance for its contents. The con-tainment vessel (cavity) is approximately 76' X 76" X 172" constructed of. 3/16" thick and 10-gage mild steel. The overall **'Wa dimensions are approximately 8' X 8' X 20', and the total weight including weight of the contents is 45,000 pvunds. Closure of the containment vessel is by a k" thick aluminum plate with silicone rubber gasket which is bolted to the containment vessel.

A pressure fitting with cap on the closure plate provides a means for leak testing. The containment vessel is centered and supported in an outer 3/16" thick steel jacket by approximately 32" of polyurethane foam insulation at the end and 10" on the sides.

The cavity will hold a total of 42, standard SS-gallon drums double stacked.

6% VI* Wfb g.

drums (14 cemented plutonium wastes,14 miscellaneous plutonium wastes and 2 enriched uranium dissolver heels), 14 packaged 24" x.24" x 12" HEPA filters and 7 cement blocks.' The shipment was unloaded normally. During the unloading and midway in the Super Tiger were 3 boxed filters sitting together on edge on top of cemented waste drums. The middle box was found to be '

hot to the touch through work gloves, and on one side of the I package the filament type scaling tape had fused to the surface of an adjacent box. The surfaces of the middle box looked darkened or scorched. Radiation smears revealed only minimal contamination ( 6. 450 counts per minute) and no other contamination was detected on other containers or in the Super

  • Tiger. The box was immediately buried individually by hand without problem. During the unloading a drum near the hot filter box but not directly underneath, was found to be warm -

to the touch through work gloves and the drums around it were also warm. The unloading of the shipment was completed without problems.

Before the hot filter box was buried, an identification tag ***

was removed along with pieces of tape used to seal the DOT Specificaton 12B fiberboard box. Through the identification tag K-M was able to identify and obtain the history of the enclosed filter.

NECO notified the licensee of the problem on June 30, 1975 and IE:III and state of Nevada on July 2,1975. The shipment of HEPA filters ceased at this time until the cause could be determined and corrective actions taken.

The filter was identified as an intermediate filter from Scrap 1 Recovery Room 127 containing an estimated 1.56 grams of plutonium.

There are three stages of HEPA filtration in the acid process gloveboxes servicing Scrap Recovery: ~

a. Primary filtration consists of one or more 8" x 8" x 8" HEPA filters at each glovebox.
b. A single 24" x 24" x 12" HEPA filter serving each Scrap Recovery Room, Rooms 127 and B-01.

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c. Final filtration consists of a bank of six 24" x 24" x 12" HEPA filters. Duct work and enclosures are either PVC or stainless steel which are acid resistant.

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Specifications for filters used in the acid systems are as follows: Filter medium of waterproof glass with aluminum separators. The frame is of three-fourths inch' fire resistant particle board and the sealant is fire resistant foam. Sponge neoprene gaskets are used on one filter face. The filters are designed for use up to 250 degrees F. The medium has a high wet strength. {*

There were four general types of waste on the loaded Super

  • Tiger:
a. General plutonium plant wastes packaged in one or more cans, polyethylene (PE) bottles or wrapped in one or '

more layers of PE. All wastes are solid and dry. These are placed in a DOT Specification 17H drum with a 4 mil PE liner.

b. Cemented process wastes, liquid waste solidified in cement in 17H drums with 50 mi PE liners.

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c. HEPA filters, double bagged in PE and double boxed in the receiving carton and a DOT 12B carton.
d. Enriched uranium scrap dissolver heel residuals packaged in a DOT 17H drum with a PE liner.

Since cemented waste drums were in the Super Tiger shipment, thermal tests were conducted and it was concluded that these were not the source of heat. The tests showed a maximum temperature in the center of the drum of 65 degrees C. (150 degrees F.) 5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br /> af ter mixing. The center temperature dropped to 55 degrees C. 22 hours2.546296e-4 days <br />0.00611 hours <br />3.637566e-5 weeks <br />8.371e-6 months <br /> af ter mixing at which time the drum surface temperature was only 30 degrees C.

The licensee tested the various HEPA filter components with concentrated and dilute nitric acid. There was no significant reaction with the media, media separators, or sealant. There was a slight reaction with the particle board frame and the neoprene gasket was softened. The licensee also had installed a mild steel band around the filter frame to use as a handle for removing the filters from the housing. The steel band and nitric acid reacted vigorously. p====

No heat generation problems had been experienced previously with either the 8" x 8" or 24" x 24" HEPA filters, but on April 4, 1974, nitric fumes were released in the storage vault I

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WP W from a packaged 24 x 24 intermediate filter. The filter was washed and dried before being shipped to burial.1/ i

. - The shipping of flammable solids or' oxidizing materials in a DOT Specification 12B carton is in noncompliance with 10 CFR

, 71.12(b) since the licensee did not comply with the terms l and conditions of the certificate of compliance nor with )

i l

10 CFR 71.31(a) " Packaging shall be of such materials and -

construction that there will be no significant chemical,

  • galvanic, or other reaction among the packaging
  • components, or between the packaging and the package content."

In addition, the release of corrosive fumes into the glovebox e l

filtering system does not meet the criteria of Regulatory l

Guide 3.12 " General Design Guide for Ventilation Systema of l Plutonium Processing and Fuel Fabrication Plants."

l I

l To prevent recurrence, the licensee proposes to transfer acid  ;

system HEPA filters to a glovebox immediately af ter removal from service. The filters will be washed to remove nitric m acid, dried, and packaged for shipment. No change in the present method of packaging is planned. The present packaging consists of a 4 mil PE bag around the filter which is then placed in the original fiberboard filter shipping carton. The carton is then packaged in a second 4 mil PE bag. The final package is a DOT Specification 128 fiberboard carton sealed with fila-ment type tape.

i Filters from the acid systems, both primary and secondary, have historically been low in plutonium content so that these filters are not normally stored for rework but shipped to l burial on a subsequent waste shipment. The licenses has l minimal storage space for wastes and shipments to burial are ,

l kept current with almost weekly shipments. L For the long term, the licensee stated they would be designing a system to remove nitrogen oxide gases and water vapor from l the nitric acid dissolvers, located in Rooms 127, B-01 and 129.

l 1

P'r'88 J/ IE Inspection Rpt No. 070-1193/75-06.

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...* .. M UNITED STATES .h 6 g

'. - NUCLEAR REOULATORY COMMISSION REGION Ill 799 , ROOSEVELT RO AD OLEN ELLYN. ILLINOIS 60937

  • c* n r e .. e.

LOCAL PUBLIC DOCUMENT ROOMS g Enclosed are copies of documents listed below relating to .

Kerr-McGee Nuclear Corporation ', Docket No(s). 70-1193 .

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Letter to Kerr-McGee Nuclear Corporation dtd August 15, 1975 from J. A. Hind with IE Investigation Rpt No. 070-1193/75-09, Memo to Thornburg dtd August 15, 1975 with IE Investigation Rpt No.

070-1193/75-09 from J. A. Hind.

Reply from W. J. Shelley, Director Regulation and Control, dated September 5, 1975.

8=='**t Letter to Kerr-McGee Nuclear Corporation, dated September 10, 1975, from Jack A. Hind.

I L

j This correspondence is submitted pursuant to arrangements made by the Public Proceedings Branch, Of fice of the Secretary, for use by the public.

1 l Where possible, these materials should be punched and filed in a j folder labeled as follows:

CORRESPONDENCE TO AND FROM APPLICANT OR LICENSEE (Excluding Environm<mtal and Antitrust) -

, .s..c, bJ NI.y;4 ~ ,'

I James C. Keppler Regional Director i

l Enclosures M**tt l As noted above l cci Washington Public Document Room, w/enci

( Central Pa!14. Files Unit, Document Room Clerk, w/o enci e

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