ML20135G081
| ML20135G081 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | South Texas  |
| Issue date: | 09/05/1985 |
| From: | Kadambi N Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | Knighton G Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8509180135 | |
| Download: ML20135G081 (10) | |
Text
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SEP 5 1985 Docket Nos.: 50-498 and 50-499 MEMORANDUM FOR: George W. Knighton, Chief Licensing Branch No. 3, DL FROM:
N. Prasad Kadambi, Project Manager Licensing Branch No. 3, DL
SUBJECT:
NOTICE OF MEETING WITH HOUSTON LIGHTING & POWER COMPANY'S HL&P) SOUTH TEXAS PROJECT TO DISCUSS POWER SYSTEMS BRANCH MECHANICAL) QUESTIONS DATE & TIME:
September 9, 1985 September 10, 1985 1:00 pm 8:00 am LOCATION:
Rooms P-110 and P-118 respectively 7920 Norfolk Avenue Bethesda, Maryland PURPOSE:
This meeting is a follow-up to HL&P's response to a staff l
request for additional information (dated April 24,1985) and information presented at a July 2,1985 meeting (HL&P letter dated July 23,1985). The applicant has provided draft responses (see Attachment) which will comprise the agenda items for this meeting.
PARTICIPANTS:
NRC N. P. Kadambi, A. Ungaro, R. Giardina HL&P Bechtel M. Powell, et al.
J. Atwell, et al.
OhiG.INAl. 5tGNED BV N. Prasad Kadambi, Project Manager Licensing Branch No. 3. DL
Enclosure:
As stated i
cc: See next page l,
Note: NRC meetings are open to be observed by interested members of the public.
I If interested, please contact N. P. Kadambi at (301) 424-0508.
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South Texas Mr. J. H. Goldberg William S. Jordan, III, Esq.
Group Vice President, Nuclear Harmon, Weiss & Jordan Houston Lighting and Power Company 2001 S Street, N.W.
P. O. Box 1700 Suite 430 Houston, Texas 77001 Washington, D. C.
20009 Brian Eerwick, Esq.
Mr. J. T. Westermeir Assistant Attorney General Manager, South Texas Pro.iect Environmental Protection Division Houston Lighting and Power Company P. O. Box 12548 P. O. Box 1700 Capitol Station Houston, Texas 77001 Austin, Texas 78711 Mr. E. R. Brooks Mr. Claude E. Johnson, Resident Mr. R. L. Range Inspector / South Texas Pro.iect Central Power and Light Company c/o U. S. NRC P. O. Box 2121 P. O. Box 910 Corpus Christi, Texas 78403 Bay City, Texas 77414 Mr. H. L. Peterson Mr. Jonathan Davis Mr. G. Pokorny Assistant City Attorney i
City of Austin City of Austin 4
P. O. Box 1088 P. O. Box 1088 I
Austin, Texas 78767 Austin, Texas 78767 Mr. J. B. Poston Mr. A. Von Rosenberg Ms. Pat Coy City Public Service Board Citizens Concerned About Nuclear P. O. Box 1771 Power San Antonio, Texas 78296 5106 Casa Oro San Antonio, Texas 78233 Jack R. Newman, Esq.
Newman & Holtzinger, P.C.
Mr. Mark R. Wisenberg 1615 L Street, NW Manager, Nuclear Licensing Washington, DC 20036 Houston Lighting and Power Company P. O. Box 1700 Melbert Schwartz,Jr.. Esq.
Houston, Texas 77001 Baker 1, Botts One Shell Plaza Mr. Charles Halligan Houston, Texas 77002 Mr. Burton L. Lex Bechtel Corporation Mrs. Peggy Buchorn P. O. Box 2166
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Executive Director Houston, Texas 77001 Citizens'for Equitable Utilities, Inc.
Route 1, Box 1684 i
Brazoria, Texas 77422 4
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Regional Administrator - Region IV U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 611 Ryan Plaza Drive Suite 1000 Arlington, Texas 76011 Mr. Lanny Sinkin Citizens Concerned About Nuclear Power 3022 Porter St. N. W. #304 Washington, D. C.
20008 Mr. S. Head HL&P Representative Suite 1309 7910 Woodmont Avenue Bethesda, Maryland 20814
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Attachment 1.
STP has already provided response to this concern (9.5.2.3.1) with the exception of part 5.
Refer to STP response to Q040.10 including Table Q 040.10-1.
The STP comunication system provides an integrated design that will l
provide effective comunication between plant personnel in all vital areas during normal plant operation and during the full spectrum of accident or incident conditions (including fire) under maximum potential noise levels. This conforms with the requirements of Standard Review Plan 9.5.2 (NUREG 0800).
The areas (working stations) described by STP's response in Q040.10 are the only areas in the plant for which comunication is necessary to support safe shutdown of the plant or mitigation of the consequences of an accident. No other areas are considered to be " vital", with respect to the need for comunications, or are necessary to support safe shutdown or accident mitigation activities. STP's response including the list of subject areas is similar to those of other previously reviewed plants.
With respect to part 5 regarding performance /preoperational tests for comunications, refer to Section 14.2.12.2 item 19. Q40.10 will be revised to reflect that this is found in 14.2.12.2.
(Ref. 9.5.2.3.1) 2.
In response to the concern regarding comunication system functionality following a DBE (9.5.2.3.2), we note that the STP design is such that it is not necessary for operators to leave the control room to bring the plant to safe shutdown during or after a seismic event.
Additionally, as stated in the response to Q430.77N the following subsystems will be available during and after a DBE:
- 1) Sound powered Maintenance Jacks
- 2) Hand-held radio transceiver
- 3) Telephone EPBAX (Ref. 9.5.2.3.2) 3.
Section 9.5.2 and the response to Q430.76N have been revised to address Inspection and Testing.
(Ref. 9.5.2.3.3) 4.
STP has already provided response to this concern. Refer to Table
- 9. 5.3 -1.
l The STP lighting system provides an integrated design that provides adequate emergency station lighting in all areas, from onsite power sources, required for fire fighting, control and maintenance of safety-related equipment, and the access routes to and from these t
areas. This conforms with Standard Review Plan 9.5.3 (NUREG 0800).
The areas (working stations) described by STP's response in Q430.78N I
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and Table 9.5.3-1 represent the only areas in the plant for which lighting is necessary to support safe shutdown of the plant or mitigation of consequences of an accident. No other areas are considered to be " vital" with respect to the need for lighting or are necessary to support safe shutdown or accident mitigation activities.
STP's response including the list of subject areas is similar to those of other previously reviewed plants.
For additional descriptive information related to this concern refer to Section 9.5.3 and the responses to Q430.80N, Q430.81N, and Q430.82N.
(Ref. 9.5.3.3.1) 5.
As sated in our response to Q430.82N and described in Section 9.5.3.2 STP utilizes an integrated emergency lighting system to provide l
adequate emergency station illumination levels. This conforms to Standard Review Plan 9.5.3 (NUREG 0800) which states that "... the emergency lighting system (s) is acceptable if the integrated design of j
the system (s) will provide adequate emergency station lighting in all areas, from onsite power sources, required for fire fighting, control and maintenance of safety-related equipment, and the access routes to i
and f rom these areas...". Ten foot-candles at work stations and two to f
five at access / egress routes are provided via the integrated use of STP's Essential AC Lighting System and the Emergency DC Lighting System as described in Section 9.5.3.
These areas are provided with lighting powered from onsite sources as shown on Table 9.5.3-1.
(Ref. 9. 5.3.3.2 )
6.
Section 9.5.3 has been revised to include a new Section 9.5.3.3 titled l
Safety Evaluation.
Backup de lighting has been discussed for all areas needing backup lighting as described in 9.5.3.2 and Table 9.5.3-1.
[
Portable de lighting has been discussed in STP's response to Q430.78N i
and in the Fire hazards Analysis Report.
i Note that the non-safety related DG (the TSC DG) is not common to Units I and 2.
One TSC DG is provided for each unit. The only coninon DG utilized for lighting is the non-Class lE DG which powers the yard area
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lighting which is not necessary for any emergency situations. This DG j
-is independent of the TSC DG's.
(Ref. 9.5.3.3.4 )
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7.
The STP design is such that it is not necessary for operators to leave i
f the control room to being the plant to safe shutdown during or after a seismic event. Note also that the control room, auxiliary shutdown panel an transfer switch panels are provided with backup power from l
Class lE DG's. These DG's are also protected from the effects of a seismic event and tornado missile impacts. See also FSAR Section l
9.5.3.1 item 2.
(Ref. 9.5.3.3.4)
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8.
The response to Q430.58N has been revised to address housecleaning measures as well as the use of dust-tight enclosures.
(Ref.
j
- 9. 5.4.1. 3.2 )
9.
The response to Q430.28N has been revised to provide more detailed infonnation on training for the emergency diesel generators.
(Ref.
- 9. 5.4.1. 3.3 )
i
- 10. Section 9.5.5.6 has been revised to include the loading requirements of the DG during testing and troubleshooting.
(Ref. 9.5.4.1.3.4 )
- 11. The response to Q430.102 has been revised to address this concern.
(Ref. 9.5.4.1.3.5) j
- 12. The response to Q430.24N has been revised to incorporate a final equipment check.
(Ref. 9.5.4.1.3.6)
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- 13. The response to Q430.24N has been revised to incorporate a brief discussion of the Preventive Maintenance program.
(Ref. 9.5.4.1.3.7 )
- 14. The concern in the past has been vibrations causing instrumentation problems on DG skid mounted panels. As described in the response to
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Q430.25N, the panels are not located on the DG skid and they have been
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vibration aged as part of their equipment qualification program.
(Ref.
- 9. 5.4.1. 3. 8 )
5 15.
Section 9.5.4.l(5) has been revised to reflect the industry standards which are met by the diesel mounted piping. Also see the revised l
response to Q430.47N.
(Ref. 9. 5.4.2.3.1.1)
- 16. Section 9.5.4.2 has been revised to reflect a description of the fuel i
oil drain tank and transfer pump.
(Ref. 9.5.4.2.3.1.2 )
- 17. Section 9.5.4.3 has been revised to describe the project's internal
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corrosion protection program for the FOST and AF0ST. (Ref.
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- 9. 5.4.2.3.2.1 )
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- 18. Section 9.5.4.4 has been revised to reflect the frequency of calibration for the instrumentation.
(Ref.9.5.4.2.3.2.2)
- 19. The response to Q040.20 provides STP's connitment to the McGuire Tech Specs with the noted exception.
(Ref. 9.5.4.2.3.3.3.1) i
- 20. Section 9.5.4.4 has been revised to indicate the frequency of water removal in both the FOST and AFOST.
(Ref. 9.5.4.2.3.3.2) t
- 21. The types of maintenance and testing of the cathodic protection system have been been added to Section 9.5.4.3.
(Ref. 9.5.4.2.3.3.3) 6019N:0249N/3
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- 22. This is a staff open item on themselves. However, please refer to Question numbers 40.22, 430.46N, 430.86N, and 430.98N for our responses to this topic.
(Ref. 9.5.4.2.3.4 )
- 23. Section 9.5.4.3 has been revised to reflect the design of the emergency fill connection with respect to tornado protection.
(Ref.
9.5.4.2.3.5.1)
- 24. A description of the emergency fill connection was transmitted in letter ST-HL-AE-1268, Section 9.5.4.3 and Figure 9.5.4-1 (Amd. 49) reflect the connection which consists of a filter and a locked closed ASME III valve.
(Ref. 9.5.4.2.3.5.2)
- 25. The response to Q430.86N has been revised to state that adequate head is available on the tank trucks to pump the oil to the emergency fill connection.
(Ref. 9. 5.4.2.3.5.3 )
- 26. Section 9.5.5.1 has been revised to reflect the industry standards which are met by the diesel mounted piping. Also see tne revised response to Q430.47N.
(Ref. 9.5.5.3.1)
- 27. Section 9.5.5.4 has been revised to reflect the frequency of calibration for the cooling water instrumentation.
(Ref. 9.5.5.3.2 )
- 28. The response to Q430.91N has been revised to include a more detailed discussion of this concern.
(Ref. 9.5.5.3.3)
- 29. The response to Q430.102 has been revised to address this concern..
(Ref. 9.5.5.3.4 )
l
- 30. Section 9.5.6.1 has been revised to reflect the industry standards which are met by the diesel mounted piping. Also see the revised response to Q430.47N.
(Ref.9.5.6.3.1)
- 31. Section 9.5.6.5 has been revised to reflect the calibration frequency of the starting air system instrumentation.
(Ref. 9. 5.6.3.2 )
- 32. Section 9.5.6.2 has been revised to reflect the pre-and after filters located in the system to prevent oil carryover from the compressor.
(Ref. 9.5.6.3.3)
- 33. Section 9.5.6.5 has been revised to indicate the period of inspection for the air dryer.
(Ref. 9.5.6.3.4 )
- 34. The response to Q430.94N has been revised to reflect the fact that no instrument air is required to provide the safety trips or support operation of the diesel in the emergency mode.
(Ref.9.5.6.3.5) l L
6019N:0249N/4 i
- 35. Section 9.5.7.1 has been revised to reflect the industry standards which are met by the diesel mounteu piping. Also see the revised response to Q430.47N.
(Ref. 9.5.7.3.1)
- 36. Section 9.5.7.5 has been revised to include the calibration frequency of the lube oil instrumentation.
(Ref. 9.5.7.3.2 )
- 37. Section 9.5.7.2 has been revised to include the frequency of lube oil inspection.
(Ref. 9.5.7.3.3 )
- 38. The existing response to NRC Question 430.99N is acceptable. The direction for lube oil filling will be in a procedure which will clearly identify which connection is to be used.
(Ref. 9.5.7.3.4 )
- 39. Section 9.5.8.1 has been revised to reflect the industry standards which are met by the diesel mounted piping. Also see the revised response to Q430.47N.
(Ref. 9.5.8.3.1)
- 40. Section 9.5.8.5 has been revised to provide the frequency of calibration of the combustion air intake and exhaust instrumentation.
(Ref. 9.5.8.3.1)
- 41. As stated in Section 9.5.8.3, the methodology used was that found in R.G. 1.7 8.
Thus, the X/Q method described in Appendix 8 was used to determine the worst case (centerline) concentration of the N2 gas at the intake to the DG.
This concentration was then used to displace oxygen at the intake to arrive at the total displaced oxygen of 17%.
(Ref. 9.5.8.3.3)
- 42. The results of the current analysis are presented in section 9.5.8.3.
Additional analyses are being performed and the results will be avail-able in September (Ref. 9.5.8.3.4) 43.
See 42 (Ref. 9.5.8.3.5) i l
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- 44. Section 9.5.8.2 and Q430.60N have been revised to describe the DG exhaust design.
(Ref.9.5.8.3.6)
- 45. Question 40.37 has been revised and will appear in Amd. 51.
(Ref.
10.2.3.1)
- 46. Table 10.4-4 has been revised to include the spurious opening of the j
i turbine bypass valve. With respect to the two items shown in your Section 10.4.4.3.1 1
I a)
The opening of a turbine bypass valve is an ANS Condition II event as described in Section 15.1.4.
Thus, the effects of the event are provided in the FSAR.
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6019N:0249N/5 i
,s b)
Each turbine bypass line has a drain which automatically will drain any liquid which collects in the line.
In the event failure occurred to automatically drain the line, the separate high level alarm would provide indication.
In any event, the worst scenario would be failure to pass steam which is equivalent to failure of the valve to open which is included in the FMEA (Table 10.4-4).
- 47. Section 10.4.4.4 and the response to Q430.105N have been revised to
. reflect STP's position on the frequency of inspection of the turbine bypass lines.
(Ref. 10.4.4.3.2 )
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SEP 5 1985 MEETING NOTICE DISTRIBUTION:
_DocketsNo(s):-50-498/499"~"
NRC PARTICIPANTS NRC PDR Local PDR N. P. Kadambi TIC A. Ungaro NSIC R. Giardina PRC System LB3 Reiding H. Denton/D. Eisenhut H. Thompson /F. Miraglia T. Novak J. Youngblood W. Butler E. Adensam E. Butcher D..Crutchfield C. Grimes, G. Holahan C. Thomas G. Lainas S. Varga D. Vassallo J. Miller J. Stolz F. Rowsome W. Johnston J. P. Knight, Acting Dir., DE R. Bernero R. Bonsak, Acting, AD/CSE, DE L. Rubenstein W. Houston D. Muller.
T. Speis F. Schroeder W. T. Russell, Acting Dir., DHFS ACRS (16)
Attorney, OELD J. Partlow B. Grimes E. L. Jordan F. Ingram, PA Receptionist (Only if meeting is held in Bethesda)
Project Manager NPrasad Kadambi-J. Lee bec: Applicant & Service List
,