ML20135D951
| ML20135D951 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Fort Calhoun  |
| Issue date: | 12/04/1996 |
| From: | NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20135D942 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-285-96-12, NUDOCS 9612100280 | |
| Download: ML20135D951 (16) | |
See also: IR 05000285/1996012
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ENCLOSURE 2
U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION IV
Docket No.. 50-285
License No.: DPR-40
Report No.: 50-285/96-12
Licensee: Omaha Public Power District
Facility: Fort Calhoun Station
Location: Fort Calhoun Station FC-2-4 Adm.
, P.O. Box 399, Hwy. 75 - North of Fort Calhoun
l Fort Calhoun, Nebraska
Dates: October 15 through November 1,1996
Inspectors: L. E. Ellershaw, Reactor inspector
l P. C. Gage, Reactor inspector
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Approved By: Dr. Dale A. Powers, Chief, Maintenance Branch
Division of Reactor Safety
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Attachment 1: Supplemental Information
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9612100200 961204 T
PDR ADOCK 05000285
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Fort Calhoun Station
NRC Inspection Report 50-285/96-12
This inspection was performed using the guidance of NRC Inspection Procedures 73753,
" Inservice inspection," dated May 4,1995, and 62700, " Maintenance implementation,"
dated April 30,1993; to determine whether the inservice inspection program, including
repair and replacement of Class 1,2, and 3 pressure retaining components, and the
maintenance program were being performed in accordance with Technical Specifications,
the applicable ASME Code, correspondence between NRC and the licensee concerning
relief requests, and ipquirements imposed by NRC/ industry initiatives. The inspection also
included followup inspection effort in operations and engineering areas, using NRC
Inspection Procedures 92901, " Followup - Operations," and 92903, " Followup -
Engineering."
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Operations
I * The licensee's fuel handling practices were nonconservative and not indicative of
the requisite concern that should be given to irradiated fuel. Water clarity was very
poor in the reactor cavity refueling pool, thus refueling crews in containment could
not visually verify fuel assembly identification, structural condition, and core
location. All observed fuel handling activities in containment were performed only
by reference to refueling bridge location and mast elevation. Refueling crews did
not utilize mast lighting and closed circuit television camera aids in handling fuel
assemblies. The governing procedure per.nitted this lack of assurance for fuel
placement and integrity. Also, the reactor core refueling procedure lacked detail
with respect to what constituted a safe condition for a fuel assembly if refueling
operations had to be suspended while a fuel assembly was in the upender or in
transit between the upender and the reactor core (Section 01).
- Good communications were observed between the refueling crews and the control
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room staff (Section 01).
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Maintenance
i e The inspectors concluded that the observed inservice inspection activities were
. performed well and in accordance with ASME Code requirements and applicable
- procedures (Section M1).
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- Nondestructive examination procedures were well developed for the identified tasks,
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and appropriately included required performance and examination criteria
(Section M3).
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The observed nondestructive examination personnel we i properly certified in
accordance with ASME Code requirements (Section M5).
Enaineerina
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i A violation of Technical Specification 2.8(4) limiting condition for refueling ;
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operations was identified when the inspectors determined that the operable wide l
l range logarithmic power channels did not provide adequate continuous neutron flux ,
l monitoring capability while core geometry was being changed (Section E8.2). l
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Report Details
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- Summarv of Plant Status
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Fort Calhoun Station was in a refueling shutdown condition.
1. Operations
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l 01 Conduct of Operations
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i a. Insoection Scope (92901)
j The inspectors conducted observations of refueling activities and the conditions
] under which these activities were performed. Of particular interest were the
controls established by the licensee with respect to foreign material exclusion and
! the use of visual aids to support the refueling crew activities.
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I b. Observations and Findinas
i While touring the reactor cavity and spent fuel pool areas, the inspectors observed
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minor lapses in foreign material exclusion control. The inspectors observed a piece
of wadded up duct tape, three loose Chicago fitting locking pins, and a small piece
of cardboard in the reactor cavity area. The concern with the locking pins was that,
while they were logged in, they were not secured to preclude them from being
inadvertently knocked into the reactor cavity pool. Licensee personnel took
immediate steps to remove the items from the area upon hearing the inspectors'
observations.
In general, the reactor cavity and spent fuel pool areas were clean. The inspectors
observed snat each area had a single entry point where material accountability logs
were being maintained. With the exception of the piece of tape and the small piece
of cardboard, all observed items, including the Chicago fitting locking pins, had
.been entered into the log.
During core reload, the inspectors observed the clarity of spent fuel pool water to
be very good. However, the clarity of reactor cavity pool water was very poor,
oven though lighting fixtures had been suspended in the pool. The mast mounted
TV camera was not being used by the refueling crew to observe fuel assembly serial
numbers or to observe damaged or impending handling damage to fuel assemblies.
Because of the poor water clarity, the inspectors could not observe beyond
approximately 2 ft below the vessel flange, nor could the inspectors observe the
opender or fuel assemblies during transit. Licensing personnelinformed the
inspectors that efforts to improve water clarity were ongoing; however, assurance
that placement of fuel assemblies in their designated core locations was controlled
by computer zone coordinates and an above water alpha-numeric index marking
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system. The inspectors observed that Operating Procedure OP-11, " Reactor Core
Refueling," Revision 23, allowed fuelloading verification and the core alignment )
check to be performed following reload activities, i
The inspectors observed good communications between the refueling crews (spent
fuel pool, reactor cavity, and the control room).
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Early on October 30,1996, the licensee suspended refueling operations while Fuel !
Assembly T004, a once-burned assembly, was in transit between the upender and
the reactor core. Rather than leaving the fuel assembly suspended for an indefinite
period of time, refueling personnel determined the best course of action was to
return the fuel assembly to the opender and place the upender in a horizontal
position. Licensee personnel were asked if thermal consequences had been
considered for leaving the fuel assembly in a horizontal position in the upender,
which restricted natural circulation. Licensee personnel then determined that the !
upender should be placed in a vertical position. Upon review of Operating )
Procedure OP-11, the inspectors noted that precautionary statements existed which
would not allow operators to leave the area with a fuel assembly in a suspended
position, or, under certain conditions, provided guidance to return the fuel assembly
to the upender area, or to place the fuel assembly in a safe condition. The
inspectors discussed with licensee personnel the apparent lack of detail with regard
to wnat constitutes a safe condition, or what to do with the fuel assembly once it
had been placed in the upender,
c. Conclusions
Foreign material exclusion controls had been established and were, in general, being
implemented. Water clarity was very good in the spent fuel pool, but very poor in
the reactor cavity refueling pool. Refueling crews in containment could not visually
verify fuel assembly identification, condition, and core location; and the governing
procedure permitted this lack of assurance for fuel placement and integrity. Also,
the reactor core refueling procedure lacked specificity with respect to what
constituted a safe condition for a fuel assembly if refueling operations had to be
suspended while it was in the upender, or in transit between the opender and the
reactor core. Good communications existed between the refueling crew personnel.
ii. Maintenance ;
M1 Conduct of Maintenance
a. inspection Scope (62700,73753)
The inspectors observed all or portions of the following work activities which were
performed by contractor personnel (Raytheon Engineers & Coristructors, and The
Atlantic Group), using the applicable procedures identified in the attachment.
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- FC-96-VT-027 Visual examination of Auxiliary Cooling Water System
Support 12-AC-3C/PS-ACH-367/ACS-184.
- FC-96-VT-028 Visual examination of Auxiliary Cooling Water System
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Support 16-AC-5/PS-ACH-371/ACS-188.
- FC-96 PT-004 Liquid penetrant examination of Containment Spray
System Pipe Weld 12-CSS-2004/07.
- FC-96-PT-005 Liquid penetrant examination of Containment Spray
System Pipe Weld 12-CSS-2004/07D.
- FC-96-UT-009 Ultrasonic examination of Containment Spray System
Pipe Weld 12-CSS-2004/07.
- FC-96-UT-011 Ultrasonic examination of Containment Spray System
Pipe Weld 12-CSS-2004/07D.
- MWO-961055 Liquid penetrant examination and visual examination
of Field Weld FW-19, root pass and final pass,
respectively, on ASME Code replacement
Valve FW-663.
b. Observations and Findinas
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The inspectors found the work performed under these activities to be professional i
and thorough. All work observed was performed with the work package
documentation and nondestructive examination procedures present and in use. The
inspectors determined through discussions and observations, that the observed ,
technicians were experienced and knowledgeable of their assigned tasks. !
The inspectors also observed the Authorized Nuclear Inservice inspector witnessing
these activities. During discussion with the Authorized Nuclear Inservice inspector,
the inspectors learned that he planned on witnessing a minimum of 30 percent of
the inservice inspections scheduled to be performed during this refueling outage. In
addition, the inspectors observed that the Authorized Nuclear Inservice inspector
had reviewed and accepted all of the contractor's nondestructive examination I
procedures being used for inservice inspection.
The inspectors observed the technicians calibrate the ultrasonic equipment before
and after performance of the ultrasonic examinations. The calibration blocks were
identified and traceable to their certifications. The inspectors also verified that the
liquid penetract materials were certified as meeting ASME Code requirements.
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c. Conclusions
The inspectors concluded that the observed inservice inspection activities had been
performed well and in accordance with ASME Code requirements and applicable
procedures.
M3 Maintenance Procedures and Documentation
a. Inspection Scope (73753)
The inspectors reviewed the welding proceOtre specification, quality control
procedure, and work order documents listed in the attachment for the replacement
and examination of one component. The inspectors reviewed these documents to
determine if they had been developed in accordance with regulatory requirements
and the applicable ASME Code requirements.
b. Observations and Findinas
The inspectors observed that the welding procedure specification and the
nondestructive examination procedures had been developed in accordance with
licensee procedures, regulatory requirements, and applicable ASME Code
requirements. Accordirigly, applicable essential and nonessential variables and
acceptance criteria had been identified and documented in the procedures. The
inspectors also reviewed Maintenance Work Order MWO 961055, dated October
17,1996, which was developed for the replacement of Valve FW-663 (a Class 3
emergency feedwater bypass valve). The inspectors noted that the work order
specified the use of NRC authorized (via request for relief) ASME Code
Case N-416-1. The use of this Code Case allowed system pressure test alternatives
provided that additional surface examinations were performed on the root pass layer
of butt and socket welds on the pressure retaining boundary during repair and
replacement of Class 3 components.
c. Conclusions
The inspectors concluded that the work order package and procedures were well
developed for the identified tasks, and appropriately included required performance
and examination criteria.
M5 Maintenance Staff Training and Qualification
a. Inspection Scope (73753)
This area of the inspection was conducted to verify that nondestructive examination
personnel were properly certified in accordance with ASME Code requirements.
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b. Observations and Findinas
Based on. review of the qualification records for five contractor nondestructive
examination personnel who had been observed performing the e>.iminations
' identified in paragraph M1 above, the inspectors noted that all had recently been
requalified (based on examination) as Level 11 Examiners for the appropriate
exarnination method.
The inspectors verified that each examiner's qualification records contained a
current annual near-distance visual acuity and color vision examination certification.
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c. Conclusions
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The inspectors concluded that the observed examiners were properly certified in
accordance with ASME Code requirements.
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111. Enaineerina
E2 Engineering Support of Facilities and Equipment -l
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A recent discovery of a licensee operating their facility in a manner contrary to the
Updated Final Safety Analysis Report description highlighted the need for a special
focused review that compares plant practices, and/or parameters to the Updated
Final Safety Analysis Report description. While performing the inspections
discussed in this report, the inspectors reviewed the applicable portions of the
Updated Safety Analysis Report that related to the areas inspected. The inspectors
verified that the Updated Safety Analysis Report wording was consistent with the
observed plant practices, procedures and/or parameters.
E8 Miscellaneous Engineering issues (92903)
E8.1 (Closed) Licensee Event Report 50-285/95002: During a refueling outage the
containment polar crane (HE-1) was used to move the reactor vessel internals lift rig
over the reactor vessel while the reactor vessel head was not installed and
irradiated fuel was in the reactor vessel. Subsequently, the licensee also used the
crane and lift rig to install the reactor vessel internals hold down ring. The licensee
identified that appropriate containment conditions had not been fully established
prior to movement of these heavy loads. The licensee's Technical Specifications did
not specifically require containment closurc or isolation during movement of heavy
loads over the reactor vessel. The licensee performed a timely and detailed safety
evaluation and root cause determination.
The inspectors reviewed the licensee's root cause determination and corrective
actions, and determined them to be thorough. The inspectors also reviewed the
changes submitted for implementation in the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report
and the operationalinstructions and maintenance procedures regarding containment ,
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closure requirements during heavy load movements. The inspectors concluded that
- the licensee was in compliance with the limiting conditions for operation dunng ;
j- 'these events, and that the implemented corrective actions should prevent '
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. In conjunction with the review of Licensee Event Report 95-002, the inspectors i
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licensees to review plans and capabilities concerning heavy load movements during I
q plant operations.' The licensee, upon review of Technical Specifications, determined !
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that no changes were required for NRC review and approval regarfog this subject. l
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j The inspectors reviewed the Technical Specifications, procedures regarding heavy
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load movement during plant operations, and the licensee's responses to
j Bulletin 96-02. The inspectors concluded that the licensee's plans and capabilities
! to handle heavy loads during power operations were consistent with existing
i regulatory guidelines. The inspectors also concluded that corrective actions in
response to Licensee Event Report 95-02 adequately addressed movement of heavy
1 loads in containment or over safety-related equipment during shutdown refueling
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! E8.2 Wide Ranae Loaarithmic Power Channels
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a. Inspection Scoce (92902)
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Reactor surveillance test results and operations logs and records were reviewed,
and reactor operations were observed to detarmine compliance with requirements in
j Technical Specifications 2.8. The procedures listed in the attachment were
j reviewed to determine satisf actory completion of initial conditions of Procedure OP-
- 11, " Reactor Core Refueling", Revision 23.
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l b. Observations and Findinas
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i The inspectors observed the licensee's control room operations during loading of the
! initial fuel assemblies at the periphery of the east quadrant of the core. The
- inspectors verified that this loading sequence was in accordance with the fuel
! handling checklist found in Appendix A of procedure OP-11, " Reactor Core
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Refueling," Revision 23. During observation of control room operations, no audible
! counts were heard during loading of the initial seven fuel assemblies in the core,
l including Fuel Assembly T028, which contained one of the installed neutron sources
i for the core. The inspectors verified that these first seven fuel assemblies loaded
were adjacent to Channel D of the wide range excore nuclear instrumentation
j system. Subsequently, the inspectors verified that wide range Channel D of the
i excore nuclear instrumentation system was inoperable pending completion of an
i approved modification for the instrumentation. The inspectors confirmed that the
i other three wide range channels were declared operable, and that the licensee was
j utilizing Channeis A and C for supplying the neutron flux information, visually and
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audibly, while loading fuel into the core. The inspectors observed the control room
operator utilizing the wide range nuclear instrumentation data to calculate the i
inverse count ratio to provide the necessary information needed to monitor the core
- for unexpected changes in neutron flux while changing core geometry. l
j Control room operators stated that the first audible indications of neutron counts ;
were noticed during the loading of the first fuel assembly (Fuel Assembly T037)in j
! the west quadrant of the core. The inspectors observed that Fuel Assembly T037 l
and the next six that were loaded were located near the core periphery in the '
vicinity of operable Channel A of the wide range excore nuclear instrumentation
system.
I In addition to the audible count rate, a review of the inverse count ratio data
- showed that a substantialincrease (30 times previous readings for Channel A and 2
times previous readings for Channel C) in monitored neutron indications was
observed. Yet, when the analogous assemblies near the inoperable detector of
- Channel D were loaded, including a source, there was no change in the dats
a provided by the operable Channels A and C. I
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The design core load for Cycle 17 had the periphery assemblies near the wide range
detectors as twice burned fuel, thus similar characteristics were expected. During
the review of inverse count ratio data for subsequent fuel assembly loading, the
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inspectors noticed a normal progression of neutron subcritical multiplication effects
for the corresponding core geometry changes.
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The inspectors reviewed Technical Specification 2.8 limiting conditions for operation
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during refueling operations. The inspectors noted that this specification states in
part, "Whenever core geometry is being changed, neutron flux shall be continuously
- monitored by at least two source range neutron monitors, with each monitor
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providing continuous visual indication in the control room." As discussed in detail
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above, the indications observed by the operators during the loading of the initial
seven fuel assemblies revealed that no signs of neutron flux monitoring, visual or
? audible, were provided by Channels A, B, or C until core loading resumed in the
vicinity of the Channel A detector. The inspectors observed that conditions within
the reactor vessel were of several thousand gallons of a high concentration (greater
that 2100 ppm) of borated water in addition to the geometrical consideration that
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the east core quadrant area was several feet away from the nearest operable
- detector when Channel D was rendered inoperable. The inspectors considered that
4 given the core geometry, boron concentration, and inoperable detector location in
conjunction with core load sequence, that Technical Specification 2,8 was violated,
in that the operable detectors were incapable of providing changing neutron flux
indications in response to core geometry changes during the loading of the first
- seven fuel assemblies (50-285/9612-01).
- Condition Report 199601336was written on October 28,1996, by the licensee to
document the inspectors' observation of the prudence of loading fuel near an
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inoperable detector channel, and to track possible revisions to future reload
sequences to improve core monitoring. The inspectors noted that Condition Report
199601336 documented comments that the rep'acement schedule for the
modification cf the wide range excore nuclear instrumentation system would ensure
Channels A and D be operable for core reload operations because of the neutron
source locations. A review of the core load sequence reflected the licensee's
priority for installing the neutron sources early for assurance of indication provided
to the corresponding detectors.
After some delays were experienced with the implementation of the Channel D wide
range excore nuclear instrumentation modification, the licensee continued the fuel
load with the other three channels of instrumentation to support their original fuel
load sequence. When questioned by the inspectors, licensee personnel stated that
they considered their actions to be in compliance with Technical Specification 2.8,
in that two operable monitors were being utilized. Licensee personnel also stated
that the utilization of a temporary detector, or " dunking chamber" was not
l considered, nor was an alternate fuelioading sequence discussed in the event of an
inoperable wide range detector.
l Further actions by licensee management included a commitment to evaluate <
Operating Procedure OP-11, " Reactor Core Refueling," to determine the need for
establishing requirements that would cause an evaluation of fuel reload sequence to
l occur in the event of an inoperable wide range logarithmic power channel,
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The inspectors reviewed the current engineering analysis determining the minimum
refueling boron concentration. The inspectors noted that the analysis incorporated
conservative assumptions such as 5 percent shutdown margin maintained with all
control element assemblies fully withdrawn,68 F coolant temperature, xenon-free
l core condition, and a 0.4 percent reactivity uncertainty. Based on the review of the
reactor operations log, the inspectors verified that between October 28-30,1996,
i the licensee exceeded the minimum refueling boron concentration, as documented
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at eight hour intervals.
i c. Conclusions
A violation of Technical Specification 2.8(4) limiting condition for refueling ,
operations was identified when the inspectors determined that the operable wide
range excore neutron instrumentation channels did not provide continuous neutron
flux monitoring capability while core geometry was being changed during initial fuel
loadina. The inspectors concluded that inadequate procedural guidance existed to
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ensure that this Technical Specification requirement was complied with. 1
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The licensee's logs and records adequately documented reactor operations. All
reactor surveillance tests were completed at the reauired frequencies, and the
surveillance test results met Technical Specification requirements.
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Reactor maintenance activities were performed properly and in accordance with
approved procedures. The licensee's logs and records satisfactorily documented
reactor maintenance activities.
V. Mannaement Meetinas
X1 Exit Meeting Summary
The inspectors presented the inspection results to members of licensee management at the
conclusion of the inspection on November 1,1996. While licensee management
acknowledged the findings presented, they also stated that they did not believe that a
potential violation of Technical Specification 2.8(4) existed, in that there were at least two
operable wide range logarithmic power channels as required by the Technical
Specifications while fuel was being reloaded. The licensee representative made a
commitment, which is described above in Section E8.2, related to the potential violation.
The inspectors asked the licensee whether any material examined during the course of the
inspection should be considered proprietary. No proprietary information was identified.
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ATTACHMENT
PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED
Licensee
R. Andrews, Division Manager, Nuclear Services
C. Boughter, Supervisor, Special Services Engineering l
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C. Brunnert, Manager, Quality Assurance /Ouality Control
J. Chase, Plant Manager
R. Connor, Manager, Training i
G. Cook, Supervisor, Station Licensing l
D. Dryden, Licensing Engineer
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M. Ellis, Supervisor, Maintenance Support )
S. Gambhir, Division Manager, Production Engineering
J. Gasper, Manager, Nuclear Projects
B Jaworski, Manager, Design Engineering
T. Patterson, Division Manager, Nuclear Operations
R. Phelps, Manager, Station Engineering
C. Stafford, Reactor Engineer
J. Tills, Manager, Nuclear Licensing
NRC l
F. Brush, Resident inspector, Callaway Plant
INSPECTION PROCEDURES USED
IP 73753 Inservice Inspection
IP 62700 Maintenance implementation
IP 92901 Followup - Operations
IP 92903 Followup - Engineering
ITEMS OPENED AND CLOSED
Ope ned
50-2535/9612-01 VIO Violation of Technical Specification 2.8(4) regarding the
f ailure to continuously monitor neutron flux during core
geometry changes.
C_Losed
50-285/95002 LER Movement of heavy loads over reactor vessel under
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inappropriate conditions.
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! LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED i
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PROCEDURES i
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Nondestructive Examination Procedure OPPD-UT-89-1," Ultrasonic Examination of Class 1 i
& 2 Similar and Dissimilar Metal Piping Welds," Revision O l
Nondestructive Examination Procedure OPPD-VT-89-3, " Visual Examination For Mechanical '
and Structural Condition of Components and Their Supports," Revision 0 ,
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! Nondestructive Examination Procedure OPPD-PT-89-1, " Liquid Penetrant Examination - I
! Solvent Removable, Visible Dye Technique," Revision 0 l
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Quality Control Procedure OCP-310, " Liquid Penetrant Examinations (Solvent Removable)," r
Revision 10 '
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Quality Control Procedure OCP-201, " Review of Vendor Procedures, Materials, Personnel l
and Equipment Certifications," Revision 0 ~
Welding Procedure Specification, WPS-101, Revision 7 !
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Station Engineering instruction PED-SEl-27, " Inservice inspection and Test Program," {
Revision 3 I
l Procedure SS ST MX-3001," Coordination of Safety Related System inservice Inspection," i
j Revision 9
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Maintenance Procedure MM-RI-FH-0708," Spent Fuel Machine PostoperationalInspection l
l and Maintenance," Revision 1
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! Operating Procedure OP-11, " Reactor Core Refueling," Revisions 22 and 23
Operating Instruction Ol-FH-1, " Fuel Handling Equipment Operation," Revision 32 l
Standing Order S0 M-10, " Foreign Material Exclusion," Revision 16
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Surveillance Test Procedure IC-ST-RM-5001," Functional Test of Process Radiation
Monitors," Revision 9 !
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Surveillance Test Procedure IC-ST-RM-0001," Functional Test of Area Radiation Monitors,"
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Revision 9
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Surveillance Test Procedure OP-ST-FH-0001," Refueling System Fuel Handling Machine
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, (FH-1) Interlocks Test," Revision 9
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Surveillance Test Procedure OP ST-FH-0002," Refueling System Fuel Transfer System
Interlocks Test," Revision 9
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Surveillance Test Procedure OP-ST-FH-0004," Refueling System New Fuel Elevator Test,"
Revision 9
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Surveillance Test Procedure OP-ST-FH-0005," Refueling System Spent Fuel Hardling
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Machine Refueling interlocks Test," Revision 9
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Surveillance Test Procedure OP-ST-FH-0006," Refueling System Spent Fuel Handling
Machine Interlocks Test For New Fuel Receipt," Revision 9
Calibration Procedure IC-CP-01-NT-001/2/3/4," Wide Range Log Channels integral Bias
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Curves and Calibration of Discriminator Voltage," Revision 2
I DRAWING
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Drawing FW-43971/1, dated October 30,1970
- WORK ORDER AND ASSOCIATED DOCUMENTATION
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Maintenance Work Order MWO 961055 dated October 17,1996
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Weld Data Form, WDF-1, dated October 29,1996
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l ENGINEERING ANALYSIS
EA-FC-95-035," Critical Boron Concentrations and Refueling Boron Concentrations,"
Revision 0
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l REFUELING RECORDS
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, inverse Count Rate Ratio Data Records
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CONDITION REPORTS
199601217
199601336
, MODIFICATION
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MR-FC-94-004," Installation and Testing Requirements for Wide Range Neutron Monitoring
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Channels," Revision 0
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TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS 2.8, " Refueling Operations"
INSERVICE INSPECTION DESIGN DOCUMENTS
Safety Evaluation of the Third Ten-Year Interval inservice inspection Program Plan
Request for Relief From Pressure Test Requirements Following Repairs and Replacements
UPDATED FINAL SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT
Section 14.24," Heavy Load incident," Revision 2
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