ML20135D536

Forwards Copy of Final Rept of IAEA Operational Safety Review Team Which Visited Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant 970810-28.Overall Rept Concludes That Plant in Upper Range of Those Visited by Osart

ML20135D536
Person / Time
Site:	Calvert Cliffs
Issue date:	11/24/1987
From:	Harold Denton NRC OFFICE OF GOVERNMENTAL & PUBLIC AFFAIRS (GPA)
To:	Bernthal, Carr, Roberts, Rogers K, The Chairman NRC COMMISSION (OCM)
References
NUDOCS 9703050314
Download: ML20135D536 (1)

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$l NEMORANDUM FOR:

Chairman Zech Comissioner Roberts Commissioner Bernthal

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Comissioner Carr Comissioner Rogers FROM:

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Harold R. Denton, Director w

Office of Governmental and ub ic Kffairs

SUBJECT:

IAEA OSART REPORT ON CALVERT CLIFFS i

We have,iust received the final report (copy attached) of the IAEA Operational Safety Review Team (0SART) which visited the Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant August 10-28, 1987. Advance copies have been given to the staff. Baltimore Gas and Electric Company has received a copy directly from the IAEA and plans to make it publicly available on Monday, November 30, 1987. We will place a copy in the Public Document Room, but do not i

plan a separate press release.

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Overall, the report concludes that the plant is in the upper range of those visited by OSART. However, areas for improvement were also identified and specific rar.omendations made. The staff intends to request that BG&E advise us of any planned actions based on recomendations made in the report.

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OPERATIONAL SAFETY OF NUCLEAR INSTALLATIONS i

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 1

OSART MISSION 4

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4 OPERATIONAL SAFETY OF NUCLEAR INSTALLATIONS a

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l, CALVERT CLIFFS NUCLEAR POWER PL IIT 1

10 - 20 AUGUST 1987 4

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e PREAllBLE I

This 03 ART Report presents the results of the IAEA Operational Safety Review Team (0SART) evaluation of the Calvert Cliffs nuclear power plant located near Lusby, Maryland. USA. The results, conclusions and i

recommendations presented herein reflect the views of the international experts carrying out the evaluation. They are provided for consideration by the responsible US authorities. The OSART's views are based on review of the l

documentation made available, on oral connunication with plant personnel, and on observations of relevant plant activities.

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Distribution of the CSART Report is left to the discretion of.the US.

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Covernment; this includes the removal of any initial restriction. The IAEA l

makes the report available only with the orpress permission of the Government of the United States of America.

I Any use of or reference to the views expressed'in this report that any be made by the competent US organizations is solely their responsibility.

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4 FORSWORD a

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by the Director General The IAEA Operational Safety Review Team (CIART) programme assists Member States by advising them on ways of enhancing the safe operation of particular nuclear facilities such'as nuclear power plants. Although good l

design, manufacture and construction are prerequisites, safety ultimately i

depends on the ability of operating personnel and the attitude and 1

conscientiousness with which they carry out their responsibilities. OSART missions focus on these aspects when assessing a facility's operational

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practices in comparison with those used successfully in other countries and when exchanging, at the working level ideas for improving safety.

'An OSART mission is undertaken only at the request of a Member State and is not a regulatory type of inspection to determine compliance with national requirements. However, an OSART review can complement national efforts by providing an independent. internat,ional assessment that may identify areas for potential improvement which may have been overlooked.

An OSART mission affords an opportunity for 08 ART members and operating personnel to exchange knowledge and experience, to update the knowledge of

' regulatory personnel of the host country assigned to follow the CSART review, and to train personnel through observation of the experts involved in the OSART review process. This can contribute to the attainment of an international standard of excellence in operational safety, not through tegulatory requirements, but through an exchange of information on, and voluntary acceptance of successful and efficient safety practices.

The LAEA Safety Series docaments, including the Nuclear Safety Standards (NUES) for nuclear power plants and the Sasic Safety Standards for Radiation Protection, and the orpertise of the CIART members themselves.

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o f.orm the point e,f departure for an 08 ART review. However, the 08 ART review f

is performance Sriented in that it accepts different approaches to safety in i

so far as they reflect good practice and contribute to an operating organization's safety objectives. Some of the 08 ART's suggesti%s for long j

term improvement may be based on good practices identified et other j

facilities during previous 08 ART missions.

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The scope of an OSART review is tailored to the specific needs of the particulse facility. A full scope review covers a number of operational 4

f management, organization 'and administration; personnel training and areas:

qualification; conduct of operations; technical support; maintenance; I

radiation protection; plant chemistry; and emergency planning and preparedness. Depending on individual needs, the 08 ART review can j

concentrate on a few areas of special interest. For example, for plants j

under construction.and approaching commissioning, an 08 ART can focus on j

plant and organizational preparedness for operation.

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The OSART team presents its findings and recommendations on potential

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improvements in plant operational safety to the operating organisation, f

which reviews and analyses them in order to determine what further actions

- may be appropriate. Although findings and repoemenda.tions'in the different review areas. may carry different weights, no attempt is made to assign priorities. Moreover, although OsttTs assess a plant's performance in individual review areas, no assessment of overall plant' safety is attempted.

l In formulating its views, the 05Att team discusses its findings with the operating organization and consider further comments made by team members. The team's working papers, or ' Technical Notes', are made l

available during the closing discussion at the site for use by the operating j

organization when considering the moed for further action. An official Summary Report, such as the one attached, highlighting the more significant matters is prepared later and sent to the Member State concerned.

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s CONTDTS 1112 INTRODUCTION.................................................

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MANAGEMENT, ORGANIZATION AND ADMINISTRATION............

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TRAINING AND QUALIFICATION.............................

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OPERATIONS.............................................

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MAINTENANCE............................................

19 5.

TECHNICAL SUPPORT I.............................'.......

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TECHNICAL SUPPORT II...............................~....

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EADIATION PROTECTION...................................

30 8.

CHEKISTRT............................................'..

33 9.

MERGENCT PLANNING AND PREPAREDNESS....................

36 ACDOWLEDCEMENTS..............................................

41 ANNEE Is CORPOSITION OF TNE CALYERT CLIFFS TEAM...........

42 ANNEZ II:

SCHEDULE OF ACTITITIES...........................

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f INTRODUCTION l

i At the request of the Government of the United States of Amer'ica, an operational Safety Review Tema (OSA?T) of international esperts visited the Calvert Cliffs Nuclear power plant of the Baltimore cas & Electric Company (RC4E) from 10 to 28 August 1987, to reytow the operating practices of this two-unit plant and to provide assistance and advice on how plant safety j

j might further be enhanced.

Before visiting the plant, the Team, composed of esperts from

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Belgium, Canada, Finland, France, the Federal Republic of Germany Italy and Switzerland in addition to the IAEA staff members, studied relevant 4

information made available by BG&E to become familiar with the plant's main features, its important programmes and procedures and the operating record

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q of the past years. At Calvert Cliffs, the team of experts, using techniques

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derived from their collective total of more than 200 years of nuclear 4

esperience, reviewed the plant operational safety indicators and other i

relevant documentation, observed work being carried out in various areas of review, examined applicable procedures and instructions and interviewed plant personnel. Throughout the period of review, there was a thorough exchange of views on the plant's operational record, on the managerial approach, on training programm9s and facilities, on personnel performance in the con' trol room and in the field, on the plant's upgrading programme and on the preparedness to cope with nuclear emergencies'.

General comment The Calvert Cliffs OSART sission was the twentieth since the.

inception of this IAEA programme, and it was the first to a nuclear power plant in the United States of America. The pressurized water reactors did not constitute a novelty to the OSART, most of the preceding missions having been to this type of reactor. It was the eleventh mission since the Chernobyl acci, dent in April 1986, which - as a positive side-effect - led to increased international co-operation in nuclear safety and radiation e

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l protection. Although there were no directly applicable lesson's to be learned with respect to design basis and principal layout, this event showed once more the importance of a cons;.vative design, of effective interlocks j

l and automatic response, of adequate containment features and of reliable i

personnel following operational instructions to ensure operational safety.

The process of identifying lessons to be learned from this and other events j

is continuing. In the past, DC&E has been following up relevant new

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developments, in close contact with industry organisations and the regulatory authority. It should continue in the future with particular emphasis on human factors in operational safety and on radiological aspects of emergency response.

Plant description Calvert Cliffs is a two-unit nuclear power plant located near Lesby, Calvert County, in Maryland. The two pressurised water reactors have a licensed thermal power of 2700 W and a not electrical output of 880 W each. The vendor of the nuclear steam supply systes (NESS) was Combustion Engineering and'the architect-engineer was Bechtel. The turbine-generator for Unit 1 was supplied by General Electric, for, Unit 2 by Westinghouse.

The NSSSs are composed of a pressure vessel, two vertical U-tube steam i

generators, four reactor coolant pumps, a pressuriser with relief and safety valves, a pressuriser relief tank and connecting piping. The reactor cores contain 217 fuel assemblies with 164 to 176 fuel' rods per assembly in a 14 x 14 configuration, and 77 control rod assemblies with five' rods per sesembly. Enrichment of the reload fuel is up to 4.1% in uranium-235 for the 24 months' fuel cycle; the neutron absorber material is boron carbide.

• 0onstruction of both units started in June 1968. Initial criticality and commercial operation for Unit 1 were 7 October 1974 and 8 May 1975, and for Unit 2 were 30 November 1976 and 1 April 1977. The two units have therefore been in operation for 10 years and 12 years. Their operating records with respect to unplanned outages and availability factors have generally been better than the US industry average, putting the plant more recently in the group of the top 25% performers, with variations between Units 1 and 2.

In recent years, the number of unplanned safety system

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l actuations has been reduced to the level of these outstanding performers, too. Staller statements can be made about the number of unusual events reported (the WRC's licensee event reports and INP0's significant event reports). Individual and collective radiation doses are below those for the top 25% of the US nuclear industry and thus are comparable with the best plants worldwide in this respect. Discharges of radioactive effluents, including the production of solid waste, are small and well below internationally recommended limits.

Calvert Cliffs has safety features to cope with design basis

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l accidents, which, in addition to mechanical and chemical shutdown systems, include redundant energency core cooling systems with high pressure injection pumps, borated water storage tanks, accumulators and low pressure l

l irjection pumps, and large dry cylindrical contaiments. The containments are made of post-tensioned reinforced concrete with a steel liner for leaktightness. Containment spray systems are provided as well as electric hydrogen re' combiners. Both units have a dedicated diesel generator ese,h and share a third generator that can be connected to either unit whenever needed.

Both units at Calvert Cliffs were operating at full power throughout the entire pe'riod of the 05 ART mission'.

Operational safety features The 05 ART found at Calvert Cliffs nuclear power plant a modern managerial approach aiming at long tem achievement of excellence 'in both

• electricity generation and safety performance. The plant is generally well operated and maintained by an orportanced staff. BG&E has succeeded in, creating favourable working conditions and instilling a company spirit in

.its employees which is a basis for good performance and small turnover of staff.

l The overall impression was that the plant is above average, in the upper range of the nuclear power plants visited by 08 ART alssions. The operational safety status is satisfactory and no shortcomings in equipment, I

l personnel or operating practices were found that would compromise safe e

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-4 operation and reliable electricity generation. The ogART was impressed with the managerial approach, with the comprehensive personnel training and in particular with the emergency response planning, which was found to be I

outstanding compared with some other plants. Several commendable good j

practices were identified, for instance in radiation protection, chemistry and emergency response planning, which will be drawn to the attention of l

other utilities. However, there are also areas where room for' improvement I

was found and recossmendations were made.

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Improvements recommended for personnel training are in the nature of f

adding final touches; for instance in making full use of the on-site i

simulator, organizing more effectively the industrial safety training and following up relevant lessons of the Chernobyl accident. The operations i

i review recommended improved working conditions in the control room, more 1

l distinguishable unit and systen labelling, reduction in the number of l

temporary changes to operating documents, development of some supplementary operating procedures and of additional guidance for emergency diagnostics, j

and more reliable provision of staff support to'the shift supervisor f'

whenever needed, i

Maintenance is the area where major improvements could be made, not for safety reasons but for increased effectiveness. The work control systen j

contains all essential elements but is too complicated, even confusing, and needs major streamlining to serve its purpose of reliable scheduling, proper support gnd close following up of all maintenance work. Preventive 1

maintenance operates in isolation and lacks the feedback of maintenance history and integration in a predictive maintenance programme. Maintenance j

facilities, including the warehouse, are poorly placed and too small.

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Crouping in one main building in the fenced-in area would be advir*ble.

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Technical support also offers a considerable potential for j

improvement, particularly in surveillance activities and operating experience feedback. The surveillance activities are currently determined i'

by regulatory requirements and lack the dynamics of continuous checking for effectiveness. This explains the unsatisfactory ratio of latent e

deficiencies detected to spontaneous failures. The safety indicator

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l programme is supported and its future expansion is recommended. Unusual event analysis needs scre systematic methodology to determine root causes beyond the direct causes. The need for concerted efforts to reduce the t

j contribution of human error to unusual events is underlined.

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Radiation protection and chemistry are the areas where more 4

commendable good practices were observed than recommendations could be made.

Perfecting of the current approach is still possible to improve the i

already good practices by some adaptation of facilities, equipment and instrumentation. Emergency response pisaning and preparedness were found to be strong points at Calvert C11fis, better developed and tested than at most other plants visited by OEARTs. This includes training of on-site and off-site personnel, drills of individual emergency units and integrated i

exercises to test the co-ordination of on-site and off-site emergency response.

In conclusion, the osART found a conscientious management and a dedicated staff at Calvert Cliffs to ensure continued safe operation of the plant. This positive statement takes account not only of the current status

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at the site but also of the various initiatives taken for further 2

i improvement. The basic attitude that continuous efforts are needed to meet all challenges now and in the future was apprntiated. By virtue of this, Calvert Cliffs is a good example of what is expected from a well managed and 4

operated plant.

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MANAGEEDfT, ORGANIZATION AND ADEINISTRATION 1

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The overall operation of the Calvert Cliffs nuclear power plant is considered to be of a high standard. Results are achieved through a programme involving the setting of goals in key areas, monitoring results, and ultimately rewarding employees for meeting objectives. The organization is dynamic; opportunities for improvement in many areas are evalugted and 1

acted upon. A team approach (task force) is often used to study specific issues and make proposals for management review and approval. The extent to which written instructions are used throughout the plant is impressive.

j They provide tight control over all activities carried out.

i Managerial principles i,

The Nuclear program plan is the first step in providing a focus on performance for the nuclear power plant. This programme is fully developed. Strategic long term goals are established and initiatives in each area are incorporated into the annual performance objectives of the Nuclear Energy Division.

Calvert Cliffs' performance is compared with that of average performers and the top 25% of the nuclear industry in the Unitad States.

strategic goals aim at making the utility a leader in its field. Trends in the past few years show progress particularly in the reduction of the number of reactor trips and lost-time accidents.

The management philosophy adopted to prevent nuclear accidents is to focus on minimizing plant transients. The strategy to accomplish this is of adherence by staff to written procedures and performance of high quality maintenance to provide reliable components. An examination of plant activities revealed that personnel training and plant procedures are well controlled, but that there are some inefficiencies in maintenance which preclude optimum performance. The plant's management is well advanced in the process of reviewing options to improve maintenance.

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i organization i

The organizati: sal structure is comprehensive, and the span of control of managers med general supervisors is adequate. Also, there are j

adeguato numbers of trained staff in most areas. The exception is in the

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Nuclear Engineering Services Department. A reorganisation has taken place within the last two years to provide better engineering support. The main thrust was to bring the engineering services to the site and thereby closer to the operating problems.

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i Design Engineering Personnel have a firm knowledge of applicable regulations and design basis events developed in the Final Safety Analysis l

Report (FSAR). This provides for good evaluation of design changes such that the modified plant is as safe or safer than the original licensed plant. Also noted is that the FIAR is updated annually.

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Plant and Project Engineering are in transition to form a matu're j

organization. Their system engineers are espected to bring elements of l

control to everyday operation through operating procedures, tests and other j

surveillance activities. They have, however, only limited k'nowledge of l

design basis events and abnormal operating pro'cedures. Plant management has recognized this shortcoming and special training is planned to compensate.

1 The number of staff positions will significantly increase in the future to i

j raise the effectiveness of the preventive maintenance programme, and to provide more support for operations and Maintenance. The staff complement will then be adequate for a good balance between long-term modification and

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day-to-day surveillance.

Nuclear safety climate i

There is respect for public safety at all supervisory and management 1evels 'in the organization. The' Nuclear Program Plan has formalized the importance of safety and given proper balance with other utility goals. All staff are alert to the potential for violations of the licence or technical specifications (Tech Spees). soth the utility and the Nuclear Regulatory Commis31on (WRC) measure performance in similar ways - taking into account e

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management attitude and programmes as well as compliance with regulations.

There is evidence of plant management going beyond regulations to effect the best possible performance.

1 To provide for further enhancement in operational safety, the utility needs encouragement to assume a more active role. It is recommended that a reactor safety function be set up to closely monitor day-tor-day activities and co-ordinate prograanes related to plant safety. This should generate i

new insights into current plant practices and assist in identifying needs

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for changes of hardware and software. The regulatory authority should encourage the Calvert Cliffs management to take such initiatives by

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accepting a broader latitude in day-to-day operation and yet closely monitoring the effectiveness of the improvement process. It was noted that the technical and administrative aspects of such an approach are under review by the NEC.

Quality assurance There is a nature quality assurance (QA) organization in place that is headed by people with significant operational experience. The QA manual is comprehensive and well written. The organization is respected, as is evidenced by frequent requests by departments for QA audits. The scope of the audits is broad; both compliance with stated requirements and, more recently, programme effectiveness are included. Independent verification is integrated into all areas of the. day-to-day business.

The Quality Assurance Manual describes how controls should be established to cover the preparation, review, approval, issue and revision of documents. An examination of these areas showed that the QA standard was' being followed.

Industrial safety The overall impression is one of a well managed health and safety programme with a comattaent to improve performance. The framework for control is set by the Industrial safety Manual which puts both corporate e

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programmes and laws into understandable language for all employees. A resident industrial safety specialist supports management and supervisors in developing safety practices and attitudss. A very positive step was taken

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in 1985 with the introduction of a safety Training Observation Prograa (Stop). The accident rate fell by half the following year and the trend is continuing in 1987.

f The ' confined space' programme is very carefully controlled but could

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still be improved by learning the lessons of socidents at other utilities.

such events were brought to the attention of the Calvert Cliffs management.

It was noted that eye incidents, although minor, appeared to be frequent.

currently, eye protection is required only for certain work. Comparisons of i

eye accident statistics with those for utilities that have mandatory eye 3

protection policies could give an insight into the benefits of a more

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comprehensive programune.

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The level of fire protection was found to be high. In particular, i

the strategy is heavily weighted towards fire prevention. This is evidenced by the extensive use -of smoke detectors (600), fire barrier removal permits.

cuttingtburning/ grinding / welding permits, sprinkler systems, and halon pro'tected.. electrical equipment rooms. The fire brigade appeared few in number, but considering the emphasis on fire prevention it seems adeguate.

Prograsunes are in place in areas of respiratory protection, chemical hazard identification, asbestos control, lead control, hearing protection, and ftest aid.

Security A comprehensive and well-managed physical security programme provides for effective protection of the nuclear power plant against any credible intrusion attempt. No suggestions could be offered for improvement. Some of the areas that were most tapressive are outlined in the following:

Plant familiarization for the local police department, the o

annual written commitment by the police to provide staff on

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demand within a set time, and exercises to prove the same, show close co-operation.

i The duties of each security post are well documented; daily o

i checks are made of security equipment by a process of check I

sheets that must be signed off.

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There is a balance between courtesy and forcefulness in the o

consistent application of access controls.

i The security training progesame is managed and developed to the same extent as other plant training programmes. Drills'are periodically j

conducted to test the response of the security force. Every fifth week, security staff receive training in weapons, points of law, recognition of events and proper response.

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TRAINING AND QUALIFICATION f

j The Calvert Cliffs trainicg prograsunes are of high quality and are

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performance based. SC&E has become the 13th utility la the USA to be i

granted full membership of the National Academy for Nuclear Training after 1l accreditation of its tenth training programme.

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j Quality training equipment is available, such as a full-scope i

simulator for operator training and acek-ups of a steam generator, the i

reactor pressure vessel head, and a reactor coolant pump seal area for training maintenance staff for work in a highly radioactive environment.

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Nechanical, electrical and process instrumentation laboratories provide good support to classroom instructions.

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q The Nuclear Traiaing Section follows written policies and, instructions. Lesson plans include measurable training objectives and main points to be cov'ered. These facilitate effective classroom and simulator 1

l' training. Periodic checkouts of the traine'es' mastery of lesson objectives l

are carried out. A good programme exists for developing and improving the instructional skills and technical competence of instructors. Instructors i

are' certified before they are allowed to conduct training, and those who i

j train licensed personnel maintain their own operator licences, periodically participate in shift activities and attend the regualification programme.

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j The review identified some areas where improvements are recommended.

j These are in the'asture of fine tuning the traintag programme.

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Licensed operators and plant operators l

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The reactor operator and senior reactor operator training programmes i

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represent a good balance between theoretical and practical training. Formal training on diagnostic techniques is provided and simulator exercises on 1

malfunctions reinforce diagnostic principles covered. Qualification guides lead consistency and comprehensiveness to on-the-job training. A well-t I

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structured annual requalific. tion programme is established to improve i

Operator knowledge and skills. supervisory personnel receive management

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skills training. The General Supervisor Operations periodically observes f

simulator training, a practice that is indicative of the management's

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communitment to training.

Attendance by licensed operators of simulator retraining sessions should be increased. This refers particularly to the sessions during the a

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first half of 1987; the 1986 attendance record was better. Operations management should emphasize the need for continuing training, and for those j

sessions missed in 1987, an opportunity to make up should be provided.

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A similar need for improvement in continuing training attendance

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applies to plant operators, particularly those assigned special tasks such 3

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as equipment tagging. In addition, there is a need for plant operators to l

review the remote shutdown system and the procedure for shutting down the 4

l Plant in the event of unavailability of the main control room. Emphasis f

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should be placed on plant operator tasks.

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slaulator training

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Individual performance of, for example, reactor operators (Ros) and senior reactor operators (Stos) is planned to be avsluated during the j

simulator requalification. Extension of such evaluation to the overall j

performance of the shift team would be des.trable, with individuals occupying positions they normally hold during a shift. A practice found noteworthy in a previous OgART was the periodic evaluation of shift teams' ability to cope with unusual events. In addition to gaining ins'ights into items for improvement, this experience was felt to minimize stress upon the occurr9 ace of unusual events. Some floribility in the simulator training could also be introduced by allowing shift supervisors to esercise their teams on specific team interests, such as an event they have experienced, after completion of the scheduled esercises. Such an opportunity would raise the s'hift supervisors' interest and give a sense of involvement in training development. In some countries one day,.usually the last simulator training day, is set aside for this purpose.

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3 13 Other nuclear plants have to share and schedule in advance the use of i

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simulators, many of which are utilized for training more than one shift per day. Calvert Cliffs should exploit the full potential of its on-site simulator by making simuistor demonstrations a part of the iraining of other personnel, such as non-licensed plant operators and technical staff.

l Demonstrations for plant operators,- for example, would develop better

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understanding of individual task responsibilities and how the operations outside the main control room relate to integrated plant operations.

j Industrial safety training Several plant groups and BC&E divisions are involved in the i

industrial training programme which covers confined spaces, heat stress, rigging, asbestos hazards, etc. However, no single individual is charged with co-ordinating the programme. As a result there is some non-uniformity and dupli. cation.of effort. Training responsibilities should be assigned and a single individus1 designated to co-ordinate oversight, and these itemsI should be included in a Calvert Cliffs instruction. Uniform standards of training delivery and trainee evaluation should be established, and a periodic,progr'asume review provided for improvements.

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Insights from the Chernobyl accident, As part of the continuing training of Itcensed operators and plant operators, training on the operational aspects of the Chernobyl accident has been provided. There are, however, more valuable insights la other areas; for example, in radiation protection and emergency planning. Nheyinclude protection of fire fighters la a highly radioactive environment, site decontamination techniques, ase of thyroid blocking agents, etc. Lessons from the Chernobyl accident should be discussed in the continuing training of radiation safety and emergency response personnel.

Maintenance personnel Mechanics and electricians (engineers, technicians) and control personnel have well structured, performance-based programmes with speciflad e

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qualification paths. A qualification manual specifying requirements in knowledge and practical skills provides consistency in on-the-job training.

j For further improvement it the training, the acquisition of relevant maintenance-related vendors' information bulletins and the establishment of 1

a screening and tracking system for items relevant to training are desirable. The involvement of higher level personnel in the training activities of the line organizations and of the maintenance training unit is needed to ensure that awareness training, for example on plant modifications, is reaching the target groups.

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OPEgATIONS The operations organission at Calvert Cliffs was found to be competent. personnel are dedicated and take professional pride in achieving good overall results. Specific operating objectives are established and adhered to.

Shift organization and turnover The number of operators on shift is higher than the minimum requirement defined by the technical specifications (Tech Specs). The shift turnover is well organized. Operator communication during turnover is good and ensures that the incoming shift receives all information necessary for centinuation of safe ond efficient plasc operation.

Senior reactor operators and reactor opecators are periodically removed from the shif t to perform activities in the Operation and j

Main,,tenanice Coordination Group or in the procedure Development and Modification Acceptance Group. Both groups raport to the General Supervisor

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operations and are an efficient support'to plant operation.

control room The control room was found to be very noisy in comparison with control rooms in other nuclear power plants. The noise is'mainly caused by the air conditioning system and the computer printers, and owing to the number of personnel entering and leaving the control room for work authorization. It is recommended that the noise level of the machinery be reduced and also that access of personnel to the control room be limited.

Indicators and recorders of the post-accident monitoring system are not clearly identified on the control room panel. Consideration should therefore be given to marking these instruments by colour coding or tagging so that the operators' attention is focused on these most reliable instruments in the event of an accident.

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i Work authorization i

j The Operation and Maintenance Coordination Group (OMC) is in charge of work scheduling. This group decides priorities and has qualified

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personnel (senior reactor operators, reactor operators and plant operators) to perfors safety tagging of eguipment. The work authorisation form is signed by the shift supervisor when authorization is given to work. This organization has been found very efficient in ensuring safe working conditions.

Locked equipment, labelling Equipment which must be locked in position for safety or operational reasons is properly listed and periodically verified. Any change in Position is logged in the control room. It is recommended to add to the list of locked valves one isolation valve on each heat exchanger not protected by a safety valve. This would protect the heat exchangers against overpressure due to heat surge.

The. plant is making efforts to reduce the problem of operating the wrong equipment owing to the mixing up of equipment and/or units that could,

result from the poor legibility of the equipment identification labels and the similarity of the two units, toon painting, equipment painting and colour-coded peceedures are the solutions envisaged. It is also suggested that the design of the identification labels be modified to improve legibility.

Documents and logs The documents in the control room should provide the operators with the necessary instructions on how to operate the plant, and on plant status. Various logbooks are used to record actual plant status, operating 1

activities and unusual events that meet this goal. Some prococates and j

documents in the control room, for example the set point book, were found j

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'with handwritten entries. Although they were correctly documented and approved, it is recommended that these modifications be incorporated in regular revisions of the documents (intervals not to exceed two years).

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The operational transient logbook in the control room is the only copy kept. As this should be a permanent record, it is recommended that a f

4 duplicate be made for plant history after each annual verification by the General Supervisor Operations. Also, the set of information logged with the l

transient record should be improved to be of help in future equipment stress j

analyses when required.

Operating procedures i4 j

The Procedures Development and Modification Acceptance Grov'p is in charge of writing and revising the operating procedures. This task is well t'

managed and every activity is fully documented. The list of abnormal procedures has been reviewed and the addition of some procedures is recommended to prepare for such abnormal events as the sticking open of 1

pressurizer spray valves and restoring power after a partial loss of vital j

busses; 125 V(DC).

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Plant cooldown to cold shutdown involves the startup of the shutdown j

ecoling system which is located in the auxiliary building. Consideration j

should be given to including a leak check of the shutdown cooling system in j

the applicable operating procedure, j

Emergency procedures l

The emergency operating procedures (EOPs) are written in accordance l

with Combustion Engineering Procedures Guidelines. These E0Ps require operator training to high standards. Detailed basic information is being compiled and will be of great help for the training. In the event of an I

emergency, the procedure 30P-0 has to lead the operator to the applicable procedures. It is recosmaended to complement tor-0 with operator guidance in j

emergency diagnostics. Because the tops do not take account of the reduced l

reliability of containment instrumentation under adverse environmental conditions, it is also recommended to introduce increased setpoint margins 4

for the parameters affected.

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Potential steam bubble formation in the reactor vessel head when I

cooling down by natural circulati'on is not addressed in thes E0Ps.-

j consideration should be given to revising the procedures such that the cooldown rate be reduced to provide sufficient auxiliary feedwater inventory during natural circulation cooldowns.

Staff support t

l Support for the shift supervisor when required is arranged using a telephone call-in system. Personnel are called at home or elsewhere if previously notified to the control room. As this technique cannot always be 4

relied upon for fast and effective support, consideration should be given to formalizing this approach by introducing an on-call system.

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MAINTENANCE i

" *Maints:..nce at Calvert Cliffs is generally well-organized and focuses

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j on nuclear safety. Results are ' achieved through structured programmes and projects co-ordinated by the Work Management comunittee. The Chesterton valve packing prograssae has been launched to reduce the leakage of valve packings and some positive results can already be observed for Unit 2.

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j roving trouble shooting crew concept will also help to improve the material

'i condition of systems.

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Some improvements are recommended in order to increase the efficiency i

of the maintenance organization, primarily in the field of work control and 1

i facilities.

Work control, system 4

Work is controlled through recently introduced daily scheduling I

1 meetings between representatives of the Maintenance Department and the

. operations Department. Specialists from supporting organizations such as QC..

or Radiation Protection attend meetings held three times per week.

j As a result, there is a good exchange of information between Maintenance and Operations. It is Operations that assigns the priorities, l

The flow ~of Maintenance orders (Mos) is controlled by the computerited Nuclear Maintenance Systems (NES) and the scheduling of the work (corrective j

maintenance and preventive maintenance) is performed by the operations and Maintenance Coordination Unit using project 2 (p2).

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The MMS presently allows a significant number of completed jobs to j

remain on the open Mos list for administrative reasons. This has an adverse l

effect on work planning, as the information related to the jobs will not yet i

1 be found in Equipment History. It is therefore recommended that the link 4

between, leading and supporting Mos be modified and that work completion be

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redefined. Consideration should also be given to speeding-up the move i

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4 towards the adoption of an automated computerited maintenance system together with an interpreted equipment database. In addition. it is suggested ' Gat information be transferred from the work control system to l

the 72'schduling system through a computerized interface, replacing the present time consuming manual system.

1 It is finally suggested that consideration be given to minimizing the ch,anges in priority of Mos at the last moment, which disrupt the orderly i

pistning and scheduling of work.

Preventive maintenance The existing preventive maintenance (FM) programme is scheduled l

manually by a dedicated planner, who pulls the corresponding PM cards and j

transfers the instruction to the different area planners who, in turn, l

transfer this information to the scheduling group. The PM planner verifies that the PM has been completed on return of the corresponding work package, f

l In fact..the PM programme is not on a database and has to be continuously i

rescheduled by hand. In addition, no sufficient feedback is sent to the 8

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system engineers. The PH programme therefore operates in isolation.and is

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never opi.inized to eliminate unneeded PMs or add others where needed. It is therefore recomusended to develop the FM prograssae as a repetitive tasks prograsune with results integrated into maintenance history, thus allowing f

further trend analysis and eventually integration in a future predictive maintenance programme.

i Equipment history 3

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j The IRLS system has been operational for the last two years and direct access to equipment history is only possible for this time period. Any i

kaforBation on MDs Performed prior to this period has to be pulled out of i

microfilm reels which are difficult to use. Therefore not all equipment history is directly accessible to the planners and erech of the information takes some ties to access. It is therefore recorsended that the existing equipment history for essential equipment be transferred to a computerized management system.

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Maintenance facilities and warehouse The maintenance facilities are generally well equipped, but are s

sometimes, for example for mechanical maintenance, too small and are scattered around the site, inside and outside the protected area, necessitating time consuming transfers of equipment. The warehouse is well organized and operated, but assin the building is too small. Also, stock and I

non-stock items are managed by different units. Consideration should

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therefor's be given to grouping all maintenance facilities and warehouses l

together in one main building ins'ide the protected area.

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5.

TECHNICAL SUPP0tT I 1

The general impression of the technical support capability and performance at Calvert Cliffs is positive. The staff interviewed and observed were well qualified, dedicated and motivated to perform high quality work. During discussions and exchanges of information, a positive attitude to safety matters was clearly identified. Although technical support in most areas is good.: some improvements are recommended, especially in the area of surveillance testing.

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j organization The Nuclear Engineering Services Department (NESD) plays a central i

role in providing technical support at Calvert Cliffs. Its main task is to support the Nuclear Operations Department (NOD) in maintaining operational safety and improving it where necessary. An important feature of the 1

technical support function is the systes engineer concert. A system engineer is responsible for a specified system or toveral specified systems including maintenance, modifications and technical review of surveillance t

test results,. He presents deviations from normal test results, procedure changes etc., to the Plant Operations and Safety Review Committee (POSRC) i j

for review and approval.

Surveillance progransne The overall surveillance test programme is mainly based on the plant j

technical specifications (Tech Specs). The tests are carried out by various sections, and test records are easily retrievable. Some trending of test results is carried out, mostly by filling in tables. Five co-ordinators

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schedule the surveillance testing in their respective areas: Operations, i

l Electrical and Controls Mechanical Maintenance. In-service Inspection and 4

Fire Protection. It is recommended that an overall co-ordinator be assigned j

to co-ordinate and advise the five surveillance co-ordinators. This overall co-ordinator should concentrate on obtaining an overview of the surveillance t

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test programme with respect to control, performance and technical results.

j The assignment should include an assessment of the effectiveness of 4

surveillance testing.

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It is also recommended that an independent technical review of the j

operations surveillance test results be carried out by the responsible system engineer, presently, this is done by the Operations surveillance I

Test Coordinator. A time limit should be established for the technical reviews by the various systen engineers. Requirements'on graphical trend l

analysis of surveillance test results should be specified and implemented.

An overview of these trends should be presented periodically to the plant Operations safety and Review Committee (p03RC).

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j In-service inspection g

.The in-service inspection programme covers more than that required by the Tech specs. The comprehensiveness of'this programac is impressive with respect to technical content and use of measur.ing equipment. The results l

from the ten-gnar reactor vessel inspection were found to be satisfactory.

Currently. the steam generator tubing shows good performaace. About 0.5% of l

the tubes are plugged, a good result taking the age of the tubes into I

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account.

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An outstanding and advanced system for ultrasonic testing was identified as a coussendable good practice. The sensitivity of this systea

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has been demonstrates to be superior to that of conventional systems.

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Reactor engineering professional performance was observed in reactor engineering. Core j

surveillance, computerized trending of core parameters, and core follow and j

reload calculations are good examples. Nowever, consideration should be j

given to having the reactor engineers contact daily both the control room and the chemistry section. The applicable forms on core fuel management 4

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parameters, including the radioactivity levels of reactor coolant, should j

also be signed off daily. This is important when a reactor such as Calvert j

cliffs is operated with fuel failures.

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Fuel handling i

The sequence sf fuel handling was reviewed 2cring a plant tour and conditions of material were observed. Some shortcomings around the spent fuel pool were noticed. To meet the cleanness standards found in other f

plants it is suggested that the floor should be cleaned up and reasonably

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thick costs of paint applied. (Calvert Cliffs repainting progresse includes 1

this itea.) The spent fuel pool and the transfer channel should also be 1

cleaned up because turbid water could have an effect on safe fuel handling.

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Fuel performance I

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During the last three years both units have suffered fuel failures.

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The failure rate has to be watched, as the trend is increasing, especially 1

for Unit 2.

Based on inspection of failed fuel rods, nine out of 13 have failed, the probable cause being fretting due,to debris. Consideration l

should therefore be given to minimizing the amount of debris by reviewing the maintenance procedures. All maintenance personnel should be made aware how important careful and clean maintenance work is. 'Some failed fuel rods are also suggested for hot cell ersaination.

Computer capabilities Computerization of various activities is rather advanced at Calvert Cliffs. But there is still potential for utilizing computers, for ermaple-in trending of plant computer signalg as well as tracking eventual degrading of components and systems.

Two commendable good practices were identified in this area These are the two computer programs for monitoring the condition of safety related rotating machines. They were found to be a sseful tool in supporting preventive mainfonance.'Both oil seaple analysis and vibrations are trended, including alara levels.

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j However, consideration should also be given to:

Utilizing more of the plant's computer potential for trending and o

condensing of plant signals. This would provide a valuable operator aid.

Flotting taportant plant parameters during transients. This would o

provide for better transient logging, useful also in operator training, and facilitate the analysis of low cycle thermal fatigue, l

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6.

TECKNICAL SUPPORT II 1

The review of operating experience feedback at Calvert Cliffs covered i

the off-line activities dealing with both the assessment of plant operational safety and the processing of operating esperience for improvement. It provided a generally positive impression of these

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activities. The operating esperience is effectively processed as a result j

of various contributing factors indicative of good plant management :

The POSRC (Plant Operations and safety Review Committee) maintains o

close control of operating experience feedback.

The introduction of the systen engineer concept in 1986 has o

increased effectiveness.

o. Highly qualified individuals process the operating experience.

i All the minimum standards of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC)

I are met.

Striving for excellence in plant availability and economy is a c"urrent policy at Calvert Cliffs. Operational safety is an integral part of these efforts in compliance with regulatory requirements but no formal documented programme for internal quantitative' assessment of operational safety' exists. To avoid any misunderstanding, the foll'owing discussion reaches beyond regulatory requirements and aims at excellence in operational safety.

Assesement of operational safety Yarious methods are used at Calvert Cliffs to assess operational safety qualitatively, but some aspects deserve further development to broaden the basis for decision making on how to enhance operational safety.

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It is reconnended that the operating organization develops and applies a comprehensive set of specific operational safety indicators.

plant safety (public safety) should be'given particular emphasis. Such a managerial tool would provide an objective means for assessing the j

operational safety status and the effectiveness of staff efforts. It would support the implementation of the Nuclear progran plan related to operational safety while being beneficial to plant availability.

i Ranking of the significance of safety related events, safety margins

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j in normal operation, inoperability of safety functions, reliability of safety functions, reliability of personnel acting in safety areas, and the j

affectiveness of surveillance activities are examples of indicators which could support the quantitative assessment of plant safety.

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Specific safety indicators i

j The reliability of the safety functions (reactor protection, emergency cooling and confinement systems) and their support functions a

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(off-site and on-site AC power systems, cooling water systems ~and associated j

instrumentation) is currently not assessed. The development of a j

reliability model is reconnended to evaluate 'the impact of the cumulative l

unavailability of safety related components and to establish overall-1 l

reliability targets. such tools would enable the operating organization to

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review and revise as necessary Tech Specs requirements on out-of-service l

timing and surveillance testing. This could eventually allow more 1

j flexibility in operations provided that the reliability targets for safety I

and support functions are met.

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Numan failure appears to be a limiting factor in Calvert Cliffs' improvement efforts. More than 36% of the safety related events resulted directly from human errors, and, if egulpment failures due to installation i

l deficiencies are addes is this figure, the banan failure contribution to safety related events rises to about 58%. Although corrective actions are

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taken on a case-by-case basis, it is recommended that human error should be addressed,as a generic issue. A comprehensive investigation should be j

carried out covering all internal and external effects which have a bearing

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on the performance of plant personnel. Baphasis should be placed on determining the root causes of these effects and corrective actions should

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be devised to eliminate the 'tegative ones or at least to minimise their consequences.

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The effectiveness of the surveillance activities at Calvert Cliffs appears to be lower than expected (33%). This figure means that 33% of the safety related events were deviations (late'nt deficiencies) detected by the 4

i surveillance testing programme and 67% were incidents'thet occurred spontaneously. since the main goal of all surveillance activities in i

nuclear power plants is to detect any latent deficiencies promptly before l

they cause an incident, it is recosumended to define a corresponding objective, for example in Calvert Cliffs' Nuclear Program Plan. The j

surveillance activities should be broadened to cover the three basic j

elements supporting operational safety; personnel reliability, equipment reliability and reliability of operator aids. In addition, i

comprehensiveness, detection thresholds, tertlag frequency and result j

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trending are recosumended to be adapted to plant specifics to make the i

surveillance activities as effective as reasonably achievable.

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operating experience feedback t

The processing of operating experience at Calvert. Cliffs is thoroughly supervised by the Plant Operations and Safety Review Comunittee (POSRC) as far as operational safety is concerned. External operating orperience is reviewed by the plant Operating Experiencs Assessment

' Committee (PCEAC) which decides on applicablity to Calvert Cliffs. It is, however, recommended to develop more guidance for personnel identifying and analysing operating experience, to provide for independence of the evaluators from on-line activities and to establish overall co-ordination under a qualified individual.

The identification of safety issues for in-depth analysis requires detailed ranking criteria based on actual and potential consequences for safety. Calvert Cliffs' Integrated corrective Action programme (ICAP) is expected to contribute to the identification of generic cafety issues. A 1

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A detailed analysis methodology for in-depth analysis should be developed, facilitating root cause identification. The " Work smarter system" could also be expanded to contribute to operational safety enhancement.

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j Root cause analysis

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Unusual analysis reports show some inconsistency in how the selected i

safety issues are analysed. Usually, the failure that is to be analysed is correctly identified. The direct cause of failure is addressed and adequate corrective actions are suggested to improve the reliability of the weak j

elements: personnel, equipment or operator aids. However, root causes are l

not always identified. Why the latent deficiency (or direct cause) which caused the failure was not detected earlier by surveillance is a question which is not systematisally pursued. This may explain the relatively low effectiveness of the surveillance activities at Calvert Cliffs.

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l This concern is reflected in the Nuclear program plan. Root cause J

l analysis is one of the three objectives in the public safety area but no j

specific guidance has been developed. In particular, clear definition of

" root cause" is needed to stimulate the relevant improvements to the 1

j surveillance activities.

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7.

RADIATION P10TECIIDW The Radiation safety section is responsible for all radiation protection matters except the sontrol of radioactive effluents, which is handled by the Chemistry Section. performance objectives are used to manage the section efficiently. Some of these objectives for the years 1966 and 1987 are: to keep the site radiation exposure (collective dose) low; to i

maintain the individual annual radiation dose of plant workers under 20 asy (2 ress); to keep the annual incidence rate of personal contamination low; to maintaa high standards of personal dosimetry; and regularly to conduct radiological evaluations of the containment buildings, the auxiliary l

buildings and other controlled areas.

i An effective approach has been adopted to apply ALARA principles. An ALARA expert was assigned to work in the Design Engineering Section and to strengthen the ALARA Croups' involvetent in planning.and designing systems, components and tools. It was also noted that the collective doses accumulated in the past several years at Calvert Cliffs are lower than at other pressurized wate,r reactors. Internal radiation exposures have never been a concern.

Organization and administration The employees of the Radiation safety section have a broad range of educational backgrounds; there is a collective knowledge in health physics, chemistry, mechanical and electrical engineering, physics and mathematics.

This facilitates comununication and co-operation between the Radiation Safety Section and other sections,' for essaple Chemistry and Design and Maintenance.

External radiation exposure Although the annual collective doses are low, there is still room to improve radiation protection at Calvert Cliffs. Many leaks In the primary system are causing airborne and surface contamination. Special efforts are recommended to reduce the number of these leaks, thereby reducing the 4

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associated contamination hazard. As a positive side-effect, these efforts would allow maintenance and repair work with no oc with less protective j

clothing and at considerable savings in time, dose and money.

1 Internal radiation exposure The sump drains from various rooms in the Auxiliary Building are j

interconnected such that airborne contamination which escapes in one room can be transferred to other rooms. Contaisination can therefore be spread f

throughout.the building. It is reconsnended to change the layout of the sump drains so that a backflow of contaminated air is avoided.

Fuel elements are reconstituted during outages; fuel pins are pulled out of elements and replaced by others. The same procedure is applied when 5

fuel pins with cladding 1'ailures are replaced. There is a possibility that sound fuel pins are damaged during this work. It could cause a. release of noble gases and iodine-131 and lead to avoidable thyroia doses. It,is

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therefore recommended that the air from the water surface above the fuel j

assembly worked on be withdrawn by a mobile ventilation unit connec.ed to l

the fuel pool ventilation system.

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Instrumentation, equipment and facilities All necessary equipment, including radiation monitoring instruments.

l instrument calibration devices, protective equipment and facilities for radwaste processing, are available to carry out the day-to-day radiation protection work. The procedure to change alars setpoints of area radiation monitors is complicated and takes time. If alarms are lit for a long time with no significance, the reactions of personnel to new alarms may decline.

Whenever a higher radiation level setpoint in a room is justified, it is recommended to change the alarm setpoint promptly (within a day).

personnel dosimetry All necessary instruments are available to provide good dostmetric services. Calvert Cliffs participates in the Nuclear Employee Data System l

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a to obtain relevant information (complete dose records, training lessons.

medical data, security clearance) of contractor personnel in a reasonable time. This system allows on-line access to current records of contractor l

Personnel. The Desimetry Service has received the National Voluntary Laboratory Accreditation for all relevant radiation categories. This

.f accrediation is renewed every year.

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Radioactive wastes and' effluent controls i

tadioactive waste processing at Calvert Cliffs was' found to be

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satisfactory. Iodine discharges through the stacks are monitored using a j

charcoal cartridge which is counted once a week. There is no provision to detect unexpected iodine discharges promptly without delay. The i

installation of a continuous iodine monitor is therefore recommended in addition to the existing measuring device now in place. It would allow the l

interruption of unexpected discharges due to system failures or human errors j

in a timely manner and avoid violation of discharge limits.

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CHEMISTRY

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j The overall impression of the Chemistry Section at Calvert Cliffs is one of professionalism with auch experience in all chemistry and i

radiochemistry operations. This section performs all chemistry and radiochemistry work related to domineralized water production, raw water analysis, main coolant analysis, steam generator analysis, and chemical and radiochemical measurements on liquid and gaseous effluents discharged to the 1

i environment. All work related to the chemistry of the main coolant and j

effluents is carried out under'close control by the Nac, which has established specifications and reporting requirements.

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co-operation among chemistry personnel is good, and continuous contacts are maintained with the Operations Section. The, Chemisi;ry section J

is asinly concerned with optimizing operations to achieve long-term integrity of the plant systems. Accomplishment of these goals would be l

facilitated by some increase in staffing.

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Organization and administration t

1 Generally, the Chemistry Section is well managed, competent, 1

understands its responsibilities and obligations and performs its work correctly. Interaction with other sections is co-operative. In addition to three units, six positions report directly to the General supervisor.

Chemistry, which askes it difficult for him to manage the chemistry programme effectively. In case of absence, his functions are delegated to different individuals, who any not always be aware of the section's day-to-day problems. In order t,o make the function of the General Supervisor Chemistry more effective, consideration should be given to creating the new position of Assistant General Supervisor Chemistry, to whom the three units would report and who would be a petsanent deputy to the General Supervisor. Moreover, the better to investigate abnormal or unusual chemical events, consideration should be given to filling the recent vacancy for a senior chemist, while retaining the present position of engineer.

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Chemical analyses The installed automatic analysers are used to obtain accurate measurements, providing an excellent overview of the main chemical parameters.

The results are processed by a computer which allows the analytical data to be reviewed easily. The quality of the analytical procedures is excellent; considerable detail is given in these procedures which enable less experienced technicians to carry out all analyses reliably. Possible chemical interferences with the analyses are identified in the procedures to assist thh technicians in recognizing abnormalities.

The Chemistry Section has voluntarily acopted periodic intercomparison prograanaes not required by any regulations.

Currently, i

intercomparisons are made with Duke power. Texas Utilities and BG&E's fossil i

chemistry laboratory as well as by means of blind samples prepared within f

the sect' ion.'The progransse covers all major analyses and technicians.

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Reports and records i

4 All results of the analyses are adequately recorded and reported.

An official computerized record of the daily results of the chemical analyses 1

is maintained, and a semi-annual effluents report is submitted to the Ntc.

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Detailed evaluations are performed whenever a chemistry parameter exceeds the action level specified in the chemistry procedures. However, consideration should also be given to making routine evaluations and reports whenever 'a chemical parameter deviates from its normal value or an unusual j

event occurs, for example major condenser in-leakage, air in-leakage, a j

radioactivity spike'in the primary coolant, a steam generator leakage or any i

i other relevant transient.

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Laboratories, equipment and instruments 1

1 Facilities in the Chemistry section include a cold laboratory, a hot laboratory, a counting room and a water treatment laboratory. It was noted that the water treatment laboratory is rather small. In addition, the air j

flow in the ventilation system for the hot lab and the counting roca was 4

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found to be reversed. It is recommended that the configuration of the ventilation system for the hot lab and the counting room be modified to allow air to flow from the counting room to the hot lab. Consideration should also be given to enlarging the water treatment laboratory and improving the environmental conditions, since the current space is not adequate to perform the required chemical analyses reliably.

8 Instruments and facilities are reliable and safe; however, a few instruments are more than ten years old and require frequent maintenance.

4 Consideration should be given to replacing these instruments with modern equipment.

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EMERCENCY PLANNING AND PREPAREDNESS Emergency planning and preparedness at Calvert Cliffs was reviewed

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taking into consideration the guidance given by IAEA Safety Series reports.

The overall arrangements by BC&E and by the public authorities are considered adequate to enable a good response to an emergency. BC&E's emergency planning and co-operation with local organizations were'found to l

be of very high standards.

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Cood practices were observed in the area of training, drills and exercises. Emergency planning and maintenance of emergency preparedness at Calvert Cliffs are well organized and conducted in a very systematic manner.

Sc'ae improvements are recommended concerning the on-line transmission of plant safety parameters from the Control Room to the Technical Support Centre (TSC), the Operational Support. Contre (OSC), the Emergency Operations

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Facility (EOF) and the Media Centre. The TSC needs some modifications to

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improve working conditions. The redundancy of the stack radiation

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4 monitoring system should also be considered.

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Emergency plans 4

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The Calvert Cliffs energency plan consists of the Emergency Response j

Plan and the Emergency Response Plan Implementation Procedures. These

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procedures are well structured, detailed documents that are up to date. For

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practical purposes, there are function specific manuals containing relevant Implementation Procedures. The layout of the Implementation Procedurep is i

very logical, indicating the invididual responsible, conditions when j

i applicable and necessary actions. The scope of the procedures is adequate.

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The emergency plans for the State of Maryland and Calvert. Dorchester and'St. Mary's Counties provide for adequatt protection of the general

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public.

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l The Ntc and the Feder'al Bnergency Management Agency (FEMA) have j

provided the basis for state local and utility emergency response plans.

The responsibilities of the emergency organizations are clearly defined and the overall emergency easponse is well co-ordinated.

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Emergency preparedness organization 1

Emergency planning and preparedness is co-ordinated by the Emergency j

Planning Unit which reports to the Nuclear Operations Department. The Energency Planning Unit oversees facilities and equipment, tests j

communications, upgrades procedures, schedules drills and esercises, conducts training and follows upgrades resulting from drill and exercise critiques.

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The staff consists of a supervisor and a complement of five personnel. The Emergency Planning Unit has a very good scheduling system for its* activities. The programune is described in and controlled by j

standard operating procedures. It includes monthly, guarterly and yearly activity schedules and a computer based followup system. Noteworthy is the excellent co-ordination between on-site and of'f-site organizations and the designation af a coordinator in the Emergency planning Unit to act as the liaison.

Emergency and recovery organizations are adequate to perform their functions.

Emergency response SG&E's emergency response organization can be notified and recalled by,a radio frequency pager system. Only five calls are needed to alert the entire SG&E organization.

A detallad procedure for immediate actions is available for the control room personnel. Four energency categories are identified according to the particular conditions. Each category is associated with protective action levels that determine appropriate response.

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i 33 Dose estimates at the site boundary which are needed for

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i categorization of emergency conditions can be obtained by means of a i

computer program. The program has limitations, however, as it is mainly i

tailored to 1OCA conditions and monitored releases.

General emergency procedures and recommended protective actions are i

very clear. Different methods for core damage assessment are available and f

on-site evacuation criteria are provided. Emergency work permit procedures include the A1. ARA philosophy for life saying alssions and plant saving missions and for post-accident sampling. The fire-fishi.ing procedures are i

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good sad are based on special fire risk analyses.

The methods and the capability of plant staff to respond to emergsney

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situations are adequate.

Facilities, equipment and resources plant status data are manually transmitted from control Room to fsc.

OSC EOF and Media Center. "This method is based on telecopiers and telephones. It is time consuming and laborious. f.wsideration should be given to using the safety parameter Display system (SPDS) for transmission of plant st'atus data.

9 The TSC is at tne disposal of the control room personnel under normal' operating conditions but can be changed quickly to serve its pr'imary purpose under ensegency conditions. Working conditions and equipment, however, are judged to be poor, but renovation of the TSC.is in progress. The equipment will be upgraded to provide an improved, functional room. Special telephone boxes will M instal' led to minimize disturbance by telephone calls.

Consideration should be given to equipping all telephones, etcept the Ntc telephone, with a flashing light for incoming calls to reduce the noise level further.

The 20F is of the highest standard and provides high quality assistance to protect public health and safety.

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j The wide range monitoring system in the main stack any lose its operability under certain emergency conditions. Consideration should be given to providing sufficient redundancy in monitoring systems for radioactive releases to enable measurement of all possible radioactive f

releases to the surroundings.

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Training, drills and exercises The training of the emergency organization and the recovery organizatics (about 370 persons) is sistematica11y pisaned and followed. The attitude to training is very good.

Drills are conducted in February, June and september and an exercise in November. Medical drills are conducted yearly. Integrated esercises involving the participation of on-site and off-site (state and county) response organizations are conducted every other year. There is,a four-part videotape serie's recorded during an earlier exercise. This series gives an excellent description of emergency arrangements and can be used for training purposes.

Good co-operation exists between BG&E and other utilities as regards emergency planning and information exchange. Esperience and new ideas from other organizations have been used to improve the educational content of exercises. Accident scenarios are calculated with computer programs such as KAAP and CRAC. This gives.a realistic basis for the exercises.

Liaison with the public and the media A booklet "What to Do in a Nuclear Power Plant Raergency..'.for People within a 10-mile Radius of the Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant at Lusby, Maryland (1986-1987)" 1s distributed yearly. Also the inside rear

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cover of telephone directories within a ten-mile radius of the Calvert Cliffs plant contains important emergency response information. The Media contre provides news with background material on the company and the power plant.

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A presentation is given yearly by 3G&E's representatives to the Board 1

of County Commissioners in each plume zone county. BC&E gives required j

training to the Calvert Memorial Hospital personnel and off-site fire i

brigades and to other off-site organizations in Calvert, Dorchester and St.

Mary's counties.

1 Esintaining emergency preparedness i

I Necessary modifications resulting from feedback of training, drills f

and exercises are introduced consistently with overall planning requirements. There is a special "energency planning problem Cause Removal j

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Form".

This enables people to draw attention to existing problems. These are documented in a computer based open items list. The emergency

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organisation's telephone numbers are checked quarterly. A pager recall test I

and a review of training records are performed once a month, i

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Upper management b'riefings on emergency planning and preparedness are held three times a year. A quality assurance audit is conducted once a year and a review by the NRC is performed at least once a year..The period for i

reviews by the Institute of, Nuclear power Operations (IWp0) is 12 to 18 l

months.

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ACENOWLEDGEMENTS 2

j The US government, the Nuclear Regulatory Commi'ssion, the state of Maryland, Calvert, Dorchester and St. Mary's Counties Baltimore Gas &

Electric and its Calvert Cliffs nuclear power plant provided valuable j

support to the Calvert Cliffs 05 ART.

The traditionally close co-operation of the United States of America with the IAEA in all nuclear safety i

activities, particularly the contribution to the 08 ART programme through the 1

provision of a large number of qualified experts to earlier missions, had

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already established many personnal contacts and a coenmon basis for continuing work. In accordance with the discussions at a preparatory l

meeting, well selected and prepared informstion was made available in advance to familiarize the CSART members with their assignments. Throughout the whole mission, Calvert Cliffs counterparts b ro open minded, co-operative and helpful in locating persons and information. They were instrumental in establishing a highly effective working relationship with the 0$ ART members. It extended occasionally beyond working hours and will not be terminated with the. submission of the. report. The efforts of thD public relations group, the work of the liaison officers and the secretarial support were outstanding. The Calvert Cliffs OSART wishes to espress its gratitude to all concerned for the prior efforts and for the excellent working conditions during the Calvert Cliffs review.

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ANNEX It COMPOSITION OF THE CALVERT CLIFFS TEAM EIDerts BENER, Jean-Paul - FRANCE Electricits de France Thermal Generation Department - Operational Technical Unit 24 years of nuclear experience Review area: Maintenance j

BLISELIUS, Per-Ake - IAEA Division of Nuclear safety 26 years of nuclear experience

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Review area: Techical support I FRANZEN, Ferdinand L. - IAEA 4

j Division of Nuclear Safety 31 years of nuclear experience Team Leader JACQ~ JET, toger - BELGIUM Centesle Nucidaire de Tihange Tihange Unit 3 18 years of nuclear experi,ence Review area: Operations I JESCHKI, Wolfgang - SWITZEELAND Hauptabteilung fur die Sicherheit der Earnanlagen Division of Radiation Protection 23 years of nuclear experience Review area: Radiation Protection LALONDE, Ray - CANADA Ontario Hydro Darlington Nuclear Generating Station 17 years of nuclear experience Review area: Management Organization and Administration OSIMANI, Celso - ITALY Ente Nazionale per Energia Elettrica Trino Nuclear Power Station 14 years of nuclear experience Review area: Chemistry PALABRICA, Ricardo - IAEA Division of Nuclear safety 19 years of nuclear experience Review area: Training and Qualification PII170 Antti - FINLAND Teollisuuden voima Oy Olkiluoto Nuclear Power Plant 13 years of nuclear experience Review area: toergency Planning and Preparedness e

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6 ANNEZ I:

(Continued) i SCARZ, coorg - FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF CERMANY 4

Gemeinschaftskernkraftwerk Grohnde GmbH Operatfons Department 13 yests of nuclear experience 4

Review area: Operations II THOMAS, Bernard - IAEA Divisich of Nuclear Safety 19 years of nuclear experience Review area: Technical Support II Scientific Visitors (observers) i SAJER, Vladimir - CZECHOSLOVAKIA Ceskoslovenska komise pro atonnove energie j

Nuclear Inspectorate a

10 years of nuclear experience Training area: Maintenance 1

J KAC30, Andras - NUNCARY i

Magyar Villancs MUvek Tr5sst

' Production Department 16 years of nuclear esperience Training area: Management Organization and Administration-

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KANC. Ho-Weon - REPUBLIC 0F K0 TEA Korea Electric Power Co.

l Ko-ti Nuclear Power Plant j

13' years of nuclear experience Training area: Operations 4

STEFANOV, Georgy - BULGARIA Kosloduy Nuclear Power Station 17 years of nuclear experience l

Training area: Management, Organization and Administration 1

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ANNEZ II:

SCHEDULE OF ACTIVITIES

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1.

Preparatory meeting with Saltimore Oas 20 April 1987

& Electric on mission arrangements 2.

Offical request of the Sesident 6 May 1987 Representative of the United states of

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America to the IAEA inviting an OSART j

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IAEA confirmation of the 08 ART mission 27 May 1987 4

Recruitment of external experts May - June 1987 5.

Operational safety Review of the 10 - 28 August 1987 calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant 6.

Submission of sumanary report October 19878 August 1 l

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